Hope for people or hope for cities? : HOPE VI at Liberty Green.

Jelisa Clark
University of Louisville

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HOPE FOR PEOPLE OR HOPE FOR CITIES? HOPE VI AT LIBERTY GREEN

By
Jelisa Clark
B.B.A., University of Kentucky, 2010

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of the
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University of Louisville
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HOPE FOR PEOPLE OR HOPE FOR CITIES? HOPE VI AT LIBERTY GREEN

By
Jelisa Clark
B.B.A., University of Kentucky, 2010

A Thesis Approved on
August 30, 2013

By the following Thesis Committee

__________________________________
Cynthia Negrey, Thesis Director

__________________________________
Lauren Heberele

__________________________________
David Imbroscio
This study investigates how well the goals of local officials align with the stated goals of HOPE VI in the case of the Liberty Green development in Louisville, KY. Research revealed that there it is not necessarily the goals of decision makers that are in conflict, but the stated goals of HOPE VI themselves stand in conflict with one another. Two major components of HOPE VI are in constant tension—the impact on residents and neighborhood development goals. Evidence from this study suggests that most of the emphasis for the Liberty Green HOPE VI development revolves around neighborhood and community development goals. And self-sufficiency, while a goal of the HOPE VI program, remains secondary.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

We have been preoccupied with the geography rather than the existence of poverty primarily because the central cities remain, in fact, the functional hearts of all metropolitan areas, the home base of America's media and opinion elite. Because the social problems of the metropolitan poor are concentrated in every urban region's core, they are highly visible to the leaders and visitors of metropolitan America, and they are disruptive of its image, enjoyment, and perhaps even its economic life (Salins 1993: 92).

Urban poverty has demanded substantial attention and widespread debate over the years. Salins (1993) offers that urban poverty has received so much attention because all US metropolitan areas house a larger number of poor who not only contend with poverty but also suffer from many attendant social problems, social problems that mar the ideal image of the city. During the 1980s urban poverty garnered more attention than ever before. Between 1980 and 1990 the number of people living in high poverty metropolitan areas increased 52%. There were big concerns about this drastic increase in poverty. This economic downturn was characterized by a decline in manufacturing and growth within the service sector. The work of William Julius Wilson suggested that the limited economic opportunities in high poverty areas translated into high rates of unemployment and increased crime. Furthermore, there was evidence to support this thesis. Between 1979 and 1989 violent crime increased 33% (Katz 2009).

Because of the high concentration of poor living in public housing, these issues of poverty became a salient issue for the department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). In the face of these social problems associated with concentrated poverty HUD
underwent an ideological change wherein the goal of public housing was expanded to include the notion that public housing should generate a broader community and eliminate poverty (Katz 2009). The Hope VI program originated as a part of Urban Revitalization Demonstration (URD) under Jack Kemp in the 1990s and since then HOPE VI has been the largest avenue for the demolition of public housing.

In 1989 congress established the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing. The commission investigated the state of public housing over an 18-month period. Its final report concluded that 86,000 of the 1.3 million public housing units were severely distressed. The commission proposed the National Action Plan, which called for increased funding for support services, the development of mixed income communities, and an increase of funding of $7.5 million for the rehabilitation and replacement of public housing units (Katz 2009). HOPE VI provided funding for demolition to public housing authorities (PHAs) that could demonstrate that a housing project was severely distressed (Goetz 2011b). The definition of severe distress is ambiguous; it can be everything from low incomes, high crime, high vacancy, or physical deterioration (Goetz 2011b; Harvard Law Review 2003). As of 2002 HOPE VI had allocated $5.3 billion to 193 HOPE VI sites across the country (Curley 2005). However the program has been far from a raging success.

HOPE VI has been criticized of heavily relying on design principles and other scholars have questioned the motives for the focus on physical design. According to Jeff Crump (2002), urban politicians and public officials favor deconcentration because demolition allows for reimagining of city as a safe zone of commerce by erasing the stigmatized structures of public housing (p.582). Brown-Saracino and Rumpf (2011) add,
“media imagery underlining ‘blight’ partially enables revitalization” because the imagery neutralizes public protest of the social cost accompanying the changes (p.291).

Furthermore demolition opens up land to bring middle and upper class families back to the city (Crump 2002: 582).

In reimagining the city HUD subscribed to New Urbanism designs in an effort to entice middle and upper income families back to the city. New Urbanism promotes walkability and smaller scale buildings opposed the superblocks and high rise towers that characterized some of the most dangerous housing projects in the U.S (Calthrope 2009). In order to pursue this design movement congress lifted the one-for-one rule, which required one unit to be built for everyone that was torn down, in 1995 (Cisneros 2009; Duryea 2006). Demolition and New Urbanism erased the blight that had come to be associated with so many inner cities. By making the city appealing the potential buyers, New Urbanism, also aided in recruiting investors from the private market.

HOPE VI emphasizes leveraging private capital. The degree to which a HOPE VI proposal will leverage private investment is actually a scored component on the application (Cunningham 2001; Harvard Law Review 2003) and applications that leveraged a higher ratio of private funds were rated higher (Duryea 2006:577; Harvard Law Review 2003). Hanlon (2010) says that mixed financing objectives have significant social and economic cost. There is a large amount of competition for limited amount of funds and HOPE VI developments tend to take away funds from other housing projects that don’t receive a grant but are in need of renovations because of contributions that local housing authorities have to make to the capital fund budget (Hanlon 2010). Furthermore, the demolition of public housing contributes to long waiting lists for public
housing subsidies. Lastly, one must also consider that profit motivation is a large part of what draws private capital.

The above critiques are actually matters of gentrification. In cities where the market pressure for gentrification has been the most intense demolition of public housing has been the most aggressive (Goetz 2011a). In 1998 the Government Office of Accounting (GOA) acknowledged that, “as the HOPE VI program has evolved, its focus has shifted from revitalizing the most severely distressed public housing sites to transforming distressed sites with the capacity to leverage outside resources into mixed-income communities” (as qtd. Harvard Law Review 2003: 1484). In light of this, public-private partnerships have the potential to devastate relatively stable housing projects and displace former residents in second rate housing (Cunningham 2001). Several analysts have argued that the level of distress has actually played a small role in the allocation of HOPE VI funds, instead areas that were able to attract private investment have been given preference (Duryea 2006; Goetz 2011a; Harvard Law Review; Keene and Geronimus 2011), and according to Goetz (2011) in the early 1990s pressures of gentrification were actually a leading predictor of demolition across the nation.

The demolition of public housing warrants particular consideration because of its disruptive impact on the lives of the poor. Because of the focus on physical design, the prime location of housing projects, and the preference given to developments that can achieve spillover effects one is left to wonder if HOPE VI is a vehicle for gentrification. The motives of the major players involved in a HOPE VI development may be different or even contradictory from the officially stated goals of HOPE VI. This goal conflict may impede the effectiveness of the program. In this paper I investigate how well the
goals of local officials align with the stated goals of HOPE VI in the case of the Liberty Green development in Louisville, KY. To date few studies have investigated whether gentrification is a goal of HOPE VI. Furthermore, there are few case studies on Liberty Green. Because of Liberty Green’s location in downtown Louisville and the rapid growth occurring in surrounding neighborhoods it is an ideal development to investigate for evidence of gentrification by examining the motives of local officials involved in the development. This study extends the literature on HOPE VI to include a more robust treatment of gentrification and the role of cities in HOPE VI developments.

In the remainder of this thesis I summarize the key theoretical frameworks and research related to the demolition of public housing and the history of HOPE VI (Chapter 2). Chapter 3 entails a full description of the employed a case study which included interviews with local stakeholders and government officials, a selection of quantitative data drawn from the US Census, Louisville Metro Police, and the Louisville Revenue Commission. Chapter 4 is the analysis of the data. Finally in Chapter 5, I discuss my findings and present my conclusion.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Since its inception public housing has undergone several reinventions. Early housing projects first appeared during the Great Depression. They were part of the New Deal public works; they generated construction jobs, which helped combat unemployment (Curly 2005; Goetz 2011b, Vale and Freemark 2012). They were envisioned as a temporary solution for the working class (Wilson 2008). Ecological theory, the dominant paradigm of the time, viewed poor urban neighborhoods as transitional and functional for the larger metropolis. As we know today many neighborhoods of extreme poverty are not temporary, and research has shown that people rarely change social class during their lifetime (Wilson [1987] 2012). Human ecology was inadequate for explaining persistent poverty. Around the 1960s the human ecological perspective fell out of popularity. It was denounced for ignoring factors other than market forces that can shape the movement of groups and land use (Curley 2005).

In the 1960s under the Johnson Administration anti-poverty policy shifted from the New Deal strategy of physical investment to a War on Poverty approach, which emphasized welfare, transfer payments, job creation, economic opportunity, neighborhood planning, and empowerment (Heathcott 2012). During the New Deal era, families receiving welfare were excluded, but by the 1960s there was pressure to reserve public housing for the neediest families (Goetz 2011b, Vale and Freemark 2012).
The change in the public housing population was accompanied by a decrease in political support and disinvestment; the initiative became politically marginalized and underfunded (Goetz 2011b). New Deal designs that emphasized solidarity, universalism, and community were abandoned due to budgetary concerns (Goetz 2011b). Instead modernist designs were employed, and later became one of the most criticized aspects of public housing. Modernist designs promoted mass production and segregation of use; they also reflected a love for the automobile. Many of the public housing projects were towers that were built on super blocks. This limited walkability, which is critical to healthy communities (Calthrope 2009). Furthermore public housing was constructed in remote locations and isolated from the rest of the community by natural barriers (Katz 2009; Baron 2009). The isolation as a result of the modernist designs was believed to foster a dysfunctional culture. Overall it’s believed that the modernist designs impeded diversity, human scale, connections, and identity (Calthrope 2009: 52). New Urbanism had an answer for all of those problems.

New Urbanism resuscitates the traditional city by bringing back walkability, mixed incomes, and mixed use areas. It is widely accepted that the changes resulting from New Urbanism will rectify many of the pathologies associated with housing projects. Janet Smith (1999), however, cautioned against this overreliance on physical design. She stated that HOPE VI places too much emphasis on esthetic principles. She was doubtful about a community built by physical design (Smith 1999). Additionally James Hanlon (2010) stated that Park DuValle in Louisville, KY, which is often referenced as a success story for HOPE VI (Calthrope 2001, Clancy and Quifley 2001,
Engdahl 2009b, Raffel et al. 2003, Turbov and Piper 2005), is symptomatic of an overemphasis on planning and design. 

The time during which New Urbanism was growing in popularity was also characterized by suburban expansion. Inner city populations dwindled as individuals moved to the suburbs. This deteriorated the tax base and left behind a disproportionately poor and minority population that was vulnerable to crime (Heathcott 2012). By the 1970s the expansion of public housing stock ended. The level of disinvestment reached a high and by the 1990s much of public housing was uninhabitable. In dealing with social problems plaguing public housing, many public housing authorities effected de-facto demolition. Properties were allowed to decline, units were left vacant, and modernization and improvement funds went unspent (Goetz 2012). The poor living conditions all made the units uninhabitable, and PHAs were then able to successfully apply for demolition. The disinvestment of the inner city was aided through red lining practices, which excluded certain neighborhoods from receiving FHA loans, and federal transportation and highway policies allowed freeways to be built through the heart of many cities, walling off poor neighborhoods from central city business districts (Wilson 2008).

Prior to the 1960s inner city neighborhoods had been described as exhibiting features of social organization, including a sense of community, positive neighborhood identification, and explicit norms and sanctions against deviant behavior (Wilson [1987] 2012), but by the 1980s cities were firmly associated with crime and violence. The negative image of public housing complemented the war on drugs, and there was
renewed interest in understanding poverty and the poor. Urban poverty became framed as an issue of concentrated poverty (Goetz 2012).

According to Goetz (2012) there have been two means of addressing concentrated poverty: the development of mixed income communities through programs such as HOPE VI, and mobility programs such as Gautreaux and Moving to Opportunity. These approaches have been strongly influenced by the theory of neighborhood effects.

**Neighborhood Effects**

William Julius Wilson ([1987] 2012) published his seminal book, *The Truly Disadvantaged*, in the 1980s and spurred the beginning of a new paradigm in urban poverty studies. Wilson’s ([1987] 2012) theory focuses on the social changes in the city. He offered several interrelated explanations for the increase in social dislocations among the underclass including shifts in the economy, historic flow of immigrants, changes in urban minority age structure, population changes in the central city, and class transformation in the inner city, all of which have increased black joblessness and in turn exacerbated other problems in the inner city.

The change in class structure in the city was significant for Wilson ([1987] 2012). During the 1960s there was vertical integration of different classes—the lower, working, and middle classes typically lived in the same neighborhoods and sent their kids to the same schools (Wilson [1987] 2012). Wilson ([1987] 2012) used the phrase “social isolation” to illustrate the environment in which interaction between groups of different classes or racial backgrounds is absent. Wilson noted that black middle class families no longer live in ghetto neighborhoods and therefore are unavailable to provide stability and

The change in social class structure is also the aspect of Wilson’s theory that is most salient for policy makers. The logic behind HOPE VI is that mixed income neighborhoods will help alleviate the problems of concentrated poverty. However, for Wilson ([1987] 2012) the increase in joblessness was the most devastating effect in the most highly concentrated areas of poverty. The presence of the middle class may have mitigated or retarded the effects of concentrated poverty, but bringing the middle class back to these neighborhoods would do very little to help established effects of concentrated poverty. These changes that took place in the inner city highlight the fact that culture is a response to social structural constraints and opportunities (Wilson [1987] 2012). Wilson stated that from a policy perspective this means “shifting focus from changing subcultural traits to changing structure of constraints and opportunities” (Wilson [1987] 2012:61).

The middle and working class provided a social buffer against the full impact of joblessness. Other institutions (churches, socials, recreational facilities) would remain viable if they were supported by stable and secure families (Wilson [1987] 2012). Without the middle and working class families the prolonged joblessness that existed in the 1970s and early 1980s created a ripple effect resulting in an exponential increase in related forms of social dislocation. The effects of joblessness would have played out in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty; they were simply exacerbated without the middle and working class. Therefore bringing middle-income families back to inner city neighborhoods did little to ameliorate the problem associated with concentrated poverty.
Wilson’s work spurred many studies focused on neighborhood effects, which have in turn influenced HOPE VI. There are six ways that neighborhoods impact residents: differential quality of services available to people in different neighborhoods (ie., public schools, childcare, medical care), socialization of young people, peer influence, social networks, exposure to crime and violence, physical distance from employment and educational opportunities (Goetz 2003). Researchers using this framework have examined the relationship between neighborhood effects, unemployment, school dropouts, crime, and teen pregnancy. Curley (2005) identified several studies that suggest that neighborhoods affect childhood development, adolescent achievement, delinquency, and parenting practices.

This perspective assumes that greater economic diversity in a neighborhood will be beneficial for all parties including the poor. There is evidence that high school graduation rates, child cognitive development, and rates of teenage child bearing can be sensitive to neighborhood effects (Goetz 2003). Young (2003) cites the work of Mignon Moore which found that the presence of socially cohesive, stable adults offers a buffer against teen pregnancy. Furthermore, living in areas of concentrated poverty can have adverse effects on life experiences such as isolating youth from employment opportunities, having inferior education, and exposure to dangerous neighborhoods and harmful environment conditions (Goetz 2003).

Also from this perspective is the notion of collective socialization, which suggests that neighborhoods indirectly affect children by influencing parenting practices and offering successful adult role models and supervision (Curley 2005: 103). This hypothesis, which has been referred to as the role model hypothesis in several studies,
assumes that residents of high poverty neighborhoods are isolated to the point that they have no means of obtaining social leverage, that is information about jobs, resources, and other means of social mobility (Curly 2009, Tach 2009). Curley (2005) cites one study which found that fewer productive role models leads to lower expectations a child has of him or herself and another study which found that IQ scores were positively correlated with the presence of a wealthy neighborhood.

The role model hypothesis has several flaws. Firstly it assumes that residents of housing projects have a culture that runs counter to mainstream culture. This line of thinking emerged from the influence of William Julius Wilson. According to Wilson concentrated poverty led to a development of an underclass that was marginalized from mainstream society. As a result of this isolation members of the underclass developed an adaptive set of behavior norms (Goetz 2000).

Other researchers have shown that the concentration of poverty has adverse effects on a variety of life experiences such as: teenage pregnancy rates, dropout rates, achievement in school, isolation from employment opportunities for youth, education quality, and exposure to toxic waste and criminal behavior (Goetz 2000:159). In spite of all this of dysfunction in high poverty neighborhoods, Tach (2009) disproves the assumption that the culture of housing projects is antithetical to mainstream culture. Most residents of housing projects have the same values as Middle America. They want their children to attend college, get married, stay out of trouble, and work a steady job (Tach 2009:271).
Furthermore, the role model hypothesis assumes that physical proximity to the middle class will yield beneficial results for lower income residents. In her warning against a reliance on physical solutions, Smith (1999) notes that proximity does not guarantee social contact, let alone social cohesion. Tach (2009) found that sharing the same space led to no more than a modest amount of social mixing and interaction between income groups. In a case study of a Boston housing project, newcomers, or the residents that moved to development after its rehabilitation, had fewer socialized social ties. Tach (2009) suspects that newcomers distrust their neighbors, and because of this distrust newcomers continue to rely on their family and friends outside their neighborhood for social connections. Similarly a study of Chicago’s Lake Parc Place indicated that while moderate-income families help create safer environments they are not necessarily serving as role models (Smith 1998). Poor residents may actually resent an influx on middle-income newcomers who drive up property values and rent.

Furthermore Crump (2002) cites research that indicates low-income people may be more circumscribed in the spatial movement, but they are still able to move through space and venture beyond their neighborhoods.

Social capital is another popular explanation for neighborhood effects (Osterling 2007). Social capital is the connections among individuals including social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness (Curley 2009). There are two types of social capital: social support, which helps people get by, and social leverage, which provides leverage (Curley 2009, Putnam 2000).

In studies of social capital there is evidence that low-income people tend to have limited social networks. In cases where they have social capital it is insular and localized,
in other words there is no means for social leverage (Curley 2009; Goetz 2003). In spite of this characterization of the social networks of low-income individuals these networks are more tightly knit and characterized by higher frequencies of intense contact. Manzo et al. (2008) found that 21% of housing project residents reported watching each other’s children regularly, 38% gave or received rides from neighbors or helped with errands, 33% borrowed or loaned small items or shared food, 46% stated that they watched out for their neighbors, and 53% believed that they could rely on others in case of an emergency.

In many cases the distinction between the two types of social capital are glossed over. When residents are forced to move from their neighborhoods they lose some social capital that they had built with their neighbors. Furthermore HOPE VI ignores residential preferences of relocatees. Pfeiffer (2012) finds that Blacks prefer integrated communities but they also prefer places with more than just a token proportion of Blacks. Some of the neighborhoods that would be the most beneficial in improving the well-being of a low-income individual may only have a token proportion of blacks. Carla O’Conner (2003) argues that urban researchers have focused on social capital in terms of network structure and composition instead of examining the conditions necessary to promote the transmission of information about resources.

Galster and Booza (2007) demonstrate that programs intended to increase social capital or social leverage through the creation of mixed income neighborhoods resulted in diminished social support. Theorists assumed that social contact would yield social capital, but this has not always been the case. In bipolar neighborhoods, which are characterized by extreme bimodal income distributions, the benefits of contact would not manifest because racial stereotypes would still mar interactions (Galster and Booza 2007).
Ultimately low-income residents do not gain social leverage, but end up losing access to things like informal childcare. Osterling (2007) offers that community attributes such as economic capital, political power, and neighborhood resources all enhance social capital. Therefore a poor community with a strong social network that lacks political power will not have as much social capital.

Today there is consensus that neighborhood effects are less important than originally conceived. Furthermore the pathologies associated with concentrated poverty do not increase incrementally with each percentage increase in poverty (Stal and Zuberi 2010). Stal and Zuberi (2010) also criticized the neighborhood effect model as being unidirectional. In other words it assumes that social dislocations, such as crime, are encouraged by simply living near others engaging in criminal behavior, but as we know crime is a structural problem which is caused by several factors such as labor trends, family upbringing, and peer pressure.

Relatedly McClure (2008) stated there is a threshold for neighborhood effects. When fewer than 15 to 20% of people live below poverty it appears that problems associated with poverty may not have a significant negative effect on neighborhood conditions, but above this threshold increased poverty poses a problem. McClure (2008) also stated that there is another threshold at 30-40% poverty. Above this level the negative effects of concentrated poverty may have taken their toll and a greater concentration may not have any additional effects.

Overall the component of deconcentrating the poor is colored by flawed assumptions and turbulent social conditions. Policies developed beginning in the 1980s
were based on research cited above that argued that deconcentrating poverty and promoting mixed income communities would alleviate the issues surrounding the moral panic associated with drugs in the mid-1980s and all of the other pathologies that were associated with the poor. It is important to examine the results of these policies. Has deconcentration really occurred? Are there any other consequences? What impacts has deconcentration had on the lives of housing project residents?

**Deconcentrating Poverty**

The theory of neighborhood effects has influenced public housing policy. As mentioned earlier the federal government has dealt with the problems of concentrated poverty using two interconnected practices: developing mixed income communities and deconcentrating poverty. HOPE VI has facilitated both of those strategies. Under HOPE VI, municipalities transformed many former public housing sites into mixed income developments and relocated many residents using strategies intended to deconcentrate poverty. In addition to HOPE VI projects, municipal efforts to deconcentrate poverty include shifting from project-based housing to tenant-based housing. Programs operating under this tenet include Section 8, litigation-based measures such as Gautreuax, and Moving to Opportunity.

Today HUD.gov (2012) outlines the key components to transforming public housing as:

- “Changing the physical shape of public housing
- Lessening concentrations of poverty by placing public housing in non-poverty neighborhoods and promoting mixed-income communities
• Establishing positive incentives for resident self-sufficiency and comprehensive services that empower residents

• Forging partnerships with other agencies, local governments, nonprofit organizations, and private businesses to leverage support and resources”

HOPE VI along with other housing initiatives all work toward these goals. Under Section 202 of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescission and Appropriations act, which was passed by Congress in 1996, PHAs were required to assess the viability of their housing stock. If the costs of rehabilitation and maintenance for a unit exceed the cost of providing a rent subsidy on the private market, then the PHA was to remove the unit from its housing stock. Under this act approximately 91,000 units across 35 PHAs were slated for demolition (Jacob 2004:233).

Several authors cautioned against applying these same assessment standards across the nation. Stal and Zuberi (2010) warned against seeing all inner-city neighborhoods as homogenous. Manzo et al. (2008) added that HOPE VI has not taken into account the true diversity of public housing nationwide, “severe distress became generalized discourse that evolved from partial understanding of 6% of public housing stock in the US” (p. 1873). In spite of a partial understanding of the housing stock in the US federal policy has forged ahead with demolishing public housing.

Section 8

As public housing was demolished many residents were moved to the private market using section 8 vouchers. There are three parts to Section 8 of the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act. Two parts, Section 8 Substantial Rehabilitation
programs and Section 8 New Construction programs, were very similar to old project-based housing programs (the subsidy was tied to the units built or rehabilitation). Section 8 Existing program, which most people are more familiar with, caught on quickly and became the second largest low-income housing program--second to public housing. The program allows certificate holders to rent units in the private market. Once in the private market, households are responsible for paying no more 30% of their income in rent. Over the years Section 8 has undergone several changes. Since its inception there have been reductions in geographic restrictions. Vouchers are portable, in other words recipients are allowed use their vouchers across jurisdictional borders, and in 1990, the program was expanded to allow statewide mobility (Geotz 2003).

Section 8 and the use of housing vouchers is in line with the goal of deconcentrating poverty and creating partnership. The portable nature of vouchers allows for subsidized housing to spread out over a jurisdiction and providing housing vouchers limits the necessity of large public project by utilizing existing structures in the private market.

*Litigation Based Deconcentration*

Litigation-based deconcentration also reflects the political shift in public housing. Gautreaux is the most notable lawsuit dealing with desegregation and deconcentration. Dorothy Gautreaux, a long-time resident of Chicago’s public housing, sued the Chicago Public Housing Authority under allegations of racial discrimination. In 1969 under the ruling in *Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority* the courts mandated that PHAs build in low minority neighborhoods in dispersal efforts (Goetz 2003). The federal district
court found that CHA had discriminated in the siting of public housing and ordered scattered site units built in predominately white areas (Goetz 2003).

A few years later a second suit was filed and in *Gautreaux v. Harris* the courts decided that housing for public housing residents should be made available on a regional basis. *Gautreaux v. Harris* escalated to the Supreme Court, and the ruling produced what is now referred to as Gautreaux, a metropolitan wide mobility program (Goetz 2003). The program provided section 8 subsidies, which allowed approximately 7100 participants to move out of racially segregated neighborhoods in Chicago (Goetz 2003; Stal and Zuberi 2010).

The Gautreaux program provided an orientation workshop, initial credit check, and home visit for interested parties. Participating families were assigned a mobility counselor who assisted participants to find an appropriate apartment within the allocated six-month timeframe, counselors also offered referrals to local service agencies and other information the residents might need after relocating (Geotz 2003). However, Gautreaux participants, like many others relocated through deconcentration efforts, traded one poor black neighborhood for another (Stal and Zuberi 2010).

Several years later in 1992 attorneys for the Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis filed a suit against the Minneapolis Public Housing Authority, HUD, and the city under allegations that they discriminated in the siting of public housing. Legal aid provided evidence that housing projects were concentrated near the traditional center of the African-American community in the city. The settlement of the lawsuit, the consent decree in *Hollman v. Cisneros*, similar to Gautreaux became an effort to deconcentrate
poverty, facilitate greater geographic spread of assisted units and assisted families, and reduce the number of public housing units on that site (Goetz 2003: 12).

Gautreuax and *Hollaman v. Cisneros* were early efforts to deconcentrate poverty and involved dispersing minority and low-income concentrations. They also reflected the notion of mobility and resident choice. As policy makers began to question the success of such efforts Moving to Opportunity (MTO) was designed in order to assess deconcentration outcomes.

*Moving to Opportunity*

Congress enacted MTO in 1982 after policy makers deemed Gautreaux a success, with the intention of answering:

- Can federal housing programs effectively promote the dispersal of low-income families?
- What short- and long-term effects does re-location have on the lives of those who volunteer to participate?
- Is it possible for MTO to become a permanent federal effort to disperse families across the US? (as qtd Stal and Zuberi 2010: 6).

Policy makers have rationalized Moving to Opportunity, like other programs intended to deconcentrate poverty, as an opportunity for individuals to have access to neighborhoods that would enhance employment and educational opportunities and at the same time decrease exposure to violence, crime, and drugs (Clark 2008).

From 1994 to 1997 HUD recruited families from five urban PHAs: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Baltimore, and Boston to participate in MTO (Curley 2005; Gay
2011; Quigley et al. 2008; Stal and Zuberi 2010). In each city an experimental group was provided with section 8 subsidies accompanied with moving assistance and mobility counseling, and were restricted to use the vouchers in neighborhoods in census tracts with poverty rates below 10% (Curly 2011; Quigley et al. 2010; Stal and Zuberi 2010). The treatment group received no mobility assistance, and the control remained in their current public housing (Curly 2010; Quigley et al. 2010, Stal and Zuberi 2010).

The results appeared promising 18 months after the initial move. The experimental group moved to more advantageous neighborhoods, exhibited improved mental and physical health, experienced less criminal victimization, and there were fewer incidences of behavioral problems for girls (Clark 2008; Stal and Zuberi 2010). At the time of the interim report, 4 to 7 years later, the positive effects of MTO had faded (Clark 2008; Stal and Zuberi 2010). This decline occurred as individuals made additional location choices (Stal and Zuberi 2010). Furthermore some families reported that life in their new neighborhoods was difficult and they felt socially isolated; some of them returned to their original neighborhoods (Stal and Zuberi 2010). Overall there was no evidence that there was impact on individual self-sufficiency (Quigley et al. 2010).

When movers and non-movers are aggregated a difference does not exist between current MTO and current section 8 locations (Clark 2008). There were gains for individual people but not necessarily from the program. These changes could be attributed to the structural advantages of suburban areas such as school, public services, and job accessibility (Clark 2008). Since the 1980s over 66% of employment growth has occurred outside the central city (Wilson 2008). Furthermore, the city is a dynamic place and many residents that did not receive vouchers were still able to improve their housing
situation (Clark 2008). Similarly Jacob (2004) found that students affected by demolition were significantly less likely to be living in public housing three years after a closure announcement. Clark (2008) suggests that because people move frequently, the counseling required with the initial voucher is limited in its scope.

Besides, Clark (2008) asserted that when aggregated, MTO is no more effective than the natural dynamics of the city. Gay (2011: 148) found that MTO has unintentionally impacted voter turnout among participants:

But residential mobility also has the potential to disrupt and perhaps, transform—for better or for worse—the political lives of poor Americans. By imposing new administrative burdens (e.g., the need to change voter registration), while at the same time exposing participants to new social environments and networks, the MTO experimental intervention, unintentionally, manipulated both the costs and incentives to electoral participation, with unknown consequences for the behavior of the targeted adults.

MTO has the potential to disrupt many aspects of life for participants including voter participation and social networks, and there is evidence that there are several limits to the scope of the program.

Deconcentration Outcomes

Kingsley, Johnson, and Pettit (2003) found that there does not tend to be very much deconcentration spatially. Residents from severely distressed neighborhoods tend to relocate into neighborhoods not too far from their original residence. Across all cities the median distance moved was 2.9 miles. However, they did find that the average poverty rate of neighborhoods of residence dropped 34%. And, while the largest share of individuals remained in neighborhoods with minority rates above 90%, the percentage living in high minority neighborhoods decreased from 71% in minority neighborhoods to
Overall 68% of HOPE VI relocatees using Section 8 lived in tracts with less than five other relocatees. In some cities, such as Lexington, KY and Louisville, KY there is a higher concentration of relocatees. In Louisville, 55% of relocatees live in tracts with 15% or more shares of Section 8 households (p. 433, 436, 439).

The original language of the HOPE VI grant required winners to heed the economic and social needs of residents in addition to the physical condition of housing. A part of promoting self-sufficiency is about improving the life circumstances of public housing residents. Forty-one percent of those that relocated with housing vouchers stated that their overall financial situations had improved (Brooks et. all 2005). Many public housing residents leave their homes under the impression that they will be able to return. However, there are strict eligibility requirements that must be met in order to return to the development after it is complete. The criteria include: employment requirements, criminal and drug test, no late rent payments in the past year, and no lease violations in the past three years (Tach 2009; Hanlon 2010). There are eligibility requirements for voucher recipients as well, although they are less stringent (Hanlon 2010). As a part of HOPE VI redevelopments some residents get displaced. In Louisville, KY during the revitalization of Cotter and Lang Homes 400 residents relocated without assistance and there is no information about what happened to them (Hanlon 2010).

Critics say that relocation tends to leave residents worse off, in particular they are sent to locations that are little better than the distressed housing projects (Buron, Levy, and Gallagher 2007). Residents that relocate using housing vouchers to subsidize private market housing face several challenges, including paying utilities, dealing with landlords, and tenant screening (Buron, Levy, and Gallagher 2007). The biggest concern for
residents that relocated via housing vouchers tended to surround paying utilities (Brooks et. all 2005).

A study of HOPE VI individuals that relocated with section 8 vouchers showed they had not experienced significant improvements in economic self-sufficiency after two years (Boston 2005). Boston (2005) also found that poor households that moved from conventional public housing experienced significant improvements in socio-economic status and neighborhood quality. The finding led him to conclude that mixed income revitalization and residential mobility has the potential to have positive outcome if it is administered properly.

Deconcentration has produced less than convincing results. Jacob (2004) found that demolition had a small negative effect on educational attainment of older children in public housing and among younger children public housing had no statistically significant impact on student achievement. Jacob (2004) also found that families tend to relocate to neighborhoods relatively close to their original residence; three years after closure notification treatment and comparison students appear to be attending schools that are identical in terms of peer achievement, and there was a modest decline in poverty—with a shift from extremely high poverty tracts to simply high poverty tracts. Goetz (2005) supported this, saying that individuals may move to neighborhoods that are less distressed than their original residence, but the neighborhoods tend to be more distressed than average.

Researchers have long questioned whether broadly defined economic development programs improve well-being (Loboa et al. 2012). In a study of job creation
Bartik cautioned against offering individual incentives because they are costly and attract low paying jobs (Loboa et al. 2010). Using this same logic Clark (2008) questioned whether the poor benefit or if there is an aggregated societal gain. In other words are the results of MTO worth the expenditure? Clark (2008) found that MTO movers were more likely to be in lower-poverty areas than Section 8 leasers, but concludes that MTO as a program doesn’t fare better than regular section 8 vouchers as a program.

**Barriers to Deconcentrating Poverty**

All of these deconcentration efforts face the same obstacle: enlisting suburban neighborhoods. In order to truly deconcentrate poverty cities must enlist suburban neighborhoods to take on housing poor as well, and in many cases this has not occurred. Suburbs have the power the resist social forces that would integrate the poor (Salins 1993, Goetz 2003). “The neighborhoods that can provide the most benefits to the poor are off limits either because they won’t accept affordable replacement units or the market won’t allow them to use vouchers” (Goetz 2005: 409). It is important to understand that the suburban way of life was created in opposition to the hectic, immoral, unstable, and dangerous lifestyle associated with urban neighborhoods (Murphy 2007). There have long been concerns that deconcentrating poverty would cause suburban crime to rise, but Lens (2013) found that there was no relationship between housing vouchers and crime. So while those concerns may be unwarranted it is logical for suburbanites to resist an influx of urban poor particularly poor that are depicted as all of the ills associated with the city.

In addition to the desired results a consequence of deconcentration connects the city to the periphery. The importance of connecting issues of central city revitalization
with growth in suburban areas is becoming more widely recognized (Wiewel and Schaffer 2001). The grand regional strategy of “New Urbanism was to rebalance the city and the suburbs by bringing more middle class families back to the city while creating more opportunity for affordable housing in the suburbs” (Calthrope 2009: 52). This strategy is reflective of a turn toward dealing with issues on a regional basis. It is important to connect the city redevelopment to suburban areas because there is typically opposition to development of low income housing in suburbs. Furthermore, city leaders are beginning to subscribe to the sentiment that the city must wait for the suburbs to take on its share of low cost housing development (Goetz 2000). Crump also recognizes the connection between central city revitalization and suburbs. The low-income people displaced by the development can potentially be relocated to the suburbs and supply low wage labor that is in short supply (Crump 2002).

The concerns of suburbanites become particularly salient when one considers the coinciding changes that have occurred in cities and suburbs. The suburbs have experienced a significant increase in poverty rates since the 1990s. Suburban poverty continues to rise at a rate greater than that of central cities and amelioration of inner-city poverty has coincided with the deterioration of inner-ring suburbs¹. This rise in suburban poverty should not just be an issue for concerned residents, but it also important to scholars of urban poverty. If the trends of current deconcentration efforts continue (ie., residents moving to neighborhoods less distressed than original but more so than average) it is likely that residents that relocate could end up in poor suburban neighborhoods.

¹ Madden (2003) provides contradictory evidence about the growth of suburban poverty. According to Madden (2003) there is evidence that poverty has become slight more concentrated among suburbs over the past 20 years, however large and older central cities in the Northeast and Midwest regions have experienced a greater increase in poverty relative to the current rates of poverty in surrounding suburbs, and large central cities in the South and West have higher rates relative to their surrounding suburbs.
Suburban neighborhoods are less well equipped to serve low-income residents—services are often dispersed and the healthcare infrastructure is inadequate. The low birthrates typically found in the suburbs have been attributed to the challenges women have in accessing prenatal care in poor suburban neighborhoods. The rise in non-English speaking populations also poses a challenge for social service providers in the suburbs (Murphy 2007).²

In discussing the role of suburbs in deconcentration one must also consider that there are fewer social service providers than in cities with comparable poverty rates (Murphy 2007). Murphy (2007) demonstrated the disparity in service providers, stating that in Washington, DC residents in a high poverty census tract would have 5 job training centers and 5 food providers in close proximity whereas residents in suburban neighborhoods with comparable poverty would not be spatially proximate to one of either type of provider. Proximity to services is critical to usage, therefore being a long distance from services is equivalent to being denied (Murphy 2007). This may be due to the fact that a large proportion of low-income people rely on public transportation. For example, in the inner city of Chicago only 19% of residents have access to an automobile (Wilson 2008), therefore the availability of public transportation is another important matter when considering deconcentrating poverty. There has been increasing interest in addressing problems regionally, and several cities have begun to focus on concerns about the decline of the central city and suburban sprawl simultaneously (Wiewel and Schaffer

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² Murphy (2007) notes that adequate social service provision is linked to population density. It is easier and more efficient for social service providers to deliver services in areas where the population is more concentrated. This inherently contradicts the goal of deconcentration, and ultimately suggests that deconcentration may be counterproductive if the goal is to truly improve the well-being of the poor.
Deconcentration efforts make this approach essential because deconcentration of poverty is just as much a concern for the suburbs as the central city.

Gentrification

Ruth Glass (1964) coined the term “gentrification” to describe the displacement of working class residents in London by middle class individual, and according to Smith (1979) gentrification is the result of a series of private and public investment decisions. In more contemporary literature Essoka (2010) defines gentrification as “The nexus between private capital investments in urban residential properties with an influx of households having higher socioeconomic status than current residents” (p. 304). In attempting to promote mixed income communities HOPE VI has the potential to spur gentrification or as some scholar observed gentrifying neighborhoods have been targeted from HOPE VI developments.

A fundamental element of gentrification is depreciation. According to Smith (1970) it is necessary in order for gentrification to be a rational market response. The process of depreciation can involve under-maintenance of properties by landlords, block busting and blow out, red lining, and the abandonment of properties. It is important to note that the state can play an important role in this process (Smith 1979). We know that the federal government played a substantial role in the deterioration of the inner city because of the disinvestment in public housing, and the government has also aided reinvestment by leveraging private investors through HOPE VI.

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3 Society has been traditionally dichotomized as rural and urban but this leaves out suburbs and according to Wang et al. (2012) the rural-urban dichotomy masks the complexity and diversity of rural and urban policies. This is concerning for mixed rural/urban areas because a places classification influences the type funds it is eligible to receive (Wang et al. 2012).
Demolition may benefit cities by improving the appearance of concentrated poverty neighborhoods, and by reducing poverty rates, crime, and attendant social ills, but the studies discussed here do not show strong evidence that demolition has been beneficial for the poor. Deconcentration and demolition merely mask a larger, structural problem. It is a superficial fix, akin to sweeping the dirt under a rug. Keene and Geronimus (2011) critique HOPE VI as a “spatial remedy” which does not address structural issues seeing as most relocated residents end up in neighborhoods that are at best marginally better than their original location. If rental or subsidized housing no longer bares the stigmatized packaging of public housing then it can be erased from the consciousness of the public. For that very reason demolition is suspected of being a poorly veiled excuse for gentrification.

Opponents to demolition have posed questions about the true intent of the policy. One opponent questions, “Is it a wise strategy for reducing the residential segregation or is it a convenient way to get these people off that property” (Goetz 2003:155)? Another individual faced with demolition because of the Hollaman decree asks, “Why do we find ourselves in the middle of all this? Because we were living on strategically important land, land that other people wanted to take from us” (as qtd Goetz 2003:162). Since the benefits of HOPE VI are mostly place-based (ie., reclaiming particular neighborhoods, reducing criminal activity, and upgrading the physical environment) and in many areas has spawned or facilitated gentrification (Goetz 2005) it is important to examine the motive of local governments and PHAs and to investigate development for evidence of gentrification.
Over time residential pressures and increasing housing demands have once again made the inner city viable as a residential alternative (Essoka 2010). Even though these areas lack structural and economic infrastructure there is desirable architecture (Essoka 2010). Furthermore, programs such as HOPE VI go a long way to rebuild infrastructure. One of the goals of HOPE VI is to leverage private capital, and the grant application even favors developments that may achieve spillover effects. Both the G OA and HUD Office Inspector General found that HOPE VI began focusing on smaller projects with the greater potential to attract private investors as opposed to the most severely distressed locations (Duryea 2006; Harvard Law Review 2003). The capacity for profit in gentrifying neighborhoods is attractive to private investors. Furthermore, some PHAs have recognized the real estate value of the land on which housing projects sit. The Boston Housing Authority went from describing the Clippership housing development as a “jewel” of public housing to severely distressed in two years. “According to the residents, Clippership did not suddenly become ‘severely distressed.’ Rather, East Boston's real estate boom prompted the BHA to realize that the real ‘jewel’ of Clippership was not its tight-knit and safe community, but rather the land under the townhouses, with its spectacular harbor views” (Harvard Law Review 2003: 1494). Based on anecdotal evidence and the actions of some PHAs it is only logical to suspect that HOPE VI has spurred gentrification.

**HOPE VI in Louisville**

In 1996 Housing Authority of Louisville received a $20 million grant to redevelop on the former site of Cotter Homes, Lang Homes, and Algonquin Square. In 1953 Housing Authority of Louisville opened Cotter and Lang Homes (Raffel et al. 2003). By
1986 the intersection where the two housing projects met had gained the reputation as being “the meanest corner in town” (Hanlon 2010: 85, Raffel et al. 2003). In the HOPE VI application Housing Authority of Louisville cited Cotter and Lang Homes as plagued with high poverty and the highest violent crime rate in the city of Louisville (Raffel et al. 2003).

The project ultimately cost $237 million; the difference between the grant and the cost was made up through a combination of private and local funding as well as funds from HUD under a different program (Hanlon 2010). Today Park Duvalle consists of 1100 housing units 613 of which are rental units, another 363 are subsidized units, and the remaining 450 units are private homes (Hanlon 2010, Raffel et al. 2003). The median sale price of market rate homes was $142,242 as of 2002, and as late as 2008 the prices were ranging from $105,000 to $300,000 (Hanlon 2010). As of 2010 the median value of owner occupied units was $121,000 (U.S. Census Bureau).

Between 1990 and 2000 the poverty rate from the census tract in which Park Duvalle is located fell from 78.3% to 28.1% (Hanlon 2010). Unemployment also decreased from 34.6% to 7.1%, which was marginally below the city-wide unemployment rate (Hanlon 2010). As of 2010 the percentage unemployed in census tract 14, where Park Duvalle is located, was 8% (U.S. Census). In 1994 Cotter and Lang Homes had a crime rate that was 137% above the city average (Engdahl 2009b). The number of crimes decreased from 530 in 1994 to 13 in 2002 (Raffel et al. 2003). In terms of the quality of life Brazley and Gilderbloom (2007) concluded that only a small percentage of residents benefited. They note that for the 27% that temporarily relocated to other public housing, there was not improvement and there is no data about the quality
of life of the 23% that were evicted. Park Duvalle like many other former public housing sites had been reimaged as a safe place to live. As the problems such as crime and violence were ameliorated, developers were able to market Park Duvalle as a place for African Americans who grew up in the West End to “return to their roots.” (Raffel et al. 2003: 104).

Liberty Green, the subject of this study, was rebuilt over Clarksdale, which was 65 years old at the time of demolition and had 713 units (Downs 2012; Louisvilleky.gov 2006). The population of Clarksdale was 97% African American and 87% were female heads of household (Stone 2011:7). Much like Park DuValle, media accounts described Liberty Green as being troubled by poverty and crime such as drugs and prostitution. By the end of 2007 approximately 41% of all former residents resided in other public housing developments, 12% at scattered sites, 26.5% used housing vouchers, and 1.5% lived in Liberty Green (Stone 2011: 42).

New construction for this project began in 2005, and the project has a price tag of $233 million dollars (Louisvilleky.gov 2006). The units for sale range in price from $100,000 to $430,000, and the first owner occupied home was sold for $580,000 in early 2012 (Downs 2012). Lessons from Park Duvalle informed the implementation at Liberty Green. Based on complaints about the lack of social services LMHA initiated Community Support Services (CSS), which was designed to reflect the needs and goals of Clarksdale residents (Stone 2011). Programming included: tutoring/mentoring, youth programming, GED training, computer classes, vocational training, homeownership counseling, and assistance obtaining medical and construction jobs (Stone 2011). In
addition a new concept middle school, Nativity School, was built in conjunction with Archdiocese of Louisville and St. Boniface Parish (Stone 2011).

In her program evaluation Stone (2011) found that a significant proportion of residents improved their level of education and there was a lower proportion of residents with below poverty incomes at follow up interviews after the rehabilitation. Stone concludes that this, among other factors, suggests that Clarksdale residents are in a better position to get or maintain a job. Stauffer (n.d) is critical of Stone’s evaluation. According to Stauffer (n.d) Stone did not sufficiently use qualitative data nor adequately use the data that was available and therefore one cannot sufficiently assess whether CSS was a causal factor in resident outcomes.

Conclusion

The attention directed at the poor is not necessarily in their best interest. As I mentioned earlier, many people remain concerned with urban poverty because cities remain the heart of metropolitan areas. Poverty does not make a pretty picture. Deteriorating housing projects are not part of the image that local officials want tourists or potential business investors to see when considering their city. Poverty and the poor are a stain that must be washed away. Similar to the way Mayor Giuliani hid the homeless in New York (Bumiller 1999). The policies implemented indicate that policy makers have rarely been concerned with actually eradicating poverty. Instead of policies that deal with underemployment and unemployment we see policies that do little more than sanitize cities by demolishing housing projects across the nation. There are many stakeholders involved in a HOPE VI development and changing the face of public
housing has multiple objectives, which impact both communities and the people who live there. The history of federal policy dealing with public housing indicates that the goals of HOPE VI may be in conflict and that improving the image of cities is primary and improving the lives of the people who live there is secondary.

There appears to be promising policy development on the horizon. HOPE VI sites are still being developed, but urban poverty policy is once again experiencing change. HUD designed the Choice Neighborhood Program to replace HOPE VI in 2010. This program has been described as being more comprehensive than just rehabilitation and includes components ranging from Early Childhood Education, employment, safety, and transportation. A similar program, Harlem Children’s Zone (HCZ), was developed with the mission to flood a number of blocks in Harlem with social services ranging from educational to medical services in order to create a safe environment for children in the area. There is anecdotal evidence that HCZ has been a success. For six years in a row 100% of students from the program’s Head Start are school ready and elementary school students are closing the black-white achievement gap in math and Language arts (Wilson 2010: 44). This policy unlike previous policy appears to be dealing with some of the structural causes of poverty
CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

There is a large body of literature covering HOPE VI, but there are few studies that question the role of gentrification in the selecting of HOPE VI sites. Recall that gentrification is “the nexus between private capital investments in urban residential properties with an influx of households having higher socioeconomic status than current residents (Essoka 2010:304), that cities are suspected of favoring gentrification, and that Goetz (2011) found that pressure for gentrification was a strong predictor of HOPE VI development in the 1990s. I use an in-depth case study to examine how well the goals of local officials align with the stated goals of HOPE VI. I ask the following questions:

- How did the Louisville Public Housing Authority select the site to apply for a grant?
- Was the process for selecting the Liberty Green site different than when Park DuValle was selected?
- To date, has Liberty Green achieve the stated goals of HOPE VI developments?

These questions were designed to assess the city’s motives in regards to the development of Liberty Green, and to determine which goals were met with the demolition of Clarksdale.

Liberty Green is a prime case to investigate because of the changing housing market in downtown Louisville, and the presence of a previous HOPE VI development
(Park DuValle in 1996) allows for comparison of the Housing Authority’s rationale in choosing which housing project to apply for the HOPE VI grant in 2002.

The implementation of a HOPE VI development requires input from several actors. According to Faegin, Orum, and Sjoberg (1991) a good case study can provide a full sense of actors’ motives that result in specific decisions. Furthermore, case studies are useful for investigating the decisions of organizational elites (Sjoberg et al. 1991). Employing a case study can expose the full complexity of the decision making process of selecting a HOPE VI site. Because of the multiple methods utilized in case studies, one is able to gain an in-depth picture of a particular phenomenon (Marshall and Rossman 1999).

Using interviews, content analysis, observations, and census data this study investigates the objectives of local officials and how well they align with the following objectives of HOPE VI as stated by HUD:

- Changing the physical shape of public housing
- Lessening the concentrations of poverty by placing public housing in non-poverty neighborhoods and promoting mixed income communities
- Establishing positive incentive for self-sufficiency and comprehensive services that empower residents
- Forging partnerships with other agencies, local governments, non-profit organizations, and private businesses to leverage support and resources. (HUD.gov 2012).

Interviews for this study were conducted with a selection of local stakeholders and government officials. Elite interviews are useful for providing insight on policies, past histories, and future plans (Marshall and Rossman 1999). I structured the interview guides to elicit information about the goals of local officials and policy makers (see Appendices A and B).
The elite interviews were conducted with individuals that were influential in the Liberty Green Development. Preliminary research revealed the names of 11 individuals involved in the early stages of planning and implementation of the project. Snowball sampling was utilized to identify other individuals not included in the original sample and produced one additional participant for this study. Because interviews with three persons were not secured, a total of nine interviews were conducted. Three individuals were affiliated with the Louisville Metro Housing Authority during the planning process for Liberty Green. Four participants were affiliated with the city of Louisville, one participant was affiliated with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and one participant was affiliated with a local non-profit focused on fair and affordable housing in Kentucky.

In addition to interviews, this study employed content analysis to investigate the goals of local officials. Content analysis is an unobtrusive and non-reactive research technique that can portray the values and beliefs of participants (Marshall and Rossman 1999). A search for all content on Liberty Green and Clarksdale in *Louisville Business First* was carried out. The earliest article published in *Louisville Business First* discussing the potential for demolishing Clarksdale was written in 2001 and coverage extended until 2013. An open records request for all city council meetings during which Liberty Green or Clarksdale were discussed was performed; but based on the quality of information from city council members and complications accessing the records, this component was excluded from the study. Content analysis was also performed on the grant application for Liberty Green. Interviews and document analysis were coded and analyzed according to grounded theory techniques (Charmaz 2006). Initial coding was
guided by the literature. During the focused coding two major themes emerged: community/neighborhood development and residential impact. The category of neighborhood development includes the designation as mixed income, downtown development, the location decision, and physical transformation. Residential impact includes the goal of self-sufficiency, perceived benefits for residents, public housing’s population, and displacement.

Observations at Liberty Green were carried out in order to assess how well the development has achieved the goal of “changing the physical shape of public housing” and “promoting mixed income communities.” Observations consisted of a block-by-block description of Liberty Green including a count of property types and physical descriptions of the buildings.

The final component of this study employed quantitative data to address how well this development has achieved the goals of HOPE VI. Liberty Green is located in census tract number 59, which encompasses both the Phoenix Hill and Butchertown neighborhoods, two neighborhoods which have undergone major changes in the recent past. The census tract, represented by red in figure 1 is bordered by I-64 in the north, I-65 to the west, E. Broadway to the south, and South Fork Bluegrass Creek to the east.
The tract-level census data was used to compare race, income, educational attainment, employment status, female-headed households, and poverty level before the construction of Liberty Green, represented by 2000 census data, and after the construction of Liberty Green, represented by the 2010 five-year estimates of the American Community Survey.

Crime rate data from Louisville Metro Police was utilized to track the changes in crime before and after the development of Liberty Green. An open records request for the total number of crimes committed each year between 2003 and 2010 in the city of Louisville and in each of the police divisions where a public housing development was located. This includes Clarksdale (Division 1, Beat 5), Iroquois (Division 4, beat 5)
Parkway Place (Division 2, Beat 5), Beecher Terrace (Division 1, Beat 3), and Sheppard Square (Division 4, beat 2).

This study also assessed whether the revitalization of Clarksdale had an impact on commercial development. Before a business opens in Louisville it must be registered with the Louisville Metro Revenue Commission before earning income. A search of new accounts opened with the Louisville Metro Revenue Commission between 2003 and 2012 was conducted. Results of the search were filtered to accounts registered with addresses in the 40202 zip code, wherein Clarksdale was located. Although this zip code extends well beyond the borders of Clarksdale it reflects Clarksdale’s location within downtown Louisville.
CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS

Liberty Green in Louisville, KY sits in the midst of downtown industry, retail shops, and a burgeoning residential development. It is surrounded by the medical center to the south and the trendy NULU neighborhood to the north. The area surrounding Liberty Green has undergone some major changes over the course of the past few decades. Clarksdale, the original version of the neighborhood, was once a development isolated from the neighboring community whereas Liberty Green, its successor, has been integrated into the community. Officials worked to incorporate Liberty Green as a solid component of the community; for instance, Louisville Metro Housing Authority and the University of Louisville partnered together to include student housing for medical school students in the area. Additionally, NULU Edge Food Market, which opened the summer of 2013, communicates that Liberty Green is in fact a part of the surrounding community. The changes that have accompanied the development of Liberty Green reflect the ideological change that spurred the HOPE VI program and that has guided federal public housing policy.

One of the concerns with HOPE VI developments is that they have the potential to spur gentrification. Even more importantly, because gentrification was a leading predictor of the selection of HOPE VI sites in the 1990s, according to Goetz (2011), it is important to assess which goals HOPE VI developments actually meet. In answering how
do the goals of local officials align with the stated goals of HOPE VI, this study revealed that it is not necessarily the goals of the major players involved in a HOPE VI program that are in conflict with one another but the goals of the HOPE VI program itself that are at times contradictory.

HUD (2012) states that the goals of HOPE VI are:

- Changing the physical shape of public housing
- Lessening the concentrations of poverty by placing public housing in non-poverty neighborhoods and promoting mixed income communities
- Establishing positive incentive for self-sufficiency and comprehensive services that empower residents
- Forging partnerships with other agencies, local governments, non-profit organizations, and private businesses to leverage support and resources.

Evidence from this study suggests that the goals of changing the physical shape of public housing and lessening the concentrations of poverty can be collapsed into one goal—neighborhood development. Neighborhood development, and in turn HOPE VI developments, impacts multiple layers of communities, from physical infrastructure to services. Demolition has been the method selected in order to meet the goal of neighborhood development, and this process is disruptive to the lives of the residents served by public housing.

The HOPE VI program is intended to have some impact on residents’ lives, which is reflected by the goal of self-sufficiency. Activities aimed at promoting self-sufficiency, such as job training or educational opportunities, are intended to help individuals transition off of public assistance. But the ultimate goal of the HOPE VI program is to change the physical shape of public housing. There is a delicate balancing act when it comes to demolishing public housing through the HOPE VI program. When asked about
the goals of HOPE VI, 7 out of 9 participants referred to some form of neighborhood development benefit as part of the overall plan. At the same time, respondents and the grant applicants expressed concerns that the redevelopment of a site might negatively impact the lives of those who live there.

According to a local representative from HUD, the HOPE VI program had “a statutory goal to tear down a specific number of public housing units.” In meeting this goal and demolishing public housing there is a potential for residents to be displaced or affected negatively in other ways. In reviewing the data, neighborhood development goals and the impact on residents are in constant tension during the implementation of HOPE VI.

**Neighborhood Development**

Neighborhood development is a large portion of the HOPE VI program. In the executive summary of the grant application presented to HUD, the Housing Authority of Louisville states, “The goal of the Clarksdale Plan is to utilize its location as an asset and develop a community with a vastly heightened livability for its residents and its neighborhoods” (Housing Authority of Louisville 2002). Here, LMHA makes it clear that neighborhood development is key. First and foremost, we see that the goal of the revitalization is about community development; residents are secondary. Since residents are a secondary concern, it is important to ask whom this new community benefits.

In discussing the need for revitalization at Clarksdale, the grant narrative reveals that the negative impact on the surrounding community plays just as important a role as the amount of physical distress at the site. According to the authors of the grant
application (2002), Clarksdale had numerous structural and social problems that negatively impacted living conditions including mold, lead, a failing boiler system, ponding water, asbestos, trash, rodents, a deteriorated sewer system, and high crime. In fact, the grant application stated that there were 180 major offenses in 2000 and that the crime in Clarksdale was almost 4 times the rate of the city as a whole (HAL 2002). In 2003, a year before work started on Liberty Green, crime at Clarksdale accounted for 8.43% of all crime in the city of Louisville (see Table 1). However, it was not the public housing development with the most crime. In 2003 Beecher Terrace accounted for 12.38% of crime in Louisville and Sheppard Square accounted for 18.13%. If the crime rates were the major factor for redevelopment criteria, then it stands to reason that Sheppard Square should have been selected as a candidate for a HOPE VI before Clarksdale instead of after. The crime rate is a secondary criterion and it is viewed in relation to neighborhood development. Crime and the perception of high crime are impediments to neighborhood development.
<table>
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<th>Clarksdale Count</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Parkway Place Count</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Beecher Terrace Count</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Iroquois Count</th>
<th>%</th>
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<td>3259</td>
<td>9.79%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Louisville Metro Police Department

Notes: 1 Only 3 months reported for the calendar year 2003. 2 Because of changes in reporting practices, 2005 figures are not comparable to previous years’ data.
In spite of Clarksdale’s poor condition, physical distress was not the determining factor in selecting it for revitalization. Several participants acknowledged that Parkway Place was in much worse condition and in fact was under consideration at one point. When asked how a housing authority chooses which site to apply for a grant, a respondent who worked on the grant application stated:

Well I think it’s a combination of factors, definitely one is the physical distress of the site. That’s a huge piece of the application, and you have to go through and have an architect certify to the issues of the site. So for Louisville, Clarksdale had a lot of physical issues: infrastructure, building issues, mold problems, accessibility issues. I think for Louisville it was Parkway and Liberty Green, excuse me, Clarksdale and Parkway were both under consideration at that time… I think that Parkway has been kind of, “which way do you go with Parkway?” Do you continue to have housing over there or should that really be more industrial?

Similarly, a representative from the city of Louisville offered:

The public housing unit that should come down before any and all of any of the ones that we took down is the one out on Hill Street but it didn’t meet the standard because you would never want to rebuild there because it’s an industrial area. Are you with me? Park Hill is the one in my judgment that needed to come down before any of these. Cotter and Lang was dang close to being in that bad of shape, but the one on Hill is the toughest.

For the grant applicantion and city official alike, Parkway Place was just as a good a candidate, if not better, for HOPE VI based on physical distress. In spite of the poor condition of Parkway, Clarksdale was the site that was selected. The statement from the city official highlights that the major difference between Parkway and Clarksdale was location. Clarksdale was surrounded by a burgeoning downtown, whereas Parkway is surrounded by an industrial area. From these comments we can see that location is a key factor.
A housing advocate also noted the importance of location:

I do not consider these about the people who live there; nobody who lived there comes back. Really, seriously and if you wanted the worst of the worsts you would have started with Parkway. They didn’t want the worst of the worst they wanted the ones where the real estate had potential value.

This participant offers a more critical observation. Because of Clarksdale’s location, demolition had the potential to increase property values in the surrounding area. As each of these participants noted, Parkway was in poorer condition than Clarksdale and yet it was not selected because physical distress is not enough to win a HOPE VI grant. All of these participants recognized that there was a site that was physically worse off than Clarksdale. The major differences between Parkway and Clarksdale were location and the potential for real estate value.

Location played a significant part in which development was chosen for revitalization. All of the physical distress problems associated with Clarksdale were considered in relation to the surrounding neighborhood, particularly the downtown and east corridor development at the time. According to the grant application, there had been an “urban renaissance” in these areas and there had been concerted efforts to revitalize downtown outlined by the Downtown Development Plan. The application cited the development at Waterfront Park and a $15,200,000 pool of financing organized by the mayor to spur the development of market rate housing downtown as clear evidence of the revitalization efforts.

Clarksdale displayed visible signs of disinvestment and decline such as boarded up buildings, abandoned businesses, and vacant lots (Housing Authority of Louisville 2002). The combined impact of disinvestment and dilapidated infrastructure made the
neighborhood less attractive to businesses; in addition, property values stagnated and, in some cases, declined. An essential feature of neighborhood development is the ability to make an impact beyond the revitalization. The grant narrative emphasized Clarksdale’s potential impact on the surrounding community, which reflects HUD’s desire for a HOPE VI to have potential for “spillover.” Furthermore, several respondents discussed the development in context of what else was occurring nearby. A participant affiliated with LMHA stated:

Well you’ve got other things going on around it that were already there. You’ve got the whole Market Street corridor with restaurants, which is very attractive.

Similarly a participant involved in the project through the city stated:

From a planning perspective we always thought that the impact of Liberty Green would be a spillover effect. That you would see this sort of residential corridor paralleling the interstate and linking Shelby Park to Waterfront Park. That you would just have this whole corridor of housing, not solid housing, but a mixture of housing happening in that linear space…we were hoping if Liberty Green was going to be 700 units that we would see about 3x that, about 2,000, in housing units, new in that area.

These participants recognized the residential and commercial potential of Clarksdale. Because of Clarksdale’s location downtown and the changes already occurring in the neighborhood cultural amenities that could attract people to the area already existed. It was an area that had the potential to be attractive to young professionals and other individuals that desire urban living. The major impediment to that was the stigma and blight attached to Clarksdale. The demolition of Clarksdale had the potential to spur more residential development by erasing that blight and rebranding the area as desirable.
Another LMHA affiliate added:

So we’ve broadened the scope of the development to include the rest of Smoketown and Shelby Park, and so what we’ve done here really is community development or neighborhood development. The impact that it’s going to have on the east end adjacent neighborhoods will change the environment completely.

The notion of spillover effects is very much about neighborhood development.

Demolishing Clarksdale was expected to contribute more than a pretty façade. It was expected to change the environment completely by increasing residential and commercial development. A participant involved with the city recognized the impact that the development had.

The changes that Liberty Green made to that side of the neighborhood and the way it links to the medical center were a big factor in changing NULU, or creating NULU.

While the envisioned residential development did not come to fruition, the demolition of Clarksdale did induce commercial development. Erasing the visible signs of blight did make the area more attractive to businesses, evidenced by the growth of businesses on East Market or NULU. Another city representative talked about the impact that Liberty Green had on the area as it relates to NULU.

If you think of the analogy of throwing a pebble into a pond, and then you start to see the ripple effect of the concentric circles. They go out from there. That’s what’s happened at Liberty Green as it relates to downtown. Liberty Green was happened simultaneously with East Market Street, which is now called NULU. So what you’ve got now is north of that area of where Liberty Green sits is this new trendy type of district, where you’re having younger professionals move into the area. There are opportunities once the housing market completely turns around for those single-family homes to be built within that Liberty Green complex.

Participants involved from two angles, LMHA and the city, recognized the changes that have corresponded to the development. Several participants talked about the
development having some kind of spillover effect. The demolition was expected to and
did have impact beyond the immediate borders of Clarksdale/ Liberty Green. The
revitalization was seen as spurring or happening simultaneously with the development of
NULU.

The revitalization at Clarksdale and its capacity for spillover played into the city’s
efforts to revitalize downtown Louisville. Karman and Bittenbender (2001) reported on
the efforts of the mayor to revitalize downtown. They asserted that:

Redeveloping Clarksdale fits with [Mayor] Armstrong’s initiative to create more
residential opportunities throughout downtown. The mayor said an economically
diverse neighborhood would be attractive to many medical center employees.
Workers living there could walk to work, he said. Doctors and researchers
working late or odd hours could go home for dinner, spend time with their
families and still be able to return to work.

Steven Spalding, executive director of the [Louisville Medical Center
Development Corporation] LMCDC, said possible opportunities for Clarksdale
residents include going to school part time at nearby Jefferson Community
College and working part time at a medical center business.

The [LMCDC] is designed to promote the medical center and attract new
businesses to the district.

"There's no question ... (a redeveloped Clarksdale) would be an advantage in
marketing the area" to potential new businesses, Spalding said.

First, Karman and Bittenbender (2001) contend that there were already initiatives
underway to create more residential opportunities downtown and that redeveloping
Clarksdale would help meet downtown housing goals. The article mentions that diverse
neighborhoods are beneficial but goes on to only talk about the way that the housing
developed on the Clarksdale site would be beneficial to medical center employees.
Having housing nearby the medical campus would be convenient for medical center
employees. This stands in support of the housing advocate who asserted that HOPE VI
developments are not about the people who lived there because they were rarely, if ever, able to move back. The location of Clarksdale continues to play a key role and the residents who live there are secondary.

In the years prior to the demolition of Clarksdale several downtown projects had taken place. Downtown development included Slugger Bat Factory and Museum and expansion of the Louisville Science Center on West Main Street. There was also the development of Waterfront Park, Louisville Extreme Park, and market rate townhomes and apartments (2002). In addition, marketing was conducted to advertise downtown living through the Downtown Management District’s Annual Downtown Living Tour (Eigelbach 2012). Other initiatives included the Downtown Housing Initiative Fund and the 1990 Downtown Development Plan (Housing Authority of Louisville 2002).

With the blight and stigmas of Clarksdale erased there was a unique opportunity to attract new businesses downtown. An editorial published in *Louisville Business First* in 2007 examined the development of Liberty Green in relation to other projects occurring downtown.

Let's resolve to go full speed ahead with the astonishing redevelopment of downtown Louisville. If we can keep all the major projects on course, the makeup of downtown by the end of 2010 will be hardly recognizable to Louisvillians today. You can't help but get excited about the planned 2010 opening of Museum Plaza⁴, the new arena and the Iron Quarter mixed-use center on Main Street. Throw in the second phase of Fourth Street Live, the University of Louisville Health Sciences Center at the old Haymarket site and the continued development of Liberty Green, and you can envision how dynamic our downtown will be.

This article provides further evidence of the growth occurring in downtown Louisville.

There were several major projects underway that were completely changing the makeup

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⁴ The planned Museum Plaza was never built.
of downtown and Liberty Green was considered in context other projects occurring in the vicinity. While this editorial does not explicitly mention the partnership between Liberty Green and the medical campus, it does allude to the proximity between the two. Here again we see the key role that the location of Clarksdale played in its selection for a HOPE VI site.

Quantitative data also suggests that Liberty Green had an impact on commercial development. The number of businesses that were opened in downtown increased between was 2003, a year before the demolition of Clarksdale, and 2005. It is also important to note that the decline in new businesses coincided with the great recession of 2008-2009 (see Chart 1). One participant talked about the commercial development, particularly in NULU, that had occurred since the demolition of Clarksdale. *Louisville Business First* reported on several new businesses that had opened in the area surrounding Liberty Green. There were five stories between 2003 and 2012 that mentioned Liberty Green in reference to new developments. There were reports on Gallery Square Lofts, Commonwealth Motorcyles, a downtown animal hospital, the sale of Wayside Christian Mission’s properties, the renovation of the Louisville Chemical Buidling across from Liberty Green, and the opening of Gebhardt Marshall Gallery. An additional report quoted the president of Bargain Supply, a long-time staple in the area, about the improvements in the neighborhood over the past ten years (Eigelback 2011). News coverage, the grant application, respondent accounts, and data on new businesses in the area are all in agreement that the revitalization of Clarksdale would be beneficial in terms of attracting businesses and indeed was successful.
The revitalization at Clarksdale was not all about corporate development; it also was intended to assist in meeting a goal of creating 2000 new housing units in downtown Louisville (Housing Authority of Louisville 2002). Lot selection for off-site development involved working with the city to include “emerging neighborhoods” where active revitalizations were underway. “HAL and its collaborators will create mixed income developments in key locations across downtown and surrounding neighborhoods that are essential to rebuilding vibrant neighborhoods and a strong community” (HAL 2002: Exhibit H.2). It was important that the revitilization contributed to neighborhood development wherever replacement housing was built not just at the Clarksdale site and off-site replacement housing was intended to contribute to overarching downtown development goals.

In discussing a development on E. Broadway that was part of replacing housing stock from the demolition of Clarksdale, *Louisville Business First* (2007) cites Mayor Abramson who said:
“The Phoenix Hill neighborhood certainly is experiencing a renaissance with Liberty Green, several private projects and this new retail and housing development,” Louisville Metro Mayor Jerry Abramson said in the release. "When we redevelop urban neighborhoods, the influence spreads outside the boundaries of a particular project and into surrounding blocks.”

This quote brings up the aim for spillover. Liberty Green had an impact on the Phoenix Hill neighborhood, but more importantly we see that the city sought urban redevelopment opportunities had the potential to spread its influence. In another article we also see that the development of Liberty Green was predicted to have an impact on other neighborhoods downtown.

Other near-downtown neighborhoods such as Smoketown, Russell, and Old Louisville benefit from new housing being built on empty lots.

The city will benefit from another award-winning, mixed-income neighborhood built so close to downtown and the medical center. (Louisville Business First 2003)

Across interviews, news coverage, and the grant application we see the discussion of spillover. This rhetoric is important because it shows the emphasis given by multiple stakeholders to the potential for impact beyond the immediate territory of development. There are a variety of reasons why spillover is attractive to developers, policy makers, and city officials. Spillover allows for projects to have a broader reach, but more importantly a project with the potential for spillover is more likely to attract more private investment. This is crucial because of the financial constraints faced by local housing authorities and HUD. At least one participant mentioned that the HOPE VI allocation from HUD is simply not enough and another participant referred to the process of using the HOPE VI allocation to leverage other funds. Because of the limitations of funding a site with the potential to draw private investment is crucial in order to change the physical shape of public housing.
The location and the potential for spillover clearly played a significant role in Clarksdale being selected for a HOPE VI grant application and there is evidence that since the transformation there have been marked gains in terms of the physical structure, poverty rate, and crime rate in the neighborhood surrounding Liberty Green. Visual evidence of the change was most salient when discussing the transformation of Clarksdale with participants. Several respondents refer to the physical transformation of Liberty Green when assessing its outcome. A city representative offered:

Well go out to Park Duvalle and you’ll see doctors living there with a $250,000-$280,000 home and around the block you’ll see a public housing unit. I’d say it works, wouldn’t you?

A representative from HUD echoes those sentiments when asked how the HOPE VI developments in Louisville have fared in achieving what s/he considers to be the goals of HOPE VI.

I would say very well. I’m sure you’ve driven through Liberty Green. In regards to one of the goals, which was to create a mixed-income community, it’s been very successful in creating those very different housing opportunities which would be rental and homeownership and multifamily housing all of the structure as well as the economic development because now you have the grocery store in Park Duvalle. So I mean it certainly met some of the economic development goals as well as eliminated a food desert. So yes I would say it met the goals very well and in terms of streetscape and how it appears in, how it blends into the rest of the community and I think from the departments perspective it’s done that incredibly well.

Observations conducted at Liberty Green support these respondents’ accounts about the condition of Liberty Green. Both participants undertake a visual approach to assessing the outcomes of HOPE VI developments. In addition to acknowledging the economic benefits, they also refer to components that can be assessed from simply looking at the developments. For these participants, seeing different types of housing units was clear evidence of successful redevelopment.
One interview participant involved in city government refers to a physical aspect of HOPE VI development, but extends it to include the impact on property values stating,

As far as just the eye test is concerned, you can see how things have changed and the newness in the area and just in terms of the overall… you know our crime rate in Liberty Green has gone down considerably relative to what it was when it was Clarksdale because you just, a new housing stock, new people come in, you’ve gotten other folks that were there that kind of separated themselves from each other so you don’t have some of the feuds that were prevalent at the time there showing themselves anymore.

The success of this HOPE VI project was judged based on the surface level appraisal. These comments reveal that residents are indeed a secondary concern. These respondents discussed the streetscape and the mixed income development, but their evaluations do not include whether the individuals that were relocated are better off or even the ways that mixed income communities are beneficial to low-income individuals. Another participant involved in advocacy for affordable housing in Louisville also refers to the benefits of the physical transformation, but is much more critical of the changes that have occurred.

Well I think Park Duvalle is still very pretty. It’s not that old so we’ll see how that holds up, but it’s losing value. I think it was a big mistake to not try and make it more integrated. So it’s losing value. So we can only guess what is going to happen there. Liberty Green is doing well. So in terms of has it raised the value of the neighborhood? Sure. Has it made it better for the people that lived there? No.

This respondent is critical of the evaluation criteria used by others in this study. To this participant the main goal of HOPE VI is to raise property values and the development at Liberty Green has been successful in doing that. This participant recognizes that the physical transformation creates visual appeal, however, it does not correlate to an improved standard of life for the people who were affected by the revitalization project.
In spite of the heavy reliance on physical evaluation criteria, there are other measures that can be used to evaluate the success of the development. Census data can shed light on the transformation that occurred in the neighborhood. Census tract 59 spans beyond the immediate territory of Clarksdale, therefore the changes that occurred are not consigned to the rehabilitation site, rather it reflects the shift in the neighborhood wherein Clarksdale was located.

According to the Census in 2000, before the revitalization occurred, the median home value in the census tract where Clarksdale was located was $63,800; post Revitalization, in 2010, the median home value was $142,000. Furthermore, prior to the development of Liberty Green there were no homes valued above $199,999; today 14% of the owner occupied homes in the census tract where Liberty Green is located are valued between $200,000 and $299,999 (see Table 2).

<table>
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<th>Value (in dollars)</th>
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<th>2010</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Percent</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Value</td>
<td>$63,800</td>
<td>$142,000</td>
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</table>

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 3, 2006-2010 American Community Survey
There were significant changes in gross rent in census tract 59 as well. In 2000, prior to demolition of Clarksdale, 50.4% of the renter occupied units had rents less than $200, and after, in 2010, the number of units rented at the same rate decreased to 32.1% (table 3). This change may indicate a loss of public housing units that occurred with the demolition. The change may also reflect the income requirements of the new developments. Individuals receiving subsidies in the new development are required to have jobs and, therefore, the minimum amount paid in Liberty Green would be higher than the minimum paid by residents at Clarksdale.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Table 3: Gross Rent in Census Tract 59, 2000-2010</th>
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<td>Specified renter-occupied units</td>
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<td>GROSS RENT</td>
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<td>$1,500 or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No cash rent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Median (dollars)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 3, 2006-2010 American Community Survey
*No value not reported for 2010 ACS

HUD’s goals of changing the physical shape of public housing and creating mixed income communities were both manifested in neighborhood development. The fact that Clarksdale was chosen for redevelopment, although there were other sites that were in greater need, reveals that spillover to neighboring communities and economic
opportunities were major factors. As a result, there appears to be a correlation between the development of Liberty Green and economic growth downtown. After demolition the census tract containing Clarksdale underwent significant changes. There were substantial decreases in the population, female-headed households, and poverty rates. Evidence presented also suggests that there were increases in income and changes in racial demography. The data already presented suggests that there is a correlation between the development of Liberty Green and neighborhood development goals including increased property values and commercial development, but what impact has this had on the residents who lived there?

Impact on the Lives of Residents

With HOPE VI developments there is a potential for residents to be displaced in spite of the best efforts to ensure that it does not happen. Public housing residents are faced with changing their physical location, which impacts their daily lives in a number of ways. They may end up dealing with the private housing market and challenges they never faced before. There is the potential that they could lose some social capital like informal childcare or access to public transportation. A comment from one participant perfectly sums up the tension between physical development benefits and the costs to residents

I think there’s just been a lot of policy changes that have had unforeseen consequences on public housing so, it’s like you and I could sit down and come up with what we think would be the best housing, public housing model in the world and then there might be some other seemingly unrelated policy that goes
into place elsewhere in the government that would then have an impact on that. So, I think it’s all just a big social experiment frankly.

The HOPE VI program may have been created with the best of intentions, but changing the physical shape of public housing has had latent consequences on the people who live in public housing and these changes are not always for the best. This is troubling because individuals living in public housing are fragile and these changes could have a major impact on their lives. A respondent affiliated with LMHA discusses this very fact:

One of the biggest criticisms about the HOPE VI program, that you’re losing public housing stock, and public housing stock serves your hardest housed folks. So [the housing authority] made that commitment for one-to-one replacement, but again it got back to the financial concerns. Could you make a financial pro forma work where you’re placing all 713, I think is how many were actually public housing units? And the other big concern was relocating, moving people from their homes and all the fears of that move as far as from residents’ concerns, and then just the logistics of getting people moved into another location and making sure they had all the resources that they needed. And then another concern I guess was this was the first time the housing authority had to add a case management component to a HOPE VI.

From this comment we begin to get an idea about those who live in public housing; they are the “hardest housed.” People served by public housing tend to be very low income and may suffer from other issues such as disability. They are people that may otherwise be homeless, hence the respondent’s concern about replacing all the units. If public housing stock is lost then there is a population that may not be housed.

Another respondent offers an alternative way consider public housing residents. According to the respondent individuals of in low-income neighborhoods are often members of protected classes.

I don’t know if you know all of the protected classes for fair housing, but race, color, sex, religion, national origin, and familial status. Familial status means the
presence of children and to be declared a protected class, it isn’t winning the lottery. A protected class is declared to be a protected class because there are hundreds of years of both legal and extralegal disenfranchisement, politically in access to capital, in access to employment, and in access to education. So it’s not yippee, I’m in a protected class, God finally somebody is recognizing that we have been excluded from all of these really important systems, and so knowing that it is not, as I always say rocket surgery, to figure out people in many of these protected classes, are going to be disproportionately lower income. So where people of low income live becomes a fair housing issue.

This respondent broaches the issue of fair housing. The individuals utilizing public housing tend to be marginalized and muted. Thinking about them as members of protected classes communicates the gravity of their social position and the necessity of caution in the relocation process. Census data reiterates the participant’s observation about protected classes. Between 2000 and 2010 the number of households in census tract 59 declined sharply from 2499 households to 1987 households. After the demolition of Clarksdale the census tract was less densely populated. There was also a decline in the number of female-headed households from 742 in 2000 to 294 in 2010 (see Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Household Type</th>
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<th>2010</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total households</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family households</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Male householder</td>
<td>248</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female householder</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>29.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nonfamily households</td>
<td>1,509</td>
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</table>

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 4, 2006-2010 American Community Survey

The female-headed households that were concentrated in Clarksdale were dispersed as a result of the demolition of Clarksdale. This is concerning because these female
householders could potentially lose some of their social capital such as informal childcare to which they had access.

African Americans were another protected class that may have been impacted by the demolition of Clarksdale. Census Tract 59 was majority African American before its demolition and, while it remained predominantly African American, the percentage of African American residents decreased from 62.9% to 53.3%. There were also increases in the percentage of whites and those who identify as multi-racial. These changes are shown in Table 5 below. Reducing minority concentrations is in line with the aims of HOPE VI, and this was achieved with the development of Liberty Green. The benefits of integrated neighborhoods make this a desirable neighborhood development goal, but it does not necessarily translate into benefits for the people who live there, because, as Galster and Booza (2007) note, racial stereotypes may still mar interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>5,071</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White alone</td>
<td>1,556</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black or African American alone</td>
<td>3,190</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian and Alaska alone</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native alone</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian alone</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some other race alone</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 4, 2006-2010 American Community Survey
The Income level of those living in Clarksdale and the surrounding area was majority low income, with 51.6% of the households in 2000 reporting an income of less than $10,000 (see Table 6). After the demolition of Clarksdale the number of households below $10,000 decreased to 36.1%. There was also a large increase in those with incomes ranging from $25,000-34,999 from 8.2% in 2000 to 11.5% in 2010 and an increase of households reporting income between $150,000 to 199,999. This increased from 0.2% in 2000 to 2.5% in 2010. All categories from $15,000 to $199,999 increased between 2000 and 2010, especially $25,000-34,999, $75,000-99,999, and $100,000 and over.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>2000</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total households</td>
<td>2,499</td>
<td>1,987</td>
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<tr>
<td>Less than $10,000</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,000 to $14,999</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>270</td>
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<tr>
<td>$15,000 to $24,999</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>256</td>
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<tr>
<td>$25,000 to $34,999</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>229</td>
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<td>$35,000 to $49,999</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>157</td>
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<td>$50,000 to $74,999</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>175</td>
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<td>$75,000 to $99,999</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>104</td>
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<tr>
<td>$100,000 to $149,999</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$150,000 to $199,999</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$200,000 or more</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median household income (dollars)</td>
<td>9,367</td>
<td>15,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean household income (dollars)</td>
<td>23,363</td>
<td>28,491</td>
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</table>

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 4, 2006-2010 American Community Survey

*In 2010 inflation–adjusted dollars

Median household income in the census tract also increased from $9,367 in 2000 to $15,439 in 2010.

In the time between 2000 and 2010 there was a substantial decrease in unemployment from 9.3% in 2000 to 4.6% in 2010. It is also important to note the
decline population, which decreased from 3,722 in 2000 to 3,269 in 2010. This decline possibly could suggest that there are more students and retirees living in the area (See Table 7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Status</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tr>
<td>Population 16 years and over</td>
<td>3,722</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3,269</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>In labor force</td>
<td>1,806</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian labor force</td>
<td>1,806</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>1,461</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>1,266</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in labor force</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1,829</td>
<td>55.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 3, 2006-2010 American Community Survey

Poverty levels also decreased between 2000 and 2010. Overall the percentage of families below the poverty level decreased from 57.2% to 41.6%. The percentage of female-headed households below the poverty level decreased from 73.8% to 67.2%.

Additionally the number of individuals living in poverty declined from 57.7% in 2000 to 44.1% in 2010 (see Table 8). While there was decrease in poverty the poverty level did not go below the 30-40% threshold found by McClure (2008). Therefore while the poverty rate decreased, the neighborhood could still be contending with the same negative consequences of concentrated poverty.
After the revitalization of Clarksdale, the percentages of individuals with high school degrees through bachelor degrees in census tract 59 all increased (see Table 9).

Surprisingly, considering the proximity to the medical center, the percentage of individuals living in the area with graduate and professional degrees actually declined.

However, the population associated with Liberty Green has more people with higher levels of educational attainment than the population associated with Clarksdale.
The demographic character of census tract 59 experienced great change after the demolition of Clarksdale. This may reflect a change in the population served by public housing as suggested by one respondent who stated:

So you asked me if public housing used to serve the poorest of the poor, absolutely, 100%, that is not true anymore. You already heard me talk about it and in one of our reports we actually analyze it and it’s worse now than it was about how many units that have been taken away from families and how many of the family units now have these higher income and behavior standards, not behavior so much as income standards than they did before.

This statement reflects concerns the impact that the demolition of Clarksdale had on residents. This respondent echoes earlier concerns discussed by another respondent regarding the loss of housing stock. One-for-one replacement does not translate into the same number of families being served. A HOPE VI development could replace the same number of units as the original development but have a higher proportion of one-bedroom units thus serving a different population. Recall that between 2000 and 2010 the number
of households in census tract 59 declined from 2,499 households to 1987 households (Table 4). This could be indicative that Liberty Green houses fewer families than Clarksdale. The respondent also suggests that the population of Liberty Green is more upwardly mobile than the population that was housed by Clarksdale. In order to return to the new development, individuals are required to have a certain income and meet other requirements, such as no history of evictions, which were not obligatory at Clarksdale. Census data supports this supposition as well—median income increased from $9367 to $15,439 (Table 6).

Concerns about potentially displacing residents was a major concern and at the forefront for participants in this study. This is reflected by several factors, including that residents were included early on in the planning process. A representative from LMHA discussed how a HOPE VI project starts with talking to residents.

We require their participation and discuss what they want in terms of quality of life and services in these new facilities. Then we apply for funds. Given the approval of HUD we begin to set up plans for the relocation of residents and providing services for them which includes total…we move them, we relocate them and they receive a stipend for their inconveniences. Then they have an opportunity to go with section 8, housing vouchers, scattered sites, or traditional public housing.

An individual involved with the city’s work on the development also discusses meeting with residents.

In 2000 we had the planning meetings in the old gymnasium at the Clarksdale site and that was a multi-day. I guess it was a 3-day effort that involved the residents and multiple stakeholder interviews.

Planners and organizers recognized the importance of including residents in the planning and acted accordingly. There were measures taken to ensure that their voices were heard. The outcomes of these meetings were then used to guide the plans for Liberty Green.
Additionally residents were surveyed in order to access the Community and Supportive Services (CSS) activities in which they were interested. Results suggested that residents were interested in tutoring/mentoring, youth training, GED training, computer classes, and vocational training (Housing Authority of Louisville, 2002). These services were then offered to residents. Measures were also taken to ensure that residents had a complete understanding of what was happening. An affiliate of LMHA talked about how social workers relayed plans to each family.

We have social workers, as a result of what they pick up at the hearings, they immediately go out into the complexes and contact them on site and they lay out the plans that would affect those individual families. They have to cover every family.

In spite of the concern given to residents during the relocation process, there is constant tension between whether residents benefit or are disadvantaged from being relocated. Public housing residents are offered numerous services as they are being relocated. One CSS involved assessing resident’s readiness to relocate. There was also protocol in place to identify the families that needed the most help. Services provided by CSS included goal setting, planning, motivation, job retention, and advocacy (Housing Authority of Louisville, 2002).

In spite of the fact that various protocols were in place, they did not assure residents would gain more than they lost by being relocated. One representative from the city acknowledges that residents are given more options, but those options may not be what they want.

You no longer see Cotter-Lang, you see Park Duvalle. When Cotter-Lang went away and Park Duvalle came in there were hundreds of families displaced. I mean you take away 2000 units and you put in a 1000 units and you think, hmm, where did those other thousand go? And that meant that scattered site housing
had to begin. Many residents didn’t want to go to scattered sites. They don’t want to live out in Fern Creek.

Residents are given choices about where they relocate but ultimately they must leave the neighborhood where they were located, and in doing so they may end up losing social capital. One thing that may be affected is access to transportation. The housing advocate discussed the use of public transit among public housing residents.

Then you look at policies about transportation, which, 64%, no excuse me, somewhere in the 80s. They had a survey, somewhere like 80% of the people who lived in Clarksdale, not Liberty Green, but Clarksdale used public transit as their primary source of transportation. So anybody who believes in sustainability we blew out a really great community that relied on public transit. Obviously, obviously, sustainability is not the issue. It’s sanitizing people.

Residents may also lose access to other sources of social capital as well as pointed out by a participant involved LMHA.

Not only are they changing their physical locality and their support system of friends and family and the way they are transported back and forth to wherever they went every day. You know to change their lives in that way and then say by the way you have all these services available to you, it’s kind of overwhelming. So it’s nice to have that one-on-one relationship with case management.

Residents are faced with moving someplace they have no interest in living. They may be losing out on their source of transportation and some of the social support that they had. While there were measures put in place to ease the transition they are no guarantee that individuals will be left better off.

There are legitimate concerns about the ways in which HOPE VI may negatively impact residents. At the same time that some study participants recognize the potential drawback of HOPE VI others see potential for residents to benefit from HOPE VI. According to a representative from HUD, HOPE VI is more than just housing. It’s also about creating self-sufficiency.
As you may know public housing’s mindset was to just house people and it has moved to more than just bricks and mortar. It’s making sure that the recipient has a choice of where they want to live. It’s doing more than just providing bricks and mortar; it’s helping them. I think the cliché is a hand up versus a hand out. Having some self-sufficiency on a personal level, as a family, incorporating other resources, and leveraging private resources to help a family become more successful in the sense of becoming educated, having support for families to get kids through the educational process. There are even programs helping them understand financial responsibilities, creating bank accounts, and things along those lines. So it’s much more comprehensive than just putting them in a tall building and providing a shelter. It’s more of helping them become more integrated in the community from a financially disadvantaged perspective.

HUD’s requirements and self-sufficiency goals do reflect this shift in policy, however this study finds that housing people is first and foremost HUD’s goal. HOPE VI does create a more integrated community that financially disadvantaged individuals have access to. It is important to keep in mind that those with the most access to Liberty Green are likely upwardly mobile to some extent and that it is those that are upwardly mobile that will benefit the most from CSS programming.
Chapter V
Discussion

In assessing how well the goals of local officials align with the official goals of HOPE VI, this study revealed that there is not necessarily goal conflict on the part of decision makers, but the stated goals of HOPE VI themselves stand in conflict with one another. Two major components of HOPE VI are in constant tension—the impact on residents and neighborhood development goals. Evidence from this study suggests that while self-sufficiency is a goal of the HOPE VI program, it is secondary. Most of the emphasis for the HOPE VI program revolves around neighborhood and community development. Demolition has been the route selected toward this end and it has the potential to negatively impact public housing residents.

The Clarksdale Revitalization plan stated that its goal was to utilize the location of Clarksdale to develop a more livable community for its residents and neighbors (Housing Authority of Louisville 2002). Changing the physical shape of public housing and thus neighborhood development were the primary goals of this HOPE VI development. Data presented in this study reiterated the importance of the location of Clarksdale for this development goal.

Physical distress, while a primary factor, was not the determining factor for Clarksdale being selected to apply for a HOPE VI grant. Respondents discussed the
poorer conditions at Parkway Place, and crime rate data revealed that Clarksdale was not the site with the most crime a year before demolition. The main difference between Clarksdale and the other projects that could have been considered was location.

Downtown Louisville was already experiencing an “urban renaissance,” and the demolition of Clarksdale had great potential to add to and benefit from downtown development goals. The number of businesses downtown was increased between 2003 and 2005 and erasing the blight and rebranding Clarksdale as desirable had the potential to raise property values and attract more businesses. Reports from *Louisville Business First* indicate that there was a surge of new businesses after the demolition of Clarksdale, and Census data reveal that property values did increase. The median value of homes increased $78,200 from $63,800 to $142,000. In terms of neighborhood development goals, census data suggests that poverty in Phoenix Hill and Butchertown neighborhoods has decreased. The physical shape of public housing has changed as well. Study participants referred to changes in the physical shape of public housing when assessing the outcomes of the development at Liberty Green. Overall census data and news coverage provide evidence that the development at Liberty Green is correlated with neighborhood development. There has been a decrease in poverty in the neighborhood and several new businesses have opened in surrounding area, both of which have helped improve the tax base in downtown Louisville.

Much of the emphasis of Louisville’s Clarksdale/ Liberty Green HOPE VI grant is on neighborhood development and the benefits of mixed income communities. The perspective of neighborhood effects, much like the assessments of participants included in this study, assumes that mixed income communities are beneficial to everyone,
including low income individuals (Young 2003). Some studies have shown evidence that high school graduation rates, childhood cognitive development, and teenage pregnancy are sensitive to neighborhood effects. Other studies, however, have found that physical proximity does not ensure social contact, or social cohesion (Smith 1999). After a revitalization project in Boston, residents had fewer social ties and there was not much social mixing and interacting between groups.

In spite of the less-than-convincing benefits of mixed-income communities, study participants still continue to cite the development of mixed income communities as a prerequisite of HOPE VI projects. Whether or not residents at Liberty Green have benefitted from living in a mixed-income community is beyond the scope of this study, however it is clear that neighborhood development was the primary goal of the revitalization of Liberty Green.

With the emphasis on design we end up with beautiful developments, which may offer better living condition for low-income individuals. Officials involved in the planning process for Liberty Green recognized the precarious position of the residents affected by the demolition of Clarksdale and acted accordingly. Residents were included in the early stages of the planning process and their involvement was solicited in order to design the CSS activities. However, census data show that there were marked changes in the demographic character of Liberty Green; therefore, the population served by Clarksdale is very different than the population served by Liberty Green.

Liberty Green has fewer female-headed households and African Americans than Clarksdale had. Furthermore, the percentage of individuals with incomes below $10,000
declined from 51.6% in 2000 to 36.1% in 2010. Some of the most fragile people in the community were affected by the demolition of Clarksdale, and some participants in this study expressed concerns that the individuals that are relocated may lose some social capital such as social support and access to transportation. While Clarksdale residents were offered first preference for Liberty Green, it is important to keep in mind that the individuals allowed to come back to the new development are required to meet standards that were not in place at Clarksdale. The standards, such as income, are much higher, thereby excluding a significant number of the previous residents. Thus, those that benefit the most from these HOPE VI initiatives are those that were already upwardly mobile to some extent.

Overall there are higher levels of educational attainment for individuals living in Liberty Green than there were for individuals who lived at Clarksdale. There was also a decrease in the overall population, which may indicate that there are more students and retirees living in the neighborhood. Future research may further investigate this change in population. We are beginning to see a shift once again in the population served by public housing. The most disadvantaged are still housed, but they are not poised to receive benefits as much as those that are upwardly mobile. The individuals that should benefit the most from self-sufficiency programming are moved to another neighborhood and potentially lose some of their social capital; what do they receive in return? Individuals may or may not be relocated to lower poverty neighborhoods, but as the literature shows this does not always produce the desired effects. The fact that the primary goal of HOPE VI is neighborhood development, one is left to conclude that HOPE VI is more for cities than it is for people.
Limitations

This study has several important limitations. First, respondents for this study were selected from a limited sample and some decision makers may have remained unidentified; therefore, the generalizability of this research is undetermined. Furthermore, while this study concludes that neighborhood development was the primary goal of the HOPE VI development at Liberty Green, it cannot say whether former residents have prospered or been disadvantaged as a result of this development. Future research should utilize resident interviews or tracking data from LMHA to address the impact the development had on Clarksdale residents. Because this research employed a case study, it cannot be generalized to other HOPE VI developments. Future research should investigate the goals at other HOPE VI developments across the country in order to determine if neighborhood development goals are primary for the HOPE VI program nationally.
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Appendix A

Interview Guide for Local Government Officials

1. What are the major issues that Louisville faces today? Six years ago?
2. How would you describe the housing market in Louisville?
3. What can you tell me about public housing in Louisville?
4. What is describe the process of implementing a HOPE VI grant?
5. What role has the city council played in HOPE VI developments in Louisville?
6. Were you involved in the process of redeveloping Park DuValle?
7. What lesson did you learn from Park DuValle?
8. Why was Liberty Green a good candidate for a HOPE VI grant?
9. Did those things inform the decisions made concerning Liberty Green?
10. In your opinion, what are the goals of HOPE VI?
11. How have the developments fared in achieving those goals?
Appendix B

Interview Guide for Louisville Metro Housing and HUD Officials

1. What are the major concerns of LMHA?
2. What can you tell me about public housing in Louisville?
3. How has public housing changed over time?
4. What is describe the process of applying for a HOPE VI grant?
5. How do you choose which site to apply for a grant? Why was Clarksdale chosen over Park Hill or Beecher Terrace?
6. What role have city officials played in HOPE VI developments in Louisville?
7. Were you involved in the process of redeveloping Park DuValle?
8. What lesson did you learn from Park DuValle?
9. Did those things inform the decisions made concerning Liberty Green?
10. What plans does LMHA have for the future?
11. How do private investors fit into the process?
12. In your opinion, what are the goals of HOPE VI?
13. How have the developments fared in achieving those goals?
CURRICULUM VITA

J el i s a   C l a r k

118 Lutz Hall
University of Louisville
Louisville, KY 40292
jsclar05@louisville.com

Education

University of Louisville, Louisville, KY
Masters of Arts in Sociology
  • GPA: 3.95
University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY
Bachelors of Business Administration
  • Major: Marketing; Minor: Sociology
  • GPA: 3.83 Summa Cum Laude

Expected
December 2013

Research Experience

Graduate Research Assistant, University of Louisville Sociology 2012-2013
Department
  • Analyzed qualitative interview data
  • Assisted in compiling literature review

Undergraduate Research Assistant, University of Kentucky 2008
  • Collected data by calling over 3,750 participants for research study
  • Entered data into computer data base
  • Maintained participant confidentiality

Teaching Experience

Graduate Teaching Assistant, University of Louisville Sociology 2012-2013
Department
  • Lead discussion sections for Race in the US
  • Developed active learning activities
  • Assessed student outcomes
Neighborhood Mentor, *New Directions Housing Corp* 2008
- Organized daily activities including meals, games, and educational activities for day campers
- Developed daily lesson plans

**Conferences and Presentations** 2013

*Push Her Against the Wall: Rap, Misogyny, and Young Listeners* presented at Anthropologist and Sociologists of Kentucky (Louisville, KY)
- Session Organizer: Race, Ethnicity, and Identity

*Hope for Cities or Hope for People? Hope VI at Liberty Green* presented at Mid South Sociological Association (Atlanta, GA)

**Papers in Progress**

Brooms, D. R. and Clark, J. S. “Engaging African American Men in Their Educational Journeys”
Brooms, D. R., Clark J. S., and Pugh, J.K., “Perceptions of Profiling, Stereotyping, and Race”

**Honors and Awards** 2013

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<td>Delta Epsilon Iota National Honor Society</td>
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<tr>
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**Service** 2011-2012

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