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University of Louisville

Secret Treaties of the Allies
with a Special Study of
The Treaty of London

A Dissertation
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Of the Graduate School of the University of Louisville
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of Master of Arts

Department of History

By

Bedford Turner

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After much study and research this paper, on one of the big questions of the World War, "Secret Treaties of the Allies" is presented, and the facts contained herein, it is hoped, will be of interest. The student of history becomes deeply concerned about the why of such action on the part of great nations combined together to fight the greatest war of all history.

This particular field of the past, for the one desiring to do research work, will remain fertile for a long time. It is like the "hidden treasure" in that the facts will only be discovered after long and careful searching. It has proven to be a most delightful study, and all of our time spent among the records and documents of ten to fifteen years ago has been time well spent.

These treaties were secret during the war and they have been kept secret since the war by the Allies, and my prophecies are that they will remain, so far as any official investigation is concerned, secret.

The original text of some of these treaties may never be known, but the context of all of them is known, and on the following pages it is hoped that information will be given that will provide the reader with a good knowledge of "The Secret Treaties of the Allies."

Why the Secret Treaties?
The question of "Why the Secret Treaties?" is one that pro-
voked much discussion in many magazines, in the Congress of the United States, and the Foreign Governments of the Allied countries. Bryce in "International Relations" makes the following significant statement, "Alliances may have to be concluded and preparations made which cannot be revealed to the legislators. Hence it will be necessary so long as the relations of States continue to be those of rivalry, suspicion, and a desire for aggrandizement to leave the conduct of all details in the hands of a few experts! One of the great historians and a man who has made a special study of governments justifies the "Secret Treaties" because only a few are in a position to know the real conditions that confront a government when it is engaged in fighting a great war.1.

The Foreign Editor of the New Age has the following to say about secret diplomacy, "As military plans must be kept secret, so must our political and diplomatic relations. Germany had fought eight months before a treaty was made. The duty of a British foreign Minister is to prevent the creation of a hegemony or dominating power in Europe. Viscount Grey was no imperialist, and had a high sense of right and wrong. He had a liberal cabinet headed by Asquith. England from all indications took it for granted that Germany was bent on ruling the world and especially Europe. Pan-German dreamers persuaded Germany to cross the Rubicon in quest of a world. German speeches revealed this. What must a foreign minister do under such conditions? (1) Secure Allies; (2) Devise plans to insure Europe that this hegemony plan would not be agitated again; (3) In attempting to avoid one danger we must not

1. "International relations" by Bryce, page 184.
run into another. 'If Germany had in her mind to go to war then England had a right to plan against her'. The treaties aim to do three things: first, to secure Allies; second, to safeguard Europe from another attempt or repetition of Germany at hegemony; third, and to make the world safe for democracy. By March 1917 the treaties were propositions not dispositions. When Russia went out and America came in much of the treaties was of no avail. The treaties may perish at the Peace Conference but the purpose and motive will go marching on.\footnote{1. What About the Secret Treaties?"Foreign Editor of the New Age, in pamphlet form in the U.of L. Library.}

The Secret Treaties did not reveal any new conduct, but was only the coming to light of a method of conduct that had been going on among the governments of Europe for a long time in peace time as well as in war. Jealously, suspicion and hatred have always existed, and the result has been that secret agreements among friendly nations have been formed for the purpose of retarding the progress of other nations that seemed to be getting too much power. In the early months of the World War it was a struggle for world supremacy in general and European supremacy in particular, but ere long it became what was termed a struggle for world democracy. For a time it seemed that Germany might win, but America's entrance on the side of humanity and the Allies turned the tide. Before America entered the war the Allies took desperate means to gain strength by inducing Italy and Roumania to enter the war and to keep Russia and Japan in the war. England was the leader of this movement.

In these treaties, the old philosophy of Europe "The end jus-
tifies the means came to light in rather strong terms. A nation was promised anything she desired or demanded if she would only agree to fight to the end.

The Honorable William E. Borah gives his reasons why secret agreements should not be entered into in a well written article in the Forum of June 8, 1918 in the following statement: "Assuming that the President's personal appearance at Versailles will establish the safety of world democracy, the triumph will be the destruction of a menace far greater than actual war, the destruction of secret diplomacy. We must have open discussions of a treaty before it is concluded and before it becomes binding upon the nations which are interested in the particular treaty. I would be perfectly willing to concede that there may be some steps in the negotiations between the negotiating parties which at times ought to be treated as secret, but the secrecy should never extend to the point where the policy of a nation may be determined prior to open, and full discussion and consideration upon the part of the treaty making powers. In weighing one against the other I have no difficulty myself in arriving at the conclusion that open diplomacy with reference to all matters which result in a final treaty or the shaping of the policy of the world to establish the relationship of nations. President Wilson said before Congress on January 8, 1918: 'Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.' The London Daily News said shortly before the war: 'Can Europe ever again tolerate the appall-
ing peril of secret diplomacy? It belongs to the traditions of autocratic and personal government—it has no place in a democracy or a democratic world.' That was a statement made before the most pronounced evil of secret diplomacy with which the world is familiar had been exposed to men, to wit, the present war. I do not contend as has been often stated by men more familiar with the subject than I, that every war in Europe for the last hundred years can be traced to the evils of secret diplomacy. But I do say, without hesitation, that every war in Europe for the last hundred years had as a contributing and impelling cause the evils of secret diplomacy. It has entered into every war back to the treaty of Westphalia. I think, furthermore, no man can study the history of the present war, its origin and cause, without coming to the conclusion that it had its origin almost wholly and exclusively in secret diplomacy. Had the consideration of these questions even after the ultimatum to Serbia, been conducted in the open before the entire world, with the sunlight of publicity beating in upon those people who were fomenting war and speculating in the lives of nations, the war would, I believe, have been averted. This war did not have its origin among the people of any country. There was no passion coming up from the great mass of those who fought and died in this war demanding war. There was no familiarity with facts which enabled them ever to have an opinion upon the matter. They moved up to the slaughter pen as thoroughly dumb driven by the secret diplomatic powers of certain European governments as the dumb brute goes to the shambles. There was not a note anywhere among the masses of Europe favoring the war. They were brought to the clash by the power that had been permitted for
for three hundred years to carry on its schemes and ambitions behind closed doors. The greatest war of history was begun not to preserve liberty, but to destroy it, and it was hatched in the chancellories of Europe. Mr. Trevelyan of the English Parliament said: 'For eighteen months they refused to give the House of Commons any information. I do not know why that arrangement with Russia about Constantinople should have been concealed from this House and the country except fear of their disapproval, and I am personally convinced, I may be wrong, that if there had been a foreign affairs committee, before whom the principle acts of policy had to be placed before they were realized, that agreement, in fact, would never have been arrived at with Russia.'

The above statement by Mr. Borah is one of the finest arguments against secret diplomacy that can be found anywhere. It is convincing to the average mind. In a world of free speech and free thinking there can be no secret activity by any government, and if secrecy is practiced war and revolution may be expected. The tottering and tottered thrones of Europe have come about because the people were not treated as free people but as slaves, and when the people saw the light, uprisings took place. The upheaval of the past decade in Europe was not an accident but the result of a policy of secrecy and oppression on the part of the governments of those nations. The old diplomacy of secrecy is giving away to the new and open diplomacy.

The Secret Treaties Revealed.

There, no doubt, has arisen in your mind a question relating to the discovery of these secret treaties and agreements. They

were not given out by the governments of Europe involved in their making, but by the Bolshevist Foreign Secretary Leon Trotsky. The old Russian Government had been overthrown, and the Bolshevist Government had just been set up. Trotsky was eager to do something that would place him in the eyes of the world, and give to him a greater hold upon his own following. The finding of the "Secret Treaties" in the archives of the Russian Government gave him his opportunity, and he joyfully made the most of it.

The following revelations were made in rapid succession by the Bolshevist Government soon after it took office: "The first state document published dealt with the desire of Russia to acquire the Dardanelles, Constantinople, the west shore of the Bosporus and certain defined areas in Asia Minor. It set forth the demand of France and England that Russia agree to the freedom of Constantinople for cargoes not from or to Russian ports, the retention of the hold of the Mussulman Government, and the inclusion of certain parts of Persia in the sphere of British influence. This document indicated that Russia agreed on the whole, but proposed an amendment demanding a clearer definition in regard to the government of the Mussulman territory and the freedom of pilgrimage. It defined the Russian sphere of influence, and indicated Russia's concern about the northern boundary of Afghanistan, and also set forth Italy's agreement provided her claims in the East were recognized.

The second document dealt with the boundaries of Germany and was in the form of a telegram from M. Izvolsky, Russian Ambassador to France, dated March 11, 1917, and stated that France recognizes Russia's freedom to define her western boundaries. This was
followed by a telegram from Sergius Sazanoff, former minister of Foreign Affairs, assuring M. Izvolsky that the agreement with France and England in regard to the Constantinople Strait need not be reexamined, and stating the willingness of Russia to give France and England the freedom of defining the western boundaries of Germany in exchange for the freedom allowing Russia to define the eastern boundary of Germany, but insisting on the exclusion of the Polish question as a matter of international decision and discussion and instructing M. Izvolsky to counteract an attempt to place the future of Poland under control of the powers.

M. Sazanoff's telegram said that Russia must prevent Sweden from becoming unfriendly, and by all means must earn the friendship of Norway, and that all political efforts to influence Roumania already had been made. The telegram touched on the exclusion of Germany from the Chinese markets, but said this must be submitted to an economical conference at which Japan should be represented.

On December 1 a series of documents were published by the Bolshevist Government relating to successive concessions offered to Greece for the purpose of inducing her to assist Serbia. These are said to have included an offer of Southern Albania, excepting Avlona; an offer of territory in Asia Minor, and other rewards at the expense of Turkey. These all came to nothing for various reasons.

One document deals with a proposal to hand over Kavola to Bulgaria if the latter joined the Entente Allies. Another concerns Great Britain's offer of the Island of Cyprus to Greece.
which lapsed owing to the refusal of Greece to help Serbia.

One document declared that France claimed Alsace-Lorraine, the iron and coal districts of France, and the wooded regions on the left bank of the Rhine. Certain free neutral states were to be formed and entirely free from Germany. Russian troops were to occupy these until certain guarantees were fulfilled and peace concluded. One document refers to a reported conference of financiers in Switzerland last September, in which Great Britain denies having participated, concerning which it is suggested that the German delegates insisted on the cession of the Baltic provinces and the independence of Finland.

Among the documents was a telegram from Sergius Sazanoff, former foreign minister, to the Allied countries dealing with the efforts of Germany to make peace between Germany, Russia and Japan through the German Embassy at Stockholm. M. Sazanoff replied that he was willing if the proposal made to Russia, Great Britain, France and Japan, in which event he would notify Italy which was then not in the alliance.

A telegram of October 31, 1917, told of a desire of the Italians to have Russia make an attack against the Austro-German army to relieve the pressure on Italy.¹ ¹

The Treaty of London was also revealed in the disclosure of the Bolsheviks, but a study of the full text, a little later in this paper, will appear.

The Japanese question of the far East was not included in the Bolshevist report because the office at Petrograd did not have a copy. The Japanese treaty was one of the most important of the secret agreements, and would form a most interesting chapter in a book. Much material is available to the one who is willing to search.

The Bolshevist report is given to show how completely the secret was revealed, and also how the Allies must have been startled to learn that their program for the future was known by the world. Trotsky gave extended reasons for reporting his important find, which are as follows:

"In proceeding to publish the secret diplomatic documents dealing with the foreign policy of the Czarist and Bourgeois Coalition Governments during the first seven months of the revolution we are fulfilling the obligation which we took upon ourselves when our party was in opposition. Secret diplomacy is a necessary weapon in the hands of a propertyed minority, which is compelled to deceive the majority in order to make the latter obey its interests. Imperialism, which is world wide in its plans of annexation and its rapacious alliances and agreements, has developed to the highest the system of secret diplomacy. The struggle against imperialism, which has ruined and drained of their blood the peoples of Europe, means at the same time a struggle against capitalist diplomacy, which has good reasons to fear the light of day. The Russian people as well as the peoples of Europe and of the whole world, must know the documentary truth about those plots which were hatched in secret by financiers and industrialists, together with their parliamentary and diplomatic agents."
The people of Europe have learned a right to know these things. To abolish secret diplomacy is the first condition of an honorable, popular, and really democratic foreign policy. It is hoped that the German people or proletariat will do as we have done and are doing. We have nothing to conceal. Our program formulates the passionate wishes of millions of workmen, soldiers, and peasants. We desire a speedy peace so that the people may honorably live and work together. 1.

His reasons for publishing the "Secret Treaties" seem to be of the highest order, but at the same time it is seen that his desire for a world revolution are being served by such publicity. Trotsky has uncovered some ugly doings of the Allies, and for his own selfish reasons he makes the most possible of his findings. It is to be supposed that the Allies had sufficient reason for promising and demanding most anything they felt they might get out of this war, but in the light of this great century their activities will be questioned more and more. If what nations plan to do in peace as well as in war will not stand before international justice then it should never be done.

Did the United States Government Know of the Secret Treaties?

The way our government acted in regard to the "Secret Treaties" is

one of the problems for historians to solve, and from what one is able to gather from extended reading there is only one conclusion and that is that the government knew but did not consider it a subject of such vast importance for the future peace of the world so the officials kept it secret as long as it was possible to do so. If the government did know and in the clear light of its knowledge kept silence then by its silence it became a party to the planning of the Allies. The only justification that one can find is in the idea that after the war the government might be able to make adjustments that would make the world safe for democracy. The facts presented in this paper will speak for themselves, and the reader will be able to decide if our State Department and the President acted wisely and in the open.

President Wilson told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that he had no knowledge of the Secret Treaties so-called until the time of the Paris Peace Conference. Since this rather positive statement by the President many historians have wondered what he could have meant by such a strange and what seems to be a contradictory statement.

Some writers seem to think that the Allies did keep the American Government informed of all its activities especially those that the government should know. In fact the British Government states plainly that the American Government was kept informed as this paper will show is true a little later. The American press carried a full report of the Bolshevist report on the Secret Treaties. The American Government either did not take the time to investigate these reports or felt that silence would be the best policy.

Mr. Lansing explained that he was aware of the Japanese
treaties and got his information from the British Ambassador in 1916, and from Japan's special envoy to America in 1917, but that he knew nothing of the Shantung provisions or the adhesion of the other Allies to these terms. 1.

Ray Stannard Baker in "Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement" makes this statement: "They kept these agreements secret from their own people, fearing their effect on the great masses of the workers and the liberal group. They kept them secret from their smaller Allies, like Serbia, and they kept them secret from America, both before and after America came into the war." 2.

The Committee on Foreign Relations questioned the President on August 19, 1919 about these treaties as follows:

Borah—I should like to know when the first knowledge came to this government with reference to the secret treaties between Japan, Italy, Great Britain and France concerning the German possessions in Shantung.

The President—I thought that Secretary Lansing had looked that up and told you. I can only reply from my knowledge, and my knowledge came after I reached Paris.

Mr. Borah—we did get a reply from Mr. Lansing———When did the treaties between Great Britain, France and other countries of Europe in reference to certain secret adjustments in Europe first come to your knowledge? Was that after you had reached Paris?

The President—Yes, the whole series of understandings were disclosed to me for the first time then.

Mr. Borah—Then we, as far as our government was concerned, had no knowledge of these until you reached Paris?

The President—Not unless there was information at the State Department of which I knew nothing.

The President and Mr. Lansing agree to this point, but from here on their agreement is not so clear. The President did not learn of the Japanese agreements until he reached Paris, but he leads us to think there might be some information at the State Department of which he knew nothing. Just why he felt as he did will, no doubt, never be answered adequately.

After Mr. Borah had questioned the President Mr. Johnson of California proceeded to question him as follows:

Mr. Johnson—Was the government of the United States officially informed at any time between the rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany and the signing of the Armistice, of agreements made by the Allied Governments in regard to the settlement of the war?

Mr. President—No; not so far as I know.

Mr. Johnson—So far as you are aware was it unofficially informed during the period?

The President—I would be more clear in my answer, Senator, if I knew just what you were referring to.

Mr. Johnson— I am referring to the so-called secret treaties which disposed of territory among the belligerents.

The President—You mean like the Treaty of London?

Mr. Johnson—Yes; like the London Pact.

The President—No; no sir.

Mr. Johnson—Could you state whether or not any official in—
vestigation was made by our government to ascertain whether or not there were any such treaties of territorial disposition?

The President—There was no such investigation.

Mr. Johnson—These specific treaties, then—the Treaty of London, on the basis of which Italy entered the war; the agreement with Roumania, in August, 1916; the various agreements in respect to Asia Minor, and the agreements consummated in the Winter of 1917 between France and Russia relative to the frontiers of Germany, and particularly in relation to the Saar Valley and the left bank of the Rhine—none of these did we (and when I say "we" I mean you, Mr. President) have any knowledge of prior to the conference at Paris?

The President—No, sir. I can confidently answer that "No" in regard to myself.

Mr. Johnson—When our government through you, Mr. President, in January, 1918, made the Fourteen Points as the basis for peace, were these points made with the knowledge of the existence of the secret agreements?

The President—Since I knew nothing of them necessarily not.

Mr. Johnson—It was not intended then by the expression of these Fourteen Points, to supplant the aims contained in the secret treaties?

The President—No; oh, no. 1.

He fails to take note of what the papers had to say in the Winter of 1917 and 1918. He was not informed of the report made to the State Department from Russia. In the rush of many things
the President may have forgotten. One likes to think that he forgot because it is true that he was burdened, and the whole world was looking to him for guidance.

Mr. Lansing says he did know, at the time of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of September and October 1917, that there was an understanding between Great Britain and France of disposition of German territory or German Islands in the Pacific Ocean. Sir Cecil-Spring Rice had informed him in October 1916, that Japan was to take the islands north of the Equator and Great Britain those south of it. VisCount Ishii told Lansing personally on September 6, 1917 that in 1915 he told Grey that Japan was to return Kiochow to China, but the islands must be returned north of the Equator.

On May 8, 1915 Ambassador Page communicated to President Wilson information gathered unofficially, in regard to the Treaty of London and plans for inducing Roumania to enter the war. Colonel House also in Europe the same time sent word to Wilson on May 14 and 17, 1915 about the same matters. Not the exact treaties but the news about them. 1.

Phillip Kerr, secretary to Lloyd George, wrote on August 27, 1922, that the English Government was instructed to tell everything to America, but that some misunderstanding had occurred about the secret treaties. Balfour spoke in a similar vein in 1918.

On March 4, 1918 Balfour was asked in the House of Commons, whether there have been communicated to President Wilson copies of all treaties, secret or public, and memoranda of all other agreements, and undertakings to which this country has become a party since August 4, 1914; and, if not, whether copies of all such agreements

1. Current History, Mary Reno Frear, June 1929. I verified all of Miss Frear's references that I could find. Her references were not always clear and easy to find. Her article is very good.
or documents will be handed to the American Ambassador in Lon-
don. Mr. Balfour replied that the honorable member may rest assured
that President Wilson is kept fully informed by the Allies. Again
on May 18, 1918, Balfour stated, "I have no secrets from President
Wilson. Every thought that I have in the way of diplomacy connect-
ed with the war is absolutely open to President Wilson. I do not
believe it possible for Great Britain and the United States of
America to carry on the great work in which they are engaged and
to deal with the complex problems which we have to face from day
to day without complete confidence; and so far as I am concerned
complete confidence has always been given." I.

Lloyd George on January 5, 1918 said, "We have no imperial-
istic aims, and President Wilson's Fourteen Points took the thought
of these treaties away from America. "People of the Peace Confer-
ence wondered if President Wilson did know of these secret agree-
because his Fourteen Points shattered much of them.

George Creel wrote, "The treaties have never been hinted at
until President Wilson heard of them at the Peace Conference and
demanded them."

In 1922 after Balfour had been told of Baker's "Woodrow
Wilson and World Settlement" he wrote to Colonel House, "Mr. Baker
certainly is wrong in his statement that Wilson was kept in igno-
rance by me of the secret treaties. The error which I feel the more
acutely because it is a calumny which, if I remember correctly,
I have already contradicted. I was absolutely open with Presi-
dent Wilson about the secret treaties." House's papers and diary
of 1917 vindicate Mr. Balfour's sincerity. 2.

1. Miss Mary Reno Frear, Current History, 1929, Page 439.
2. Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Seymour, vol 3.
On April 28, 1917 House talked over with Balfour the peace terms which would be imposed at the end of the war. The understanding was that the information was to be conveyed to the President. At the dinner and conference of April 30 they discussed fully the treaties. They talked of the boundaries of Poland, Serbia, Roumania and Austria-Hungary, and of Italy's aspirations. House recorded in his diary on April 30, 1917: "This led me to ask what treaties were cut among the Allies, as to the division of the spoils after the war? Balfour said that they had treaties with each other, and that when Italy came in they made one with her in which they promised pretty much what she demanded. Balfour spoke with regret at the spectacle of the great sitting down and dividing the spoils of war, or, as he termed it, "dividing the bear-skin before the bear was killed." I asked him if he did not think it proper for the Allies to give copies of these treaties to the President for his confidential information. He thought such a request entirely reasonable, and said that he would have copies made for that purpose. He was not certain that they had brought them over, but if not, he would send for them. Japanese treaties were not discussed, but Asia Minor and Constantinople were discussed fully. After the dinner of April 30, Colonel House, Balfour, and Wilson went over the above things fully says House's diary. This gave Balfour his opportunity to talk direct to President Wilson. The ground we covered was exactly the same as Balfour and I covered Saturday. I tried to steer the conference to embrace what Balfour had said to me and what the President and I had agreed upon in former conferences."

House's diary continues: "The discussions ran from shortly after eight o'clock until nearly half past ten, when the Presi-
ident was due at a reception given by the Secretary of State to
the members of Congress to meet the British and French Missions. I asked Balfour again about the Allies' treaties with each other and the desirability of his giving copies to the President. He again agreed to do so. When the conference broke up I walked down stairs with Mr. Balfour and asked if he felt that his mind and that of the President had touched on all points. He was quite enthusiastic and said that he had never had a more interesting interview. He spoke of the President having a wonderful combination of human philosophy and political sagacity. The President and Mr. Balfour went to the reception together and I went to my room to prepare for my train. Before I left the President had returned and we had a few minutes further conversation. He was delighted at Balfour's comments and seemed happy over the results of the evening's work.

House's diary certainly reveals that the President knew of the secret treaties, and had gone over with Balfour all of them except the Japanese treaty. One is led to suppose that the thing uppermost in the President's mind was to supplant these treaties at the Peace Conference with one much more suitable to world peace and world democracy. He was absorbed in many things that he hoped to do at the Peace Conference and forgot some important items—such as the Secret Treaties when he was questioned by the Senate Committee. Some weeks after the dinner conference the President wrote House as follows: "England and France have not the same views in regard to peace as we have by any means. When the war is over we can force them to our way of thinking."

Several times after the dinner conference the treaties

1. Miss Frear in Current History 1929, I verified her statements when I could secure the source material and so give her credit.
were brought to the President's mind. On January 30, 1918 shortly after drafting the Fourteen Points, Balfour wrote to President Wilson in regard to the Treaty of London, about which he understood the President was concerned: "I gather from the letter sent by Wiseman that you would like to know my thoughts on the Italian territorial claims under the Treaty of London, concluded in 1915. The treaty (arranged long before I was at the Foreign Office) bears on the face of it evident proof of the anxiety of the Allies to get Italy into the war, and of course the use to which that anxiety was put by the Italian negotiators. But a treaty is a treaty, and we—England and France (of Russia I say nothing)—are bound to uphold it in letter and in spirit. The objections to it are obvious enough: it assigns to Italy territories along the Adriatic which are not Italian but Slav, and the arrangement is not justified on the ground of nationality but on the ground of strategy. Now I do not suggest that we should rule out such arguments with a pendentis consistency. Strong frontiers make for peace; and though great crimes against the principle of nationality have been committed in the name of 'strategic necessity,' still if a particular boundary adds to the stability of international relations, and if the populations concerned be numerically insignificant, I would not reject it in deference to some 'a priori' principle. Each case must be considered on its own merit. Personally, however, I am in doubt whether Italy would really be strengthened by the acquisition of all her Adriatic claims; and in any case it does not seem probable that she will endeavor to prolong the war in order to obtain them. Of the three west-European belligerents she is certainly the most war-weary; and if
she could secure peace and "Italia Irredenta" she would I be-
lieve, not be ill satisfied. P.S.—I shall always be delighted to
answer with complete frankness any question you care to put to
me, but this I think you know already." 1.

Just before the Armistice, allusions to the secret treaties
came to the President's notice. An official American commentary
was being drafted at the special request of the Allies. In this
draft which the President approved on October 30, 1918, appeared
these sentences: "These proposals (Point lx) is less than the Ital-
ian claim, less, of course, than the territory allotted by the Treas-
ty of London. Syria has already been allotted to France by agree-
ment with Great Britain." 1.

From the above statements one is led to believe that Sena-
tor Johnson had a good idea that the President had drafted his
Fourteen Points in the full knowledge of these secret treaties
which the President denied very emphatically. Mr. Johnson, in fact,
asked directly if he knew of these treaties when he drafted his
Fourteen Points. The facts seem to reveal that the President
knew or should have known of these treaties.

The President must have known of these treaties for on a
Cable sent to Colonel House on Armistice Day to President Wilson,
urging, to assure the Yugoslavs of consideration at the Peace
Conference, was the following: "This act is advisable in order to
reassure them in the face of the Italian occupation of the Dal-
matian coast along the line of the Treaty of London. The United
States alone is in a position to speak a word of caution, since
France and Britain are committed by the Pact of London." 1.

1. Ray Stannard Baker, "Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement" vol 3
page 33. Miss Frear also refers to this.
A cable sent by President Wilson to Colonel House on December 1, 1917 had the following statement on it, "for a division of territory as contemplated in Asia Minor." This is a specific statement by the President himself as to the division of territory at the close of the war.

Colonel House's statement as to why the President spoke as he did may help one to feel that President Wilson was in earnest when he spoke to the Senate Committee which is as follows: "It may be he forgot the date when the news first came to him. There was nothing to be gained by a misstatement, and it is clear to me that he spoke from conviction. There was no man living who had more information and misinformation brought to him than President Wilson. How could he on the spur of the moment know when he heard of this or that." 1.

Ray Stannard Baker says there are only two possible conclusions:" 1. That he lied when he said to the Senate Committee that the whole series of understandings were disclosed to him for the first time when he reached Paris; 2. That he was as he says ignorant of them." 2.

The President certainly knew that in time every statement that he made would be scrutinized, and if there was any misstatement some future historian would find it and publish it to the world. He had his dates terribly mixed when he said that he did not hear of the secret treaties until he reached Paris. President Wilson was one who was very careful of what he said, and it is known that the State Department was often inefficient and especially so at certain periods of the war so some of the blame must rest on the Secretary of State.

1. Intimate Papers of Colonel House, by Seymour, vol. 3.
The Secret Treaty of London

The Treaty of London of April 26, 1915 which brought Italy into the war was perhaps the most comprehensive and far-reaching of any of the secret arrangements among the Allies. Ray Stannard Baker says it was the chief obstacle at the Peace Conference and caused more discussion by the Council of Four than any other single subject. 1.

"The factor in post-bellum politics which has done most to threaten the good understanding of the Allies has been the situation created by the secret treaty of London entered into by Italy, Great Britain, France and Russia on April 26, 1915. This document has been referred to in the harshest terms by many students of international politics. It has been characterized as "infamous" and "iniquitous" by men of light and leading in the world's affairs. It is, therefore, of interest to study the genesis of this much-discussed document and see if an explanation, if not a justification, can be found for the act of four statesmen of the eminence of Grey, Cambon, Imperiali and Bernkendorff in signing a document of which all right thinking men are today heartily ashamed." This is a frank statement by one who has studied the treaty carefully and thoughtfully. 2.

The excuses for it on the part of Grey, Cambon and Bernkendorff were dire necessity and ignorance. The Italian plenipotentiary was not ignorance or dire necessity but a desire to get territory that would be helpful to Italy. The principle role in the securing of this treaty was carried out by Italy.

At the moment of the outbreak of the world war Italy was still a member of the Triple Alliance. The Consulta did not regard the cause of the conflict put forward by the Central Powers as a "casus foederis" provided for in Italy's treaty with them. The Italian Government, therefore, informed the Central Powers that it intended to remain neutral during the conflict. The Italian Cabinet, however, informed both groups of belligerents that it would remain neutral, but did not furnish any guarantee as to how long and under what circumstances this neutrality would be maintained. This gave both an opportunity to court Italy's good favor, and this they did. The offers of both will be given later in this paper.

The uncertainty of which way Italy would go was causing great anxiety and embarrassment, both to the Central Powers and to the Allies. This anxiety was further increased by three powerful groups in Italy, the Pro-German party under Giolitti, the Independent Socialists under Mussolini and the advanced wing of the Liberal Party, which were working for their own interests and desires. As a result of these parties it became a battle royal for both groups of belligerents to get Italy to declare for one side or the other. The result of the war seemed to hinge at this time with Italy's decision.

Germany seemed to know that it was hopeless for her to expect Italy to join sides with her, but she hoped to obtain from her an ironclad treaty of neutrality such as would relieve the Wilhelmstrasse and Ballplatz of all anxiety, and allow them to shape their policies with the Italian problem eliminated. Prince Bлюw, the German Ambassador to the Quirinal, therefore, began a se-
ries of negotiations with this object in view. At this time began an era of sordid huckstering which forms one of the most unlovely episodes of the recent world conflict. The negotiations between Rome and Berlin were carried on for weeks. They were the more long drawn out as it became increasingly difficult for Bulow to get the Vienna Government to entertain the proposals of the Rome Cabinet. The great sacrifice that the Vienna Government was called upon to make was too much for a nation to give up unless she had it to do and as yet the Central Powers were still going strong in their fight for world supremacy. Berlin believed that Italy had more to gain by being neutral than by throwing her manhood and material resources into this the greatest of all European conflicts. Berlin was wrong, however, for Italy was ready to sacrifice greatly in order to control the Adriatic Sea. When war rages nations are ready, in too many cases, to sacrifice honor for power, and as one studies the last war he becomes more convinced of that startling truth.

Finally, however, in April 1915—note that this is the same month and the same year that the Secret Treaty of London was signed by Italy, France, Great Britain and Russia—Wilhelmstrasse and the Consulta reached an agreement and the terms on which Italy would guarantee her neutrality to the Central Powers were committed to paper by Baron Sonnino, and on April 8 were formally submitted to the Central Powers. 1.

1. A very fine article on this subject may be found in Current History, N.Y. Times, Gordon Gordon-Smith, Nov. 1919, pages 249-257. The article has been helpful to me in preparing this paper.
WHAT GERMANY OFFERED

This document ran as follows:

ARTICLE 1. - Austria-Hungary cedes the Trentino to Italy, with the frontiers which the Kingdom of Italy had in 1811, that is to say, after the Treaty of Paris of Feb. 28, 1810.

Note to Article 1. -The new frontier separates itself from the present frontier at Mount Cevedale: it follows for an instant the rising ground between Val Venosta and Val de Noce, then descends on the Adige to Gargazone, between Meran and Botzen, follows the plateau on the left bank, cuts the Sarentina Valley in halves from the Isarco to the Chiusa, and rejoins the present frontier by the Dolomite territory of the right bank of the Avisio, not including the Gardona and Badia Valleys, but including the Ampezzan Valley.

ARTICLE 2. - A revision, in favor of Italy, will be made of her eastern frontier, by including in the territory ceded the towns of Gradisca and Goritzia. The new frontier separates from the present one at Troghofel, running toward the east to Osternig, whence it descends the Carnic Alps, to Saifniz. Then, by the rising ground between Seisera and Schliza, it remounts to the Wirsehberg, then again follows the present frontier to the Nevea Pass, and then descends the sides of the Rombone to Isonzo, passing to the east of Plazzo.
Map showing chief points on the Adriatic East Coast claimed by both Italy and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. Also it shows Fiume and various islands named in the Treaty of London.
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It then follows the line of the Isonzo to Tolmino, where it leaves the Isonzo to follow a line more to the east, a line passing to the east of the Pregona-Planina plateau and following the hollow of the Chiappovano, descends to the east of Goritzia, and, across the Carso de Comen, runs to the sea between Monfalcone and Trieste, near Nalresina.

ARTICLE 3. - The town of Trieste, with its territory, which will be extended to the north to Nalresina (inclusive) so as to touch the new Italian frontier, (Art. 2,) and to the south in such a way as to include the present judiciary districts of Capo d'Istria and Pirano, will be constituted as an autonomous and independent State, as far as concerns international, military, legislative, financial, and administrative affairs, Austria-Hungary renouncing all sovereignty over it. It shall remain a free port. Neither Austro-Hungarian nor Italian militia shall enter it. It will take over its quota of the Austrian public debt, in proportion to its population.

ARTICLE 4. - Austria-Hungary cedes to Italy the group of the Cursola Islands, including Lissa (with the adjacent islets of S. Andrea and Busi) and Lesina, (with the Spalmadores and the Torcola,) Curzola, Lagosta, (with the adjacent islets and reefs,) Cazza, and Meleda, and in addition, Pelagosa.

ARTICLE 5. - Italy will occupy the ceded territories (Arts. 1, 2, and 4) immediately. Trieste and its territories will be immediately evacuated by the Austro-Hungarian
authorities and militia. All the soldiers and sailors from the towns and territories serving in the Austro-Hungarian Army will be at once mustered out.

ARTICLE 6. - Austria-Hungary recognizes the full sovereignty of Italy over the town and Bay of Valona, including Sasseno, with, in the hinterland, the part of territory necessary to their defense.

ARTICLE 7. - Austria-Hungary will cease completely to take any interest in Albania, comprised within the limits assigned to it by the conference of London.

ARTICLE 8. - Austria-Hungary will grant a complete amnesty and will immediately liberate all persons sentenced for military or political offenses, who belong to the territory ceded (Arts. 1, 2, and 4) or evacuated, (Art. 3.)

ARTICLE 9. - Italy, for the liberation of the territories ceded, (Arts. 1, 2, and 4,) of the quota of the Austrian or Austro-Hungarian public debt and for the pensions payable to former imperial and royal functionaries and in exchange for the complete and immediate transfer to the Kingdom of Italy of all real and movable property, excepting arms, on the territories and in compensation for all the rights of the State on the said territories, for present and the future, without any exception, will pay to Austria-Hungary a capital sum of 200,000,000 Italian lire in gold.

ARTICLE 10. - Italy undertakes to observe complete neutrality during the present war as far as Austria-Hungary and Germany are concerned.
ARTICLE 11. - During the whole duration of the present war, Italy renounces her right to invoke later in her favor the dispositions contained in Article 8 of the treaty of the Triple Alliance, and Austria-Hungary makes the same renunciation for the Italian occupation of the Dodecanesus. (Signed)

SONNINO.

Austria's Objection to the above offer.

Prince Bulow and his Government hoped to force Austria to accept the offer made, but there was one point that the Ballplatz refused unreservedly to accept, and that was the immediate carrying out of the terms asked by Italy. Austria was willing to subscribe to them, but on the condition that the carrying out be postponed until the war had closed. The point on which the long and painful negotiations met shipwreck was Italy's demand for the immediate military occupation of the territory ceded to her and the immediate evacuation by Austrian troops of the territory to be erected into the autonomous and independent State of Trieste.

To the above demand Austria refused to submit, and Italy through Sonnino declared it was a 'conditio sine qua non' of her signing the treaty of neutrality.

This was the opportunity of the Allies. London, Paris and Petrograd approached the Consulta and asked what price she would demand for entering the war on their side. They knew that the price would be high for Italy had just refused an offer that was very attractive. The Allies were expecting a high price to be asked, but one can imagine the consternation in their camp when Italy disclosed her askings. This was no time for the Allies to split hairs over a million men or so and a few miles of territory so whatever Italy asked she would receive. France had to keep 500,000 troops on her southern frontier so long as Italy remained out. These troops were needed and they were needed badly at this time to help push back the Germans from the gates of Paris.

One can see here a reason for secret agreements in time of war while it is hard to justify them on the ground of right it is easy to see why they happen on the ground of necessity. It seems that the philosophy 'the end justifies the means' might be acceptable here if ever acceptable.

These secret agreements and especially the Treaty of London are not so hard to understand after one has studied them for many months with an unbiased mind. The World War had on April 26, 1915 become a life and death struggle, and the Allies saw that all they had must be thrown in the fray if they were to save themselves and the world. Not only must great armies be put into the field, but great statesmen must exert themselves in every way possible.
SECRET TREATY OF LONDON

April 26, 1915.

The Marquis Imperiali, acting on the instructions of his (the Italian) Government, has the honor to communicate the following memorandum to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey; the Ambassador of France, M. Cambon, and the Ambassador of Russia, Count Benckendorff:

ARTICLE 1. - A military convention is to be concluded without delay between the General Staffs of France, Great Britain, Russia, and Italy to determine the minimum number of troops which Russia would have to throw against Austria-Hungary if the latter should want to concentrate all her forces against Italy. Russia should decide mainly to attack Germany. Similarly the said convention is to regulate the questions relating to armistices, in so far as such armistices form an essential part of the competence of the Supreme Army Command.

ARTICLE 2. - On her part Italy undertakes by all means at her disposal to conduct the campaign in union with France, Great Britain, and Russia against all the powers at war with them.

ARTICLE 3. - The naval forces of France and Great Britain are to render uninterrupted and active assistance to Italy until such time as the navy of Austria has been destroyed or peace
has been concluded. A naval convention is to be concluded without delay between France, Great Britain, and Italy.

ARTICLE 4. - By the future treaty of peace, Italy is to receive the district of Trentino; the entire Southern Tyrol up to its natural geographical frontier, which is the Brenner Pass; the city and district of Trieste; the County of Gorizia and Gradisca; the entire Istria up to the Quarnero, including Voloscoce and the Istrian islands of Cherso and Lussina, as well as the smaller Islands of Plavinika, Unia, Canidoli, Palazzuoli, S. Petro dei Nemi, Asinello, and Gruica, with the neighboring islets.

Note 1. - Here follow the details of the frontier delimitations: In execution of the conditions of Article 4 the frontier line should run as follows: From the summit of the Umbrile northward as far as Stelvio, thence along the watershed of the Rhetian Alps as far as the sources of the Adige and the Eisach; after which it will cross the heights of the Reschon and the Brenner and those of the Etz and the Tiller. The frontier will then turn southward, passing round Mount Tobloch in order to reach the real frontier of Carniola, which is near to the Alps. Passing along this frontier, the line will reach Mount Tarvis and follow the watershed of the Julian Alps beyond the crests of Predil, the Mangart, and the Tricorne, (Triglav,) and the defiles of Podberdo, Poldansko, and Idria. Thence it will turn in a southeasterly direction toward the Schneeberg, in such a way as to exclude the basin of the Save and its tribu-
taries from Italian territory. From the Schneeberg the frontier will descend toward the seacoast - Castua, Matuglia, and Volosca being considered as Italian district.

ARTICLE 5. - Italy will likewise receive the Province of Dalmatia in its present frontiers, including Lisserica and Trebigne, (Trebanje,) in the north, and all the country in the south up to a line drawn from the coast, at the promontory of Planka, eastward along the watershed in such a way as to include in the Italian possessions all the valleys of the rivers flowing into the Sebenico - viz., Cikola, Kerda, and Buotisnica - with all their affluents. Italy will likewise obtain all the islands situated to the north and west of the coasts of Dalmatia, beginning with Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Skerda, Maob Pago, and Puntadura, and further north, and down to Melada in the south, with the inclusion of the islands of St. Andrea, Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Torcola, Curzola, Cazza, and Lagosta, with all the adjacent rocks and islets, as well as Pelagosa, but without the Islands of Zirona Grande and Zirona Piccola, Bua, Solta, and Brazza.

The following are to be neutralized: (1) the entire coasts from Planka, in the north, to the southern extremity of the Sabbioncello peninsula, including this last-named peninsula in its entirety; (2) the part of the littoral from a point ten versts south of the promontory of Ragusa Vecchia to the Viosa (Vojuzza) River, so as to include in the neutralized zone the entire Gulf of Cattaro, with its ports of Antivari, Dulcigno, San Giovanni di Medua, and Durazzo; the rights of Montenegro, arising from the declarations exchanged by the
two contracting parties as far back as April and May, 1909, remaining intact. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that those rights were guaranteed to Montenegro within her present frontiers, they are not to be extended to those territories and ports which may eventually be given to Montenegro. Thus, none of the ports of the littoral now belonging to Montenegro is to be neutralized at any future time. On the other hand, the disqualifications affecting Antivari, to which Montenegro herself agreed in 1909, are to remain in force; (3) lastly, all the islands which are not annexed to Italy.

Note 2.—The following territories on the Adriatic will be included by the powers of the Quadruple Entente in Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro: In the north of the Adriatic, the entire coast from Volosca Bay, on the border of Istria, to the northern frontier of Dalmatia including the entire coast now belonging to Hungary, and the entire coast of Croatia, the port of Fiume, and the small ports of Novi and Carlopolgo, and also the Islands of Veglia, Pervicicio, Gregorio, Coli, and Arbe; and in the south of the Adriatic, where Serbia and Montenegro have interests, the entire coast from Planka up to the River Drin, with the chief ports of Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno, and San Giovanni di Medua, with the Islands of Zirona Grande, Zirona Piccola, Bua, Solta, Brazza, Jakliian, and Calamotta.

The port of Durazzo may be given to the independent Mohammedan State of Albania.
ARTICLE 6. - Italy will receive in absolute property Valona, the Islands of Sasseno, and as much territory as would be required to secure their military safety—approximately between the River Voyazza in the north and in the east down to the borders of the Chimara district in the south.

ARTICLE 7. - Italy, having received Trentino and Istria in accordance with Article 4, and Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands in accordance with Article 5, and the Gulf of Valona, is not, in case of the creation of a small autonomous and neutralized State in Albania, to resist the possible desire of France, Great Britain, and Russia to distribute among Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece the northern and southern parts of Albania. The latter's southern littoral from the frontier of the Italian district of Valona to Capo Stylos is to be neutralized. Italy is to have the right to conduct foreign relations with Albania; at any rate, Italy is to agree to the inclusion in Albania of a territory large enough to allow her frontiers to touch those of Greece and Serbia, west of Ochrida Lake.

ARTICLE 8. - Italy will obtain all the twelve islands (Dodecanese) now occupied by her, in full possession.

ARTICLE 9. - France, Great Britain, and Russia admit in principle the fact of Italy's interest in the maintenance of the political balance of power in the Mediterranean, and her rights, in case of a partition of Turkey, to a share, equal to theirs, in the basin of the Mediterranean—viz., in that part of it which adjoins the Province of Adalia, in which Italy has already acquired special rights and interests.
defined in the Italo-British Convention. The zone which is to be made Italy's property is to be more precisely defined in due course in conformity with the vital interests of France and Great Britain. Italy's interests will likewise be taken into consideration in case the powers should also maintain territorial integrity of Asiatic Turkey for some future period of time, and if they should only proceed to establish among themselves spheres of influence.

In case France, Great Britain, and Russia should, in the course of the present war, occupy any districts of Asiatic Turkey, the entire territory adjacent to Adalia and defined more precisely below (?) is to be left to Italy, who reserves her right to occupy it.

ARTICLE 10. - In Libya, Italy is to enjoy all those rights and privileges which now belong to the Sultan in virtue of the Treaty of Lausanne.

ARTICLE 11. - Italy is to get a share in the war indemnity corresponding to the magnitude of her sacrifices and efforts.

ARTICLE 12. - Italy adheres to the declaration made by France, England, and Russia about leaving Arabia and the holy Moslem places in the hands of an independent Moslem power.

ARTICLE 13. - Should France and Great Britain extend their colonial possessions in Africa at the expense of Germany, they will admit in principle Italy's right to demand certain compensation by way of an extension of her possessions in Erythraea, Somaliland, and Libya, and the colonial
areas adjoining France and British colonies.

ARTICLE 14. - Great Britain undertakes to facilitate for Italy the immediate flotation on the London market of a loan on advantageous terms to the amount of not less than 50,000,000

ARTICLE 15. - France, Great Britain, and Russia pledge themselves to support Italy in not allowing the representatives of the Holy See to undertake any diplomatic steps having for their object the conclusion of peace or the settlement of questions connected with the present war.

ARTICLE 16. - The present treaty is to be kept secret. As regards Italy's adhesion to the Declaration of Sept. 5, 1915, this declaration alone will be published immediately on the declaration of war by or against Italy.

Having taken into consideration the present memorandum, the representatives of France, Great Britain, and Russia being authorized thereto, agreed with the representatives of Italy, likewise authorized thereto, as follows:

France, Great Britain, and Russia express their complete agreement with the present memorandum submitted to them by the Italian Government. In respect of Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the present memorandum, regarding the co-ordination of the military and naval operations of all the four powers, Italy declares that she will actively intervene at an earliest possible date, and, at any rate, not later than one month after the signature of the present document by the contracting parties.
The undersigned have confirmed by hand and seal the present instrument in London in four copies. April 26, 1915.

(Signed) Grey,
Cambon,
Imperiali,
Benckendorff.

Part 2.

Declaration by which France, Great Britain and Russia undertake to not conclude a separate peace during the course of the present European War.

The Italian Government, having decided to participate in the present war with France, Great Britain and Russia and to accede to the declaration made at London, 5th September 1914, by the three above named powers.

The undersigned being duly authorized by their respective Governments, make the following declaration:

The French, British, Italian and Russian Governments undertake not to conclude a separate peace during the course of the present war.

The four Governments agree that, whenever there may be occasion to discuss the terms of peace, none of the Allied Powers shall lay down any conditions of peace without previous agreement with each of the other Allies.

In faith thereof the undersigned have signed the present declaration and fixed thereto their seals.

Done at London, in quadruplicate, the 26th day of April, 1915.
Part 3.

Declaration.

The Declaration of the 26th day of April, 1915, whereby France, Great Britain, Russia and Italy undertake not to conclude a separate peace during the present European War shall remain secret.

After the Declaration of War by Italy the four Powers shall sign a new declaration in identical terms, which thereupon shall be made public.

In faith whereof the undersigned have executed the present Declaration and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at London, in quadruplicate, the 26th day of April, 1915.

Signed
Grey
Imperiali
Benckendorff
Cambon.  l.

This treaty seems to be a flagrant betrayal of one of the most loyal and bravest of the Allies, the Kingdom of Serbia. The carrying out of this treaty would have been a terrible blow to the aspirations of Serbia and the Southern Slavs for unity, as it would, without their consent, have transferred from the yoke of Austria nearly a million people. What argument can be advanced in palliation of this apparent betrayal? Ignorance and dire necessity as was stated above seems the only one that carries much weight. The World War had opened up so many vast problems that the statement of the various countries had not grasped them all, and the Slav question was one of them.

*Of all the international questions raised by the war the 1. History of the Peace Conference, vol. 5, App. 3, page 384.*
Jugoslav was probably the furthest removed from the beaten tracks followed by European Statesmen. The Polish question, Italia Irredenta, the Danish Duchies, the future of Constantinople, and similar questions were more or less familiar and in the range of practical politics. But the study of the Jugoslav question had been confined to a few experts like Dr. Seton Watson, Mr. Wickham Steed, and Sir Arthur Evans in England, and Professor Dennis, M. Andre Choradame, and M. August Gauvin in France. But they were experts, and it is notorious that during the recent world conflict the men in power showed a curious disregard of expert advice and preferred to follow rule-of-thumb methods imposed on them from day to day by the march of events. 1 1.

"Another point which contributed to their short sighted policy was their curious skepticism as to the ultimate and complete breakup of the Austrian Empire. The statesmen in Vienna had balanced so long on the tight rope that they were credited with being able to continue the performance indefinitely. The idea that the Poles, the Czechoslovaks, the Roumanians, the Italians, and the Southern Slavs could break away completely from the Austrian yoke, either forming new states or joining others already in existence, was not realized by the statesmen of the Allied Powers until near the close of the war. These nearly all belonged to the old school of diplomacy." 1 1.

To transfer these Slavs from autocratic Austria to democratic Italy would be a kind act in the mind of the Entente. 1 1.


The Treaty of London.
President Wilson had not at this time enunciated the freedom-giving principle of the self-determination of peoples.

In the Serbian Parliament on April 15, the rumor, about secret agreements, was discussed. Serbia had become uneasy about what might be done. M. Drogoliub Pavlovitch, a member of the Skupština, addressed the following question to the Government:

In the foreign press and in our own, rumors are obstinately in circulation concerning an early action on the part of Italy. This action is to be determined by certain compensations. These are again to be made at the expense of the Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene peoples. I ask the minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister if these rumors correspond to the truth.

In reply to this pointed question much discussion followed. The press took up the question vigorously, and the Serbian people became greatly agitated.

The rulers of Serbia still had faith in the Entente and did all possible to quiet the fears of the people, but their fears did not subside even though they did become quiet to some extent.

The discussion in the Serbian Parliament had very little effect, if any, among the other nations or her Allies. They were bent on getting Italy into the war and any price would be paid. There could be no turning back because Germany was hurling her millions against the Western Front. The Allies in their desperation must have Italy, and if they could get Italy the United States of America would certainly be influenced. If they could get America the war would be won in the course of time.

To the above question by Pavlovitch was made a statesmanlike reply, which quieted the people very much.
In reply to this interpellation M. Pashitch, the Prime Minister, made the following declaration:

"All I can say for the present in reply to the question of M. Pavlovitch is the following: It is true that rumors have reached us from various sides of pourparlers that have been begun between Italy and the powers of the Triple Entente for the participation of the former alongside the latter in the solution of the various questions. As before, rumors have been current that pourparlers have also been begun between Italy and Germany and Austria regarding the concessions which Italy could obtain by remaining neutral and associated with Germany and Austria. These rumors are not confirmed officially. This is why we cannot know whether or not they correspond to the truth. For it often happens that false rumors are spread with a view of bringing about declarations and of sounding the opinions and sentiments in certain quarters.

For the moment I cannot put faith in these rumors or believe that they conform with the truth, for I believe that Italy will not violate the principles in the name of which she realized her own unity. I do not think she will abandon this just principle at the time when we are seeking the solution of the problem of nationalities.

Italy realized her unity on the basis of the principle of nationalities. All her juridical science leads up to the inviolable postulate that the State must maintain and respect the principle on which it is founded. If it
abandons it, it shakes its own foundations. This is why I think that Italy, in ranging herself alongside the Triple Entente, will be guided by the principle of nationalities and that she will be able to arrange her interests in the Adriatic in such a way that there will be no regrettable consequences either for her or for us, and that there will not be a disaccord between the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and the Italians. For it is only an accord between these two peoples that would furnish the surest guarantee against the "push" of Germany toward the Mediterranean.

In Italy there are great political men whose wisdom is able to appreciate the importance of an accord between the Serb-Croat-Slovene people and Italy, an accord which alone can assure the prosperity of the two peoples by increasing their mutual friendship and by assuring the communications between them for the development of their commerce. This is why, gentlemen, I think that the Italian statesmen will not be guided by the idea of obtaining a town or an island more or less. They must know in advance that Italy's force does not lie in this or that town or island, but in the friendly relations between her and the Serb-Croat-Slovene people.

These friendly and statesmanlike utterances of N. Pashitch found, however, no echo in Rome nor in the capitals of the Entente Powers, and did not prevent the signing of a treaty which bartered away the freedom of nearly a million Jugoslavs.
The Italians were to get the Dodecanese Islands of the eastern Mediterranean, wholly inhabited by Greeks, and a "right, in case of the partition of Turkey, to a share equal to theirs (Great Britain, France and Russia) in the basin of the Mediterranean," that is a large territory in Asia Minor occupied by Greeks, Turks, and other nationalities. They were also promised territory in Africa in case France and Great Britain decide to take other possessions there.

Besides all the possessions promised Italy she was to get a share in the war indemnity, and a loan from Great Britain of £50,000,000. The price offered Italy was a very high one, and one that it is hard to justify.

The final article of this treaty declares:

The present treaty is to be kept secret.

It was not officially published until April 20, 1920, and is the only one of the secret agreements that so far has had official publication. It was given out in 1917 by the Bolsheviks, and was commented upon throughout the world. It had a poisoning effect throughout the Balkan States; it was perhaps one great argument used by the Germans in persuading Bulgaria to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers. It undoubtedly embittered and prolonged the greatest war of all history.

The study of "The Secret Treaties of the Allies" has been interesting and profitable, and the field which is still rich in material will be explored in greater detail and to include all the treaties until a more extended work is produced.
Map Showing the Proposed Acquisitions for Italy, Agreed to in The Treaty of London.

The shaded portions show what Italy was to get out of the war if she joined the Allies.
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