The cost of wisdom: a comparative theoretical analysis of research ethics in the United States, Germany and Hungary.

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THE COST OF WISDOM
A Comparative Theoretical Analysis of Research Ethics
in the United States, Germany and Hungary

By

Steven A. Drewry
B.A., Indiana University, 1977
M.S.W., Ohio State University, 1983

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Kent School of Social Work
University of Louisville
Louisville, Kentucky

May, 2004
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A Dissertation Approved on

April 5, 2004

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Janet Ford, Ph.D.
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents

Austin Drewry and Miriam Bocard Drewry

and my family

Mary Ann Drewry and Austin Francis Drewry

Parents plant the dreams, family brings them to life.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First let me thank my dissertation chairperson, Dr. Tom Lawson, for guiding me toward using my strengths and giving me the seminal idea for this work. His have been the most generous of gifts, fine mentorship and the determination to do things right. My other dissertation committee members, Drs. Anna Faul, Joe Brown, Pam Yankeelov and Janet Ford, have provided me with wonderful support and very useful critique.

For Dr. Ruth Huber, who first brought me into the Kent School's doctoral program, I don't have words to express my gratitude. Her encouragement has been unwavering, and her navigational skills priceless to a fellow who had been a long time away from the sea. Thank you, Ruth.

For Robin Johnson, Andy Carlson and Rachael Richter-Hauk, my colleagues at Capital University, whose steadfast support made this workable, and for being my Greek chorus in Dayton.

For Alma and Bob Brethen, who made this dream possible, and who stuck by me through times thick and thin. Their generosity has been great, their faith in me abiding and strong.

No one completes anything of value alone. For Joe and Timmie, who reminded me that family is forever. And especially for Mary Ann and Austin, the dearest ones to my heart, I can only say what I've already said so many times. I love you, and I'll be back home again soon.
ABSTRACT

THE COST OF WISDOM
A COMPARATIVE THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH ETHICS IN THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY AND HUNGARY

Steven A. Drewry

May 8, 2004

This dissertation is a comparative theoretical analysis of human rights, research ethics and human subjects protection. The history of human rights is a long one, but for the sake of immediacy and focus, the author will limit the discussion to events pertaining to the last century and the beginning of a new one. Through a process of sociocultural review of significant human rights and scientific events pertinent to research involving human subjects, this work will examine the evolution of research ethics in the United States, Germany and Hungary. These nations are not intended to be representative of international research ethics as a whole, but their 20th century histories starkly depict how the forces of democracy, national socialism and communism have shaped our view of how science has been used to transform societies and our beliefs regarding the human condition.

The author intends to place these societies and the research topic in a theoretical context that will add depth and resonance to the discussion by examining how the aforementioned political schemes, and the ethical codes which have arisen within them, came to produce the greatness and tragedy documented in these pages. The theories
to be used in this analysis are structural functionalism, general systems theory, conflict
theory, Peter Blau's exchange theory of power, and symbolic interactionism.

The art and science of social work stand amidst the issue of how societies come to
address the ethics of human subjects protection in research. With its historic dedication to
the protection of human rights and the enfranchisement of all peoples within and across
societies, social work is positioned to negotiate and implement the principles codified
into the traditions and laws governing international human subjects protection for
research participants.

The dissertation will begin with sociohistorical review of the nations under study
to provide necessary context and information about the research topic. A theoretical
analysis will follow. The dissertation will include a recommendation for a code of
research ethics which has broad applicability across cultures, and conclude with a
discussion of the role of the social work profession in its operationalization.
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Wisdom is sold in the desolate market
Where none come to buy.
William Blake

INTRODUCTION

Germany: 1947—Werner Helwig sits uncomfortably in the witness chair at the trial of accused Nazi scientists in Nuremberg. He is not used to such proceedings, such formality, and all the people. So many Americans. The judges, the prosecuting attorney, all Americans. The prosecutor wears an American army uniform, the first Helwig has seen up close. It is pressed and clean, not like the uniforms he's grown used to seeing in recent months.

Helwig is a young man, barely into his twenties. He is overwhelmed by the clamor of all the voices, talking at once, too much like the railway platform in Munich when he rode east so long ago, except no one is yelling at him. Yet he is still afraid; intimate with the fear now after wearing it for so long, every moment of each day in Auschwitz, so natural it feels like the biggest part of him. Without the fear, he says to himself, I wouldn't be me anymore.

A translator gives him a set of headphones, so he can understand the English words in his own German. She slips on a pair of her own and retreats to a stenographer's table. Now the American prosecutor approaches him. He's smiling, but the smile makes Helwig leery. He seems nice, though, and introduces himself as General
Taylor, Telford Taylor. The general is young, Werner thinks. Maybe forty or so. And big. To Werner Helwig, all Americans look big, and victorious.

Across the room, at the defendants’ table, sit rows of men, older than Taylor, smug and unperturbed, a little bored perhaps. Helwig doesn’t know any of the men, but he knows who they are. He has seen their photographs in the newspapers, and knows what they’ve been accused of. Somehow he expected men so evil to look different from other men, but they don’t. They just look old and tired and bored.

General Taylor asks Helwig questions about his family. About his parents, and his sister. Werner doesn’t quite understand why, because they’re all dead now. Burned and dead. Taylor wants to know about 1943, when they were all herded onto the train cars, like livestock, and rode interminable hours east to Poland, not knowing exactly but still knowing what awaited them. Helwig doesn’t want to talk about all this; what good can possibly come from it? They’re all dead now; only I survive.

General Taylor asks him why he was sent to Auschwitz. Helwig doesn’t know what to say. He’s asked if he is mentally retarded. How would I know, he replies. One of the older men at the defendants’ table smiles. Taylor asks Helwig if he’d been sterilized at Auschwitz. Werner knows what this means, and nods.

"Can you tell me why you were sterilized?" Taylor asks.

"...I suppose it was because I could not defend myself."

In fact, there was no Werner Helwig. In truth, however, there existed thousands of Werner Helwigs, victims of impersonal hatred and systematic eradication which civilized peoples in the 20th and 21st centuries have come to characterize as illustrative of
Nazi Germany during the era of the Third Reich (1933-45). We condemn the perpetrators of such heinous acts as deviants and monsters, and isolate them from the rest of the human race, as if there occurred an evolutionary anomaly in place and time, an anomaly so foreign and incomprehensible that it could have happened nowhere else.

Yet it has. As we traverse the history of the 20th century, we step over, again and again, the rank proof of modern humanity's capacity for immense destruction in the name of improving the general lot of society. Eugenics. Racial hygiene. Ethnic cleansing. Liquidating enemies of the state. Creating weapons so vast in devastating power that they will end war for all time. Purging society of strange looking people whose opinions threaten freedom.

The perpetrators have different names, to be sure. Different origins and intents, to be fair. But regardless of names, places and possible motives, each of these forces has used the power of science and technology to further its aims and justify its means for the purported sake of societal improvement. In the process, though, the rights of human beings have too often been neglected or sacrificed for an alleged greater good. Perhaps, when the history of our time is written, it will be said that we confused an unbridled faith in the goodness of science with an unexamined surety in the goodness of ourselves.

Problem Statement

The true problem, however, is neither science nor technology. The problem is that humankind has elevated science and technology to godly heights, placing hopeful but ultimately flawed faith in science without reckoning for the flaws in its creators. Science has produced marvelous growth and change in the human condition, especially in the past
one hundred years. Its efficiencies have seduced humankind into believing that science, having altered the fates of societies and enriched the quality and duration of human life, has somehow transcended the limitations of people, and our weaknesses. It has not. Rather, science and technology have at times amplified human faults instead of eradicated them. Science, like anything else of human creation, possesses an immeasurable potential for good, yet bears a propensity for unspeakable wrong (Katz, 1972, 1992). Science is simply a way of looking at problems; technology is its tool for problem solving. Like any worldview, science has its limits, biases and blind spots. Like any tool, technology must be wielded by knowing, responsible hands, and must be bound in its use to those activities which are both productive and right.

So now we are presented with a second problem, for when we use words like right and wrong, we enter the murky world of morality and ethics (Freeman, 2000; Loewenberg, Dolgoff & Harrington, 2000). It has been the history of science and technology that the discovery of technological means to achieve scientific ends has outpaced the ethics which govern such actions (Murakami, 1995). In our time, human genome research is the most obvious example (Mandl, et al., 2003; Steinbrook, 2002; UNESCO, 1997; Weber, 2001), yet the scientific history of the past one hundred years is replete with other instances where the exclamation, “We can do this!” has far preceded the question of “Ought we to do this?” (Grodin, 1995; Kimmel, 1988). Thus the history of science and ethics is one of which it can be fairly said that scientific experimentation has pushed the limits of the ethics which guide it at least as much as ethics and respect for human rights have structured and guided the research.
Promptly following World War II and the Nazi War Crime Tribunals, there arose the Nuremberg Code as a first step in codifying a set of principles to govern research activities involving human subjects (Amdur, 2003; Beals, Sebring & Crawford, 1949; Gordon & Prentice, 2000). Shortly thereafter, the General Assembly of the United Nations produced a universal declaration of human rights (1948). Both documents grew from a wellspring of outrage at the conduct of the Third Reich during World War II, and were written in the hope that institutionalized codifications of ethical behavior in scientific research and protection of human rights might abolish such atrocities forever.

In 1964, the first Declaration of Helsinki (Tadd, 2000; World Medical Association, 2002) attempted to expand the rights of human research subjects and promote international compliance.

But here reside the origins of a third problem. It is indeed well and good that international bodies such as the United Nations, the World Medical Association and numerous others have promulgated ethical codes to regulate scientific inquiry and protect human rights. Unfortunately, some nations have not elected to adhere to these ethical codes, and some of those nations who have wholeheartedly adopted international codes of research ethics have proven less than fully compliant (Annas, 1992; Barondess, 2000; Beecher, 1966; Harkness, 1996).

Moreover, it is relatively simple to develop and ratify a set of ethical principles with which few civilized people would disagree. The Nuremberg Code, for instance, puts forth these core tenets for the governance of scientific research involving human subjects:

- Voluntary and informed consent for participation
- Anticipated benefits of human subjects research must outweigh anticipated
risks

- Subjects of such research must have the option of withdrawing from research activities without penalty

- Risks and benefits of human subjects must be shared equally among people.

Who in good conscience could not agree with these principles? What would it say about a society that elected not to concur with the Code’s stated aims? The precepts listed above are among the hallmarks of civil society, and time has demonstrated that nations which have refused assent to international codes of research ethics and shunned participation in dialogue regarding protection of human rights have been generally viewed as rogue states (Grodin & Annas, 1996; House of Terror, 2002; Lozansky, 1989). Conceptually, then, there appears to be more or less international agreement about the tenets underlying the ethics of human subjects research. We can hypothesize that the civilized world community theoretically endorses an international code of research ethics.

How these codes of ethics are operationalized and implemented from country to country is a different matter entirely. In theory, concepts such as voluntarism, informed consent, favorable benefits-to-risk ratio, etc., are readily translatable from language to language and culture to culture. But when these concepts are put into practice, the weight of culture and history shapes the meaning of concepts to the place and time of implementation. For instance, the United States, with a legacy of institutionalized freedom of speech, right to prompt redress of grievance and a recent history of litigiousness (United States Bill of Rights, 1789), may operationalize informed voluntary consent much differently than, say, Hungary, with its newly won social democracy after decades of oppression (Bodi, Fabian & Giczey, n.d.b).
Put succinctly, we are faced with three related problems. The first problem concerns the trust we have historically placed in science as an unfettered social good and the faith imbued in science by society as the best of paths to human progress. Second, the obvious need, in light of world events in the last one hundred years, to integrate and regulate scientific inquiry via a broadly accepted code of research ethics. And third, the difficulty of operationalizing and implementing ethical research standards developed by international accord in such a way that they are respectful of and workable within a given culture.

For the profession of social work, each of these problems is interwoven with issues of preeminent importance to social work ethics, particularly as social work embraces a global and international sphere of practice (Hamalainen, 2002/2003). If social work research, and the professional ethics which govern and guide such an enterprise, is to lead the profession into the 21st century and an era of multinational collaboration in expanding the knowledge base of social work, then a workable code of international research ethics must be forged which respects both the traditions of the profession and the spirit of the profession's code of ethics (NASW Code of Ethics, 1999; Zahl, 2002/2003). Of particular import is the NASW Code's emphasis on protection of human subjects during research activities and social work's heightened regard for respect of cultural differences (Loewenberg, Dolgoff & Harrington, 2000; NASW Code of Ethics, 1999).

For instance, the NASW Code speaks clearly and directly to the matters of client self-determination, respect for the dignity and worth of each person, regard for social and cultural diversity and avoidance of conflicts of interest in professional practice. These
tenets of ethical practice have correlates in the field of research ethics: voluntarism, informed consent, and the need for research integrity. One might argue that the NASW Code's section on research almost mirrors the Nuremberg Code. But a potential difficulty arises when we consider that voluntarism in one culture may have a vastly different meaning from that of another culture. To use an example, in the United States, with its tradition of independent choice and assured freedoms of speech, the concept of voluntarism may be appreciably more inclusive than voluntarism in Hungary, where no such freedoms and independent choices were tolerated during the period 1944-1989. Put a bit differently, voluntarism carries little penalty in a free democracy; in a repressive totalitarian regime, voluntarism may carry the penalty of being shot for making the "wrong" choice.

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to explore the development of ethical practices in the protection of human subjects engaged in scientific research activities. The study will examine the evolution of ethical research practices across three cultures: the United States, Germany and Hungary. Because there exists a strong presence of cultural relativism in the manner in which ethical research practices are defined, operationalized and implemented (Baker, 1998a; Bernstein, 1988; Christakis, 1999; Dalla-Vorgia, et al., 2001), we will need to analyze how commonly accepted principles of ethical research have been adopted in different nations, with appreciably different histories, in order to gain a cross-sectional view of an increasingly global enterprise (deJong, et al., 1999; Koenig, 1999; Maio, 2002).
Additionally, if there is to arise a consensually derived international code of research ethics governing the protection of human subjects, the voices of several distinct cultures must be heard in order to produce a genuinely meaningful set of guidelines to which multiple nations will adhere (Mayor, 1999; Tadd, 2000). To do otherwise is tantamount to inflicting one culture’s value system upon another’s, and that is a slippery slope which all too frequently leads to the imposition of a moral hierarchy from one group of people upon another (Baker, 1998b; Gergen, 1999). A brief review of the history of 20th century totalitarianism suggests the perils of such “othering” of different peoples and cultures when it is grounded in a stance of cultural, racial or moral superiority (Neuhaus, 1992; Riggins, 1997). Such practices are anathema to the spirit and the letter of the social work professions mission, values and ethical standards (NASW Code of Ethics, 1999).

Significance

The timeliness and relevance of examining research ethics across cultures, especially those national cultures grouped in recent years under the sociopolitical rubric known as “the West,” are consequential. In a time of transnational cooperation among nations for purposes of economic development and social advancement, the international research community is experiencing an infusion of money that is often connected to a global sociopolitical agenda (European Commission, 2000, 2002; Kalantaridis, 2000). Also, many of the social and biomedical problems faced in the modern world have tentacles which stretch across cultures (e.g., SARS, AIDS), and require multinational
collaboration to generate wide-ranging solutions (Coker & McKee, 2001; Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, 2002; Dallia-Vorgia, et al., 2001).

In such a research environment, which nation's ethical protocols take precedence? For instance, should funding for stem cell research emanate from an American source, but actually be conducted in Germany or Hungary, to which set of (necessarily culture-bound) research ethics would researchers need to comply? American, since the funding for the research grew from an American source with an American geopolitical agenda and a clearly defined and legislated human subjects system? Or German (or Hungarian), since the research is to be conducted within their respective national borders by native researchers with native research subjects, in a research environment with perhaps different human subjects protections, and almost certainly different research cultures? These issues have immediate and direct implications for social work if the profession is to remain among the vanguard of meaningful social science research for the world community, yet stay true to the values underlying the NASW ethical code.

Research Questions

The fundamental research questions to be addressed in this study are:

- What are the differences in research ethics and human subjects protection among the United States, Germany and Hungary?
- To what might these differences be attributed?
- What are the influences of history and culture upon these differences?
- What are the unifying, or at least common, principles of ethical research to which each culture subscribes?
• What are the barriers among these cultures which might prohibit or subvert the development of commonly agreed upon ethical principles of human subjects protection in research?
• Are these barriers incommensurate?
• What contribution might the social work profession make to the creation of a workable code of research ethics that possesses broad, respectful applicability?

Methodology

The proposed study constitutes an exploratory analysis, conducted on the theoretical level of research ethics and human subjects protection across three cultures with diverse histories and, more to the point, diverse experiences with the treatment of human subjects in research (Mill & Olgilvie, 2002; Singleton & Straits, 1999). In effect, the study is a comparative analysis or cross-sectional ethnography of three societies: the United States, having arisen as a society wherein the individual is granted unalienable rights, with a substantive body of regulations governing the protection of human subjects (Amdur & Bankert, 2002; United States Declaration of Independence, 1776); Germany, a nation with a justifiably proud history of scientific inquiry whose population, with the noteworthy exception of the Third Reich era (and, for East Germany, the ensuing 45 years of Soviet control), has been traditionally granted rights of protection by virtue of law (Fulbrook, 1999; Pommerin, 1996); and Hungary, a society with an equally proud scientific history which was severed from its traditions during the occupation of the Third
Reich in World War II and in the years of Soviet domination (Balazs & Hare, 1990; Csepeli & Kolosi, 1993; Kahler, 2000).

These three nations were chosen for this study primarily for convenience of the researcher, as he has had the opportunity to visit these countries and dialogue with social work scholars and experts in research ethics in the United States, Germany and Hungary. In addition, these three nations were selected as broadly representative of three forms of governance: a fully capitalistic republican democracy (United States), a social democracy with a harrowing 20th century history of Nazi dictatorship and socialist rule (Germany), and a social democracy just now emerging from decades of absolute totalitarian domination (Hungary).

The study will focus primarily, although not exclusively, upon the post-war era, as the issue of ethics in research and human subjects protection was first outlined and codified in the Nuremberg Code. This document has, for the intervening 55 years, been the foundation upon which modern research ethics and human subjects protection have been built (Gordon & Prentice, 2000; Mayo, 2001).

As mentioned above, however, history, politics, social culture and circumstance have shaped how different nations have elected to address the topic of research ethics and operationalize the principles of human subjects protection. Further, the scientific traditions of the United States, Germany and Hungary vary considerably. It is the fundamental thesis of this dissertation that these forces have been critical factors in the definition and construction of modern research ethics within these diverse societies, and that current efforts in each nation to protect human subjects of research are imbedded in a cultural context of near Talmudic complexity.
Consider that the structure of the modern institutional review board (IRB) system in the United States is a microcosm of Talcott Parsons’ structural functionalist model of societies (Parsons, 1951), with interacting systems reminiscent of Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s general systems theory (von Bertalanffy, 1967). Or ponder the idea that the influence of Joseph Goebbels’ mastery of propagandistic symbols has haunted German science long after that sinister genius killed himself in a bunker underneath the rubble of Berlin in April, 1945. Also reflect upon the impact of the bastardized Marxism that corrupted ethical science in Hungary for 45 years. How might that have changed the purpose and evolution of research in that beleaguered nation?

We shall start with a chronological history, with particular focus on the 20th and 21st centuries, in order to set the examination of research ethics and human subjects protection in each nation’s unique context. The historical foundations of each country will be discussed to bring a sense of narrative drive to our understanding of how these respective cultures have evolved. In addition, the study will attend to the significant moral, cultural and sociopolitical developments which have occurred in the United States, Germany and Hungary to examine how each nations’ guiding philosophy has been shaped and manifested in a system of governance. We shall also consider the matrix of rights and laws governing these societies, and judge the effectiveness of these governing systems in providing human rights protection to its citizens.

From this comparative analysis, presumably there will emerge historical, philosophical, sociopolitical, moral and legal similarities among the three countries. Equally likely, differences will arise (Collier, 1993). The study will of course focus ample attention on the similarities and differences relative to the evolution of research
ethics and human subjects protection, but we must recognize from the outset that such contrasts may be largely attributable to a nation's cultural context and social history, rather than to any perceived or anticipated moral failing of its people (Christakis, 1999; Riggins, 1997).

Given that international trends toward globalization and research collaboration will very likely accelerate (DeBoer-Ashworth, 2000; Kitschelt, 1994), the issue then becomes one of ethical commensurability across nations (Kuhn, 1962/1996). To wit, where are the common ethical grounds among these diverse cultures, what are the barriers to integrating existing ethical research codes and laws, how might divergent standards be negotiated such that each culture's web of traditions and means of governance be respected, and can an overarching set of ethical practices be constructed to protect human subjects engaged in international or multinational research (Baker, 1998a, 1998b)?

The format for this work will consist of several chapters designed to give the reader a chronology of historical events for each nation on the dimensions noted above, followed by a chapter dedicated to using Donald Chambers' model of problem analysis (Chambers, 2000). After these chapters, discussion will center on the theories that undergird the evolution of human rights and research ethics in the post-World War II era, and assess the commensurability of various ethical codes in the context of cultural similarities and differences. Finally, the researcher will provide a commentary directly addressing the viability of identifying a cross-cultural set of ethical principles for research involving human subjects, and end with a discussion of the relationship between codes of research ethics and the social work profession's ethical code.
CHAPTER I

FIN DE SIECLE TO THE END OF THE GREAT WAR

This chapter will focus on events in the United States, Germany and Hungary from the period, 1900-1920. We shall examine these three nations across the dimensions of history, sociopolitical movements, science, culture, underlying philosophy and pertinent changes in law. For purposes of maintaining narrative flow, some of these dimensions will be combined under broader headings that more accurately capture the essence of the times. A brief summary of cultural similarities and differences will conclude the chapter.

The first decades of the twentieth century saw the flowering of the progressive movement, including the full birth of social work. Born as a response to the urbanization of the United States, social work during the early years of the century sought to feed the assimilation of a new generation of immigrants into the melting pot of American society. These times also witnessed the origins of a pseudoscientific reaction to immigration, the eugenics movement, which in decades to come would pose a threat to the lives of millions of Europeans and Asians, and require America’s powerful but ambivalent status as a world player to conquer. Eugenics also brought the legitimization of racial hygiene, backed by the power of the state, and the sentinel warnings that the might of science, left unrestricted, could become a tool of oppression as readily as a key to progress.
In Europe, the period, 1900-1920, gave the world a foreshadowing of the terror of the technological warfare that would inflame the century to come. With it came the death throes of traditional empires, and in that vacuum modern totalitarianism would have its genesis.

The United States

In March, 1900, Wilbur Wright stood in the tiny back yard of the Wright Bicycle Shop on Third Street in Dayton, Ohio. His experiments with inventing a flying machine had not been going well, and he was beginning to doubt the accuracy of the notes and tables compiled by his predecessors in Europe. They simply didn’t add up to Wright, and worse yet, didn’t match his experience with the glider he and his brother Orville had built and piloted. There was something wrong in the balance of the glider; it was too dependent on wind currents and made the thing almost impossible to steer. Adding an engine would only compound the problem. No, the problem of balance had to be solved before he would even considered putting an engine on his glider.

Will Wright was not an educated scientist. Quite the reverse, actually. He thought of himself as more of a tinkerer, a bicycle mechanic. He looked more like a tinkerer, too. Tall, angular and lean, Will Wright was balding, with eyes that looked right through you. His sharp nose pointed to a mouth that perpetually carried the expression of someone who was on the inside of a good joke. Will didn’t talk much, so combined with that look, most people thought him humorless and unfriendly. A man who didn’t readily suffer fools. It wasn’t actually true; it was just the way he came across.
He liked to take a break from his work at the shop once in a while and go out back to watch the pigeons perched on the phone and electric wires above the yard. He was sure that the answer to finding a way to balance and steer his glider rested with the birds, not more calculations. Will observed the pigeons fly away, floating on currents of air, guiding themselves by arching and tilting their wings, soaring.

That was it. The answer to flight wasn't adding mechanized power, it was really finding a way to balance and flex the wings. Will ran back inside the shop and explained it to Orville. Together, they built a new model of their glider, but this model had wings that could be warped up and down, mimicking the action of a bird's wings, and could be controlled by a glider pilot using a wooden rudder. Wilbur Wright, bicycle mechanic and dreamer, had figured out how to fly (Tobin, 2003).

The Progressives

Wilbur Wright and his brother Orville were emblematic of the spirit of the times as America turned to the opening of a new century. New inventions were springing up everywhere, from the telephone and electricity a couple of decades before, to the driving machines that were opening up the vast American countryside and fueling migration in and out of the cities. In the America of 1900, everything seemed possible. It was the dawn of a modern age.

A new political movement was afoot in the new century, too. Born of industrialization, the rise of corporatism and labor unrest, the progressive movement was all about reform. Economic reform to stabilize the "trickle up" redistribution of wealth that had been gradually happening in the United States since the end of the Civil War in
1865. Legal reform to break up the trusts that had monopolized crucial industries and placed overwhelming power in the hands of a few. Political reform to seize back the power of the vote, and wrestle the *vox populi* away from the smugness and corruption of urban party politicians. And social reform, as American cities grew far beyond the infrastructure necessary to sustain them, afloat with immigrants who sought new lives, but often found that they felt at home only in the tenement slums and ethnic enclaves of backwater urban neighborhoods, where the cacophony of foreign languages drifted above the city like coal smoke.

Poverty was rampant among the immigrants, and housing was worse. Rather than finding a melting pot in America, immigrants simply found social and economic isolation. America’s farmers and native laborers fared little better in an era when the nation’s agrarian traditions were slipping into a fondly recalled but disappearing frontier past. Industrialization and the staggering dichotomy of wealth were choking out the citizenry, cleaving rich from poor. This wasn’t Jefferson’s America anymore (The Progressive Era, 1999).

The progressives were from all over the country, and had passions for very different causes, but there were two commonalities among them. First, many if not most of the progressive reformers came from America’s tradition of middle and upper class elites (Mills, 1956; Sandel, 1996). Predominantly Yankee, Protestant and nearly bursting with noblesse oblige, the progressives wanted to correct the excesses and disadvantages which had overcome the United States, and return it to a nation more reflective of democratic ideals and social justice (Young, 1990). Mainly, the progressive movement was about reinventing an America which had lost its ideological way on the path from agrarian frontier to industrialization, urbanization and a new role in the world order (The Progressive Era, 1999).

While zealotry was not uncommon among these reformers, none embodied the zest and swagger of the progressive movement more than Theodore Roosevelt. The 26th President of the United States, Roosevelt carried the standard of progressive politics, and instigated such modern reforms as the conservation movement, anti-trust legislation and labor reform. In addition, T.R, as he was often called, asserted a new role for America in world politics. Hereafter, the United States would be increasingly bound to the fate of Europe, and the residue of the progressive philosophy would propel the United States into World War I (Gilbert, 1997).

Roosevelt was a dominant figure on the American political landscape until his death in 1919, but it was left to another progressive reformer, Woodrow Wilson, to navigate America’s relationship with the world during the war years of 1914-1918. Wilson believed that the reform movements of the United States ought to be exported to other parts of the world, particularly Europe. This is the essence of Wilson’s oft quoted
statement that America’s entry into World War I was intended to make the world safe for democracy. The absolute persona of youthful American idealism, undergirded with not just a little Yankee hubris, Wilson’s reformist spirit would prove his undoing, and ultimately his death.

Science, Eugenics and the Law

The reformist movement which captured American culture during the pre-World War I years was not limited to political and economic change. In keeping with the new century’s zeitgeist, American science also became caught up in the desire to improve the lot of humankind and to preserve what was viewed by some as the best people with the best traits in American society.

Blending science with social philosophy, the American eugenics movement took as its launching point the genetic studies of Gregor Mendel and the principles of natural selection first witnessed by Charles Darwin. The eugenicists believed that they offered a public good to American society. Essentially, the eugenicists wanted to change American breeding habits in order to eradicate some of the social problems facing the country: poverty, criminal behavior, social deviance, and the changing face of the American citizenry from white western European stock to the swarthy and foreign stock drawn from eastern and southern Europe. Further, the eugenicists wanted to retrain traditional Americans to have more children—the best and the brightest—in order to out-propagate those citizens considered to be of lesser genetic quality: the alcoholics, psychotics, the retarded and the poor, the “feebleminded,” and the mentally ill (Barondess, 1998, 2000; Lombardo, n.d.). While the eugenicists adopted a variety of
means to foster their goal of ethnic and sociocultural hygiene, such as Fitter Families Contests at state and county fairs, a primary tactic used to accomplish this end was involuntary sterilization of those social cohorts deemed "undesirable."

Lest one think that the eugenics movement was the construction of scientific cranks, note that Francis Galton, the brilliant English scientist, Leonard Darwin (Charles’ son), and Charles Davenport, American born, Harvard Ph.D., were among the most vocal and assured of eugenics supporters. Alexander Graham Bell and Luther Burbank also strongly endorsed the eugenics movement, and even Theodore Roosevelt once commented that America’s white middle class was committing "racial suicide" by procreating at a lesser rate than recently arrived Old World immigrants (Lombardo, n.d.).

Foremost among American eugenicists was Charles Davenport. Born in Stamford, Connecticut in 1866, Davenport grew up in a puritanical home where his father, a strident abolitionist, devout churchgoer and temperance zealot, ruled over Charles and his ten brothers and sisters with a strict, unforgiving hand. The family had a tradition of valuing education, and Charles received his Ph.D. in biology from Harvard in 1892, then briefly taught at the University of Chicago.

In 1904, Davenport became director of biological research at Cold Spring Harbor, on New York’s Long Island. His directive from the Carnegie Institute, the main funding source for his work, was to engage in experimental research related to human evolution. Davenport shunned experiments with human beings, but began instead to collect and aggregate family histories to study the influence of genetics upon the transmutation of desirable (and undesirable) traits across human generations. He was convinced, under the influence of Mendel’s genetic studies, that certain traits were passed genetically across
generations. Moreover, he believed strongly that certain traits and characteristics were based in ethnic and national origins (Barondess, 1998, 2000; Lombardo, Eugenics Archives, n.d.).

Davenport, however, was neither a politician nor a legislator. For that, the eugenics movement relied upon a man named Harry Laughlin, superintendent of the Eugenics Record Office, the repository of Davenport’s voluminous collection of family genetic histories. Laughlin believed that most modern immigrants were “worthless,” destined only to pollute the American race. He was an ardent supporter of sterilizing “hereditary defectives,” and in 1914 Laughlin published his Model Eugenical Sterilization Law, proposing the mandatory sterilization of the “socially inadequate.”

In 1907, Indiana became the first state in the union to pass legislation that permitted sterilization on eugenic grounds. Connecticut soon followed. By 1914, twelve states had enacted sterilization laws modeled upon Laughlin’s plan, and by 1924, 3,000 people in America had been involuntarily sterilized. For the most part, those sterilized were considered to be feebleminded, insane, criminal, alcoholic, diseased, deformed and dependent. This latter category included orphans, the homeless and the poor (Lombardo, n.d.).

At final tally, sterilization laws were adopted by 30 states. The sterilization laws written by Laughlin and the eugenicists were upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Buck vs. Bell (1927). Curiously, the majority opinion of the court was offered by Oliver Wendell Holmes, an otherwise impeccable jurist, who allowed that, “three generations of imbeciles are enough” (Lombardo, Eugenics Archives, n.d.). It wasn’t until 1942, in Skinner vs. Oklahoma, that the U.S. Supreme Court overturned sterilization
laws permitting involuntary sterilization of criminals. Involuntary sterilization of the mentally ill was not outlawed in the United States until the 1970s. By that time, approximately 60,000 Americans had been victims of involuntary sterilization (Barondess, 1998, 2000; Eugenics Archives, n.d.). The age of genetic engineering in the United States had finally ended, for a time. (It is worth noting that an influential work in ringing the death knell for the eugenics movement in the United States was B.F. Skinner's *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, first published in 1971.)

*American Culture*

The United States during the period addressed in this section underwent a great transition, from nascent industrialized country with an agrarian tradition to a fully industrialized nation and, by the terminus of World War I and the Treaty of Versailles, one of the great western powers. Acculturating the western world to the American way of life had been initiated by Woodrow Wilson, and of course this process reverberates through American foreign policy to the present day. Never again would the United States fully retreat from the world scene, even though occasional isolationist movements would assert themselves among the populace.

Internally, the United States grappled with the full meaning of this transformation, both in terms of ascertaining the responsibilities inherent in world politics and calculating how to manage threats, real and imagined, from outside the western hemisphere. Was it now the responsibility of America to export democracy to the rest of the world and then defend it when threatened? How was the nation to contend with the inundation of immigrants, foreigners with foreign ideas, that were now crowding Ellis Island? And
what about the effects of world thinking and world culture that were increasingly difficult
to keep at bay from America’s shores? Perhaps the oceans were not wide enough to keep
the Old World from further influencing the New.

Also, we can view this period as a time of progressive reform, as the nation
attempted to retain democratic ideals while adapting them to the modern world. In
general, the progressive era was one of which Americans can be justifiably proud. As it
became manifested in the exportation of Americanism to other cultures in order to
improve them, though, the zeal of progressivism may have borne the kernels of
burgeoning Yankee arrogance. Of greatest portent, however, may have been this nation’s
enchantment with eugenics, for it wouldn’t be long before this peculiar American export
would be taken up by less well intentioned proponents than Charles Davenport.

Hungary

It has been said that Hungarian historical periods end in catastrophe, and that
Hungarian history itself appears episodic and in a chronic state of rebuilding (Held,
2000). This may be due, in part, to the fact that Hungarian history is a tale of conquest,
struggle against oppression, followed by independence and recovery. Prior to the turn of
the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, Hungary had been conquered by Arpad’s warriors in 895, the Tatars of
the Great Khan in the 13\textsuperscript{th} century, the Ottoman Empire in the 16\textsuperscript{th} century and the
Habsburgs in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century (Held, 2000; Lazar, 2002).
Hungarian Politics and Governance

The failed revolution of 1848, a popular uprising driven by the Hungarian people's desire to replace the Austrian Habsburg monarchy and Hungarian nobility with a democratically elected, independent parliament, has reverberated well into the 20th century. All across Europe, the populace was in revolt against the seemingly unshakable power of the monarchical system. People were sick of centuries of despotic rule by the nobility. The revolutions of 1848 sought to instate systems of government reflecting the rise of the modern nation. In Hungary, this revolt was compounded with a desire on the part of Hungarians to be rid of the Habsburgs, their rapacious autocracy, and their insatiable acquisitiveness for more territory (Brandt, 1987). The brutal measures used by the Habsburgs to put down the uprising chafed the already bitter relationship that existed between Austrians and Hungarians, and began a series of events that would soon produce the collapse of Habsburg rule in Central Europe.

The Compromise of 1867, which came about as a long-term result of the failed revolution for Hungarian independence of 1848, gave Hungary a measure of freedom from the Habsburg Empire of Austria insofar as internal rule was concerned. Still, governance over foreign affairs remained solely in Vienna (Kosary, 1998).

But by the start of the 20th century, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, always more unified in name than anything else, was beginning to show signs of fracture. Desirous of spreading Habsburg Rule, Emperor Franz Josef was looking for an excuse to stretch his domain into the Balkans. As part of this plan, he had struck a pact with Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany. Both of these actions laid the groundwork for war and demise of the empire (Lazar, 2002).
In 1900, the internal differences of the Habsburg Empire, which comprised peoples of German, Czech, Slovakian, Polish, Hungarian, Romanian, Serbian, Croatian and Italian descent, were growing worse. While appearing to be united by a common language, used only at the Viennese court and thereby camouflaging the rifts between a variety of peoples, disparate cultures and the ruling aristocracy (Hall, 1981), the rise of nationalistic aspirations among these subjugated peoples began to create rumblings much like those occurring in other parts of the western world (Gilbert, 1997).

In addition to cultural and nationalistic disruptions, economic and political forces were at work, too. Labor revolts, assassinations, political movements involving socialists and anarchists, and general disenchantment with monarchical governance were creating an atmosphere redolent with the scent of impending change. From 1905 through 1912, there were periodic uprisings in Hungary, primarily in Budapest, each with nationalistic themes, and each calling for independence from Austrian rule.

Within Hungary itself, various groups of non-Magyar Hungarians were also calling for greater representation and voice within the Hungarian parliament. These events culminated in 1912 with an attack on Count Istvan Tisza, the new president of the Hungarian parliament. An anarchist sneaked into a parliamentary session and fired pistol shots at Tisza. The president was not injured in the assassination attempt, but the event underscored the depth of non-Magyar opposition to Budapest’s dominance over Hungarian internal affairs, language and culture (Gilbert, 1997).

All over the Austro-Hungarian Empire, conditions were the same: fractious and increasingly vocal and violent. By 1913, it was apparent that the empire was falling apart, victim of its own internal strife and failure to adjust to the social and political
changes brought about by the increasing power of nationalism, socialism and general unrest. The mounting fury of marginalized people whose culture, language and economic well being had been corroded by decades of oppressive reign emanating from Vienna and Budapest was catching fire (Mars, 2000; Riggins, 1997).

The Habsburg monarchy elected to look outward toward conquest rather than inward toward reform. Needing an external enemy, and always grasping for extension of empire, Franz Josef looked south, toward the Balkans. In the summer of 1914, in Sarajevo, a Serbian anarchist gave him just the excuse he needed for invasion.

The Crucial Summer

John Keegan (1999) has postulated that the First World War was tragic and unnecessary, a conflict which could have been averted at many points during the summer of 1914. Yet Keegan’s thesis rests upon his belief that World War I was brought about by a series of avoidable events which were either ignored or mishandled during the summer of 1914. This is a disputable point, for it is predicated on the notion that war was undesired by both the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and implies that Europe stumbled thoughtlessly into a morass of its own making.

For some time prior to 1914, Kaiser Wilhelm II had been developing a military machine in Germany and was now itching to put it to good use. Likewise, in Austria-Hungary, the divisiveness apparent within the empire required that the emperor find an external enemy to quell internal dissent, mobilize the varied peoples of the empire in common cause against an obvious threat from without, and simultaneously extend the power and scope of what was, by 1914, an empire in the early stages of its death throes.
In the rush to war that summer, though, there was at least one Hungarian who had reservations, Istvan Tisza.

Count Istvan Tisza de Boros-Jeno was born in 1861 in Transylvania, and was murdered by Magyar communists less than three weeks before the final armistice in 1918. Tisza was intermittently prime minister of Hungary through much of the period, 1900-1917. His was one of very few voices that raised opposition in Vienna to the forces clamoring for war and annexation of the Balkan nations. Because he was himself the son of a prime minister, Tisza had benefited from growing up near the seat of power, and recognized more than most how intoxicating and corrosive such power could be when accompanied by arrogance and greed (Thursfield, 1998). In the thirst for war that was enveloping Vienna and Budapest, Tisza saw not victory and expansion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but destruction and defeat.

Tisza did not anticipate that war would bring a ready conquest of the Balkans for Austria-Hungary, but thought instead that it would likely bring virtually all the European nations into conflagration due to the system of treaties designed to create a stable balance of power among empires. A singular voice, regardless of its eloquence, proved insufficient to avert the cries for war, and in Vienna (still maintaining steadfast control over foreign affairs for Austria-Hungary), his warnings went unheeded.

In July, Franz Josef, wounded and angry about the assassination of his nephew and heir in Sarajevo, sought and was given the infamous “blank cheque” from Wilhelm II, which granted Austria-Hungary unconditional support from Germany in the event of war (Gilbert, 1997; Keegan, 1999). But the system of treaties that existed in Europe in 1914 would surely prompt the involvement of Russia, France and England, should Serbia...
be invaded. Thus when Austria-Hungary elected to enter Serbia and bombard Belgrade, a full European war was all but assured. In August, 1914, the machinery of modern war was unleashed, and a carnage began which would scar the remainder of the century.

The Peace Treaty of Trianon

By November, 1918, the Great War had ended, at least militarily. The human and social cost had been unimaginable. Of 63 million combatants, 8.3 million were killed or missing in action. Twenty-one million had been wounded or taken prisoner. Almost half of the soldiers sent into battle were casualties. From the Habsburg Empire, 1,500,000 soldiers were lost.

Civilian casualties were equally shocking: eight million dead, nearly 20 million wounded. For most purposes, a generation of Europeans was gone (Gilbert, 1997; Keegan, 1999), and humankind had been introduced to its own frailty in the face of technology’s power.

Yet nature, never to be outgained, inflicted as many casualties of war as did the planned killing. In 1918 alone, 20 million died of Spanish influenza in Europe, Asia and North America (Bray, 1996). The toll of disease and pestilence rivaled that of the Plague of Death in the 14th century (Zinsser, 1934/1963), and unknown millions of people were displaced, wandering Europe, dazed, hungry and homeless (Diamond, 1997). The war had been the greatest disaster in historical memory.

Essentially, the Great War was a stalemate. On the western front, fought over four years in gruesome trench warfare, the front had moved less than ten miles since 1914. On the eastern front, the empire of the Habsburgs had been shattered, the Russian
army had laid down its guns and begun to trek home in 1917, the Russian monarchy had fallen to the Bolsheviks, and Serbia was still not part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. An atmosphere of general revolt seized the continent, sparked by the Bolshevik uprising to be sure, but fed by years of economic hardship and sociopolitical oppression (Rees & Donald, 2001). To this day, no one can say with certitude what prompted Europe, especially Austria-Hungary and Germany, to initiate what must ultimately be considered as simply an act of mass self-destruction. Old Europe was dead, buried in ground hallowed with blood, a cloud of mustard gas hanging ominously over the rows of graves.

The final blow for Hungary came in 1920, with the Peace of Trianon. Not truly a peace, but rather an ultimatum given by the victors to the vanquished, the Peace of Trianon dismantled the vestiges of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and forced Hungary to yield two-thirds of its territory and three-fifths of its population (Bodi, Fabian & Giczey, n.d.b; Held, 2000; Romsics, 2002). One-third of ethnic Hungarians now lived outside the country’s boundaries, often just a few kilometers over a contrived national border (Lazar, 2002). This made the new nation of Hungary almost ungovernable from Budapest, and even an outside observer, C.A. McCartney, the British historian, noted that the vindictive peace which created so many small, defenseless states out of the Austro-Hungarian Empire might someday have difficulty withstanding the incursions of historically militaristic nations such as Germany and Russia (Lojko, 1999).

Further cleaving the nation, nearly every newly formed region and county of Hungary began to carve out its own, highly centralized form of government (Romsics, 2002). It was a fragile nation, rife with civil turmoil, abundant only in chaos and
widespread misery. Geographically, politically and economically, Hungary after the war was a broken country.

Hungarian Science and Culture

Oddly, as Hungary ended its tenure as a dominant European power politically and militarily, it did not leave behind its legacy of cultural influence and scientific achievement. During the period before the Great War, Hungary had taken steps to gradually introduce principles of market capitalism into its economy. In this it was considerably advanced over most of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and helped to foster civil society in Hungary, especially in Budapest. Like much of Hungarian history, the introduction of capitalism into Hungary's economy was characterized by fits and starts, wherein it evolved rapidly in the fin de siècle era, then was stunted by external control from Vienna (perhaps sensing a threat to its dominance) as the time of war approached (Kolosi & Szelenyi, 1993).

At the turn of the century, Hungary's economy was attracting substantial foreign capital, and was thus integrating with the rest of central and western Europe at a faster pace than was Austria. This in turn facilitated the growth of civil society and the advancement of the arts in Hungary. Use of rail travel was increasing, and signs of new construction were plentiful, particularly in the cities (Lazar, 2002).

(Author's note: A stroll through Pest will provide the reader with ample proof of the considerable appeal of Hungarian architecture during this time. Buildings designed and constructed in the late Habsburg era are everywhere, regal in design and quite beautiful. Likewise, Pest's subway system is a testament to the modernity embraced by Hungarian
city planners during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Its ornate metalwork and intricately lovely tile facades put shame to much more “modern” facilities.)

Hungary had also introduced the Bismarckian model of social care to central and eastern Europe immediately prior to the beginning of the 20th century. Also during this time, Hungary created a health administration to oversee health care in the nation and was responsible for implementation of Hungary’s health laws (Kapronczai, 1999). Hungary was clearly and fully joining the modern world (Bodi, Fabian & Giczey, n.d.a).

The Hungarian Academy of Sciences, originally formed in 1825, had by 1900 become a bastion of learning and research and was respected internationally for its contributions to the study of philosophy, social and historical sciences, linguistics, mathematics and the natural sciences (Koenig, 1997). The academy was particularly renowned for its assimilation of the ideals of the 1848 social reforms in Europe, and just prior to the outbreak of war had initiated scholarly inquiry into the ills of society, much like the progressives in America (Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2002).

Unlike some European countries, in Hungary Jews were by and large welcomed into the social and scientific arenas, especially in Budapest. Jews were broadly assimilated into civil society, and were generally viewed as symbols and progenitors of modernism, industrialization and urbanization, qualities much valued in pre-war Hungary (Ungvari, 2000).

The tale of Hungary in the period, 1900-1920, then, is a tale of two cultures. One culture, politically tied and militarily dependent upon the Habsburg Empire seated in Vienna, was disintegrating as it fought the changes so insistently forced by modernity. The other Hungarian culture, that directed toward scientific achievement, cultural
advancement and acceptance of intellectual inquiry and growth of civil society, was flourishing. The former was most certainly destroyed by World War I. The latter, though, somehow managed to survive well enough to propel Hungary into the modern age.

Germany

Wilhelm II, Kaiser of Germany during this time, was born in 1859, son of Emperor Frederick II and Victoria, the daughter of England’s Queen Victoria. Wilhelm was raised to be not only an emperor, but a soldier as well. At 29 years of age, he became emperor of Germany and within two years had rid himself of the most powerful and influential politician in the nation, Otto von Bismarck. Wilhelm was not a proponent of either modernism or parliamentary democracy. Born to the throne, with the accompanying sense of rightness and entitlement, he was an autocrat through and through, and ruled Germany as a monarchy. He was among the last of a dying breed (Gilbert, 1997).

Germany’s Militaristic Politics

Wilhelm believed devoutly in a strong military and the importance of extending Germany’s power and influence throughout the world. His imperialistic purposes were played out during the waning days of the 19th century in Africa, where he, with the French and his British cousins, essentially carved up that continent for colonization. Wilhelm supported the Boers against the British during the Boer War of 1899-1902, not so much because he held any great affinity for the Dutch colonizers of South Africa, but
rather to weaken and limit British influence in that region (Gilbert, 1997). Wilhelm had other plans, German plans, for Africa, but World War I would abort them.

At home, Wilhelm ruled Germany as if the reforms of 1848 and the Bismarckian period had never occurred (Brandt, 1987). By the turn of the century, the same social unrest that was plaguing Austria-Hungary and the United States was asserting itself in Germany. The expense of Wilhelm’s imperialist ventures around the globe had fallen largely on the German middle and lower classes in the forms of higher taxes, which lowered the standard of living among German workers and their families (Gilbert, 1997). Slow to offer reforms, Wilhelm also faced labor revolts, strikes, a failed assassination attempt in 1900, and an increasingly acrimonious socialist movement that was embodied in the German Parliament by the Social Democratic Party.

Still, most of Wilhelm’s energies were directed toward expansion of the empire and the development of a modern war machine. Eager to outdo Bismarck, Wilhelm envisioned his reign as a continuation of Bismarck’s Second Reich (the first being the supremacy of Germany in the Holy Roman Empire centuries before) which would promote Germany as a world power second to none, and certainly not second to the British (Baring, 1994).

By 1908, however, the stress of autocratic governance, combined with the now chronic social unrest within the country and Wilhelm’s near obsession with outdoing the British, appeared to have caught up with him. He suffered what has been termed a “nervous breakdown,” and retreated from his role in the German government for a few years. During this time, Wilhelm’s chancellor, von Bethman-Hollweg, filled the vacuum created by Wilhelm’s absence. No less an imperialist that Wilhelm, von Bethman-
Hollweg was a strong supporter of the German-Austro-Hungarian alliance. As the clandestine German policy of war preparation mounted, von Bethman-Hollweg looked for ways to use the alliance to limit what he feared would be a growing dominance of Russia in European affairs (Gilbert, 1997; Keegan, 1999). Much like Franz Josef and his war planners in Vienna, von Bethman-Hollweg was waiting for a spark to set off the powder keg.

By 1914, Wilhelm was fully recovered. The spark he and von Bethman-Hollweg had been so patiently awaiting had occurred early that summer in Sarajevo, with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria. Knowing that Franz Josef wanted to annex Serbia, Wilhelm offered the Austrian emperor the "blank cheque" described elsewhere, knowing quite well that this would provoke war. Wilhelm, like Franz Josef, gambled that Austria-Hungary’s movement to absorb Serbia would not bring about a full European war, that none of the great powers on the continent would go to war for the Balkans, regardless of alliance treaties. They were both wrong.

_The Detritus of War_

The course and outcome of the Great War has been recounted above. Suffice to say here that Germany lost 2,000,000 soldiers dead, a male mortality rate for the generation of men ages 19-22 during the war years of almost 20%. This does not speak for the wounded, captured and missing. In Germany after the war, men born between the years 1892-1895 were scarce. Total loss rates for this generation, including those lost to death, grievous wounds, disease and starvation, approached 40% (Keegan, 1999).
Even before the war ended, though, Germany was falling apart. Early in 1918, 400,000 workers in Berlin went on strike for peace. Within two days later, the strike had spread to six other German cities. Martial law was declared in Berlin and Hamburg. A brief time later, the Social Democrats in parliament called for an end to the war. Socialists like Rosa Luxemburg did likewise. In October, the Allies overran a thirty-mile stretch of the Hindenburg Line. In parliament Prince Max of Baden, the new German chancellor, agreed to sue for peace, on the sole condition that in the future, only the Reichstag would have the power to declare war (Gilbert, 1997).

Like Austria-Hungary, Germany by war's end was in shambles. Wilhelm was chased from power and left the country, a defeated king, one week before the November armistice of 1918. After his abdication, socialist forces in the country, enheartened by the success of the Bolsheviks in Russia, sought to fill the void of formal power by creating a German socialist revolution modeled on the Russian revolution of 1917 (Keegan, 1999). They called for a general mutiny of the German army. On the disintegrating eastern front, German soldiers began their long walk home.

*German Philosophy and Sociology*

While there can be no denying that the primary thrust of German politics during the period, 1900-1918, was indeed militaristic with imperialistic aims, there is equally no denying that there was also a very significant intellectual movement afoot in Germany prior to and during this era. For example, the influence of Karl Marx upon the progressive and socialist movements in the United States, Germany and Hungary is
obvious. For decades into the future, the impact of Marx’ thinking would pervade world sociopolitics and efforts directed at national reform.

Unlike Hegel, who conceptualized issues such as class, distribution of wealth and the state as ideals, Marx viewed these matters materialistically. Marx took Hegel’s ideals and philosophically operationalized them into a political schema that could be practically attained (Munch, 1993; Ritzer, 2000). Since Marx viewed labor as a nation’s (or an economy’s) source of wealth, it is understandable why his thinking was so attractive to working people of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. After all, it was labor which was most cruelly victimized by the industrial revolution and the rise of the wealthy, ownership class. But even though Marx’ thinking about society is eminently practical, he was dismissed by sociologists during his lifetime as being too ideological, and perhaps a “closet” economist (Ritzer, 2000).

It may be closer to the truth, however, to consider that Marx was at first not well regarded by the generally conservative sociological theorists of the time because he was a proponent not of explanation, but of change. This in turn made him even more attractive to those in American, German and Hungarian (as well as Russian) societies who had identified the ills brought about by the industrial revolution and wanted to ameliorate them via radical change.

The ghost of Marx pervaded German philosophy and sociology for some time after his death in 1883. In fact, the impact of Marx’ thinking seems to have resonated with the passage of time and the advent of organized social disruption. The work of Max Weber, for instance, tried to work within the Marxian tradition but focused more intensively upon dualisms implicit in Marxian thought: rationality vs. inequality,
efficiency vs. waste, and scientific advancement vs. dehumanization. Weber found these dualities difficult to reconcile within what he considered Marx' simplification of societal forces and his view of economics as largely a deterministic phenomenon (Munch, 1993). In addition, Weber held that a simple explanation of how people were stratified within a society which did not include power relationships as well as class relationships was insufficient (Ritzer, 2000).

Georg Simmel, another German sociologist of this period, focused his attention upon the nature of social interactions. Simmel believed that the proper study of sociology required an analysis of the nature and forms of human relating. Simmel's thinking was to have a profound effect upon American sociology, particularly in the development of symbolic interactionism. Just as importantly, especially to our discussion of the influences of culture upon meaning and interaction (Geertz, 1973; Hall, 1981), are Simmel's beliefs regarding the role of culture in developing, and ultimately controlling, the individual. Put somewhat differently, Simmel believed that, as a society becomes increasingly complex and expansive, the importance of the individual diminishes (Ritzer, 2000). Thus, in Simmel's view, the more dependent people become upon social processes and services, the more freedom they must sacrifice to meet their needs (Ignatieff, 1984; Munch, 1993). Simmel's ideas regarding the manipulation of symbols to in turn manipulate cultural meaning would influence the creation of the Third Reich. In the propaganda machine constructed by Joseph Goebbels, we can readily see that part of Goebbels' depraved brilliance was much concerned with how to use typification of the Jews to dehumanize them and thereby rationalize their destruction.
While neither a philosopher nor a sociologist, the impact of Sigmund Freud upon German intellectual thought at this time cannot be ignored. Freud, not a German but an Austrian, simply changed the way we view our existence and the recursive interaction with reality that we call experience (Freud, 1922/1960). There is no need to go into a detailed discussion of Freud’s thinking here (such is his influence that a detailed discussion is unnecessary); suffice to say that were we to apply Freud’s conceptualization of the provinces of the mind (id/ego/superego) to social and governing systems, it is not difficult to see their analogs in the concepts of savagery, civilization and religion.

Let us take a moment to contemplate the influences of these German philosophers and sociologists upon modern times. Marx, and the socialist/communist states which have to a significant degree attempted to embody and empower his thinking, have had an undeniable effect upon the course of western history in the 20th century. Moreover, Marxian thought has served as a theoretical bedrock for modern conflict theorists (Collins, 1975; Dahrendorf, 1959) as well as sociologists attempting to explain power structures in the United States (Mills, 1956). Marx’ thinking has even informed the philosophy underlying the helping professions in the United States, most particularly social work (Reamer, 1993).

Insofar as the influence in modern times of Weber’s thinking, one has only to look at the impact of bureaucracy in our lives to see Weber’s ideas regarding the rational-legal construction of modern states. Additionally, Weber’s elaborate analysis of the intricate mechanics of the modern social state deeply affected the views of Talcott Parsons and the structural functionalist movement (Merton, 1968; Parsons, 1951/1979).
Likewise, Georg Simmel has cast a long shadow over the development of American symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969; Goffman, 1959, 1974). Simmel was intrigued by the nature of human interactions and the complex meaning systems that surround and describe these interactions. Simmel, like the symbolic interactionists who followed him, believed that there existed a typology of interactional patterns (Ritzer, 2000), and that if one could identify such a typology, commonalities of meaning across interactions might be discovered. For example, Simmel was fascinated with the symbolic meaning of money in a capitalist society, holding that money was not simply a currency of exchange for goods and services, but also carried a value quotient for the individual. In modern America, as in much of the western hemisphere, it is rather apparent that Simmel’s assessment has tremendous merit.

Each of these German thinkers was to have a very strong, and at times very unsettling, effect upon the evolution of events as the 20th century unfolded. The manifestation of Marxian thought in the creation of a totalitarian regime in Russia would have a frightening consequence for the people of Hungary. Weber’s dualistic construction of the forces at play in society implied that such contradictions could be reconciled, but as Munch has pointed out (1993), efforts in 20th century Germany to reconcile these contradictions, particularly that concerning scientific advancement vs. dehumanization, have resulted in the creation of a fascist state with a staggering propensity to wantonly sacrifice humanity for the purported cause of science. Simmel, on the other hand, in expressing the cost to the individual of dependency upon the state, predicted the dehumanizing forces which underlie totalitarianism, industrial capitalism and the modern welfare state (Ignatieff, 1984).
Nonetheless, it is clear that the militarism of the German (and Austro-Hungarian) empires may have eventuated in the ultimate demise of the ruling government and reigning power structures, but within the confines of civil society in each nation, a rich scientific and philosophical culture was flourishing in the pre-war era. Unfortunately, for Germany at least, the price of peace was to culminate in the perversion of this culture.

**The Peace That Would Not Go Away**

In January, 1919, the victors met the vanquished in a rail car outside of Paris. While there were no substantive negotiations, since the terms of the armistice had been German and Austro-Hungarian surrender, the major figures writing the Treaty of Versailles (as well as the Treaty of Trianon) were Woodrow Wilson of the United States, David Lloyd George of Britain, Georges Clemenceau of France and Vittorio Orlando of Italy. How such generally reasonable men created a document that was to haunt Europe through the end of World War II is difficult to fathom (Gilbert, 1997; Taylor, 1961).

There were in fact five treaties, named after five suburbs of Paris: Versailles (Germany), St. Germain (Austria), Trianon (Hungary), Neuilly (Bulgaria) and Serves (Turkey). Only two directly concern us here, Versailles and Trianon, and the Peace Treaty of Trianon has been addressed elsewhere in this text. The main terms of the Treaty of Versailles were:

- The surrender of all German colonies as League of Nation mandates;
- The return of Alsace-Lorraine to France;
- Cession of Eupen-Malmedy to Belgium, Memel to Lithuania, the
- Hultschin district to Czechoslovakia, Poznania, parts of East Prussia
and Upper Silesia to Poland;

- Danzig to become a free city;

- Plebiscites to be held in northern Schleswig to determine the

- Danish-German frontier;

- Occupation and special status for the Saar under French control;

- Demilitarization and a 15 year occupation of the Rhineland;

- German war reparations of 6,600 million pounds;

- A ban on the union of Germany and Austria;

- An acknowledgement of Germany’s guilt in causing the war;

- A provision for the trial of the former Kaiser and other war leaders;

- Limitation of Germany’s army to 100,000 men with no conscription,

- tanks, heavy artillery, poison gas supplies, aircraft or airships; and

- Limitation of the German navy to vessels under 100,000 tons and no

submarines.

Germany signed the treaty in January, 1920, under protest; the United States
Congress refused to ratify the treaty. In France and England, there was tremendous
uproar. From the right, the clamor focused on the lack of pursuit by the French and
British governments of article 11, the trial of the Kaiser. On the left, the furor arose over
article 10, placing all blame for the war upon Germany. Socialists maintained that the
war had been instigated by international capitalist interests and that blame ought to be
shared by all countries who were participants (Gilbert, 1997).

Virtually no pre-war European national boundary was unaltered after the Treaty
of Versailles. The geopolitical winners were England and France, having usurped much
of Germany's colonial territories. Germany was stripped of its role as a world power, its pre-war boundaries were substantially reduced, and the nation was humiliated by the forced acknowledgement of complete responsibility for the outbreak of war. Moreover, Germany's capacity for self-defense was entirely compromised, and the article requiring massive war reparations would cripple her economy for years. The treaty was without question a devastating, vengeful act on the part of the victors, secured virtually at gunpoint from a historically proud people. The terms would prove impossible to complete, and right there in that little rail car, the seeds of the next world war were irretrievably sown (Taylor, 1961).

Summary

Germany and Hungary in 1920 were broken countries, their boundaries violated, governments crushed and societies left rudderless and impoverished. Before and during the war, both Germany and Hungary had seemed to be nations divided within themselves. Warlike and imperialistic at the top, civil and cultured in the middle, and poor, as always, on the bottom. Many of their contributions to philosophy, sociology, science and architecture would be forgotten or perverted by coming events. Nature abhors a vacuum, it has been said. The vacuum in governance in Germany and Hungary would soon be filled by unstable extremists and anemic democrats, each vying to rule defeated nations without economic resources or even the means to protect themselves.

America had come out of the Great War a reluctant world power. The war to save democracy had shown that the oceans were not large enough to protect her from either foreign entanglements or foreign wars. Wilbur Wright's flying machine had helped
introduce a new facet to warfare, one with devastating consequences for the future. The
progressive era was over, its energy fully spent in the war, although Fightin’ Bob La
Follette and a few others would continue the good fight into the next futile decade.
Kaiser Bill had given America an evil “over there” that Americans could unite against,
and in so doing set aside domestic differences for a time. But already in Europe there
were forces mustering that would create a new set of foreign entanglements, and no
amount of isolationism at home would prevent another trip across the ocean. The world
had become too small.
CHAPTER II

1920 TO THE EDGE OF CALAMITY

This chapter will describe the period, 1920-1939, the era between two world wars, and examine events occurring in Germany, Hungary and the United States. A brief summary will conclude the chapter.

The annihilation of World War I produced a hunger for order in post-war Europe. The ravages of broken economies, broken cultures and the death of empires across the continent had left Europe without a compass to guide the future. Into the void that followed the war fell wobbly democracies, inflation-fractured socioeconomic systems and heretofore culture-rich national identities. Into the breach strode strong leaders who brought with them a nationalism reflecting not the pride of tradition but the xenophobia of uncertain times. The anger set ablaze by the peace treaties ostensibly ending World War I fueled a hatred for those who did not appear to endure a full measure of post-war suffering, and it would take a new machinery of state to bring them to their perverse justice and rid modern European societies of them once and for always.

In the United States, a new position in the world brought a new prosperity at home. Yet the lawlessness that was brewing in Europe enamored Americans and personified the growing disparity between haves and have-nots. Demagoguery, so captivating in Germany, Italy and Hungary, was far from foreign in America. Franklin
Roosevelt was elected to end the Great Depression, and slyly used both socialism and the industrial demands of modern war to make good on his promise.

Germany

Jupp was born in 1897 in the smoky, factory-ridden industrial region of Germany known as the Rhineland. His parents were working class Germans, a factory foreman and the daughter of a blacksmith. Firmly reared, Jupp went to Catholic schools, in keeping with his mother’s devout faith. He was a fragile child, small and clumsy, and the other children at school showed him little mercy for his deformed foot, the result of contracting polio when he was very young.

Jupp was smart, though. He’d been rejected from military service during World War I due to his foot, but as it turned out, that was as much blessing as curse. He’d secured a number of Catholic scholarships to university, and by the time Jupp took his Ph.D. in history in 1921, he had attended eight German universities and made up in education what he lacked in physical prowess.

Originally, Jupp had wanted to be a writer. He wrote novels, a couple of plays, and tried to acquire a job as a newspaper reporter for a Berlin daily. Each venture met with rejection, and each rejection embittered Jupp a little bit more. Combined with the ridicule he’d suffered as a child, his small stature and deformed foot, the repeated rejections of his writing and the general malaise under which Germany lived in the years immediately following World War I, Jupp carried around more than his share of unspoken wrath and rancor toward the human race. Soon, however, this would change. He would find his voice.
In 1922, largely by happenstance, Jupp heard a speech delivered in Munich by a young radical, Adolph Hitler. The speech changed his life. Somehow the speaker captured the rage curdling within Jupp and gave him a focus for his anger. None of his misfortune was his own fault, Jupp realized. It had been inflicted upon him, first by the defectives who had tormented him as a child, then by the shameful ways Germany had been treated in the aftermath of the war, and by the smug intellectuals and financiers, most of them Jews, who were bleeding the country dry of its pride, money and morale. Well someday the bastards would pay.

Jupp decided to get closer to this Hitler fellow. The more he knew Hitler, the more he admired him. Hitler made sense. And he seemed to like Jupp, and needed his help as a writer and an organizer. Jupp finally belonged to something now, something bigger than himself, a movement that would restore Germany to her glory, erase the past, and wipe out those who would sell out her future.

Jupp, now going by his given name of Joseph, became an important man in the new movement called National Socialism. He wrote speeches extolling the wondrous future in store for Germany, if only Hitler came to power. He edited the party’s Berlin newspaper, Der Angriff (The Attack), and became skillful in developing party propaganda. Jupp was finally a success, and got to wear a uniform, too. A few years later, when Hitler was released from his unjust incarceration, Jupp became propaganda minister of the entire Nazi party. He had discovered his voice, and his mission in life (The Goebbels Diaries, 1948).
At the end of war, the need for national unity evaporates and divisiveness takes its place. Idealism subsides, and coarse realism takes over (Allen, 1931). Even before the war had ended, Germany erupted into revolution. In October, 1918, sailors mutinied in Kiel and, mimicking their Russian brethren, created soviet councils of workers all across Germany. In November, Kurt Eisner, leader of the socialists, declared Bavaria a socialist state. Kaiser Wilhelm's government was crumbling into chaos. A few days after the Bavarian declaration, Wilhelm abdicated and fled with his family to Holland. Eisner's reign was short-lived, however. He was assassinated by a German nationalist in early 1919, ostensibly because he was a Jew. For the next few months, Germany was a state embroiled in civil war. Friedrich Ebert, the new president, established martial law, invaded Bavaria, reclaimed it from the socialists and executed the party's leaders, including the longtime German socialist reformer, Rosa Luxemburg (Gilbert, 1997).

Meanwhile, the new German government, ensconced in Weimar, began work on a German constitution that guaranteed personal liberties and gave both men and women the right of suffrage. It was the Weimar government that eventually signed the Treaty of Versailles, an act for which it would never be forgiven. Compounding the Weimar republic's problem with internal dissent was rampant inflation in the German economy. For example, in 1921, there were 64 German marks to the American dollar. By the end of 1923, it took 4,200,000,000,000 marks to match the dollar. With this absurd level of inflation, German payment of the war reparations demanded in the Treaty of Versailles was impossible. France and Belgium, insisting that Germany's debt be paid one way if not another, invaded the Ruhr valley, Germany's center of coal, iron and steel production,
thereby insuring the further decline of Germany's economy. In 1924, the economy collapsed, feeding even more outrageous inflation and creating widespread unemployment.

It was left to an American banker, Charles Dawes, to create a different plan for future war reparations. Dawes essentially placed Germany on a deferred payment plan, with the approval of the victorious allied leaders, and arranged for Germany to receive an infusion of foreign loans. This maneuver stabilized the economy, and by late 1924 inflation in Germany had been contained, if not arrested (Gilbert, 1997).

Not everyone in Germany was pleased by this turn of events. Extremists within Germany were counting on inflation, hatred of foreigners, the shame generated by the war guilt clause in the Versailles Treaty, and out of control unemployment to stoke anger among the German people toward the Weimar government. One such extremist, Adolph Hitler, continued to rant against Weimar, the influx of foreign money (and hence, foreign influence) and the terms of the treaty. By 1925-26, he had successfully built his Nazi party into a nationalist coalition supposedly designed to restore Germany to her former greatness and free her from foreign control. Chief among Hitler's lieutenants was Joseph Goebbels, a brilliant propagandist who used newspapers, radio broadcasts and speeches to capture the fears and resentments of Germany's largely unemployed working class. He also wanted to focus them upon the alleged source of their trouble, the Jews, and simultaneously upon their savior, Adolph Hitler. While not the first person to effectively use media for propagandistic purposes, Goebbels was surely the most gifted, and the most unscrupulous (DeFleur & Ball-Roebach, 1989; Simons, 1976; The Goebbels Diaries, 1948).
By the end of the decade, Goebbels and the Nazis had built German fears and anxieties to such a point that they had in effect created a new reality, one founded on scapegoating a single group of German citizens, the Jews, so as to free Aryan Germans from the onus of blame for the war and its aftermath (Finzsch, 1997; Gergen, 1999; Riggins, 1997). Moreover, the ones to blame for Germany’s woes were to be purged (Arendt, 1963). In that way, Germany’s recent past would not become prologue to a more dismal future.

The New Messiah

Germany’s history is one of promising beginnings, dramatic changes and abrupt breakdowns (Baring, 1994). By 1925, Hitler’s Nazi party was clearly in ascendance, particularly in Bavaria. Also in that year, Friedrich Ebert, the Weimar president, died. In the general election that followed, former Marshal Hindenburg, a hero of World War I, was elected second president of the Weimar republic. Hindenburg was old, tired, and despite his stature among Germans, no match for Hitler and the accelerating momentum of his Nazi party in the aftermath of Hitler’s release from prison and the ensuing publication of his Nazi screed, Mein Kampf (My Struggle).

In Mein Kampf, Adolph Hitler laid out his agenda to full public view. Concentrating on Jews, and to a lesser degree Marxists, Hitler wanted to purify German racial integrity by cleansing it of Jewish/socialist thinking and genetic pollution. He called for nothing less than eradicating the “Jewish danger” from Aryan German life, and put forth himself as a bulwark against the incursion of Jews, socialists, and any one else who sought to corrupt his new Germany. Hitler would protect Germany from her
enemies, both within and without the country, and never again would Germany be at the mercy of non-Aryan, inferior peoples (Hitler, 1925/1998).

Over the next several years, Hitler slowly but persistently built his Nazi party. The genius of his appeal was twofold. Hitler had blended the traditional Germanic bond of \textit{gemeinschaft} with the call to larger purpose and national salvation imbedded in the concept of \textit{gesellschaft} (Lyons & Miller, 1997). This combination provided an allure to the increasingly desperate German people that was unifying, reassuring and uplifting.

At the time of the 1928 elections for Reichstag representation, the Nazi party secured 810,000 votes, although Nazis held only twelve seats in the new assembly. An economic downturn in late 1928 yielded an increase in Nazi membership, and rising unemployment further expanded its rosters. All the while, Hitler’s speeches and Goebbels’s propaganda hammered away at the Jews. Jews were responsible for the bad economy and unemployment. Jews were bleeding the country dry and banking their money elsewhere to prevent it from helping Germany. When the Great Depression hit Germany in 1930, unemployment spiked further upward, and the attacks against Jews grew more vicious. Hitler’s stormtroops began physical assaults against Berlin’s Jews. Across the nation, the attacks spread. As unemployment rose, so did Nazi membership. By 1933, the Nazis were powerful enough to demand that Hitler be appointed German chancellor. When the Weimar government refused, the street violence intensified, and Hitler countered this with still more strident calls for a strong government run by the Nazis. (Gilbert, 2001). Germany was becoming a terrorist state.

In January, 1933, Hitler and the Nazis got their wish. Adolph Hitler became chancellor of Germany, invited to do so by the weak and ill Hindenburg. Within weeks,
Hitler abolished democracy in Germany. The trigger was the Reichstag fire, which Hitler blamed on communists, socialists and of course the Jews. On March 19th, the Nazis began to round up and concentrate their enemies behind barbed wire near a little town outside Munich named Dachau. Before the year was out, more than 100,000 Germans had joined them (Gilbert, 2001). Adolph Hitler, the corporal who had failed at virtually everything he’d ever tried, had patiently, painstakingly accomplished one of the most amazingly unanticipated revolutions in history, and in so doing would perfect the modern totalitarian state.

_The Fate of Defectives_

In the new Germany, there would be no room for those who might erode the ideals of the Third Reich. The initial solution was to sterilize the infirm, the defective and the deformed (with the notable exception of Dr. Goebbels). The laws were quickly expanded to include Jews, Gypsies, and anyone else deemed unfit for procreation. The Nuremberg Laws, as the compulsory sterilization statutes were called, were an exercise in socially reconstructing race in Germany from different to defective to diseased (Conrad & Schneider, 1980; Finzsch, 1997). In addition, by co-opting the longstanding positivistic German legal tradition, through which rights were granted to all citizens by law, the Nazis managed to put the legal system into league with them by creating a new system of rights, one which would carefully discriminate whose rights would supercede others, and which rights would need abolition for the greater good of the state (Muller, 1991; Reich, 2001). Max Weber’s and Georg Simmel’s worst fears about the powers of state to control the individual were being realized (Munch, 1993).
Between 1933 and 1938, camps modeled on Dachau sprouted up across Germany. Hundreds of thousands of people were incarcerated, all identified by the party as either defectives, pollutants or enemies of the state. At first, most were put to hard labor, secretly rebuilding the German war machine under the aegis of IG Farben and other German corporations dedicated to creating an unassailable (and profitable) Third Reich (Koenig, 2000). In time, with the careful planning of Joseph Goebbels and his associates, the practical utility of confinement and slave labor gave way to another utterly pragmatic endeavor: scientific experimentation using those whose lives were not worth living (The Goebbels Diaries, 1948).

For the Good of the Many: The Rise of Nazi Science

German science had a exceedingly proud tradition by the end of World War I. During the next few decades, however, Hitler and the Nazis would corrupt this tradition beyond recognition (Szollosi-Janze, 2001). The Nazis would use science, much as they used the German legal system, not to foster these justifiably honorable contributions of German society, but to politicize and turn them to a nefarious purpose, the purging of undesirable peoples in Germany and, in time, the rest of Europe (Barondess, 1998; Proctor, 1992).

Implicit in the Nazi policies of eugenic improvement and racial purification was the concept of Social Darwinism. Briefly, Social Darwinism deviates from Charles Darwin's principle of natural selection in that it does not occur naturally in the environment, but is steered by the hands of people (Weindling, 1987) and, in the case of
Nazi Germany, by the machinery of state (Kuhl, 2001). It is utilitarianism taken to a
disastrous extreme (Freeman, 2000).

Nazi eugenics policies, though, were not born in Germany. Recall that the
eugenics movement, while cultivated in Britain, did not reach full flower until it had
crossed the ocean to the United States. Remember also that the eugenics movement in
the United States had its policies codified into law in 30 American states, and fully
60,000 people in America were involuntarily sterilized during the period, 1924-1970
(Barondess, 1998, 2000; Lombardo, n.d.).

Yet the Nazis fully systematized racial hygiene during the 1930s, and extended its
Darwinist principles to include not just the infirm or defective, but entire groups of
people who were deemed undesirable by the Nazi government. First in line were the
Jews, although we must not forget that the Gypsy population of Europe was nearly wiped
out during the years of Holocaust, and thousands of Catholic and Protestant clergy,
liberals, socialists and intellectuals fell prey to the so-called racial hygiene movement as
well (Weindling, 2000).

This embrace of Social Darwinism for purposes of racial cleansing was predicated
on two shifts in thinking which warrant comment here. First, the ethos of medicine, and
secondarily science, in Nazi Germany moved from one founded on the ethic of care-
based practice of the individual (rooted in the Hippocratic Oath’s famous dictum of “first,
do no harm to the patient”), to the broader social ethic of preventive care that respects the
emerging needs of the larger society (Reich, 2001). The significance of this shift cannot
be overstressed, for within this new social ethos of medicine and science resides the
denigration of the rights and needs of the individual to the purported greater needs of
society. In the name of such a fanatically utilitarian cause, almost any social policy, even that of racial hygiene, can be rationalized (Shuster, 1998; Szollosi-Janze, 2001).

The second shift in thinking concerned what we might call the “scientizing” of race (Weindling, 1989) and ultimately the “diseasing” of race. In essence, the scientific and medical establishments of early 20th century Europe were greatly concerned about the impact of disease upon the human condition (Bray, 1996; Zinsser, 1934/1963). Believing that many infectious diseases were borne by vermin and thus spread via vermin contact to infect large populations of people, some scientists in central and eastern Europe came to the conclusion that certain peoples, inherently unclean, were primarily responsible for the transmission of infectious disease (Weindling, 2000). This in turn provided a “scientific” bridge between eugenics and eradication of disease. Put differently, vermin cleansing became racial cleansing in an effort to exterminate the hosts of infectious diseases. Ultimately, the disease hosts were anyone the Nazis decided were political enemies.

Considered in this light, Nazi policies directed toward eradication of peoples for political and racial reasons could readily be embraced by medical science, and former agents of care and assistance (the medical community and helping professions) became agents of destruction (Caplan, 1992; Kuhl, 2001). Further, it was not solely the practicing medical community which accepted this rather facile explanation for racial hygiene, but the academic and legal institutions in Nazi Germany as well (Seidelman, 2000). Thus there existed a troika of human exploitation in Nazi Germany, comprised of the state, the medical profession and academe. Each benefited, in that the support of the academy reinforced the state’s legitimacy in pursuing racial persecution and eugenics.
programs, the medical profession implemented the policies and received political rewards and power, and the academy benefited from having human subject material available for teaching and experimentation. The legal institutions in Germany then protected each from legal accountability (Muller, 1991; Proctor, 1992; Sidel, 1996). From a Freudian perspective, it is as if the primary ego functions of Nazi society colluded with a clearly id driven impulse to co-opt the social controls embedded in the supposed superego institutions of civil German society (Freud, 1922/1960).

*Can Moral Perversion Produce Good Science?*

Much has been written questioning whether “good science” can survive in the moral depravity of a totalitarian state (Moore, 2002; Proctor, 2000). Certainly the horrendous experiments conducted by Nazi scientists and physicians are reprehensible in the extreme. But at the risk of withholding full condemnation of German science during the Nazi era, there are a couple of considerations we must entertain. First, even though Nazi experimentation with captive human beings was (and remains) an abomination of the first magnitude, some good did indeed come from it. Nazi science developed the world’s first comprehensive body of scientific knowledge regarding the ill effects of tobacco use and in fact instigated the first social campaign against smoking. Also, Nazi science developed useful drugs such as Demerol and methadone, and made notable strides in the evolution of computers, liquid fuel rocketry, nuclear fission, magnetic tape recording, modern insecticides and human genome research (Katz, 1972, 1992; Moore, 2002).
The second consideration, one which calls into question the alleged ignorance of the American medical community regarding Nazi science and racial hygiene, is the frequency of publication of Nazi practices in such august scholarly periodicals as the *Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA)* during the pre-World War II years (Seidelman & Flanagin, 1996). Beginning in 1933, the journal published information describing new regulations in Germany forbidding Jewish physicians and scientists from participating in public medical debate and attending German medical schools, the promulgation of eugenics programs in Germany as part of national public health policy, eugenically driven sterilization programs (1934), racial hygiene (1934), the Nuremberg racial laws (1936), and racial purity as part of the German code of medical ethics (1938). Assertions that the American medical and scientific establishments were unaware of Nazi activities toward the Jews during the 1930s ring rather hollow in light of the fact that *JAMA* was then and is now a widely read and oft-quoted publication.

As wicked as Nazi science may have been, there exists a moral danger for science as a whole to portray Nazi physicians and scientists as monsters solely of Hitler’s creation, devoid of human decency and freakish in their tenacious persecution of racial and political scapegoats. It may be consoling for us to think of Nazi policies, and the Holocaust in general, as a singular event of pure evil which is an absolute moral aberration of human behavior (Neuhaus, 1992). This position, though, puts science at risk of being blindsided by the dark potential that is part of every human being, while glibly ignoring the often demonstrated reality that all human endeavor can be used for good or ill, regardless of nationality or culture.
Amidst Evil, Some Good

It should be noted here that most German physicians and scientists, like most German jurists, collaborated in varying degrees of enthusiasm with the Nazi agenda depicted above. That said, there were some German scientists who did not, and some German scientific institutions that tried to avoid participation in Nazi human subjects experiments.

One such scientist, Max Planck, was a world-renowned physicist. Planck was born in Kiel, Germany, in 1858. Taking his doctorate in physics from the University of Berlin in 1879, Planck’s contributions to physics are generally thought to have marked the commencement of modern science (Max Planck Gesselschaft, 2000). Both Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr cite Planck’s quantum theory as a major influence upon their work. A vocal opponent of Adolph Hitler, Max Planck resigned his position as president of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in 1937 in protest of the Nazi plan to eliminate Jewish teachers from Germany’s universities. In addition, Planck refused to work on any of Germany’s war research projects, although he was eminently qualified to do so.

Another German physicist, Werner Heisenberg, remained in Nazi Germany during the war years, but was a staunch defender of Albert Einstein and other Jewish scientists. Heisenberg, born in Wurzburg in 1901, won the Nobel Prize for physics in 1932, but his scientific career in Germany was blocked by the Nazis due to his frequent defense of prominent Jewish scientists and their “Jewish style” ideas. While Heisenberg did contribute his knowledge and skills to the German nuclear weapons project, it has been argued that his dedication to this effort was less than enthusiastic (Max Planck Gesselschaft, 2000).
Like most German scientists, many German scientific institutions willingly corrupted themselves to the Nazi cause. There were two instances, however, in which German institutions resisted Nazi incursion. Each tried to maintain a measure of scientific autonomy from Nazi politics, but each in the fullness of time was caught up in the survival politics of the era and ultimately capitulated. The first organization, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, was established in 1920 to support the autonomy of German science (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 2003a). Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft held out until 1934, when pressure from Hitler and the Nazis became too great and the institute was threatened with closure unless it cooperated with the Nazi scientific agenda (Koenig, 2000).

The second organization, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, was an internationally respected research center for the physical sciences (Max Planck Gessellschaft, 2000). In 1941, Werner Heisenberg was named its director. Like Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute eventually succumbed to Nazi politics and practices, if not the ideology (Koenig, 2000). The point here is that while it is true enough that Nazism perverted medicine and science during the Third Reich era, it is inaccurate to maintain that all German scientists and German institutions were eager participants who rushed to join Hitler’s maniacal forces and diabolical agenda.

In addition to German physicians and scientists who elected to resist Hitler, there were also German social workers who did likewise. Once such person, Alice Salomon, deserves special mention. Alice Salomon was in a sense the German Jane Addams. Born in 1872 to German-Jewish parents, Alice was instrumental in developing professional social work in her native country. In 1899, she formed the first school of social work in
Germany and was closely allied with the women’s rights and other progressive movements of the era (Hering & Waaldijk, 2003). Such was her prestige that the school was named the Alice Salomon Social School for Women.

Salomon struggled with anti-semitism virtually her entire life. After World War I, she was denied the presidency of a German women’s organization, the Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine, because the membership did not want a Jew as their formal leader. When the Nazis came to power in 1933, Salomon was banned from the school which bore her name, along with other faculty of Jewish descent. Still, Alice resisted the racial hygiene policies of the Third Reich until she was expelled from the country in 1937. After emigrating to the United States, she died in 1948 (Hering & Waaldijk, 2003), and many of the social workers she trained became the “brown sisters” of Hitler’s Lebensborn program.

German Culture

Like German politics and science, Nazism warped German culture during the late 1920s and 1930s. By 1927, Goebbels’s propaganda machine was running full bore, and by the time of Hitler’s ascent into formal power in 1933, virtually all facets of German art, media and high culture were refracted through the lens of Nazi propaganda (The Goebbels Diaries, 1948). Architecture was the embodiment of the Nazi ideal, as were film and literature. Each was controlled and carefully shaped by the state, and Hitler’s grand vision of the Aryan culture dominant was manifested in every corner of Germany and beyond. A reign of terror is not the ally of a prosperous life of the mind. Let us now add that it is neither the friend of a vibrant, diverse culture.
Hungary

Ever so briefly in the immediate aftermath of the Peace of Trianon, Hungary was a republic (Lazar, 2002; Romsics, 2002). Within weeks, however, Bela Kun, a Hungarian bolshevik, created the “133 day revolution” (DeBoer-Ashworth, 2000), and in an effort to reunite at least some of historic Hungary, promptly invaded Magyar Slovakia and Romania. Slovakia relented, but Romania invaded Hungary in retaliation, captured Budapest, and set up a new Hungarian government, dedicated to the elimination of Kun and his socialists. Many of Kun’s followers were captured and executed, but Kun managed to escape to Soviet Russia, where he would in time fall victim to Stalin’s great purges of 1937 (Gilbert, 2001).

Miklos Horthy ruled the new government, titularly a kingdom without a king. Horthy had been an admiral in the Austro-Hungarian navy during World War I, and his method of rule was strongly militaristic and extremely right-wing (Lazar, 2002). Horthy was much enchanted with the manner in which Mussolini was restoring a war-riven Italy, and seemingly believed, like many others in Europe, that the proper antidote to the encroachment of bolshevism was fascism (Rees & Donald, 2001).

The Vagaries of Hungarian Recovery

Recall that after the Peace of Trianon, Hungary was torn apart both by the terms of the treaty and the factionalization of Hungarian political society into regional and local governing bodies. Horthy realized that no sense of national identity, much less national recovery, could come about if his nation continued to splinter into near tribalization. Yet
there was a pressure on Horthy, provided by the victorious allies, that held his right-wing government in sway: Hungary could only bring together its regional fragments and resurrect its economy if it avoided a full military dictatorship and accommodated at least some of Europe’s nascent democratic principles (Kolosi & Szelenyi, 1993; Lazar, 2002).

Gradually, a new Hungary emerged in the 1920s, consolidating its means of governance nationally and engaging in economic reforms which diminished the role of the old monarchic traditions. Horthy and his fledgling government made a stuttering yet consistent effort to democratically redistribute what was left of Hungary’s modest wealth. By decade’s end, Hungary was starting to get back on its feet (Bodi, Fabian & Giczey, n.d.b).

Still, the allure of Mussolini’s Italian fascism clouded Horthy’s mind. Resentment about the large number of Magyars living outside of Hungary’s borders continued to fester and, secretly, Hungary began to rearm. A Hungarian politician, Gyorgy Gombos, was creating a homegrown fascist movement in the Budapest government, and with Gombos’ increasing power in parliament, Hungary experienced a rise in the anti-Semitism sweeping Germany and Italy. There were violent attacks on Jewish students in Budapest beginning in 1928, but these were just a harbinger of things to come (Kitschelt, et al., 1999).

As the new decade turned, Hungary began to suffer the awful consequences of the Great Depression. Political events, and shifting political beliefs, brought about a stronger embrace of fascism as Hungarians grew more economically desperate and frightened (Szalai, n.d.). With the popularity of fascism, of course, came surging waves of anti-Semitism as the populace sought someone to blame for the unemployment, poverty and
generalized malaise so prevalent in Europe. Attacks against Jews occurred more frequently, and Jews were ostracized for the very things which had brought favor in the pre-World War I era: upward mobility, economic success and intellectual achievement (Ungvari, 2000). The Hungarian parliament passed *numerus clausus* laws, limiting the number of Jews who could be admitted to Hungary’s institutions of higher education, and the specter of Jewish responsibility for bolshevism was aroused once more (Mars, 2000).

In Budapest, anti-Semitic acts became more commonplace as the decade passed. Nazi propaganda seeped across the Hungarian border and infected university students, their teachers and the general population alike. Violent persecution of Jews began to take on the systematic quality of terrorism so evident in Nazi Germany, and vitriolic attacks against Jews were standard fare in Hungary’s newspapers (Barany, 2000). Fear and anger were gripping Hungary, and pulling it rightward toward an extremism that even Horthy could not fully control.

Horthy’s Hungary, to some degree, fell victim to the same preoccupation that pervaded Hitler’s Germany: restoration of national borders destroyed by the Peaces of Trianon and Versailles. His tactics, by 1937-1938, were similar as well, and like Hitler, Horthy tried to buoy the national economy with military rearmament. Encouraged by Hitler’s successes in the Sudetenland and Mussolini’s in Ethiopia, Horthy prepared for another war, and Hungary would again find herself on the losing side.

**Hungarian Science: Leave Now While You Can**

As in Germany during this era, Hungary’s scientific and medical communities were undergoing a profound change. Hungary’s long history of scientific and medical
research, its advanced system of administered health and social care (Kapronczai, 1999), and the country’s longstanding care-based ethos of medical science (Berta, 1999) were being corrupted by the influx of Nazi scientific propaganda and virulent anti-Semitism. While the eugenics movement in Hungary was never embraced with the same vigor that elevated it to pseudoscience in the United States and Germany, the ideology of eugenics and racial hygiene was known and recognized in Hungary (Barondess, 1998). Neither the practicing scientific and medical communities, nor the Horthy government, fully pursued eugenics in any systematized way (Butler, 2002; Kuhl, 2001). (This is not to say that Jews and the Roma population [Gypsies] did not eventually meet the same fate as non-Aryans in most other European countries.)

Prominent Jewish scientists recognized early on that they were neither welcome nor safe in fascist Hungary. Two such individuals, Leo Szilard and Edward Teller, provide good examples of the flight of numerous Hungarian scientists and intellectuals from their native but inhospitable land.

Leo Szilard was a brilliant scientist who contributed greatly to the growth of the fledgling scientific fields of thermodynamics, biophysics, nuclear physics and the development of atomic energy. Born in Budapest in 1898, Szilard was the son of a civil engineer. He was educated in Budapest, but his education was temporarily disrupted by his service in the Austro-Hungarian army during World War I. After the war, Szilard continued his studies in Hungary until 1920, when he emigrated to Germany to escape the increasingly anti-Semitic, repressive Horthy regime. During the 1920s, Szilard studied and worked in Germany with such important physicists as Albert Einstein, Max Planck and John von Neumann. He fled Germany in 1933 to avoid Nazi persecution and
went to Britain, where he continued to teach and perform nuclear research until he left for the United States in 1938. Szilard was a critical figure in mustering support from President Franklin Roosevelt for developing atomic energy, and helped create a team of physicists for war preparation research, later known as the Manhattan Project (Apor, 1999; Cohen, 1999).

Edward Teller, like Leo Szilard, was from Budapest. He was born into an affluent, educated Jewish family in 1908, and soon demonstrated his prowess in mathematics. In 1926 he too left Hungary and the growing extremism of Horthy rule, and went to Germany to engage in higher education in physics. After recovery from an accident in Munich, during which he lost his right foot, Teller went to the University of Leipzig to study with the prominent physicist, Werner Heisenberg.

With Hitler’s rise to power in Germany, Teller knew there was no future for him there either. In 1934, he emigrated to Denmark and worked with Niels Bohr to unlock the secrets of the atom. By 1935, Teller was in the United States, investigating the possibilities of splitting the atom and using nuclear fission to construct advanced weaponry in the event of war with Nazi Germany. Fearing that his former mentor, Heisenberg, might be discovering the same thing in Germany, Teller sought out Leo Szilard and Albert Einstein, and together they convinced President Roosevelt of the impending danger from German scientists. In time, Teller also became instrumental in the development of America’s atomic bomb and, later, the much more potent hydrogen bomb (Teller, 2001).

While not every émigré Hungarian scientist was as gifted, nor as fortunate, as Leo Szilard and Edward Teller, their stories illustrate the point that Hungarian science during
the years between the world wars was bled of much of its talent and intellectual force by
the advent of anti-Semitic fascism and totalitarian rule. Even had such notable figures as
Szilard and Teller remained in Hungary, they might well have faced increasing repression
of their work. Moreover, refusal of the Hungarian academic press to publish their
groundbreaking theories (Barany, 2000) might have contradicted the rigidly anti-Semitic
propaganda in Hungary that was increasingly passing for truth (DeFleur & Ball-Robeach,

Religion and Culture in Hungary During the Interwar Period

Religion held a central place in Hungarian culture during the first thirty years of
the 20th century, a tradition with a centuries-old history dating to the reign of St. Stephen
(1000-1038 A.D.). In fact, Stephen’s decision to ally Hungarian Christianity with Rome
instead of Byzantium effectively set the course for Hungary’s cultural alliance with
western rather than central or eastern Europe (Lazar, 2002).

The most powerful religions in early 20th century Hungary were Catholicism and
Calvinism, with Catholicism the faith of roughly two-thirds of Hungary’s inhabitants.
Lutherans accounted for about 6% of the religious population. By the 1930s, this
equation had changed little, although there had been an increase in the Lutheran
population to approximately 12% (Froese, 2001).

As the Horthy regime turned more and more to a fascist form of government,
religion began to lose favor in Hungary and worship of God was, at least superficially,
replaced by worship of the state. This of course is a cornerstone of totalitarian rule,
whether fascist or communist, and as Hungary took on the characteristics of a police state
in the late 1930s, freedom of religion, like freedom of the press, became one of its casualties (Barany, 2000; Froese, 2001). In the coming years, particularly after Hungary joined forces with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, religious persecution would be pursued with the vigor and thoroughness of racist extermination. The churches either closed or went underground, disrupting centuries of influence upon Hungarian history, culture and family life (Bodi, Fabian & Giczey, n.d.a; Tomka, 2001).

Yet Hungarian culture has proven itself nothing if not resilient (Held, 2000). This is due largely to several underlying constants in Hungarian history, some of which are a strong sense of nationalism among the Hungarian people and an omnipresent Hungarian identity (Kitschelt, et al., 1999; Kosary, 1998). Moreover, Hungarians exhibit an acceptance that their nation's history is one defined by fits and starts, wherein there is quick, florid social and cultural evolution after a period of repression, often followed by another repressive time during which evolution is stunted, and then when the latest repression is again cast off, Hungary flourishes anew (Kolosi & Szelenyi, 1993). We shall see this pattern unfold over and over as the narrative of Hungary in the 20th century continues, and underneath the pattern is an irresistible trend toward two things: a uniquely Hungarian version of modern capitalism and social democracy.

The United States

He was the guy who fixed the 1919 World Series. Arnold Rothstein was acquitted in the Black Sox trial in Chicago, even though nearly everyone knew he was somehow behind the fix. To this day, nobody can say for sure how he managed to pull it off. Those who claim to know something say he bet $250,000 on the series, counting on the
Cincinnati Reds to prevail over the unbeatable Chicago White Sox, and that when the Sox won games six and seven (in those days, the World Series ran nine games rather than the current seven), Rothstein assured Sox pitcher Lefty Williams that if he didn’t throw game eight, both Williams and his wife would be killed. The Sox lost both the game and the series (Asinof, 1979).

Meyer Lansky and Lucky Luciano, proteges of Rothstein’s in New York, said Arnold Rothstein could fix anything but the weather. But he didn’t start his life as one of the rich and powerful in America. Born in 1882 of Jewish parents in the Italian ghetto of New York, Rothstein’s family suffered the same fate as most recent immigrants to America. Denied access to the economic and social opportunities they’d envisioned from Ellis Island, the Rothsteins lived an impoverished life, with little hope of things getting better any time soon.

Not Arnold. If there were no legitimate social and economic paths out of the ghetto, then he would pick another way. At 16, he quit school. He hung out in pool halls, learning the gambler’s trade. By the time Arnold was 20, he was loansharking, slowly building his business relationships with politicians, judges, the police, and of course, other criminals with backgrounds like his. His organization included such criminal luminaries as Dutch Schultz, Legs Diamond, Frank Costello, Waxey Gordon, Johnny Torrio and the head of Murder, Inc., Louis Lepke. Rothstein had Tammany Hall, New York’s political machine, in his pocket, too. He was covered in New York, so he decided to branch out.

That’s where Luciano and Lansky came in. Friends since childhood, each of them had unsurpassed organizational skills. They saw American corporations like
Standard Oil and U.S. Steel taking over entire industries. Why couldn’t their organization, the Cosa Nostra, do the same with crime? No reason they couldn’t. Their syndicate of criminals captured the gambling trade. Then, when prohibition was passed in 1919, they took over bootlegging. After all, people weren’t going to stop drinking just because it was illegal (Allen, 1931).

They were called gangsters, but they thought of themselves simply as businessmen. They were supremely good at it, and what a business they ran during the 1920s and 1930s.

*American Society, Culture and All That Jazz*

America in the early 1920s was flush with victory and ready to revel in peace. The demobilization of the draftees who had fought in World War I commenced in 1920, and the country was ready for a return to normalcy. But if the world had changed as a result of the Great War, so indeed had America. There would be no return, only the unceasing flow of modernity, and Americans embraced it. Progressivism was not yet dead, but dying, and the might and resolve which America had mustered to make the world safe for democracy now would be put toward eradicating the country’s internal enemies: labor movements, bolshevism, and the pernicious effects of alcohol.

Taxes remained high after the war, due in part to war debt but also to the new income tax law passed in 1913 that showed no signs of being repealed now that peace had returned (Gilbert, 2001). Inflation was high, with food and rent costs growing each month, and it too was proving hard to shake off in the aftermath of war.
During the pivotal year of 1919, the United States had entered the prohibition era, to once and for all banish alcohol from American life, and with it the saloons, bars and taverns that represented all that might stand in the way of a new age of sobriety and hard work (Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, 1919). 1920 saw the creation of another amendment to the nation’s constitution, granting women the right of suffrage (Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, 1920). Both of these amendments bore the mark of the progressive era, but only one would stand the test of time and wisdom. (Prohibition was repealed in 1933.)

In the 1920s, America witnessed the coming of a new class of urban immigrants. Not drawn from the traditional immigrant bases of western Europe, which in most cases had been assimilated into the country’s agrarian tradition, this new group of immigrants settled primarily in cities, and rather than assimilate into American life like their predecessors, many of the newest wave of immigrants remained in ethnic neighborhoods in the urban centers of New York, Boston, Philadelphia and Chicago. Thus America’s cities, long considered a melting pot of Europe’s disenfranchised, were changing into a world of metropolitan tribalization, in which ethnic groups clustered among their own rather than disperse into the general population (Allen, 1931). Georg Simmel and Max Weber might have argued that as the larger American culture expanded in both population and complexity, the dehumanizing forces of industrial urbanization prompted newly arrived immigrants to band together to maintain a sense of cultural importance in their new nation (Ritzer, 2000).

The opportunities in these urban enclaves were scarce. Shut out from chances for a better life in the mainstream of America, unable and unequipped to traverse the expanse
of the American heartland, some new immigrants elected to pursue a deviant path to the American Dream. The road would lead to a new American underground, sparked by prohibition and the unbound wish of Americans to forget the destruction of war and the worries that attend to success. This voyage would use alcohol as its fuel, and its map would be the margin between the new legislated morality of the nation and the desires of its people. Prohibition may have changed America’s drinking habits, but it did so at the cost of fostering a revelry of crime.

The social mores of America were shifting as well. Remember that prior to the war, America had viewed itself as a new world, happily divorced from the old. But the war had shown that in the new century and the modern world, America’s fortunes were once again tied with those of Europe. During the 1920s, European influences pervaded American tastes, and vice versa. American soldiers had brought back European tastes for haute couture from London and Paris, and European styles graced the windows of main street department stores. A new American music, called jazz, was spreading across the United States and had crossed the ocean to Europe, and with it came a cultural cross pollination that further connected the continents (Allen, 1931). The new music fed the joie de vivre that had captured the good times of the 1920s among middle and upper class Americans and Europeans, so much so that jazz became the aural backdrop of the age.

Technology, in the forms of automobiles, phonographs and radio broadcasts were connecting Americans to one another as never before. It gave Americans the impression that we were closer to one another, that no gulf between us was unbridgeable. If western settlement had ended the physical frontier of the United States, invention and technology were closing the social and cultural frontiers.
Propelling the sense of good times was a bullish stock market. As American corporations became the icons of the times, and American capital was rebuilding drained and bloodless Europe, the American stock market became a symbol of the nation’s newfound power and prosperity. Everyone who had any money to invest put it in the stock market. Stock indices kept rising, stock prices doubling, then trebling. Like a child who has let go of a balloon, it simply didn’t occur to anyone that the market would stop rising, much less collapse under the weight of speculation. It was as if Americans were treating the stock market as the latest frontier, replacing the one that had faded from the nation’s landscape through conquest and modernity (Allen, 1931).

But stop it did, in October, 1929. The rising balloon turned into a bowling ball falling from the sky. Fortunes were lost. Peoples’ life savings were destroyed. Confidence in the nation’s economy shook like an earthquake. The grand party of the 1920s was over, and it would take the better part of a decade, and the coming of war, for the hangover to pass.

*Brother, Can You Spare Me a Dime?*

*American Politics and the Economy of the 1930s*

By Christmas, three million people were unemployed, and more than 22,000 businesses had failed. For the next eighteen months, the stock market made faltering attempts at a comeback, but by late 1931, it was evident that everything had changed, the market was now playing by different rules that no one could fathom. The era of Republican prosperity was over.
There had been unemployment promptly after the end of World War I, combined with severe inflation, but both Woodrow Wilson and Warren Harding had managed it reasonably well. Helping of course was the onset of a vigorous economy buoyed in large measure by technological strides in manufacturing and transportation of goods. With the death of Harding in mid-decade, Calvin Coolidge, Harding’s vice president, inherited a robust economy and his job as steward was simply to keep it going. That he did. Herbert Hoover, Coolidge’s successor, did much the same, but the great stock market crash of 1929 was testament not so much to a lack of stewardship on Hoover’s part as it was to a general overextension of stock speculation and the pollyannaish belief that the growth and prosperity of the American economy would go on indefinitely (Allen, 1931; Gilbert, 2001).

Naturally, as unemployment skyrocketed and food lines began to stretch down the streets of urban America, as farms were foreclosed in the heartland and drought ravaged the plains states, fears of the working class grew. Labor unrest increased as plant closings multiplied and still more people were put out of work. Suddenly, socialism didn’t look as bad as it had during the post-war years of Palmer Raids and the imprisonment or deportation of suspected bolsheviks and “fellow travelers.” It seemed that the bottom had fallen out of American capitalism, and the citizenry was desperate for leaders with solutions (Allen, 1931).

Kingfish

The conditions were ripe for would be saviors. Down in Louisiana, there was a man who would show the country how it was done. Huey P. Long was born in 1893 in
Winn parish to a middle class family. He was a bright student, possessing a photographic memory, but he quit school when he was seventeen to become a traveling salesman. Long sold books, canned goods and patent medicines around the state, learning its power structures and developing the relationships which would serve him later in his political career.

Huey married and settled down for a time in 1913. He studied law and passed the Louisiana bar exam in 1915, and promptly took on Standard Oil in a class action injury compensation suit. Even though he lost, the case demonstrated Long’s populist beliefs and his desire to represent “the little guy” against the immense wealth of big corporations. Elected to his first political office in 1918, by 1924 he was using radio to spread his populist message to the people of his home state, and in 1928 he was elected governor of Louisiana.

Kingfish, as Huey Long liked to be called, raised corporate taxes and used the money to pave thousands of miles of Louisiana road, build bridges over the Mississippi River, construct hospitals for the poor and middle classes, endow Louisiana State University’s medical school, and provide school kids across the state with new schools and updated textbooks. Fed up with Long’s antagonism and his success in taking away Standard Oil’s profits, the oil giant tried to have Long impeached in 1929, but failed. From this victory, however, the seeds of Long’s eventual demise were sown. He became increasingly ruthless in his attacks on political enemies, and his polemics against the traditional powers in Louisiana became strident to the point of demagoguery.

Still, Huey Long was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1930 (some say Standard Oil and Louisiana’s upper class clandestinely supported his election to get him out of the
state). But Huey didn’t leave. Simultaneously holding the governor’s mansion, he didn’t take office in Washington, D.C. until 1932, at the depth of the depression, and promptly sided with progressive senators, arguing for bold, forceful action to bring the nation out of its economic crisis. Long supported the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, but turned on FDR when the new president wasn’t sufficiently forthcoming with political patronage for the Kingfish and his cronies. Now he was beginning to believe that he was not only bigger than Standard Oil, but more important than the president as well.

Throughout his brief but stormy career in the senate, Long fought for the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the farmers and working people of the country. Predictably, his efforts produced little in the way of lasting results. Back in Louisiana in 1935, Huey Long was planning a run for president against Roosevelt in the 1936 election when a physician, Carl Weiss, assassinated him in the Louisiana State Capitol. It was widely believed at the time that the assassination was personally, rather than politically, motivated. Regardless, the tumultuous political life of an American original was over (Hair, 1991).

*Happy Days Are Here Again!*

With Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s landslide election to the presidency in 1932, much of America was hopeful that economic circumstances would change for the better. Running on what he termed “a new deal for America,” Roosevelt believed that radical change was necessary to save the country from revolution. Roosevelt in a sense inoculated the United States with quasi-socialist reforms in order to stave off a full socialist revolt (Gilbert, 2001). He was inaugurated as president a scant 33 days after
Adolph Hitler came to power in Germany. Six days later, the U.S. Congress passed an emergency banking act, giving Roosevelt the power to reopen those American banks which he hoped would become solvent. It was the beginning of America’s New Deal, and that session of congress was to pass more legislation than any other in American history. Roosevelt and his congress increased employment through the use of federal works projects, and further bolstered the economy by increasing defense spending. He built a system of dams on the Tennessee River, providing electrical power to vast areas of the impoverished South. In 1935, FDR and his congress passed the Social Security Bill, establishing for the first time a network of financial safeguards for America’s population.

But Roosevelt was not without his critics. Foremost among these was the United States Supreme Court. In the same year that social security was passed, the court determined that several of Roosevelt’s economic recovery initiatives—most especially those dealing with improved wages for working people and increasing fair competitiveness within industries—were unconstitutional. Roosevelt countermanded the court’s ruling with an executive order (Black, 1999). The accusations of dictatorship came furiously from FDR’s opponents, comparing him with Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin. The powers of American laissez faire were enlisted against him, and were embodied in corporate and judicial opposition (Gilbert, 2001). Still, the presidential election of 1936 gave Roosevelt another landslide victory. He carried every state in the union, save two.

In full flush of his reelection victory, FDR countered his enemies on the Supreme Court by calling for a reorganization of the entire federal judiciary. Most significantly, he wanted to expand the number of Supreme Court justices from nine to fifteen, which would effectively permit him to appoint the additional six justices and thereby “pack” the
court with New Deal appointees. Roosevelt’s failure to enact this change in the judiciary marked the high water point of his radical action in altering American domestic policies, but his reforms were to characterize the beliefs and behavior of the federal government in the United States for the next fifty years (Black, 1999).

Tuskegee: Science, Politics and Race

Following World War I, the United States experienced a resurgence of a uniquely American organization’s power, that of the Ku Klux Klan. Founded quickly on the heels of the Civil War by defeated Confederates, the Klan wanted nothing less than a return of antebellum relations with the African American (Allen, 1931). Freed, granted full citizenship and the right to vote by the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments to the Constitution (Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, 1865, 1868, 1870), the African American remained subservient to white Americans in everything but the letter of the law, particularly in the American South.

The so-called “Red Scare” of the early 1920s prompted a fear of difference in the United States (Allen, 1931; Conrad & Schneider, 1980), and this proved socially and politically contagious to the matter of race (Daynes, 1997; Finsch, 1997). Combined with the raging unemployment and economic upheaval of the 1930s, the race issue in the United States exploded with a revival of virulent racism, much of it aggravated by the use of the African American as a convenient symbol of those “others” who would take away resources sorely needed by white Americans (Blumer, 1969; Riggins, 1997; Tauber, 1995).
In this racial and political atmosphere, the U.S. Public Health Service initiated a study of the natural course of untreated syphilis in human beings in 1932 (Amdur, 2003; Antle & Regehr, 2003; Gordon & Prentice, 2000). Chosen for the study were approximately 300 African American males, indigent, uneducated sharecroppers in rural Alabama (Brawley, 1998). The purpose of the study was simply to observe a phenomenon occurring in nature; in 1932, there was no known treatment for syphilis. At the time, so-called “studies in nature” were considered appropriate (Rothman, 1982), and any ethical concerns might have focused on the vulnerability of the study population, their lack of power within the greater society (D’Cruz, 2000; Grigsby & Root, 1993), and apparent lack of informed consent (Katz, 1972; Reamer, 1987).

The research participants clearly did not have a full understanding of either their condition or the nature of the study. There was likely no overt deception in the research project, but there exists some evidence that the participants believed they were in fact receiving medical care (Amdur, 2003). It is worth noting that even though some modern research ethicists have argued that deception in research is acceptable if no harm is done (Goode, 1996; Lawson, 2001), there is no body of scholarly analysis which attempts to justify the treatment of the Tuskegee subjects.

Greatly compounding the matter is the fact that, even after penicillin was discovered and used to effectively treat syphilis, the treatment was withheld from the Tuskegee research subjects (Brawley, 1998; Gordon & Prentice, 2000). After forty years of study, the Tuskegee research project was abandoned in 1972 after the study became public knowledge (Kampmeier, 1974).
The Tuskegee study is highly charged ethically for an additional reason other than those noted above, for it represents a grievous disconnect commonplace in scientific research in the 20th century: the seeming chasm between scientific experimentation and the practice of medicine. The core principle of the Hippocratic Oath, “first, do no harm,” which in the medical sense prohibited a considerable amount of scientific experimentation, seemingly did not apply to the experiments of science (Lederer, 1995). This moral contradiction between medicine and science had its roots in the days of Baconian England, when proponents of the then fledgling discipline of science wanted to divorce the scientific method from the religious oppression of the Catholic Church (Mahoney, 1991). In so doing, scientific exploration also divorced itself from the ethical and moral constraints then embodied in the tenets of religious philosophy. Thus in the late 19th and early 20th century, science was commonly viewed as the unfettered and pure pursuit of truth. As the mid-20th century unfolded, however, the fallacy of this belief would be demonstrated a thousand times over, at tragic expense.

Summary

The period, 1920-1939, saw Germany and Hungary living in the dark shadows of defeat, wounded of course by war, but infected by the punitive terms of the Treaties of Versailles and Trianon. Surely seeking to put an end to world war, the architects of those treaties could not have found a way to more surely perpetuate it.

While both Germany and Hungary attempted to curb the influence of socialism by eventually embracing its secret twin, fascism, the United States, under Franklin Roosevelt’s deft leadership, elected to incorporate elements of socialism into American
democracy in order to ultimately overcome it. These may each be viewed as desperate measures, but the times under discussion here were equally desperate, marked by anger and a fearful intolerance borne of the catastrophic consequences of world war, the onslaught of modernity and worldwide economic upheaval.

It has frequently been said that in the Great Depression, American caught a nasty head cold, but Europe caught pneumonia. This phrase captures not only the relative calamity visited upon the United States and Europe, but the interreliance and connectedness that characterized the western world on the eve of World War II. No longer able to isolate herself from Europe economically, in the coming years America would find that she could not isolate herself politically or militarily, either. What had started out at the beginning of the 20th century as two western worlds, an old and new, was now moving inexorably toward one.
CHAPTER III
A FIERY CRUCIBLE, THE GADGET
AND A FLICKERING OF FREEDOM’S LIGHT

This chapter will address events occurring during the period, 1940-1960, in Germany, the United States and Hungary. While it is beyond the intent of these writings to provide an extensive and detailed account of World War II, salient events relevant to human rights violations and the ethics of research will be addressed. The format will be the same as used in previous chapters. A brief summary will conclude the chapter.

In 1939, the world went to war again. Even more savage that the first world war, World War II refined the technology of death first seen in World War I. Hitler’s terrible, efficient genocide wiped out millions of Europeans, only to be outdone by Stalin’s sweeping purges in Russia. The Third Reich became the very persona of mass extermination, and among the most calloused of murderers were physicians and scientists. It would be fifty years before the German people fully reconstructed their desecrated national identity.

But Nazi Germany’s embracing of lethal technology was matched by the United States, albeit in service of a different cause. The development of the atom bomb, an incredible feat of scientific acumen, changed the world forever and created a cloud of fear over the peoples of the tiny globe we inhabit. The aftermath of the war, like World War I before it, set the stage for the onset of another war. Perhaps less tumultuous than
World War II, the Cold War proved no less perilous. From the wreckage of war arose a fear of the new adversary, Soviet communism, and the measures taken to combat it brought about a sacrifice of those very liberties that had differentiated us from our enemy.

The legacy of the atomic bomb also gave the world further transgressions against human rights in the quest for scientific knowledge. The detritus of world war left us in search of ways to explain what had happened, and caused a reexamination of the human condition. New technologies and the complexities of managing a large scale war effort demanded new ways of thinking about how modern societies are made, and the coming years would introduce the world to existentialism, structural functionalism and systems theory.

Hungary exchanged one dictatorship for another, and for the span of a few weeks cast off its oppression and reached for freedom. But Hungarians soon learned that the gap between America’s words of support and its actions would be precisely that distance through which a Soviet tank could pass.

Germany

By 1940, Germany under Adolph Hitler and the Nazis had geographically absorbed all or part of Austria, the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia, Poland, France, the Low Countries of Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg, and the Baltic States of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, all in the name of anschluss (growing room) for the Germanic peoples (Gilbert, 2001). Also by 1940, the Nazis had nearly perfected the machinery necessary to forcibly “evacuate” most of the Jewish populations of these nations into
concentration camps. The camps were publicly referred to as labor camps, replete with signs over camp entrances that proclaimed, *Arbeit Macht Frei (Work Makes You Free).* Privately, among the Nazi hierarchy of Goebbels, Heinrich Himmler, Reinhard Heydrich and Adolph Eichmann, they were called what they in fact were: extermination facilities (Arendt, 1963/1994).

Himmler, Heydrich and Eichmann. The remarkable thing about these men is how singularly unremarkable they each were prior to joining the Nazi party. Heinrich Himmler served as a cadet during World War I, secured a diploma in agriculture in 1922, then became a fertilizer salesman. Reinhard Heydrich was dishonorably discharged from the German navy in 1922. Adolph Eichmann flunked out of school, worked briefly in his father’s mining camp as a laborer, and then, like Himmler, became a salesman until 1933. These hardly seem to be the resumes of mass murderers (Arendt, 1963/1994; Goebbels Diaries, 1948). Yet each man appears to have found himself by joining Hitler’s burgeoning Nazi party during the years before Hitler assumed full control over Germany and her fate.

Moreover, Himmler, Heydrich and Eichmann all shared one trait: tremendous skill in organizing and navigating large bureaucracies (Wistrich, 1997). Only Himmler and Heydrich betrayed the rancorous anti-Semitism that so pervaded Goebbels (Goebbels Diaries, 1948). Adolph Eichmann, busily about the extermination of Europe’s Jewish population, made it known that he personally had nothing against the Jews. For Eichmann, completing his death camp quotas each month was apparently just a job, and he approached it with the methodical attention to detail one would expect of a diligent bureaucrat (Arendt, 1963/1994; Wistrich, 1997).
German Society and the Nazi Death Wish

During World War II, German society, politics and culture were thoroughly defiled by Hitler and the Nazi party. Such was Hitler’s power, complete and absolute, that few if any of Germany’s societal institutions remained untainted by the poison of Nazism. For decades, if not centuries, Germany’s contributions to Europe’s scientific, political, religious and cultural traditions had been highly influential and generally well regarded. During the Third Reich, however, science, the law and the academy had been corrupted in the service of racial and ethnic purging. The arts and media had been used as a vehicle for Goebbels’s propaganda. Conventional religion had been banished and replaced with worship of Hitler’s personification of the ideal Aryan state, and culture had been distorted to reflect only the Nazi agenda (Goebbels Diaries, 1948; Muller, 1991; Seidelman, 2000).

This phenomenon, wherein whole societies are captured by dictators, their every institution co-opted for the benefit and reinforcement of the ruling powers, was not a genuinely new thing (Hunt, 1999). Soviet Russia under Lenin and Stalin had constructed a prototype for the 20th century (Lozansky, 1989), but the Nazis of Hitler’s Third Reich brought an efficiency and thoroughness that elevated totalitarianism to its pinnacle. Every facet of German society had been used to further the Nazi cause. Each German institution had either been abolished or become so politicized that its activities could not be separated from the sociopolitical agenda behind it (Proctor, 1992, 2000). It remains rather curious that Nazism had its proclaimed origins in an effort to resist Soviet-style
socialism, yet used quite similar totalitarian methods in securing and maintaining its power.

A Brief, Digressive Analysis

How could this have happened? How could an otherwise proud, wise people permit such outrages against humanity as occurred in Germany and greater Europe during the era of Nazi rule? Still today the answers to a large degree elude us. Certainly the laudable if arrogant desire to improve the human condition by perfecting the human being played a role. In this endeavor, science, in the form of rampant logical positivism divorced from moral consequences contributed mightily (Mahoney, 1991). The abandonment of humanist ideals as guiding principles for ethical conduct also created a fertile ground in which such egregious transgressions could be conceived and grown (Freeman, 2000; Loewenberg, et al., 2000). The ethically uncluttered pursuit of scientific knowledge as a *sine qua non* of human advancement and progress, placing the ostensible good of society in primacy over the rights of individuals, surely legitimized and fed the entire process (Sidel, 1996; Szollosi-Janze, 2001).

Perhaps what made Nazi totalitarianism’s original contribution to modern genocide, however, was the power and sophistication of technology. Killing untold numbers of people one pistol shot at a time, as occurred in Soviet Russia under Stalin in the infamous purges of 1937-38, was time consuming and simply inefficient (House of Terror, 2002; Lozansky, 1989). The genius of Nazi genocide was its terrible efficacy, opening the possibilities of murdering hundreds if not thousands of victims each day. Organized and overseen by bureaucratic functionaries like Heydrich and Eichmann,
supported by state-of-the-art planning contributed by Albert Speer and the advanced machinery made available to the Nazis by IG Farben, Nazi genocide became a marvel of the horrifying technology of carnage.

But by way of fully articulating the causes of the Holocaust and other Nazi atrocities, something remains missing. There exists a gap between the thought and the deed. Put differently, how could such a dreadful thought of racial extermination be manifested in the killing machine constructed by the Nazis?

Recall the discussion above concerning the social reconstruction of "otherness" of Jews, Gypsies and other people of perceived difference during the incipient days of Nazism (Gergen, 1999; Riggins, 1997; Weindling, 1989). In order for a genocide of these proportions to be allowed (if not always supported), there needed to be a way of creating a qualitative breach between those who must commit dastardly acts on the behalf of the German people and those who must be destroyed. Those to be destroyed must somehow be dehumanized, such that the ordinary I-thou relationship which exists in civil society is transformed into an I-it relationship (Buber, 1958). When such a conversion successfully takes place, the process of extermination becomes the killing of animals or vermin, not the eradication of peoples (Weindling, 2000), and a clearly immoral act becomes morally inconsequential (Caplan, 1992; Konopka, 1992). There is an obvious if perverse logic to this, one which suggests that, rather than being governed by the caprices of madness, Nazi ideology and Nazi science were rooted in a hideous, methodical rationality which Max Weber had predicted decades before (Geiderman, 2002; Ritzer, 2000).
Josef Mengele was an engaging, curious and bright child, born in the Bavarian town of Gunzburg in 1911. His childhood friends affectionately called him by his nickname, Beppo. As he grew up, Josef gained confidence in himself despite a harsh, rigid upbringing in the Catholic Church, a stern and critical mother, and a father who preferred to work long hours at his farm implement factory rather than suffer the wrath of his wife.

Beppo left Gunzburg for Munich in 1930 to study philosophy and medicine. He quickly became caught in the throes of the Nazi party, and like Himmler, Heydrich and Eichmann, seemed to find comfort in its structure and clear sense of direction. As Mengele furthered his studies, he came into contact with Ernst Rudin, who argued for racial hygiene on the basis that some people’s lives were just not worth living. Rudin also proposed that physicians had the social obligation to destroy these lives for the good of society.

In 1937, Mengele’s star began to rise. He received a research assistantship in the field of genetics at the University of Frankfort, and the young student’s twin intellectual interests, science and genetic purification, found a common path in the Nazi party. Josef joined both the party and the German army, and was accepted into the Waffen SS, but within a few years his military career took an unplanned but exciting turn when he learned of the concentration camps being built to pen the undesirables of the Reich. Mengele immediately saw the potential for in vivo scientific experiments with living human subjects. In May, 1943, he took up his new assignment, near a little Polish town named Auschwitz (Lifton, 1986; Wistrich, 1997).
Mengele became a symbol of Auschwitz, greeting each victim-laden train, immaculately dressed in his *Waffen SS* uniform, replete with the Iron Cross he’d earned while serving on the eastern front. He would stand on the rail platform, riding crop in hand, directing the disembarking prisoners into two groups, left and right, while the Auschwitz orchestra, composed of future victims, played a lively Strauss waltz. Those on the left were promptly escorted to the gas chambers; the lucky ones on the right joined the IG Farben laborers, or were selected for Mengele’s heinous experiments in the Auschwitz hospital.

He was particularly fond of children, especially sets of twins. Many of Mengele’s experimental surgeries were focused on twin studies, trying to determine the genetic differences between identical twins in order to resolve the riddle of nature vs. nurture. When his experiments on a given set of twins had been completed, “Uncle Mengele” would playfully walk across the compound with the children to visit the chimneys where the gas chambers were located. He became known as the White Angel of Auschwitz due to his oft-present white laboratory coat, and like an angel, Mengele disappeared from Auschwitz in early 1945 as the Reich crumbled and the Russians approached the camp from the east (Lifton, 1986).

*A Toll for the Dead*

Czech partisans assassinated Reinhard Heydrich in 1942. In retaliation, the SS murdered all male inhabitants of the nearby Czech village of Lidice who were sixteen years or older. Heinrich Himmler surrendered to the Allies in 1945, only to take self-administered poison during his first days of captivity. Joseph Goebbels committed
suicide right after Adolph Hitler’s death in April, 1945. Before doing so, he murdered his wife and six children. Adolph Eichmann escaped to Argentina quickly after the war. He was tracked down, arrested and extradited to Israel in 1960. His trial in Jerusalem aroused international interest in the Holocaust and remembrance of the genocide of the Jews. Eichmann was found guilty and executed in 1962. Josef Mengele disappeared after World War II. For decades, his whereabouts remained unknown. After Mengele’s death, the truth was discovered: he had escaped Germany in 1948, settled in Argentina under an assumed identity, and lived there with his family, living the life of an unassuming businessman, until suffering a massive stroke while swimming in 1979 (Lifton, 1986; Wistrich, 1997).

No one knows how many people died in World War II. About fifteen million soldiers were killed in action. A minimum of ten million civilians had been systematically murdered, six million of them Jews. Perhaps five million more civilians were killed in bombings and air raids. Four million prisoners of war were either killed or allowed to die the slow death of medical neglect and starvation (Gilbert, 2001). Thirty-four million dead? A reasonable guess.

How many were victims of the abomination of so-called scientific experiments conducted by Mengele and the other Nazi doctors? Few records survived the war, and in those that did, no names were listed, only the experiments.

Germany in the Postwar Era

In February, 1945, Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin, the respective leaders of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, met at Yalta, a town
in the Crimean region of Russia. The topic was the impending defeat of Nazi Germany and the terms of surrender that the anticipated victors would accept. Additionally, the victors determined how the former Nazi Germany would be subdivided and ruled by American, British, French and Soviet occupiers under unified control centered in Berlin (Gilbert, 2001).

Later that year, after Germany's unconditional surrender in May, representatives of the victorious nations met again, in Potsdam, a suburb of Berlin. Roosevelt had died by this time. His vice president, Harry Truman, had been inaugurated as president just weeks prior to the conference. Truman, Churchill and Stalin transferred authority for rule of the defeated Germany to their military commanders in each zone of governance. National Socialism was outlawed and its surviving leaders would be brought to trial. Nazi ideology was banned, Germany was fully disarmed, and the victorious allied powers began the process of re-establishing Germany as a democracy.

All German territory invaded by the Russian army was ceded to Soviet occupation, and Stalin agreed to set up an independent socialist democracy in his zone of defeated Germany. The western allies gave Stalin a part of Germany that had been subjugated by the Americans in exchange for partial occupation of Berlin. Due to a lack of clarity in the Potsdam agreement, the migration of untold thousands of displaced war refugees (which muddied the issue of restoring national and ethnic boundaries), Stalin's intentional obfuscation regarding the eventual removal of Soviet forces from conquered areas of eastern Europe, and general tentativeness about the postwar intentions of the allied powers, the Postdam agreement proved less than binding on the victors.
Moreover, the newness of Truman to the U.S. presidency, compounded by Churchill's electoral defeat in Britain, unsettled the negotiations and gave the cagey Stalin the opportunity to grasp for an expansion of Soviet territory (Gilbert, 2001). Already, the stage was being set for the next war. Initially viewed as a war over governance of former German territory, the Cold War was actually a war of political and economic ideology: western capitalism vs. eastern communism, and through most of the remaining years of the 20th century, its European focal point would be Berlin.

German War Guilt

After the war ended and the Nazi propaganda machine had been dismantled, those Germans who had genuinely not been aware of the atrocities committed in their name by the Nazis became well informed by their new occupiers. Those who had known, or suspected, became aware of the horrendous scope and efficiency of the murders. On a national scale, this awareness, and the accountability extracted by the victors, produced what might be termed an existential crisis of identity for the German people (Fulbrook, 1999).

The conundrum was this: the vicious legacy of Nazism was seen by the world as a German phenomenon, and thus the German people, who had largely supported Hitler's rise to power, were in considerable measure responsible for the Holocaust. Yet Hitler and his henchmen were clearly moral deviants, who had brilliantly and perversely captured the institutions of Germany and directed their energies toward completing the Nazi agenda. Was it possible then, that Nazi deviance was responsible for the genocide in Europe, rather than the German people themselves? In other words, were the Nazis
horrible because they were monsters, or because they were German? Also, were those Germans who collaborated with the Nazis doing so by volition, or under duress? These questions were to haunt Germany in the immediate postwar era, and the matter lingers like a foul mist to this day (Rusen, 2001).

The social reconstruction of Nazism in modern Germany, most particularly that part of Germany west of the line of occupation (ultimately to become West Germany, or the Federal Republic of Germany), is a nettlesome thing. It appears to have occurred in generational stages (Ludtke, 1993). Right on the heels of war’s end, as the atrocities became public knowledge, with commensurate public blame by the allies, many Germans attributed Nazism to deviance and monstrosity, an evil strain of human nature run amok (Conrad & Schneider, 1980; Neuhaus, 1992; Rusen, 2001). In so doing, the Nazis were “othered,” permitting the German people to differentiate between good Germans and bad Germans (Nazis). Thus guilt was pushed away, held at arm’s length, and externalized from behavior which might be considered intrinsic to Germans (Gergen, 1999; Riggins, 1997).

Some other Germans, less psychologically adept at reconstructing the past or perhaps more culpable for racist behavior, simply avowed that the Holocaust never happened, that it was a contrivance of the victorious allied forces, socialists, Zionists and other historic enemies of Germany (Fulbrook, 1999; Rusen, 2001). These two forces, those who espoused the Nazi deviance theory and those holding tightly to denial that atrocities had even occurred, dominated German thinking relative to war guilt for many years. There still exist remnants of this thinking in 21st century Germany (Rusen, 2001).
During the 1950s and early 1960s, this dualistic stage of German thinking regarding Nazi atrocities began to shift. The second stage of adaptation to German war guilt was constructed around a moral condemnation of Nazism, treating it less as a monstrous, thoroughly unGerman phenomenon than an historic aberration having its roots in centuries-old European anti-Semitism, the Great Depression, the despondency of Germany arising from the terms of the Versailles Treaty, and the nation’s ensuing sense of vulnerability and shame (Ludtke, 1993; Rusen, 2001).

The third stage of adaptation, one which seems to have begun only within the past couple of decades, appears to be restorative. It is characterized by a historicization of the Holocaust and the beginnings of German integration of the horrors of Nazism with a modern German identity. This present stage seems to coincide with the integration of the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany) into the historic German nation (Allinson, 2000; Fulbrook, 1999).

Interestingly, Germans who found themselves in the eastern zone after the war had somewhat of a different experience regarding war guilt and German ethnic and national identity. As Soviet occupation of East Germany became a reality, and socialist communism became the dominant ideology in the new German Democratic Republic (GDR), Nazism gradually was seen in a different light. Recall that Hitler had originally touted fascism in the early 1920s as an antidote to socialist ideological encroachment into traditional German nationalism and the reigning sociopolitical philosophy of the times. Now, east of the Oder, socialism was gradually reconstructed as an antidote to Nazism (Allinson, 2000). In so constructing this new sociopolitical morality, socialist Germans of the GDR suffered less guilt and accountability for Nazi atrocities, and may have
embraced socialism with more vigor than might have been anticipated from an essentially captive people for this reason (Allinson, 2000; Ludtke, 1993).

The Philosophical Approach

The postwar era in Germany also saw a rise in the influence of existential philosophy. Existentialism had been a strong intellectual force in Europe since the late 19th century, represented by the writings of Soren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche and Edmund Husserl. In fact, one can discern a grievously warped misinterpretation of Nietzsche’s thinking in *Mein Kampf*. In that book, Adolph Hitler attempted to extend Nietzsche’s concept of the Superman to an ethnoracial group, the German people. Hitler contorted this idea to ground his beliefs in racial superiority and Germanic supremacy, and create the Nazi ideology (Finzsch, 1997; Kaufmann, 1956; Konopka, 1992).

Certainly of much greater import insofar as German existential philosophy is concerned, though, are two vital thinkers who in some respects represent the intellectual dichotomy that existed in the era prior to and right after World War II: Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger. Each influenced by their existential ancestors, as well as by the writings of Karl Barth, Jaspers and Heidegger ended up on different sides during the Nazi era.

Jaspers, born in Oldenburg in 1883, was more than an able student. By the end of World War I, he had earned a professorship at the University of Heidelberg, and by the early 1930s, was publishing his first substantive works in the philosophy he called *Existenzphilosophie*. His principal interest was in the nature of man and existence, positing that man’s experience of existence did not derive so much from an overarching
philosophy of life or a set of teachings, as from the essential meaning emanating from experience itself. In so doing, he effectively connected the theories of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche (Kaufmann, 1956).

Given the disdain Jaspers implicitly placed upon the value of ideology in finding life’s meaning, it is no great wonder that his opinions met with opposition from the newly empowered Nazi party. It did not help matters that Jaspers had married a Jewish woman. In 1933, Jaspers was removed from Heidelberg and his teaching responsibilities. He was vilified by the Nazis, especially when he took a public stance against the mistreatment of Jews, and his works were no longer published in Germany during the Third Reich.

After the war, Jaspers was reinstated to the university by the Americans, and he resumed his publishing career by writing a book examining the nature of German guilt in permitting the Nazis to rise to power (Kaufmann, 1956). While not as widely known as several other existential philosophers, Jaspers was nonetheless a prominent influence upon the development of Jean-Paul Sartre’s concepts of authenticity, despair and the search for individual life meaning (Sartre, 1957).

Martin Heidegger, certainly better known and perhaps more highly regarded as an existential philosopher, was born six years after Jaspers, in the Black Forest. He was a student of Edmund Husserl’s, and was thus strongly swayed by Husserl’s phenomenology. An early student, Jean-Paul Sartre, was much taken with Heidegger’s ideas concerning the nature and discovery of meaning in reality, but was eventually put off by Heidegger’s lack of disdain for the Nazi party. Heidegger’s existentialism was significantly more grounded in politics and society than was either Jasper’s or Sartre’s. He believed in the Platonic idea that an elite of philosopher-soldiers best governed
societies. Heidegger also deeply distrusted democracy and modernism, and was a German nationalist to his core (Kaufmann, 1956). Holding so dearly to this set of tenets, it is not difficult to see how he might have at least conceptually embraced National Socialism. After the war, Heidegger, while still active in the evolution of phenomenology and existentialism, retreated back to his birthplace in the Black Forest, tarred until his death in 1976 by his association with Nazism.

*The Two Germanys*

The allies ruled Germany, however disjointedly, for the remainder of the 1940s. During this period, the world saw the advent of what would soon be known as the Cold War, as the uneasy alliance between east and west began to disintegrate now that the Nazi menace had been defeated. The first major signal of the coming ideological war between the Soviet Union and the western allies arose in the form of a blockade of Berlin in 1947. Berlin had been subdivided into zones of governance by the Americans, British and French, but the area surrounding Berlin was occupied by the Russians, leaving Berlin at Stalin’s mercy.

Berlin, like most of conquered Germany, was starving. Much of the inner city was rubble, the residuum of constant bombing during 1945. There was no food, little potable water, scarce fuel for heating in the face of brutal northern European winters, and even less hope that this circumstance would change in the foreseeable future without substantial help from the allies.

Enter George Catlett Marshall. Marshall was Truman’s Secretary of State, but more than that, he was a rare breed: an exceptionally capable soldier who was also a deft
politician with long range vision in foreign policy. George Marshall foresaw that a
defeated Germany, wedged between the allies in the west and Soviet Russia in the east,
might prove more dangerous to European stability than the shattered Third Reich.
Marshall understood that the end of World War II had set the world stage for still another
war, certainly a war for territory but more importantly a war of ideology between
democratic capitalism and communism. And Germany sat squarely in the middle of its
first battle.

It was Marshall’s genius to see that rebuilding a devastated Germany was in the
best long term interests of both Europe and the United States. To this end, he convinced
Truman, the American Congress and the allies to infuse West Germany and allied
occupied Berlin with sufficient economic and material aid to ward off further
disintegration, shore up Germany’s skeletal infrastructure, reawaken democracy (albeit
American style), and in so doing hold further Russian incursion at bay.

By 1947, the so-called Marshall Plan was in full stride. Knowing that the west
was attempting to co-opt Berliners through the provision of desperately needed foreign
aid, the Russians instigated a blockade of Berlin, shutting off the flow of material goods,
food and water to the city. This was the first crisis of the Cold War (Fulbrook, 1999).
The allies, primarily the Americans, countered with the Berlin Airlift. Accepting that the
Russians surrounded Berlin and consequently blocked access to the city by land, the
allies created a massive air rescue operation to ensure that adequate supplies reached the
beleaguered capital and its citizens. This tactic of point-counterpoint would become the
model for Cold War strategy for decades to come, as each side in the ideological war
would seek to destabilize the other, only to be countered in an effort to restore the balance of power (Brandt, 2000; Federal Republic of Germany, 2003).

The German Democratic Republic

Walter Ulbricht was born in Leipzig in 1893. He joined the German Communist Party at an early age and studied in the Soviet Union until he was elected to the Reichstag in 1928. Ulbricht served in the Reichstag until Hitler’s takeover of political power in 1933, then left the country to live in Russia until the end of World War II. Upon his return in early 1946, Walter Ulbricht became the first general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party and deputy premier of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). As such, Ulbricht was instrumental in the sovietization of East Germany, and effectively governed the GDR under the aegis of the Soviet Union until his retirement in 1971 (Pritchard, 2000).

Initially, the sovietization of East Germany was greeted with tolerant if not enthusiastic support from the Germans living in the eastern zone. The dream of a Marxist/Leninist future, manifested in a proletarian paradise, provided an elixir for defeated Germans in the new socialist state while simultaneously freeing them from the onus of Nazism and Hitler’s atrocities. After all, in the years leading up to and during World War II, socialism had been viewed by some as a social antidote to fascism, so the introduction of Soviet communism to East Germany in one sense sounded a death knell to the Nazi past, and the guilt of association that came with it (Allinson, 2000).

As the years passed, and the dream of a perfect socialist state withered in the cold light of reality, the verdant proletarian paradise did not materialize. Rather, East
Germany became a dull gray totalitarian state. Governed by Ulbricht at the head of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and the secret police, the brutish and despised Stasi, the people of East Germany after a while longed for the freedoms they saw developing across the contrived line of German separation in West Germany (Stokes, 2000). Nowhere was this longing more sharply felt than in divided Berlin. Between 1946 and 1961, more than three million Germans emigrated from East Germany to West, many of them Berliners. Ulbricht and Eric Honecker, Ulbricht’s eventual successor, would soon put a stop to that (Federal Republic of Germany, 2003; Pritchard, 2000).

Honecker was the son of a miner, born in Neunkirchen in 1912. Like Ulbricht, Eric Honecker joined the German Communist Party and actively resisted Hitler and the National Socialists. The Nazis arrested him in 1935, and he spent the entirety of World War II in a Nazi prison.

Freed upon the end of the war, Honecker was elected to the parliament of the GDR in 1949, and remained a member of East Germany’s politburo and a trusted aide to Walter Ulbricht until the latter’s retirement in 1971. Eric Honecker then became general secretary of the SED and assumed Ulbricht’s former position at the head of the East German government. It was Honecker who in large measure conceived of blocking the flight of East Germans to the west by building the Berlin Wall in 1961 (Pritchard, 2000). He remained general secretary of the SED and head of the GDR until 1989. Honecker was exiled from the reunited Germany in 1993 and died in Chile shortly thereafter (Federal Republic of Germany, 2003).
The Federal Republic of Germany

Meanwhile, in the western zone, the allies were engrossed in the much more cautious venture of reshaping West Germany into a democracy. Unlike the Soviet shadow government suddenly imposed upon East Germany by Stalin, the occupation of West Germany was a messy business. The allies were fearful that in the vacuum created by the Nazi downfall, combined with the general state of chaos pervading postwar Germany (surely not diminished by the artificially designated zones of governance), the sociopolitical climate was fraught with the danger of political extremes. Considering that Germany’s defeat in World War II had brought about a tectonic shift in German society and history, this fear was likely well placed (Brandt, 2000).

Furthermore, the recent history of Germany lent itself to feeding any allied fear that extremist groups might arise to fill the power vacuum. The allies, most particularly the Americans, thus actively dissuaded extremist dialogue in German political discourse during the period, 1945-1949 (Rogers, 1993). To the occupying American military forces, rightist discourse smacked of National Socialism; leftist discourse sparked fears that West Germany might cross over to adopt the socialist pathway inflicted by the Soviets in the eastern lander of the divided country. From the outset of West German reconstruction, then, political activity and discourse was pushed to the center, where a tepid moderation reigned. This would characterize West German political philosophy and party development for the remainder of the 20th century (Pommerin, 1996; Rogers, 1993).

Amidst this unsettled environment arose a unifying voice for the new Germany. Konrad Adenauer was born in 1876. A lawyer by training, he became mayor of Cologne during the waning days of World War I. Adenauer was a vocal member of the Catholic
Centre Party, and entered provincial and later national politics during the 1920s. Equally vocal in his dissent with Hitler and the Nazis, Adenauer was imprisoned in 1934 and, like Eric Honecker, spent the war in a Nazi prison (Federal Republic of Germany, 2003).

After the war, Konrad Adenauer helped establish the Christian Democratic Union. In 1949, he became the first chancellor of the new Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). He would hold this post for fourteen years, through the tenuous birth of the FRG and the critical days in 1961 when Honecker cemented the divide between the two Berlins.

Adenauer was a strong proponent of German modernity. In the Marshall Plan, he saw an opportunity to swiftly rebuild and modernize West Germany’s infrastructure as well as construct a social democracy sustained by western economic resources and advanced technological development (Welsch, 1996). He also envisioned the new Germany as a partner with the west, and fostered a western styled social culture in the reconfigured nation. Further, Adenauer sought to solidify the integrity of German families by simultaneously providing material support and reinforcing the importance of strong family life in the new Germany (Sing, 2002/2003).

These efforts reassured the allied powers that Germany was moving toward the future, away from its nationalistic past. To the allies, modernity served as a bulwark against the resurgence of fascism, a moderating force which might dilute historic German traditions (Pommerin, 1996). Additionally, Adenauer’s desire to partner with the west was viewed by the allies as providing the opportunity to keep an eye on any German attempts to clandestinely rearm, as they had after the disastrous Treaty of Versailles (Gilbert, 2001; Welsch, 1996). Lastly, Adenauer’s alignment with the west placed a friendly, closely managed and monitored Germany squarely in the path of future Soviet
incursions into western Europe. Unsurprisingly, Adenauer was much praised by his new allies, and the stability he brought to Germany opened the door to the restoration of full sovereignty and removal of allied military occupation in 1954 (Baring, 1994; Federal Republic of Germany, 2003).

The Resurrection of German Science

At the end of World War II, many in the German scientific community were tried as Nazi collaborators. Predominantly, these scientists had either promulgated Nazi racial hygiene policies or actively participated in Nazi scientific experiments on involuntary human subjects in places like Auschwitz and Dachau (Pozos, 1992; Szollosi-Janze, 2001). Others, primarily those engaged in the development of weaponry and advanced physics, were spirited away by the allies to their respective countries to continue their work under the auspices of the victors. The exploits of these scientists would be put toward the cause of the new Cold War, their technological discoveries somehow cleansed by the new allegiance (Weindling, 2000).

But there were some German scientists who had managed to survive the Nazi era, laboratories and consciences more or less intact, who remained in the new Germany. Among these was Werner Heisenberg, the 1932 Nobel Prize winner who had so inspired the field of nuclear physics, developed the theory of quantum mechanics, and constructed the uncertainty principle, which was essential for understanding the atom (Max Planck Gesellschaft, 2000).

Heisenberg was instrumental in re-establishing the legitimacy of German science during the immediate postwar era (The Post-War Era: Reviving German Science, 2003).
He headed the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics in 1946-47, where he tried to revive ethical research in West Germany. In 1949, he was named president of the German Research Council. This council affiliated with the *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft* in 1951. Heisenberg renamed the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in 1948, to the modern Max Planck Institute, and moved it from Gottingen to Munich in 1958. He was also a key stimulus in prompting Germany to join with international research efforts in physics, and thereby initiated the reintegration of German science back into the international scientific community (*Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft*, 2003a; *Max Planck Gesellschaft*, 2000; *The Post-War Era: Reviving German Science*, 2003).

The United States

When Harry Truman sat down with Churchill and Stalin at Potsdam in July, 1945, he could certainly be forgiven for feeling unprepared to do battle with these two giants of their times. After all, Truman had assumed the presidency only weeks before, succeeding another giant, Franklin Roosevelt. His political background had been limited to Missouri politics and a little over a year of experience on the American national scene. Even the national experience had been scant, for Roosevelt commanded the national stage. Truman's role as vice president, like that of most vice presidents, was largely ceremonial.

In photographs of the Big Three taken at Potsdam, Truman looks smaller than Churchill and Stalin, less comfortable in his position as a world leader. Americans at the time were worried that Truman would be overwhelmed and outsmarted by the cagey, erudite Churchill and the blunt, forceful Stalin. But Harry Truman, if he was worried at
all, had no cause to be. In his hip pocket, Truman carried the greatest trump card in the history of humankind, and within a few weeks, he would show it to the world.

*The Gadget*

As early as 1939, Leo Szilard had raised the possibility of developing weaponry from new research on atomic energy and nuclear fission. Szilard had emigrated to the United States from Europe a short time before, and since then had been working with Enrico Fermi, conducting experiments in setting off nuclear chain reactions with the use of uranium. Now, he was disturbed that the Nazis might be up to the same thing. It was, in Szilard’s view, essential that the United States begin to develop the capacity for atomic weapons before the Nazi scientists could do so.

In the summer of 1939, Szilard went to his friend, Albert Einstein, for help. Einstein was the most famed scientist in the world. Perhaps with the force of Einstein’s words, Franklin Roosevelt might be convinced to initiate a new project devoted to exploring the military uses of atomic energy. In August, Einstein wrote a letter to the president. There was no immediate response, but it appears that Einstein’s letter sparked the president’s interest, for by late 1941, a large scale United States atomic project was underway. It was called the Manhattan Project (Cohen, 1999; Teller, 2001).

*Oppie*

Chosen to spearhead the greatest assemblage of scientists ever congregated in one place was J. Robert Oppenheimer, known by his colleagues and later the world as Oppie. Born in 1904 to an upper class Jewish family in New York, Oppie studied at Harvard,
Cambridge and Gottingen universities, and gradually began to make his mark in physics and quantum theory. During the 1930s, Oppenheimer got into left wing and socialist politics in America, partially due to the poverty of the Great Depression, but also as a reaction to the rise of Hitler and National Socialism in Germany, where the Oppenheimers had relatives suffering under Nazi anti-Semitism.

In league with his fellow physicist, Edward Teller, a Hungarian expatriate like Leo Szilard, and General Leslie Groves, the military commander of the Manhattan Project, Oppie selected a desolate, largely uninhabited part of New Mexico for the site of the project. Named Los Alamos, the site would become the most heavily secured and secret laboratory in the United States. For the next three years, Oppie, Teller, Szilard and other world-renowned physicists, many of them refugees from Hitler’s Europe, worked on what would become the atomic bomb. For the sake of secrecy, Oppie ordinarily referred to the atomic bomb simply as “the gadget.”

In July, 1945, as Harry Truman prepared for his trip to Potsdam, they detonated the first atomic device at the Trinity site near Los Alamos. It was the most horrific manmade explosion in history, an event that would define the next fifty years and separate human history into periods before and after “the bomb” (Cohen, 1999; Teller, 2001). General Groves promptly informed the president about the successful detonation. Truman arrived at Potsdam knowing he held in his hands the most powerful weapon ever conceived.

But some of the scientists at Los Alamos were far from convinced that the atomic bomb needed to be used against an enemy in order to prove its devastating power. Leo Szilard, for one, had tried for months before the Trinity test to speak with Roosevelt.
After Roosevelt’s death, he also repeatedly tried to make contact with Truman regarding a demonstration of the bomb’s power at an uninhabited place, to show the Nazis, and later the Japanese, what they were in for if they did not surrender. Organizing a group of Los Alamos scientists to petition the president for a demonstration of the bomb rather than unveiling its power for the first time against a civilian population, Szilard’s request was turned away by the military (Murakami, 1995; Wilson, 1971). So sheltered by the military was Truman that the president didn’t know about Szilard’s petition until well after the bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August, 1945 (Committee on Political and Social Problems, 2003). In the end, most of the Los Alamos scientists, including Oppenheimer and Teller, held fast to the belief that using the bomb on civilian populations was necessary to win the war and secure the unconditional surrender of Japan (Teller, 2001).

The Plutonium Experiments

Shortly after the testing of the atomic bomb at Trinity site and the ensuing detonations over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a few scientists at Los Alamos and some of their colleagues at the University of Chicago, University of California at San Francisco, Argonne National Laboratories in Chicago, and various hospitals across the nation elected to test the effects of injected plutonium upon human subjects (Department of Energy Human Radiation Experiments: Experiments List, n.d.; Welsome, 1999). They had realized early in the work of the Manhattan Project that the atomic bomb would generate substantial amounts of radiation in and around the bomb site (Committee on Political and Social Problems, 2003; Wilson, 1971). While there had been some
preliminary studies concerning the effects of injected radium in the United States during the early 1930s conducted at Elgin State Hospital in Illinois, these experiments had been far from conclusive, and now the scientists wanted to determine precisely what the impact of plutonium radiation might be on human beings (Department of Energy Radiation Experiments: Experiments List, n.d.).

Beginning in 1944-45, patients at several hospitals in the United States were injected with radioactive plutonium (Welsome, 1999). Eighteen people were injected at the Manhattan Engineer District Hospital in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; at least one in Rochester, New York; eleven at the University of Chicago; and three at the University of California at San Francisco. Excreta, and in some cases, body parts from deceased human participants, were then sent to Los Alamos for plutonium analysis (Department of Energy Human Radiation Experiments: Experiments List, n.d.; Makhijani & Kennedy, 1994; Mann, 1994).

Apparently many of the human subjects chosen for the plutonium experiments at the end of World War II were unwitting participants who did not know what they were being injected with, or who at best were poorly informed when asked for consent (Sea, 1994; Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power of the Committee on Energy and Commerce [The Markey Report], 1986). Also, a considerable number of the participants in these and other postwar experiments were selected from highly vulnerable populations of the American citizenry, such as prisoners, children, the elderly, the mentally retarded, pregnant women, people of color and the impoverished (Makhijani & Kennedy, 1994; Mann, 1994).
It is sadly ironic that the plutonium experiments in the United States were being performed at the same time that the Nuremberg Trials of Nazi scientists were taking place in Germany. Even with the release of the Nuremberg Code in 1948, the radiation experiments in the United States continued until the 1970s, albeit with substantially less openness and publicity (The Markey Report, 1986; Sea, 1994).

The Nuremberg Trials

Precisely two days after the bombing of Hiroshima, August 8, 1945, representatives of the American, British, French and Soviet governments began the international military tribunal—commonly referred to as the Nuremberg Trials—in Nuremberg, Germany. In part, the city was chosen because of the Nuremberg Laws, Hitler’s legalistic rationale for the racial cleansing of the Jews in the Third Reich. The intent of the military tribunal was to hold accountable to international law those Nazis who had been accused of war crimes committed during World War II. Full responsibility for prosecuting and judging the defendants, however, fell solely to the Americans.

The initial trials focused on major Nazi governmental figures, such as Hermann Goering and Rudolph Hess. It quickly became obvious that these men had not acted alone, that in fact the full magnitude of Nazi atrocities could never have occurred, nor become so efficaciously systematized, without the help of accomplices in the legal, medical and scientific communities (Beals, Sebring & Crawford, 1949; Geiderman, 2002).

In early 1946, Harry Truman, at the request of American chief prosecutor, Telford Taylor, granted approval for additional war crimes trials. The second series of trials,
known as the Nuremberg Medical Trial, began in December, 1946. Officially, the trial is recorded as the *United States vs. Karl Brandt, et al.*, but there were actually twenty-three defendants, all but three of them physicians (Leaning, 1997; Shuster, 1997).

In his opening address to the court, Telford Taylor laid out the essence of his case: he accused the defendants of murder, systematic torture and atrocities committed in the name of medical science (Beals, Sebring & Crawford, 1949). But this was to be no witch-hunt. The remarkable thing about Taylor, beyond his legal acumen, was his vision of these trials. Taylor knew that what the Nazis had done was considerably more than just lose the war and thus be held responsible for its destruction. He realized that Nazi atrocities, and the technology of murder they had so efficiently refined, were abominations of humanity that must be held up to the light and air of public hearing. Taylor seemed to understand that in order for Germany, if not the world, to begin the healing from World War II, certain actions committed by those Germans entrusted with public faith must be given fair hearing and trial. Put more succinctly, the genocide of the Third Reich must be laid at the feet of the Nazis and their accomplices, not the German people (Leaning, 1997; Shuster, 1998). To do otherwise risked a recurrence of the disastrous Treaty of Versailles and the enmity, not only of those who waged the war, but of the German people as well.

*The Nuremberg Code*

The findings of the Nuremberg Medical Trial resulted in a sentence of death for seven of the twenty-three defendants. As part of the verdict, the judges elucidated what would become known as the Nuremberg Code. For the first time, a broadly defined code
The ten points of the Nuremberg Code, as given in the medical trial verdict, were:

- Voluntary, informed consent of participants
- Experimental results must be for the good of society
- Anticipated results must justify performing the experiment
- Undue risk and suffering must be avoided
- Risk of serious injury or death is sufficient cause not to conduct the experiment
- There must exist a favorable benefit-to-risk ratio
- Sufficient safeguards for the protection of human subjects must be taken prior to and during research
- Experiments must be conducted only by scientifically qualified people
- Subjects must have the right to withdraw from research without penalty
- The researcher must terminate the experiment if serious injury or death is anticipated

In essence, the Nuremberg Code stressed the importance of voluntary, informed consent, favorable benefit-to-risk analysis, and the right of withdrawal from experiments without penalty (Amdur, 2003; Childress, 2000). Underpinning each of the tenets of the code, though, is the principle that the autonomy of each individual engaged in research must be respected (Katz, 1996).

The Code was not without critics. Some argued that the Nuremberg Code was essentially a distillation of American medical ethics and jurisprudence (Faden, Lederer &
Moreno, 1996). Others posited that since the Nuremberg Medical Trial concerned itself with medical experiments rather than scientific experiments as a whole, it created an unnecessary distinction between the two insofar as research ethics are concerned (Harkness, 1996; Seidelman, 1996). There were indeed critics who suggested that the intrinsically punitive nature of a war crimes tribunal created a hierarchically (and morally) superior climate wherein victors could inflict their ethical standards upon the vanquished without having to examine the behavior of their own (American) scientists (Leaning, 1997). Finally, some stressed the political nature of establishing an international code of ethics that in some respects “othered” the Nazi scientists and physicians, reinforcing a moralistic hubris akin to the “it can’t happen here” mentality (Hunt, 1999).

It seems clear that even when the above criticisms are weighed, that the Nuremberg Code was an important step in holding violators of human rights accountable to the international community, as well as underscoring the importance of individual rights when the purported good of society is espoused (Wunder, 2000). In addition, the Nuremberg Code, while perhaps not an ideal articulation of human subjects protection, nor carrying as much legal power to enforce compliance as it might have, did provide a necessary first step upon which later codes might build. It was a watershed event in the protection of human research subjects and human rights (Shuster, 1997).

_The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights_

By 1946, Woodrow Wilson’s dream of a League of Nations had become the United Nations, housed in New York City. Shortly after the Nuremberg Code was
promulgated, the United Nations put forth its Universal Declaration of Human Rights (General Assembly of the United Nations, 1948). Given thrust by Eleanor Roosevelt, the widow of the recently deceased American president and a long time advocate of human rights (Black, 1999), this declaration was to prove the bedrock of European and international law regarding the protection of human rights in the postwar world. Founded in some measure upon the United States Bill of Rights, the United Nations declaration consisted of thirty points:

- People are born free and equal in dignity and rights
- There shall be nondiscrimination in application of rights
- People have the right to life, liberty and security of persons
- No one is to be held in slavery and servitude
- No one is to be subjected to torture or cruelty
- Each person has the right to recognition as a person before the law
- Each person has the right to be equal before the law and the right to equal protection under the law
- Each person has the right to effective remedy by national tribunals for rights infringement
- There shall be no arbitrary arrest, detention or exile
- Each person has the right to a fair and public hearing by an impartial tribunal
- Each person is entitled to the presumption of innocence
- Each person has the right to privacy and noninterference
- Each person has the right to freedom of movement and residence
- Each person has the right to asylum
• Each person has the right to a nationality
• Each person has the right to marry and have a family
• Each person has the right to own property
• Each person has the right to freedom of thought and religion
• Each person has the right to freedom of opinion and expression
• Each person has the right of peaceful assembly
• Each person has the right to participate in governance
• Each person has the right to social security
• Each person has the right to work and equal pay
• Each person has the right to rest and leisure
• Each person has the right to an adequate standard of living
• Each person has the right to an education
• Each person has the right to participate in the cultural life of the community
• Each person has the right to social order
• Each person has the right to exercise social duties
• Each person has a right to government which protects these rights.

While there can be little doubt that each member nation of the fifty-one
signatories adhered to the letter, much less the spirit, of this declaration, its existence did
give notice that the world community took seriously the issue of human rights. The
United Nations declaration also codified, in a manner of speaking, the distinction
between modern, civilized states and rogue states. (Yet within three weeks of adoption,
the first violation of the human rights declaration was to occur in Hungary, when the
The communist regime refused to permit Cardinal Mindszenty to leave the country and incarcerated him as a political prisoner [Gilbert, 2001].

Shortly after the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights was voted into being, the Council of Europe convened to set up its own agreement for the protection of human rights (Council of Europe: Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950). In 1953, the council went so far as to create a treaty among member nations. These were its terms:

- Right to life
- Prohibition of torture, slavery and forced labor
- Right to liberty and security
- Right to a fair trial and no punishment without rule of law
- Right to respect for privacy and family life
- Freedom of thought, conscience, religion, expression, assembly and association
- Freedom to marry and have a family
- Right to effective and nondiscriminantal legal remedy

The council also set up a means of international enforcement of these rights and freedoms, a European Court of Human Rights, to be housed in Strasbourg, France (Council of Europe: Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950).

The importance of this action by the Council of Europe is difficult to overestimate, as it would provide the groundwork for numerous decrees and laws,
national as well as international, which were the foundation documents of the European Union, its parliament, and laws governing human subjects protection in both Germany and Hungary. These issues will be addressed in greater detail in forthcoming chapters. For now, suffice to say that each declaration noted above grew out of the Nuremberg Code as part of an international movement to bring human rights out of the ashes of Nazi Germany. It is true enough that, like the Nuremberg Trials and the code which came from it, the United Nations and Council of Europe documents took as their source the United States Bill of Rights, and thus may justly be accused of having a pervasive American influence. It is equally true, however, that signatory states entered into these agreements of their own volition, without American pressure or coercion.

*American Politics: Spies, Everywhere Spies*

The United States was not to have sole possession of the atomic bomb for long. In late 1949, news spread throughout America that a Los Alamos scientist, Klaus Fuchs, had given the secret of the atomic bomb to the Russians. Another spy, David Greenglass, in league with his sister and her husband, Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, had also provided the Soviets with information about the atomic bomb (Schrecker, 2002). When Russia detonated her own nuclear device, America entered a period of mass hysteria spurred by the primal fear of annihilation. School children were told to hide under their desks should a nuclear attack occur. Civil defense shelters were built to house the citizenry in the event of nuclear war with the Russians. Individuals bought detailed blueprints to construct backyard bomb shelters, to be stocked with army surplus supplies and cases of canned goods so that at least a few American families might survive the new holocaust.
And in the nation’s capital, a leader emerged to give focus and voice to America’s amorphous fear. His name was Joseph McCarthy, and the coming era would forever bear his name.

*Tailgunner Joe*

He was one of many returning World War II veterans who wanted to run for political office. Like most of them, Joe McCarthy made the most of his experience as a soldier and, like some of them, he fabricated bravery in combat where there may have been only exposure. When he ran for Congress right after the war, McCarthy used the sobriquet “Tailgunner Joe” to highlight his brief combat experience in the Army Air Corp (Hirschfeld, 1969). Once elected and settled in Washington, DC, McCarthy was largely undistinguished except for his reputation as a hard drinker in a town of hard drinkers, and his propensity to play loose with facts in the service of a cause he believed in. And the greatest cause Joe McCarthy believed in was himself (Landis, 1987)

Everything changed for Tailgunner Joe in February, 1950, in Wheeling, West Virginia. There he gave his famous speech in which he said he possessed the names of 205 members of the Communist Party who were in the State Department of the United States government (Halberstam, 1993). Up to this point, so-called “red baiting” had been percolating in America since right after World War II, but it was based mostly on fear and the paranoia that seems to grip the United States when it is victorious in war. With his state department speech, McCarthy lit a fuse that set this paranoia in motion, and the resulting repression of ideas, speech and action bore a resemblance to nothing so much as an American form of fascism (Cannon & Hansen, 1976).
Heroes became villains, and villains heroes (Daynes, 1997). J. Robert Oppenheimer, for example, the man who spearheaded development of America's atomic bomb, was vilified for his leftist politics twenty years earlier and lost his security clearance to continue his work on nuclear energy (Dean, 1982). McCarthy had somehow managed to crystallize a variety of unarticulated fears in postwar America: the Soviet capacity for nuclear war, the loss of China in 1949 to the communists, rampant postwar inflation, the onset of the Korean War, the *denouement* of victory in World War II, the lack of an obvious external enemy, and generalized xenophobia (Hirschfeld, 1969; Schrecker, 2002).

The nation's response was equally difficult to comprehend. Perhaps because there was no clear-cut external enemy, yet the country as a whole seemed to feel threatened, Americans turned on one another. After all, the United States was embroiled in a new kind of war, a war of ideological conquest, and no one was wearing uniforms to demarcate good guys from bad (Daynes, 1997).

*The Limits of Decency*

Periodically in the United States, there occurs an irony of democracy (Landis, 1987), wherein democracy and the rights we hold so dear are wantonly sacrificed in the name of protecting those very rights. It is not uncommon that such public outcries for safety and security are fed and manipulated by powerful political forces who stand to gain the most by the abridgment of civil liberties. Such was the case during the McCarthy era. Fear, perceived helplessness in the face of threat, ignorance, and the presence of a ready demagogue to spark the tinder are the necessary ingredients for
sociopolitical chaos. Joe McCarthy, a demagogue extraordinaire, was available for duty when his country called.

McCarthy was proficient in the oratorical games of rhetorical proof and propagandizing (Simons, 1976), as well as adept at the art of *ad hominem* attacks on those whose policies he disagreed with. He used the new power of media, most particularly television, to spread his frightening warnings, and demonstrated a breathtaking expertise in using symbols to forge and solidify public opinion and paint his opponents in red (Blumer, 1969; DeFleur & Ball-Roeach, 1989). McCarthy was also powerfully dramatic in the presentation of his “facts” about the perils of encroaching communism, often using repetitive phrases and physical gestures to punctuate and drive home his most accusatory points (Goffman, 1959, 1974). Moreover, he was not limited by the truth (Dean, 1982), which gave him license to not only capitalize upon the perceived communist threat, but to amplify it for both personal gain and the acquisition of political power (Collins, 1975; Dahrendorf, 1959). In so doing, he regenerated a longstanding, archetypal political elite in America, one that was more “right thinking” than others, more patriotic than others, and in effect, more American than others (Mills, 1956).

Yet McCarthy’s superciliousness was to provide his eventual undoing. In 1954, two events occurred, both involving television broadcasts to millions of American homes, that unraveled the specter of McCarthyism. The first was Edward R. Morrow’s courageous commentary on his news program, wherein he addressed McCarthy as a divisive, arrogant demagogue who was doing more harm to the nation than good (Halberstam, 1993; Levy, 1994).
The second event, much more portentous than even Morrow’s, was the Army-McCarthy hearing in June. Over thirty-six days of televised congressional hearings, the Army’s case, deftly presented by a wily attorney by the name of Joseph Welch, showed McCarthy to the American people for what he was, a bully (Thomas, 1973). The case centered on the efforts of Roy Cohn, a McCarthy assistant, to have G. David Schine, a member of Cohn and McCarthy’s staff, released prematurely from Army duty. In the course of these escapades, McCarthy made the mistake of suggesting that the United States Army was, like the state department, riddled with communists. As the hearings moved toward conclusion, Welch angrily stood up to McCarthy, uttering his era-closing statement, “Have you no decency, sir? At long last, have you left no sense of decency?” (as quoted in Thomas, 1973).

A New Scheme for Sociology

The incredible changes that had occurred in the United States as a result of the Great Depression and World War II necessitated a new way of explaining what had happened. The end of World War II brought forth new explanatory schemes for both the radical expansion of complex American bureaucracies and the advance of new technologies. Two such theories, structural functionalism and general systems theory, sought to examine the ways in which modern society was constructed such that it remained stable yet adapted to rapid change.

Structural functionalism, described in the works of Talcott Parsons and Robert Merton, holds that societies create structures, commonly embedded in the norms, mores and social roles of the culture, which manage change such that adaptation occurs, but
without threatening the fundamental homeostasis of the society. These structures provide continuity, and shepherd change processes so that the society remains stable while integrating new adaptive information. These change processes, according to Parsons and Merton, satisfy four essential social functions: adaptation, achievement of social goals, integration of the various structures within the society and maintenance of the social culture (Craib, 1992; Merton, 1968; Parsons, 1951/1979).

Let us take Franklin Roosevelt's efforts to lead America out of the Great Depression as an example. Roosevelt knew that the nation's economic life had changed for good as a result of the stock market crash in 1929. His predecessor, Herbert Hoover, had tried the old economic solutions to no productive avail. Roosevelt needed to stabilize the economy and the social upheaval that resulted from massive unemployment. Using the political, social and economic structures that had characterized American life for decades, Roosevelt shifted the nation's guiding economic philosophy, market driven capitalism, to incorporate elements of socialism in order to provide jobs and financial solvency. His various works projects and the social security system he created are manifestations of increasing governmental influence over the well being of the American citizenry. Yet Roosevelt did not disrupt the core of the nation's structure (democracy) nor its fundamental economic philosophy (capitalism). In fact, Roosevelt used the democratic process to muster widespread public support for his programs and helped sustain the nation's faith in capitalism while simultaneously changing it so radically that his New Deal initiatives would last, largely unthreatened, for fifty years. He thus fostered adaptation to a new economic and social reality, achieved the social goals of increasing
fiscal solvency and employment, integrated existing cultural structures with new ones necessary for successful adaptation, and maintained the culture as a whole.

Another new scheme, arising out of the field of physics, was general systems theory. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, wrestling with the technological lessons stemming from the Manhattan Project and the development of the atomic bomb, developed his theory of integrated systems, wherein a system’s integrity was defined by the nature of its boundary and the manner in which the system dealt with new information in an effort to adapt to a constantly changing environment (von Bertalanffy, 1967). Von Bertalanffy posited that a complex system is comprised of processes (rather than Parson’s structures) which regulate homeostasis and maintain system integrity. Inputs provide new information which prompts a need for adaptation; outputs are the response to the adaptation. Boundaries, or the limits of the system, regulate the input and release the output such that the system remains in rough equilibrium with its environment. Morphogenesis, or change and growth of the system, is regulated by the system’s capacity to take in new information and productively use it for adaptation. Morphostasis, or the tendency of a system to remain constant, is regulated by the system’s ability to titrate the input such that the system may adapt but in a manageable way that does not threaten the system’s fundamental integrity (von Bertalanffy, 1967).

Walter Buckley, a sociologist, converted von Bertalanffy’s general systems theory to describe social phenomena. In his hierarchy of systems, Buckley set forth his model of systems (Buckley, 1967). According to Buckley, there exist three levels of system: mechanical (e.g., an internal combustion engine), homeostatic/organismic (e.g., temperature regulation in the human body) and process/adaptive (e.g., a village which
grows into a city). For Buckley, a homeostatic systems model well describes systems whose structure and function are intended to maintain themselves and system integrity. In other words, homeostatic systems are primarily concerned with regulation. Process/adaptive systems, on the other hand, change, morph and adapt to the environment such that they are constantly increasing in complexity. Process/adaptive systems, then, are in a state of perpetual flux (Buckley, 1967).

The Manhattan Project is a good example of a process/adaptive system, in that it was indeed purposeful, but did not have a truly homeostatic structure. Pulling expertise from a variety of sources and cultures, Robert Oppenheimer sought to create a system of experts who could provide input to the development of the atomic bomb, not to stabilize a system but to prompt it toward growth and complexity. By parceling out various pieces of the research to different teams of physicists, Oppenheimer wanted to produce a complex system that would be much greater than simply the sum of its component parts. Further, whatever his intentions for the long-range future, Oppenheimer and the atomic bomb scientists generated an output that would force adaptation to its existence from virtually the entire civilized world. Japan adapted to its existence by surrendering. The Nazi scientists recognized that the United States provided them with the best opportunity to continue their nuclear research. The Russians contended with the bomb’s existence by competing in an arm’s race that would span five decades. There was no “not adapting” to the existence of the atomic bomb, and each effort by either the United States or the Soviets to adapt to improvements in the other’s armaments resulted in greater and greater increases in system complexity (what we’ve come to term the Cold War).
Wichita and Willowbrook

Not all American scientific experimentation during the period, 1940-1960, involved plutonium. In the early 1950s, social science researchers from the University of Chicago wanted to do a study on the decision-making processes of jurors in criminal cases. The study required audiotaping closed door jury deliberations in Wichita, Kansas. Due to concerns that presence of taping equipment might influence jurist behavior, the researchers elected not to inform juries that they were being audiotaped, nor even that they were participating in a research study (Amdur, 2003; Gordon & Prentice, 2000).

The study was completed and the results disseminated among scholars and researchers. Only when the nature and design of the study, particularly the absence of informed consent, appeared in local newspapers did the full magnitude of public disfavor become known. The Wichita jury study became a topic of national attention, not for the purpose of the study, but for the manner in which it was conducted. This study provided two milestones for human subjects protection in the United States. First, this episode marks the first time that public outrage at the behavior of researchers eventuated in regulations intended to protect the American public from scientific exploitation. Second, the Wichita study highlighted that certain public institutions were not to be compromised in the name of scientific research without due deliberation and full disclosure of intent (Amdur, 2003). In effect, public institutions that protected the rights of citizens were to be granted the same protections to which individuals were entitled.

Of no less import were the Willowbrook hepatitis studies of the mid-1950s. Briefly, the Willowbrook studies, as they became known, were a series of experiments conducted at a long-term care facility in New York that housed retarded children.
For some reason, a high percentage of children at Willowbrook contracted hepatitis while in residence there. Scientists elected to purposely infect healthy children at the institution by feeding them a substance created in part with the feces of children who had active cases of hepatitis. The purpose was to study methods and rates of disease transmission, thereby gleaning information which might be useful in eradicating the disease (Edsall, 1971; Krugman, 1971). From an ethical standpoint, however, these children and their parental guardians were given the solution without knowledge or consent (Grigsby & Roof, 1993).

These studies, each conducted several years after the Nuremberg Code had been laid out as the ethical guide for medical research, beg a question. Given that the first principle of the Nuremberg Code expressly discussed informed, voluntary consent, making it a *sine qua non* of ethical research and human subjects protection, how could these experiments have taken place with the sanction of the American scientific community?

The answer is convoluted, and will unfortunately reverberate throughout the remainder of our discussion. To begin with, the Nuremberg Code was not widely disseminated during or after the Nuremberg Medical Trial in either the United States or, for that matter, Germany (Faden, Lederer & Moreno, 1996; Tuffs, 1996). To some degree this was attributable to the social construction of Nazi physicians (as monsters), which *de facto* “othered” the Nazis and freed American physicians and scientists from the need to examine their own research practices (Gergen, 1999; Harkness, 1996). Another factor is that the Nuremberg Code, while a seminal and vital document, did not carry the weight and leverage of law (Grodin & Annas, 1996), even though the right of informed
consent had been a part of American jurisprudence since the Schloendorff vs. Society of New York case was heard by the United States Supreme Court in 1914 (Mishkin, 2000; Pinals & Appelbaum, 2000; Reamer, 1987).

Yet another factor is one that has existed in American society for a long time and remains with us today, the power and paternalism of the medical and scientific communities (Grodin, 1995; Katz, 1992; Seidelman, 1996). The paternalistic stance of traditional American medicine creates a power imbalance between physician and patient, wherein the physician (or medical community) holds the power of healing, and the patient is left only with compliance as part of the power equation (Blau, 1964). In the course of this exchange, the concept of true voluntarism on the part of the patient is compromised (Tauber, 1995).

Perhaps the most disconcerting factor, however, is the apparent disconnect in American society between the practice of ethically founded medicine, on the one hand, and the pursuit of scientific experimentation on the other (Lederer, 1995; Sonis, et al., 1996). The essence of this split seems to emanate from the dictum, “do no harm.” This belief, a core of the Hippocratic Oath, governs the practice of medicine, yet simultaneously limits or prohibits altogether much scientific experimentation on human beings (Lederer, 1995).

Also, the practice of medicine clearly requires the exercise of ethics, a point driven home in the Nuremberg Medical Trial (Beals, Sebring & Crawford, 1949), but the pursuit of scientific knowledge via the logical positivistic tradition espouses to be largely value free, with the acquisition of scientific knowledge considered to be the highest good (Freeman, 2000; Mahoney, 1991). When cut loose from a grounding in ethics and the
primacy of the rights of the individual, the logical positivistic model may run amok, creating a difficult paradox: if science is intended to promote progress and improvement in the human condition, then left ethically ungoverned, that same science can produce dreadful results for the individual research participants left in its wake. Wichita and Willowbrook demonstrate that abuses of research subjects were not limited to the grotesque experiments perpetrated by the likes of Mengele in the Third Reich, but in fact were being committed in the United States. Indeed, the American scientists who conducted the research at Wichita, Willowbrook and Tuskegee may have been guilty of no greater crime that exhibiting that peculiarly human trait of a willingness to ignore or rationalize human suffering and injustice if it seems to be in the service of the general good of society.

Hungary

In March, 1944, German troops entered Hungary, empowered the Arrowcross, Hungary’s fascist political party, as the political machinery of state, and promptly deported 400,000 Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz under the steely bureaucratic competence of Adolph Eichmann. Admiral Horthy, who had struck something of a devil’s pact with Hitler and Mussolini just prior to the war in order to secure some of Hungary’s historic territory lost in the Peace of Trianon, was unable to stop the exodus of Jews to the Nazi death camps, nor the ascendancy of the Arrowcross to dominant political power (Seibel, 2002).

By December, the Russians were on the outskirts of Budapest, preparing to lay the city to siege. Thousands of Hungarian soldiers and civilians had already died in the
war. Budapest was under Russian siege from shortly before Christmas, 1944, until mid-February, 1945. Six weeks of constant shelling from Russian cannons had reduced much of Budapest to rubble. More than 30,000 buildings in the capital city were destroyed. Hundreds of bodies floated in the Danube, between Buda and Pest (House of Terror, 2002; Lazar, 2002).

In April, the Russian army drove the last of the German army from Hungary after a failed German offensive at Lake Balaton. The Soviet Union was now in full control of all Hungarian territory. First as liberators, then as occupiers, and finally as oppressors, but for one brief month they would remain so until 1989.

60 Andrassy Boulevard

The house at 60 Andrassy Boulevard lies on one of the loveliest streets in Budapest. Lined with trees, laden with stately rows of late Habsburg era villas and apartment buildings, Budapest’s ornate subway line rumbling underneath it, today Andrassy Boulevard is a beautiful, vibrant thoroughfare which connects downtown Budapest with Heroes’ Square. But the house at 60 Andrassy Boulevard was not always so.

Even though Hungary was under direct Nazi rule for only a short time toward the end of World War II, the building at 60 Andrassy Boulevard quickly gained a fearful notoriety among the citizens of Budapest when the Arrowcross came to power. The leader of the Arrowcross Party, Ferenc Szalasi, had rented the building in late 1937 to house the headquarters for his growing Hungarian fascist movement. By 1944, the Arrowcross, with full support from the Third Reich, had taken charge of Hungary’s
political system and initiated the by now familiar task of eradicating Jews from the nation, eliminating all remnants of political opposition and terrorizing Hungary’s populace (House of Terror, 2002). 60 Andrassy Boulevard became the center of Szalasi’s terrorist regime. Former coal cellars underneath the building were converted into cells and chambers of unspeakable torture. By the end of the war, it had become an exceedingly efficient operation of state supported terror.

With the Nazis’ defeat, the Arrowcross turned from the hunter to the hunted. Immediately after the war, with support from the allied coalition that had divided Germany into zones of occupation, the Soviets initiated a series of war crimes trials for former Arrowcross members. The headquarters for the new Soviet-style Hungarian secret police entrusted with ferreting out Arrowcross war criminals was 60 Andrassy Boulevard (Kitschelt, et al., 1999)

Leading the new secret police, known as AVO, was an erstwhile tailor’s apprentice with a fourth grade education, Gabor Peter. Peter ruled AVO, and the Hungarian people who possessed the temerity to oppose the new socialist state, as might be imagined, with a fearful brutality which cowered any potential opposition as well as members of his own secret police. The house on Andressy became synonymous with a painful, protracted death, and in time came to represent the crushing oppression of communism under the puppet Hungarian ruler, Matyas Rajkosi (Kahler, 2000; Teller, 2000).

Rajkosi was of course a Hungarian. Born in 1892, he served in the Austro-Hungarian army in World War I but was captured by the Russians and spent much of the war in a Russian prison camp. Radicalized by the experience, Rajkosi returned to
Hungary after the war and joined the new Hungarian bolshevik party with Bela Kun in 1919. After the rise of Admiral Horthy, both Rajkosi and Kun fled to Russia. Kun was killed in Russia in 1937, but Rajkosi had clandestinely returned to Hungary in 1924 to foment a socialist revolution in his native country. Imprisoned by Horthy in 1925, Rajkosi spent the next fifteen years in a Hungarian prison before he was again exiled to Russia in 1940.

Rajkosi held a festering grudge against Horthy, and upon Horthy’s overthrow and the Russian occupation of Hungary in 1944-45, Rajkosi returned triumphantly to Budapest and was named general secretary of the Hungarian communist party. After a brief, futile effort to restore parliamentary democracy, the Hungarian people were coerced into accepting Soviet domination. Rajkosi established a totalitarian state with AVO as its fist, and the modern era of Hungarian oppression under communism began in earnest.

Rajkosi banished thousands of enemies, real and imagined, to labor camps and to the Soviet gulag in Russia. Under the adroit leadership of Gabor Peter, thousands more were murdered. It is difficult to estimate precisely how many Hungarian “enemies of the state” were exiled or killed, but the most commonly cited conservative figure is around 450,000 (DeBoer-Ashworth, 2000; Fricz, 2000). Ironically, in 1953, Gabor Peter joined their number in one of Stalin’s anti-Semitic purges. Rajkosi ruled Hungary as a pure Soviet-style dictatorship until the death of Stalin in 1953, when Imre Nagy replaced him after a bitter struggle for power which to some degree precipitated the Hungarian revolt of 1956. The screams from the cellars of 60 Andrassy Boulevard fell silent at last.
One may be forgiven for thinking that Hungary had become captive to the Soviet Union solely by virtue of the Russian army’s advance to the westernmost Hungarian border at the end of World War II. In fact, Hungary’s fate had been settled as early as 1943 by the allies coalesced against Nazi Germany.

Initially, the policy of the United States and the other allies fighting Hitler was to create a European federation among the central and eastern European states after victory had been achieved. As the war progressed, the United States briefly considered supporting a republican or monarchic government in Hungary (essentially a condition of status quo ante bellum). By 1943, however, Roosevelt and his advisors had elected to grant Hungary and most of eastern Europe to the Soviets as part of the price for Soviet help in defeating the Nazis (Romsics, 1995). Anticipating that the geopolitical reality after the war might well require a buffer zone between the allies of western Europe and the Soviets, Roosevelt believed that the so-called eastern bloc would readily satisfy that purpose. Secondly, granting Stalin the sanction to hold on to the territory acquired by the Russian army in the eastern front assault on Germany would not only mollify Stalin, but maintain his motivation to approach Berlin quickly regardless of the cost in Russian lives (Borhi, 1995).

No one’s fool, Stalin had approached the anti-fascist elements of the Hungarian power structure through emissaries in early 1944, ostensibly as an act of camaraderie and assistance in ridding Hungary of the Nazis. The United States encouraged this alliance, and supported the Hungarian anti-fascists in seeking Russian help to liberate their nation from the stranglehold of the Arrowcross. Thus the Americans had rather cynically
conned Hungary into exchanging oppressors in order to placate Stalin and push him to engage the German army in Hungary. The titular American support for a Hungarian democracy evaporated shortly after the war, and a full Soviet takeover of Hungary filled the vacuum (Borsodi, 1995).

Rajkosi's Stranglehold

Over the course of 1945-1949, the people of Hungary gradually began to realize that the dream of a postwar democracy in Hungary was dead. The elections held immediately after war's end tipped favorably toward the establishment of social democracy, land reform to break up the old aristocratic estates into smaller tracts farmed by peasants, economic recovery, and a casting off of the fascist yoke (Lazar, 2002). But the Soviets and their Hungarian ruler, Matyas Rajkosi, shared no such intentions. The Soviets pillaged what remained of Hungary’s wealth (80% of which had been destroyed in World War II) and transported it east to Russia (Bodi, Fabian & Giczey, n.d.b.). The country was nearing complete social and economic collapse. Stalin’s army, Gabor Peter’s AVO (soon to become AVH, a change in name only), and Rajkosi’s exportation of thousands of Hungarians to labor camps both within Hungary and farther east to Russia effectively neutralized any potential opposition to a complete Soviet takeover of the nation (Held, 2000; Kitschelt, et al., 1999). Hungary was so quickly swept from Nazi fascism to Soviet communism, from one totalitarian state to another, that Hungarians have called the transition as brief and simple as changing clothes from one uniform to another (House of Terror, 2002; Schmidt, 2000).
Poverty and starvation were widespread in the cities and across the countryside (Szalai, n.d.). Families were split apart by Rajkosi’s deportations (Tomka, 2001). Industry was centralized under the communist government in Budapest. Local and regional governments were abolished (DeBoer-Ashworth, 2000). Many people were exiled from their homes in Hungary’s towns and cities, forced to work on communal farms with little in the way of agricultural skills and only the most rudimentary farming tools.

A matter of weeks after signing the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, the Hungarian government began the persecution of Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty, the Hungarian prelate of the Catholic Church, charging him with conspiring with the remnants of the Habsburgs to take over the country. In 1949, Mindszenty was put on public trial for treason. Throughout the trial, he spoke out against Rajkosi and the communists, becoming a persona of the anger and frustration then pervading much of Hungarian society. Mindszenty also became a symbol of Hungarian courage. He was found guilty of conspiracy against the “republic,” and was sentenced to a life of penal service in the labor camps of eastern Hungary (Gilbert, 2001). By 1950, each of the major religions of Hungary (Calvinist, Catholic and Lutheran) had signed forced loyalty oaths to the state. Clergy were, like Mindszenty, accused of conspiring against the people of Hungary and sent to labor camps. Worship of God had been replaced with idealization of the perfect socialist state (Froese, 2001).
Gradually, Hungarian society became fearful, passive and publicly silent, as the new socialist state eradicated the symbols of old Hungary and replaced them with the leveling monotony of communism (Barany, 2000). Not content with controlling the bodies of the Hungarian people, the communists also required fealty of the mind and soul (Foucault, 1975/1995). The party became preeminent in all facets of public life, and in this classless society ruled by the proletariat, it soon became evident that access to life’s amenities was not equally distributed according to one’s needs, but founded upon loyalty to the regime (Kolosi & Szelenyi, 1993; Young, 1990).

There is a Soviet maxim written by unknown dissenters during the years of Stalinist oppression and terror, which reads as follows:

DON’T THINK; IF YOU THINK, DON’T SPEAK; IF YOU SPEAK, DON’T WRITE; IF YOU WRITE, DON’T SIGN;
IF YOU THINK, SPEAK, WRITE AND SIGN, DON’T BE SURPRISED! (Lozansky, 1989).

Culture, Science and Education in Communist Hungary

As it had destroyed Hungarian civil society, the sociopolitical system and the role of traditional religion, so did the communist ruling party obliterate Hungarian culture, folkways and mores (Tokeczki, 2000). There would be no more variety of human experience; that was counterrevolutionary. There would exist only the tedious adherence to creating the perfect socialist state, where poverty, unemployment, homelessness,
mental illness, alcoholism and a host of other social problems simply did not exist. Those who saw social problems were enemies of the state. Anyone drawing public attention to social problems was a criminal. The public mood sank into anhedonia, drudgery became the norm, escapism through alcohol was the secret national pastime, and transcendence above the flatness of one’s destiny was a ticket to the eastern quarries (James, 1902; Kahler, 2000). Hungary had become an appendage to the Soviet Union, no longer a nation of its own. Its people were captives wearing shallow smiles on their tired faces.

Science, as in Nazi Germany, was bastardized into reinforcing the propaganda of the state. Even the proud, justifiably renowned Hungarian Academy of Sciences lost its autonomy, and its brilliant scholars and scientists were enlisted in the service of studying the multiplicity of ways that socialism was improving peoples’ lives (Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2002).

Religion in Hungary had been replaced with worship of the state, and scientific pursuit of knowledge was replaced with scientific atheism. Scientific atheism, as defined by the communist party, critiqued traditional religion as oppressive, and held up the worship of science as the foundation of the atheistic worldview (Froese, 2001). Science in Hungary during the communist era was used as a weapon of truth management, such that the findings of scientific inquiry were manipulated to confirm the political agenda of the state.

Social science did not fare better. It was assigned the unenviable duty of using scientific means to empirically test socialist suppositions. By the mid-fifties, however, these research endeavors were depicting a socialist system that was not classless by any
means. General well being and access to resources was not, as it turned out, spread widely across Hungarian society, but rather was connected with status in the Hungarian communist party. Additionally, class was found to be linked to who controlled the means, not of production, as Marxist ideology would have it, but of the redistribution of surplus (Craib, 1992; Kolosi & Szelenyi, 1993).

These findings were noteworthy for several reasons. First, given the general paucity of essential resources such as food, hard goods, gasoline, etc., why was there a surplus? Second, the data discovered by social scientists during the Rajkosi regime relative to distribution of wealth (such as it was) gave lie to the premise of socialism: that there existed a distributive justice in Hungary which allowed for the equal allotment of resources based upon need, not status (Young, 1990). Third, and perhaps most significant in terms of future implications, the control over the means of redistribution of surplus suggested that the potential for a hidden, "informal" economy existed. The questions begged, of course, were by what means would this surplus be redistributed, by whom, and what sort of economy might accommodate the redistribution? Given the prickly issues raised by this research, it is not terribly surprising that the social and behavioral sciences in communist Hungary did not receive tremendous support from the state (Piko & Kopp, 2002). After all, in Hungary as elsewhere, the social and behavioral sciences have traditionally examined the nature of social problems, and in a perfect socialist state, social problems do not exist. Moreover, the social and behavioral sciences have often had empowering roles in society, and empowerment of individuals and groups clearly did not rank highly on the communist agenda in postwar Hungary (Apor, 1999; Butler, 2002).
During the infancy of Soviet occupation of Hungary, Rajkosi and his Soviet mentors decided that professional training and education in Hungary were to be divorced from academic research activities. Thus research, as discussed above, was to focus on demonstrating empirically the validity of socialist ideology and political processes, whereas professional education and training were given the work of operationalizing the ideology through such means as manufacturing, technology, industrial improvement and re-education of the populace (Peteri, 1991).

This presented the ruling elite with a conundrum. To wit, political practicality in the socialist state required absolute control over intellectual and cultural life, yet this collided with the obvious need in a devastated postwar nation for trained expertise which might bring creative problem-solving skills to the reconstruction of the country. Modernization was critical to the Soviet ideal, especially since it was a requirement for competition with the west. But rapid modernization was shackled with a politicized agenda. The result was that modernization in Hungary, as in the rest of the Soviet domain, tended to be characterized by homogeneity and stasis rather than differentiation and growth (Buckley, 1967; Peteri, 1998).

1956

Virtually the day Stalin died in 1953, fissures began to appear in what Churchill had once termed the “Iron Curtain.” In the Kremlin, the seat of Soviet power in Moscow, the power struggle began. Taking advantage of the political uncertainty in Russia, people living in the Soviet bloc nations of East Germany and Czechoslovakia engaged in mass
demonstrations against communist hegemony in their countries. The revolts were quickly suppressed (House of Terror, 2002).

In 1955, Austria was granted neutral state status, and all World War II occupying powers were required to withdraw from her borders. Russian soldiers left Austria and fell back into Hungary. That same year saw the emergence of the Warsaw Pact, a Soviet response to the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO consolidated western Europe into a bloc for defense against possible Russian incursion. The Warsaw Pact created the same bloc against western incursion. Now there were essentially two great alliances facing one another along the eastern zone boundary in Germany and the western borders of Czechoslovakia and Hungary (Gilbert, 2001). More to the Soviet Union’s purpose, however, the Warsaw Pact, signed by each of the Soviet bloc nations, gave a semblance of legal authority for the stationing of Russian troops inside the signatory states.

Stalin had ruled the Soviet Union with the absolutely sure hand of a dictator since Lenin’s death in 1924. He had shaped his country in precisely the way he wanted, mercilessly killing those who opposed him and all those who might someday oppose him. His death after such a lengthy and terrifying reign left a power vacuum that destabilized Russia and eroded the rule of puppet dictators across the countries now comprising the Warsaw Pact. This included Matyas Rajkosi in Hungary. His poor stewardship of Hungary’s declining economy, with the ensuing fall in the Hungarian standard of living, contributed to Rajkosi’s downfall in the mid-50s (DeBoer-Ashworth, 2000).
The Unlikely Martyr

Rajkosi was replaced as Hungarian Prime Minister by Imre Nagy, but retained his position as general secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party until 1956. Between Rajkosi and Nagy, Hungary experienced its own power struggle during 1953-56. By 1956, Rajkosi was out of power, and Nagy became uncontested leader of Hungary. That same year, the new Soviet general secretary, Nikita Krushchev, gave his famous “secret speech,” denouncing Stalin and the criminal nature of his reign. The secret speech was intended to draw a line of demarcation between the old Soviet regime and the new. It also threw Soviet-style communism into a moral crisis that further weakened Moscow’s unyielding rule over the countries behind the Iron Curtain (Kovrig, 1995).

Imre Nagy was the son of Hungarian peasants. He fought in World War I, was captured by the Russians and spent much of the war in a Siberian prison camp. Nagy escaped the camp in early 1917 and participated in the Bolshevik Revolution later that year.

He returned to Hungary briefly during the Bela Kun uprising of 1919, but fled back to Russia when Admiral Horthy came to power and destroyed those involved in the Kun-led revolt. Nagy returned yet again in 1945, after the Red Army had occupied Budapest. There he gradually rose in the ranks of the Hungarian Communist Party, introducing land reforms for the Hungarian peasantry and representing a somewhat more liberal communist regime than Rajkosi’s (Mulcahy, 2000).

Replacing Rajkosi entirely in 1956, and faced with an unsettled, angry nation tired of a decade of murderous rule under Rajkosi, Nagy loosened state control over the media and encouraged public debate on political and economic reform. He released Cardinal
Mindzenty from prison and restored the prelate to his former status as an internationally known Hungarian religious leader. But Nagy, regardless of his differences with Rajkosi and his later reputation as a freedom-loving democrat, remained a socialist at heart and believed that Hungary’s best interests lay in a less repressive but still steadfastly socialist form of governance (Mulcahy, 2000).

The Hungarian Revolution began quietly enough on October 23, 1956. Students congregated in front of the radio building in Budapest, demanding an end to Soviet occupation and the establishment of a “truer” form of socialism under Nagy. The police were called out to disperse the crowd and make a few arrests to reinstate order. The demonstrators, now quickly growing in number, fought back. The police opened fire on the crowd, and suddenly the modest student uprising began to spread like an oil fire through the city’s streets (Lazar, 2002).

The next day, the students returned, but now their ranks were swollen with officers and enlisted men of the Hungarian army. The protesters toppled Stalin’s statue, for nearly ten years a fixture in central Budapest. The following day, October 25th, Soviet tanks opened fire on the demonstrators in Parliament Square, killing a score of people and wounding perhaps two hundred others (House of Terror, 2002).

The simple demonstration of two days before now become a full-scale armed uprising. It spread across Hungary, to Debrecen, Miskolc and a host of other cities. The protestors, their confidence increasing as their numbers rose, called for a free, democratic Hungary and the complete ouster of Soviet troops from the country. On October 29th, Nagy went on Radio Kossuth, Hungary’s national radio, to announce that Hungarian socialists were now in charge of Hungary, and that free elections were being planned. He
dissolved the hated AVH, and abolished one party rule by the communists. The Red Army left the country. For the first time in twelve years, Hungary was not occupied by a foreign power (Froese, 2001; Held, 2000; Tokeczki, 2000).

Of course, the uprising in Hungary was not going unnoticed in the west. Having given Stalin Hungary as “war reparations” after World War II, the United States and the other allies were now faced with a critical question: would the Soviets use their massive force to retake the country in spite of world opinion, or were they more inclined to negotiate a polite withdrawal from Hungary and then consolidate their control over other bloc states (Borhi, 1995; Romsics, 1995)? Compounding this, to what degree if any ought the United States insert itself into the conflict, potentially triggering a third world war, for the sake of a small, out-of-the-way central European nation (Kovrig, 1995)?

The United States and its allies ended up offering little more than lip service to Hungary’s dire attempt to liberate itself from Soviet control. Sensing that the Soviets were fearful of a domino effect in other Warsaw Pact countries should Hungary fall, America held back from giving more than encouraging words to the Hungarians (Kitschelt, et al., 1999). In the final analysis, the United States was unwilling to risk destabilizing both eastern Europe and the tentative balance of power with the Soviets by facing down Krushchev over Hungary (Kovrig, 1995).

Having successfully bluffed the United States and President Dwight Eisenhower, Krushchev again sent the Red Army across Hungary’s eastern border on November 4th. In short order, Soviet tanks recaptured Hungarian airfields, bridges and major highways. There was valiant fighting all over Hungary, but the Hungarian army was no match for the Russians. In a few days, the Hungarian Revolution had been crushed. Janos Kadar, a
communist member of Nagy’s now defunct coalition government, was named leader of the restored Hungarian communist government. Kadar offered Nagy safe passage out of the country, but on November 23rd, Nagy was captured. He was later tried and convicted of treason. In 1958, Nagy was executed by the Kadar regime, and his name was removed from all official Hungarian documents in an effort to deny his existence and the reality of the uprising (Rev, 2001).

Budapest was again in ruins after the Soviets reclaimed absolute power over Hungary. In the span of a month, Hungary’s freedom uprising had been routed in full view of the world. Twenty thousand Hungarians were wounded. Twenty five hundred had been killed, most of them in Budapest. Two hundred thousand people were forced to leave Hungary in the aftermath of the revolution (House of Terror, 2002). Imre Nagy was not one of them, but he, along with all the others, had learned a brutal lesson. In a totalitarian state, there is no such thing as a little bit of freedom.

Summary

The decades, 1940-1960, were the apocalypse of the 20th century. The rise and fall of the Third Reich, and the lesser-known but equally bloodthirsty reign of Stalin’s Soviet Russia, yielded the most cataclysmic slaughter known to humankind. But if the savage extermination experienced by the people of Eurasia was the most horrific of events during mid-century, perhaps the repression of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was the most poignant. Bravery certainly had no better stage than this small but never helpless nation during that short month of freedom.
For the United States, these times underscored for the remainder of the century that America was not only the breadbasket, but also the armory of the world. Science and technology had given the world frightful means of mass destruction. Germany used its science to create a means of ending a people; America used hers to create a means of ending one war and inadvertently beginning another.

These years also saw the rise and fall of fascism in Germany, Hungary and the United States. America, fresh on the heels of victory over foreign fascism, fell prey to its own homemade version, better to remind us that we must be careful of what we hate, because sometimes we become it.

But the events of these twenty years also carry hope. The advent of ethics codes to govern the conduct of human subjects research, the first international declaration of human rights, and the rebirth of the United Nations each bear witness that despite the horrors of mid-century, we can learn from them and maybe do more than simply survive; perhaps we can indeed prevail (Faulkner, 1950).
CHAPTER IV
A HUMAN FACE, THE WALL
AND A DISILLUSIONED DEMOCRACY

This chapter will review the period, 1960-1980, in Hungary, Germany and the United States. As in previous chapters, the narrative will pay particular attention to the chronology of events that have significance to human rights and the evolution of human subjects protection in research. The chapter will conclude with a brief summary.

The quashing of the Hungarian revolution, curiously, was followed by a temporary loosening of the communist stranglehold on the nation’s economy and, after a period of severe retribution, a diminishing of the terrorism that had been the hallmark of Matyas Rajkosi. Janos Kadar, popularly condemned for the murder of Imre Nagy, ended up being hailed as a reformer. But Kadar was at the mercy of the Soviets, and his efforts to manage Hungary’s economy by permitting the existence of a city on the back of a whale, while humanizing Hungarian socialism, in the course of events backfired on him and hastened his ultimate demise.

Germany remained a fractured nation, with one Germany wooing and winning acceptance from the west, as the other struggled to survive the dreary dullness of life in a flawed socialist paradise. Ideological boundaries proved insufficient to keep the people of Berlin apart. A wall of concrete and barbed wire, though, provided the world with an emblem of the seeming permanence and intractability of the divisions of the Cold War.
The United States elected a president who symbolized a much-needed optimism during these years, but his boldness of vision would not be tolerated. America imploded, its institutions weakened by effrontery in foreign policy and corruption at home. Two presidents in a row were hounded from office.

Racism simply would not go away. American scientists still did not adhere to the Nuremberg Code or its corollaries. And it took an act of Congress to build an ethics review system that would make Talcott Parsons and Ludwig von Bertalanffy beam like proud fathers.

Hungary

Unquestionably, the repression that followed the 1956 uprising in Hungary was ferocious and cruel. Janos Kadar, Hungary’s new ruler, carried the *imprimatur* of the new Soviet regime under Nikita Krushchev, and wasted no time in restoring full communist reign over the country. Not all of the Nagy-inspired achievements were revoked, however. The government’s policy toward agrarian reforms was relaxed, and the standard of living began to improve. Food production increased, and with it came relief from the daily fear of starvation for most Hungarians (Lazar, 2002).

Krushchev was not Stalin. While it may appear from the outside looking in that the Soviet Union was as repressive as ever, Hungary began to see a modest reduction in state-inspired terror, and a shift from Rajkosi’s purely totalitarian communism to a relatively moderated authoritarian communism under Kadar. This change was gradual, as Kadar felt his way into leadership of post-uprising Hungary. Figuratively, Kadar in the years immediately following the 1956 revolution was walking a tightrope. He dared
not fully maintain the reforms instigated under Nagy for fear of increasing the appetite of
the Hungarian people for more freedom. Yet Kadar realized that Hungary could not
return to the days of absolute totalitarianism without risking another revolution. Between
1956 and 1962, he wavered, and the degree of Hungarian repression wavered with him
(DeBoer-Ashworth, 2000; Fricz, 2000).

In a sense, the communist rulers of Hungary were faced with a teetering of the
country's governmental and sociopolitical structures between the stabilizing, regulatory
functions of a pure homeostatic system and the impulsion toward growth and change
characteristic of a process/adaptive system (Buckley, 1967). There came a point in
Hungary where the circumstances were ripe for change, yet the homeostatic purpose of a
modern totalitarian state, wherein change is tantamount to revolution, was forcibly
maintained by the Hungarian leadership and their Russian overseers in an effort to hold
on to unchallenged authority. This time, it worked. Thirty years later, the impetus across
eastern Europe toward change and adaptation would overwhelm Soviet-style communism
and it would be swept aside.

**Socialism with a Human Face**

Kadar, in a clever masterstroke, eventually decided to adopt a "both/and" position
rather than revert to the "either/or" situation that had prevailed pre-1956. That is, he
elected to hold firm to a thoroughly socialistic form of state governance, with an overtly
centralized and rigidly prescribed economy, while simultaneously averting his gaze from
the growing informal economy which might permit Hungarians to moonlight extra
income and trade it clandestinely for an improved standard of living (Stark & Bruszt, 1998).

This accommodative form of socialism would characterize Hungarian life after 1962, albeit with the predictable fits and starts so common in Hungarian history. In addition, as we shall later see, the accommodative socialism instigated by Kadar reverberated through the 1989-1990 transition to market-driven capitalism, and allowed Hungary to dramatically transform its system of government without bloodshed or coup d’etat (Stark & Bruszt, 1998).

Kadar’s peculiar form of accommodative socialism became known as socialism with a human face. More colorfully, this new mode of socialist economy was often referred to as “a city on the back of a whale,” suggesting that the formal socialist economy could coexist with an informal, black-market capitalism. Fueling the black-market was the existence of two working structures: the edifice of state-acknowledged socialist employment, and the unacknowledged (but widely permitted) capitalistic moonlighting system (Teller, 2000). Hungarians now possessed a measure of privacy in both personal and economic life to complement their public lives as devout socialists (Tokeczki, 2000). By 1968, this double existence had effectively created a Hungarian middle class via black-market enterprise (Bodi, Fabian & Giczey, n.d.b.).

While certainly not without its benefits, socialism with a human face was also a corrupting influence, too. Hungarian society since 1947-1948 had been stripped of its independent and historically rich foundations in scientific, cultural and spiritual life. All that remained was stark physical survival. With the coming of the city on the back of a whale, Kadar had managed to improve material life among the citizenry. Yet underneath
his apparent largesse lurked a desire to feed public apathy rather than foster a higher standard of living (DeBoer-Ashworth, 2000; Rev, 2001).

Kadar’s New Economic Mechanism (NEM), as the two-tiered economy was officially known, also promoted a thoroughly western-styled erosion of idealism in the new middle class insofar as the greater good of Hungarian society was concerned. The NEM created a façade of social well being. The poor remained poor, and party officials, still rewarded commensurately with their loyalty to the Kadar regime, remained unobtrusively wealthy. What had changed was the insertion of a buffering class between them to protect the well to do from the impoverished and provide the impoverished with something for which to aspire. Such was life during the 1960s and early 1970s in the perfect socialist state.

Morally, the NEM corrupted the citizenry by setting up a way of living predicated on the double life necessary for the existence of the two-tiered economy. Implicit in the new economy was secrecy. The middle class was free to pursue through moonlighting a higher standard of living, but they were not to flaunt it outside of their class (Tokeczki, 2000). Of course the urban poor knew it, as did the governing regime. But again the rule of “do not speak” held dominion. This time, though, it pertained to material acquisition as much as political dissent (Lozansky, 1989). Kadar’s masterstroke proved brilliant in dividing Hungarian society against itself in the pursuit of western material amenities, while simultaneously cementing his control over Hungary. In a little over ten years, popular opinion of Janos Kadar had moved from assassin of Imre Nagy to abundant and generous father figure (Lazar, 2002).
As the decade turned, the pendulum began to swing back again, toward a more formalized socialism spurred by a declining economy in Hungary and the rest of the Warsaw Pact nations as well as in western Europe. This pendulum swing may be attributed to three factors. First, the vagaries of Hungarian history show us again and again that periods of repression tend to follow times of freedom (or its facsimile) (Held, 2000). Second, the global economy, particularly those countries who were dependent upon fossil fuels for industry and transportation, suffered a period of substantial inflation. Among those was Hungary. The costs of goods outran the capacity of most Hungarians to keep pace financially through moonlighting. Hence the standard of living diminished during the early and mid-70s, and the middle class in Hungary suffered great economic losses. Third, in Russia, there had occurred a change in leadership. In 1964, Leonid Brezhnev had succeeded Nikita Krushchev as head of the Soviet Union. A power struggle ensued as Brezhnev jockeyed for control with Aleksei Kosygin. As had been the case with Stalin’s succession, there was a period of political instability during the struggle. Brezhnev assumed full power in the Soviet Union late in the 1960s, and began another repressive tenure in Russia. Not as bloody as Stalin, Brezhnev’s solidification of power nonetheless meant death to his enemies and a tightening of the Soviet grip on the Warsaw Pact countries (Gilbert, 2001). The Czech uprising in 1968 confirmed for Brezhnev the wisdom of his policies.

Never a proponent of what the west was now calling, “goulash communism,” Brezhnev insisted that Kadar impose a purer socialism upon Hungary. He believed that the two-tiered economy of Hungary, while perhaps a necessary evil in the years following
the 1956 uprising, had been tolerated by Krushchev in his weakness for western ways (DeBoer-Ashworth, 2000).

This turn of events prompted by Brezhnev’s hardening toward the west did not bode well for Kadar. He was prized by the people of Hungary for precisely what Brezhnev opposed. In the mid-70s, however, Kadar capitulated and restored Brezhnev’s purer form of socialism. The black-market never was fully eradicated, but it did lose the implicit approval of the Hungarian communist party. The middle class, which had gotten used to the benefits of Kadar’s city on the back of a whale, began to turn against him as their fortunes declined. Kadar’s popularity began to sink, and it would continue to do so for years to come (Fricz, 2000). If the Hungarian people had learned in 1956 that there was no such thing as a little bit of freedom, Hungary’s leaders were soon to learn that process/adaptive systems did not revert to homeostatic/organismic systems except to avert disaster.

*Science and the State*

Remember that social science research in the 1950s and 1960s, while never completely embraced by the Hungarian communist party, was enjoined in the service of empirically demonstrating the efficacy of socialist ideology. One of its critical findings, that class was linked to control over the means of surplus redistribution, was pivotal in the development of the informal Hungarian economy. Thus social science research proved quite valuable to Kadar in constructing his socialism with a human face (Kolosi & Szelenyi, 1993).
Ironic then that during the Kadar regime, culture-oriented social science research had so little state support. Care-oriented medical science was another matter (Berta, 1999). Medical science was generally viewed as somehow more objective than social science, and thereby more generally beneficial to the proletariat. Additionally, medical science was inherently paternalistic and disempowering of the individual due to the hierarchically superior relationship between doctor and patient, and because of that medical science did not carry the ideological contradictions with socialism that social science might have. Lastly, as mentioned above, in a perfect socialist state, there exist no social problems, so the very need for social science evaporates beyond its utility in reinforcing state propaganda (Peteri, 1998; Piko & Kopp, 2002).

This dichotomy is nowhere more evident than in the Hungarian Academy of Sciences during the Kadar era. While there was indeed some relaxation of strict doctrinaire rule over the academy during the 1960s, the mathematical and natural sciences experienced a greater degree of state support during the entirety of the Kadar regime than did the philosophical, social and historical sciences (Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2002). Also, the mathematical and natural sciences did not suffer the variability of support during the time of socialism with a human face that faced the philosophical, social and historical sciences. In other words, what state support for science that existed in the period, 1960-1980, did not appreciably fluctuate in the political climate for the so-called hard sciences; it surely did for the softer, social sciences (Piko & Kopp, 2002).

In all the sciences, as in most other Hungarian institutions, there developed an elite, the academic membership of which was more closely allied with party loyalty than
scholarship and intellectual prowess (Peteri, 1991). This set of circumstances did not promulgate an atmosphere of *avant-garde* research or bold scientific inquiry. Individuality was neither cherished nor encouraged, and the value of a single person mattered little. It was not a time of scrupulous dedication to the principles set forth in the Nuremberg Code, which by its very definition undercut the power of the state over the rights of the individual (Blasszauer, 1986; Catlin, 1999).

**Germany**

Konrad Adenauer’s desire to reconstruct Germany was reaching fruition by 1960. West Germany had been admitted to the Council of Europe in the early 1950s, joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1954, and later that same year began negotiations with other western European nations for the development of a single economic market which would cross national borders (Gilbert, 2001). By 1957, a nascent “Common Market” had been established in western continental Europe to bolster war recovery and expand western European economic power in the world (Welsch, 1996).

Meanwhile, East Germany was becoming increasingly sovietized and repressive, lurching from one crisis to another (Stokes, 2000). Unlike some members of the Warsaw Pact countries, the GDR still possessed some capacity for heavy industry, and had maintained many of its skilled workers and technicians after the end of World War II (Pritchard, 2000). Not all of the potential rebuilders of the GDR wanted to remain in East Germany, however. This was particularly true in Berlin. By 1961, the tide of East Germans crossing over to the west had become intolerable to the Ulbricht government. Every month, 4,000 East Germans abandoned the proletarian paradise for the enticements
of the west. On one day, August 12th, almost 2,500 East Germans walked through the thinly guarded checkpoints to the west, with no intentions of returning (Gilbert, 2001; Stokes, 2000).

Not only was this bleeding East Germany of much needed skilled labor, it was an embarrassment to the Ulbricht regime. The Soviets didn’t like it either. The sight of thousands of socialist workers escaping the attractions of a perfect Marxist/Leninist state for an uncertain yet alluring future in the west, played out on an international stage, was not good advertising for the communist model of governance (Allinson, 2000). The flood of defections had to be stopped, and Eric Honecker had a crude but ultimately very effective way of stemming the flow.

The Wall

When Berliners awoke on the morning of August 13, 1961, they did so to the sight of East German troops constructing a human wall guarding the Soviet zone of East Berlin. Within weeks, this human wall had been replaced by a barrier of brick and concrete nearly one hundred miles long. Across the top of the wall, broken glass had been strewn to deter potential escapees from attempting to leave the eastern part of the city. Barbed wire was laced along the entire length of the wall above the broken glass to entangle those East Berliners sufficiently intrepid to have scaled the concrete rampart, ensnaring them long enough to be captured or shot by East German police. Between 1961 and 1989, when the wall was torn down, more than one hundred people were killed trying to cross the wall, and a great many more were seriously wounded (Federal Republic of Germany, 2003).
Of all the symbols of the Cold War, perhaps the Berlin Wall was the most striking and potent. The existence of the wall verified in the starkest way imaginable the lie of socialist freedom and the abject disregard for human rights so characteristic of totalitarian states. Additionally, the Berlin Wall became a symbol of the unassailable division between the superpowers, the United States and Soviet Russia, and their ideological incommensurability (Blumer, 1969; Goffman, 1974; Kuhn, 1962/1996). For the remainder of the Cold War, the Berlin Wall would provide a front stage for the intransigence that defined the era (Goffman, 1959). The illusion played out was one of good vs. evil, depending on which side you were on. The reality concerned the limitless wielding of international power rather than a titanic struggle for the soul of the world.

Divided Berlin, in a sense, represented the history of the postwar environment in Europe. Largely destroyed during World War II, split into zones of occupancy by the victors, separated physically, economically and ideologically between west and east, Berlin became a microcosm of the Cold War. For decades, the city would be the central stage upon which the war between communism and capitalism played out (Goffman, 1959), an emblem of the global civil war embroiling the world. When the Berlin Wall was torn down in 1989, it was again made a symbol of the abrupt demise of communism occurring across eastern Europe, and was sold chip by precious chip to westerners eager to own a souvenir of their ideological victory (Daniels, 2000).

**Ostpolitik**

In 1966, former mayor of West Berlin, Willy Brandt, became foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Germany. Brandt constructed the policy known as *ostpolitik*, or
reconciliation between the ideological factions of Germany. Ostpolitik signified a
dramatic change in the foreign policy of West Germany. Under Konrad Adenauer,
foreign policy was governed by the Hallstein Doctrine, which held that there were
physical and ideological barriers between the FRG and GDR that were essentially
unbridgeable (Federal Republic of Germany, 2003).

The Hallstein Doctrine, developed by the Adenauer government in the immediate
postwar era, was not wholly of German creation. In part, it was designed to distance
West Germany from East, but like the Berlin Wall, it exemplified the greater division
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Hallstein Doctrine was
created to mollify the western powers and enlist western political and economic support
for West Germany in the years after World War II (Pommerin, 1996; Theis, 1994).

When Willy Brandt was elected chancellor of West Germany in 1969, ostpolitik
became the driving force in the country’s foreign policy. A Social Democrat, Brandt
envisioned a peaceful coexistence between the two Germanys. Ostpolitik was a
fundamental shift in western policy toward the Warsaw Pact countries, Germany in
particular. Over the next several years, Brandt was to negotiate and sign a treaty with the
Soviet Union accepting the division of Berlin and establishing normal diplomatic
relations with the GDR. It may appear at first that the influences of ostpolitik did not
extend beyond the borders of East and West Germany. Yet this is not entirely true.
Ostpolitik was a precursor to the more widespread international policy of détente, which
in the period, 1970-1976, guided the United States and the Soviet Union toward more
friendly relations, and produced a short-lived era of reduced international hostility
between the superpowers (Gilbert, 2001). A byproduct of détente was the introduction of

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American capitalism into the Soviet economy, in the presumably harmless form of Pepsi Cola and Levi’s blue jeans. Rather than quenching the thirst of Russia’s youth for all things American, détente merely provided a hope of what might be. Détente, by giving Soviets an appetizing taste of capitalism’s fruits, spelled the beginning of the end for the buttressed, isolated life of communism. Perhaps it is true that the real genius of America is its ability to co-opt enemies.

Ironically, the treaty signed by the United States and Russia to cement détente as the operational philosophy between the two nations took place in Helsinki, Finland. Helsinki was also the site of the 1964 World Medical Association conference that had profound effects upon the world of research ethics and human rights (Tadd, 2000; World Medical Association, 2002).

The Declaration of Helsinki

Amidst the tensions and fears of the Cold War, the World Medical Association met in Helsinki during 1964. In the course of that conference, the so-called Declaration of Helsinki was conceived as the first effort to establish mutually agreed upon ethical standards for research involving human subjects (World Medical Association, 2002). There have been periodic updates and refinements to the initial declaration since 1964, but the foundation elements remain essentially unchanged since that landmark event.

In essence, the Declaration of Helsinki affirmed the tenets of the Nuremberg Code, with two important additions:

- The rights of the individual must be preeminent to the needs of society in all research involving human subjects
• Every human subject involved in research is entitled to the best effective treatment available

One may be tempted to think that the addition of two simple items to the Nuremberg Code might not warrant the respect that has attended the first Declaration of Helsinki. But the concepts underlying these seemingly small additions to the Nuremberg Code speak directly to events which had occurred during and after World War II, events which could not be laid solely at the feet of Hitler’s Nazis. True, the Nazis had indeed argued that research involving human subjects, and the atrocities committed in its name, were to some degree justified when measured against the potential overall good of society. Also true is the assertion that the Nazi doctors routinely denied treatment, effective or not, to their research subjects.

As we’ve seen above, research endeavors in the United States had also violated the Nuremberg Code after its adoption. Recall that eugenics experiments, plutonium experiments, and the Tuskegee studies were all being implemented in America at the time of the Helsinki conference. Each of the aforementioned transgressed upon the rights of the individual, and surely one could not find a better example of denying effective treatment to research subjects than is found in the Tuskegee studies.

Perhaps the greatest importance of the first Declaration of Helsinki, though, is located in the subtext of the event and its affirmation of the Nuremberg Code, plus two additions. For the first time, a voluntary code of research ethics was developed with contributions from a truly international body. The key notions here are voluntarism and international collaboration (Striefel, 2001). The Nuremberg Code, as inflicted by American victors in the aftermath of World War II upon a vanquished Germany, was
anything but voluntary on the part of Germans. Moreover, the Nuremberg proceedings in
general carried a strongly punitive connotation toward Germany and Nazism.

Also, since the Nuremberg Code was driven by the United States, its genesis was
clearly not international, although the authors may have viewed the code as having
international application. Indeed, most researchers in the United States were largely
unaware of its existence and thus adherence to its principles was due as much to
happenstance as anything else (Beecher, 1966; Leaning, 1997). Since there exists ample
documentation that the Nuremberg Code was not adequately disseminated in the United
States and Germany (Faden, Lederer & Moreno, 1996; Harkness, 1996; Tuffs, 1996), it is
difficult to imagine that the code found wide distribution internationally.

Nonetheless, the Declaration of Helsinki in 1964 was a second watershed event in
the evolution of ethical codes governing research involving human subjects. It was
especially noteworthy for setting a context for ethics dialogue in which mutuality,
voluntary participation and genuine international commitment would become the sine
qua non for future discourse.

* A House Divided Against Itself *

By 1960, East Germany had established its pattern of existence and governance.
The German Democratic Republic was neither democratic nor republican, but had rather,
under duress certainly, adopted the Soviet model of political rule. Attendant to such rule
were the by now familiar methods of the modern totalitarian state: denial of human
rights, treatment of human beings as undifferentiated objects, command of the media for
the propagandizing of state support under the guise of truth, repression of dissent, and the elimination of supposed enemies through intimidation, slavery and death.

Inadvertently, East Germany had also established a sociopolitical pattern of being in perpetual crisis. For all that, East Germany was among the most stable of Warsaw Pact nations, adapting to the life of ongoing crisis such that it became the norm. Using technology as a metaphor for life generally in the GDR, Stokes (2000) has suggested that technological advancement in East Germany was distinguished by a wealth of scientific talent, adequate technological infrastructure, very limited resources, and so much political control that the scientific abilities of East Germany were stunted and the nation's strengths nullified. Thus innovation, differentiation of industry and economic growth became retarded, failing to attain but a small portion of their potential.

The oppressive nature of the GDR’s totalitarian regime gradually robbed East Germans of the hope that they might someday improve their lives. Fear of the Stasi (the omnipresent East German secret police), disappointment in the Marxist/Leninist promise of a worker’s paradise, a stagnant standard of living and the chronic lack of necessary goods fostered widespread apathy. It may be that this generalized social indifference partially explains how East Germany managed to remain relatively stable in the face of constant internal crisis and turmoil.

In some respects, East Germany during the postwar era and well into the 1980s represents a thoroughly bastardized example of Talcott Parsons’ structural functionalist social stability. East Germany during this time also offers us a vivid depiction of Walter Buckley’s homeostatic/organismic level of systems, wherein chronic crisis inhibits growth and diversification of a social system, such that the system becomes perpetually
“stuck” in its efforts to adapt to both internal and external change (Parsons, 1954; Buckley, 1967).

In contrast, West Germany was really beginning to thrive. No longer just a puppet state of the west, West Germany by the early 1960s was establishing itself in the western world’s eyes as a paragon of social democracy and economic stability. The infusion of American money which followed World War II helped pay off some of Germany’s war debt, and the remainder had been used to rebuild West Germany’s industrial and manufacturing infrastructure (Federal Republic of Germany, 2003). German traditions in the arts were again flourishing, and there grew, albeit slowly, a renewed pride in the German philosophy, history and science which had antedated the Third Reich (Pommerin, 1996; Welsch, 1996).

As West Germany began to shed the national disgrace of Nazism, science, long a source of German intellectual strength, again became respect worthy. Germany cleansed its scientific institutions of the taint of National Socialism and reestablished its system of legitimate scientific inquiry. Certainly West Germany’s willingness to engage other western European nations in cooperative scientific pursuit helped dilute memories of the recent past, as did its enthusiasm for germinating a new European economic cooperative, the Common Market (Brandt, 2000; Dallia-Vorgia, et al., 2001).

A pivotal event in this transformation of postwar West Germany was its eagerness to join the Council of Europe in the early 1950s, and its zeal in affirming that organization’s position on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Council of Europe, 1950/1998). Further, West Germany had sustained its commitment
to human rights via active and ongoing participation in the Council of Europe’s standing convention for human rights (Council of Europe, n.d.).

Internally, West Germany was reconstructing the moral legitimacy of its scientific community through the resurrected authority of such longstanding institutions as *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft*, whose role it was to support German scientific autonomy, and the German Research Council, which had joined *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft* in 1951 (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 2003a). Both of these institutions were structured such that funding for research conducted in West Germany had to undergo a rigorous ethics review of proposed scientific experiments involving human subjects in order to qualify for funding (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 2003b; 2003c).

West Germany also instigated and empowered the German National Ethics Council to provide a forum for scientific debate concerning ethical issues in the German sciences. This was, and remains, an independent body incorporating the disciplines of medicine, theology, philosophy, law and the social sciences which worked with the West German parliament to enact legislation protecting the rights of human subjects participating in research (German National Ethics Council, n.d.). In addition to the National Ethics Council, Germany created regional ethics councils at the *lander* level of government to oversee research within its geographic purview. It bears noting that, for much of the period under discussion, 1960-1980, West Germany’s efforts to ethically regulate scientific experiments involving human subjects far exceeded the measures used in the United States.
We are left, then, with a portrait of two Germanys, separated symbolically by the Berlin Wall, but divided more substantively by dramatic differences in governing ideology and methods. The two Germanys were growing apart culturally, too. West Germany was rejoining the so-called free world, embracing western mores and sociopolitical norms. East Germany was adapting to life under totalitarian rule structured and managed long distance from Moscow. For decades following World War II, the world wondered whether there would come a day when the two Germanys might reunite. Given the recent past, there was an obvious fear in Europe that a reunited Germany may not be an entirely good thing. Still, the fears of protracted Cold War, with the terrifying destruction of nuclear holocaust ever menacing, was a greater threat to world peace than a restored Germany could possibly provide.

The United States

In 1960, America elected a new president, John F. Kennedy. Kennedy, like his challenger, Richard Nixon, was not new to national politics, but he was the first president who fully embodied the experiences of the generation that had survived the Great Depression and won World War II. As such, Kennedy's was the persona of youthfulness and vigor, the incarnation of a generation that had come of age and come to power. In John Kennedy, America placed its hopes for a newer, better nation. However irrationally, the United States perceived itself as a country on the brink of a greatness never before realized.

Kennedy did not begin his tenure as president with a clean slate, though. He inherited a nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union which constantly threatened to
explode and annihilate humankind. The fears of communist aggression that had briefly subsided after the McCarthy years flared up again with Fidel Castro’s overthrow of a brutally corrupt regime in Cuba, only ninety miles from Florida. Perhaps the most demanding bequeathment that fell to Kennedy, however, was America’s growing civil rights movement.

*Racism in America: Like Mom, Baseball and Apple Pie*

Since the end of the Reconstruction era in the late 19th century, the United States had struggled with the lingering racism of the Civil War’s legacy. In the subsequent decades, what had evolved was a *de facto* racial policy in the United States that amounted to “separate but equal.” Put differently, America’s Negro population (to use the term of the day) was purported to live in equality with white Americans, but live separately. In practice, this was rarely if ever the case. African Americans were prejudiced against in virtually all walks of American social, economic, political and legal life. Separate but equal was a myth, salving the hypocrisy of America’s original sin, slavery.

In 1954, a then little known African American attorney, Thurgood Marshall, was to strike a match to this hypocrisy and spark a civil rights movement in the United States that would reverberate for decades. In the landmark Supreme Court case, *Brown vs. Topeka, Kansas, Board of Education*, Marshall argued that separate but equal was in fact not equal at all. He demonstrated in America’s highest court that racial segregation in this country assured that African Americans and white Americans would receive qualitatively different educations, thus nullifying any notion that equal education and
equal opportunity were an American reality. Marshall won his case, and the legal basis for racial segregation in the United States began to die (Halberstam, 1993).

Thank you, Miz Rosa...

But even in a more or less just democracy, law does not always dictate social behavior. Brown vs. Board of Education, as the case became known, may have ended the legal basis for racial segregation, but it did not erode the sociopolitical pillars upon which American racism rested. That would require years of steady pushing on the part of racism's opponents, and the push began with a bus ride.

Rosa McCauley was born in Tuskegee, Alabama, in 1913. She moved, with her parents, to Montgomery in the early 1920s and attended a segregated school there. Rosa became an educated woman, and in 1932, she married Raymond Parks. Raymond and Rosa settled in Montgomery, Rosa completed her education, and then found work as a seamstress at a downtown department store.

One cold day in December, 1955, Rosa left her job at quitting time and boarded a bus for the ride home. She was cold. Her feet hurt. She sat down in the first seat she saw, in the “whites only” front section of the bus. As the bus made its way through downtown Montgomery, making its routine stops, the seats in the front of the bus gradually filled up. A white man was left standing while Rosa sat. When the bus driver insisted that she move to the “colored only” rear of the bus, Rosa refused. She’d had enough. The driver had her arrested. A few days later Rosa Parks was convicted of disorderly conduct.
American heroes are rarely born. They bear no distinguishing marks or physical characteristics by which they might be identified. Rosa Parks was no different in that respect. Her only distinguishing feature, until that day on the Montgomery bus, was her color. But what a ruckus she raised. Within a matter of days after her conviction, Rosa was a hero in Alabama. A young minister, Martin Luther King, Jr., called for African Americans in Montgomery to boycott the city's buses. The boycott lasted almost a year, and ended only when the city was served with papers from a federal court declaring segregated bus service to be illegal.

Dwight Eisenhower, then President of the United States, had used Federal troops to integrate a Little Rock, Arkansas, high school in the late fifties to implement Brown vs. Board of Education. Montgomery, Alabama's public transportation system had been integrated by a seamstress and a preacher with the help of the federal government. Legitimized racism in America was coming down, one pillar at a time. Throughout the 1960s, the federal government struck down pillar after pillar of America's racist heritage, culminating in 1964-1965 with the Civil Rights Voting Act, pushed through congress and signed by President Lyndon Johnson (Dallek, 1998; Thomas, 2000). Overt racism was now illegal in America, but morality could not be legislated.

The Longest October

In late September, 1962, a U-2 spy plane making a routine surveillance over Cuba saw what appeared to be nuclear missile launch sites. This was later confirmed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Kennedy was at first wary of this intelligence because he harbored deep suspicions about the competence and veracity of the CIA.
He’d been lambasted in the press for almost a year after the disaster at the Bay of Pigs, and the CIA had orchestrated that ridiculous venture. Sensitive to more outlandish machinations by his intelligence agency, Kennedy was skeptical that Cuba would risk war with the United States over nuclear weapons. He also recognized that if Castro had nuclear weapons, Nikita Krushchev and the Soviet Union had given them to him.

By mid-October, Kennedy had his proof that the Russians were in fact placing medium range nuclear missiles in Cuba. His first response was to call together his circle of advisors to review alternatives. The “best and the brightest,” as this group was often called, told Kennedy he basically had six options: do nothing, negotiate, invade Cuba, blockade Cuba, call in air strikes against the missile bases, or escalate the situation with America’s nuclear weapons. Kennedy wisely slowed down the decision making process, effectively cooling off the military and the CIA, and chose to go with a naval blockade of the island (Halberstam, 1972; Thomas, 2000).

For thirteen days, the world held its breath. Nuclear war with the Soviet Union seemed imminent. In the United States, children kissed their parents goodbye in the morning as they went off to school, wondering if they’d ever see them again. It seemed as if everything had stopped except this crisis. Families prayed together at night. No one made plans. Things were too uncertain.

As October dragged on, Soviet ships, likely carrying more nuclear weapons, made their way across the Atlantic to Cuba. Krushchev threatened the United States with retaliation should the blockading American vessels stop any Soviet ships. The Russian boats moved inexorably toward Cuba. Kennedy and Krushchev feverishly exchanged
diplomatically worded but nonetheless menacing cables back and forth between Washington and Moscow.

On October 27th, a confusing thing happened. Kennedy received two cables from Krushchev, a few hours apart. One reiterated his earlier threat, but the other cable had a more conciliatory tone. This second cable said that if the United States agreed to remove its missiles from Turkey, the Soviets would pull their missiles out of Cuba. Unsure what to do with these conflicting messages, Kennedy turned to his younger brother, Bob, for counsel. Robert Kennedy, using shrewd judgment, recommended that the president ignore the first message from Krushchev and reply only to the second. The president did so, Krushchev accepted his offer, and soon the American media reported that the Soviet ships were turning back, away from the blockade. Kennedy had averted a catastrophe, and the Cuban Missile Crisis was over (Gilbert, 2001; Thomas, 2000).

This incident appears to have taught both Kennedy and Krushchev a lesson. Both agreed to engage in negotiations for nuclear weapons control and disarmament. Additionally, each leader signed a nuclear test ban treaty to arrest further weapons development. But the Cuban Missile Crisis may have had an unintended negative result. It may have convinced Kennedy and his advisors that the Russians would balk at going to war to protect another communist country. This particular lesson quite probably encouraged a shift in American foreign policy, one that opened the door for American involvement in a little country in southeast Asia. A far away place called Vietnam.
So much has been written about the 1960s in America that it is difficult to tell fact from fiction from faulty memory. Surely no decade in the postwar era so troubled and divided the United States, and no decade began with such promise and ended with such disillusionment. The beginning of the 1960s saw the rise of the civil rights movement, an enterprise to spread the technological and human wealth of the United States to the third world, and the adolescent struggles of the newest generation of Americans to forge a world devoid of hate and war. By the end of the decade, a president, his brother and the charismatic leader of the civil rights movement had been murdered. The endeavor to spread American good will to impoverished countries had become a hypocrisy writ large in the blood of the Vietnam War, and the innocence and naivete of America’s youth had been replaced with bitterness and contempt for the nation’s institutions.

With the successful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, John Kennedy’s presidency took on new steam. No longer viewed as a dilettante by either world leaders or his own people, Kennedy began to set forth an agenda of moderate reform. More than ever, he represented a new hope in America, a leader who might bring the nation to the full measure of its promise. When Kennedy was murdered in Dallas toward the end of 1963, not only the young president died, but something about America died, too. Something ineffable, but very real.

Conspiratorial rumors abounded, even though a presidential commission reported that a lone gunman with no apparent motive had killed Kennedy. No one really believed that. How could one man have destroyed all the vitality and optimism that Kennedy had personified? This was not like Lincoln’s assassination nearly a century before; that had
been vengeful, but at least it had sprung from the expected wrath of a defeated Confederacy. Kennedy’s murder made no sense. Unless of course one subscribed to the multitudinous conspiracy theories.

The conspiracy theories, and the lack of an explanatory scheme for Kennedy’s death, began a process that continued throughout the 1960s and reached culmination in the 1970s with Richard Nixon’s banishment from the presidency after Watergate: regard and trust for America’s institutions fell like dominoes. Kennedy’s murder, and his brother’s, and Martin Luther King’s, showed Americans that no one was safe anymore. Free speech was no longer free, and dissent became traitorous. Blacks vs. whites. Freaks vs. straights. Young vs. old. Hawks vs. doves, *ad infinitum*. The country was polarized demographically, generationally and morally.

Somehow this obscured much of the good that occurred in the decade. Lyndon Johnson, Kennedy’s successor, signed more civil rights legislation and created more social programs to help the needy than any president in history (Dallek, 1998). Yet his legacy of domestic progressivism will forever be tarred by his dogged involvement in the Vietnam War and his chimerical belief that somehow America’s military might and his own tightlipped determination could win an Asian land war.

As the decade wore on, cities burned with the pent up rage of broken promises. College campuses were shut down in protest of an interminable war with no clear purpose. Drug use, which had started early in the 1960s as a means of finding a new consciousness, was by the end of the decade simply a way of dulling out the incessant negativity of a nation turned inward against itself. Not even the Beatles could outlast the 1960s.
So, How Do We Explain This?

Among the outgrowths of the dramatic social and political eruptions of the 1950s and 1960s was conflict theory. Originally conceptualized by Ralf Dahrendorf in the late 1950s, conflict theory sought to counter the by then staid constructs underlying structural functionalism and restore the long sullied reputation of Karl Marx (Craib, 1992; Ritzer, 2000). In 1959, Dahrendorf posited that societies grew and adapted to change, not as Parson's had suggested, by consensus, but by the friction created when opposing social forces meet in conflict (Dahrendorf, 1959). According to Dahrendorf, and later his acolyte, Randall Collins (1975), consensus, however uneasily obtained, is reached by the negotiation of two conflicting social parties when the power differential between them grows toward parity. In other words, status and control in a society are regulated by power rather than the consent of the governed. As long as there exists sufficient imbalance of power between opposing forces, the lesser of the forces has little to negotiate but the shape of its fealty (Blau, 1964).

For instance, let us take the United States during the 1960s. Conflict theory well describes the struggle for power within the country between young and old, entrenched power elite vs. counterculture, and the United States' role in Vietnam. Friction was created when the members of the counterculture challenged the legitimacy of America's institutionalized power structure. The power imbalance between the two was sufficiently disparate, however, that no accommodation could be reached, and fealty was not forthcoming. The result, a culture war of sorts, produced at least a decade of social upheaval and reverberates even today.
Conflict theory may also inform the resolution of America’s Vietnam War. Two opposing forces, ostensibly the ideological combatants who were by proxy representing the Cold War adversaries, Russia and the United States, were more or less equally matched until the United States entered the war. For some time thereafter, it appeared that the Republic of South Vietnam, with America on its side, would win. As the conflict escalated to include the North Vietnamese army, the seeming disparity between opponents in South Vietnam vanished. A negotiated settlement was reached only when it became clear that, for whatever reasons, the Republic of South Vietnam could not win without the help of the United States, and in America the price of continued warfare was rising as conflict at home escalated. Richard Nixon’s negotiated peace with North Vietnam, framed for public consumption as “peace with honor,” was actually a way of reframing a by then acceptable power shift in Vietnam (acceptable to the Americans) after the conflict became obviously unwinnable without a massive escalation of force which might have risked expansion of the war to include the Soviets, and would most certainly have escalated conflict within the United States.

_A Third Rate Burglary_

By 1968, Lyndon Johnson had had enough. His dream of becoming the new FDR was hopelessly rent and his spirit as a leader irredeemably lost. America elected Richard Nixon, the antithesis of John Kennedy, as the president to lead us out of our chaos. Where Kennedy had symbolized an enthusiastic courage about the future, Nixon cynically pandered to the fears of his silent majority and sold them a vision of an America long since gone. His secret plan to end the Vietnam War boiled down to letting
Vietnamese soldiers die in place of Americans. But Nixon’s greatest flaw was his unquellable fear of being turned out of office, as had happened to him twice before.

Thus it was that in the early 1970s, Richard Nixon began to sabotage the political campaigns of his opponents (Bernstein & Woodward, 1974; Jaworski, 1976). Nixon was neither the first nor the last politician to use dirty tricks in his campaigns, but he was likely the most systematic and well recorded. In June, 1972, at the Watergate office complex in Washington, D.C., several men committed what was later called a third rate burglary. Their target was the Democratic Party headquarters, and their purpose was to find information which might prove damaging to the Democrats in the 1972 presidential election.

As the whole story gradually unfolded, the strands of responsibility for the crime led to the White House and Nixon’s reelection committee (Bernstein & Woodward, 1974). Just over two years later, Richard Nixon resigned his presidency, after America had lost faith in yet another of its institutions (Jaworski, 1976). For the remainder of the decade, America just tried to forget that its last three presidents had been murdered, broken, and shamed from office.

The Naked Emperor’s New Clothes

In 1966, a preeminent American scholar and scientist, Henry Beecher, published an article in the New England Journal of Medicine in which he cited 22 experimental studies, each conducted by respected researchers and published in distinguished medical journals, that had violated the research ethics articulated in the Nuremberg Code (Amdur, 2003; Beecher, 1966).
Beecher asserted that in each of these studies, the principle of informed consent had been disregarded, and that human participants involved in the research studies had been exposed to excessive risk. He further concluded that ethical code violations were, in his estimation, not rare but commonplace. Beecher was particularly vociferous in his attack on a pervasive belief among American scientists that the ends justified the means. In other words, the old Nazi argument that individual rights could be sacrificed if there existed sufficient potential good for society was alive and well in the United States.

Around the same time as the appearance of Beecher's reasoned screed on research ethics, psychologist Stanley Milgram was publishing articles in various professional journals that described his research on obedience to authority (Milgram, 1963, 1964, 1965). Seeking to find an answer to how Nazi genocide could have occurred, Milgram conducted now well known studies which relied heavily upon the deception of research subjects (Lawson, 2001). Basically, the subjects were told they were assisting in a study of the relationship between negative reinforcement and learning. In actuality, the participants were themselves the subject of study to determine why people commit acts they know to be cruel and inhumane (Gordon & Prentice, 2000; Mayo, 2001).

Even though Milgram's experiments were common knowledge by the mid-to-late 1960s, it wasn't until 1973 that Senator Edward Kennedy convened congressional hearings on health care and human subjects experimentation (Kimmel, 1988; Mishkin, 2000). These hearings were brought about by public outcry over the publicity attendant to the revelations of the Tuskegee syphilis studies (Brawley, 1998; Kampmeier, 1974), but also spoke to the growing popular concern regarding the apparent lack of ethical boundaries in American science.
After the congressional hearings overseen by Senator Kennedy, it seemed evident that some apparatus of federal oversight of research involving human subjects needed to be constructed. From this conclusion, the National Research Act of 1974 was born. The significance of this act has direct bearing on our discussion of scientific experimentation in the United States because the apparatus built to oversee research activities in this country is the modern institutional review board (IRB) system (Brainard, 2001b; Grigsby & Roof, 1993; Wendler & Rackoff, 2001). The mandate of the IRB, while growing primarily from concerns regarding biomedical research, also governed research conducted in the social and behavioral sciences. It required that all federally funded research involving human subjects undergo scholarly review prior to implementation. Further, the National Research Act of 1974 obligated that all research activities, biomedical and social/behavioral, adhere to the same set of ethical standards, known generally as the Common Rule (Amdur & Bankert, 2003; Federman, et al., 2002; Oakes, 2002).

The National Research Act of 1974 also established the National Commission for Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. Meeting in Belmont, Maryland, in 1978, this group produced what is usually referred to as the Belmont Report, an articulation of ethical standards in human subjects research (Drewry, in press). The Belmont Report governs all IRB review of research ethics in the United States, and is the standard used by IRBs throughout the country. The report holds that three principles must define the ethics of research: respect for persons, beneficence and justice (National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1979).
Each of these principles addresses different elements of research ethics as first elucidated in the Nuremberg Code. The principle of respect for persons, for instance, addresses issues relative to autonomy. These include ethical decisions with regard to a human subject’s right to independent decision making and the protection of those subjects with diminished autonomy (e.g., children, prisoners). Also subsumed under the principle of respect for persons are the subject’s right to voluntary and informed consent, confidentiality and privacy, and the right to withdraw from research without penalty. Of particular importance in the respect for persons provision of the Belmont Report is the requirement of researchers to protect vulnerable populations and to refrain from any activities which may result in coercion of subjects to participate in research.

The second principle of the Belmont Report, beneficence, speaks to the well being of research subjects. Most pointedly, beneficence refers to the relative risk-to-benefit ratio of research involving human subjects. In essence, the report holds that risks to human subjects must be minimized while potential benefits are maximized. The issue here is justifying any potential risk to subjects against the potential benefit to humankind.

Also important to the spirit of beneficence discussed in the Belmont Report is the manner in which human research subjects are treated during the course of the research itself. This is the point of nexus with the principle of respect for persons, for beneficence requires that each human subject be treated humanely in the context of risk-to-benefit ratio, but also be treated with honesty, fairness and respect. Lastly, the principle of beneficence addresses issues of possible conflict of interest and research integrity.
The third principle of the Belmont Report, justice, addresses issues of risk distribution. Put another way, the spirit of justice, insofar as the Belmont Report articulates it, requires that risk in human subjects research be as equally distributed among a population as possible, such that no one group is selected for exposure to risk in order to protect another group. Also included under the principle of justice is the requirement that no group be singled out for particular research benefit at the expense of another group. An example of this concern is manifested in the Tuskegee Study, wherein only poor African Americans were chosen as the human subjects for syphilis research. It is noteworthy, however, that the principle of justice speaks to exclusion as well as inclusion, such that no group suffers unequal risk nor experiences unequal benefit as a result of human subjects research (Amdur, 2003; Drewry, in press; National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1979).

The modern American IRB system, legitimized by law and institutionalized in a bureaucracy of Byzantine intricacy and dimension, is the very model of structural functionalism and systems theory. Let two examples suffice for purposes of brief analysis. From structural functionalism, the IRB system draws its network of norm setting, interlocking value structures and complex governance that create and maintain the homeostatic functions so typical of bureaucracies. General systems theory well describes the ways that IRBs remain up-to-date regarding changes in ethical research. The IRB generates output, which shapes the ever-changing manifestation of the principles of ethical research and defines the IRB’s relationship with its environment. Inputs, in the form of social demands for increasing accountability in scientific experimentation among researchers, provide necessary information for the system to
change and adapt such that it reflects its social and legal mission as first set down in the Belmont Report.

This document, while strictly an American doctrine governing research ethics, is a third watershed event in the evolution of ethical research codes for the protection of human subjects. Like the Nuremberg Code, the Belmont Report has not been without its critics. Certainly no one in the scientific research community opposed the principles of respect for persons, beneficence and justice in theory. Rather, the criticism has focused on the overt legalism of the National Research Act, from which the Belmont Report emanated (Annas, 1995; Capron, 1999; Galliher & Galliher, 1995), the rigidity of an ethical code some regard as static (Baker, 1998a, 1998b, 2002; Chadwick & Dunn, 2000) and unreflective of changing moral truth (2000; Momeyer, 2002; Payne, 2000; Rosnow, et al., 1993), and the complexity of the IRB system itself (Savulescu, Chalmers, & Blunt, 1996; Seiler & Murtha, 1980).

By far the greatest criticism of the Belmont Report has come from opponents of the Common Rule. These critics allege that social and behavioral research ought not be held to the deterministic rules of positivistic, biomedical scientific inquiry (Ansay, 2002; Brainard, 2001b; Church, Shopes, & Blanchard, 2002; Zussman, 2000). Moreover, social science critics of the Common Rule have claimed that quantitative research methodologies, and the ethics which hold sway over them, are inappropriate for qualitative research (Baez, 2002; Blee, 1999; D’Cruz, 2000; Herrera, 2001), and needlessly restrict the use of novel means of social science exploration (Shea, 2000; Sieber, 1982; Wachholz & Mullaly, 1997).
It may be testament to the long overdue and far-reaching dictates of the Belmont Report that it has been met with such vituperative criticism. Possibly the amount of time that had elapsed between the Nuremberg Code and the Belmont Report prompted some scientists to question its necessity. Maybe American hubris and scientific paternalism about the need for a stringent code of research ethics caused some to bristle at its imposition. It may be that true believers in the American tradition of free scientific inquiry saw undue governmental regulation in the IRB system itself. But whatever the rationale or source of the voluminous opprobrium that attended the creation of the IRB system and the Belmont Report, it signaled that from now on, research involving human subjects in the United States would be closely monitored. The Belmont Report thus became scientific America’s new set of clothes.

Summary

The period, 1960-1980, saw an invigorated West Germany slowly reintegrating with the remainder of non-communist Europe. West Germany during this time was also reclaiming much of its reputation in the world scientific community, and cleansing its institutions of the debasing residue of National Socialism. East Germany, meanwhile, struggled to find its place within the constricting world of Soviet domination, now austerely demarcated by the specter of the Berlin Wall. East Germany was a nation promising much to its citizenry but primarily delivering a roughly egalitarian form of dull misery. Possessing much human talent, East Germany could not capitalize upon such precious assets because of the sociopolitical climate that pervaded its society and sought homogeneity at any cost.
Hungary, having tasted a bit of freedom in 1956, returned only part way to radical sovietism. Janos Kadar deftly transformed himself from the *persona* of Nagy’s murderer to affable father of his country through the creation of socialism with a human face. This city on the back of a whale did indeed accommodate the middle class aspirations of many Hungarians, but also cynically exploited the peoples’ desire for creature comforts in order to maintain absolute communist control over the mechanisms of state.

In America, faith in democracy and its institutions had undergone assaults upon its integrity as well. Assassinations, popular unrest not witnessed since the Civil War, and the betrayal of the peoples’ trust in its leadership had left most Americans disillusioned. Scientific inquiry had been challenged as never before, and demonstrated that even in the United States, bad things could be done to good people by scientists with noble intent but too little oversight.
CHAPTER V
COMING IN FROM THE COLD

This chapter covers the period, 1980-Present, in the United States, Germany and Hungary. The format will remain that of previous chapters, and content will be particularly attentive to the state of scientific experimentation and the continued evolution of research ethics in these three nations. A brief summary of the era will conclude the chapter.

In the United States, a cowboy actor took a firm grasp on conservative politics and, once elected president, restored America’s faith in its institutions and leadership. Money became America’s new religion, and his adherents said Ronald Reagan won the Cold War by bankrupting the Soviet Union and its satellite states. The first baby boomer president, Bill Clinton, reintroduced the country to quasi-liberalism but became tarnished by his personal deficiencies and the ugly political tactics of his enemies. It seemed America, now the lone superpower, needed external foes to keep her from turning upon herself. A terrorist group with a foreign sounding name would soon solve that problem.

Germany joined with other western European countries to form a union of nations that united the continent more so than at any time since the Holy Roman Empire. The Wall came tumbling down, Berlin was a single city once more, and the two Germanys became one again. With the melding of Europe, the ideological war between east and west that had started on the heels of World War II was finally over. An era of
globalization and measured international cooperation began. The European Union and other international organizations formalized and legislated common sets of laws governing human rights and research ethics. How the words would be made flesh was another matter entirely.

Hungary was at long last free. Transition became a word fraught with powerful political and social meaning, and Hungarians struggled with their own definition of freedom as they had struggled with the multitudinous forms of oppression they had experienced. Like other former Warsaw Pact countries, Hungary was a laboratory where two potent ideologies, capitalism and socialism, would be blended to see if at last they might coexist.

The United States

Having had two essentially caretaker presidents after the fall of Richard Nixon's administration, by 1980 America was again ready for dynamic change. Gerald Ford, Nixon's immediate successor, had pardoned the shamed president in a professed desire to bring healing to the country, but many Americans by this time were so cynical about the motives of national leaders that some suspected Ford's pardon was the prearranged price he agreed to pay in order to assume the presidency upon Nixon's demise.

Ford's successor, Georgia governor Jimmy Carter, was elected on a platform of plain talk, decency and a promise to restore integrity to the White House. Echoes of Harry Truman could be discerned in Carter's campaign rhetoric, and the governor's use of symbols to bring disaffected voters back into the political fold was masterful (Goffman, 1959; Simons, 1976). Jimmy Carter's presidency was marred, however, by
economic inflation which would simply not go away, and by the unresolvable plight of American hostages in Iran (Gilbert, 2001).

The United States had not had a heroic president since John Kennedy, nearly twenty years before. Both Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon had left office in dispute if not downright disdain; Ford and Carter were decent men but neither was a charismatic leader. In their stead, America chose a movie star.

Ronald Reagan and the Old West

Ronald Reagan, elected president in 1980, was a walking, talking symbol of an America long since gone. Reagan had spent most of his youth as a film actor in Hollywood, not particularly distinguishing himself but gaining a modest level of popularity nonetheless. In the mid-sixties, Reagan ran for the governorship of California on a platform of conservatism and restoration of law and order. In the subtext of Reagan’s campaign, though, resided something else. Ronald Reagan embodied for Americans of the World War II generation a return to traditional values and respect for America’s crumbling institutions. In that sense, Reagan was a generational candidate, with broad appeal to Californians tired of civil unrest, antiwar demonstrations and the rising voice of America’s youth-oriented counterculture. By 1980, Ronald Reagan had long been a national political figure, an emblem of conservatism un tarnished by the failure and duplicity of Richard Nixon.

Often portrayed in the media as something of a joke, and a puzzlement to his liberal detractors for the entirety of his administration, Reagan’s campaign for president spoke to a very deep core of American traditionalism. In Reagan, people found a symbol
of a father, loving yet tough, who would put an end to the divisiveness plaguing the
country and help America find its course again. He was no-nonsense, and surely would
not molly coddle those who might corrupt the dream of America. Further, Reagan was a
zealous anti-communist. He saw the ideological battle between the United States and the
Soviet Union in clearly delineated terms, good guys vs. bad guys. The Cold War was a
gunfight straight out of the Wild West era, and in Ronald Reagan’s America, good would
by God prevail over evil. His presidency was a complete break with the recent past,
connecting more with the social and political climate of the 1950s than with anything
resembling the intervening two decades. The American zeitgeist of Reagan’s 1980s was
largely incommensurate with what had come immediately before, defined not so much by
a new set of American values as a return to the old (Bernstein, 1988; Kuhn, 1962/1996).
His was a presidency analogous to the restoration of a regal crown.

Reagan was the first American president to serve two full terms since Dwight
Eisenhower in the late 1950s. He disdained the policy of détente with the Russians and
elected instead to oversee a profoundly expensive military buildup of America’s might.
Ronald Reagan gambled that the Soviet Union would compete with this military
expansion and thereby bankrupt herself. He suspected that the financial resources of the
United States far superceded the resources of the Soviet Union, and that the worldwide
economic recession he presided over in the United States during the 1980s would prove
to be a crippling if not fatal economic blow to Russia. Thus, Reagan and his advisors
reasoned, the United States would survive the economic front of the Cold War while the
Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies would implode from want of domestic resources
and the ensuing civil unrest.
This is of course an oversimplification of Reagan’s foreign policy principles, but in most important respects, and much to the dismay of his critics, Ronald Reagan got it right. A decade of feverish military weapons competition with the United States drained the blood from the always precarious Soviet economy. Late in the decade, the fissures which had been spreading in the Soviet empire finally began to crack. In 1989, Berliners destroyed that most massive of Cold War symbols, the Berlin Wall. Over the next two years, the Soviet Union and its partner states fell apart not with a bang, but a whimper, as internal national revolts toppled the repressive socialist regimes of eastern Europe (Daniels, 2000; Eliot, 1934; Grosser, 1992; Kocka, 2000; Miller, 1994). In the end, the grand conflict of our times came down to a power disparity so great that one side had little but fealty to offer the victor (Blau, 1964).

**Perestroika and Glasnost**

It was Reagan’s good fortune that in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. Gorbachev was considerably younger than his predecessors in the Soviet Union, and more comfortable with the ways of the west. He quickly recognized that the Soviet Union was in dire need of economic restructuring. His plan was to gradually introduce elements of western-style capitalism to the Soviet Union in order to liberalize the economy and the Russian culture to make it more efficient and competitive with the west. Gorbachev called this restructuring *perestroika*.

One of Gorbachev’s first initiatives was to reduce the influence of Soviet rule over the internal political and economic decisions of Warsaw Pact countries. In the spirit of what Gorbachev termed *glasnost*, or a new openness, the Russian leader loosened the
binders on Soviet media. For the first time in decades, Russians and their eastern European counterparts were granted a semblance of free speech. What the people living under nearly a century of communist rule now heard conflicted greatly with what they had always been told (Lozansky, 1989). As an unintended result, it was Gorbachev, more than previous Russian leaders, who lost credibility within his own country. Across eastern Europe, workers interpreted glasnost as Russian weakness, grabbed their opportunity for dissent and wrung it for all it was worth. In Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, strikes broke out. The strikes in Poland were particularly powerful and captured the attention of western media (Gilbert, 2001). Within a very short few years, the entire Soviet empire that Stalin had seized in the last years of World War II was in revolt. It seemed that Gorbachev, too, was learning that there is no such thing as a little bit of freedom. For the United States, it seemed that the Cold War was finally ending, and Ronald Reagan, savior of the west, had found the role of a lifetime.

The Home Front: Greed is Good

Reagan’s military buildup, successful though it may have been in bringing an end to the Cold War, brought a high price at home. He had begun his first term in office with massive tax cuts, directed primarily at corporations and the already wealthy. Reagan adhered to the tenets of supply side economics. The theory behind supply side economics was that by granting tax cuts to the wealthy and corporate America, these entities would in turn reinvest these monies back into the national economy, producing more jobs, reducing inflation and increasing the sophistication and productivity of the country’s technological infrastructure. Succinctly, Reagan’s policy was that “a rising tide
lifts all boats,” meaning that as the wealthy became wealthier, the benefits would trickle down to include all Americans.

Supply side economics, though, did not really work. What the United States witnessed in the domestic economy was more like, “a rising tide lifts all yachts.” The wealthy did not in fact reinvest their tax savings into the general economy, but rather invested it in already existing businesses listed in the stock market or simply sat on their savings. If supply side economics basically holds that supply creates its own demand, supplies were not increasing due in part to lack of investment in manufacturing and industry. Rather, manufacturing and industrial enterprises were shifting their supply-creating ventures out of the United States. This turn of events, combined with the exorbitant costs of the military buildup, generated a tremendous budget deficit in America and a national recession that was felt most acutely by the poor and the middle class.

In addition, Reagan’s domestic policies, and the tenor of discourse in the nation as a whole, seemed to feed the country’s appetite for conspicuous consumption of goods. Curiously, many Americans acted as though economic times were good, spending profligately and saving little. Greed, the ugly twin of unbridled capitalism, became good. An equally ugly phenomenon captured the spirit of the times; that getting one’s own was what counted, and what happened to others mattered little. After years of frustration and disillusionment stemming from the assassinations of the 1960s, Vietnam, Watergate, chronic civil unrest and an apparent inability to solve the nation’s social problems, many Americans were just saying to hell with it and grasping for what they could get in the way of material solace.
In 1988, Reagan left office and his vice president, George Bush, won the presidential election on a platform that consisted of a promise to continue the Reagan legacy. During Bush's time in office, the bill came due for the failures of supply side economics and the country's recession deepened. While George Bush did wage a successful war against Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Kuwait during his term, such a victory was insufficient to assure his reelection. After twelve years of Republican rule, the country elected a Democrat in 1992, Bill Clinton.

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*Bill and Hillary*

With the election of Bill Clinton to the White House, the baby boomer generation of Americans, those who came of age in the 1960s and 1970s, assumed national political power in the United States. Clinton ran on a platform of restoring economic vitality to the country and spreading the burden of taxation more equitably among the social classes (Gilbert, 2001). Clinton also sought to resurrect America's network of social programs which had dwindled due to lack of funding during the Reagan-Bush era.

Clinton and his wife, Hillary, represented something more than a simple change in political and social priorities, however. For the duration of Clinton's two-term presidency, he and Hillary were reviled and systematically investigated by radical conservatives in the country. This had a polarizing effect upon America's people and their various political and religious allegiances. It was as if the Reagan constituency could not adapt to its loss of political power, and pulled out all stops to sabotage and subvert Clinton's efforts to rescind or modify Reagan's policies. It surely wasn't the first time in modern American politics that discourse had turned so abjectly destructive, but it
was clearly the most sustained vitriolic attack upon a presiding administration since the McCarthy era forty years before.

After a sputtering start, during which the Clintons failed to pass health care reform, the economy began to improve to a level unforeseen and unimagined. Stock prices rose dramatically and seemingly without end. During the late 1990s, America’s prosperity appeared to be without limit, and this was most obviously manifested in Clinton’s popularity with the American middle class.

But Bill Clinton, while a man with great strengths as a political leader, possessed great weaknesses as well. First among these was his reputation as a philanderer. Throughout his time as president, there flickered the threat of scandal and sexual impropriety between Clinton and a variety of women. Clinton’s enemies, and they were many, finally discovered the “smoking gun” they needed to assassinate Clinton’s character upon a national stage. Her name was Monica Lewinsky.

The Lewinsky scandal resulted in impeachment proceedings that consumed much of the last two years of Clinton’s presidency. By the time the congressional hearings were over, Clinton’s reputation had been smeared and many of his accomplishments blemished. It was a savage period in American politics, a time when the partisan desire to bring down an American president brought about the debasement of both the congress and the presidency, and in the final analysis, the nation itself. Beyond this, the Clinton impeachment proceedings signaled the intensification of ideology-driven politics in America, most plainly on the radical right.
If the hallmark of genuine charisma is that no one feels indifferent or lukewarm toward the individuals possessing it, then Bill and Hillary Clinton were charismatic leaders. In its next president, America had someone appreciably different. George W. Bush, the former president’s eldest son, was less charismatic than just plain likeable. He began his presidency in 2001, under the cloud of an appointed rather than elected outcome to the presidential race of 2000. The contest between Bush and Al Gore, Clinton’s vice president, was so closely contested that the United States Supreme Court rendered the final decision after a series of vote recounts and political hijinx in the state of Florida, where George Bush’s brother was governor.

The presidency of George W. Bush began inauspiciously under such circumstances. Bush did not at first appear to be especially consequential, and his command of American domestic and foreign policy seemed sketchy at best. Bush’s economic policy was a remodeled throwback to Reagan’s supply side economics; at its core was an immense tax cut, granted primarily to the nation’s wealthy. His platform theme, compassionate conservatism, turned out to be radical conservatism once Bush and his cabinet were sworn into office in early 2001. By summer of that year, many Americans doubted the wisdom of his presidency and the underlying motives of his advisors.

Then something happened. On the morning of September 11, two hijacked American commercial jet airliners crashed into the World Trade Center in New York City, destroying the buildings and killing nearly 3,000 people. A terrorist group, al-Qaida, promptly claimed responsibility. 911, as the event soon became known, shook
America like no occurrence since the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Life in the United States seemed forever different, no longer safe from the terrorist attacks that had ravaged Europe and the Middle East for decades, and certainly not invulnerable.

George Bush, who to this point had appeared to be merely a scion of one of America’s longstanding political families and a Texas good ol’ boy in disguise, came into his own. The president rallied the nation, and redirected its fear and anxiety into a righteous, patriotic fervor. He became an adept war time leader whose foreign policies, while certainly worthy of close scrutiny, fit the American mood and united the country like nothing had since Kennedy’s death. Bush sent American troops into Afghanistan, the stronghold of al-Qaida, and quickly secured a military victory over the repressive Taliban government, whose leaders sheltered al-Qaida’s leader, Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden eluded capture, however, and the threat of future terrorist attacks on the United States, while diminished, lingered on like a nightmare from which there could be no awakening.

The attack on the two World Trade Center buildings provides us with an opportunity to briefly examine how symbols can be manipulated for, in this case, a patriotic cause. Initially, most Americans responded to the sight of the twin towers burning, broadcast incessantly on television for days after the event, with fear and outrage. Gradually, though, through the political and media manipulation of this symbol of transgression on American soil, the fiery twin towers were transformed into a symbol of unity and freedom. A complex dramaturgy evolved, with heroes and villains (FDNY, George Bush as heroes; Osama bin Laden and Mohammad Atta as villains), replete with modern day morality play featuring the personae of good vs. evil (Goffman, 1959).
Blumer and Goffman have referred to this sort of symbol manipulation as symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969; Goffman, 1959, 1974). Essentially, symbolic interactionism describes the means by which symbols, whether visual or verbal, are assigned social meaning for the purpose of altering social reality (Gergen, 1999). At some point in the meaning revision process, a consensually agreed upon meaning adheres to an event. To wit, patriotic Americans must have been outraged by the World Trade Center attacks. To respond otherwise, or to speculate as to why these attacks might have occurred (other than because the terrorists “hate freedom”) was to bring one’s patriotism and love of country into question. Thus the symbol of burning twin towers was reshaped from understandable fear and outrage, most people’s initial reaction, to a patriotic fervor that only violent response could sate.

The IRB, Science and Politics

By the early 1980s, the American system of research review known as the IRB was taking root as the scientific and ethical law of the land for federally funded research activities involving human subjects. An elegantly elaborate and systematic means of evaluating scientific compliance with the principles of the Belmont Report, the IRB system is presently managed nationally under the Office of Human Research Protection in the Department of Health and Human Services (Amdur, 2003; Amdur & Bankert, 2002). Since much research activity involving human subjects is planned and instigated at the university level, though, the American IRB system is administered most immediately and potently through university ethics review committees (Chadwick &
Dunn, 2000; Flynn, 2000; Institute of Medicine's Committee on Assessing the System for Protecting Human Research Participants, 2002).

As noted above, the IRB system has come under critical fire from a variety of sources in the scientific and ethics communities. True, the IRB system is a labyrinthine network of rules, procedures and regulations that grows in complexity (and some say intrusiveness) with each passing year (Ansay, 2002; Blee, 1999; Blunt, Savulescu & Watson, 1998; Brainard, 2001a). Yet scientific inquiry, as has been its history, continues to outpace the field of applied ethics (Baker, 2002; Boutros & Schafer, 2001; Bramwell, 2001; Capron, 1999). For example, human genome research, on the vanguard of scientific experimentation during the 1990s, has created all manner of ethical quandaries regarding the morality of such experimentation and its implications for society (Hanna, 2000; Randall, 2001; Rosnow, et al., 1993; Sjoberg & Gill, 1995; Steinbrook, 2002).

Additionally, American society has witnessed the incursion of business and industry funded research during the period, 1980-2003, and there currently exists no legal requirement that privately funded research involving human subjects be subjected to the scrutiny of the IRB system (Anderlik & Elster, 2001; Annas, 1995; Flynn, 2000; Institute of Medicine's Committee on Assessing the System for Protecting Human Research Participants, 2002; Ziman, 1998). According to some scholars, there is a mounting public concern that business ethics and law will supercede medical and scientific ethical codes as the governing force in scientific advancement. In other words, ethical scientific inquiry will fall victim to the unrestrained pursuit of profit (Annas, 1992; Josefson, 1996; Kondro, 1996; Payne, 2000; Seiler & Murtha, 1980), and morally
dissonant conflicts of interest between researchers and business profits will rise (Fox, 1999; Hauck, 2001).

The American IRB system has indeed been far from perfect. In the first years of its inception, there arose several near scandals involving human subjects research that had previously gone undetected. (It may be argued, however, that instituting systematic research ethics review had heightened public awareness of previous ethical infractions.)

One such incident, mentioned above, concerns political investigation of the plutonium experiments conducted in the United States for several decades following World War II.

In 1986, Congressman Edward Markey convened a hearing in the United States House of Representatives to probe the extent to which American citizens had been subjected to radioactive plutonium during the course of medical and scientific experimentation that followed the Manhattan Project (Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power of the Committee on Energy and Commerce [The Markey Report], 1986). The details of these proceedings have been adequately covered elsewhere in this text. The point here is that over a decade had passed since the National Research Act of 1974, the Belmont Report had long been publicized in the scientific community, IRB research review mechanisms had been in existence for nearly seven years, and still the plutonium experiments had gone unreported and unpublicized. Not until the mid-1990s, under the Clinton Administration, did the public become fully aware of the frightful extent of these human rights violations (Department of Energy Human Radiation Experiments, n.d.; Faden, Lederer & Moreno, 1996; Makhijani & Kennedy, 1994; Sea, 1994).
Disheartening as well were Henry Beecher's findings published in 1993. Recall that Beecher had published a seminal and distressing work on American scientific compliance with the Nuremberg Code in 1966. In 1993, Beecher followed up his 1966 study to determine whether compliance had improved. By then the National Research Act had been law for nineteen years, the IRB system had been in existence for nearly thirteen years, and the findings of the Markey Report had been published if not widely read. The entire nation had read about the Tuskegee Syphilis experiments and a variety of other ethical infractions. Alas, Beecher found that medical and scientific compliance with the Nuremberg Code had not appreciably improved. Beecher, too, worried that the influences of business, large profit potential and the sustained disregard for fully informed consent would continue to corrupt unbiased, ethical research in the United States (Beecher, 1966, 1993).

Yet as the new century turned, at least one other potentially insidious force threatened to compromise the integrity of American science. In 2003, Congressman Henry Waxman, ranking member of the Committee on Government Reform, announced that the Bush Administration was methodically subjecting both federally funded scientific inquiry and dissemination of scientific information to an ideological vetting through the prism of radical conservative beliefs (Waxman, 2003).

Waxman accused the Bush Administration of manipulating scientific committees to skew membership toward the radical right's political agenda, withholding scientific findings from the scientific community and the American public, "blacklisting" American scientists who were pursuing scientific agendas antithetical to the Bush Administration's ideology, and refusing to continue funding for their research. Waxman
referred to this practice as “scientific McCarthyism,” and denounced it as more typical of a totalitarian state than a democracy (Waxman, 2003). Among the areas of scientific blacklisting cited by Waxman were HIV/AIDS, human sexuality, and the suicide rate of America’s gay and lesbian communities. Waxman was particularly concerned that these practices appeared to have the support of the Department of Health and Human Services, which also oversees the operation of the nation’s IRB system.

Germany

During the early 1980s, the two Germanys found themselves headed in entirely different directions. West Germany continued its plan, originated by Konrad Adenauer and in most respects supported by his successors, of reengaging western Europe and the United States and gradually reclaiming its historic position as a leadership nation within its political and economic sphere of influence. East Germany, like most other Warsaw Pact countries, plodded along, its political prestige limited to those states remaining under the sway of Moscow.

Toward the end of the 1980s, though, this began to change rather dramatically. Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost initiatives, seen by the western world as a great leap forward toward liberalism among the Soviet bloc nations, was really a last ditch effort to salvage the remnants of Russia’s ideological and economic control over a factionalized, very disgruntled set of satellite states. By 1989, the Soviet Union’s formerly ironclad grip over the Warsaw Pact countries could barely make a fist. The world suspected there would be a bloodbath reminiscent of Hungary in 1956 and
Czechoslovakia in 1968, but instead the Soviet-style communism Europe had grown to accept was simply washed away.

**Entropy in East Germany**

The principle of entropy is drawn from general systems theory. In essence, it holds that a system that deflects external input for a sustained period of time in an effort to maintain system integrity at all costs will eventually implode (von Bertalanffy, 1967). The so-called moment of truth comes when the system becomes so invested in self-maintenance that it cannot and will not adapt to significant shifts in the external environment. A pressure builds. Unenlivened by the introduction of new information, the outputs become numbingly repetitive, such that they are no longer meaningful. The system falls into a state of chronic crisis. Self-maintenance of the system becomes untenable, the system's integrity begins to crumble, until a surprisingly small external assault prompts the system's destruction (Bateson, 1972, 1979). *Perestroika* and *glasnost* were too little, too late to prevent the entropy of the Soviet Union and its totalitarian method of governance.

Ronald Reagan's sudden and frighteningly expensive military buildup of the early 1980s appears to have been the catalyst that sparked this phenomenon in the Soviet bloc and its mother country, but that may be too facile an explanation. Years of economic hardship, rampant inflation and a stubbornly quiescent standard of living had produced a torpor among the population of the worker's paradise that was sparked, not so much by America's military buildup as by the signal inadvertently given by Gorbachev to the people behind the Iron Curtain through his introduction of *perestroika* and *glasnost*. 

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What much of the world interpreted as an awakening to freedom, a long awaited openness to reform that made Gorbachev a hero in the west, was interpreted quite differently in the east. It was a sign that the Soviet hand was weakening. It meant that the Soviets were unable to control their satellite nations with the pathological intensity of past years (Bateson, 1972, 1979). It also meant there might be a fissure that, if properly capitalized upon, would bring down what was now perceived as a brittle façade of totalitarian oppression (Daniels, 2000; Grosser, 1992; Kocka, 2000; Osmond, 2001).

In fact, Gorbachev was indeed trying to open up the Soviet Union to freer expression and wanted to gradually incorporate elements of market-driven capitalism into the wavering socialist economy (Schulze, 1987). He saw, rightly, that socialism, as it was then implemented, could never compete successfully with western-style capitalism, and had to give in a little ideologically and pragmatically in order to survive (Osmond, 2001). In this respect, his thinking was not that far distant from Imre Nagy’s three decades before (Mulcahy, 2000).

Walter Buckley might have said that Gorbachev was trying to cajole the traditionally homeostatic/organismic socioeconomic system of Krushchev and Breshnev toward something more akin to a process/adaptive system in order to avoid the entropy he foresaw (Buckley, 1967). The greater problem, though, was that Moscow had so adroitly manipulated the symbols of capitalism and the west to mean something corrupt and devouring of the socialist dream that an “either/or” ideological schema had developed over the years. It was simply impossible to reframe those symbols as now acceptable in the limited amount of time Gorbachev had (Blumer, 1969; Geertz, 1973; Goffman, 1974). Things were just shattering too fast.
That Forced Together Will Fall Apart

Given that the underlying impetus for change in East Germany, as elsewhere in eastern Europe, arose from economic hardship and a flatlined standard of living, it ought to come as no surprise that the first manifestations of unrest emanated from the labor movement in the form of strikes (Gilbert, 2001). As had occurred in 1919, the port cities of northernmost East Germany were the first to strike. These strikes were followed by mass protests in Berlin, where thousands of Berliners took to the streets in pro-democratic demonstrations (Gilbert, 2001). All over eastern Europe, the demonstrations spread. In some cities, the police joined the demonstrators. Over the short span of months, it became obvious that the center would no longer hold. A revolution was coming (Daniels, 2000; Grosser, 1992; Kitschelt, 1994; Rees & Donald, 2001), although in retrospect, some would argue that, given the socialist doctrine of perpetual revolution, it was an anti-revolution (Osmond, 2001; Sakwa, 2001).

Early in 1989, the Hungarian government had elected to open its border with Austria. Within three months, 120,000 East Germans, using the communist documents they had carried most of their lives, had traveled clandestinely through Czechoslovakia to Hungary, then across the open Hungarian border, through Austria, to West Germany (Gilbert, 2001; Theis, 1994). Demonstrations intensified in East Germany. In late 1989, nearly a million protestors marched through the streets of the six largest cities in the country. Eric Honecker and the East German government resigned in early November. Three days later the new provisional government began to dismantle the Berlin Wall.
The next day, the border between East and West Germany was opened for the first time in over forty years. Thousands of East Germans crossed in a single day (Gilbert, 2001). What had been unthinkable only a year ago was now happening all across the eastern European frontier.

West Germany and Reunification

West Germany had spent the better part of three decades regaining the legitimacy it had lost during the Third Reich era (Federal Republic of Germany, 2003). As mentioned above, West Germany had joined the Council of Europe in the early 1950s, and during the 1950s and 1960s it had worked to construct a common market among western European nations. West Germans had also actively engaged the nascent research ethics review process in western Europe and joined with other nations in supporting the Declaration of Helsinki of 1964.

The fall of communism in 1989-1990 surprised West Germany as it did virtually every other nation (Baring, 1994). That the GDR would open its borders, permitting thousands of East Germans to emigrate to the west en masse, was welcomed in the sense that many of the émigrés were skilled technical workers, but still the numbers were staggering (Grosser, 1992). As the transition took on the appearance of permanent reality and the two Germanys began to seriously plan for reunification, concerns arose regarding the integration of the lander from the former GDR into the new, western-oriented Germany (Kitschelt, 1994; Miller, 1994).

Certainly one concern was ideological. Two nations that had been ideological antagonists for forty years were now challenged to find a common path toward a new
future (Lush & Banki, 1991). Ideological and political affiliations were sometimes
masked as scientific and technical qualifications, with those whose past had linked them
to communism coming under question regarding their scholarly and scientific
accomplishments (Lush & Banki, 1991). Given the four decades of hostility between
West and East Germany, these sorts of ideological vettings could hardly have been
surprising, but they surely did not make the transition to a fully integrated Germany any
easier.

Additionally, the relative standards of living in the former GDR and West
Germany were very different. Poverty levels in the East German lander were much
higher than in West German lander. Income levels and manufacturing productivity were
substantially lower, and the population of the former GDR absorbed a disproportionate
amount of social welfare resources. During the 1990s, former GDR lander lagged in
economic investment and restructuring while simultaneously gaining in consumption of
goods (von Hagen & Strauch, 2000). It appears that former East German lander will
remain transfer dependent for the foreseeable future, a condition that suggests that the
population of these areas will consume lots of resources but not contribute much to the
nation’s overall economic well-being for some time to come (von Hagen & Strauch,
2000).

This change of events, beginning in 1989, has caused West Germany to
reexamine its commitment to a mixed form of socialism and capitalism, typically called
social democracy. Before the fall of communism and the integration of East Germany
with West, the FRG relied largely upon the state to manage the social welfare and
economic infrastructure of the nation (Kitschelt, 1994; Puljiz, 2002/2003). Since
transition, however, and with the advent of the European Union, the former West Germany has gradually shifted its domestic social and economic policies toward a greater reliance on United States-style market-driven capitalism. In some measure, this shift is due to the overburdening of West Germany’s socioeconomic infrastructure by the needs of the former GDR’s population (Kitschelt, 1994). In other words, the state simply doesn’t have that much money.

Unfortunately, this policy change has exacerbated some of the fears that East Germans brought with them to the west. Whatever the reality might have been, those Germans who had lived under the forty years of socialism tended to believe that socialism had provided them with a socioeconomic safety net that would protect them from catastrophe. Now in the west, with capitalism the driving economic force, they worried that, as displaced Germans, a western-style economy would not shelter them from financial misery should hard times befall them (Miller, 1994). There is also another factor that has proved disquieting to East Germans who are trying to adapt to life in the west. In the worker’s paradise, there were no social problems. No poverty, no homelessness, no alcoholism. Of course this was a chimera; each of these social problems existed in the formerly communist countries of the Soviet bloc, but they went unacknowledged or were blamed on the lack of socialist fervor among those who suffered them (Bodi, Fabian & Giczey, n.d.b.). In the west, however, social problems were widespread. The tendency among the recently arrived East Germans, already uncertain about their status in the FRG, was to attribute the existence of social problems to the corruptions and inherent unfairness of capitalism (Osmond, 2001).
Whatever the internal problems facing the restored Germany, reunification has aroused old fears among other European countries. Germany's history in the 20th century has not been an especially reassuring one for her neighbors. The catalyst behind two world wars, responsible for mass murders of previously unimaginable magnitude, a reunited Germany poses a threat to European peace, real or contrived, in the minds of other nations (Wolffsohn, 1994). That Germany has furnished such unequivocal support and leadership to the birth and growth of the European Union has done little to assuage the hoary fears of other member nations (personal communication with Joseph Schmucker von Koch, 2004; Wolffsohn, 1994). In all likelihood, only the passage of time with no recurrence of German efforts to dominate Europe yet again will put these apprehensions to rest.

The European Union

In 1993, West Germany, with fifteen other western European nations, founded the European Union. There had existed affiliations among the nations before, such as the European Community and the European Economic Community (the child, so to speak, of the Common Market), but the European Union (EU) tied western Europe together like nothing since the Holy Roman Empire (European Parliament, 2001). The previous organizations cited above had economic benefit as their driving force. The EU expanded this to include common values to which each member nation must adhere: human dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity and justice (European Parliament, 2001). Since its founding, the EU has added new members periodically, and is currently expanding to
include most of the former Warsaw Pact countries, including Hungary (All Aboard the Euro-train! 2003; personal communication with Joseph Schmucker von Koch, 2004).

The merging of European nations for common cause is certainly a significant event, were we to look only at the potential economic gain attending to membership. Of greater importance for this discussion, however, is the power of the EU to codify human rights and the protection of human research subjects within its network of laws and regulations. In 1998, the European Parliament reaffirmed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights first put forth in 1948 by the United Nations, punctuating the importance of human rights (European Parliament, 1998). In so doing, the EU took a major step toward establishing a transnational code of ethics for research involving human subjects.

This pivotal act was quickly followed by the European Commission’s instituting of a formal working group on research ethics, particularly those studies involving human subjects and biotechnological research (European Commission, 2000). With the coming of experimental technologies for the investigation of stem cell and human genome research, the Commission has initiated dialogue among EU nations regarding the development of integrated, transnational codes of research bioethics that will govern this vanguard research (European Commission, 2002). These efforts expand and amplify the work already begun by the World Health Organization (n.d.), Pan American Health Organization (n.d.), UNESCO (1997) and the European Science Foundation, which is closely affiliated with the European Union (European Science Foundation, 2000). The Council of Europe has ratified these undertakings (Council of Europe, n.d.), as has the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (2002).
In Germany, as elsewhere in Europe, these ventures have generated a heightened awareness of the need for codes of research ethics to protect the rights of human subjects. These codes are tied together by the mandates espoused by the EU for member countries which, while based upon commonly accepted best ethical practices that transcend national borders, remain internally produced and monitored within each nation.

While there may exist modest differences in these various ethical dicta, mostly attributable to variations in focus and locale, the commonalities are striking:

- Necessity of informed consent
- Respect for human rights
- Protection of marginalized peoples
- Voluntarism
- Withdrawal from research without penalty
- Favorable risk-to-benefit ratio
- Equality of research risks and benefits
- Confidentiality
- Provision of necessary health care to research subjects
- Rigorous research review prior to experimentation

Of noteworthy importance to these ethical codes is the underlying ratification of the importance of human rights, the dignity of the individual, the supremacy of individual rights over the proposed good to society and, in the case of human genome research, the right of the person not to be reduced to a set of genetic characteristics. Within each of these codes, the principles of respect for persons, justice and beneficence resound with the spirit if not the letter of the Belmont Report.
An example of this renewed awareness of scientific research ethics can be seen in the "Medicine and Conscience" conference held in Germany in 1996, at which the Nuremberg Code was widely praised, for its content perhaps more than the manner in which it had come about, and expanded to include antidiscrimination clauses to protect marginalized populations (Nuremberg Revisited, 1996; Voelker, 1996; Wunder, 2000).

During the 1990s, Germany also scrutinized the ethical safeguards for biotechnological research involving stem cell and human genome studies (Schiermeier, 1996; Tuffs, 1995). Ethical protections and oversight were strengthened through the promulgation of addenda to already existing ethical codes, in an effort to set up ethical standards for such research which were contemporaneous with the scientific experimentation (A Bioethics Dilemma for Germany, 1999; Bostanci, 2002; Holden, 1998; Koenig & Vogel, 2001). Germany has distinctly taken a leadership role in Europe to ensure that the bioethics issue is adequately governed in a transparent fashion to avoid the taint of past accusations. Perhaps this once, the questions, "Can we do this," and "Ought we do this," will be asked simultaneously. By the turn of the 20th century, Germany's much deserved but sometimes sullied reputation as a bastion of modern scientific thinking had been fully restored.

Hungary

If Germany's reunification was distinguished by an exodus from east to west and an arduous reintegration of ideologies and socioeconomic expectations, Hungary's went somewhat smoother. By virtue of its history, Hungary was used to transitions. What differentiated the transition of 1989-1990 was that it was internally generated, not
inflicted by a totalitarian force from outside Hungarian civil society (Bodi, Fabian & Giczey, n.d.b).

Since 1990, Hungary has been engaged in a process some have termed, "creative destruction," wherein old institutions are torn down or dismantled and new ones erected in their place simultaneously. In a very real sense, Hungary is reinventing itself as a new nation, attempting to incorporate the advantages of socialism with the obvious allures of market-driven capitalism (Bodi, Fabian & Giczey, n.d.a.). Ideologically, then, Hungary is the embodiment of the postmodern state, striving to find a way for elements of socialism and capitalism to systematically coexist such that the best of each contributes to the well-being of its people (Bross, 1999; Kitschelt, et al., 1999; Stark & Bruszt, 1998).

*Capitalism with a Human Face*

As in other Warsaw Pact countries, the Hungarian economy struggled mightily during the 1980s (Bodi, Fabian & Giczey, n.d.b.). Increasing national debt, combined with decreasing income, effectively destroyed the city on the back of a whale, and along with it, Hungary's middle class (Teller, 2000). In 1989, the years of deprivation and the bankruptcy of communist ideology in the face of growing social distress reached critical mass (Szalai, n.d.), and a quiet revolution occurred.

Per its history, Hungary's quiet revolution was transitional rather than starkly confrontational. The accommodative form of socialism that had been Imre Nagy's dream (Mulcahy, 2000), and which Janos Kadar had adopted as socialism with a human face, the city on the back of a whale, had prepared Hungary for a calmer, less fractious transition than may have been experienced in other former Warsaw Pact nations.
In fact, after the fall of the Kadar regime, many of the previously communist *nomenklatura* remained in prominent leadership positions (Fricz, 2000). Thus in Hungary, there were few street demonstrations or strikes comparable to those occurring in other east European nations; rather, the transition from Soviet-style communism to social democracy and market-driven capitalism was negotiated (Kitschelt, et al., 1999). Put a bit differently, the *nomenklatura* rather nimbly exchanged their political capital for economic capital in the new Hungary and maintained a measure of their former power in the new state (Kolosi & Szelenyi, 1993; Stark & Bruszt, 1998).

Hungarians had, for the past few decades, possessed a desire for western goods. Due to the city on the back of a whale and the presence of a strong informal economy that sustained the Hungarian middle class through the 1960s and 1970s, they had been able to afford them (Teller, 2000; Tokeczki, 2000). Still, many Hungarians, like their East German counterparts, worried that a complete transition to western-style capitalism would produce social and economic injustice and result in a classism they felt had been tempered in their erstwhile socialist state (Csepeli & Kolosi, 1993).

The Hungarian transition has been remarkable in that the shift from socialism to a market-driven social democracy has not produced the degree of socioeconomic upheaval that some predicted. Instead, the course of transition has been a gradual, if at times fitful, change that has integrated privatization and investment into a reformed infrastructure that has retained much of the fiscal and philosophical support for social programs (DeBoer-Ashworth, 2000; Puljiz, 2002/2003). This has in turn diluted much of the concern on the
part of the populace regarding what they perceive as the social injustices inherent in capitalism (Havas, 2002; Kahler, 2000).

Perhaps the greatest economic threat to Hungary in its transition to a market economy is its lack of a strong manufacturing and technological base (Hungary: Gloomy Celebrants, 1996; Kalantaridis, 2000). During the communist era, there was little in the way of technological advancement and adaptation to modern manufacturing methods (Balazs & Hare, 1990). This has understandably stunted Hungary’s economic growth and capacity for competition with western nations. The desire to catch up fast is one of the compelling reasons why Hungary was eager to join the European Union at its earliest opportunity (Balazs & Hare, 1990), and remains committed to globalization (meaning expansion of markets and introduction of new technologies) as a passageway to social and economic recovery (Hamalainen, 2002/2003; Kalantaridis, 2000). It sounds as if Hungary is embracing market-driven capitalism as its guiding ideology, and to some degree, it is, but Hungarians are wary of dismantling the country’s socialist legacy entirely. The first official bill passed by the freely elected Hungarian parliament in 1990 commemorated the 1956 revolt to reform socialism, and restored the name of Imre Nagy, the uncertain socialist, to all public records (Agovino, 2000; Rev, 2001).

The Renaissance of Hungarian Science

Even before the transition of 1989-1990, Hungarian scientists were examining the topic of research ethics, albeit privately. The increasing use of western medical technologies was prompting moral and ethical dilemmas for scientists and physicians alike (Blasszauer, 1986). Bela Blasszauer, an internationally recognized expert on
research ethics and human subjects protection, audaciously organized the first East-West Bioethics Conference in his native Hungary even before the transition. Since that time, Blasszauer has been instrumental in bringing Hungary into stride with modern research ethics review practices and facilitating the resurgence in Hungarian scientific study (Catlin, 1999). By 1991, Hungary had begun the process of liberating its research community from the constraints exacted by communism (Anderson, 1992), and introduced a competitive system of peer-reviewed research which was funded through central research councils (Peteri, 1998).

Since that time, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, once among the most highly regarded scientific institutions in Europe, has reshaped its infrastructure, unshackling its scholars from the ideological chains imposed by the socialist state and reclaiming Hungary’s tradition of fiscal support for legitimate scientific inquiry (Abbott, 1998; Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2002). It has also restored the parity between the care-oriented medical sciences and the culture-oriented social sciences, freeing especially the latter from its propagandistic function mandated by the former regime (Berta, 1999; Piko & Kopp, 2002). The Hungarian Academy of Sciences now houses eleven sections:

- Linguistics and literary studies
- Philosophy and historical studies
- Mathematical sciences
- Agricultural sciences
- Medical sciences
- Technical sciences
- Chemical sciences
Like the rest of Hungarian society, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences struggles with its recent past, and the economic difficulties incurred with the transition from fully subsidized state funding to market-driven capitalism (Agovino, 2000). It is sad to contemplate, however, that the Hungarian Academy, with its 179 year tradition of surviving empires, wars, military occupations, fascism and communism, is now temporarily faced with budgetary constraints at the moment of its liberation from intellectual bondage (Koenig, 1997; Lajos, 1993).

Human Rights, Research Ethics and the Hungarian Parliament

Among the first acts of the Hungarian Parliament, after it had endorsed the 1956 revolt and the memory of Imre Nagy, was to disavow the legitimacy of totalitarian socialism and to affirm the resurrection of human rights and the rights of individuals in civil society (Szalai, n.d.).

In 1997, the parliament passed what is known as Act CLIV of 1997 on Health, a law that articulated and codified human rights for recipients of health care in Hungary. Among the rights enumerated in this momentous legislation were:

- Equality of access to health care
- Individual freedom
- Right of self-determination
• Preservation of human dignity
• Value of the individual
• Empowerment of the individual via open access to information
• Informed consent
• Right to choose appropriate caregiver
• Right to have contact with others
• Right to leave health care facility
• Right to personal information and medical records
• Right to refuse care
• Right to knowledge of medical record access and use
• Confidentiality

Some of these provisions mirror the recent United States HIPAA regulations, designed to give health care patients more control over the uses of their medical records, except of course that Act CLIV on Health antedates HIPAA by six years. To the American reader, a number of the provisions of Act CLIV on Health may seem needless. Keep in mind, though, that in communist Hungary, political dissidents were often placed in psychiatric hospitals and other highly restrictive health care facilities as a surrogate prison. Hence, rights such as freedom to leave, to have visitors, to choose caregiver and to examine all medical records and have control over how medical records are used are of vital importance to Hungarians in the context of their oppressive past in what amounts to a terrorist state (Hungarian Parliament, 1997a, 1997b).

Of equal importance was still another provision of Act CLIV on Health, that governing research on human subjects. These rules are:
• Research is to be conducted solely to improve the human condition
• Only approved research by appropriate review committees for ethics compliance is to be conducted in Hungary
• Only safe research is to be conducted in Hungary
• Only research without demonstrably similar effective treatment will be conducted
• Research must have a favorable risk-to-benefit ratio
• Research will not be approved if there exists a disproportionately high risk to life or emotional well being
• Informed consent
• Voluntarism
• Withdrawal of consent at any time in the research process without penalty
• Shared and equal risks and benefits of research among people (Hungarian Parliament, 1997c)

Essentially, the Hungarian Parliament passed Act CLIV on Health (for the protection of human research subjects) as a Hungarian ratification of the Declaration of Helsinki. A cursory review of the provisions of each document reveals their obvious similarities.

Also in 1997, Hungary signed the Ovideo Treaty, a bioethical health agreement also signed by the western nations in the European Union. Likewise, in 2002, the parliament enacted two departmental orders, both based upon Act CLIV on Health, which empowered the Medical Research Council to regulate ethical research through systematized research review committees established on the central (national), regional and local levels across Hungary. These committees are the Scientific and Research
Ethical Committee, the Clinical Pharmacological Ethical Committee, and the Human Reproduction Committee (Mandl, et al., 2003).

Hungary was the first of the central and eastern European countries, and the first former Warsaw Pact nation, to join the Council of Europe in 1990. In June, 2002, the commissioner for human rights visited Hungary to monitor progress and compliance with the Council of Europe’s human rights policy. His report is illuminating. He said that Hungary had made significant progress in the protection of human rights in a very short period of time, perhaps due to its recent history of Soviet inflicted, systematic human rights violations. The commissioner also noted that the disenfranchised poor in Hungary and the Roma (Gypsy) population have suffered a disproportionate amount of economic hardship. Further, he asserted, the rights of minorities have been well safeguarded in Hungary’s new parliamentary democracy by means of law and parliamentary decree, particularly on the local level of governance (Council of Europe, 2002).

Lastly, in 2000, survey research was conducted in eastern Europe to determine areas of good research review practice. Hungary was one of the participating nations. Among the variables under study were the composition of research review committees, how committees were structured, what were the important functions of each review committee, and how committee members had been trained. The researchers found that in Hungary, research review committee members were pulled from both medical and nonmedical disciplines, and were specially trained in bioethics. Hungary was cited as an exemplar of research review and human subjects protection in the study (Coker & McKee, 2001).
Summary

The period, 1980-Present, has seen stunning changes in the United States, Germany and Hungary. In the United States, political conservatism, briefly interrupted by the Clinton Administration, has become the *zeitgeist* of powerful entrenched interests and corporate America. Research ethics, first proclaimed by Americans at the Nuremberg Trials after World War II, have had a checkered history of compliance even though a sophisticated mechanism of oversight and review has been in place for years. And science, like it had been so many times in the century just past, was facing the corrosive effects of politicization.

Germany’s restoration to a respected position in Europe has been completed, its historic borders reestablished, and its people reunited. A new era of collaboration spread across Europe during these twenty years. The European Union and its parliament solidified the links among countries and legislated codes of human rights and research protection for individuals that, by century’s end, spanned the continent. Germany’s once vaunted scientific reputation had been reclaimed, and her ethical review regulations and processes prepared the nation’s scientific establishment for the largely unmapped ethical future of human genome research (personal communication with Joseph Schmucker von Koch, 2004).

Hungary had risen like a phoenix from the ashes of totalitarianism, searching for the right political and economic mix of benign socialism and capitalism with a human face and, in so doing, create a postmodern state that might bring together the finest elements of both. Shed of the toxic dogmatism that had imprisoned it for decades, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences once more asserted its place at the forefront of modern
scientific thinking, only to be restrained for a time by the fiscal vagaries of transition. Hungary’s parliament enacted legislation that honored its past and set a promising course for the future of human rights. Hungarians, servants to unwanted masters for so many years, could now look to the horizon and welcome a new day.
CHAPTER VI
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND RESEARCH ETHICS

Thus far we have witnessed the evolution of science and ethics in three nations during the 20th century. Yet the development of science and ethics in the United States, Germany and Hungary has not occurred in a vacuum of social history. The unfolding of this topic has carried transnational strains that link these cultures in a variety of ways. For example, the eugenics movement had its origins in Britain and the United States, but did not reach its dreadful terminus until it had been borrowed by the Nazis of the Third Reich and elevated to the status of gruesome state religion. Two Hungarians, Leo Szilard and Edward Teller, were instrumental in creating the atomic bomb for the United States. After World War II, the Americans brought former Nazi scientists to the United States to work on the advanced rocketry that directly lead to the American space program. There exist many more examples of this cross-cultural scientific pollination, but the point is that the fates of these three countries have been intertwined over the course of the past one hundred years.

As we have seen, though, these three cultures are different from one another. The United States, while it has surely struggled to preserve the freedoms so proudly enunciated in its Bill of Rights, has had no event in the 20th century to compare with the National Socialist revolution so deftly orchestrated by Adolph Hitler in Germany, nor has
it suffered Hungary's 45 years of totalitarian domination at the hands of the Arrowcross and Stalinist Russia.

The field of research ethics has fared the same. Americans first articulated the Nuremberg Code, but American scientists have hardly been exemplars of rigid adherence to that doctrine. There has also been a disturbing trend in the United States regarding the role of science and political ideology which is faintly reminiscent of the politicization of science in Nazi Germany and Communist Hungary. It seems to assert itself during times of perceived external threat to the country (e.g., McCarthyism, the late 20th century terrorist threat), and underscores how fragile the sociopolitical support for scientific inquiry really is, even in a free society.

The modern field of research ethics had its origins as a response to the horrors perpetrated during the Third Reich era, but as we've seen, the German people have grappled mightily with that scientific legacy. In Hungary, science and ethics had been thoroughly perverted in service to socialist ideology and centralized control of the country and its resources. Arising from the sins of the past, both countries have developed ethical codes to tightly govern human rights in order to protect human subjects of research. The United States as well has legislated protections for human research subjects. In a way, then, each nation has arrived at a similar place insofar as the ethics of research are concerned, but from different paths.

In the preceding chapters, we have discussed 20th century events in the United States, Germany and Hungary through a process of using key episodes and historical figures to depict events of primary importance to the topics of human rights and human subjects protection in research. Let us now shift our focus somewhat, and adopt a wide-
angle lens. To do so, we shall apply a theoretical framework to these occurrences in order to more fully understand what has happened in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, and how this century came to unfold as it has. The principle theories we will use to analyze this period will be structural functionalism, general systems theory, conflict theory, Peter Blau’s exchange theory of power, and symbolic interactionism.

After that, we will return to the problems originally stated at the very beginning of this work. Using the model of problem analysis developed by Chambers (2000), we will hopefully bring some cogency and structure to the subject of human rights and research ethics. This will be followed by using the theories mentioned above to look more closely at human subjects protection. The chapter will also include a discussion of the philosophical foundations of research ethics, and the means by which we might begin to apply research ethics theory across cultures.

A Theoretical Analysis of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century in Germany, Hungary and the United States

He surely didn’t realize it at the time, but Wilbur Wright’s invention signaled a Kuhnian leap in the progress of science and technology. Like the television and the computer, two other momentous inventions of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the invention of the airplane set the stage for a century entirely unlike the preceding one. Not simply building upon the discoveries of the past, Wright’s brainchild created a tectonic shift that catapulted science and technology into the modern world such that the bridge to the past crumbled away behind it (Kuhn, 1962/1996).
In like manner, World War I had the same impact upon the colonial empires of the 19th century and the monarchies that ruled them. After the war, the European empires that had ruled much of the undeveloped world either abruptly ceased to exist or, in the cases of Britain, France and Germany, became so weakened that their influence extended no further than their borders.

The system of alliances that had existed in Europe prior to the war was broken, as were the nations themselves. The familiar organizational schemes of empire had been shattered in Germany and Hungary, leaving a vacuum of governmental structure in the wake of monarchy’s failure. In the chaos that followed the devastation of World War I, Europe sought order. And for a brief period, Europe got it.

The apparatus of the 19th century European empires in Germany and Hungary was based upon an intricate network of balance and control which was needed in order to command the vast reaches of empire. Necessary to manage such complex structures was an equally vast bureaucracy. Connected by a system of functions designed to provide both structure and equilibrium to their respective societies, the bureaucracies of national infrastructure and external conquest in Germany and Hungary were predicated on the notion that adaptation to environmental changes was best accomplished by increasing the power differential over one’s enemies, and expanding national borders by conquest of countries that challenged one’s supremacy. A byproduct of this system was the absorption of additional resources from conquered nations which would in turn create greater wealth for the empire and solidify its power over those it governed.
In a sense, then, 19th century European empires were the very model of Walter Buckley’s homeostatic/organismic level of systems, with the societal and governmental infrastructure of Talcott Parson’s structural functionalist description of system maintenance and adaptation (Buckley, 1967; Parsons, 1951/1979). Such systems are designed to protect themselves from too much internally generated change as well as externally inflicted challenge to the system’s integrity and well-being (von Bertallanfý, 1967). Part of the protective strategy of such systems is to deflect, or in some cases overwhelm, perceived assaults to the structure of the system in order to maintain equilibrium. In periods of heightened stress to the system, the tendency of homeostatic level systems is to shut down inputs from the external environment altogether, essentially to resist too much change and thereby remain the same (von Bertalánffy, 1967).

And herein lies a problem. For what keeps a system fresh is input. When a homeostatic system detects danger to its sense of equilibrium, it enters a state of crisis. The function of the system is then to mobilize its infrastructure to deflect the threat. Inputs are repulsed unless they reinforce the system’s equilibrium and reduce the intensity of the crisis. Outputs are either reduced, due to the energy required to internally stabilize the system, homogenized, or shut down altogether. Thus the system, in an effort to protect itself, resists adaptation. It is as if the system becomes a fortress under siege. At some point, with either repulsed or filtered input and little if any output, the system implodes. This is the state of entropy, and it produces destruction of the system (von Bertalanfý, 1967).

During the first decades of the 20th century, the world of empire imploded into what we call World War I. The reason this is significant is that the remainder of the
century would give witness to a series of such implosions. Nazi Germany came about in some respects as a result of the entropic chaos that followed World War I and the failures of the Weimar Republic to restore civil and economic order. The Soviet Union arose from the Bolshevik Revolutions of 1905 and 1917, from the stresses of which the Russian Empire imploded and collapsed during World War I. Decades later, the Soviet Union, and its puppet regimes in eastern Europe, suffered the same fate in 1989-1990. One would be hard pressed to find a better metaphor for a closed system (strongly resisting inputs while limiting the diversity of outputs) than that represented by the Iron Curtain.

What happens to people within societies that perceive themselves to be under attack? The homeostatic response tends to generate homogeneity among a society’s populace. Tendencies toward variation and diversification become stunted. Internal diversity often becomes reframed by leaders of a closed system society as threatening to the system’s viability. The critical state produced by a threat to the system’s equilibrium reduces its membership to common denominators that are valued to the degree that they contribute to system maintenance. Hence, individuals who reinforce system maintenance are useful to the homeostasis of the system; those who deviate from this first purpose of a homeostatic system are treasonous to the life of the system. Consider the fates of the Jews in Nazi Germany or political opponents to the Soviet regime in Communist Hungary.

Also consider the process by which such “deviates” become devalued and marginalized. We have often pondered how the atrocities of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Hungary could have occurred. How otherwise decent people might have supported, however passively, the extermination of an entire subgroup of a national population. The
answer resides in the social perception that this subgroup is a genuine, immediate threat to system survival. In other words, those system members who deviate from the first purpose of a homeostatic system under threat are somehow threatening the viability of the system itself, and thus must be eliminated. This is how systematic human rights violations on a massive scale occur within societies that possess an otherwise humane history and culture. It also helps explain the absence of deep remorse in the perpetrators of such violence...After all, it was them or us, wasn't it?

The same is true, unfortunately, of research. What is research but the search for new and meaningful system inputs and outputs? Research in a (totalitarian) homeostatic system under siege is antithetical to system maintenance. If it is to exist at all, it must exist in service to system equilibrium, and is thus not free. To the governance structure of a totalitarian state, dedicated first and foremost to system maintenance and increasing its control over internal system functions, unfettered research is an untenable risk. It could turn out a variety of different ways. That is the nature of free inquiry. But only some of the ways research could turn out are useful to maintaining the equilibrium of the state, so science must be put to the constricted political purpose of reinforcing the homeostasis of the machinery of state. Science that is not managed to a specified purpose may quite possibly end up being treasonous. Scientists who participate in research that is not state-supported are hence threats to the system, and become “othered” as deviants who must be policed and reeducated to the first purpose of a purely homeostatic system (Riggins, 1997). At this point, scientists and other disenfranchised people, ostracized as enemies of the system and thus thoroughly disempowered, have little to offer but fealty, or their lives (Blau, 1964).
We might ask, however, how can a system entirely shut down its inputs in an effort to internally restabilize? In the reality of a complex human culture, it can't shut them out completely. Rather, inputs are reshaped internally to buttress the system's efforts to maintain its integrity and equilibrium. We can think of a social system's inputs as a complicated array of meaning-laden symbols, which in human systems take the form of language, events or both. Symbols which enter the system are then reconfigured to serve the system's first purpose. Through a process of interaction between incoming symbol and already existing, system maintaining meaning, the symbol is transmogrified into something which serves the system's first purpose. In other words, the symbol is dramaturgically manipulated to foster equilibrium. If for some reason the symbol does not lend itself to a meaning shift that perpetuates system maintenance, it is rejected as yet another threat to the system (Blumer, 1969; Geertz, 1973; Goffman, 1959, 1974; Hall, 1981).

Totalitarian systems, such as Nazi Germany and Communist Hungary, are seemingly by design homeostatic/organismic level systems. The internally generated conflict between groups in such a system is stifled for reasons articulated above. Internal conflict is considered a threat to system viability and must be eradicated. External conflict, though, is another matter indeed. For a totalitarian system, external conflict can be handled in such a way that it actually fosters greater compliance from internal system components. To wit, there is nothing like an external threat to bring otherwise diverse people together and dilute any power struggles among internal hierarchies. Hitler knew this. Part of his genius was his capacity to turn almost every external threat to his advantage by using it to solidify internal German support for his policies and manipulate
German nationalism into a monolithic National Socialism (Collins, 1975; Dahrendorf, 1959).

_A System with Built-in Change_

At the risk of trumpeting American hubris, we may want to consider that the genius of this nation’s founding fathers was to create a new kind of system for a new land. The United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights are redolent of process/adaptive systems thinking. While it is unlikely that Thomas Jefferson and James Madison would have used such a florid term, the United States of their creation includes many of the qualities of Buckley’s process/adaptive systems.

The constitution of the United States is founded in the belief that the original thirteen colonies comprised a varied system that would grow and change over time, increasing in both size and complexity as it evolved. Equilibrium and system maintenance were secured through a network of values, principles and rights, as expressed in the Declaration of Independence (1776) and the first Bill of Rights (1789). These documents served the purpose of giving the new nation a template for both security and freedom that has proven immutable in most respects. To be sure, there have existed periods in American history when some of the original rights laid down by Madison, Jefferson, et al., have been compromised. For instance, Abraham Lincoln temporarily suspended the writ of _habeas corpus_ during the most threatening times of the Civil War and, as mentioned elsewhere, the threat of abridged rights posed by extreme interpretation of the USA Patriot Act is very real. Additionally, the United States does not have a stellar record of protecting the rights of all Americans. Slavery was not
abolished until almost a century after the Declaration of Independence was signed, and it required the passage of several constitutional amendments to secure the right to vote for all adult Americans (United States Constitution: Amendments, n.d.).

To some degree, though, the fact that the United States Constitution has proven to be a living, breathing document, integrating rather than rejecting necessary changes, suggests the existence of a process/adaptive rather than a homeostatic/organismic level of system in America. It may be fairly said that the inputs into the American system that prompted system adaptation did not generate immediate change. However, the point here is that the inputs did in fact prompt system adaptation and altered the outputs such that the system successfully adapted to a changing external and internal environment. Also, the American system integrated rather than fully rejected the need for growth in complexity and diversity (Buckley, 1967; von Bertalanffy, 1967).

Some of what may account for the genesis of the American process/adaptive system is that the founding fathers worked during the Enlightenment, with its intellectual culture of openness and faith in human potential. The belief that America represented a new nation and a fresh start for western peoples was commonly accepted at the time of the country’s origin. But the real genius of the American democratic republican method of governance lies in two matters that are mechanical rather than philosophical.

Inputs and outputs that are somehow logically related to one another are assured through the system of representation that defines democratic republican governance: members of the government are elected by the people for short periods of time. No public election puts a person into office for longer than six years. The House of Representatives, created as the voice of an ever-evolving popular mandate, is elected
every two years. These are the voices of popular input, or the will of the people. Outputs are the measured, reasoned results of popular inputs as deliberated within an elected legislature which, through the power of the vote, is held accountable for what it produces.

The second mechanical construct that was built into the founding fathers’ scheme for a new and different nation is America’s system of checks and balances. Briefly, the governance of the United States is entrusted to three separate branches of government: legislative, executive and judicial. Their respective powers are roughly equal, but historically have varied over time such that at one period of American history the legislature might wield more power than the executive (e.g., the Clinton impeachment), the judicial may wield more power than either remaining branch (e.g., the Bush vs. Gore 2000 presidential election), and the executive might possess more power than the other branches (e.g., Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal era).

It is the essential nature of the system of checks and balances which prevents undue abuse of power by one branch of government for a sustained period of time (Blau, 1964). This element of the democratic republican method of governance strikes adaptive balance through the natural friction of competing facets of government, and provides a model of the workable and just exchange of power (Blau, 1964).

Although the terms were not known at the time, the American governance system has a base that is well described by the tenets of structural functionalism (Parsons, 1951/1979) merged with the humanistic aspects of Merton’s adjustment of Parsons’ original theory (1968). After all, it is a government of the people, by the people and for the people.
The means of government in the United States is founded upon the consensus theories of Parsons and Merton, but builds in structured conflict in order to spark necessary changes within the system itself (Collins, 1975; Dahrendorf, 1959). From what does the institutionalized conflict emanate? The Bill of Rights, which guarantees freedom of thought, speech and assembly, as well as the electoral process itself. The founding fathers must have known that a new nation whose fuel was fear of oppression and a myriad of diverse interests and peoples would need an unassailable arena for the expression of conflict, and that such an arena must carry the assurance and gravitas of legislated human rights. When we combine these elements of the American system, what we have is a process/adaptive system that maintains equilibrium by inducing change within a context of stable norms, shared values and established rules of order (Parsons, 1951/1979).

It is precisely this delicate balance that has sustained the United States during the 20th century. But what keeps alive the cultural awareness of this unusual American style of governance is the self-reflective nature of its symbols and the deeply ingrained meaning system underlying these symbols (Blumer, 1969; Goffman, 1974). The Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights and the United States Constitution itself do not merely represent the primary symbols of what most Americans believe about their country. They are the primary symbols. The American flag, the White House, the Capitol Rotunda, Mount Rushmore, the Liberty Bell, even the dollar sign, are secondary symbols. They are simply powerful stage props in the dramaturgy of American culture (Goffman, 1959).
Just as an example, let us take the argument in the United States about gun control. The issue isn’t framed typically as somehow symbolic of the Sons of Liberty or the Minutemen fights at Concord and Lexington in 1775, nor is it presented as a function of the nation’s need to maintain a militia. Rather, the conflict regarding gun control is framed as an issue concerning the right to bear arms, as set forth in the Bill of Rights. The discussion, if we may use such a civilized term in this context, does not focus so much on the practical wisdom or madness of having an armed citizenry roaming America’s streets as it does on how one interprets the words of the founding fathers as set forth in the Bill of Rights.

*Why No Entropic America?*

A process/adaptive system does not implode into entropy. Instead it morphs and changes toward complexity and adaptation, co-opting and integrating inputs in order to maintain equilibrium in the face of constant change while still adjusting to internal and external demands (Buckley, 1967). We have already reviewed the history of 20th century Germany and Hungary, nations wracked by tumultuous, entropic change that for significant periods of the century bastardized their people, their culture and their heritage. Prisons, with and without walls, were built to maintain the homeostasis of totalitarian regimes in the name of national solidarity and the common good of their citizens (Foucault, 1975/1995; Ignatieff, 1984). Even prison walls, however, were insufficient to hold back the insistent forces of change, and in time the rigidly homeostatic systems instigated by the National Socialists in Germany and the Communists in Hungary died.
from a combination of internally and externally imposed stress. Why didn’t the United States?

While it may seem simplistic, the reason has to do with the differences between homeostatic/organismic and process/adaptive systems. The homeostatic systems of governance instigated in Germany, whether by Kaiser Wilhelm or Adolph Hitler, were closed systems that sought control as the critical factor in maintaining order and sociopolitical equilibrium. Freedom and diversity, inadequately institutionalized in either Wilhelm’s or Hitler’s Germany, oddly reduced system openness to change. In their place, Wilhelm and Hitler substituted loyalty and homogeneity. These traits, or conditions of social acceptance and survival, while under other circumstances laudable, reduced the quality and quantity of inputs to their respective systems of governance and, in so doing, neutralized their value to the society. Sanitized inputs misrepresent the demands placed upon a system by internal and external environmental factors. The symbolic meanings of inputs become distorted exclusively to the purpose of power maintenance, and thus lose influence as cues for system adaptation. Outputs from these types of systems take on a stunning similarity, and why oughtn’t they? The function of information flow in and out of a homeostatic system in crisis is best served by consistency, not change.

Of course research suffers the same fate. In repressive homeostatic systems that resist change in the face of clear demands for it, research must either be banished or co-opted to such an extent that it is just a tool for propagandistic reinforcement of system equilibrium. Unfettered research, were it to somehow exist in such a stagnant place, would be tantamount to sabotage of system survival.
Hungary suffered a similar, though perhaps less drastic, fate under the regimes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Admiral Horthy. Still, scientists like Edward Teller and Leo Szilard saw early on the fate that awaited them had they elected to stay in their native land. Not only were they Jews, they were scientists, and the repressive systems they left behind would condemn them for both sins against the state.

Were there any question about the need for closed homeostatic systems to repress difference and dissent, the Hungarian Uprising of 1956 must surely answer it. Recall that even Imre Nagy sought only to reform socialism, not banish it. Hungarians at the time wanted to modify socialism such that it possessed a recognizable human face. Though often called a revolution, the Hungarian Uprising was actually reformist in its intent. Even reform, though, was considered the direst of threats to Hungary's communist rulers and their masters in Moscow. A closed homeostatic political system cannot remain the same and change simultaneously, because it is predicated on control and subjugation. As we have noted throughout these pages, in political systems that rely on abolishment of human rights and the enslavement of people as prerequisites to maintaining power, even a little bit of freedom is a dangerous thing. Totalitarian systems that introduce it are virtually inviting destruction.

The United States, on the other hand, has shown resilience in the face of 20th century chaos. It is the thesis of some hubristic Americans that this is attributable to a kind of American superiority, either of its people, its way of life, or both. This is fallacious. In many respects, if not of fact then mythology, America has not been unduly saddled with the historical and cultural detritus that Europe has experienced. America is a new country. Not all that different perhaps, but new.
It was born of a different time in western history, a time of philosophical enlightenment and the pragmatics of a stark political reality. Distrustful of the absolute power embodied in Europe’s monarchs, but hopeful that the best had not yet been written about the heights to which man might one day ascend, the founding fathers of the United States dreamed with eyes wide open of a system of governance that reflected authority back to its constituents in a sociopolitical culture that protected both security and freedom. They dreamed of an open system that embraced change while not forgetting the bedrock principles of the nation’s foundation. In building a country based upon the paradox of security and freedom, America’s founders created a democratic republic that could withstand the vagaries of dramatic change while keeping its essential philosophy inviolate. There existed no contradiction between security and freedom. In fact, they complemented one another.

Wilbur Wright’s invention thrust America and the world into a modern era. The airplane would in time unite the new world with the old in ways neither could have imagined a short two decades before. As well, there would be new consequences that would be unforeseeable and to some degree unwelcome. The United States adapted to this new era without tremendous disruption; Europe did not. The political and social systems at rule in the United States, based on what by the dawn of the 20th century were considered the verities of the founding fathers, were set up to withstand and incorporate change. The systems of empire-based Europe were not.

Jefferson has been widely quoted as having said that in order for America to remain vibrant, a revolution should occur every twenty years or so. He did not say that these revolutions must be political. In the 20th century, many of Jefferson’s revolutions
have been scientific and technological, and more than a few have been social. The American process/adaptive system is so constructed that it integrates change and maintains its fundamental equilibrium. Until the second half of the 20th century, European systems have commonly sought to maintain equilibrium at the expense of change, or vice versa.

Thus we see another difference between homeostatic and process/adaptive systems. The former typically addresses intense demands upon the system with an either/or construction of the demand. The latter tends toward constructing demands upon the system as both/and. The differences have profound implications, because the either/or construct sets up a resistance to substantial demands on system integrity, and eventually, if the demand is sustained beyond the tolerance of the system's equilibrium, the system shuts down and implodes. The both/and construct avoids this pitfall by embracing the change and using it to foster co-optation of the demand such that the demand is integrated into the adaptation process.

The empires of Europe resisted change either by repulsion or conquest. The United States took the raw materials of change and forged something new for the American system. For example, as Hitler's Germany was attempting to find its way out of the Great Depression, it resisted the changes implicit in socialism that were sweeping across the continent. Hungary did likewise. Franklin Roosevelt, however, embraced some aspects of socialism to put America back to work and in a sense inoculate the country against a full socialist revolt. Roosevelt used facets of socialism to protect the security of working Americans and to safeguard the freedoms and privileges that most people associated with the idea of America. In so doing, he used his power as president
to help the nation adapt to the Great Depression while simultaneously increasing the bureaucratic complexity of the country vastly. This positioned the United States to assume greater power in the world after World War II, and in fact put in place the scientific bureaucracy known as the Manhattan Project that ultimately defeated the totalitarian powers of Japan and Germany. The achievements of the Manhattan Project, terrible though they may seem now, also served to keep the Soviet Union at bay until that totalitarian regime imploded in 1989-1990.

Yet the process/adaptive system of the United States has not been without flaws. The very security and freedom of the American system of governance has often produced excesses which could happen only in a system whose purpose is adaptation and increasing complexity. It has brought about profligate greed during those times when rampant capitalism has been left unrestrained, and created an economic imbalance among its populace that sometimes puzzles the rest of the world.

In research, the freedom of scientific exploration has proven a fertile ground for discoveries that have benefited untold millions of people. As we’ve seen, though, there have been periods when scientific freedom has been stretched to the limits of license. Combined with the historic paternalism of medicine, science and social engineering, American science has often trampled on the human and legal rights of thousands of citizens with a startling lack of consideration for the protections constitutionally granted in the nation’s original charter.
The Best of Both Worlds

After World War II, West Germany adopted some of the forms of American governance as its own in the wake of Nazism's defeat. Not surprisingly, West Germany elected to create in its social democracy a distinctly European variation on the American democratic republic. Embracing a measured configuration of state-managed capitalism due to the visible excesses of the pure American form, and wincing under American pressure to conform its new government to American dictates, West Germany stamped its resurgent society with what may have been the best of both worlds. The security of West Germans was and is managed and protected through a state-sponsored network of benefits. Simultaneously, the country's industrial and manufacturing infrastructure, devastated during the carnage of the war, was initially sustained with the help of the government but eventually survived and flourished under its own market-driven steam (Federal Republic of Germany, 2003; Pommerin, 1996).

During the ensuing fifty years, West Germany has hammered out a system of state management and governance that brings together a surprising number of the elements of a process/adaptive system while not abandoning the essential equilibrium of a nation ravaged and split apart by war (Welsch, 1996). As an example, look at the lengths West Germany went to in order to rejoin the European community via affiliations with the United Nations, NATO, the Council of Europe and, eventually, the European Union. These are not the acts of a closed system concerned only with its own homeostasis.

West Germany integrated the former GDR without great duress and certainly without a threat to its integrity as a system. Quite the reverse, actually. The periodic rumblings of other European nations, still concerned about the potential threat of a
reunited Germany, lend testimony to that (Miller, 1994; Wolffsohn, 1994). Germany in fact appears stronger than at any time since before World War II (Baring, 1994), and is taking a leading role in the development of codes of ethics for research in the biotechnical age (Bostanci, 2002; European Commission, 2000). Such a contribution to world research standards hardly supports the notion of dulled outputs from a closed system ready to implode.

Hungary, since the transition, has also experimented with blending the much-needed equilibrium of a recently freed but still shaky country with the facets of process/adaptive systems necessary for integration into the modern world. The rapidity with which the Hungarian Academy of Sciences has been reinstated as a center for free inquiry gives affirmation to the desire of Hungarians to open up the windows after decades of oppressive stagnation under communist rule (Anderson, 1992; Apor, 1999; House of Terror, 2002).

Hungary, like West Germany after World War II, appears to be seizing the opportunity to enter the postmodern age with the securities and freedoms characteristic of a process/adaptive system. Its eagerness to join the European Union, the promptness with which it engaged the European Parliament’s standards for ethical research, and its assertive stance in protecting human rights and freedoms while at the same time codifying into law the fundamental safeguards to protect its people are all signs of a nation poised to open itself up to external inputs and produce innovative outputs that embrace change and complexity.

Within Hungary, there exists ample evidence that the country’s post-war experience with socialism and its more recent welcome of market-driven capitalism may
be producing a useful political and economic friction (Agovino, 2000; Bodi, Fabian &
Giczey, n.d.b.; Rees & Donald, 2001). Steeped in decades of socialist ideology, but
fondly recalling the days of the city on the back of a whale, with its relative abundance of
western goods, modern Hungarians are conflicted regarding these twin legacies (Sakwa,
2001; Stark & Bruszt, 1998). An example of this is the dissonance that many Hungarians
face regarding the matter of what is “true.” During the communist era, state-controlled
media propaganda promulgated the existence of a single, socialist “truth,” that was
socially constructed from socialist ideology. Such a truth does not really exist in
democratically diverse societies (Held, 2000). But in this case, dissonance may be
Hungary’s ally, as it prompts dialogue and conflict which spark new ideas and innovative
ways of blending the past with the present, socialism with capitalism, and thereby forging
a social system that is both practically workable and uniquely Hungarian.

Both Germany and Hungary appear to have found a way to retain the history and
traditions of their respective cultures to provide continuity and balance in the modern
world, yet have not reverted to the limitations inherent in homeostatic systems. Instead,
each nation seems to have selectively taken the best from their long histories of scientific
discovery and cultural richness and blended it with newer ideas milled, forged and tested
in the United States. In so doing, they may be creating postmodern states that have
drawn their lessons from the best the world has to offer.

The Problems Restated

In the introduction, many pages ago, several problems were set forth as being
pertinent to this study. It has been the history of science, and its handmaiden technology,
that somehow they have been elevated to godly heights without adequately reckoning for
the limitations and human flaws of those who have wielded their power. It should be
profusely clear from a reading of the preceding pages that science and technology have
an immense capacity for improving the human condition, and an immense capacity for
magnifying human flaws. Like any other template for regulating human behavior, the
rules of scientific inquiry must be governed by codes of ethical behavior such that the
propensity for good is maximized while the tendency toward evil is thwarted (Anderson
& Rorty, 2001).

However, when we use words like good and evil, right and wrong, we enter a
different level of analysis from traditional scientific questions (Abramson, 1996).
Science has long concerned itself with the capacity and methodology of attaining a
defined purpose. Ethics, on the other hand, is the study of whether such a purpose is
indeed desirable from the vantage point of human decency and moral rightness. In the
course of the 20th century, we have seen again and again how the pursuit of scientific
goals and the development of technology have been perverted by a blurring of intent
(e.g., scientific justifications used to fulfill political motives) and the corruption of free
inquiry for the manipulation of power and the oppression of people.

Civilized societies have addressed these problems by creating a plethora of ethical
codes designed to rein in absolutely free scientific inquiry via the codification of ethical
“firewalls.” By this, we mean boundaries of human construction to ensure that the
unfettered quest for scientific knowledge is limited in the means through which the
knowledge is acquired. Put more succinctly, ethical codes are intended to make sure that
the ends of scientific pursuit do not overwhelm the means through which scientists pursue it.

Most if not all of the ethical codes regulating the use and treatment of human beings in scientific research share certain core values. Among these are voluntarism, informed consent, equitability of risk and benefit, and a number of others. But given the substantially different histories of the cultures we’ve examined, these values may have vastly different meanings based upon cultural difference and history relative to these values (Hochhauser, 1999).

For example, voluntarism in a reasonably free society, such as the United States, may have a different operational meaning than it does in Hungary. With the ingrained American tradition of freedom and individual choice, voluntarism implies unhindered volition that is not impeded by life and safety threatening consequences. Such rights have a tradition, supported by the power of law, of being relatively unassailable in the United States. Hungary, on the other hand, has no such longstanding tradition in the 20th century, and the meaning of voluntarism will reflect that. The same is true for Germans living under the Third Reich. Clearly, the operational meaning of voluntarism in America is considerably different than its meaning in Nazi Germany or Communist Hungary. The implications for vagaries of operational meaning within ethical codes have great significance when we attempt to implement commonly accepted value meanings across cultures (deJong, et al., 1999; Emihovich, 1999). As we shall see in coming chapters, the power of culturally embedded meaning often takes on greater significance than any seemingly objective reality.
Theoretical Analysis of Human Rights and Research Ethics

Let us now turn directly to the issues of human rights and human subjects protection in scientific research by utilizing Chamber’s model of problem analysis (2000). Included in the model are the following dimensions:

- Problem definition
- Who is affected by the problem
- Causes and consequences of the problem
- Relevant history of the problem
- Ideologies associated with the problem
- Options for solving the problem
- Gainers and losers relative to problem resolution

The issues raised above will then be refracted through several explanatory schemes to facilitate an understanding of human subjects protection in research from a social work macro level and sociological perspective. The theories that will be salient to this discussion are those used earlier to analyze events of the 20th century.

Chambers’ Model of Problem Analysis

Problem Definition

The problem of human subjects protection in research can be defined rather simply as finding a balance between furthering scientific knowledge relative to the human condition, on the one hand, and securing the protection of human subjects of such research on the other. While this matter has been a concern for many years (certainly
since the late Renaissance, when Bacon set forth the principles of inquiry later known as
the scientific method, and when the critical split occurred between scientism and
religion), it is only during the 20th century that the problem of human subjects protection
in research has come to “critical mass” (Mahoney, 1991). This occurred largely as a
result of the egregious violations of human rights which have occurred under totalitarian
regimes, such as Nazi Germany and Hungarian Communism (Gordon & Prentice, 2000),
and resulted in the development of several codes designed to govern research activities
involving human subjects (Amdur, 2003).

The first of these codes, the Nuremberg Code (1948), came about as a result of
Nazi war crime trials immediately following World War II. We have already discussed
the tenets of the Nuremberg Code, and will address them further later on in this work.
Much of the Nuremberg Code was later incorporated into the United Nations Declaration
of Human Rights (1949), the first Declaration of Helsinki (1964), and the foundation
document arising from the United States, the Belmont Report (1979).

Causes and Consequences

The causes of 20th century abuses of human rights in the context of human
subjects research have arisen from many sources in addition to the advent of modern
totalitarianism and the transgressions of Nazi war criminals. Also involved were the
forces of logical positivism run amok and divorced from a solid grounding in morality,
the abandonment of humanism as a guiding principle in human endeavor, the pursuit of
scientific knowledge as a *sine qua non* of human advancement and progress, and the
encroachment of what Hannah Arendt has called, “the banality of evil” (1963). Lastly,
the 20th century has reflected the technological quest for broadly applicable solutions to historically troubling problems. While certainly not a bad thing in its own right, such a quest, when coupled with the awesome power of technology, has too often resulted in the "othering" of disenfranchised peoples (Riggins, 1997), the quixotic chase for a means of perfecting the human condition (Amdur, 2003), and in extreme cases (e.g., Nazi Germany, Stalinist Hungary), the attempted eradication of entire peoples in the name of eugenic cleansing (Arendt, 1963; Gordon & Prentice, 2000).

Put more simply, the 20th century has given us the dark spectre of totalitarian rule, a technological capacity to powerfully alter the fates of peoples, a desire on the part of some societies to purge "misfits" and scapegoats from the social landscape, and the legitimacy of radical, often misused logical positivism and its offspring, scientific experimentation, as a tool in this process. The combination of these forces has also exposed, although not for the first time certainly, a peculiarly human trait: a willingness to ignore or rationalize human suffering and injustice if it appears to be in the service of a general betterment of humankind.

The consequences of human rights violations in the name of scientific inquiry are many. They have resulted in an othering of large groups of human beings (Arendt, 1963; Riggins, 1997), an inappropriate domination of logical positivism as the sole scientific path to improvement in the human condition (Mahoney, 1991), an acceptance if not approval of totalitarianism as a legitimate form of governance, and a grievous measure of human suffering. Moreover, the grinding process of human rights violations in the 20th century has generated a cheapening of human experience and a disdain for difference.
which has ultimately demeaned the great variety of human experience (James, 1902) and made life itself seem cheap, inauthentic and meaningless (Sartre, 1957).

**Relevant History and Ideology**

Much of the relevant history of human rights violations and the ideology behind abuse of human subjects of research has been covered above. It is noteworthy for historical context, however, to return for a moment to the advent of scientism and it’s split from religion.

During the time of Bacon (c. 1600), western civilization witnessed the rise of the nation state as an entity independent of the control of the Church of Rome and various other religious forces. Attendant to this was the increasing validity attributed to the scientific method of advancing knowledge, as opposed to the received wisdom of the Church (presumably as the arbiter of God’s wishes).

Such it was that a rift occurred between scientism and religion (Mahoney, 1991). While not in itself a bad thing, this rift also split what we now call logical positivism from morality. The result, which reached its culmination in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, was a pursuit of scientific knowledge that was neither moderated nor morally governed by clear ethical guidelines. One could argue that science in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century has been a knowledge building process which has chronically outstripped its ethical principles.

During the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, science has been paired with its brethren, technology, and the rift between logical positivism and ethical governance has grown massive. For the first time, the power of technology to change elements of the human condition on a broad scale has been realized, often in horrific ways. Combined with the 20\textsuperscript{th} century’s primary
contribution to political governance, totalitarianism, such a technology of human change has too frequently been used to quash the human desire for freedom in the name of creating a better world, a world where all basic needs are satisfied. Thus, ideologically speaking, humankind has in a sense sacrificed freedom and difference for a homogenization of experience that, while gratifying basic human needs (Ignatieff, 1984), has in some totalitarian societies created a personal and social human experience flat as the Hungarian Plain.

How has this occurred? How could people of totalitarian states (e.g., Nazi Germany, Communist Hungary), have been hoodwinked into accepting such a stark trade? Kenneth Gergen (1999) informs this topic well. Gergen holds that power structures, especially power structures which control communications systems, socially construct a cultural meaning which becomes a "truer truth" than experienced reality. For example, in Hungary (personal communication with Ferenc Bodi, 2003), there existed no poverty, no hunger and no homelessness, even though one might be walking past hungry, impoverished people who lived on the street. The social construction of cultural truth (i.e., a perfect socialist state), trumped, if you will, observable reality. Put somewhat differently, when the truth is unacceptable (i.e., the penalty for acknowledging the obvious is severe), the lie becomes the truth. This of course signals the death of genuine voluntarism and truly informed consent.

Few would argue that the defeat of totalitarian regimes is not a good thing. Yet, curiously, so-called free states (e.g., the United States), have at times used the tools of totalitarian control to defeat totalitarianism. For instance, the scientists actively working to create the atomic bomb as part of the Manhattan Project were kept concentrated in
New Mexico, their freedom to leave severely abridged due to the need for secrecy.

Likewise, Joseph McCarthy’s House UnAmerican Activities Committee (HUAC) used the tactics of a police state to ostensibly free the U.S. from the threats of communism.

Similarly, the scientific exploits of scientists in the United States have at times approached some of the heinous transgressions of scientism run amok in totalitarian states (Amdur, 2003; Gordon & Prentice, 2000). For example, the little known (at the time) plutonium experiments conducted in Chicago and San Francisco immediately after World War II (wherein research subjects were unwittingly subjected to injections of plutonium “just to see what would happen”) bear a frightful resemblance to some of Mengele’s horrific experiments at Auschwitz.

In summary, the phenomenon of human rights violations, especially those committed in the name of scientific advancement, know few if any national or ideological boundaries. We prefer to believe that only “the bad guys” have performed dreadful experiments upon fellow human beings, and that through ethical codifications of human subjects protection, such as the Nuremberg Code, “the good guys” have put a stop to these terrible practices. This reassuring social construction, while widespread, does not bear up under the cool, penetrating light of the facts.

Options for Problem-Solving

As intimated above, the primary means of establishing human subjects protection for research subjects has been to codify ethical principles (e.g., Nuremberg, Helsinki, Declaration of Human Rights, Belmont Report) into laws and institutional bodies to administer and govern the implementation of these laws.
In the United States, for instance, the Belmont Report grew from legislation passed in 1974 which essentially set up the institutionalized review board system (IRB) we have in America today. In Germany and Hungary, the bellwether year appears to have been 1997, the year in which both nations passed legislation creating a rough equivalent to the IRB in order to review and govern research practices in those countries.

Curiously, the mechanism chosen by all three nations to administer the codification of research ethics has been bureaucratic, although the bureaucracies have been delegated responsibilities at varying levels of society (i.e., in the U.S., the IRB review system occurs at the institutional level; in Germany, at the lander and national levels; and in Hungary, at the county, regional and national levels).

The common threads which link all three systems of research review are the power to modify or abort research projects which offend codified ethical principles, the similarity of the principles themselves, and the complex system of interlocking processes, norms and regulations which provide the “safety net” for research subjects.

_Gainers and Losers_

Clearly, the primary gainers of these systems of research review, and the legislation which undergirds them, are research subjects themselves. But the societies in which these subjects reside are also gainers, because clearly defined ethical boundaries are illustrative of a society’s fundamental view of human beings and the rights which adhere to social members.

Additional beneficiaries of complex systems of research review are those entrusted with review: the bureaucracies that administer the rules. Great numbers of
people have jobs due to the presence of formalized research review processes. Lastly, ethical researchers themselves are gainers, because their research carries the ethical *imprimatur* of IRB processes, and they are clearly delineated from researchers whose ethics are questionable or tainted with brazen conflicts of interest.

The losers, alas, are the obverse of the above. Researchers whose ethical practices do not measure up to modern ethical research expectations struggle to avoid or sidestep research review committees. But there are ethical researchers as well whose research may be impeded by lengthy, bureaucratically frustrating review processes. Potentially, there are other losers, too. By their very construction, research review committees are entrusted with great power, and the system of accountability for research review committees may not be as refined, nor as stringent, as that imposed upon researchers. There is the potential for corruption among research review committees, especially those organized as bureaucracies. Put another way, who shall we appoint to police the police?

*Explanatory Macro Social Work and Sociological Schemes for the Ethics of Research*

*Structural Functionalism and General Systems Theory*

Both structural functionalism (Parsons, 1951/1979) and general systems theory (von Bertalanffy, 1967) inform the elaborate system of review that governs research. From structural functionalism, the research review processes of the United States, Germany and Hungary draw the systems of norm-setting, interlocking value structures
and complex governance which create and maintain the homeostatic function so characteristic of bureaucracies.

Moreover, when we examine the methods employed by research review committees, we see Parsons’ elegant, if perhaps somewhat overdeveloped, scheme of shared function and simultaneous delegated responsibility. Each committee member has a role, and together the collective roles make up a complex yet singular means of carrying out the committee’s function of ensuring compliance with articulated ethical principles.

From what do these principles emanate? Von Bertalanffy might hold that the principles of ethical research are the output of a system with clearly defined boundaries and functions, with societal inputs which create a self-maintaining yet self-correcting process, wherein societal inputs (e.g., new information regarding changes in technology and legislation) force an adaptation of the existing system such that ethical principles and research review practices are under constant challenge to integrate new information into the research review process. This fosters the circular causality which is so characteristic of self-regulating and successful systems.

Walter Buckley (1967), in his hierarchic scheme of systems, lends another dimension to this process. As we have talked about elsewhere, Buckley held that not all systems are the same. Rather, there are levels of systems: mechanical, homeostatic/organismic and process/adaptive. Buckley would likely view IRB systems as generally adhering to a homeostatic/organismic model, characterized by structure which supports function, and a “purpose” of maintaining and/or restoring equilibrium. Yet one could argue that research review processes had their origin in a process/adaptive level system. Recall that ethical codes had their birth in a radical response to the Nazi
war crimes. The goal of developing and codifying ethical codes was clearly not to simply produce a homeostatic state wherein the system of National Socialist rule was restored, maintained or even modified. The goal was to ensure that such crimes against human beings would not occur again.

The ensuing codes thus prompted, not a restoration to the *status quo*, but rather a jump to a new adaptation altogether. This new system, the process of adapting modern research practices to a system of scrutiny and accountability, is a good example of Buckley’s process/adaptive systems: the goal is not equilibrium, but adaptation, growth and increasing sophistication.

*Conflict Theory*

But what prompts such a shift in systems? What is the spark which sets this growth afire? Dahrendorf (1959) and Collins (1975) might posit that it is conflict which creates the spark, from friction occurring as two power hierarchies vie for control over norm-setting processes. In the case noted above, clearly there was conflict emanating from the death of an old regime (Nazi Germany) and the rise of a new regime (The Allies). Similarly, when one examines the “transition” era in Hungary and East Germany (c. 1989-1991), one sees the entropic collapse of Soviet communism as it resisted the adaptation necessary to successfully survive. The conflict between the exhausted social system (Soviet communism), placing its energy in resisting change, fell prey to the forces of social democracy and adaptation to a market-driven form of capitalism.
Blau's Exchange Theory of Power

Peter Blau (1964) posits that power is exchanged between two entities in a predictable manner: at some point in a conflict, one side of the conflict accumulates power to the substantial detriment of the other. When this occurs, the side whose power is subsiding has little to offer the victorious side of the conflict other than compliance. In the case of the defeated Nazi Germany, power so greatly shifted at the end of World War II that the Nazi government fell, utterly and completely. Likewise, during the transition years in Hungary and other parts of Eastern Europe, Soviet power disintegrated so swiftly and fully that communist leaders in Hungary had little recourse but to comply with the principles and processes of social democracy and market-drive capitalism in an effort to maintain what was left of their political power.

Similarly, let us picture a researcher who submits a research proposal to an IRB. The researcher needs the approval of the IRB, and must submit to its power. The researcher has little to offer but compliance.

Symbolic Interactionism

What is the medium of exchange in these power transfers? How is the shift of power negotiated? Blumer (1969) and Goffman (1959, 1974) might suggest that the medium of power exchange is discourse, and that the medium of discourse is language. What is language? Commonly accepted symbolization of complex meaning systems. The interaction of symbols within a society creates a power intrinsic to the symbol itself. To wit, symbols, precisely manipulated such that the complex meaning systems are
encapsulated within the symbol, have the capacity to arouse responses and interactions out of proportion to the original meaning of the discourse.

Take, for example, the swastika: what does it conjure? Jackboots on the pavement in the dark of night, perhaps. Or crowds of Jews piled onto freight trains, bound for who knows where (just close the curtains and don’t look). Goebbels, the master propagandist; Eichmann, the fastidiously efficient bureaucrat; Mengele, murderer of twins. Oppression, death, cynical disregard for suffering, the darkest side of human nature.

How about Hungary? 60 Andrassy Street. Thuggery and the mundanity of torture. Rajkosi, the Stalinist lap dog; Gabor Peter, the failed tailor’s assistant who succeeded in stitching together a police state; or Imre Nagy, uncertain martyr of freedom.

Now, take America at the Nuremberg Trials. Telford Taylor, astute solicitor for compassion and justice; Werner Helwig, impotent victim of an overpowering state machinery of destruction. America, arbiter of rightness and ethical propriety. Free, victorious in might and morality. A beacon of goodness in a dirty world.

Lastly, let us look at the codes of ethical research: sprouted from the horrors of Nuremberg, rampant science at last restrained by a simple moral calculus, designed and codified to protect our better angels from the propensity for evil that lurks deep within each one of us.

These of course are typifications, the purpose of which has been to demonstrate how readily symbols and language can be used to shape our perceptions of events and entire peoples. The sociocultural history preceding this chapter depicts again and again
how easy it is to maneuver complex meaning systems into symbols useful in the bartering of power in modern societies.

A Philosophical Scheme for Research Ethics

Of great pertinence in understanding the philosophical undercurrents to human subjects protection in research are these ethical theories:

- Relativism
- Consequentialism (or utilitarianism)
- Kant’s deontology

Ethical relativism is a philosophy which essentially holds that ethical standards are related to something else (Freeman, 2000). That is, the search for an ethical truth of human existence which is somehow not conditional, or relative, is ultimately bound to fail. One could argue that scientific inquiry, the core of research, is an attempt to locate, identify and describe precisely that which is not relative, but common to the experience of all persons. There is merit in this assertion, but the idiosyncrasies of human experience preclude such sweeping declarations. Necessarily, the experience of each individual participant will, in some measure, be unique to that individual. Put another way, the experiential meaning of protection for human subjects is socially constructed by the individual participant and perhaps the researcher, too (Christakis, 1999; Gergen, 1999). This is true of individuals, and of the cultures in which they are embedded.

While the principles discussed, for instance, in the Belmont Report (respect for persons, beneficence and justice) have universal relevance among the research community, they are, as practiced by the researcher and experienced by the human
subject, neither objective nor absolute (Reamer, 1987). One manifestation of respect for persons, autonomy, will certainly differ among cultural groups depending upon their experience of free choice. The same may be said of voluntary consent. Relativism posits that ethical behavior, its meaning, and its experience, will vary among people. It is incumbent upon the researcher, however, to ensure that it is the experience of the human subject which is honored, rather than that of the researcher or the dominant culture. This distinction is especially critical when one considers that the researcher-participant relationship is often covertly hierarchical (Baez, 2002; Blee, 1999; D’Cruz, 2000) in social and behavioral science research and frankly hierarchical in some biomedical research (Hochhauser, 1999; Tauber, 1995).

Obviously, consequentialism, sometimes known as utilitarianism, has provided a powerful influence upon the ethics of human subjects protection. The consequences of unencumbered research on human subjects, most starkly depicted in the experiments conducted by the Nazis during World War II, clearly were the precursors of the Nuremberg Code and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Moreover, the tenets outlined in all of the ethical codes under scrutiny speak very directly to the importance of blending the best for the individual (micro ethics) with the potential benefit to humankind (macro ethics) (Amdur, 2003; Freeman, 2000; Reamer, 1993). This is the essential issue in the risk-to-benefit analysis.

Research is, by its very purpose, a utilitarian pursuit in that it commonly seeks the greatest benefit for the most people. If the merit or “rightness” of an act is determined by the value of its consequences, then most ethically scrupulous research is meritorious if it
benefits humankind. But research, according to virtually all modern codes of ethical scientific conduct, must also be just.

For instance, consequentialism’s focus upon justice provides a useful analog for the Belmont Report’s description of justice in research. Recall that the Belmont Report calls, as do other ethical codes under discussion, for respect of an individual’s rights as primary to ethical research. These codes also speak to the need for benefit to the larger group of which the individual is a part. Consequentialism’s concern with justice parallels these principles, in that it addresses a culture’s need to encompass the rights of the individual, the benefit to the larger group and the means of governance which sustains the society (Freeman, 2000; Reamer, 1993). Moreover, the doctrine of consequentialism also addresses the matter of fair distribution of risk and benefit in research, suggesting that in a just society, there exists equal treatment of individuals and groups.

Kant’s deontological argument, that an act is good if it is right, regardless of the consequences, starkly contrasts with the principles which underlie consequentialism (Freeman, 2000; Roberts, 2002). Yet one can argue that the first principles outlined in the Belmont Report are predicated on a deontological premise. To wit, following first principles such as these is fundamentally necessary in conducting ethical research with human subjects. Treating human subjects with respect, beneficence and justice is a *sine qua non* of ethical research (as well as social work practice), and such behavior stands apart from any consequences or outcomes of the research. Essentially, the Belmont Report holds that respect, beneficence and justice are human rights not to be abridged regardless of the possible benefit to humankind. These values are an outgrowth of the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki. This philosophical position also stands
in contrast to ethical relativism, as it presupposes certain “truths” about how human
subjects must be treated in their role as research participants (Reamer, 1993). For Kant,
then, rightness or morality supercedes culture, custom or social more; it transcends
ethical relativism.

How then do these three theories of ethics co-exist? While the seeming
incommensurability of the theories has been suggested above, perhaps the incongruities
are more paradoxical than real. The study of research ethics involving human subjects is
rife with seeming contradictions (Payne, 2000), and some authors argue that holding
social and behavioral science research to an ethical paradigm founded in the rigidly
positivistic tradition of medicine and the hard sciences is itself problematic (Ansay, 2002;
Brainard, 2001b; Capron, 1999; Church, Shopes & Blanchard, 2002). Others have
posed that such a rift between the social/behavioral sciences and the so-called hard
sciences is illusory, bound more by politics and the history of research culture than by
any a priori difference (Emihovich, 1999; Herrera, 2001; Kleijer, 1999; Kondro, 1996;
Zussman, 2000).

The Integration of Research Ethics Theory Across Cultures

It may well be, then, that the ground in which an integrative theory of ethics for
the protection of human subjects might be grown has already been plowed. The
Nuremberg Code, Declaration of Helsinki and the Belmont Report each proposes that
certain fundamental rights adhere to the protection of human subjects as research
participants. Among these are the first principles of respect, beneficence and justice,
which are manifested in the behavioral standards of voluntarism, informed consent, lack
of coercion and confidentiality. These principles and their manifestations are Kantian in their power as moral reference points.

But ethical research must also maintain a focus on a favorable risk-to-benefit ratio. In other words, ethically sound research must strive to attain the most good for the most people at the least risk. Moreover, it must avoid singling out one group of people, vulnerable or not, for undue risk or unfair benefit. Clearly, this position adheres to the tenets of consequentialism, or just utilitarianism driven by the principle of equal distribution of risk and benefit.

While first principles may conceptually seem immutable and universally acceptable (who, after all, would argue that respect for persons, beneficence and justice are not worthy guides for ethical behavior), the application of first principles might necessarily vary from culture to culture. Most obvious of these potential variations is the protection of vulnerable populations, for a marginalized population in one culture might conceivably be a powerfully dominant population in another. Thus, in this instance, the application of respect for persons, beneficence and justice will differ at the pragmatic level from culture to culture. Beyond this, since each culture in some measure socially constructs the meaning of research, the interpretation of the Belmont Report’s first principles, and the manifestations of these principles, the meaning will necessarily be relative and culture bound. These differences will be most apparent as ethical principles are operationalized within a given culture, or when two dissimilar cultures attempt to combine research efforts and then must negotiate the operational meaning of first principles (Engelhardt, 1996; Kleijer, 1999).
The essence of ethical relativism, however, cuts deeper than a social or cultural level. In its most elementary form insofar as research ethics are concerned, relativism has to do with the idiosyncratic experience of each research group and research participant. Each participant or group brings a unique background and symbolically signified meaning context to the research experiment, replete with individual hopes and expectations. All of these factors come together to create a unique research experience for each participant, one which is constructed at the point of convergence of the research event with the personal and cultural histories of participants. Thus each participant and group will have a different experience, and such experiences will vary relative to what is brought to the research event.

Kant's deontology, consequentialism and relativism each inform the process by which human subjects are protected in the course of research, but at different levels. Deontology well describes the first principles discussed in the Belmont Report. Clearly the principles of respect for persons, beneficence and justice are intended as absolute, bedrock beliefs in the ethical practice of research. These first principles, however, become manifest in ways that are intrinsically value driven and culture bound. The practice of research, while striving to be value free and objective, simply is not (Boutros & Schafer, 2001; Kleijer, 1999). Moreover, the values which drive ethical research are not static, but ever changing in an evolving social construction of the meaning of "research" (Baker, 2002; Capron, 1999; Christakis, 1999; Momeyer, 2002). So at different levels of understanding, the ethics of research are theoretically absolute yet relative in their application.
What holds these two seemingly disparate conceptual models together is the underlying purpose of attempting to find a means of protecting human subjects in the course of research while striving to improve the well being of the greatest number of people at the least risk. Additionally, whatever benefits and risks accrue must be shared in a just, equitable fashion. This is, in a word, utilitarian, and what binds the deontological argument with relativism is the pragmatic pursuit of a favorable risk-to-benefit ratio, interwoven with the adherence to bedrock principles of human subject protection idiosyncratically applied to a given study population within a given culture (Jansson, 1997).

Summary

The history of the 20th century lends itself to analysis through the use of several macro level theories that help us understand what has happened in the United States, Germany and Hungary, how it has happened, and to some extent, why. Also of interest are the differences in adaptation to cataclysmic events among these three countries. By their nature and structure, totalitarian regimes are homeostatic and tend to resist change, seeking internal systemic control instead. These types of systems governed both Germany and Hungary for crucial periods of their 20th century history. The United States, by virtue of its system of checks and balances among governmental units, its institutionalized freedoms of speech and assembly, and the right to vote has created a system of governance known as process/adaptive. The intent of this type of system is change adaptation and growth toward increasing complexity. The result is a system that tends to co-opt and incorporate change rather than attempt to vigorously repulse it.
Chamber’s model of problem analysis permits us to concisely examine the topic of human rights and protection of human subjects engaged in scientific research within its sociohistorical, ideological and cultural contexts. In essence, the crux of the matter is finding the balance between increasing scientific knowledge of human experience and ensuring that human subjects in such studies are well protected and well served for their participation in them. The causes of human rights violations in the course of scientific inquiry during the 20th century are many. Among them are a disconnect between scientific experimentation and ethical controls which has its origins in past centuries, a singular devotion to logical positivism which has experienced a similar disconnect from the politicization of human experience and science itself, and a leap of scientific expertise in the 20th century that has outrun the limits of ethical guidance.

Major efforts on the part of civilized societies during the post-World War II era to establish ethical codes have each resulted in the construction of sophisticated bureaucracies designed to regulate and manage scientific experimentation within the confines of widely agreed upon ethical rules. Structural functionalism and general systems theory well describe the mechanics and routine operations of such systems. Conflict theory contributes understanding as to how change comes about within these systems of research governance as they interact with the larger society. Theories of power also contribute to our comprehension of the manner in which these systems interface with the research culture it oversees. Symbolic interactionism informs not only how the language and meaning of research comes to be represented within a given culture, but tells much about meaning construction in the cultures themselves.
Undergirding this conceptualization of research and ethics are the philosophical contributions of relativism, utilitarianism and Kant's deontology. Relativism helps us understand how the research experience can validly differ from one person to another, and one culture to another, while seemingly adhering to the same core value principles. Utilitarianism supports the notion of research itself, in that research typically seeks the most good for the most people at the least risk. This belief is reflected in the ethical principle of favorable risk-to-benefit and equal distribution of benefit to all. Kant's deontology is embodied in the idea that an act is good if it is morally right. Virtually all modern ethical codes governing research using human subjects validate this assumption implicitly in seeking benefit that is respectful of persons, beneficent and just.

Finally, an integration model has been suggested which brings these seemingly disparate viewpoints together. The model integrates Kant's deontology at the value or moral level of ethics, utilitarianism as the pragmatic manifestation of core research ethics values, and relativism as a bridge that permits the operationalization of ethical codes within a context that respects the culture of research implementation.
CHAPTER VII
SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH CODES OF ETHICS
ACROSS THREE CULTURES

In the course of this work, we have examined a number of ethical codes governing research with human subjects. Each code has been borne of sociohistorical events or their aftermath, and in important ways each code has built upon its predecessors. In this chapter, we will compare the significant ethical codes guiding research with human subjects and determine their commonalties and differences in order to begin the process of synthesizing them, if possible, into a unified ethical system with broad theoretical application across cultures.

We will also explicate important legislation in the United States, Germany and Hungary that has proffered safeguards established in each country for the protection of human rights. These laws have great bearing on the force with which ethical codes for research have been executed, particularly in Germany and Hungary, where human rights have customarily been protected by means of law rather than encoded in foundational documents such as the American Bill of Rights. Additionally, there are cultural differences that may separate one country from another. As discussed above, these sociocultural variations will influence how even commonly agreed upon principles are operationalized in a given culture.
Finally, in this chapter we will grapple with the issue of legal and ethical commensurability among the human subjects protection codes to determine if in fact there exist contradictions so great that no common code of research ethics can be instituted which will have workable application and moral resonance in each nation.

Codes of Ethics

The Nuremberg Code

As we have discussed elsewhere, the Nuremberg Code was the first important effort to set forth the tenets of acceptable ethical behavior for research involving human subjects. To review, these principles were:

- Voluntarism
- Informed consent
- Experimental results must be for the good of society
- Anticipated results must justify performing experiments
- Undue risk and suffering must be avoided
- Risk of serious injury or death is sufficient cause not to conduct the experiment
- There must exist a favorable benefit-to-risk ratio
- Sufficient safeguards for the protection of human subjects must be taken prior to and during research
- Experiments must be conducted only by scientifically qualified people
- Subjects must have the right to withdraw from research without penalty
- The researcher must terminate the experiment if serious injury or death
Certainly all of the principles of the Nuremberg Code are of vital importance. Most critical, however, are the precepts of voluntarism, informed consent, favorable benefit-to-risk ratio, right of withdrawal without penalty, and safety of participants (Amdur, 2003; Beals, Sebring & Crawford, 1949; Childress, 2000). Implicit in each tenet of the code is the principle of autonomy, and the respect that must adhere to the rights of the individual (Katz, 1996).

The Declaration of Helsinki

In 1964, the World Medical Association met in Helsinki, Finland, to put forth its code of research ethics for medical and scientific experimentation involving human subjects. Founded upon the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki added these elements:

- Rights of the individual participant supercede potential benefits to society
- Human subjects involved in research are entitled to the most effective health care treatment
- The rights of vulnerable populations must be safeguarded
- Researchers must demonstrate knowledge of the ethical codes of their own nations

As we can readily see, the Declaration of Helsinki underscores the rights of individuals and asserts that research participants are entitled to effective medical care should the need arise during or after the course of research. Moreover, the declaration notes that some peoples require additional protection given their vulnerable or socially marginalized
status. Of great import is the clause of the declaration that insists upon demonstrated knowledge of appropriate ethical codes on the part of the researcher (World Medical Association, 1964/2002). Again, we can identify underlying beliefs in the declaration which will influence future ethical codes: respect for individuals, regard for safety of participants, acknowledgement that some people may be more vulnerable to potential abuse than others, and responsibility of the researcher to know the ethics of research involving human subjects.

The Belmont Report

Given a mandate via the National Research Act of 1974, the National Commission for Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research issued the Belmont Report in 1978. It is noteworthy that the National Research Act did not limit its concerns, nor its regulations, solely to biomedical research. Given the tenor of public outcry arising from the Wichita Jury Studies and the Milgram experiments, the commission was charged with developing a common rule for research activities that would govern both biomedical and behavioral research. Thus the commission was comprised not only of medical scholars, but also experts in the fields of ethics, religion, law and industry (Amdur, 2003; Gordon & Prentice, 2000; Mishkin, 2000).

The authors of the Belmont Report approached their charge somewhat differently than had the originators of the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki. Rather than simply itemize the principles and behaviors of ethical researchers, the commission identified three essential values which must guide ethical research. Under each core value, the commission then added directives that operationalized each value. The
significance of this structure is that the Belmont Report, though certainly "carved in stone" and institutionalized by force of law, implied that how the core values might be implemented might need modification or improvement over time. The core values and their original directives are as listed:

- Respect for persons
  
  - Treat individuals with autonomy
  - Protect persons with diminished autonomy
  - Secure informed consent without coercion
  - Ensure voluntarism
  - Protect privacy and confidentiality
  - Ensure the right to withdraw from research without penalty

- Beneficence
  
  - "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you"
  - Risks are justified by potential benefits to the individual or society
  - Risks to the individual are minimized and benefits maximized
  - Conflicts of interest are adequately managed such that bias in important judgments related to conduct during research is unlikely

- Justice
  
  - Distribute the risks and potential benefits equally among all who might benefit from research
  - Do not target vulnerable populations for convenience or compromised position
  - Do not systematically exclude people who are likely to benefit from
research (Amdur, 2003; National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1979)

Note the appearance of informed consent, lack of coercion, voluntarism, protection of vulnerable populations, protection of privacy and confidentiality, right of withdrawal without penalty, favorable benefit-to-risk ratio, and equal distribution of risk and benefit among and across populations. These build upon and to some degree amplify the tenets of the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki. Note as well the inclusion of something not articulated directly in either previous ethical code: appropriate management of conflicts of interest or, put another way, protection of research integrity.

Keep in mind that the Belmont Report was essentially the first ethical code for research that was built for Americans by Americans. Yes, the Nuremberg Code was defined by Americans, but the history of American compliance with the Nuremberg Code, such as it was, suggests rather strongly that it was meant for a foreign audience (Baker, 1998b). Recall that the Nuremberg Code was not even widely distributed in the United States (Faden, Lederer & Moreno, 1996; Leaning, 1997).

One of the key aspects of the commission that generated the Belmont Report is that it included representatives from law and industry. In this instance, it is probable that the matter of research integrity and avoidance (or management) of conflicts of interest arose from dialogue central to the concerns of these representatives (Annas, 1995). As it has played out in the twenty-plus years since the inception of the Belmont Report, this first espoused concern regarding the potential incursion of business and law into the realm of research ethics was a harbinger of things to come (Capron, 1999; Flynn, 2000; Galliher & Galliher, 1995; Kondro, 1996). In fact, there have been arguments put forth
which posit that the aims and methods of scientific inquiry are incommensurate with the
goals of business-sponsored research (Payne, 2000), and that American society is losing
faith in science precisely because of its often cozy relationship with business sponsorship
(Fox, 1999).

Another unique facet of the Belmont Report, and the commission that created it,
was its frank inclusion of the social and behavioral sciences in its ethical purview (Amdur
& Bankert, 2002). The so-called Common Rule governing all American research that
involves human subjects has been the topic of much heated debate from the social and
behavioral science research community. The sum and substance of these critiques are
that the rigidity and ready generalizability of logical positivism, as operationalized in
biomedical and quantitative research, do not adequately address nor account for the
vagaries of qualitative social and behavioral science research (Brainard, 2001b; Church,
Shopes & Blanchard, 2002; Haimes, 2002; Sjoberg & Gill, 1995; Van Den Hoomaard,
2001).

Several solutions to this dilemma have been offered, including a recommendation
that the Common Rule, instead of trying to pigeonhole qualitative research into the strict
rules of positivistic research, simple blend the two traditions choosing the best
sensitivities of each to forge a new ethical model (Zussman, 2000). Others have advised
that research ethics, being culture bound both within and across societies, are socially
constructed and therefore ought to be treated as malleable entities rather than authentic
first principles (Abramson, 1996; Baker, 1998a, 1998b; Bernstein, 1988; Emilhovich,
1999; Engelhardt, 1996). Some have even framed the debate in terms of static ethical
norms (principles-based) compared with ever changing ethical norms (evolution-based), arguing for a postmodern interpretation of ethical codes (Baker, 2002; Momeyer, 2002). Still, however, the Common Rule stands, and governs research review in the United States as originally written.

The World Health Organization

The ethical code of the World Health Organization bears a close resemblance to the principles laid down in the Belmont Report. These principles are:

- Respect for persons
- Beneficence
- Nonmaleficence
- Proportionality of risk-to-benefit
- Scientific soundness

The first two principles of course are those espoused in the Belmont Report. Nonmaleficence speaks to the need for scientific research to be focused on the good of humankind and the human rights of the individual. Proportionality of risk-to-benefit addresses issues of justice and equality for both individuals and groups of people. Scientific soundness strongly implies that research that is not scientifically sound cannot be ethical. In addition to setting forth these tenets of ethical research, the World Health Organization also recommends a system of review and accountability for research involving human subjects. Similar in structure and intent as the American IRB system, the World Health Organization’s research review system requires that members of research review committees come from diverse academic and scientific disciplines, and
that there be a rotating membership roster in order to maintain freshness of scientific perspective and neutralize the potential for compromise of research integrity.

Additionally, research review committees must keep written records that are available for review by the public, involve the researcher in the review process, and disseminate rules and procedures that reflect changes in best ethical and scientific practice (World Health Organization, n.d.). Clearly, the World Health Organization seeks transparency in its research review, and ensures that its research review process and protocols are exposed to the light and air of public accountability.

**UNESCO**

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is an international body dedicated to forging transnational ethical agreements for research involving human subjects. As such, it is committed to a spirit of international cooperation, while maintaining respect for the individual cultural traditions of member nations. In 1997, UNESCO put forth its universal declaration of human rights for genome research, which asserts the organization’s position on human rights in the age of biomedical research and establishes a code of bioethics to govern this vanguard research. In addition to articulating its stance on human rights, UNESCO also underscored its doctrine of research ethics (largely drawn from the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights):

- Respect for dignity regardless of genetic characteristics
- Right of the person not to be reduced to genetic characteristics
- Respect for individual uniqueness and diversity
• Right not to be used for financial gain
• Right to a favorable benefit-to-risk ratio
• Right to free and informed consent
• Right to be informed of the results of genetic examination
• Right to prior research review
• Right to minimal risk or burden and right to maximum benefit
• Right to nondiscrimination based upon genetic characteristics
• Right to confidentiality
• Right to just reparation for damages related to genetic research
• No research endeavor shall prevail over respect for human rights
• Right to equality of benefits

This code of bioethics reiterates the now familiar tenets of the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki and the Belmont Report. Of note, though, is its emphasis on the matter of reducing human beings to a set of genetic characteristics, the regard UNESCO places on diversity and human difference, and the right to information relative to genetic examination. Further, UNESCO’s declaration raises the issue of the relationship between biomedical research and financial gain, and resoundingly places the seeking of financial gain in a subordinate role to the rights and well being of the individual (UNESCO, 1997).

*The European Parliament*

While not exclusively focusing on the ethics of research involving human subjects, the European Parliament’s human rights charter (European Parliament, 2001),
addresses the larger issue of human rights which serves as the moral backdrop for emerging international codes of research ethics. Among the charter’s principles are:

- The right to human dignity
- The right to freedom
- The right to equality
- The right to solidarity
- The right to justice

Implicit in these fundamental rights are the precepts of autonomy, voluntarism, informed consent, lack of coercion, protection of vulnerable populations, and equality of benefits and risks (European Parliament, 1998, 2001; European Science Foundation, 2000). These rights, overt and implied, resonate throughout the European Union’s stance on human rights and human subjects research, and have been accepted by each member nation and codified into continental and national law in both Germany and Hungary (Council of Europe, n.d.; Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; European Commission, 2000, 2002; German National Ethics Council, n.d.; Hungarian Parliament, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c).

**CIOMS**

Of no less importance, although perhaps less political and legalistic power, is the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) international set of ethical guidelines for biomedical research involving human subjects (Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, 2002), which has proclaimed the following as essential ethical norms for research involving human subjects:
• Ethical review of all proposed research
• Scientific validity of proposed research
• Right to informed consent
• Respect for vulnerable individuals, communities and populations
• Respect for women as research subjects
• Equity regarding distribution of benefits and risks of research
• Choice of control in clinical trials
• Confidentiality of research participants
• Compensation for injury incurred as a result of research
• Strengthening of national and local capacity for ethical review of research
• Responsibility of research sponsors to provide health care to human subjects

Once again, we see the echoes of the Nuremberg Code, the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration of Helsinki ringing through this document, even though the CIOMS guidelines specifically address biomedical research. Also important is the support offered in this set of ethical principles for scientific validity and ethics review bodies. Lastly, note the specificity in the CIOMS standards for women’s rights and the rights of vulnerable communities (e.g., the Roma communities of Hungary and other European nations).

Legislation

Much of Hungarian and German law relative to protection of human rights and adoption of ethical codes for the protection of human subjects in research has been drawn from the various pieces of legislation promulgated by the European Parliament during the
past decade. In Germany, for example, the German National Ethics Council and
_Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft_ work very closely with the German Parliament and
advises that body in deliberations concerning research ethics and funding priorities
(Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 2003b, 2003c; German National Ethics Council,
n.d.). This typically produces social policies governing the ethics of research and
protection of human rights which combine ethical analysis with the pragmatism inherent
in political processes, such that both fundamental rightness and efficacy are thoroughly
considered (Jansson, 1997). Thus ethical conscience and legal compliance are
represented in German research ethics law (Kahn & Mastroianni, 2001). Deeply inferred
in such law is the presence of a value-laden schema for scientific inquiry designed to
assert the rights of individuals in the context of free inquiry (Kleijer, 1999).

Hungarian law protecting human rights and the rights of human research subjects,
while perhaps not yet as sophisticated and intricate as German law, follows much the
same model. The Hungarian Academy of Sciences is philosophically, as well as
geographically, very closely associated with the Hungarian Parliament and its legislative
efforts to generate human rights protections that carry the force of law (Abbott, 1998;
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2002; Peteri, 1998). Moreover, Hungary’s all too
recent history of oppression creates a sociopolitical atmosphere that is exceedingly
sensitive to legal protection of its citizenry from human rights violations (Apor, 1999;
Fricz, 2000; Kahler, 2000; Mandl, et al., 2003).

In the United States, the National Research Act of 1974 established human
subjects protection codes and linked federal funding of research to ethics compliance via
the institutional review board system (Amdur, 2003). There is clear evidence of concern
for human rights violations implicit in the National Research Act and the Belmont Report, but it is less than overt. Human rights protections are encoded in the United States Declaration of Independence (1776), the Bill of Rights (1789) and the Amendments to the United States Constitution (n.d.). Beyond these foundation documents of the republic, however, there is little sweeping legislation in the United States which explicitly protects human rights in the modern age of research. To be sure, American codes of research ethics are expected to stay current with scientific advancement and the incursion of business and political interests through the governance of institutional review boards and inputs to the system provided by social demand (Blunt, Savulescu & Watson, 1998; Brainard, 2001a; Chadwick & Dunn, 2000; Federman, Hanna & Rodriguez, 2002).

Of more recent concern in the United States is the passage of the so-called USA Patriot Act of 2001 and the increasing politicization of scientific findings confronted by Henry Waxman (USA Patriot Act, 2001; Waxman, 2003). The USA Patriot Act, a clever acronym for “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism,” was passed by the United States Congress in October, 2001, as a result of the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City. Exposed to little congressional scrutiny but much public fanfare, the USA Patriot Act was in large measure a panicky response to the attack. Only much later, sobered by the passage of time and crisis, did America realize that the law, which in fact did seem to increase security and potential terrorist surveillance, purchased a modicum of safety at great expense to the civil liberties and human rights of American residents. Within the provisions of the USA Patriot Act, amidst a social milieu of fear and
insecurity, lay increased legal latitude for governmental observation and monitoring of its citizens, curtailment of some forms of freedom of speech and surveillance of internet usage and e-mail. Further, the USA Patriot Act loosened legal restrictions against wiretapping, monitoring of financial transactions and in a few cases was used to arrest people without criminal charge. Perhaps the greatest damage perpetrated by this ill considered law was the texture of fear and suspicion it spread across America. For the first time in decades, since the 1960s actually, Americans grew afraid to speak their minds. Disagreement with the Bush Administration's policies and practices regarding America’s safety was said by Attorney General John Ashcroft to be aiding and abetting the terrorists.

With little question, the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center had demonstrated to most Americans that the nation’s defense against external attack was insufficient. But like most other hastily thought out responses to a critical event, the USA Patriot Act went too far. In the zeal to protect the country, the nation’s leaders may have sacrificed some of America’s freedoms in an effort to protect them. When we combine this with Congressman Waxman’s assertions about the ideological and political vetting that scientific inquiry was simultaneously undergoing, it isn’t hard to see why some Americans paused to wonder whether the state control over information flow which Hungary had recently shed wasn’t being assumed by the United States.
A Comparative Analysis of Cultural Similarities
and Differences Relative to Research Ethics

Let us now turn to some of the research questions posed in the introduction of this work:

- What are the differences in research ethics and human subjects protection among the United States, Germany and Hungary?
- To what might these differences be attributed?
- What are the influences of history and culture upon these differences?
- What are the unifying, or at least common, principles of ethical research to which each culture subscribes?
- What are the barriers among these cultures which might prohibit or subvert the development of commonly agreed upon ethical principles of human subjects protection in research?
- Are these barriers incommensurate?

Differences in Research Ethics and Human Subjects Protection
Among the United States, Germany and Hungary

The United States

In the United States, the ethics of research involving human subjects are encoded in law which emanates from the protections articulated in the Bill of Rights (1789) and amendments to the United States Constitution (n.d.). Indeed the country was founded in large part as a reaction to human rights incursions committed by Great Britain and her American representatives prior to and during the American Revolution (Burns, 1981).
Research ethics are also intimately tied to funding for research. The National Research Act of 1974 expressly requires that all federally funded research undergo prior review by the appropriate institutional review board (IRB) to ensure that both the spirit and the letter of the Belmont Report and later refinements are incorporated into the research protocol. Ongoing research receiving federal funds must be reviewed no less frequently than once per year until the research has been completed (Amdur & Bankert, 2002). As these requirements have been woven into the culture of American research involving human subjects, they have taken on the aura of best practices, and are typically required by most if not all research institutions in the United States whether federally funded or not (Federman, Hanna & Rodriguez, 2002).

Given long institutionalized American traditions, such matters as voluntary consent, freedom from coercion, withdrawal from research without penalty, and equality of risk/benefit are typically closely scrutinized in IRB reviews of research protocols (Amdur, 2003; Chadwick & Dunn, 2000). Also, because of America’s legalistic traditions and the generally litigious nature of American society, written informed consent is very tightly observed (Gambrill, 1999; Homan, 2001; Olsen, 2003; Pinals & Appelbaum, 2000; Reamer, 1987; Wendler & Rackoff, 2001).

Where the American system of research review has struggled since the passage of the National Research Act of 1974 is upon the shoals of administering the Common Rule (Oakes, 2002). Social and behavioral scientists, often engaged in qualitative and ethnographic research that sometimes have a sociopolitical agenda (e.g., empowerment of marginalized subgroups in American society), argue that the rules of biomedical, highly positivistic scientific inquiry are inappropriate and needlessly limiting in much of social
science research (Antle & Regehr, 2003; Baez, 2002; Church, Shopes & Blanchard, 2002). Some scholars have suggested that one way of addressing the issue of power disparity between researcher and subject, which in many respects lies at the root of voluntarism, informed consent, lack of coercion, etc., is to involve research subjects in the process of ethical code development (Berwick, et al., 1998; Blee, 1999; D’Cruz, 2000; Epstein, 1999). Others have posited that the very broad applicability of positivistically based research ethics hinders their utility with diverse populations (Haimes, 2002; Herrera, 2001), and does not adequately involve the research participant in the ongoing process of co-creating the research experience (Kahn & Mastroianni, 2001; Kleijer, 1999; Olsen, 2003). There have also arisen criticisms of the Common Rule, founded as it is in biomedicine, as having an intrinsic paternalism, which some critics see as fecund soil for potential human rights violations (Sjoberg & Gill, 1995; Smith, Hiatt & Berwick, 1999).

Yet an argument can be made that a Common Rule for research ethics in the United States is necessary. Social awareness of research is greater than at almost any time in our history, and the need for simple, transparent codes of research ethics is of paramount importance (Brainard, 2001a; Ziman, 1998). Recent court settlements involving research universities and their respective IRBs have been widely publicized, attenuating popular faith in science and its independent means of self-governance (Anderlik & Elster, 2001; Bramwell, 2001). While much of the public concern is an outgrowth of vanguard biomedical research (Steinbrook, 2002), it may prove less than helpful in reassuring an uncertain American public that social science ethics are satisfactorily articulate when some social scientists put forth arguments for deception in
research (Goode, 1996) and others split ethical hairs by making fine distinctions between forms of research deception (Lawson, 2001).

In the final analysis, the research culture in the United States is in a state of uncertainty and transition. Biomedical research is again showing us that methodology may be outpacing the ethics that govern it, and there are contradictory discourses about the merits of first principle, Kantian ethics vs. postmodern ethical relativism (Abramson, 1996; Anderson & Rorty, 2001). Some present the position that morality and ethics must be founded upon unchangeable principles of right and wrong. This is the Kantian argument discussed elsewhere in this work, that an act is correct if it is morally right. Others forcefully reason that ethics, especially those crossing cultures, consist of a negotiated moral order socially constructed by participants and the larger constituencies they represent (Baker, 1998a; 2002).

This much, however, is clear. The National Research Act of 1974 is the bellwether event, or benchmark, of research ethics and activities in the United States. Having grown from the principles of respect for persons, beneficence and justice, which arise directly from the nation’s Bill of Rights, the ethical code embodied in the Belmont Report is unlikely to change anytime soon. Given how generally well it fits with other research ethics codes and human rights documents of more recent international vintage, it may not need to.

Germany

As we have seen from our analysis of German history and culture, there do indeed exist differences in the evolution of human rights legislation and codes of research ethics
between that country and the United States. Germany, in some ways, has dealt with the
issues of human rights and research ethics in two distinct ways that ultimately are
logically related. First, in the immediate post-war atmosphere, Germany sought to
enliven its reputation as a scientific center of European research. Konrad Adenauer’s
desire to create a resurgent Germany from the ashes of the Third Reich included a wish to
elevate German science to respectability after the atrocities of the Nazis. Interspersed
with this goal was the national shame we’ve addressed above (Fulbrook, 1999; Ludtke,
1993).

As Germany reclaimed its position in European science it took a leadership role in
facilitating various ethical and legal measures to define proper codes of research
involving human subjects across the continent (German National Ethics Council, n.d.;
Max Planck Gesselschaft, 2000). It was also instrumental in developing the European
Union’s stance on human rights and ethical research (European Commission, 2000;
European Parliament, 2001; European Science Foundation, 2000). Today, Germany has
a national and regional network of research councils that closely oversee research
activities in the nation and the various lander. Its system of research review, the laws
passed by the German Parliament, and the particular elements of the codes of ethics to
which German scientists adhere have been used as models by other nations, most notably
for our discussion, Hungary.

Germany’s place in the world, and its intention to overcome the sins of its past at
the bloody hands of the National Socialists, has in fact hastened its reentry into the
prestigious company of other scientifically advanced western nations (Federal Republic
of Germany, 2003). Many of the cutting edge bioethics initiatives arise from the work of
German ethicists (Bostanci, 2002; Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Holden, 1998), including how the Kantian first principles discourse might be integrated with postmodern ethical relativism (personal conversation with Joseph Schmucker von Koch, 2004). This is a complex matter that will be discussed in detail shortly.

It is also important to consider that human rights in Germany are legislated by the German Parliament rather than encoded in any first documents such as the United States’ Bill of Rights. The significance of this is profound, in that legislation can be changed at any time which may abridge human rights in nations without founding principles that are deeply woven into the culture. Recall the facility with which Adolph Hitler rescinded the human rights of German citizens in 1933 (Gilbert, 2001), and essentially turned German civil society upside down in building his Third Reich. Remember as well that Germany’s legal institutions were more than compliant in legitimizing Hitler’s wishes. This is not to say that such a course of events is imminent in Germany today, but it does underscore how readily human rights codified into law can be quickly uncodified when politically expedient. Further, note that human rights were maintained, and in some cases enhanced, for National Socialists while simultaneously being eradicated for Jews and other perceived opponents of Nazism. We can readily see the convenient relativism that comes about when human rights are subject to the caprices of political forces (Hunt, 1999).

To be sure, participation in transnational coalitions such as the European Parliament and the Council of Europe hinders one nation’s willingness to unilaterally compromise human rights that are so forcefully articulated in European law and the ethical codes and protections that emerge from them. Doing so would very likely result
in censure and possible expulsion from these modern unions, and few if any member
nations would take such drastic actions without full regard for the consequences.
Moreover, coalitions like the European Union not only bind member countries legally
and ethically, but economically and politically. Having spent decades creating a
European Union that benefits each nation, a country with anything approaching sensible
leadership would think twice before endangering its economic well being for the sake of
internally oppressing a marginalized population.

Hungary

Hungary, like Germany, has codified human rights and research ethics into law
(Hungarian Parliament, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c). While Germany has struggled to
reconcile its recent history of reborn science and legislated human rights with the awful
past of Nazism, though, Hungary has had little such internal national conflict with the
ravages of Communism (House of Terror, 2002). True enough, some Hungarians have
experienced the natural dissonance of living for generations under socialism, suddenly
overcoming that legacy, and to one degree or another cautiously assenting to a capitalist
experiment (Agovino, 2000; Csepeli & Kolosi, 1993). But Hungarians appear to have
little nostalgia for Communist rule and few wish for its resurgence (Bodi, Fabian &
Giczey, n.d.b.).

The reason is not all that complicated. There is a big difference between a legacy
of defeat and a legacy of being freed from foreign occupation. Germany has wrestled
with a history of totalitarianism that was internally imposed by Hitler and the National
Socialists, but that was defeated by foreigners intent on its destruction. Hungary, on the
other hand, tends to view its history of totalitarian rule as externally inflicted upon it. The Arrowcross, it is true, was comprised of Hungarians, but the ideology of Hungarian Nazism and the resulting oppression of Jews, the Roma population, etc., was of German Nazi origin. Likewise, Matyas Rajkosi and Gabor Peter were Hungarians, but the machinery of oppression was borne of Stalinism and Soviet occupation (Kitschelt, et al., 1999; Teller, 2000). Thus, few Hungarians after the transition experienced the shame so characteristic of many Germans in the years following World War II, and for this reason Hungarian efforts to assert the primacy of human rights and ethical research came about rather quickly (seven years) after the quiet revolution of 1990.

Another reason for this fairly rapid transition from the oppression of communism to the relative freedom of social democracy lies in Hungary’s unique history of accommodative change (Held, 2000; Lazar, 2002; Stark & Bruszt, 1998). After transition, many of Hungary’s socialist nomenklatura in effect jumped ideological ships from socialism to market-driven capitalism and social democracy in an attempt to maintain at least a semblance of their former power and social status (DeBoer-Ashworth, 2000; Fricz, 2000).

A history, in some measure of course socially constructed, since 1944 of externally imposed oppression and denial of fundamental human rights has hence propelled Hungary to reaffirm and solidify its commitment to the protection of Hungarians. Still wincing from the spiked memories of communist control of their land, modern Hungarians have, through parliamentary procedure, secured their human rights with a vigor and forthrightness common to people who have long been denied them. The rapidity with which Hungarians have resurrected their religious institutions gives
testimony to this phenomenon (Froese, 2001), as does the promptness of reform experienced by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Abbott, 1998; Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2002), and Hungary’s attempts to modernize its economy and technological infrastructure (Kalantaridis, 2000; Kitschelt, 1994).

The recollection of oppression and denial of rights in Hungary is very fresh, and is likely to be a firewall against further human rights infractions for some time to come. Combined with Hungary’s recent decision to join the European Union (and thus be networked with the EU’s parliamentary legislation regarding human rights and ethical research), this vibrant awareness places Hungary in a similar position as other EU member nations. There is simply too much to lose in terms of national reputation and economic damage for any nation of the European Union to behave as a rogue state.

Research Questions Revisited

And Research Ethics Commensurability

What are the differences in research ethics and human subjects protection among the United States, Germany and Hungary? As we have seen from the review of various ethical codes for the protection of human subjects, there do not exist great differences among the codes in either letter or spirit. Each puts primary emphasis upon these principles:

- Voluntarism
- The autonomy of the individual
- Informed consent
- Lack of coercion to participate in research

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These comprise essential first principles of ethical research and, judging from the regularity of their inclusion into codes of ethics for research involving human subjects, may be considered Kantian in their essentialness to such research. Each of these tenets is interwoven into both the research law and the codes of ethics of the United States, Germany and Hungary, as well as the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, the Belmont Report, UNESCO, COIMS, and virtually every other national and international statement of human rights and human subjects protection. We must consider that these principles are not only fundamental, but ubiquitous across these cultures, and represent a repetitively familiar recitation of what a great many people consider to be the greatest good for the most people (Freeman, 2000).

If there exist differences, to what might such differences be attributed? There is a risk in assuming that these principles, although commonly agreed upon, symbolize precisely the same complex meaning system across cultures (Hall, 1981). If our examination of history and culture has shown us nothing else, the thick description of the United States, Germany and Hungary depicts with striking clarity that culture and meaning are strung together like a DNA helix (Geertz, 1973). Consequently, the meaning of such concepts as voluntarism, lack of coercion, informed consent, etc., are
interpreted uniquely within each individual culture, and are as worthy of respect as any other facet of a peoples’ history (Sandel, 1996).

Note that Act CLIV of 1997 on Health, the Hungarian Parliament’s decree on human rights and health care, puts great emphasis on equality of access to health care and strongly implies that medical records belong to the individual patient. Additionally Act CLIV specifies that patients have the right to contact with others and the right to leave a medical facility. This is very likely due to practices that were widely used by the Hungarian Communists to perform secret experiments, and to their use of hospitals and psychiatric facilities as housing for incarceration and torture (House of Terror, 2002).

Has the United States Congress felt the need to articulate with such pointed detail these rights? No. America’s history, at least the social construction of America’s history, has no such antecedents that would prompt Congress to itemize them. The differences in sociocultural experience thereby grant different meanings to the phrases, confidentiality of and right to review one’s medical records. Insisting upon the right to see one’s medical records in Communist Hungary may have eventuated in being shot. Insisting upon the same right in the United States may eventuate in having to contact an attorney.

*What are the influences of history and culture upon these differences?* The argument that the symbolic meaning of concepts and language is imbedded within culture has been amply presented over and over again in these pages (Blumer, 1969; Goffman, 1959, 1974). What accounts for the differences in meaning? The individual, but particularly the collective, experience of a culture’s people in the context of previously acquired traditions and history (Hall, 1981). The interaction of events, symbols and
meaning construct a particular reality for each culture that cannot be disregarded without
denigrating an entire people and the myriad, symmetrical ways they are intertwined.
Such elegant connections are in fact what ultimately constitute a people (Geertz, 1973).
They are ignored at one’s own peril, and invite resistance in precisely the same way that a
system under critical attack resists input that threatens the integrity and very life of the
system and puts forth output that counterattacks the threat (Buckley, 1967; von
Bertalanffy, 1967).

How have the people of the United States responded to the 911 attacks on the
World Trade Center? Some have interpreted the attacks as an act of simple warfare,
perpetrated by one culture (terrorists) against another. Others have broadened the
meaning of this event to include elements of religious war, culture war, hatred not just of
America, but freedom itself. Still others view 911 as something akin to just desserts.
After all, they reason, what could America expect after decades of exploitation of Arabic
third world countries in order to satisfy a seemingly insatiable appetite for oil, showing
no inclination whatsoever to either conserve fossil fuels or diversify sources of energy?
Within this argument, 911 was long overdue retribution for America’s rapacious
corruption of other cultures. In other words, Americans brought it on themselves and
should have seen it coming.

The great danger of cultural myopia is that it breeds hubris. Hubris, in turn, is
founded in a hierarchy of presumed superiority. The United States after World War II
provides us with an uncomfortable example. What, after all, is the Nuremberg Code but
a distillation of American medical ethics combined with a watering down of the U.S. Bill
of Rights? The good thing about such a supposed moral hierarchy is that in this case it
hit the mark more than it missed. The bad thing is that the Nuremberg Code, rightly, has been the benchmark for all ethical codes governing research with human subjects that have come since. In this way, American norms, values and mores have been institutionalized in nearly every western civil society, and American structures for the ethical functioning of research have pervaded research in these societies (Merton, 1968; Parsons, 1951/1979). William James might have observed that the varieties of ethical research experience have thus been diminished (James, 1902).

What are the unifying, or at least common, principles of ethical research to which each culture subscribes? As mentioned above, the United States, Germany and Hungary clearly subscribe, at least conceptually, to a set of common principles. But to the listing offered above we must add:

- Experimental results must be for the good of society
- Anticipated results must justify the performance of the experiment
- Undue risk and suffering must be avoided
- Protection of human subjects must be a sine qua non of ethical research
- Experiments must be both scientifically sound and conducted by scientifically qualified people
- Research must be terminated if serious injury or death is anticipated
- Rights of the individual supercede potential benefits to society
- Human research participants are entitled to the best available health care
- The rights of all people, especially vulnerable populations, must be protected
- Researchers must demonstrate knowledge of pertinent ethical codes governing human subjects research
• Participants must be treated with respect for their autonomy
• Participants with diminished autonomy must be especially protected
• Conflicts of interest must be managed so that bias is identified and adequately managed such that rights of individuals are maintained
• No group of people likely to benefit from participation in research should be systematically excluded

These principles are codified in the Nuremberg Code, the first Declaration of Helsinki and the Belmont Report, are generally accepted by the United States, Germany and Hungary, and are established in each nation’s legislation.

What are the barriers among these cultures which might prohibit or subvert the development of commonly agreed upon ethical principles of human subjects protection in research? One of the barriers that might subvert transnational agreement on the development of ethical principles for the protection of human subjects in research is the political antipathy that currently exists between some European Union members and the United States. The recent decision of the American Bush Administration to invade Iraq has deeply angered many Germans (personal communication with Jakob Braun, 2003), and has aroused fears in continental Europe that the United States has elected to pursue a unilateral foreign policy that excludes the United Nations, and particularly the European Union, in decisions concerning international affairs.

A second barrier that has greater immediate relevance to issues of human rights is the Bush Administration’s de facto position on human rights protections for so-called combatants involved in the Afghanistan war, wherein hundreds of suspected terrorists with purported connections to the Taliban regime have been incarcerated at an American
military base on the island of Cuba. There may indeed exist evidence that these prisoners were terrorists, but they have been denied the right of *habeus corpus*, the right to an attorney and, thus far, the right to a public hearing. These actions, although occurring during wartime, are in undeniable violation of the human rights documents we have examined above (e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights), and remain a source of friction between the United States and its former allies in Europe.

Beyond these political barriers, which we must assume to be temporary due to their clear departure from trends toward multilateralism that have long been established between the United States and Europe, legislation in the United States relative to human rights has not been nearly as forthright and articulate as that recently passed in Germany and Hungary (European Parliament, 1998; Hungarian Parliament, 1997b, 1997c;). Further, the USA Patriot Act (2001) has the potential to appreciably compromise human rights in the United States, a direction in counterpoint to the course adopted by member nations of the European Union (European Parliament, 2001). At this writing, then, we must ask whether the United States truly subscribes to a position on human rights that is compatible with that of the European Union.

*Are these barriers incommensurate?* It is unlikely that the position taken by the Bush Administration on civil and human rights will continue unabated in the United States, as it is fundamentally antithetical to the founding principles of the nation, as well as trends toward multilateralism and defense of human rights that have characterized American foreign policy for decades.

Surely there is little room for theoretical or philosophical incommensurability in the tenets of the codes for ethical research we have examined. None of the nations under
study have espoused opposition to the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki or the Belmont Report. In fact, the opposite has happened. We can see a consistent thread of evolution from the Nuremberg Code to the Declaration of Helsinki and the Belmont Report, and research ethics legislation in the United States, Germany and Hungary are founded upon the core principles of these documents. It is only in the cultural operationalization of such principles that appreciable difference might occur, but it is probable that, if past is prologue, these differences can be negotiated to accommodate culturally relative application of these ethical codes (Baker, 1998a, 1998b; Bernstein, 1998; Sandel, 1996).

Toward a Common Code of Research Ethics

Arriving at a conceptually common code of research ethics for the protection of human subjects that has broad applicability is not terribly difficult at this point. The principle codes of research ethics agree on quite a few points:

- Voluntarism
- The autonomy of the individual
- Informed consent
- Lack of coercion to participate in research
- Lack of penalty for refusal to participate or withdrawal from research
- Confidentiality and privacy
- Favorable risk vs. benefits
- Equality of benefit distribution
- Justice in administration of risk
• Respect for persons
• Experimental results must be for the good of society
• Anticipated results must justify the performance of the experiment
• Undue risk and suffering must be avoided
• Protection of human subjects must be a *sine qua non* of ethical research
• Experiments must be both scientifically sound and conducted by scientifically qualified people
• Research must be terminated if serious injury or death is anticipated
• Rights of the individual supercede potential benefits to society
• Human research participants are entitled to the best available health care
• The rights of all people, especially vulnerable populations and communities, must be protected
• Researchers must demonstrate knowledge of pertinent ethical codes governing human subjects research
• Participants must be treated with respect for their autonomy
• Participants with diminished autonomy must be especially protected
• Conflicts of interest must be managed so that bias is identified and adequately managed such that rights of individuals are maintained
• No group of people likely to benefit from participation in research should be systematically excluded

That these points ought to be included in any reasonably thoughtful code of research ethics involving human subjects is hardly debatable at this point in our discussion. But ethics codes governing how human beings are to be treated in a research environment
cannot be considered complete without also addressing the larger context in which research ethics must necessarily be applied. That larger context is human rights.

Political considerations and the vicissitudes of ideology set aside, the human rights principles which need to be included in a substantive code of research ethics for human studies are:

General Rights:

- Right to human dignity
- Right to freedom
- Right to equality
- Right to solidarity
- Right to justice

Specific Rights:

- Research involving human subjects must be founded in nonmaleficence
- Respect for human dignity regardless of genetic characteristics
- Respect for individual uniqueness and diversity
- Respect for women as research subjects
- Right not to be used for financial gain
- Right of the individual not to be reduced to a set of genetic characteristics
- Right to nondiscrimination based upon genetic characteristics
- Right to be informed of the results of genetic examination
- Right to just reparation for damages related to genetic research
- Right to prior research review by scientists trained and qualified to evaluate the ethics of human subject protection
• Right to decide the uses of personal genetic material
• Choice of control in clinical trials
• Strengthening of national and local capacity for review of ethical research
• Responsibility of research sponsors to provide health care to human subjects

Regardless of how comprehensive a code of research ethics might be, however, such a code is not particularly meaningful unless there exists a means of enforcement. Witness the tepid compliance of many scientists in the United States with the Nuremberg Code (Beecher, 1966, 1993), which did not carry the force of law. In the United States, only the passage of the National Research Act of 1974, with its convoluted system of bureaucratic governance, produced widespread adherence to the principles of the Belmont Report (Amdur, 2003; Gordon & Prentice, 2000).

It is comforting that much of European law concerning the ethics of research and protection of human rights has been codified into law. In the United States, the civil liberty assurances in the Bill of Rights have certainly stood the test of time and political transgression, McCarthyism and the USA Patriot Act notwithstanding. But further legislation affirming and safeguarding basic human rights is needed to ensure that the rights of citizens remain inviolate in the world’s oldest democracy. At times of perceived external threat, it seems, American civil rights and fundamental freedoms are among the first things thrown onto the battlements.

To be sure, bureaucracy has earned its bad reputation. That said, codes of ethics, to be meaningfully imposed and thoroughly implemented, require a means of enforcement that is open to change but difficult to avoid or eradicate. Codes of ethics are nothing if not a shared set of interlocking principles, values, norms and scientific mores.
They do not live in a vacuum, though. They must be sustained by a structure that operationalizes the principles so that they are readily understood and easily executed by a diversity of well-trained scientists from a variety of disciplines. Further, codes of ethics must thrive within an atmosphere which has the best characteristics of Buckley’s homeostatic and process/adaptive systems. To wit, homeostasis provides the foundation and self-regulatory action needed for a code of research ethics to remain stable and reliable. Obviously, the rules can’t be changing all the time; that would produce chaos, not clarity. Yet codes of ethics must evolve and adapt to govern the changes in technology that vanguard scientific inquiry yields. In an age when scientific advances are as regular as changing weather, a code of ethics founded in a process/adaptive system is required to keep pace with the science it is intended to govern. Otherwise, in the thrilling but dangerous times of biotechnological research, we shall unavoidably revert to the now unacceptable practice of waiting for ethics to catch up with technology. Put differently, we must close the gap between the phrases, “We can do it!” and “Ought we do it?” Only a process/adaptive approach to creating and constantly reshaping a workable code of ethics for research can do so (Buckley, 1967).

It may seem odd to say, but conflict between technology and ethics, scientists and philosophers, may hold a key to reconciling these questions so that they occur more or less simultaneously. Recall that conflict causes the spark, or friction, necessary to prompt a system into quick adaptive response. We can think of conflict within a system as the interplay between new, sometimes radically new, input and the system’s reaction to accommodate or integrate this new information. The integration generates output that restabilizes both the system and its immediate environment, bringing each into a state of
information consonance. In this way, the system’s homeostasis is not just restored but recalibrated to bring it into phase with the changing external environment. System equilibrium is maintained by the process of adapting to ongoing change. Ethical codes are kept current by taking in and adjusting to scientific advances, and scientific advances are modulated by ever-adapting codes of ethics. A balance of power exchange is struck, so that ethical codes and scientific inquiry do not engage in adversarial power struggles for supremacy and legitimacy, but rather balance one another and create the spark for further change and adaptation.

In a similar manner, ethical codes are tailored to cultural differences in order to maintain relevance and meaning in changing contexts. The inputs are the vagaries of cultural meaning, which are refracted through the ethical code’s principles. Outputs are culturally specific interpretations of the code’s tenets which fit, if not entirely match, the needs and symbolic meaning systems of the culture to which the code is being applied.

This, then, is the mechanism by which Kant’s first principle (that an act is right if it is intrinsically good), combined with the utilitarian imperative that an act is moral if it benefits both the needs of the individual and the larger community (in this case, each research participant’s well-being and the benefit to the greater society), produces an ethical code that is broadly relevant, highly adaptive and respectful of cultural specificity.

The trick, if you will, is ensuring that the system of ethical review of research remains fluid and responsive and avoids stasis. Historically, ethical codes have been prized to the degree that they reflect eternal verities. The evolution of ethical codes governing research on human beings, though, has had a different history. One code has been built on the back of the previous one. Like science, codes for ethical research have
been in a state of ongoing evolution ever since the first Kuhnian leap at Nuremberg. There have certainly been periods in German and Hungarian history that research ethics have been trampled upon and ignored, only to resurface anew, stronger and more definitive than before. In America, too, adherence to research ethics has waxed and waned. But in each nation, codes of scientific behavior in the pursuit of new knowledge about the human condition have, in the final analysis, sustained the means by which our better angels assert themselves. In that vital endeavor, at times in spite of ourselves, we have managed to prevail.
CHAPTER VIII

RESEARCH ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL WORK PROFESSION

In the last chapter, we identified a common code of research ethics to govern human subjects protection, and placed this code within a larger context of human rights. The question remains, however, as to what relationship exists between ethics codes for research, human rights and the social work profession.

The history of social work is replete with examples of how the profession has committed itself to social change processes and the elevating of the human condition. Consider the historical origins of social work, born in the waning days of the 19th century amidst the progressive movement. Jane Addams and her settlement house movement were clearly engaged in social change, and helping immigrants become enfranchised American citizens was her fundamental purpose. Addams' desire to help those who had recently come to the United States was at its core an effort to secure the rights attendant to American citizenship for Chicago's newest denizens. While Addams has gained deserved notoriety for ensuring that immigrants had a place to find food and solace, it was her larger goal to help them assimilate into American life by learning how to speak, read and write English, and to ultimately find work to sustain themselves and their families in a new land.

As the profession matured, and the spirit of Addams' dream became manifest in such progressive social programs as those found in Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal,
social work eventually became the gatekeeper for the network of social care infrastructure in the United States. Surely part of that function was to act as an agency of social control, in order to administer benefits to those most in need (Epstein, 1999). But just as importantly, social work became integral to the process by which human rights in America were safeguarded (Reichert, 2003).

The NASW Code of Ethics

We have only to look at the profession’s code of ethics for evidence of this point. The ethical standard of the profession, the National Association of Social Workers’ Code of Ethics (NASW, 1999), articulates very specifically the mission and values of social work. According to the NASW code, social work exists to promote social justice and social change on behalf of its clients, and to do so in such a way that clients are respected for their autonomy and diversity (NASW Code of Ethics, 1999). Moreover, the social work profession is dedicated to facilitating social change so that people become empowered to address their own needs. What drives social work is a set of core values:

- Service
- Social justice
- Dignity and worth of the individual
- The importance of human relationships
- Integrity
- Competence

These core values are implemented through the fostering of certain key practices which operationalize the values of the profession:
• Respect for the individuality of the person
• Commitment to the rights of the client
• Client self-determination
• Voluntarism
• Informed consent
• Respect for difference
• Avoidance of conflicts of interest
• Privacy and confidentiality
• Access to records concerning client service
• Protection of vulnerable populations
• Competence of social work practice
• Avoidance of discrimination
• Social action to protect human rights
• Research to promote the knowledge base of the profession

By this time, such a recitation of principles ought to ring familiar. The value base and the key components of social work practice are obviously in line with such pivotal ethical documents as the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, the Belmont Report, and virtually all of the human rights documents and legislation we have thus far reviewed (Grigsby & Roof, 1993).

Implicit in the social work code of ethics are the philosophical underpinnings we have found in other codes of ethics, particularly those which govern research involving human subjects (Freeman, 2000; Loewenberg, Dolgoff & Harrington, 2000; Reamer, 1993). Kant’s first principles are evident in social work’s core values, put into practice
according to the utilitarian/consequentialist tenet of greatest benefit to the greatest
number, and applied evenly but with respect for cultural and individual differences such
that no individual or culture is hierarchically superior to another (Freeman, 2000).

Social Work Research

The profession has matured since the days of Jane Addams and the progressive
movement, to be sure. Yet Jane Addams’ essential curiosity about the workable
pragmatics of public service lives on in social work’s commitment to research. Because
social work is an eminently practical endeavor, the profession has long been concerned
with the essence of applied research, the desire to determine what works. This sustained
inquisitiveness has gained momentum in recent years, and while the issue of social work
research has become highly politicized within the profession, it is undoubtedly the case
that research will drive the profession for the foreseeable future (Gambrill, 1999; Myers

Because research is such an integral part of social work, the NASW Code of
Ethics specifies precisely how social work research is to be conducted. As we saw
above, in our discussion of the relevance of the NASW code’s tenets to the protection of
human rights, the profession’s code of ethics governing research activities echoes the
principles espoused in the fundamental documents of human subjects protection:

- Research is a professional responsibility of social workers
- Each social worker should engage in evaluation of practice
- Each social worker engaged in research should be familiar with
  ethical principles governing research

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• Research involving human subjects must be governed by voluntarism and informed consent of participants
• There must be no penalty for nonparticipation or withdrawal from social work research
• There must be full disclosure of known or anticipated risks and benefits to research participants
• There should be no undue inducement for research participation
• The rights of vulnerable people and populations must be secured in social work research
• Social work research participants should receive appropriate support services as necessary
• Research participants should be protected from unwarranted harm or danger
• Privacy and confidentiality of participants in research must be maintained
• Social work research must be devoid of dual relationships with clients and foreseeable conflicts of interest (NASW Code of Ethics, 1999)

Were we to overlay this ethical code for social work research upon the codes of ethics governing research involving human subjects that we have thus far considered, there would be a nearly exact match. It seems transparently clear that social work has done its homework insofar as the creation of a thoroughly up-to-date code of research ethics is concerned, and that social workers who adhere to the spirit and letter of the profession’s code will be conducting research well within the boundaries of proper human subjects ethics.
International Social Work and Cultural Relativism

Yet the NASW Code of Ethics, laudable as it may be, is not the only pertinent document regulating the ethical behavior of social workers and social work researchers. The International Federation of Social Workers (IFSW) has promulgated a code of ethics for social workers that has worldwide implications (International Federation of Social Workers: Ethics in Social Work, 2004). The IFSW code of ethics is the child of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (General Assembly of the United Nations, 1948; Reichert, 2003). Predictably, it overtly places international social work ethics in a human rights context. Here are the IFSW core ethical principles:

- All people have inherent worth and dignity
- Individuals and peoples have the right to self-determination
- All people have the right to participation in empowerment
- Each person must be treated as a whole
- Social work services are founded in a strengths perspective
- Social workers must promote social justice
- Social workers challenge negative discrimination
- Cultural and racial diversity must be respected by social workers
- Resources must be distributed equitably, according to need
- Social workers must challenge unjust policies and practices
- Social workers must work in solidarity to create an inclusive society
- Social workers must demonstrate a commitment to human rights

Increasingly, the social work profession has expanded its focus to include service to other cultures. In the United States, social work has staked out its position regarding the importance of serving clients from a variety of ethnic and cultural backgrounds and presented its stance in the profession’s code of ethics (NASW, 1999). As the demographic characteristics of America’s population continue to change, the need for a flexible, culturally sensitive ethical code will only grow more relevant to practice with such a diverse group of people.

We live in an age of globalization. In tracing the history of research ethics, and the history of the 20th century itself, we have repeatedly discovered episodes wherein the United States was unable or unwilling to remain aloof from the cataclysm of world events. World Wars I and II are obviously the most glaring examples, but the Cold War that followed Hitler’s defeat embroiled America in a sustained effort to influence other nations, and win the ideological war that consumed the latter half of the past century. Today, the United States is no longer the cultural island of Theodore Roosevelt’s time, divorced from the machinations of the old world, nor can it simply send its power “over there” to fight wars and then come home to an undisturbed idyll. America is part of the world like never before in its history, and the wages of isolationism and unilateral decision-making are too high to pay.

Whether it realizes it or not, the social work profession is part of this process. From its earliest beginnings, social work has had an international focus. The immigrants at Hull House came from all over Europe, and while Jane Addams’ purpose may have been to help immigrants assimilate into everyday American life, she immediately faced the task of contending with a polyglot of cultures and diverse peoples. It is no different
today. Modern social workers deal on a daily basis with clients from other nations and other continents, and it is incumbent on the social work profession to adjust its practices in light of cultural difference (Reichert, 2003; Wachholz & Mullaly, 1997).

We have much to learn from other cultures, and the path to such learning is research. As we have seen, most ethical codes that structure and guide human subjects research share first principle commonalities, and at minimum imply a utilitarian world view concerning the betterment of humankind while simultaneously protecting individual human rights. There appears to be widespread consensus among ethicists regarding these two core philosophies of research ethics.

Within the realm of cultural relativism, though, lies a potential rub. One of the thematic currents running throughout this work has been the influence of history and culture upon meaning construction within a given society. There can remain little doubt that meaning is indeed socially constructed through the interplay of a nation’s history, traditions, culturally specific rituals, language and use of symbols. Thus experience itself is embedded within a culture’s interwoven meaning context, and plays out in myriad forms of social interaction that are largely idiosyncratic to that culture but are nonetheless deeply entrenched in social norms, values and even the personal lives of a nation’s citizenry. Unique culturally acquired meaning, then, is not to be taken lightly, for it is the glue which holds a society together.

The problem arises when one culture, for whatever reason, attempts to superimpose its meaning system upon another. How many times have we witnessed this phenomenon during the 20th century? Our sociohistorical review has emphatically depicted these occurrences, in Nazi Germany, Communist Hungary, the McCarthy years
in America, *ad nauseum*. Within cultures, the imposition of logical positivism upon the research communities of the social and behavioral sciences also provides us with an example of an allegedly hierarchically superior world view shaping and molding a seemingly lesser subculture to its own image. There are in fact so many episodes of this all too repetitive event that we may call it a commonplace of human interaction.

Many times, the power to oppress subcultures lies in one culture’s superordinate meaning system and the raw power of its symbols. For instance, the German *blitzkrieg* of tanks and stormtroopers was a very convincing display of the unquestionable supremacy of Hitler’s war machine. Today, we see a similar manifestation in the currency of American financial power, and its capacity to influence world affairs with nearly the assurity of a tank assault.

It is not difficult to see, then, how one culture’s interpretation of a widely accepted code of research ethics might supercede another’s when such power disparities exist. To briefly return to an example cited in the introduction to this work, whose code of ethics, and culturally relative meaning system, takes precedence when nations work together to engage in scientific inquiry? What if the United States finances a research agenda in Hungary which, given its present state of fiscal need and its desire to bring in foreign investments to help rebuild the nation’s infrastructure, could compromise the spirit of Act CLIV of 1997 on Health? Might Hungary’s dedication to the preservation of human rights be contorted in the face of such alluring financial incentives? Or, more likely, would an American interpretation of how an ethical principle ought to be operationalized trump a Hungarian interpretation were there to be a substantial sum of money to tip the scale?
Perhaps the resolution of this potential dilemma resides in a process of negotiated interpretation of the culturally specific meaning of an ethical concept, using as a moral rudder the most conservative operationalization of the research principle. For instance, if in the United States, voluntary informed consent carries with it the assumption of a written assurance of consent, but in Hungary no such tradition of “getting things in writing” exists, then the cautious researcher might secure a research participant’s signature on the consent form.

Were there to exist a single most important guiding principle of ensuring that stringent codes of research ethics are applied sensitively but uniformly across cultures, it would be self-determination of the research participant. This is where social work makes a critically important contribution to the research protection process.

Social Work Ethics and Human Subjects Research

*What contribution might the social work profession make to the creation of a workable code of research ethics that possesses broad, respectful applicability?* This final research question of the dissertation is now poised for an answer. The social work profession has a compelling history of dedication to human rights and amelioration of the human condition (Reichert, 2003). From its inception during the progressive era in the United States, through Alice Salomon’s groundbreaking efforts to create schools of social work in Germany, to the modern era of Hungarian social workers dedicated to addressing the needs of the nonexistent in the aftermath of a perfect socialist state, social work has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to the betterment of the world’s peoples.
But commitment in and of itself is inadequate to the task of protecting individual and collective rights in the context of human research studies. True enough, the principles of the Belmont Report could have been written by social workers. The fit between the NASW Code of Ethics and the tenets of the Belmont Report is that close. Also tight is the fit between the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki and the International Federation of Social Workers’ ethical code (IFSW, 2004; NASW, 1999). There are two additional concepts, deeply embedded in both the NASW and IFSW ethical codes, which position social work to operationalize codes of research ethics in a unique way.

Social work’s abiding belief in the right of client self-determination, which research ethics codifies as the principles of voluntarism and autonomy, makes this profession stand out in contrast to the implicit (and sometimes overt) paternalism of other helping professions. Medicine, and its affiliated professions, carries within its culture an unequal relationship between physician and patient. Presumably, this hierarchy is predicated upon the knowledge differential between healer and afflicted. Law, on the other hand, posits a similar relationship between attorney and client, with both being ultimately subservient to the law itself.

Social work has no such power or knowledge disparity. Yes, it is incumbent on social workers to possess sufficient training and expertise to facilitate change in their clients’ lives. Yet the nature and process of such change is clearly client-driven, and the helping relationship between social worker and client is egalitarian. The client maintains the right of self-determination and autonomous decision making. There is no implied contract between social worker and client that the social worker possesses greater knowledge about a client’s situation or condition. Rather, the helping process is guided
by client need, with the social worker's expertise as a commonly agreed upon map for change.

Likewise, the social work profession's belief in the importance of client diversity and respect for difference creates an environment that is significantly different from many other professions. In medicine, the positivistic underpinnings of the profession create a change environment that capitalizes, very effectively, upon the similarities among people. That is, ultimately, the power of logical positivism: it is founded upon the ways in which people are fundamentally the same. In the practice of law, and in the legal codification of human rights that typically exist in civil societies, each citizen is protected under law in precisely the same manner as every other. The power of such law is that it is indeed blind, that at least in theory, no one person is above or beneath the law.

Undoubtedly, these professions have contributed mightily to the betterment of humankind and the protection of individual and collective rights. Only social work, however, puts such steadfast emphasis upon the acknowledgement of human difference and its importance in understanding and helping people. And herein lies its great contribution to the operationalization of research ethics across cultures.

Social work is an applied profession. That is, social work is more concerned with how to apply knowledge than with who discovered or purports to own knowledge. It logically follows that an applied profession is well positioned to operationalize knowledge and apply it according to its ethical dictates.

The ethics of social work, particularly those mentioned immediately above, guide the practice of every social worker. Client autonomy, self-determination, voluntary participation, the profession's devotion to social justice, and its essential respect for the
dignity and worth of every individual’s right to difference, are each core values of ethical social work practice. These values, as the IFSW’s ethical code suggests, cross cultures and international boundaries. Regard for cultural relativism is ineradicably woven into the profession.

When we consider the part that social work might play in the operationalization of research ethics, regard for cultural relativism and respect for the integrity of difference are absolutely vital. Social workers possess the skills and the ethical commitment to facilitate the negotiation among cultures that is so necessary for respectful and workable application of ethical principles. Moreover, the profession’s covenant with clients about the importance of egalitarian relationships helps mitigate the influence of power disparities. Lastly, social work’s belief that client well being is the **sine qua non** of ethical practice has the capability to keep the research process focused precisely where it needs to be, on the primacy of human benefit for individuals who shoulder no unwarranted and unknown risk.
CODA

From the time of Wilbur Wright and the dawn of modern science in the 20th century, through the holocausts of war and savagery and oppression, we have witnessed the well meant, and sometimes indifferent and diabolically motivated, egresses upon the rights of human beings. At Auschwitz, Hiroshima, the gray and deadly quarries of eastern Hungary, and in the laboratories and hospitals of science and healing, violations of human rights have taken place that can shock the mind and numb the heart.

We know now that unspeakable harm can come to people when the ends of science negate the means by which knowledge is acquired, and when technology is not modulated by ethics. We know also that the aspirations to godliness that exist within us carry the raw materials of our downfall, and that within the light of human wonder lives an equal genius for something dark.

Scientific knowledge has been purchased in these times at terrible expense. Whether the cost of wisdom has been worthwhile, only our future decisions will determine.

Werner Helwig slips off the translator’s headphones and places them next to the judge’s bench, on a little table. The old men sitting across the room from him look sleepy now, as dusk outside begins to descend and long shadows spread over the courtroom. The young man glances up at the American, Taylor, who nods back at him. Helwig pushes himself up from the witness stand, at last free to go...
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identity (pp. 45-66). New York: Walter de Gruyter.


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CURRICULUM VITAE

STEVEN A. DREWRY Ph.D., LISW

Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ph.D.</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Kent School of Social Work</td>
<td>University of Louisville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Louisville, Kentucky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.S.W.</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Clinical/Administrative Social Work</td>
<td>Ohio State University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Columbus, Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.A.</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Literature/Creative Writing</td>
<td>Indiana University</td>
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<td>Indianapolis, Indiana</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Present Positions

- 2001-Present: Assistant Professor, Social Work
  Capital University
  Dayton, Ohio
- 2002-Present: Field Liaison, Social Work Program
  Capital University
  Dayton, Ohio
Former Positions and Academic Appointments

1999-2001  Adjunct Professor, Social Work  
           Capital University Adult Degree Program/Dayton Campus

1995-2001  Clinical/Associate Director  
           Preble Counseling Center, Eastway Corporation

1991-1997  Adjunct Assistant Professor, Counseling  
           Wright State University Graduate Program

1992-1995  Marital/Family Therapist  
           Wright Health Associates

1988-1995  Instructor, Psychology  
           University of Dayton Graduate Program

1987-1992  Clinical Director  
           Dayton Institute for Family Therapy

1987-1992  Clinical Supervisor  
           Family Intensive Assessment and Treatment Program  
           Catholic Social Services of the Miami Valley

1980-1990  Written Media Specialist (Contract)  
           Kettering Medical Center

1984-1987  Senior Consultant  
           Personal Performance Consultants

1983-1984  Clinical Coordinator  
           South Community, Inc.

1977-1979  Written Media Specialist  
           Indiana University Medical Center

Licensure

Ohio       Licensed Independent Social Worker #I 1552

Certification

Academy of Certified Social Workers
Professional Affiliations

1981-Present  National Association of Social Workers
2001-2002   *Dayton Daily News* Board of Community Contributors
1996-2001  Ohio Council of Behavioral Health Care Providers
1988-1992  American Association of Marital and Family Therapy Clinical Member

Areas of Research Interest

- Social Work Clinical Staff Development and Retention
- Integration of Social Work Research into Practice
- Research Integrity and Human Subjects Protection
- International Social Work

Research

2002-Present  Research Ethics and Human Subjects Protection in International Social Work
                University of Louisville
2002-2003  Core Behavioral Healthcare: Factors Associated with Clinical Staff Turnover and Retention
2002  Research Assistantship, Kent School of Social Work
                University of Louisville

Grants

2000-2001  Project Clinical Director: Community Service PRC
                Grants, Department of Jobs and Family Services,
                Preble County, Ohio (Nine Community Outreach Programs)
1998-2001  Project Director: Empowering Families-at-Risk
                Preble County, Ohio
                Funded by Ohio Office of Criminal Justice Services
1998-2001  Project Director: Jailhouse Help Program
                Preble County, Ohio
                Funded by Ohio Office of Criminal Justice Services
1997-2000
Project Director: Stop Abuse Program
Preble County, Ohio
Funded by Ohio Office of Criminal Justice Services
(Byrne Grant)

1987-1992
Project Clinical Supervisor: Family Intensive Assessment and Treatment Program
Funded by Montgomery County, Ohio, Juvenile Court

Teaching

2003-Present
Introduction to Social Work/Social Welfare (SW 200)
Capital University
Dayton, Ohio

2003-Present
College Reading and Writing (UC 110)
Capital University
Dayton, Ohio

2002-Present
Advanced Research Seminar (LPS 399)
Capital University
Dayton, Ohio

2002-Present
Research Methods for Social Science (SOC 220)
Capital University
Dayton, Ohio

2002-Present
Cultural Pluralism (UC 200)
Capital University
Dayton, Ohio

2002
Research Methods in Psychology (PSY 220)
Capital University
Dayton, Ohio

2001-2002
Undergraduate Thesis (LPS 499)
Capital University
Dayton, Ohio

1999-Present
Social Work Practice II & III (SW 460/461)
Capital University
Dayton, Ohio
1998-2001 Undergraduate Field Instruction, Social Work
Capital University
Dayton, Ohio

1998-2001 Undergraduate Field Instruction, Social Work
Indiana University
Richmond, Indiana

1997-1998 Graduate Field Instruction, Social Work
Indiana University
Indianapolis, Indiana

1991-1997 Systems Theory & Family Counseling (CNL 780)
Advanced Family Therapy (CNL 781)
Advanced Couples Therapy (CNL 782)
Wright State University
Dayton, Ohio

1996 Graduate Field Instruction Seminar (CNL 867)
Wright State University
Dayton, Ohio

1988-1995 Case Management for the SMD Population (PSY 567)
University of Dayton
Dayton, Ohio

1988-1989 Graduate Field Instruction, Counseling
Wright State University
Dayton, Ohio

1987-1989 Undergraduate Field Instruction, Counseling/Psychology
University of Dayton
Dayton, Ohio

1983-1984 Graduate Field Instruction, Social Work
Ohio State University
Dayton, Ohio

Professional and Community Committees

2003-Present Founding Dean Search Committee
Capital University
Columbus, Ohio

2003-Present Chair, Faculty Search Committee
Social Work Program
Capital University
Columbus, Ohio

2002-2003 Voting Member, Human Studies Committee B
Social and Behavioral Sciences
University of Louisville
Louisville, Kentucky

2002-Present Social Work Curriculum Committee
Capital University
Columbus/Dayton, Ohio

2002-Present Liberal and Professional Studies Curriculum Committee
Capital University Center for Lifelong Learning
Dayton, Ohio

2001-Present Degree Plan Review Committee
Capital University Center for Lifelong Learning
Dayton, Ohio

2001-Present Admissions Committee
Capital University Center for Lifelong Learning
Dayton, Ohio

Capital University Center for Lifelong Learning
Dayton, Ohio

1999-2001 Chair, Family and Children First Council, Advisory Committee
Preble County, Ohio

1999-2001 Social Work Education Coordinator, Eastway Corporation
Dayton, Ohio

1995-2001 Family and Children First Council, Advisory Committee
Preble County, Ohio

1999-2001 Directors’ Leadership Council, Eastway Corporation
Dayton, Ohio

1999-2001 Clinical Directors’ Council, Eastway Corporation
Dayton, Ohio

1995-1999 Executive Council, Preble Counseling Center
Eaton, Ohio
1995-1999  Quality Improvement Committee, Preble Counseling Center
          Eaton, Ohio

1995-1999  Utilization Review Committee, Preble Counseling Center

1993-1995  Client Services Committee, Wright Health Associates
          Dayton, Ohio

          Antioch University, Yellow Springs, Ohio

**Trainings and Presentations**

2004  *Voluntarism, Informed Consent and the Ethics of Social Work Research*
      Capital University
      Dayton, Ohio

2003  *Models of Adult Learning*
      Faculty Presentation, Dayton Center
      Capital University

2001  *Parenting After Divorce*
      Ohio State Extension
      Eaton, Ohio

2000  *Workplace Violence Prevention*
      Greenbriar and Heartland of Eaton Nursing Centers
      Eaton, Ohio

2000  *Preventing Secondary Trauma*
      Greenbriar Nursing Center
      Heartland of Eaton Nursing Center
      Eaton, Ohio

2000  *Managing the Aggressive Client*
      Oxford View Nursing Center
      Oxford, Ohio

2000  *Stress Management and Burnout Prevention*
      Greenbriar Nursing Center
      Heartland of Eaton Nursing Center
      Eaton, Ohio
2000  
Conflict Management Training  
National Trail Schools  
Preble County, Ohio

1996-2000  
Employee Assistance Program Supervisor and Employee Orientation  
Greenbriar Nursing Center  
Eaton, Ohio

1998  
Practice Wisdom and the Beginner’s Mind  
Community Services Training Consortium  
Dayton, Ohio

1998  
Common Factors in Successful Therapy  
Community Services Training Consortium  
Dayton, Ohio

1998  
Brief Treatment Approaches in Chemical Dependency (four training series)  
Preble County Recovery Center  
Eaton, Ohio

1997  
Preventing Secondary Trauma: Helping Helpers Help Themselves  
Community Services Training Consortium  
Dayton, Ohio

1997  
Diagnostic Assessment and DSM-IV  
Preble Counseling Center/Preble County Recovery Center  
Eaton, Ohio

1996  
The Art of Good Selfishness: Staying Alive in the Helping Professions  
Community Services Training Consortium  
Dayton, Ohio

1996  
Maximizing Staff Effectiveness: Boundaries and Negotiation  
Miami Valley Training Network  
Dayton, Ohio

1996  
Stress Management and Burnout Prevention in Integrated Mental Health and Chemical Dependency Services  
Preble Counseling Center/Preble County Recovery Center  
Eaton, Ohio

1994  
Brief Treatment in Mental Health  
(five training series)
Preble Counseling Center
Eaton, Ohio

1994
Stress Management Training
Dayton Daily News Staff
Dayton, Ohio

1989
Adolescent Substance Abuse: Experiment, Symptom or Dependence?
Ohio NASW, Dayton Chapter
Dayton, Ohio

1989
Workplace Stress: Eating the Elephant
St. Elizabeth Hospital Workplace Health
Dayton, Ohio

1988
Brief Strategic Therapy
(three training series)
Butler County Mental Health Center
Middletown, Ohio

1988
Stress in the Hospital: Caring and Coping
Kettering Medical Center
Kettering, Ohio

1988
Managing Change in the Workplace
AT&T
Dayton, Ohio

1987
Change Management
Monsanto Mound
Miamisburg, Ohio

1987
Retirement Planning: Coping with Life Transition
G. Michael Crawford & Associates
Dayton, Ohio

1984-1987
Employee Assistance Programming: Orientation for Employees and Supervisors
Personal Performance Consultants
Dayton, Ohio

Consultation

1996-2001
Greenbriar Nursing Center
Eaton, Ohio
1995-1996  Preble County Recovery Center
          Eaton, Ohio

1990-1991  Upper Valley Medical Center
          Employee Assistance Program
          Piqua, Ohio

1988-1989  Miami Valley Hospital
          Employee Assistance Program
          Dayton, Ohio

Publications


