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Religion and regionalism : congregants, culture and city-county consolidation in Louisville, Kentucky.

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RELIGION AND REGIONALISM: CONGREGANTS, CULTURE, AND CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATION IN LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY

By

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B.A., York College of Pennsylvania, 2005
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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the love of my life

Gabrielle Marie Ambrosius,

our wonderful son Knighton Joshua,

and our coming daughter.

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Last but not least, I thank the residents of Louisville, Kentucky for welcoming me into their community over the last three years and daring to implement a governmental reform many thought was long dead and near impossible to pass at the polls. Whether or not one agrees with the goals or (supposed) results of city-county consolidation, it is clear that it takes guts for a polity to opt for what Savitch and Vogel (2004, 760) call "a radical form of organizational change." The people of Louisville truly embody the sentiment expressed by Isabel McLennan McMeekin (1946, 256):

> Louisville has always been called the gateway from the North to the South, but it is also the dividing line between the East and the West and between Yesterday and Tomorrow. It is, perhaps more than most cities, conscious of its past and, its citizens like to think, ambitious that its future will make all its dreams come true.

ABSTRACT

RELIGION AND REGIONALISM: CONGREGANTS, CULTURE, AND CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATION IN LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY

Joshua D. Ambrosius

May 8, 2010

Literature on religious involvement in public affairs typically examines the national scene, particularly public opinion and political behavior in presidential elections. Few scholars examine religious actors in urban politics and policymaking. Those who do study local politics emphasize morality policy and ignore issues of metropolitan governance and institutional design, central concerns of the urban politics field. This dissertation fills that gap by studying Louisville, Kentucky, site of the first large-scale city-county consolidation since 1969. I ask: does religion affect how people vote in a consolidation referendum and shape their opinions about merged government?

I employ a survey instrument (N=807), collected randomly across Louisville Metro in 2006, and use multiple linear and binary logistic regression to predict religiosity, "culture war" stances, and consolidation referendum participation and support. I control for socio-economic status, demographics, residence, and political ideology. I operationalize religion as a variable in two ways: as a factor score index measuring level of religiosity, combining behavior, belief, and salience items; and as religious affiliation, predominately Roman Catholic and Southern Baptist in Louisville. I also employ the

2006 General Social Survey for comparison with the nation and several additional religion databases to better understand Louisville's religious ecology.

I find that religiosity did not significantly affect one's turnout or vote but is positively related to opinions of the merged government. Religious affiliation did not significantly affect turnout but significantly affected one's vote and opinions. Regression results show that Catholics were 37 percent more likely to support consolidation than Southern Baptists. I downplay theories that differences over redistribution to central cities and political trust may be driving differences over consolidation.

I posit a theory labeled "polity replication" based in the institutional and organizational theory and sociology of religion literatures. I argue that participation in a religious denomination's organizational structure conditions members to prefer similar structures in other societal institutions. Two forms of metropolitan governance, *monocentrism* and *polycentrism*, parallel the poles of church polity (i.e., denominational governance): episcopal/centralized (Catholic) and congregational/decentralized (Baptist).

In conclusion, I present recommendations and implications for research, religious practice, and politics/policymaking.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Introduction: Religion, Social Science, and Urban Studies

Religious institutions and organizations have always been important components of human settlement and civilization. Kotkin's (2005) treatise on ancient urban history goes so far as to list the city's *sacred* role on par with its more-emphasized political and economic functions. The social sciences' founders, including early economists, psychologists, historians, and sociologists, understood the importance of religion and integrated its study into their most-celebrated works (Smith, 1776; James, 1902; Maslow, 1964; Tawney, 1926; Durkheim, 1897; Weber, 1930). By the mid-to-late twentieth century, however, work on the social scientific study of religion faded into obscurity as the secularization thesis won acceptance. With roots in Marx, Freud, Weber, and Durkheim, the secularization thesis—in its most basic form—holds that societal modernization, including urbanization, correlates with declining levels of religiosity. The theory predicted that the power and influence of religious organizations would fade, ultimately undermining the church as a major institution of human society.

This rejection of religion's importance was engrained in urban studies, perhaps most of all, as the field embraced structural Marxism and Kotkin's other urban functions—known collectively as *political economy* (Swanstrom, 1993; Sapotichne, Jones, and Wolfe, 2007). Even theologians began to speak of the "secular city" (Cox, 1965). As cities grew, religion waned—or so it was thought. Religion was simply

incompatible with modern, industrial, urbanized society. Sociology's founding fathers—who spoke a great deal about religion—inspired later generations to discontinue further scientific investigation into religion's role in society.

At the advent of the twenty-first century we now recognize the secularization thesis largely as an ideologically-tinged byproduct of Enlightenment-era rationality. If true at all, secularization is largely a European phenomenon; but even this "fact" has been challenged (Stark and Iannaccone, 1994). Worldwide, including the United States (U.S.), just the opposite may be true. A recent United Nations Population Fund (2007, 26) report on global urbanization states it well:

> The revival of religious adherence in its varied forms is one of the more noticeable cultural transformations accompanying urbanization. Rapid urbanization was expected to mean the triumph of rationality, secular values and the demystification of the world, as well as the relegation of religion to a secondary role. Instead, there has been a renewal in religious interest in many countries.

Religion is being rediscovered in all branches of the social sciences—from sociology to political science, and even economics and New Institutional/organizational theory (Ebaugh, 2002; Wald and Wilcox, 2006; Iannaccone, 1998; Demerath, et al., 1998; McMullen, 1994; Scheitle and Dougherty, 2008). Urban studies—particularly the urban politics subfield of political science—appears to be an exception (Sharp, 2007). Urbanists rank the lowest in religious interest when compared with political science's other Americanist and Comparativist branches (Ambrosius, 2008a; 2009a). While sociologists of religion, for example, employ urban theory to explain the distribution of religion across neighborhoods and the metropolitan region—a concept known as religious ecology—urbanists largely tend to ignore other bodies of work outside the limited urban field (Form and Dubrow, 2005, 2008; Eiesland, 2000; McRoberts, 2003; Sapotichne, et

al., 2007). This includes work on religion and politics by scholars of American national politics (Sharp, 2007).

Many studies find that religion affects partisan identification, electoral participation/decisions, and personal opinions on social and political issues in the U.S. (Campbell, 2007; Denton, 2005; Gilderbloom and Markham, 1995; Green, Rozell, and Wilcox, 2003; Guth, et al., 2006; Kohut, et al., 2000; Langer and Cohen, 2005; Layman, 2001; Leege and Kellstedt, 1993; Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth, 2009a; Wilcox, 1996). Much of this work relies on large samples of the mass public—drawing on publically available datasets (particularly the General Social Survey and American National Election Study) or survey data collected specifically to gauge the relationship between religion and politics (e.g., the National Survey of Religion and Politics; see Guth, et al., 2006).

Recent media accounts confirm that religious institutions and organizations are playing central roles in the fundamental issues and concerns of our time—including exurban growth, the housing boom and economic collapse, globalization, climate change, healthcare reform, urban planning and revitalization, and community economic development (Mahler, 2005; Rosin, 2009; Wright, 2009; Winter, 2009; Wisdom, 2009; Reep, 2009; Henriques and Lehren, 2007). In the cases of globalization and the housing crisis, some are even attributing a causal link to religious forces (Wright, 2009; Rosin, 2009).

Despite this apparent "revival" of religion, little research has examined religion's effect on local political allegiance, behavior, or beliefs. Those limited studies that have explored local "culture war" divisions tend to rely on qualitative case studies rather than

quantitative analysis of random-sample survey data (e.g., Sharp, 1999). Only one study thoroughly examines the relationship between religion and politics in a U.S. city (Demerath and Williams, 1992). Two recent multi-author volumes engage moral and religious influences on local politics using multi-city samples (Djupe and Olson, 2007; Sharp, 2005). Sharp (2005) and her colleagues concentrate on morality policy while Djupe and Olson (2007) extend their analyses, conducted by contributors, to issues "beyond the culture wars" like social justice and race relations.

No contemporary authors emphasize potential religious influences on several key theoretical and empirical issues central to the urban politics field—including metropolitan governance, governmental fragmentation, and city-county consolidation. At the heart of these issues is the question of institutional design: what set of institutions and organizational structures is best-suited for governance of the metropolitan region in the contemporary U.S.? Given that governance structures "are the work of civil society and therefore…based on a rule of willing consent," religion likely plays a role in shaping individual preferences for institutional design (Oakerson, 2004, 20). Religious institutions dominate American civil society and are influential in shaping personal moral and political commitments (Putnam, 2000; see above citations). Nonetheless, the direct effect of religion on preferences for differing forms of metropolitan structure has not been explored previously in the urban politics literature or elsewhere.

Religion and Consolidation in Louisville, Kentucky

Louisville, Kentucky is an interesting locale for exploration of religious ecology and its implications for local institutional design due to both its rich religious history and

recent political innovation. Louisville is a mid-sized, middle American city bordering the southern and Midwestern regions, long labeled the "gateway from the North to the South" (McMeekin, 1946, 256). The city is historically Democratic and Roman Catholic but located in a politically "red state" within the contemporary "Bible belt." Louisville has sizable populations of Roman Catholics, black Protestants, and white evangelical Protestants, particularly Southern Baptists, as well as several large megachurches, two prominent seminaries, and a denominational headquarters (Jones, et al., 2002; Hartford Institute, 2009; Barlow, 2004; Gaustad and Schmidt, 2004). Louisville is home to over 500 individual religious congregations (Jones, et al., 2002). Southeast Christian Church, located in Louisville's suburban east-end, is frequented each weekend by over 18,000 worshippers (Hartford Institute, 2009). The city itself boasts another six churches over 2,000 average weekly attendees—the accepted cutoff for "megachurch" status (Hartford Institute, 2009; Thumma and Travis, 2007). Louisville's largest predominately black church, St. Stephen Church, has an average attendance of approximately 8,000 (Hartford Institute, 2009).

Louisville's medium size and relative geographic isolation make it a more manageable case study than oft-studied "megacities" and other mid-sized cities located within megalopolis regions (Ambrosius, Gilderbloom, and Hanka, 2010). Barlow (2004) argues that the Midwest region is the most-representative of the U.S. as a whole of any of the country's regions, demographically and in terms of religious affiliation. Louisville lies on the Midwestern frontier, an area referred to as "Kentuckiana" due to its border with Indiana (Barlow, 2004, 31). Louisville shares many characteristics, including ethnic and cultural diversity, with nearby Midwestern cities like its "Ohio River sister city,"

Cincinnati, Ohio (Williams, 2004, 217). On the other hand, the U.S. Census Bureau places Louisville in the southern region, which has long been said to possess a distinct regional subculture (Salisbury, 1962; Ellison and Musick, 1993). Thus, Louisville could be termed the Upper South or the Lower Midwest (Ownby, 2005). While research findings from Louisville are not representative of the nation as a whole, or even all other cities (see Stein, 1960), a case study conducted in Louisville likely will uncover conditions more reflective of "typical" American communities than studies of cultural and social outliers like New York City or Los Angeles (also see Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg, 1991). A previous study with similar goals used a southern community (Atlanta, Georgia) to test general hypotheses without reference to the study's regional context (McMullen, 1994).

While interesting for religious and geographic reasons, Louisville has also drawn attention for its recent political reforms. Residents of the City of Louisville and surrounding Jefferson County voted to consolidate their governments in a 2000 referendum, with the merger of city and county completed by 2003 (Savitch and Vogel, 2004). This was the first large-scale consolidation in a U.S. city since Indianapolis and Marion County, Indiana, merged in 1969 (Morgan, England, and Pelissero, 2007). Since consolidation, Louisville has become a magnet for scholars of urban studies, regional planning, and public administration. The local elite, national experts on urban policy, and adherents of the "New Regionalism" hail Louisville's successes in overcoming regional competition and planning for a better future (Brookings Institution, 2002; Greater Louisville Project, 2005, 2007, 2008; Rusk, 2003; Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom, 2004). Critical local academics, on the other hand, lament its downsides,

focusing on consolidation's power dimension, dilution of minority influence, and inability to live up to its lofty goals—enhancement of economic development and fair share housing in particular (Ambrosius, 2009b; Imbroscio, 2006; Savitch and Vogel, 2000, 2004; Savitch, Vogel, and Ye, 2009).

Like most communities, Louisville faces a host of local political issues where religion is certain to play a role. These include arguments over homosexuality and gay rights, pornography and adult entertainment, and sex education in public schools. While these issues may or may not have developed to full-fledged local culture "wars" in Louisville, divisions in public opinion exist in any urban environment where forms of conventional and unconventional culture butt heads.

Research Questions

Savitch and colleagues' (2008) account of Louisville's political culture demonstrates that religious congregations and believers, particularly evangelicals, are inclined to take political action on important local moral matters. While personal moral issues may make up the bulk of the bickering at the national level, religious differences are thought to extend beyond sexuality and abortion to economics, diplomacy, and other policy arenas (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2003; Guth, et al., 1996; Wilson, 2009). In Peterson's (1981) famous terms, local governments are "limited" by the federalist structure and thus cannot make war or peace, close their borders to outsiders, or take action in a host of other policy fields. Nonetheless, the realm of local politics certainly encompasses the distribution of local power and decision-making and concerns over "who gets what"—the natural stuff of politics. Do religious differences influence

personal political stances on these more-lofty issues of urban political economy and institutional design? Some evidence indicates that local churches may have played a role in influencing public opinion about consolidation in Louisville (Savitch and Vogel, 2004).

Sharp (2007, 59) admits that, "To many analysts, the notion that cultural cleavages would shape urban electoral outcomes may at first blush appear absurd." She then acknowledges that in fact "it may not be the case that differences in religiosity…are directly implicated in voter mobilization and vote choice in local elections, except perhaps in referenda involving morality issues" such as Brown, Knopp, and Morrill's (2005) study of gay rights in Tacoma, Washington (Sharp, 2007, 59). Sharp believes that the possibility is still open that religion and other cultural factors may be "linked to differences in participation levels, thus shaping the effective electorate and hence electoral outcomes. And…culture might serve as an important contextual or mediating variable" (Sharp, 2007, 59).

Sharp's willingness to ask questions of religion's value and her lingering doubts about religious differences on substantial, non-morality issues beg for future exploration of religion's effect on local government and politics. Does religion influence urban government and politics beyond the typical culture war issues? What is the mechanism, or theoretical connection, spurring any demonstrated religious effect? Why might churches or religious believers approach a seemingly non-moral issue like city-county consolidation with unusual passion? The central question of this study, operationalized, is: does religion (religiosity and/or religious affiliation) influence individuals' preferences for institutional design, manifested by participation in a city-county consolidation

referendum, vote choice in favor of consolidation, and approval of a merged city-county government?

Since I must test this question in a given locale, it becomes pertinent first to ask: to what extent does the county under study reflect the religion, politics, and culture of the general population? Empirical, contextual questions take the following forms: What is the geographic distribution of Christian edifices, religious identification, and individual religiosity across the urban continuum of Louisville-Jefferson County Metro? What variables contribute to the formation of Louisville's religious ecology? What variables predict individual religious identification and religiosity in Louisville? How do these findings compare with the nation? How does Louisville compare with the nation on religious differences on political ideology, partisan identification (support for President George W. Bush), and attitudes on the divisive culture war issues of homosexuality and sex education in public schools? By religious differences, I mean differences in both religious affiliation and religiosity.

Furthermore, to test whether preferences for city-county consolidation are possibly masking preferences for something else, I ask: do religiosity and/or religious affiliation influence, in the same or similar way, individuals' (a) attitudes on redistribution to central cities, (b) penchants for political trust, and (c) approval of the primary consolidation entrepreneur (Louisville's mayor)?

I theorize two connections between religion and urban institutional design, represented by two key independent variables: religiosity and religious identification/ preference (a proxy for religious affiliation). Because religions are divided on some issues of social justice and redistribution, and consolidation is supported by a diverse

coalition of interests, the direction of effect (positive or negative) on religiosity is somewhat ambiguous. On one hand, consolidation and other regional initiatives are thought to harness suburban resources for the betterment of the typically-decaying urban core (Rusk, 2003; Dreier, et al., 2004). Many churches take part in similar urban-suburban partnerships that could reinforce pro-regionalism attitudes and behaviors (Sider, et al., 2008; Owens, 2006). However, this understanding is complicated by the recent rise of politically conservative religion which views any form of government-imposed redistribution as suspect. In this sense, religiosity may be a proxy for conservatism and NIMBY ("not in my back yard") attitudes. On the other hand, consolidation can be seen as furthering the interests of the powerful—economic growth and development (Savitch and Vogel, 2004). In this context, conservative religionists may favor consolidation while liberal, urban parishioners—particularly black Protestants, who fear dissolution of influence—may view consolidation and its supporters with suspicion.

I propose an original theory as to why different religious denominations may have differing views on city-county consolidation and, more broadly, questions of institutional design in society at large. It is known that religious denominations possess divergent organizational structures (Allen, 1995; Zech, 2003). For example, the Southern Baptist Convention is a loose alliance of Baptist churches that prides itself on maintaining relative congregational autonomy (Mao and Zech, 2002). On the other hand, the Roman Catholic Church is an international conglomerate with many levels of administration (Mao and Zech, 2002). Local Catholic Church officials and their congregations are beholden to the leadership at the regional (diocese), national, or Vatican levels. These two church structures—inspired by their distinctive theologies—correspond fairly well

with two models of urban structure: *polycentrism* and *monocentrism* (Oakerson, 2004). Past research has found that culture does influence societies' institutional structures and policy preferences (Greif, 1994; Koven, 1999). Differences in local culture are thought to influence the pursuit (or lack thereof) of regionalism—with certain areas preferring individualized, localized control and others more collective, regional government (Burns, 1994; Dreier, et al., 2004; Miller, 2002; Rusk, 2003).

Catholics and Southern Baptists are the two largest religious denominations in Louisville and, in many ways, represent the two poles of Christian polity (see McMullen, 1994 for similar examples). It seems likely that Southern Baptists will view consolidation with more skepticism, while Catholics will view it more favorably. Black Protestants will likely view both consolidation and the regime with skepticism. It is documented that much of consolidation's opposition came from within the black community (Porter, 2008; Savitch and Vogel, 2004). The religiously unaffiliated often align with the liberal end of the political spectrum and the Democratic Party in U.S. politics (Leege and Kellstedt, 1993). Their views of consolidation could go either way—in support of far-left critics or in alliance with the local Democratic establishment. Other Protestants and Christians' opinions are likely largely divided, perhaps reflective of, or cutting across, other political divisions. Non-Christian religions compose such a small proportion of Louisville's population that an attempt to understand particular traditions' positions is particularly difficult; and any collective effect is nonsensical because of the inclusion of vastly different traditions (Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, etc.).

Data Sources

This study analyzes data on local public opinion in Louisville, Kentucky from the 2006 Louisville Metropolitan Survey (LMS; Department of Sociology, 2006). The 2006 LMS asks a host of questions on religion and religiosity, morality, and local politics including participation and vote in the consolidation referendum and opinions of the consolidated Louisville Metro government. This study also employs the General Social Survey for comparison with the nation as a whole and as a means to test locally-derived theory (GSS; Davis and Smith, 2006). In addition, I explore several other data sources on Louisville's religious ecology and history to provide context as needed.

Overview

Following a literature review and methodology description, findings are divided into three chapters (IV) "Louisville's Religious Landscape"; (V) "Culture War in Louisville and the Nation"; and (VI) "Religion and City-County Consolidation in Louisville." Each of the three includes review of historical or contextual information, analysis of descriptive statistics and inferential methods, and discussion of the findings. The final chapter (VII) titled "Discussion and Implications" summarizes the findings and discusses implications for research and practice.

Contributions

This dissertation contributes to the social scientific literature in several ways. At a basic level, it reconnects urban politics with political science through analysis of religion, political behavior, and institutional design (Feiock, 2004b). Ramsay (1998),

Swanstrom (1993), and Sharp (2007) have all argued that the urban politics field has ignored cultural factors (including religion) in favor of an unhealthy reliance on what Swanstrom calls "economism." When religion appears in the urban literature, it is often in the form of a religious metaphor with little substantive reference to religious phenomena (see Judd, 2005 for numerous examples). Henig (2008), writing in a special issue of *Urban News* devoted to the status of the Urban Politics Field (UPF), argues that UPF scholars should test hypotheses from the national level at the urban level to stimulate the subfield and dialogue across American political science. Liu (2008, 2) summarizes Henig's argument:

> Henig offer[s] suggestions regarding how the UPF can reinvigorate itself to be more influential in [mainstream political science]. His main suggestion is "to self-consciously use city settings as sites to test hypotheses generated at the national level under differing economic, political, and cultural contexts." For Henig, using the city as the unit of analysis paid research dividends in the past, and it could do so once again in the future.

This sentiment is the foundation for this present study. This dissertation seeks to fill the "God-shaped hole" in urban politics, to borrow King's (2005, 531, n1) apt phrase; to move beyond the racial and economic divisions dominating the urban literature to the cultural and religious cleavages that have so polarized the U.S. electorate in recent presidential elections. This research connects the scientific study of religion—by sociologists, economists, and political scientists—with theory on urban ecology, urban political economy, regionalism, institutional design, and political behavior. The identification of religious influences on urban public opinion and electoral outcomes will hopefully open the eyes (and hearts) of urbanists to a new vein of urban research.

This study introduces a unique causal mechanism, termed "polity replication." This theory opens up a new strain of research in public administration, organizational and institutional theory, urban politics, and other subfields of contemporary political science—including national, comparative, and international politics. For example, Roman Catholics may be more likely than Baptists (to use the two key traditions of this study) and other Protestants to view international organization and nation-state cooperation with favor (see Nelsen, Guth, and Fraser, 2001). Furthermore, if participants in religious denominations are in fact structured to prefer particular institutional forms outside the church, perhaps other private associations—from hierarchical corporations to community-based nonprofit organizations—similarly encourage institutional preferences.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

This review summarizes several bodies of literature which relate to the present research questions. I first discuss explorations of religious ecology and past findings on the distribution of religion across metropolitan regions. Secondly, I explore the literature on individual religiosity, grouped by findings on several key demographic characteristics. Thirdly, I summarize theories on religion and politics at the national level and beyond, including evidence for a "culture war" and studies of the "faith factor" in national elections and public opinion. Fourthly, I discuss religion's place in the study of urban politics and the limited work done in this area. Finally, over three sections, I turn to institutional theory and institutional design in church and state, including literature on city-county consolidation and religious influences. Hypotheses are suggested throughout, culminating in the primary hypotheses in the final section and accompanying table.

Religious and Urban Ecology

A hot topic in the sociological study of religion has been the study of "religious ecology," either of an entire city or metropolitan region (Form and Dubrow, 2008; Livezey, 2000), a single subsection of the metropolis (Ebaugh, O'Brien, and Chafetz, 2000; Form and Dubrow, 2005; Eiesland, 2000; McRoberts, 2003), or communities across several cities or regions (Ammerman, 1997; Blanchard, 2007; Blanchard, et al.,

2008). This sometimes involves a census of religious congregations and a geographic analysis of their locations or an analysis of where religious followers/members reside within a community (Sinha, et al., 2007; Ebaugh, O'Brien, and Chafetz, 2000). The term "religious ecology" is rarely defined explicitly in these works; and if it is anything like its cousins urban or human ecology, it could mean many things—particularly with the newfound emphasis on environmental (or "ecological") research.

"Ecology" (or "ecological") typically implies two distinct connotations in the social scientific literature that are often intertwined. First, it can simply refer to the use of aggregate (or community-level) data. In this sense, ecological study can represent either (a) the sum of individual characteristics or preferences (and is thus subject to the ecological fallacy, which limits the application of aggregate conclusions to individual actors; Robinson, 1950) or (b) structural conditions. Second, ecology can simply refer to *environment*—surroundings or context—and the environmental conditions (Eiesland and Warner, 1998). This is also a structural conceptualization (Blanchard, et al., 2008).

McRoberts (2003, 9) attempts to define religious ecology by simply stating that "urban forms give rise to religious forms." McRoberts (2003, 9) traces the study of religious ecology back to the Chicago School of Sociology's urban ecology, which "treats the city as a system analogous to a natural ecology." According to McRoberts, religious ecology is rooted in the Chicago Schools' understanding of neighborhood transition ("invasion" and "succession") applied to religious organizations' patterns of land use. Eiesland (2000, xi) employs a slightly more-specific understanding of religious ecology, which she defines as "the patterns of relations, status, and interaction among religious organizations within a locality." This builds on her understanding of the

"ecological frame" or perspective—which is the "theoretical and practical response to increased religious pluralism and the restructuring of religious life" (Eiesland and Warner, 1998, 41). Eiesland and Warner (1998) also use the metaphor of the natural world to describe communities.

Livezey (2000) further discusses the Chicago School roots of religious ecology. Citing Sennett (1969), Livezey (2000, 15) argues that Robert Park (1968) and his Chicago School colleagues (Park and Burgess, 1925) diverged from their German teachers by seeking to "discern the urban culture…in the ways in which it was internally divided" (i.e., the city's own "ecology"). Simmel, Weber, and Spendler, on the other hand, contrasted city life with rural life, that of "farm and village," assuming that cities exhibit a singular form of urban culture (Livezey, 2000, 15). This may have been truer of European cities which at the time housed a single ethnicity and largely a sole religious tradition. U.S. cities like Chicago instead embodied the "melting pot" metaphor of America composed of immigrants from various world regions and, increasingly, various world religions who immigrated to its neighborhoods—which took the form of ethnic enclaves. Religious scholars in the U.S. thus applied Chicago School methods to study the diversity of religious congregations within cities—particularly Chicago (e.g., Kincheloe, 1989; Drake, 1940). In one such example, Douglas (1926) surveyed over one thousand churches located in large cities across the U.S. and compared various phases of "adaptation" to changing urban environments.

Implicit in Chicago-style religious ecology is the notion that individuals attend churches near their residence; and the inverse, that churches locate nearby the homes of their target population. Related to religious ecology is what McRoberts (2003, 11-12)

calls the "religious voluntarism" literature, which is rooted in Rational Choice-inspired conceptions of religious consumers, church competition, and religious market share. Following Warner (1993), McRoberts criticizes the ecological perspective for ignoring the fact that individuals decide which churches to attend; and many people decide to attend churches in neighborhoods where they do not live. McRoberts (2003, 12) also derides the voluntarism perspective for ignoring the "ways localities present opportunities for and place constraints on the flowering of religious markets." There is an apparent tension between the application of urban ecology and organizational ecology to the study of religious ecology. McRoberts (2003, 12) concludes that the two perspectives should share insights:

> It seems that the ecological and voluntarism perspectives can benefit from cross-pollination. Sensitivity to the voluntary aspects of participation can extend the explanatory power of religious ecology. Meanwhile, the place-oriented insights of religious ecology can make voluntarism theory more applicable to local contexts.

Sociologists identify two types of congregations—*parish* and *niche*—that, to an extent, parallel the divisions between urban and organizational ecology (Ebaugh and Chafetz, 2000; McKinney, 1998; Ammerman, 1997; McRoberts, 2003). Ammerman (1997, 36) nicely summarizes the two types in the following passage:

> Congregations, then, are related to their immediate contexts in a variety of ways. Some are strongly identified with the people who inhabit a given locale and are therefore tied into the dense network of affiliation that is the local community. They approximate the parish image. Others occupy a specialized niche, serving a culturally or theologically defined constituency. Urban congregations probably always lie somewhere between the two poles of parish and niche…

Guest and Lee (1987) document the parish model, arguing that more-established churches with members most like their surrounding neighborhoods are the most-involved

in community affairs. Roman Catholic congregations are thought to typify the parish model because they still delineate congregational territories, although this changes as young members move from the neighborhood but still return for Sunday mass (Ebaugh, O'Brien, and Chafetz, 2000). On the other hand, Ebaugh, O'Brien, and Chafetz (2000) describe immigrant churches that carve out a niche by catering to a specific ethnicity and drawing members from throughout the metropolitan area. Another example of niche churches are the numerous predominately gay congregations forming in cities around the country, such as those affiliated with the Metropolitan Community Church, groups of gays within traditional denominations, or even independent gatherings in gay bars (Warner, 1995; Davidson, 1987; Thumma, 2006). Ebaugh, O'Brien, and Chafetz (2000) confirm Ammerman's (1997) suggestion that many churches lie along a spectrum between the two types.

Ammerman cautions that "niche" is used differently in this sense than in organizational theory/analysis (also see McRoberts, 2003, 12). Organizational theorists, like Baum and Singh (1994), see every organization as possessing a niche, in that it must carve out its own position within a particular market for a product or service. In Ammerman's (1997, 384, n58) sense, niche congregations are ones that "successfully garner enough resources from a large institutional environment to be able to offer a distinctive array of services with little competitive overlap." Wuthnow (1994a) sees niche congregations as small churches with few ties to their immediate contexts while categorizing megachurches, which serve a larger region, as a distinct type of relationship between congregation and community. Form and Dubrow (2005) similarly define the

downtown "first church" because it largely serves the entire metropolitan area rather than only the few residents of the downtown business district.

Cities have changed quite a bit since Park and Burgess (1925) first attempted to simplify the urban form as several concentric zones emanating from the city center. Almost immediately, other scholars attacked the Chicago School's model and proposed their own revisions (Hoyt, 1939; Harris and Ullman, 1945). Hoyt (1939) saw various sectors, or wedges, radiating from the center and demarcated by major transportation routes, often of the "spoke and wheel" design that would later become highways and expressways. Harris and Ullman (1945) proposed that the city is instead made up of "multiple nuclei"—including suburban areas functioning as smaller business districts. This theory foreshadowed later literature documenting polycentric urban regions and "edge cities" (Garreau, 1991). Consequently, the simple Chicago School model has fallen out of favor in urban studies and, for some, has been replaced by a "postmodern" Los Angeles School (Dear and Flusty, 1998; Dear, 2002). Dear (2002, 5) believes that American cities are patterning after the post-industrial Los Angeles (LA) area of southern California (rather than old, industrial Chicago); that LA is the "prototype of our urban future." Dear (2002, 20) distinguishes the LA School from its Chicago precursor by the ideas that the "urban peripheries are [now] organizing what remains of the center" and urban development has become a chaotic, non-linear process.

While the urban studies field has, to an extent, left Chicago behind, scholars of religious ecology continue to employ a Chicago-style conception of the urban form. While early religious ecologists did link their theories to Chicago School methods, today's religious ecologists do so implicitly without citations of Park and Burgess' work.

Only one religious scholar has attempted to apply the new vision of the LA School to urban religion (Miller, 2001). In a volume edited by Dear, Miller (2001) recounts the continued importance of religion in the U.S., even in LA despite California's high rates of secularism. Los Angeles appears to pattern after the nation—or maybe the nation after LA, in the LA School's eyes—with the rise of Latino Catholicism, Black Protestantism, and evangelicalism and the decline of mainline Protestantism. Miller also documents the growth and presence of numerous megachurches. He does little, however, to connect the religious ecology to urban theory.

Religiosity and its Determinants

National research on the U.S. population has often found that certain individuals are more religiously-inclined than others. Since the mid-twentieth century, social scientists—especially sociologists of religion—have sought to explain variations in religious observance across demographic lines (age, race, gender, etc.), socioeconomic statuses, regional differences, and daily, competing time constraints. These broad categories compose much of the explanatory literature on religiosity. This literature mostly confirms common perceptions of the independent variables' impacts on church attendance/participation and overall religiosity. This section briefly summarizes the existing body of work on determinants of religiosity.

Race. Many studies have found that blacks in the U.S. participate in religious activities more than whites when controlling for other individual socio-demographic and economic factors (Johnson, Matre, and Armbrecht, 1991; Nelson, Yokley, and Nelson, 1971; Sasaki, 1979; Taylor, et al., 1996; Taylor, Mattis, and Chatters, 1999). Some argue

that much of the difference is due instead to regional and urban-rural differences (Hunt and Hunt, 2001). Taylor, Mattis, and Chatters (1999) find that religious involvement for blacks varies systematically by age, sex, marital status, and region. Claims of a religious resurgence among Hispanics warrants further investigation and a thorough comparison with blacks, whites and others (Stevens-Arroyo, 1998).

Sex. It has been shown repeatedly that women in the modern West are generally more religious than men in terms of belief in God and participation in religious services and activities (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle, 1996; Brierley, 1991; Schobie, 1975; Yinger, 1970). For example, Jacobs and Worcester (1990) found that 84 percent of British females believe in God compared with only 67 percent of males. This consistent difference has been attributed to gender differences in "structural location" in society, including such items as labor force participation and child-rearing (de Vaus and McAllister, 1987; Gee, 1991; Luckmann, 1967; Nelsen and Potvin, 1981); levels of guilt (Gray, 1971; Suziedelis and Potvin, 1981); overall socialization (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; D'Andrade, 1967; Suziedelis and Potvin, 1981; Mol, 1985); and even risk preferences, a theory based on an inventive discussion of Pascal's wager argument (Miller and Hoffmann, 1995).

Age and Marital Status. Older individuals tend to be more religious and attend church more regularly than younger people, although scholars debate how much of this is simply due to progression through "life courses" and if period effects exist (Argue, Johnson, and White, 1999). As men and women age, marriage and family formation—the addition of children—tend to increase the desire for religious community (Carroll and Roozen, 1975; Mueller and Cooper, 1986; Roozen, McKinney, and Thompson, 1990;

Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy, and Waite 1995). While religiosity and family formation are certainly correlated, the effect may be reversed, considering that most religious traditions place an emphasis on marriage as the sole expression of sexuality and encourage forming families to "replenish the earth" (Aldous, 1983; D'Antonio, 1983, 1985; Thornton, 1985).

Socio-economic Status. Individuals with higher education, income, and overall socio-economic status tend to be less religious than others. Nationally, the most educated Americans are the least religious (Albrecht and Heaton, 1984; Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; Caplovitz and Sherrow, 1977), although education's effect may not hold if one examines particular religious denominations (Albrecht and Heaton, 1984). Also, more-educated persons may exhibit less religious devotion but accumulate more religious knowledge (King and Hunt, 1975). The relationship with wealth is often found to be weaker, with some researchers finding a positive or "backward bending" relationship, meaning that participation is highest for middle-income groups (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975). The wealthiest individuals, who also tend to be very educated, may not feel the need for religion—or perhaps manipulate it to their advantage, as in Marx's famous account. One study on the effect of religion on wealth accumulation finds that conservative Protestants accumulate very little wealth compared with the general population and followers of other religious traditions, especially Judaism (Keister, 2003).

Geography: Regionalism and Urbanism. Geography, including region of residency, influences religiosity. For example, it has been demonstrated repeatedly that Southerners possess a distinct culture that places a strong emphasis on religious observance, particularly of the "fundamentalist" type (Ellison and Sherkat, 1995; Fichter and Maddox, 1965; George, 1988; Hunt and Hunt, 2001; Levin, Taylor, and Chatters,

1995; Taylor, 1988; Taylor, Thornton, and Chatters, 1987; Wuthnow and Christano, 1979). Fundamentalism may lead to intolerance and thus limit the building of "bridging" social capital across religious and racial lines, although more research is needed to differentiate the effects of *region* and *religion* (Ellison and Musick, 1993).

In addition, rural inhabitants tend to be more religious than city-dwellers and even suburbanites (Hunt and Hunt, 2001; Miller, 2001). Church attendance increases when one moves out to the periphery from the central city (Carlos, 1970). This may be due to urbanism's association with nontraditional behavior and values (Fischer, 1975a, 1975b). Urbanization has been thought to lead to a reduction in church attendance in the West. Landis (1959, 342) wrote that the National Council of Churches found that in the U.S. "the per cent of urbanization of a county was the most important statistic to analyze in connection with the churches located in that county and their membership." Furthermore, rural dwellers have fewer options for participating in local community. At least one study found that regional differences matter more than rural versus urban residence in predicting religiosity (Chalfant and Heller, 1991).

Time Constraints: Employment and Commuting. Economists have begun to analyze household religious participation as they do other nonmarket activities—using a "household-allocation-of-time framework" (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975). Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975, 43) find evidence for "the existence of income and substitution effects on religious participation." Drawing on Putnam (1995, 2000), many scholars have identified an overall decline in Americans' community engagement. Time constraints such as long hours spent working, commuting, and viewing television tend to exert a

downward influence on religious participation and other types of social capital-building activities (Putnam, 2000).

Type of Residence. While a thorough comparison of religiosity by residential structure—single-family home versus apartment/condominium—has not been conducted, some research is suggestive of a link between housing type and religiosity. While employment status may capture competing time constraints, housing type may capture competing social constraints. Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000, 17) find that apartment dwellers socialize more with their immediate neighbors and that these "increases in sociability appear to drive out other forms of social interaction such as churchgoing…" Indeed, they find that apartment dwellers attend church and frequent other social outlets less than home dwellers (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2000). Home dwellers are also more likely to own their place of residence. This leads to greater stability within the community and more active participation in community life, including church and politics (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Gilderbloom and Markham, 1995).

Religion and Politics in the Nation

According to Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth (2009b), there are two dominant theories on the role of religion in the American public square. They call these the *ethnoreligious* and *theological restructuring* perspectives. The ethnoreligious perspective believes that differences in political culture exist across religious traditions, which are confounded by racial, ethnic, and regional differences. From this perspective, Roman Catholics—particularly Latino Catholics—are expected to differ from white Protestants in their political views. This theory held well when immigration from various parts of Europe

was at its height; and was very descriptive of local politics in the U.S. (Freeman, 1958). This perspective still largely describes Black Protestant and Latino Catholic/Protestant politics (Smidt, et al., 2009b).

The more-contemporary restructuring perspective makes use of Hunter's (1991, 1994) "culture war" language. As Wuthnow (1988) famously argued, religious traditions themselves are becoming polarized between *traditional/orthodox/conservative* and *modern/progressive/liberal* factions. Thus, at least for the three large white American traditions—Roman Catholicism, Mainline Protestantism, and Evangelical Protestantism—greater differences exist within rather than across traditions. According to this perspective, for example, conservative Roman Catholics may have more politics in common with conservative Mainline and Evangelical Protestants than they do with liberal Catholics.

Roman Catholics have approached public life in three manners. O'Brien (2008) labels these the *republican*, *interest group*, and *evangelical* approaches. The republican approach emphasizes "shared responsibility as American citizens" in a pluralistic society, while the interest group model is "grounded in the immigrant working class experience, also serv[ing] as a form of identity politics, allowing civic action which was clearly Catholic" (O'Brien, 2008, 22-23). The third, more-recent approach—termed evangelical by O'Brien—is the "Catholic version of the social Gospel." Rather than denoting conservative social positions like those held by contemporary *evangelical* Protestants, O'Brien's (23) use of evangelical indicates "style," which is a commitment placing Christian discipleship "beyond the claims of citizenship and group self-interest" which

often results in progressive positions favoring social justice. In sum, this evangelical position:

> …involves a direct move from religious judgment to political prescription; it is the sharp end of identity politics, demanding discipleship, devaluing citizenship, and practicing, at least in language, what Max Weber called a "politics of ultimate ends." It challenges the domination of republican categories and calls into question the acceptability of interest group negotiations (O'Brien, 2008, 23).

O'Brien's categories reflect similar reasoning as the ethnoreligious and restructuring perspectives. His interest group model is clearly an example of ethnoreligious theory, while the evangelical style is a component of religious restructuring. Catholics following this evangelical approach transcend religious divisions and take public action to achieve the common goals of other, socially-minded Christians. The republican model is an alternative group that places citizenship ahead of ethnicity and religious culture; and is thus not represented by ethnoreligious nor restructuring theories. All three are potentially relevant to the experiences of urban Catholics.

Recent presidential and congressional elections have brought cultural restructuring to the fore and spawned allegations of an extremely polarized public, particularly the 2000 and 2004 elections (Jacobson, 2005). These recent elections not only pitted Republican versus Democrat and conservative vs. liberal, but also religious vs. secular and red state vs. blue state—perhaps even suburban/rural vs. urban (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2005, 2008; Gimpel and Karnes, 2006; Sperling, et al., 2004). Some scholars debate this perspective arguing that the culture war is a myth and most Americans reside somewhere in the tolerant middle (Fiorina, 2005; Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder, 2006; Wolfe, 1999). Others find that views on morality issues are more complex and less "bipolar" than commonly perceived (Craig, et al., 2005). Despite

claims that the "God gap" had subsided by the 2008 presidential contest that witnessed the election of the first African American President, Barack Obama, evidence suggests that similar religious voting patterns have persisted (Smidt, et al., 2010).

Whether or not the public is as polarized as media accounts suggest, clear differences do exist between traditionalists and modernists on culture war issues (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2005, 2008; Hunter, 1991, 1994). These include the morality/legality of abortion, the morality of homosexual activity and legality of same-sex marriage, the appropriateness of premarital sex and sex education in public schools, and the availability of pornography and other forms of adult entertainment. Even Wolfe (1999), who purports to debunk the culture war, cites the nature and morality of homosexuality as the sole, major moral issue dividing American political culture.

Religion is a powerful predictor of individuals' stances on these issues (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2005, 2008). Members of traditionalist religious denominations and those in most denominations who attend church regularly tend to align themselves with conservative positions against abortion, homosexual activity and same-sex marriage, sex education, and pornography (Adamczyk and Pitt, 2009; Hardinge, 2004; Jelen, 1986; McIntosh, Alston, and Alston, 1979). Furthermore, those in the U.S. who participate in religious services more often have found a comfortable home on the conservative end of the political spectrum and within the Republican Party (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2005, 2008).

In addition to culture war issues, religious affiliation and religiosity influence opinions on a variety of public policies. For example, it has long been theorized that religion affects economic structures and individuals' attitudes about economics (Tawney,

1926; Weber, 1930; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2003; Barker and Carman, 2000; Wilson, 2009). Classically, Tawney (1926) and Weber (1930) both attribute the rise of capitalism to Protestant beliefs and ethics. In today's global economy, Guiso, et al. (2003) find that following a Christian religion is correlated positively with attitudes favoring economic growth, even more so than for adherents of other non-Christian faiths. In other words, Christian theology and culture seem to endorse "good" economic development policies—those "conducive to higher per capita income and growth" (Guiso, et al., 2003, 225). Attitudes on social welfare policy are discussed in the later section on redistribution.

Religion and Urban Politics

While religion is increasingly seen as playing a role in American politics, scholars have largely ignored its effects on local or urban politics. Pratt (2004, 170) asks, "Is the urban politics literature…correct in implying that churches are no longer significantly involved in the governance of the nation's largest cities?" This question implies that religious organizations were once greatly involved in urban governance and that something recently changed indicating that this may no longer be the case. To test Pratt's implications, I examined the founding fathers and dominant voices of the urban politics literature. Does religion "show up" in the key debates and theories in urban politics, community power, and, more recently, urban political economy?

The "community power" debates of the 1950s and 60s launched urban politics "as a focus for study in its own right" (Harding, 2009, 27). This debate pitted elite theorists (Hunter, 1953) against pluralists (Dahl, 1961/2005), both sides arguing that they

understood who held power in cities. Hunter (1953), in his landmark "reputational" study of "Regional City" (revealed to be Atlanta, Georgia), found that all place-shaping policy was made by a small group of "unelected" economic elites and the elected mayor. Dahl (1961/2005) countered with findings from his analysis of New Haven, Connecticut, arguing that no single group held sway over all policy. Rather, a plurality of groups with distinct but overlapping memberships—each headed by "mini-elites"—was responsible for crafting education and developmental policies, to use his two examples.

This debate contributed little to understanding religion's role in the city. Hunter (1953, 83) does mention religious leaders, but dismisses any notion that religion matters:

> It may be noted here that none of the ministers of churches in Regional City were chosen as top leaders by the persons interviewed in the study. The idea was expressed several times by interviewees that some minister *ought* to be on the listing, but under the terms of power definitions used in the study they did not make "top billing." It is understood, however, that in order to get a project well under way it would be important to bring the churches in, but they are not, as institutions, considered crucial in the decision-making process. Their influence is crucial in restating settled policies from time to time and in interpreting new policies which have been formed or are in the process of formulation. Church leaders, however, whether they be prominent laymen or professional ministers, have relatively little influence with the larger economic interests.

In other words, ministers may play a role in implementing or supporting policy but not in the actual policymaking process. Hunter (1953, 82) concludes that, "Within the policy-forming groups the economic interests are dominant." He does state that the Jewish "sub-community" includes representation in the top group of policy leaders, due to their economic power; and that several ministers are considered powerful within the black "sub-community," although black leaders are much more isolated.

Dahl's (1961/2005) analysis responds with a passage on the Catholic Church's influence over education policy. While ministers may have little impact on urban

redevelopment, they are reported by several informants to influence public education. Dahl, however, finds little evidence of any *direct* influence. Instead, any Church influence is *indirect* and divided—some Catholic elements within the community favor parochial schools and siphon the best students from the wealthiest families; meanwhile, because the city is two-thirds Catholic, many moderate-income Catholics rely on the public school system for their livelihood and the education of their children. Thus, Dahl's study essentially confirms Hunter's finding that church leaders do not influence local policy—except for powerful individuals who incidentally belong to a particular faith.

Later books on urban political economy confirm these early findings. Logan and Molotch's (1987) "growth machine" thesis—the idea that a coalition of powerful local interests, dominated by "place-based" capital, works to intensify urban development—"returned to Hunter's main theme" by establishing a neo-elitism with elements borrowed from Marxism (Harding, 2009, 35; see also Molotch, 1976, 1993). Logan and Molotch's (1987) book includes no religious terms in the index and no substantive discussion of religion's role in the city. They do, however, mention the church in passing while commenting on the social organization of the ghetto:

> Even the black churches, an important part of black neighborhood life, cannot make up for the absence of an indigenous exchange value engine. No church organization is ever of crucial importance in metropolitan dynamics (except occasionally as a tourist site). And the black church, unlike the Catholic or Protestant churches of the immigrants, is not itself closely tied to the religious organizations of the dominant white groups. Not only are black ministers not considered important to growth goals, they are also irrelevant to the personal salvation of white leaders (Logan and Molotch, 1987, 131-132).

Logan and Molotch make clear that the church, particularly the black church, is unconnected to economic interests and is thus extraneous to policymaking. If Logan and Molotch represent a neo-elitist view, what of neo-pluralism? Urban regime theory, the dominant contemporary urban analysis originally formulated by Stone (1989) and Elkin (1987), has its roots in pluralist thinking (Harding, 2009). Regime theory describes "formal and informal modes of collaboration between public and private sectors, arguing that the fragmentation of power between a market economy and popularly elected political institutions makes such cooperation necessary in order to realize important local policy goals" (Mossberger, 2009, 40). Does Stone's (1989) influential study of Atlanta address the impact of religion on local policymaking?

Stone (1987) does cite an example of a white minister allying with larger business interests to combat the construction of new public housing. However, the minister does so largely because of other ties—he once edited the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce news magazine and chairs the commission of the hospital located next to the planned public housing. The minister "feared that the hospital"—not his church, apparently—"was being encircled by a spreading ghetto" (Stone, 1987, 42).

In another passage, Stone speaks of a community group known as U-Rescue founded by black ministers (one is also a state legislator) to oppose "urban renewal," the displacement of residents and churches by new development. "City officials concluded that U-Rescue was indeed a formidable grass-roots organization, capable of wielding significant electoral power and of bringing an effective legal challenge" (Stone, 1987, 68). The election of a black minister—"a particularly savvy negotiator"—as a state legislator from the neighborhood displays the power of the church in the black

community (Stone, 1987, 68). The organization did not last, however, partially due to the minister's transfer to another area by the hierarchy of his religious denomination. Stone also discusses the election of Andrew Young, "a minister by training," as Atlanta's mayor—although his election was primarily due, one assumes, to his secular accomplishments as a member of Congress and as the United Nations ambassador under President Carter (Stone, 1987, 109).

In later work, Stone (2005) connects the church to his idea of "selective incentives"—side payments necessary to gain acquiescence from particular publics (Stone, 1987, 175). He writes that "to head off potential opposition, especially from someone like a pastor with established connections and a ready-made audience," some form of "extragenerous compensation" is due (Stone, 2005, 317). This suggests that the power of churches, if any, lies in the large body of weekly attendees that can be churned, perhaps by religious fervor, into political action. In his discussion of megachurches, Chaves (2006, 337) states that "the pastor of one 2,000-person church probably gets an appointment with the mayor more easily than the pastors of ten 200-person churches." McCann's (2002) account of Louisville's neighbor, Lexington, Kentucky, found that one megachurch joined a coalition of developers in their effort to develop a parcel of land at the city's fringe. The pastor spoke at a city council meeting with support from two hundred parishioners, all wearing buttons in favor of growth and development (McCann, 2002, 385).

Few scholars have seriously applied any of these theories of urban politics and political economy to studies with religion as the centerpiece. A lone scholar, Newman (1991; 1994), has directly applied both growth machine and regime theory to urban

religious institutions. While admitting that the growth machine's architects ignore religious institutions, Newman (1991) borrows Logan and Molotch's dichotomy of exchange vs. use value in his study of televangelist Charles Stanley's First [Southern] Baptist megachurch in Atlanta, Georgia. According to Newman, some churches do prize their real estate holdings—in this case, prime downtown real estate—for the exchange value (to the tune of $62 million) rather than simply its use value. As Pastor Stanley expressed to his congregation, "God is for growth and anyone opposed is under Satan's influence" (Newman, 1991, 241). This article views Logan and Molotch's work as a new theory of land use, in the tradition of Burgess and Hoyt, rather than its implications for community power. Essentially, Newman wishes to explain the existence of downtown "superchurches," "misfits" which defy past classifications based in Chicago School theories of the urban form. When Newman (1991, 240) does address power, churches are seen as subservient to growth machine interests:

> An increase in the local population may help sustain these institutions [churches] by increasing the number of clients and support groups. More important, perhaps, is that such institutions often need the favor of those who are at the heart of the local growth machines—the entrepreneurs, media owners, and politicians—who can make or break their institutional goals.

However, Newman does ask whether the pastor of such a large church participates in the elite machinery of growth. He states that many church members are middle-to-upper income and employed in industries that benefit directly from growth (Newman, 1991).

Newman's (1994, 23) other study, which jumps ship to Stone's regime theory, argues that the members of the Concerned Black Clergy (CBC) organization in Atlanta have recently "become active regime participants helping to influence policy decisions on behalf of the city's poorer citizens." According to Newman, this has not always been the

case. Newman cites Stone's (1989, 167) critical view that, "Black ministers, who are key links between black officeholders and the black public, have indicated that any impairment to an incumbent mayor is perceived as a weakening of black solidarity and a threat to black political power." This "black solidarity" led the clergy to support urban development and regressive tax schemes that favored the rich and, to some extent, hurt the poor, simply because the mayoral office-holder was African American. More recently, with the creation of the CBC in 1983, the group has lobbied on behalf of poor, black neighborhoods on issues like rapid transit development. Newman concludes that black ministers serve as gatekeepers in times of regime instability; but once African Americans irreversibly dominate the regime, they are free to mobilize against regime policies. According to Google Scholar, both of these papers together account for a mere four citations in others' work (August, 2009). To say that their contributions have been ignored is an understatement.

In a similar vein, Pratt's (2004) analysis of religion and urban government in Detroit and New York City makes use of regime theory as well as its intellectual ancestor, Dahl's pluralism, to interpret metropolitan religious organizations' involvement in urban governance. This book only receives one citation on Google Scholar (August, 2009). This compares to nearly 800 for Stone (1989), nearly 1,500 for Logan and Molotch (1987), and over 1,000 for Peterson (1981). Granted, these classics have circulated for over two decades—but they each average well over 40 citations per year.

What of Peterson's (1981) *City Limits*, a book inspired by Tiebout's (1956) public choice model that strikes fear in the hearts of urbanists (Sapotichne, et al., 2007)? Peterson mentions little about religion, except to highlight historical, ethno-religious

conflicts between established Protestants and new-comer Catholics. Peterson does, however, contribute to this discussion in another way—by discounting local politics. He writes that "local politics is groupless politics"—in that "formally organized groups play a much less prominent role in [local] policy formation" (Peterson, 1981, 116-117). In other words, community associations such as churches are unlikely to affect local policymaking because it is shaped, to a large extent, by the federalist and economic structures.

Pratt (2004, 170) inquires:

> …is it the case, as some would contend, that churches have irreversibly declined as a political force in urban America? Is the urban politics literature—as summarized in leading textbooks on the topic—correct in implying that churches are no longer significantly involved in the governance of the nation's largest cities?

Pratt cites Djupe's (1996) conference paper on the decline in importance of religious leaders in local politics as evidence. Pratt earlier lists the "textbooks" to which he refers, including: Jones (1983), Judd (1979), Peterson (1981), and Stone (1986). My review of the key works in urban politics has shown that, at least since the mid-twentieth century, urban politics scholars have not held a high view of religious actors in cities. But, according to Pratt, one does not have to dip into the historical record of medieval Europe or pre-industrial America to find examples of religious influence in Western cities. Pratt cites several texts from the 1930s to the 60s that treat religion as a more important component of urban governance and politics. However, his case is unconvincing because he cites works that only devote a few pages to discussion of religion—including Dahl's three-page account of "the church" cited above.

Following the fields' dominant voices, urban politics scholars as a whole have expressed minimal interest in religion as a political variable. Based upon empirical evidence on American Political Science Association (APSA) organized section cross-memberships and journal citations of religious search terms, contemporary urbanists rank the lowest in religious interest when compared with Americanists and comparativists (Ambrosius, 2008a; 2009). Table 2.1, reprinted from Ambrosius (2009a) shows that only 4.3 percent of the membership of the APSA Urban Politics section are also members of the Religion and Politics section. This is the second lowest of the nine subfields examined—only Political Economy has a lower percent of cross-membership with Religion and Politics. Table 2.2, also from Ambrosius (2009a), shows that the urbanist journals—*Urban Affairs Review* (UAR) and *Journal of Urban Affairs* (JUA)—rank at or near the bottom in terms of citations of religious search terms in their titles and abstracts when compared with other subfields' top-ranking journals (rankings from Garand and Giles, 2003). UAR, the official journal of the Urban Politics section, ranks dead last in religious references with only 0.02 annual cites in article titles and 0.19 annual cites in article abstracts over its 43-year existence.

Pratt (2004) takes the lack of religious references in the major texts of urban politics as a possible sign that religious influence has waned in American cities (citing Djupe, 1996), a conclusion he himself finds surprising given the increasing evidence of religious influence at the national level. Other scholars have attributed, directly or indirectly, the lack of religious and other cultural research among urbanists to peculiarities of the field: the influence of structural Marxism, an overreliance on political economy, or even a pronounced academic prejudice in the subfield (Ambrosius, 2008a,

2009; Sapotichne, et al., 2007; Sharp, 2007; Swanstrom, 1993). Another possibility is that urbanists' neglect of the social scientific study of religion is due to urban politics' isolation from mainstream political science (MPS); and both MPS and sociology of religion's reliance on a rival theoretical framework, Rational Choice, which is labeled "pathological" by urbanists (Ambrosius, 2008a; Imbroscio, 2007; McKinnon, 2005; Sapotichne, et al., 2007).

Table 2.1: APSA Section Members also in Religion & Politics Section

Section	Total Members	Percent in R&P
Political Parties	624	8.17%
Presidency	447	7.16%
Foreign Policy	643	7.00%
Legislative Studies	636	5.66%
Public Policy	894	5.59%
Comparative Politics	1622	5.36%
Public Administration	568	4.93%
Urban Politics	417	4.32%
Political Economy	688	3.49%

Source: APSA website (2004).

Table 2.2: Ranking of Subfield Journals by Annual Rates of Religious Terms

Rank	Journal	Annual Title Rate	Journal	Annual Abstract Rate
1	PSQ	0.89	PP	1.54
2	PP	0.77	JPAM	1.41
3	CP	0.29	PSQ	1.22
4	APSR	0.26	PAR	1.05
5	JPAM	0.19	APSR	0.38
6	PAR	0.16	WP	0.31
7	JPE	0.13	JUA	0.25
8	JUA	0.08	LSQ	0.23
9	WP	0.07	CP	0.21
10	LSQ	0.04	UAR	0.19
11	UAR	0.02	-	-

NOTE: Eleven total journals were searched, including the top ranked journal from each subfield in Table 1 along with APSR and two journals representing UP. JPE does not have abstracts. JPAM abstract searches include full-text results. Searches are current through 2007 unless recent issues are excluded from a database.
Search terms: Catholic; charitable choice; Christ; Christian; church; congregation; evangelical; faith-based; God; Protestant; religion; religious; spiritual.

Ramsay (1998, 597) argues that the reliance on scientific positivism is waning and giving way to a "growing appreciation for the importance of culture," including religion, among urbanists. Pratt (2004, 173), too, ultimately concludes that the under-emphasis is unwarranted:

> In the case of New York and Detroit, at least, the evidence presented indicates that throughout the century-long period surveyed [1895-1994] the churches significantly impacted government and vice versa. It is

> reasonable to expect that subsequent research, focused on these or other large American cities, would provide additional support for the view that religious bodies remain a significant, ongoing aspect of present-day urban governance.

Much of the contemporary work at the national level examines the impact of religion on elections and public opinion. What about the importance of religion to urban electoral outcomes? Pratt (2004, 8) writes that several early writings on city politics treat "the importance of religious voting in city elections" (Reed, 1934; Gosnell, 1937; Kneier, 1947). Stone (1987) seems to suggest that religious affiliation may affect electoral decisions at the local level. This could occur through several mechanisms. For example, a church leader may encourage parishioners to support or oppose a particular policy initiative or agenda given his/her church's receipt or lack of receipt of incentives from policy leaders/entrepreneurs (Stone, 2005). Churches may also need a "favor" from the local leadership that pushes congregants into political advocacy (McCann, 2002). Or, from an ethno-religious perspective, religious affiliates may support or oppose a policy because its proponents are of the same or different religious persuasion, respectively. While past scholars certainly studied conflicts between Protestants and Catholics, as Peterson (1987) alludes to, it is unlikely that modern voters in urban elections continue to oppose rival faiths *en masse*.

This leaves the first explanation—that of church support or opposition. While suggestions of this nature conjure images of a fiery pastor at the pulpit, this may also occur through indirect means, as Dahl (1961/2005) suggests. For example, church culture may condition members to favor certain institutional forms over others.

Little scholarship of urban electoral politics has centered on religion, or even included it as a potential variable. Sharp (2007, 58-59), alluding to the religious restructuring hypothesis, writes that,

> …urban scholarship has very little to offer about the extent to which culture war divisions do or do not shape election outcomes within cities…Matters of religiosity and the broader cultural divisions outlined earlier are largely ignored. It is as though cities are somehow immune to the postindustrial cultural division that some analysts claim is central to understanding elections in America…Is there a parallel body of contemporary urban scholarship addressing these important matters of the role of religion [and] cultural polarization…but in the urban electoral sphere? The answer is by and large no.

The largest body of work on religion and urban politics focuses on the black church and its political/community activities (Day, 2001; Owens, 2007; Sawyer, 2001; Smith, 2003; Smith and Harris, 2005; Wallace, 2003). Some scholarship has examined clergy activism in urban settings (Crawford and Olson, 2001). A few studies have examined local culture war divisions over issues like sex education, evolution, abortion, and homosexuality, hot issues in both the church and public at large (Brown, Knopp, and Morrill, 2005; Deckman, 2004; Sharp, 1999). Few, if any, of these studies rely on polling random samples of the urban public.

One reason why few scholars have examined public opinion in cities is the lack of polling data collected and available at the local level (Peterson, 1981). As Peterson (1981, 127) states,

> Polling public opinion is almost as expensive among a relatively small population confined within one city as it is for the United States as a whole. But whereas the cost of a national poll can be borne by national polling organizations with a national audience or by national candidates with national constituencies, the cost of local polling is often prohibitive.

This may be one reason why scholars of religion and politics typically rely on polls of the mass public—the costs are comparable and the payoff looms larger. Urban politics scholars do not poll local populations about religion because of these scholars' lack of interest in the topic. If they do conduct a poll—many simply rely on secondary data, if public opinion is even a matter of interest—question space is limited and must be devoted to more pressing matters of politics and economics.

There is a single study that examines a topic similar to this dissertation within a single city using similar methods—Demerath and Williams' (1992) study of Springfield, Massachusetts. Demerath and Williams recount a religious and political history of Springfield with emphasis on the city's recent conversion from Protestant Congregationalist domination to Roman Catholic majority. They conduct a thorough case study of three issues of "community controversy" which together range from social policy to public morality: (1) publicly-provided homeless care; (2) economic development of a black neighborhood (Winchester Square); and (3) sexuality, including abortion and sex education. They survey, via a mail questionnaire, 256 members of the public and small "elite" samples of political-economic, religious, and educational insiders. While they collect this quantitative data, they rely more on qualitative and historical analysis to answer questions of religious change, community power, and church-state interaction.

Given Springfield's Catholic majority, questions of religious hegemony that may defy church-state divisions naturally arise. Demerath and Williams find less "bridging" of church and state than they predicted. Nonetheless they find that, "Religionists of varying stripes…have exerted considerable political influence on selected issues, indeed

more influence than many social scientists might have expected" (Demerath and Williams, 1992, 255). The authors nicely summarize the state of religion (and religious research) in America's communities:

> Religion in Springfield may be in decline, but is hardly in demise. Any attempt to understand civic power and politics without it is sadly myopic. Issues of homelessness, black-neighborhood development, and sexuality have all evoked major religious responses. Religious protagonists have had their say, if not always their way. In the process, they reveal a dimension of urban power that is frequently neglected (Demerath and Williams, 1992, 140).

Urban politics scholars also have a hearty interest in urban *policy*, particularly the extent to which the U.S. national government intervenes in urban affairs. Studies of urban policy emphasize several stages of development beginning with the Progressive Era's calls for reform and culminating in the post-Great Society decline in federal involvement in cities' problems (see Mohl, 1993). While religious actors—clergy and other religiously-motivated reformers—are identified as key players in the early twentieth century progressive age, they are notably absent from later stages (Ibid). Advocacy for assistance to central cities—whether genuine or for the purposes of "renewal"—shifted to the new urban lobby (e.g., U.S. Conference of Mayors) and the downtown business community (e.g., Urban Land Institute) during the depression/New Deal and post-war periods, respectively (Ibid). Private involvement in urban communities largely shifted to leftist radicals until the late twentieth century when the church reemerged as a key player identified by urbanist academics (Ramsay, 1998). This is partially a response to the worldwide rebuff of socialism but also a result of the "new federalism," which forced communities to fend for themselves with less support from above. Privatization

advocates now call for increased involvement of faith-based institutions in social service delivery at the neighborhood level (Savas, 2005).

Institutional Theory and Design

Since the mid-twentieth century, political science—and much of social science in general—has left behind the (typically "naïve") study of institutions for the study of individual actors, encouraged by the dominant approaches of behavioralism and Rational Choice (Peters, 1999). This shift is even reflected in the discipline's change of name from Government to Political "Science" (Goodin, 1996). Beginning in the 1980s, a "counter-reformation" under the banner of New Institutionalism has returned to examining the importance of formal and informal institutions in constraining individual action (Peters, 1999). Goodin (1996) notes that institutionalism has recently reemerged in nearly every branch of the social sciences in distinct yet comparable forms—in history, sociology, economics, political science, and social/political theory.

Of all the social sciences, sociology has been the most consistent in emphasizing the importance of institutional effects on individual agency. Goodin (1996, 7) writes of sociological institutional theory:

> The old institutionalism within sociology focused upon ways in which collective entities—the family, the profession, *the church*, the school, the state—create and constitute institutions which shape individuals, in turn. The new institutionalism focuses, more modestly perhaps, upon ways in which being embedded in such collectivities alters individuals' preferences and possibilities. But it is the hallmark of sociological institutionalism, whether old or new, to emphasize how individual behavior is shaped by (as well, perhaps, as shaping) the larger group setting (emphasis added).

It appears that sociological institutional theory is more helpful for the purposes of this present investigation because I examine the role of the church(es) in shaping individual preferences for political institutions; rather than political institutions constraining individual actions, as emphasized by political science-based institutionalists. While often turning first to political institutions and organizations, the general approach of institutional theory in political science is nonetheless applicable:

> …there are important respects in which institutions matter to behavior, and it is those to which the "new institutionalist" resurrection of that older institutionalist tradition within public administration points. The behavioralist focus usefully serves to fix attention upon agency, upon individuals and groupings of individuals whose behavior it is. But those individuals *are shaped by*, and in their collective enterprises act through, structures and organizations and institutions (Goodin, 1996, 13; emphasis added).

Even political scientists within the aforementioned behavioral and Rational Choice camps are rediscovering institutions: "Behavioralists find they need to bring the state back in, game theorists find it emerging from within their models. Either way, institutions (political and otherwise) have once again come to the fore in political studies" (Ibid, 15).

Scholars are divided over the definition of "institution." Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom (1999, 37) writes that some refer to institutions simply as organizational entities, such as legislatures, corporations, or family units; others, including herself, define institutions as "rules, norms, and strategies adopted by individuals operating within or across organizations." In simple terms, institutions are ideas about how something should be done, structured, or otherwise constituted. Ostrom's view is representative of the most-widely accepted definition in institutional theory, including her own subfield of institutional rational choice or, more specifically, "institutional analysis and development" (IAD). Institutional design, then, is "the process of crafting a

configuration of rules…aimed at reducing the severity of the trade-offs among multiple values by shaping incentives in ways that encourage desirable behaviors" (Oakerson, 2004).

Meyer, Boli, and Thomas (1987, 36-37) hold a similar conception but go into greater detail of the process of "institutionalization":

> By *institution*, we mean a set of cultural rules that give generalized meaning to social activity and regulate it in a patterned way. Institutionalization, then, involves processes that make such sets of rules seem natural and taken for granted while eliminating alternative interpretations and regulations. In the Western tradition, rules become institutionalized as they are linked more closely to moral authority and lawful order in nature.

In an earlier echo of this same claim, Zucker (1983, 2) writes that institutions represent a "phenomenological process by which certain social relationships and actions come to be taken for granted." In this light, McMullen (1994) links neoinstitutionalism to Berger and Luckmann's (1966) influential ideas about the "social construction of reality"—meaning that individuals and organizations interact to form socially-approved representations of each other's actions which, through habitualization, become institutionalized and thus understood as objective reality. New Institutionalists emphasize how individuals "learn…taken-for-granted scripts, habits, routines, rules, and conventional menus and categories of action" (McMullen, 1994, 710). In other words, "The views, interests, and beliefs of individuals themselves are constituted by institutions" (Ibid, 710-711).

While institutions extend beyond organizational entities, organizations and their structures, as Ostrom (1999) suggests, are typically important components of institutional arrangements. Organizations, concisely defined, are "social unit[s] with some particular

purposes" (Shafritz and Ott, 1996, 1). In considering the differences between organizations and institutions, Powelson (2003) writes that, "An organization is an administrative and functional structure, clearly bounded, while an institution is a significant practice within a culture, such as the institution of marriage." In this sense, American religion and metropolitan governance are both institutions; individual denominations and congregations are organizations with administrative and functional structures. Metropolitan governments are organizations which reflect preferences for how an institution should be structured or organized. Institutional environments shape organizational structures and culture. According to Rainey (1997, 15-18), organizational structures "are the relatively stable, observable assignments and divisions of responsibility within [an] organization, achieved through such means as hierarchies of authority, rules and regulations, and specialization of individuals, groups, and subunits."

Ostrom (1999) states that in the absence of empirical research based on an appropriate framework, "recommendations of [institutional] reform may be based on naïve ideas about which kinds of institutions are 'good' or 'bad' and not on an analysis of performance." This may affect non-experts choices or preferences for institutional design. Ostrom challenges the *Homo economicus* view of man dominate in neoclassical economics and substitutes an understanding of "bounded rationality." From this view, information gathering is costly, processing capabilities are limited, and decisions are thus made based on "incomplete knowledge of all possible alternatives and their likely outcomes" (Ostrom, 1999, 46). People can make mistakes (see V. Ostrom, 1986)—for example, they can errantly vote in favor of city-county consolidation and later recognize (perhaps) that such a vote was not indeed in their individual interests (or vice versa).

Culture—political, religious, organizational, or in general—affects institutional and organizational structures. Ostrom (1999, 57) defines *culture* as "attributes of a community" including "the level of common understanding that potential participants share about the structure of particular types of action arenas." Processes of institutional change are key to the practice of institutional design because institutions build on preexisting institutional and cultural frameworks and rarely construct institutions "from scratch." Goodin (1996) identifies three major models of institutional change by means of *accident*, *evolution*, or *intention*. While institutions do arise at times by accident and do adapt to their environments, most efforts at institutional design and change are intentional—that is, based on the efforts of entrepreneurs and their followers.

A similar debate paralleling differences between individualist and institutionalist camps is waged between the competing positions on the "agent-structure problem" (Wendt, 1987; Imbroscio, 1999). This debate pits structuralist accounts of social and political action versus those who believe individual, human agency plays a role in determining outcomes. In response to structuralist works, such as Peterson's (1981) aforementioned study, some scholars rejected both extreme perspectives in favor of a "dual" notion of structure. Scholars like Giddens (1979) and Abrams (1982) spoke of "structuring" and "structuration"—arguing that structure does shape human action, but individuals can in turn reshape societal structures. Thus, individuals are not completely handicapped by social forces. Imbroscio (1999) posits that social science is coalescing around this dual view of structure. Some prominent urbanists, most notably Stone (1989), explicitly embrace the views of Giddens and Abrams. While the structuralist view may be akin to the old institutionalism, the duality perspective reflects the

contemporary emphasis on "new" institutionalism—a sort of synthesis between institutional and behavioral poles. Imbroscio (1999) argues that this debate is important because it dictates our views of democracy and political responsiveness—thus if elected leaders are beholden to existing institutions, then they cannot be held responsible for neglecting social justice in favor of economic development, for example.

Institutional Design in Church and State

One possible connection between urban government and politics and religion is the study of institutional design. No work has directly linked internal denominational structures to preferences for similar structures in society, such as monocentric or polycentric urban governance.

All Christian denominations accept some form of religious authority. Typically, authority can take the forms of Pope, Bishop, Priest/Minister, Pastor, or Deacon/Elder. These offices are situated at various levels and roughly correspond with equivalent levels of secular, political authority at the international, national, regional, and local ranks. One could term this "religious federalism." This term is used differently in this sense than its use by other scholars. Some speak of religious federalism as "institutionalizing majoritarian tyranny in a religious federal state" (El-Gaili, 2004). Instead, the term can refer to a federal, or multi-tiered, structure within a single church, denomination, or other religious body (see Takayama, 1974).

While most religious bodies have varying levels of authority, one often predominates. It is often clear to members and even outside observers which level is most-emphasized in church governance. Determining which level of authority *should*

predominate is still a highly-controversial issue in the twenty-first century church. This is made obvious by the ever-growing independent, non-denominational, and inter-denominational churches forming in the U.S. and around the world—which essentially *opt out* of denominational hierarchy in favor of local, congregational control (Smidt, et al., 1996, 238, n9).

Scholars of religious governance refer to denominations' forms of *polity* (Harrison, 1959; Moberg, 1962; Takayama, 1974; Davidson, Schlangen, and D'Antonio, 1969; McMullen, 1994). Citing Harrison, Takayama defines polity as "formally (or theologically) defined aspects of church government and administration, including the relation between individual and groups within a denomination" (Takayama, 1974, 10-11). McMullen (1994) understands religious polity as a form of institutionalized myth and ritual. He writes, "Polities are the rules of ecclesiastical authority and dictate the rituals by which church government operates" (Ibid, 712).

Takayama (1974) goes on to describe three main types of church polity: *episcopal* (or hierarchical); *presbyterian* (or collegial); and *congregational* (or autonomous). In the episcopal type, "formal hierarchy is most explicit…the church itself being sometimes finally defined by and restricted to the clerical bureaucracy" (Takayama, 1974, 11). Takayama lists the Roman Catholic Church as being "strictly hierarchical," while other examples like the Protestant Episcopal Church and the United Methodist Church are somewhat more "balance[ed]." On the other end of the spectrum, "Congregationalism places the maximum power in the local group both with respect to the choice of the minister and the control of organizational affairs" (Takayama, 1974, 11). Prime examples are the variety of Baptist groups—Takayama (1974, 29) writes that,

> Baptists believe that local congregations bear the marks of the true Church and theologically they do not accept any higher human authority and organization. They believe that their national conventions are merely functional associations of local churches formed for their mutual support and a channel for their cooperative efforts, but have no binding authority over local churches.

While Takayama notes that Protestant denominations in the contemporary U.S. have tended to resemble one another—many taking the congregational form—the Roman Catholic Church is distinct as the only major body to retain a truly hierarchical/ centralized polity. Thus, a comparison of governance structures (polity) in the Catholic Church and, for example, a prominent Baptist tradition like the Southern Baptist Convention should be striking—theoretically, theologically, and in practice. I do not emphasize the presbyterian-type denominations for several reasons: (a) there exists a varying degree of reliance on regional institutions in these churches, thus preventing broad generalizations; (b) Takayama (1974) suggests that a move to congregational polity is at work in many presbyterian denominations, thus making regional institutions largely into "fifth wheels"; and (c) these types are not highly represented in Louisville, the location currently under study. Past studies comparing church polities have also sought to compare examples representing the *poles* of church polity (McMullen, 1994).

Past research finds that congregants generally perceive the correct structure implied by the polity typology, both of their own denomination and others' denominations (Davidson, et al., 1969; McMullen, 1994). For example, Catholics recognize a hierarchical structure in their own churches—although Protestants do tend to see the Catholic Church as slightly more hierarchical than its own members (Davidson, et al., 1969). Davidson, et al. (Ibid, 322) do theorize that their results may not be

attributable to actual church practices but rather "ideological commitments to traditional Protestant norms."

Baptist Pastor George W. Truett (2001) classically portrayed Catholics as the "exact opposite" of Baptists in his 1920 address from the U.S. Capital highlighting the differences between Baptists and Roman Catholics and the disparaging views Baptists hold of the Catholic Church. He said:

> The Baptist message and the Roman Catholic message are the very antipodes of each other. The Roman Catholic message is sacerdotal, sacramentarian, and ecclesiastical. In its scheme of salvation it magnifies the church, the priest, and the sacraments. The Baptist message is non-sacerdotal, non-sacramentarian, and non-ecclesiastical…the Catholic conception of the church, thrusting all its complex and cumbrous machinery between the soul and God, prescribing beliefs, claiming to exercise the power of the keys, and to control the channels of grace—all such lording it over the consciences of men is to the Baptist mind a ghastly tyranny in the realm of the soul and tends to frustrate the grace of God, to destroy freedom of conscience, and to hinder terrible the coming of [the] Kingdom of God.

Cairns (1981, 79, emphasis in original) argues that the church is simultaneously an "eternal, invisible, biblical *organism*" and a "temporal, historical, visible, human, institutional *organization*." He identifies these as the respective *end* and *means* of the church. In essence, the end shapes the means (polity) chosen by a particular church. Luther and other reformers often made reference to "the idea of the invisible church: the enduring existence of true Christians—proto-Protestants—guided by Providence, yet often invisible amid the deep anti-Christian corruption of the [Catholic] church" (Barnett, 1999). Cairns (Ibid, 79) writes that, "Any large corporate body must of necessity have leadership; and, as it grows, the division of functions and consequent specializations of leadership must come if it is to function effectively."

Sommerfeld (1968) similarly attributes denominations' social structures to their theology of the Divine Person or Godhead, which he labels "the Ultimate." While not exactly corresponding with the three historical polities, Sommerfeld's typology does exhibit striking similarities—confirming Cairns' (1981) idea that the end (the Ultimate) shapes the means (polity). He defines three ways of conceiving the Ultimate: *Familial*, *Democratic*, and *Dominical*. Familial and Democratic correspond roughly to the hierarchical and congregational polities, respectively. The Familial-type "views the Ultimate primarily in terms of divine family relationships" among the members of the Trinity—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This Familial-type places authority in the Church as the "cumulative possessor of knowledge." Sommerfeld (1968, 182) writes, "To know God is to know what the church has come to know of the Ultimate through the years." Religious authority is thus "recorded in corporate decisions arrived at in and through the apostolic continuity of the divine family" (Sommerfeld, 1968, 184). This conception characterizes the Roman Catholic Church (Ibid).

The Democratic-type, on the other hand, "emphasizes that there is a divine Ultimate…whom each and all can individually know and experience" (Sommerfeld, 1968, 182). For the Democratic-type, religious authority is "centered in the spiritual experience of the individual" (Sommerfeld, 1968, 184). This conception characterizes "mainstream" American Protestantism, including Baptists, minus what some may call the "high" or intellectual church with their emphases on documents. Lutherans, Episcopalians, and Calvinist Presbyterians are characterized by Sommerfeld as a third type, Dominical, and are more difficult to corporately fit into a traditional polity. Dominical roughly corresponds with a blend of hierarchical and presbyterian governance.

In sum, the Familial-type emphasizes the body corporate, the Church and its hierarchy; the Democratic-type emphasizes the individual and individual congregations.

In many ways, the whole of the Reformation and later Protestant schisms were due primarily to disputes over church governance systems (Cairns, 1981; Barnett, 1999; Sullins, 2004). Cairns (1981) writes that the origins of church polity lie with Christ who chose the twelve apostles to be the leaders of the fledgling church and these same apostles developed the other offices of the church, presumably under the influence of the Holy Spirit, the third member of the Godhead bestowed upon Christ's followers at Pentecost. Cairns cautions that this "does not by any means imply a pyramidal hierarchy, such as the Roman Catholic church has developed, because the new officials were to be chosen [democratically] by the people, ordained by the apostles" (Ibid, 79). This statement reflects Cairns' own bias. Protestant reformers like the Puritans opposed the "un-Christian episcopal hierarchy" of Catholicism and "considered their presbyterianism outlook [on polity] the same as that of the church polity practiced by the apostles" (Barnett, 1999). Despite Vatican II's liberal reforms and lower-level clergy and laity demanding greater roles in church decisions, the Catholic Church remains committed to its episcopal form of polity and has offered minimal concessions to Catholic "congregationalists" (White, 1972; D'Antonio, et al., 1989; Kohmescher, 1980).

No scholarship has examined whether churches intentionally (or implicitly) encourage their followers to prefer or even replicate these organizational structures outside the walls of the church. Some scholars speak of "cue perceptions," the explicit or implicit instruction provided by religious leaders on "matters politic" (Leege, 1992; Welch, Leege, Wald, and Kellstedt, 1993). If according to Sommerfeld and Cairns,

conceptions of the Ultimate influence denominations' own organizational and social forms, then might not cues involve replicating a denomination's own organizational form? Phrased alternatively, if political issues concern the organization of government, it makes sense that religious believers would prefer their own theologically-derived organizational preferences based in their idea of the Ultimate. To use Schattschneider's (1960) famous terminology, organizations are defined by the "mobilization of bias." In this sense, religious organizations may be some of the most "biased" of all. Clergy, and laity acting on cues, spread the message of the Gospel, distilled through their particular religious tradition—of which one's own conception of what constitutes the "true Church" and how this body should be governed compose a key component of such a Gospel.

Political institutions at the national level in the U.S. are set by constitutional prerogative: the roles of Congress (legislature), Presidency (executive), and Court (judiciary) remain relatively unchanged, despite relative shifts in importance one direction or the other. At the state and local level, there exists quite a deal of variation in institutional design (Miller, 2002). Just as arguments persist over the proper organizational structure of religious denominations, so do arguments continue over the "best" form of local governance. At a basic level, these debates pit *monocentrists* against *polycentrists* (Oakerson, 2004).

Monocentrists, or consolidationists, prefer a single, centralized government with authority over the whole of a metropolitan area with power to regulate behavior and development. Polycentrists favor many localized governments covering the metropolitan region—"a pattern of governance that emerges from the interactions of multiple independent centers of authority" (Oakerson, 2004, 21). While typically emphasizing the

benefits of interjurisdictional competition, based in Tiebout (1956), polycentrists also embrace institutions meant to encourage collective action but without centralizing authority (see Feiock, 2004a). Monocentrists and polycentrists derive their commitments from both empirical observation (such as the effect of one form of governance on economic development outcomes, over the other) and normative values (such as beliefs about government or the market's abilities to direct society). Visser (2002) terms the two camps' models "reform-consolidation" and "market-public choice," respectively. These two terms are also used to describe historical stages of evolution of urban governance in the U.S., with reform-minded monocentrism dominating the early twentieth century and polycentrism achieving relevance in the mid-century wake of Tiebout's thesis (Wallis, 1994; Schechter, 1996). Visser (2002) describes a later wave of reform encouraging greater consolidation in the 1960s-70s, and again in the 1990s, together culminating in several large scale city-county consolidations: Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee (1962); Jacksonville-Duval County, Florida (1967); Indianapolis-Marion County, Indiana (1969); and Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky (2003; Morgan, England, and Pelissero, 2007).

These two terms, monocentric and polycentric, are also used in urban economics and geography to describe theories or observations of the urban spatial form. The monocentric city model posits a single central business district surrounded by declining values of land rent and thus differing land uses from office to factory to housing and eventually agriculture (see Anas, Arnott, and Small, 1998). This economic model, which has much in common with the earlier sociological theories of urban form, is based in the influential works of Alonso (1964), Muth (1969), and Mills (1972). Later scholars have

documented a trend toward multi-centered urban regions with multiple business districts and thus more-sporadic patterns of development (Garreau, 1991; Dear, 2002). This view is associated with the LA School of urban geography (Dear and Flusty, 1998). The political and economic versions of monocentrism and polycentrism are not interchangeable. In this study, the terms are used in the political sense.

Is religious fervor, gained through religious participation, responsible, at least in part, for passionate views on the structure of urban institutions? The prominent political scientist, polycentrist, and Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom (2000) alleges that academic monocentrists' rely on "self-evident truths." Ostrom makes the case that scholars and policy practitioners often act as if their diagnosis and ensuing policy prescriptions are dictated by "common sense" and thus obvious to all. The demonization of metropolitan fragmentation is one of her two chief examples. Ostrom (2000, 33) admits that the "sheer complexity of… [local] government service delivery arrangements" bewilders most analysts and laypeople alike. Many perfunctorily presume that having "large numbers of small governmental units" servicing a single metropolitan area obviously leads to "inadequate, inefficient, and inequitable services" (Ibid). The inverse—that large, centralized, consolidated governments are more professional, efficient, and equitable—became conventional wisdom.

Often without recourse to scientific evidence, advocates of monocentrism push to consolidate metropolitan regions under a single governmental entity. Ostrom cites monocentric theorists claiming things like, "A diagnosis of the metropolitan malady is comparatively easy and its logic is too compelling to admit disagreement….Nothing, it would seem, could be more obvious or more rational [than consolidation]…" (from

Hawley and Zimmer, 1970, 3). Modern-day advocates make similar claims, ignoring evidence like Ostrom's own comparative study of police agencies in 80 metropolitan areas across the U.S. She and her colleagues conclude that small and medium-sized departments are more effective at producing direct services and that police performance is enhanced in metropolitan areas with larger numbers of departments. Both findings contradict monocentrists' claims.

Religionists often make reference to their Truth's self-evidence; and are often encouraged by philosophers and theologians to instead base their policy recommendations on rational argument and commonly-held values/norms in pluralistic societies (see Stout, 2004; Ambrosius, 2005). Perhaps it is only natural that those favoring hierarchical church governance or localized, congregational governance would see these structural forms as best for all organizations in society.

Catholics and evangelicals (of which Southern Baptists constitute the largest component in Louisville and the nation) have the greatest penchant for receiving ministerial cues (Leege, 1992). Thus, one would expect that these denominations are prime candidates for the exhibition of the effect discussed here—which I label "polity replication" for shorthand. One can imagine a Southern Baptist arguing with a Roman Catholic friend over the proper role of authority in the church. What if the same Southern Baptist and Catholic parishioners instead discussed an upcoming city-county consolidation referendum? It is conceivable that the Southern Baptist may make the claim, "I've always believed in local control, whether we're talking about church or matters of state." The Catholic may respond something like, "There is nothing wrong with large, central government—our church is large and lead by His Holiness the Pope.

This is better for the church, and our city would be better off consolidated with a strong mayor able to do as he/she sees fit." These hypothetical statements are not meant to stereotype but rather reflect past research findings and this present studies' theoretical orientation. This sentiment is certainly suggested by past research on elite and public Catholic support for urban political machines in the U.S. and European Union integration in Europe, where Catholic support was significantly higher than among Protestants (Merton, 1972; Nelsen, Guth, and Fraser, 2001).

What of the direction of causality? Leege (1992, 200) writes that "religion is both a shaper and mirror of culture and social life." Are religious denominations *shaping* attitudes about the proper design of political institutions; or are they themselves simply *mirroring* the societal debate and pre-existing preferences of outsiders? While mirroring no doubt occurs, shaping is much more important, and likely, in the contemporary U.S. and elsewhere. Cross-national studies indicate, or at least theorize, that countries with Catholic majorities exhibit centrist/corporatist forms of government, while Protestant nations are more democratic and participatory. For example, Gill (2004, 2) writes that in Latin America:

> Catholic leaders and their devout followers often had strong preferences for centrist and corporatist forms of government. During the nineteenth century, the Church fervently resisted the advance of European liberalism and fuelled the preference of practicing Catholics for more corporatist forms of social organization.

While the Latin American case has colonial baggage, it does seem that the introduction of Protestantism and increases in individual religiosity may advance democratic ideals—or at least civic participation. Comparison of European countries, past and present, reveals similar patterns. It is clear that a nation's religious identity (in most if not all cases)

predates the contemporary governance structure and even the existence of the modern state. Christendom was inspired by Christianity's universalism; and later Catholic support for EU integration continues to draw its inspiration from the Church's social teachings (Nelsen, Guth, and Fraser, 2001). As Weber suggested, it is religion that affects "other forms of social and political behavior" first—and then the culture itself may begin to reshape religion (Gill, 2004, 2).

The roots of the Baptist movement lie in separatist Congregationalism, which argued against the state church and were active in England during the late 1500s (Cairns, 1981). Early Congregationalist Robert Browne "argued that believers were to be united to Christ and to one another by a voluntary covenant, that officers were to be chosen by the [church] members, and that no congregation was to have authority over another" (Ibid, 337). Followers were among the first settlers of North America who "applied [this] covenant idea to political life by entering into the Mayflower Compact before landing at Plymouth" (Ibid, 338). This is a past example of congregants' vision of church polity shaping other societal institutions. The first English Baptist church emerged from this movement in the late 1500s and the first in the new world came in the 1600s (Ibid).

Other scholars like White (1972) argue that churches' organizational structures can be a reflection of their environments. For example, many American churches' congregational polities are the result of America's national emphases on democracy and self-governance/reliance. White (Ibid, 100) writes, "we find churches in the free-church tradition modeling their ecclesiastical organizations after the political structures of society." Combining the insights, it seems that polity affected the very foundations of

American society, which then tend to reinforce and reproduce a certain democratic, congregational polity in some indigenous religious movements.

City-County Consolidation: Attitudes and Religious Influences

City-county consolidation is one form of contemporary metropolitan reform with profound influence on the life and governance of a city. Consolidation involves the dissolution of City and County and the creation of a new government encompassing the territory of both. The effect is akin to the annexation of all unincorporated land within a county into the central city limits. Questions remain as to whether the new government is a "city without suburbs" or, in cases of powerful suburban interests, "suburbs without a city" (Rusk, 2003; Savitch and Vogel, 2004). Consolidation is "a radical form of organizational change because it is so complete and often difficult to reverse" and is thus, perhaps, the most drastic form of institutional (re)design available to local governments in the U.S. (Savitch and Vogel, 2004, 760). Consolidation is almost universally supported by Chambers of Commerce, who recognize this form of government as more corporate-like in its structure.

Morgan, England, and Pelissero (2007, 52) summarize the consensus view of who typically supports efforts at city-county consolidation and who does not:

> The central-city business elite, civic organizations, big-city newspapers, and reform groups often support reorganization, while suburban newspapers, mayors and employees of small towns, fringe-area business people, and central-city blacks often lead the opposition.

This seems to suggest that a regression analysis of individual beliefs about consolidation would find positive effects on socio-economic indicators like income and education, although mitigated by distance from the city center, and negative effects on

suburbanization and African American status (Erie, Kirlin, and Rabinovitz, 1972; Harrigan, 1993; Lyons, 1972; Temple, 1972). Temple (1972) and Horan and Taylor (1977) find that socio-demographic variables are important predictors of attitudes on consolidation. On the other hand, Edwards and Bohland (1991) find that socio-demographic factors are weak or insignificant predictors of consolidation support, except for residence. Urban residents are more likely than suburban residents to support consolidation, while suburban residents are more likely than rural residents. This supports a hypothesized decline in support as one moves from the city center to the urban fringe.

Edwards and Bohland (1991) conclude that one's vote in a consolidation referendum reflects two "attitudinal dimensions" of reform-mindedness and attitudes toward economic development strategies. According to my reading of the issues, debates over city-county consolidation often center on preferences for institutional design, redistribution from suburb to city, political power/trust, and views of consolidation elites—which may be reflected in individuals' opinions. In other words, one's opinion of consolidation or a consolidated government may be a proxy for their ideas about institutional design (under general terms such as the role of government in society), redistribution, political power, or prominent personalities.

Research on religious actors and city-county consolidation is slim. Carr and Feiock (2002) do find that religious organizations exert a modest impact on both "stages" of the consolidation process: *agenda-setting* and *referendum*. Their comparative study is based on data collected through a national survey of county officials in communities that held referenda on city-county consolidation over a ten-year period. Carr and Feiock

(2002, 84) write that, "Religious groups apparently had a very minimal role in the issue; in fact, most respondents (62 percent) felt these groups had no effect whatsoever." Their data show that only nine percent of the responding county officials believed religious actors had a significant involvement in agenda-setting or the referendum stages of consolidation, respectively.

Savitch and Vogel (2004) suggest that churches may have played a role in influencing public opinion about consolidation in the Louisville case. However, they merely mention in passing that the coalition opposing consolidation, Citizens Organized in Search of the Truth (CO$T), held meetings or rallies in local churches. It is unknown, from their research, to what extent religious organizations themselves took stances on the issue.

Much research on consolidation emphasizes elites or entrepreneurs' attitudes about consolidation and/or roles in placing the issue on the agenda and bankrolling electoral support (e.g., Durning and Edwards, 1992). While consolidation may be put on the agenda by elites, it is decided by the voting public. Peterson's *City Limits* (1981) approach and Logan and Molotch's (1987) "growth machine" thesis surprisingly share much in common but differ on who benefits from growth. Likewise, voters must decide if consolidation is in the interest of "the city" as a whole or a subsection of the city's elite. Religious commitments' influences on voters' perceptions of consolidation and decisions in consolidation referenda have not been investigated.

Current research on private actors' involvement in the consolidation issue is rather pluralist in orientation and based on power's first face (decision making) or, at best, its second face, manipulating agendas (Dahl, 1961/2005; Bachrach and Baratz,

1962). It ignores more recent developments like Lukes' (2005) third face of power—manipulating people's preferences. Religious organizations no doubt exercise power's third face. Church members make their own individual decisions that they believe are based in their own conclusions, but are indeed shaped by the church and its leadership. This use of power is not necessarily nefarious or even conscious. While it is assumed that business, labor, and political groups shape preferences, religious organizations are often ignored. While Carr and Feiock's (2002) respondents may not have witnessed the hand of the church in action, it still remains that religious organizations affected consolidation referendum outcomes, in the least, through their encouragement (or discouragement) of civic involvement and impartation of civic skills (Sharp, 2007; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). The building of civic skills in churches is known to vary based on type of church polity—hierarchical church structures like those exhibited by Catholic churches are less conducive to learning civic skills than more-participatory Protestant congregations (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995).

Religious organizations may also shape attitudes about morality and institutional design and, in this way, affect the outcome of a consolidation referendum. Scholars have ignored the application of power's third face to the study of religion and institutional design. While churches certainly play minimal, if any, roles in setting metropolitan agendas and bullying the public (at least successfully), they certainly shape members' values and, to borrow a popular term, "worldviews"—the loose English translation of the German, *weltanschauung*. Christian author James Sire (2004) defines a worldview as:

> ...a commitment, a fundamental orientation of the heart, that can be expressed as a story or in a set of presuppositions (assumptions which may be true, partially true or entirely false) which we hold (consciously or subconsciously, consistently or inconsistently) about the basic constitution

> of reality, and that provides the foundation on which we live and move and have our being.

Contemporary Christians, particularly evangelical Protestants, have attempted to recast their faith as a worldview in opposition to the perceived secularism of other modern and postmodern schools of philosophy (Naugle, 2002). The more "subconscious" elements of a contemporary Christian worldview are ripe for sociological and psychological analysis—including preferences for institutional design manifested through consolidation referenda and subsequent perceptions of a merged city-county government.

Toward a Theory of "Polity Replication"

A theory of polity replication should emphasize two mechanisms—*ideological* and *participatory* polity replication. Figure 2.1 illustrates these two forms of polity replication as a path diagram—in similar fashion to a logic model, a scheme used by program evaluators to understand the theoretical connections between inputs and outcomes (McLaughlin and Jordan, 1999). The arrows represent directions of causality or feedback loops. On one hand, attendance at church worship and religious education shapes a congregants ideology about God and spirituality (theology), state (political ideology), society (social ideology), and structures/organizations. Presumably, those "in the pews" more often will receive more "cues" and thus be more likely to vote on political issues, like consolidation and morality-based referendums, reflecting their church's official or unofficial positions.

Figure 2.1: Path Diagram of Polity Replication Process



On the other hand, those who participate in church programs and governance may learn civic skills, according to Verba and colleagues (1995), and develop intense preferences for similar governance structures. While participants in corporate or government bureaucracies may come to loathe such structures, monetary constraints may prohibit organizational members from leaving. The religious sector, however, is entirely voluntary and thus participants can generally "self-select" the church that best fits their preferences (McMullen, 1994). Since many religious adults were raised as religious children, their preferences for a religious tradition are shaped early on through socialization and their preferences for organizational structure will develop later, based on positive or negative experiences. Some Catholics, who become disillusioned with church ritual or hierarchy, may join a mainline or evangelical Protestant congregation following a conversion experience. This should not, however, be seen as the norm (e.g., Hadaway and Marler, 1993). Most congregants are likely to believe their church structure is the best or ideal form.

While this present study does not explicitly test which form of polity replication is at work in consolidation referenda, I posit that both are present. However, the effects of each cannot be parsed out due to limitations in the present data. This section and the corresponding figure are included to better illustrate the theorized connections and inspire further exploration of polity replication.

Religion, Redistribution, and Public Trust

Consolidation support, as a variable, may instead serve as a proxy for redistribution support, because consolidation is often seen as marshalling suburban

resources to aid a central city; or public trust, because consolidation support requires taking elites' claims at face value and the belief that elites consider citizens' interests in addition to their own.

Researchers have examined the effect of religious affiliation and religiosity on penchants for redistributive policy. Wilson (2009) cites literature arguing that evangelical Protestants tend to take conservative economic positions that place emphasis on individual responsibility rather than government intervention (also see Johnstone, 1988; Hargrove, 1989; and Barker and Carman, 2000). This does not mean that evangelicals take their faith's requirement to love and serve the poor lightly (Wuthnow, 1994b). Instead, evangelicals tend to support "relational" approaches to alleviating proverty—i.e., the charitable works of congregations and individual believers (Smith, 1998). Black Protestants tend to take very liberal positions on social welfare policy—and are the only major U.S. religious tradition for which increased religiosity correlates with increased liberalism (Wilson, 2009). Roman Catholics and mainline Protestants tend to lie somewhere in the middle and are more likely to support government social programs than evangelicals (Ibid).

Wilensky (1981) finds a strong relationship between Catholic party power and social welfare spending in the liberal democracies of Europe and America. He also posits a connection between Catholicism and corporatism. Wilensky (1981, 362) writes:

> Catholic power (where it appears) is not only a more important source of welfare state development than left party power, but as one might expect, Catholicism is one historical root of corporatist democracy and has similar effects… statistically speaking, they are substitutes for one another… Catholic parties, once formed, can and do build upon the ancillary institutions of the Catholic Church, which are much older than the centralized state. Catholic party dominance thus taps an older social-political complex.

Wilensky (Ibid) further argues that "while highly centralized governments may precede the creation of Catholic parties, the fully developed corporatist-technocratic linkages caught by our measures are a quite recent development." His "simple" causal model thus begins with Catholic political power and proceeds through the intermediate development of corporatism and ends with significant welfare efforts by the state.

Benabou and Tirole (2006) employ Weber's "Protestant Ethic" to argue that more religious individuals oppose social welfare because they work hard and believe in justice for those who do not. They write that, "At the individual level, studies *universally* find that more religious individuals, particularly Protestants, have less favorable attitudes toward redistribution than others and are more tolerant of inequality" (Benabou and Tirole, 2006, 733; emphasis added). They cite several studies as evidence, including Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) and Scheve and Stasavage (2006).

An interesting strain of research suggests that the rise of the welfare state in Western liberal democracies may lead to declines in religiosity, a suggestion that may support religiously-inspired skepticism of public welfare (Gill and Lundsgaarde, 2004). In this sense, government social services replace the church's role as social support mechanism (see also Scheve and Stasavage, 2006). The Bush Administration's Faith-Based and Community Initiative—which sought to incorporate small and religious organizations, including congregations, into the federal social service regime—recently sparked public debate over the separation of church and state. It would seem that conservative evangelicals may have found a happy medium between government largesse and Christian charity—so long as the "government shekels" come without "government shackles" (Kennedy and Bielefeld, 2002).

The identification of a "religious effect" in a consolidation referendum could represent polity replication in action or religious preferences for redistribution—because Catholics tend to support social welfare while Southern Baptists tend to identify with conservative parties and movements that do not (Wilson, 209; Wilensky, 1981; Ammerman, 1991). Perhaps both are at work. Controls for political ideology may not accurately represent Catholics' positions, for example, since they tend to endorse liberal economics and conservative social values (O'Brien, 2008). To test whether this is the case, one may wish to examine religious attitudes on redistribution to central cities in the mass public. If the same patterns emerge—i.e., the same religious traditions favor redistribution as those favoring consolidation—then it may seem that the public understands consolidation as a form of redistribution. However, if the same religious patterns are absent, then one may conclude that another force is at work—such as polity replication.

When it comes to political trust, Roman Catholics may be more trusting of government than Southern Baptists. This relationship seems intuitive given the churches corresponding polity structures and attitudes on income redistribution. However, one scholarly investigation concluded that while trusting people is positively correlated with confidence in public officials and religious institutions, no significant differences on trust exist between religious traditions in the U.S. (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002). Their findings do suggest a positive relationship between religiosity and public trust if the same individuals trust people, governments, and churches (Ibid).

Hypotheses

Table 2.3 features the expected signs of the various independent variables' effects on the chief dependent variables (or groupings of dependent variables) included in this study. I discuss these hypotheses under the three headings of religious, culture war, and consolidation hypotheses. While Table 2.3 focuses solely on individual-level variables and relationships, I also discuss neighborhood-level hypotheses under the religious hypotheses heading. While literature is cited in several respects, I do not cite evidence if it has already been cited previously in this literature review.

Religious hypotheses. Church attendance and overall religiosity are likely distributed fairly randomly throughout the city region because urban-dwelling African Americans and suburban-dwelling whites, particularly evangelicals, are often very religious (e.g., Taylor, et al., 1996; Wilcox, 1990; Wuthnow, 1988). However, central cities themselves are often seen as irreligious places exhibiting unconventional, and often secular, cultural elements (Cox, 1965; Fischer, 1975a). Louisville is largely composed of three religious groupings—Southern Baptists (and other evangelical Protestants), Roman Catholics, and Black Protestants. Given their demographic compositions, I expect to see Black Protestants concentrating in the central city, Roman Catholics spreading across the city region, and Southern Baptists congregating in the suburban rings. Past research has found that religious salience increases moving outward from urban to suburban to rural contexts (Miller, 2001). This suggests a negative linear relationship between religiosity and distance from the city center, although this relationship may be mitigated in Louisville by a common social structure across the metropolis. In other words, many scholars of public opinion typically compare urban or metropolitan areas' social

Table 2.3: Expected Signs of Independent Variables' Effects on Dependent Variables/Groupings

Independent Variables (IV)	Religiosity	Culture War Issues	City-County Consolidation Turnout	City-County Consolidation Vote/Opinion
Female	+	?	-	?
Black	+	?	-	-
Age	+	+	+	?
Education	-	-	+	+
Income	-	-	+	+
Fulltime	-	?	-	+
Married	+	+	+	?
House	+	+	+	+
Conservatism	+	+	+	-
Distance to CBD	+	+	+	-
Religiosity	NA	+	+	?
So. Baptist	+	NA	-	-
Catholic	-	NA	+	+

NOTE: + means a positive effect; - means a negative effect; ? means the direction is unclear; NA means "not applicable" (i.e., that the IV does not or cannot appear in such a model). ? is inserted if there is no precedent for such a relationship, or the literature indicates the relationship could be positive or negative. Higher values on the dependent variables are, respectively: more religious, more conservative stances on the culture war issues, more likely to vote in the consolidation referendum, and more likely to support city-county consolidation in the referendum and in one's opinions. The expected effects of the religious affiliation dummy variables compare the two traditions, So. Baptist and Catholic, with one another.

structures with rural areas and do not believe it necessary to subdivide between urban and suburban (see Arcury and Christianson, 1993, for a Kentucky example of this practice in environmental studies). However, in urban studies, urban-suburban differences are often emphasized and found to be quite pronounced (e.g., Swanstrom, et al., 2004).

Churches should be more centralized than the population because original structures were built in or near the downtown and these “first churches” are, in many cases, still located in the central city (Form and Dubrow, 2005). These historical

buildings are valuable for religious, artistic, and emotional reasons ("use value"; Logan and Molotch, 1987), not to mention that their restoration is more environmentally-friendly and, in some cases (but not all), more cost-effective than new construction. However, Chicago school urban ecology predicts that churches will follow members to the suburbs as they gain affluence and move outward to the suburbs (McRoberts, 2003). Churches that moved at the height of urban decline likely relocated to original or inner-ring suburbs. Rural churches at the fringe of the county are few, as less dense populations cannot support many membership organizations. These exurban areas do tend to house at least one megachurch (Eiesland, 2000). This suggests a linear decline in church presence across the urban continuum from the city to the urban edge. Churches at the fringe likely have the largest lot sizes due to the ready availability of undeveloped land parcels.

I predict that Louisville will compare favorably with past research and with the nation in terms of what socio-demographic variables predict religiosity. Because Louisville borders two regions and is a mix of native Kentuckians and those from other regions, its population is more representative of the nation as a whole than the more rural parts of Kentucky—which more resemble typical southern areas and have many characteristics in common with Tennessee or West Virginia. Table 2.3 indicates that I expect, holding other variables constant, conservatism, distance to the central business district (CBD), and the female, black, age, married, house, and Southern Baptist dummy variables to all have positive effects on religiosity. Southern Baptists are likely to be more "religious" than Catholics because of their emphasis on individual accountability and participation; and the presence of an "evangelical bias" in survey items (see

Mockabee, Monson, and Grant, 2001). I expect a negative relationship between the indicators of socio-economic status (SES) and religiosity. These include education, income, and fulltime employment. Fulltime status also represents a time constraint on religious participation.

Culture war hypotheses. I believe Louisville exhibits similar political and moral positions/attitudes to the nation as a whole on political ideology, partisan identification, and the divisive issues of our time. When culture war issues are viewed as a group, I expect positive (more-traditional) signs on age, marital status, house residence, conservatism, distance from the CBD, and religiosity (see Table 2.3). I expect negative signs on education, income, and in some cases, female and black. Females are often supportive of abortion, gay rights, and sex-education, but in opposition to pornography and other forms of adult entertainment. They are also less conservative and less supportive of the Republican Party and former President Bush. Blacks are also less conservative and less supportive of Republicans, but often opposed to abortion and homosexual activity. However, blacks may be more supportive of sex education and adult entertainment than whites. For brevity's sake, I do not emphasize culture war differences among religious traditions in this dissertation.

Consolidation hypotheses. Table 2.3 divides the hypothesized effects of the independent variables between city-county consolidation referendum turnout and vote/opinion towards consolidation and consolidated government. The expected signs on turnout are based on both conventional views of turnout in general elections and literature on consolidation specifically. Females, blacks, full-time workers, and Southern Baptists are expected to exhibit lower likelihoods of voting; whereas, the older, more-educated,

higher-income, more-suburban, more-religious, home-dwellers and Catholics are likely to exhibit higher likelihoods of voting.

When it comes to vote choice in the consolidation referendum, I expect higher SES to translate into electoral support for consolidation (education, income, fulltime, and house). I expect black, conservative, and suburban voters to oppose consolidation. There is little literature to draw from in predicting the consolidation views of women and older/married persons—thus, these relationships are unclear or not statistically significant (coded with a "?"). One might theorize, though, that all are more trusting and thus more likely to support consolidation.

I suspect that religious differences do indeed extend beyond local culture war issues to other political issues such as city-county consolidation and approval of the local regime. In terms of religiosity, the direction is unclear. Because religious individuals have largely identified with conservatism and the Republican Party in recent national elections (e.g., Langer and Cohen, 2005), one may hypothesize that religiosity and identification with conservative religious groups will negatively affect support for consolidation. However, most religious faiths mandate or strongly encourage support for the poor (see Pacione, 1990) and thus more religious people may endorse greater societal concern for impoverished urban populations. In this case, more-religious individuals in Louisville may favor consolidation for its oft-hypothesized redistributive benefits.

I expect differences over consolidation to exist between Southern Baptists and Catholics due to my theory of polity replication. Southern Baptists will be less likely than Catholics to support consolidation; or the converse, Catholics will be more likely to support consolidation. This effect should be exhibited in both referendum vote and

opinions of the consolidated entity. I would also expect Catholics to have higher rates of turnout in the referendum. It is possible that differences in vote may be mitigated in opinions by Southern Baptists adapting to the "popular" local view of supporting the regime in power.

Conclusion

This literature review outlines the theory underpinning this dissertation's research questions and the hypotheses under examination. The remaining chapters summarize the methodology and test the hypotheses, ultimately lending credence to my theory of polity replication.

CHAPTER III

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter details the methodology employed for this dissertation. I first identify and discuss the data sources. I then describe in detail the construction of all dependent and independent variables. Next I calculate and present the descriptive statistics for all variables. Finally, I describe the statistical methods used to test my hypotheses.

Data

This study utilizes multiple data sources at the individual and neighborhood levels. The chief source of data is the Louisville Metropolitan Survey (LMS) collected in spring 2006 by the University of Louisville's Urban Studies Institute in consultation with the Department of Sociology, whose faculty designed the questionnaire (Department of Sociology, 2006). Previous versions of the LMS were collected in 2004, 2000, and earlier years. The unit of analysis is the individual. Survey respondents were chosen by random digit dialing across Jefferson County, Kentucky (Louisville Metro), a technique which ultimately resulted in a sample of 807 complete interviews with adult respondents aged 18 or over. Participants were asked for responses on political, moral, and religious issues along with basic socio-demographic characteristics.

Scholars who have previously utilized the 2006 LMS data have noted that the respondents compare favorably with 2000 U.S. Census data and are thus likely fairly-representative of Louisville's population, although these analyses only examine a subsection of respondents asked environmental questions (Ambrosius, 2008b; Gilderbloom, Hanka, and Ambrosius, 2009; Walton, 2006). In this present analysis, I find that the full sample is somewhat more female, older, and more educated than U.S. Census Bureau data for 2006. The sample also drew slightly more white respondents than the rate in the population of Jefferson County. Consequently, I weight the sample to reflect better the population using four criteria: sex, race, age, and education (Sapsford, 1999). Rather than using dated 2000 Census data, which possibly would eliminate important demographic shifts that have occurred over the six years from 2000 to 2006, I utilize three-year estimates from the American Community Survey (ACS), 2005-2007. The three-year estimates are more reliable than an ACS collected in a single year; and the LMS collection year forms the center of the ACS analysis period. The weighting process successfully weighted up male, black, younger, and less-educated respondents to their approximate levels in the population. See Table 3.1 for a comparison of the ACS with the unweighted and weighted versions of the LMS. The exact wording of all relevant questions asked by the LMS is included in Appendix A.

Figure 3.1 illustrates the distribution of LMS respondents across the territory of Louisville Metro. Respondents are scattered randomly throughout their ZIP codes of residence using a dot density technique because a full street address was not provided (to protect confidentiality). This map reveals that respondents' locations are fairly distributed across the metropolitan area and do not exhibit a substantial regional bias.

Table 3.1: Comparison of ACS, 2005-2007, with Unweighted and Weighted LMS, 2006

Dataset	ACS, 3-year estimates	LMS, unweighted	LMS, weighted
Year	2005-2007	2006	2006
N	704,648	807	805
Sex			
Female	51.9	61.1	51.2
Male	48.1	38.9	48.8
Race			
White	75.6	79.1	73.5
Black	19.7	17.2	20.7
Other	4.6	2.3	4.4
Age (20+)			
20-34	25.6	15.9	24.9
35-44	19.8	14.1	18.4
45-59	29.9	34.6	29.5
60-84	22.0	31.4	22.3
85+	2.7	2.5	3.0
Educ			
No HS diploma	14.4	6.9	13.2
HS diploma	29.8	20.2	29.1
Some college	21.9	30.2	22.8
AA degree	6.5	8.3	7.5
BA degree	16.4	14.7	16.7
Graduate school	10.9	19.6	10.7

Figure 3.1: Approximate Location of LMS Respondents by ZIP Code Dot Density

To illustrate better the distribution of religion across Louisville, I compiled my own list of Louisville's Christian congregations. My initial source for this congregational census was Church Angel (www.churchangel.com). This website presents an excellent starting point for an electronic database containing a particular community's Christian churches. While critics may allege that this source of data will miss many smaller, African American and non-denominational congregations, the list includes a significant number of churches from historically-black denominations (e.g., African Methodist Episcopal) and those without denominational ties. Church Angel lists congregations by their city. In addition to Louisville, I searched for the approximately 80 "lower-class" cities (as defined by Kentucky law) in Jefferson County that remain intact after consolidation (Savitch and Vogel, 2004). This search yielded a total of 554 Christian congregations. This compares favorably with Jones, et al.'s (2002) figure of 594 religious congregations in Jefferson County, which includes non-Christian religious establishments. Because Louisville is overwhelmingly Christian, I chose to disregard other relatively-small religious traditions (including Judaism and the eastern religions), with very few houses of worship in the city, in this analysis.

I geocode each congregation by its street address and ZIP code using the Louisville/Jefferson County Information Consortium's (LOJIC) interactive mapping system (http://www.lojic.org/mylouisville/viewer.htm). This process returns the census tract in which the church is located, while a search of the Jefferson County Property Valuation Administrator's (JCPVA) property database (http://www.pvalouky.org/propertyinfo/search.php) yields the parcel identification number and the acreage of the site. Eighty-six percent coded on the first run, which rises to over 93 percent following

address corrections. A total of 38 correct addresses could not be located in LOJIC or PVA records for a final N of 516.

To further gauge Louisville's religious history and ecology, I integrate contextual data from: (1) Stark and Bainbridge's (1996) dataset *Religious Ecology of 378 American Cities, 1906-1936*, which gathers data from the 1910, 1919, 1930 and 1941 U.S. Government publications titled *Religious Bodies*; (2) the 1952, 1971, 1980, 1990, and 2000 *Religious Congregations and Membership Studies* (RCMS; Jones, et al., 2002); (3) the 2000 LMS, which asked several religious questions; and (4) the Hartford Institute for Religion Research's *Database of Megachurches in the U.S.* (http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/database.html).

For comparison with the nation as a whole and further testing of my hypotheses, I employ the U.S. General Social Survey (GSS) collected in 2006, the same calendar year as the LMS (Davis and Smith, 2006). The GSS is a respected project of the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF). It is a nationally-representative, personal-interview poll of non-institutionalized U.S. adults. The 2006 iteration represents the 26th round of collection since the GSS began in 1972, which has proceeded biennially since 1994, and is the first to include Spanish-language interviews. According to NORC, the GSS is the most frequently analyzed social science data source other than the decennial U.S. Census (National Opinion Research Center, 2009). The 2006 GSS dataset contains 4,510 cases. Due to the 2004-2008 rounds of the GSS adopting a non-respondent, sub-sampling design, one must use a weight variable when performing data analysis. I use the weight variable "wtss," which considers both the sub-sampling of non-respondents and the

number of adults in each household. This weight allows one to generalize about the population as a whole even though only one adult per household is eligible to participate in the survey.

For comparison with the LMS, the GSS includes relatively-comparable questions on political and moral positions, religious affiliation and religiosity, and basic socio-demographic characteristics. While the question wording is often different, the GSS is the best available national dataset for direct comparison with the LMS. The exact wording of all relevant questions asked by the GSS is included in Appendix B.

Dependent Variables

This study makes use of religious, moral, and political dependent variables. Some of these variables are also employed as independent variables in other statistical models alongside socio-demographic controls. The following subsections describe the various dependent variables.

Neighborhood-level Church Variables. Using my database of churches in Louisville, I construct several variables to represent the number of churches per community-grouping. All are calculated by both census tract (N=170) and ZIP code (N=32) because the geocoding process captured both. Census tracts are a better approximation of neighborhoods because they are smaller and more numerous. However, ZIP codes are also advantageous because LMS respondents were asked to identify their ZIP code. This allows one to calculate neighborhood-level church attendance and religiosity averages for those ZIP codes represented by sufficient respondents (seven or greater) and compare with measures of neighborhood churches.

The first church variable is a per capita measure capturing churches per 1,000 residents of the census tract or ZIP code. The second is churches per unit of land area, measured by one square mile (i.e., church density). I employ population density (persons per square mile) as a comparable measure calculated for census tracts using 2000 Census population and the tract area in square miles. The third is the percentage of religious land use, calculated in acres given the total lot sizes of all churches in the tract or ZIP code. Census tract population and land area are provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. ZIP code population and land area are obtained from CSG Network, a website existing "to provide assistance, direction, information and reference material for students" (http://www.csgnetwork.com/zcl.html).

Religious Identification. While serving as a key independent variable in regression analyses, I discuss religious identification in detail here because it does serve first as a dependent variable when I analyze the religious distribution. The LMS asks the basic question, "What is your religious preference?" The response choices are (1) Baptist; (2) Other Protestant Denomination; (3) Roman Catholic; (4) A Christian religion not yet mentioned; (5) A non-Christian religion; and (7) No religious preference. The dominant white American religious traditions are Roman Catholic, Mainline Protestant, and Evangelical Protestant (Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth, 2009a). This LMS question does not allow for a division of Protestants into mainline and evangelical branches. However, for unknown reasons, the question does isolate the "Baptist" religious family. The likely reason for breaking out Baptists is their prevalence in Louisville—largely divided into white Southern Baptists and various African American Baptist traditions. An identification of evangelical Protestants is further hindered by their likely inclusion in

several response categories: Baptist, Other Protestant, a Christian religion, and even no religious preference. Non-Baptist evangelical Protestants who are unfamiliar with the Protestant label likely answered "A Christian religion not yet mentioned" or, for those in non-denominational or independent churches, perhaps even, "No religious preference." Many Christians, particularly evangelicals or "born again" Christians, deny that their faith is comparable to other traditions and thus should not be labeled a religion (see Ridenour, 1967 for one such example). It is clear that the other Christian religion category includes respondents beyond Eastern Orthodox and conservative non-traditionalists (e.g., Mormons and Jehovah's Witnesses) not captured by the other categories because those choosing this category are greater than these traditions' rates in the population.

Given these constraints, the classification scheme that comes closest to that offered by Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth (2009b) divides the LMS sample into Southern Baptists, Black Protestants, Other Protestants, Roman Catholics, Other Christians, Other Non-Christians, and the unaffiliated, a diverse category including both religious, non-religious, and anti-religious respondents. Southern Baptists do serve as a decent proxy for evangelicals in Louisville because they account for about three-quarters of the evangelical population (Jones, et al., 2002).

Southern Baptists are identified as those white respondents who selected "Baptist." This category likely includes a few mainline or other evangelical Baptists because the percentage in the LMS (18.5 percent) is slightly higher than that found by the 2000 RCMS (15.6 percent), although the vast majority of white Baptists in Louisville are indeed Southern Baptists (as is the case across the South—see Shortridge, 1976). The

RCMS finds 164 Southern Baptist congregations but only 28 other Baptist congregations, which together account for a mere 0.5 percent of religious adherents in Louisville.

Black Protestants are identified as those black respondents who selected "Baptist," "Other Protestant," or "a Christian religion." This category accounts for 18.0 percent of the LMS sample. While some of these Black Protestants may be members of largely-white denominations, the bulk likely attend congregations associated with historically-black denominations. As the cliché goes, Sunday morning is the "most segregated hour" in America (Hadaway, Hackett, and Miller, 1984). Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth (2009b) argue that Black Protestants exhibit similar social, political, and theological positions and thus deserve their own category without division into evangelical and mainline.

The Roman Catholic category is fairly straight forward because it was selected by the respondents themselves. 23.6 percent of respondents identify with the Roman Catholic Church, making it the largest single religious body in Louisville.

Other Non-Christians, including Jews, Muslims, and Hindus, are only represented by a few respondents (totaling 3.3 percent) and, as a composite category, are unfit for stringent analysis. The other Christian categories—Other Protestants (13.0) and Other Christians (10.4)—are ambiguous categories that likely include a mix of mainline Protestants like Lutherans and Methodists, evangelical Protestants including both Pentecostals and self-defined fundamentalists, various Eastern Orthodox traditions, and other traditions taking the "Christian" label. There is no means by which one can subdivide the two "other" categories into these individual traditions. The remaining category, the religiously unaffiliated, accounts for 13.2 percent of the LMS sample.

While the GSS offers considerably more detail in its variables "RELIG" and "DENOM" (see Appendix B), I pare the responses down to those given by the LMS for direct comparison. Southern Baptists are Protestants (RELIG) who selected Southern Baptist in the denomination (DENOM) follow-up question. Black Protestants are those black respondents who selected Protestant, Christian, or Non-denominational on RELIG. Again, Roman Catholics are able to explicitly self-identify. Other Protestants are given their own category. Other Christians are grouped by non-blacks who selected Orthodox Christian, Christian, or Non-denominational. The remaining religious groups are placed together in the Other Non-Christian category. Those selecting "None" are labeled unaffiliated.

All religious categories are included in statistical analysis but the Southern Baptist and Roman Catholic religious traditions are the dominant traditions in Louisville and the key affiliations under study. Thus, they receive primary attention in discussion of this study's findings. Religious identification is measured at the individual-level but can also be aggregated by ZIP code for those ZIP codes with more than seven respondents, an arbitrary but necessary cutoff meant to ensure that a neighborhood score is not based on one or few respondents' characteristics.

Religiosity. Both the LMS and GSS ask a host of questions on one's religious salience, behaviors, and beliefs. I construct an index of religiosity from both datasets using factor analysis. The LMS religiosity index sums information from three religious salience questions, two religious behavior questions (one public, one private), and one belief question. These LMS questions capture the following: importance of religion, desire to become more religious, closeness to God, worship/religious activity attendance,

frequency of scripture reading, and belief in an afterlife (see Appendix A for exact question wording).

The GSS questions capture: strength of religious preference, the extent to which one considers oneself religious, the extent to which one considers oneself spiritual, worship attendance, religious activity attendance, frequency of prayer, and belief in an afterlife (see Appendix B for exact question wording). The three religious salience measures in the GSS are notably different from those in the LMS, but they capture similar attitudes on one's personal religiosity. The worship attendance question in the LMS asks, "Over the past 12 months, how often did you attend a religious gathering such as a worship service, Sunday school, or Bible study?" Because this item does not isolate worship service attendance but includes other religious activities, I incorporate two GSS questions into the index: "How often do you attend religious services?" and "How often do you take part in the activities and organizations of a church or place of worship other than attending services?" While the LMS features scripture reading as a private religious behavior, the GSS only asks about frequency of prayer. This is likely the largest difference in index construction because personal scripture reading is thought to reflect an "evangelical bias" (Mockabee, Monson, and Grant, 2001). Finally, while the GSS asks numerous belief questions, I only include belief in the afterlife (measured with an ordinal "certainty" scale) because this is the only belief question asked by the LMS.

I use factor analysis, or more specifically a variant of factor analysis called principal components analysis (PCA), to construct an index of religiosity from both datasets (Jolliffe, 2002). The factor loadings, eigenvalue, and explained variance of both the LMS and GSS religiosity indices are included in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. The factor

loadings are comparable across the two datasets, the eigenvalues each exceed 3.0, and the explained variance captured by the single factor each exceeds 50 percent. Thus, both indices fulfill basic statistical requirements (Ibid). Like religious identification, this variable is used at the individual-level but can also be aggregated by ZIP code for those ZIP codes with more than seven respondents.

Table 3.2: Religiosity Index, LMS

	Factor loadings
Importance of religion	.822
Closeness to God	.770
Desire to be more religious	.668
Worship/church attendance	.728
Bible/holy book reading	.725
Belief in life after death	.530
Eigenvalue	3.051
Explained variance (%)	50.843

Political Ideology. Political ideology is captured by a five-point scale of conservatism. The LMS asks the question, "Do you think of yourself as a Liberal, a Conservative, or as middle-of-the-road?" It then follows-up with, "Do you consider yourself a strong or not very strong [liberal or conservative]?" I combine these two questions to create the following scale: (1) strong liberal; (2) weak liberal; (3) moderate; (4) weak conservative; and (5) strong conservative.

Table 3.3: Religiosity Index, GSS

	Factor loadings
Strength of religious preference	.730
Extent considered religious	.817
Extent considered spiritual	.713
Worship/church attendance	.785
Religious activity participation	.697
Frequency of prayer	.748
Belief in life after death	.468
Eigenvalue	3.589
Explained variance (%)	51.272

The GSS asks a more-detailed, seven-point question: "I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale?" This scale is as follows: (1) extremely liberal; (2) liberal; (3) lean liberal; (4) moderate; (5) lean conservative; (6) conservative; and (7) extremely conservative. The "lean" categories compare well with the "not very strong" (or "weak") categories in the LMS. To collapse this scale into the same five-point one captured by the LMS, I make these categories equivalent and instead combine "extremely [liberal or conservative]" and "liberal or conservative" into single categories. While a slightly different approach for each dataset, the results of statistical analysis should be comparable.

Political Identification. The GSS does ask a question labeled "PARTYID" which asks, "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?" The LMS, however, does not ask such a question. The LMS does ask whether one feels "very favorable, favorable, neutral, negative, or very negative [towards] George W. Bush?" of approximately half the sample (440 cases). Using the very favorable and favorable categories, I create a dummy variable that represents those respondents (30 percent) likely to have voted for Bush in 2004. Jefferson County does lean Democratic but the Bush-Cheney Republican ticket in 2004 claimed nearly half of the vote (almost 49 percent). The LMS approximation is lower because: (a) the sample includes those who did not vote in 2004 but responded with a negative opinion of Bush; and (b) it reflects the fact that some 2004 Bush supporters likely jumped ship to "neutral" or "negative" given Bush's falling approval ratings and unpopular war in Iraq. Interestingly though, using the estimated population from the 2004 ACS, Bush garnered 2004 electoral support from 31.6 percent of the total 520,727 adults (18 and over) in Jefferson County. Thus, this variable is a decent approximation of Bush's electoral support.

The GSS asks more straightforward questions: "Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in [the 2004] election?"; "Did you vote for Kerry or Bush?"; and "Who would you have voted for, for President, if you had voted?" Given the responses to these questions, I create a dummy variable that sums those who: (a) voted for Bush; and (b) would have voted for Bush if they had voted or had been eligible to vote. Because the second component (b) allows for change of opinion between 2004 and 2008, but the first (a) does not (unless one misreports), I would expect this dummy

variable to be higher in support of Bush than the LMS. It is (43 percent). Nationally, Bush garnered support from nearly 51 percent of 2004 voters or just shy of 30 percent of 2004 (ACS) U.S. adults. Despite the inherent differences, these two dummy variables are the best comparable measures of political identification across the two surveys. I caution readers to compare these measures carefully with full awareness of their incompatibilities.

Homosexuality. Both the LMS and GSS ask a comparable question on the morality of homosexual relationships. The LMS asks, "Homosexuality is wrong. Do you…" (1) strongly agree; (2) agree; (3) not sure whether you agree or disagree; (4) disagree; or (5) strongly disagree? I flip this scale so that higher scores represent greater disapproval of homosexuality. The LMS question does not seem to make a distinction between homosexual orientation and homosexual behavior.

I create a comparable five-point scale from the GSS variable "HOMOSEX" which asks, "What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex—do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?" I code this scale: as (1) not at all wrong; (2) unsure if wrong; (3) sometimes wrong; (4) almost always wrong; and (5) always wrong. I place the unsure category at level 2 rather than in the center because the next category is "sometimes wrong" which does not fit on the same side as "not at all wrong." The GSS question does seem to emphasize behavior over orientation.

Sex Education. On the issues of sex education in public schools, the LMS asks, "How supportive are you of some form of sex education being taught in public schools?" following a short statement priming the respondent: "Now I'd like to ask you some

questions about sex education, a topic that is often debated among communities and in schools. The Centers for Disease Control reports that in 2003, just over 52 percent of teens surveyed in Kentucky claimed to have had sexual intercourse at least once." A second statement and question was then read regarding "comprehensive" sex education (which includes, by the definition given in the survey, discussion of contraception but also abstinence), as well as several other follow-ups probing respondents attitudes toward, and knowledge of, the issue.

In a rare instance of providing less detail, the GSS simply asks, "Would you be for or against sex education in the public schools?" Because this is a two-point division, unless non-responses are placed in-between, I am forced to do the same with the LMS and create comparable dummy variables that express (1) opposition or (0) support for public sex education. Because the GSS question does not include the term "comprehensive," I simply use the first LMS question which refers to "some form of sex education." Nine percent of the LMS sample asked the sex-ed questions oppose sex education, while eleven percent of the GSS respondents are in opposition. The LMS is likely slightly lower because it is an urban area with more liberal views than the nation as a whole, which includes rural populations holding more conservative views.

Adult Entertainment. Regulation of adult entertainment, or sexually-oriented businesses, is a moral issue faced by all local governments (Sharp, 2004). The LMS asks three questions on adult entertainment establishments' effects on local neighborhoods. They begin with: "Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements about various community issues." The three statements are: "Adult bookstores and strip clubs tend to create an unsafe neighborhood;" "Communities that

have adult bookstores and strip clubs are more likely to have robberies;" and "Adult bookstores and strip clubs hurt other businesses in the area." I combine these three into an index capturing opposition to adult entertainment. I first recoded all responses into the same five-point scale expressing increased levels of opposition (i.e., agreement with the statement): (1) very much disagree; (2) somewhat disagree; (3) no opinion; (4) somewhat agree; and (5) very much agree. I then run PCA using these three items. Factor loadings are all above 0.85, the eigenvalue is over two, and the explained variance exceeds 73 percent. See Table 3.4 for the PCA results.

Table 3.4: Adult Entertainment Opposition Index, LMS

	Factor loadings
Adult ent. unsafe	.857
Adult ent. makes robberies more likely	.867
Adult ent. hurts other businesses	.850
Eigenvalue	2.210
Explained variance (%)	73.662

City-County Consolidation. A large portion of the LMS is devoted to the recent 2003 merger of Jefferson County and the City of Louisville. The 2004 LMS contains the same questions on merger but lacks any questions on religion. From the 2006 questions, I created two dummy variables and a factor score.

First, I simply established whether one voted in the merger referendum using the basic question: "Did you vote for the merger, against the merger, or did you not vote at all?" I summed those voting for or against the merger and code them as 1. I then coded

those living in Jefferson County or Louisville in 2000 but who did not vote as 0. Those who were ineligible to vote, meaning they reported living elsewhere in 2000, are coded as "system missing." This does miss those living in Jefferson County but otherwise ineligible or unregistered to vote. According to these LMS questions, 59 percent of adults living within Jefferson County reported voting in the 2000 merger referendum.

Second, from the same question, I establish whether a voter supported consolidation. Of the 59 percent of eligible respondents reporting a vote, roughly 70 percent supported and 30 percent opposed consolidation. The actual referendum results show that 54 percent of voters approved consolidation. As with most surveys, slightly more respondents report voting than the amount actually turning-out; and more report supporting the winning vote (in this case, consolidating the city and county).

Finally, I use the follow-up questions asked of all respondents, "regardless of whether [one] voted," to create a factor score of support for the merger and subsequent merged government. The full question text of these six items is located in Appendix A. In short, they ask whether one: is (1) better off since merger; (2) trusting of the merged government; (3) convinced that merger benefits all residents; (4) convinced that the merged government does not waste taxes; (5) convinced that the merged government's employees are honest; and (6) convinced that race relations have improved post-consolidation. All items load on a single factor. The eigenvalue is greater than 2.5 and most factor loadings are high, although the questions on merger making one better off and improving race relations load lower. The explained variance is slightly lower than 50 percent, but the index is acceptable for use. The results of the PCA are included in Table 3.5.

Table 3.5: Merger Index, LMS

	Factor loadings
Merger made one better off	.431
Trust merged government	.768
Merger benefits all	.786
Merged government does not waste taxes	.683
Merged government's employees honest	.744
Race relations better post-consolidation	.414
Eigenvalue	2.584
Explained variance (%)	43.073

One further measure of support for the merged government is support for Democratic Mayor Jerry Abramson, the former mayor of the City of Louisville, champion of consolidation, and present mayor of Louisville Metro. Abramson, locally labeled "mayor for life," is so connected with the issue of consolidation that his own approval rating should compare favorably with personal opinions of merger and the merged government. However, this question was only asked of half of the sample (440 cases) and thus, if included in the PCA, would delete half of the LMS cases listwise from the consolidation index. I analyze this item on its own as an alternative explanation of consolidation position. This variable is measured on the same five-point scale as the original Bush variable—asking whether one feels "very favorable, favorable, neutral, negative, or very negative" towards Mayor Abramson. The scale is kept as a five-point variable but flipped so higher responses capture positive views.

Redistribution and Political Trust. The GSS asks several questions concerning one's beliefs about national spending priorities, two of which deal directly with federal spending on redistribution to "big cities." The pair of 2006 GSS questions labeled "NATCITY" and "NATCITYY" has a subtle difference in question wording. Respondents are first read the following statement: "We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount." Then, 1467 interviewees responded to "spending on solving the problems of the big cities." Alternatively, 1530 responded to "spending on assistance to big cities." These two questions are part of a host of GSS items that are reworded slightly to examine the impact of question wording on the answers respondents gave.

Given the slight difference in wording, I make use of both of these items individually and then in a combined measure. A Chow test comparing regression coefficients indicates whether the two samples belong together or are in fact too different (Chow, 1960). It appears that respondents to the question worded "solving the problems" were more likely to call for increased spending—48 percent for additional spending versus 12 percent believing too much is spent; whereas respondents to the more general term "assistance" are more likely to oppose additional spending—22 percent for additional spending versus 36 percent believing too much is spent. It is not surprising that the combined measure's distribution lies somewhere in between. The coding is as follows: (1) spending too much; (2) spending just right amount; and (3) spending too little.

The GSS asks several questions concerning political trust. I combine four questions into an index using PCA. The results of the PCA are included in Table 3.6. The index meets accepted standards—the Eigenvalue exceeds two, the variance exceeds 50 percent, and all four factor loadings exceed 0.5. The four items are whether: (1) politicians treat people fairly; (2) treatment depends on who one knows; (3) politicians are corrupt; and (4) government administrators are corrupt. An additional item, bribery frequency, was removed from the PCA due to an extremely low factor loading (0.199). The political trust questions were asked of a subsection of the GSS respondents.

Table 3.6: Political Trust Index, GSS

	Factor loadings
Politicians treat people fairly	.518
Treatment depends on who one knows	.512
Politicians are corrupt	.865
Government administrators are corrupt	.865
Eigenvalue	2.027
Explained variance (%)	50.678

NOTE: Initial PCA included an additional item (bribery frequency) that was removed from index due to a low factor loading (.199).

Independent Variables

While also serving as dependent variables, religious identification and religiosity are the key independent variables predicting political and moral attitudes and political behavior. The following subsections describe the independent variables—both test variables and controls.

Neighborhood-level Characteristics. I make use of a single neighborhood-level independent variable—location—that takes two forms: distance to/from the central business district (CBD) and concentric ring of residence. Distance from the CBD is a standard explanatory variable in the urban subfields of economics, geography, and sociology. This variable captures the distance from the downtown ZIP code (40202) or census tract (004900) in miles. Distance to the CBD is calculated using MapQuest for ZIP codes and, for census tracts, using the geographic coordinates of tract centroids provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. Because Louisville is still a very monocentric city with a single downtown and a relatively centralized housing market, this measure may be of interest in predicting church locations (Ambrosius, Gilderbloom, and Hanka, 2010). I also use tract location to assign a three-point ordinal measure of urban ring. My method is discussed in detail below under the heading "Individual Socio-Demographic Controls." I include summary statistics for nonwhite percent, percentage of total residents identifying as something other than "white only" on the 2000 Census, in the coming table for reference even though race is not considered at the neighborhood level in further analysis.

Religious Identification and Religiosity. The construction and measurement of these variables are discussed above in the section on dependent variables.

Political Ideology. This variable—level of conservatism—is also discussed above.

Individual Socio-Demographic Controls. These control variables include sex, race, age, educational attainment, annual income, employment status, marital status, and dwelling type. All are available and are nearly identical in the LMS and GSS. Several of these are measured as dummy variables with values of 1 for female, black, fulltime employment, married, and single-family home residency. All other values are assigned 0. Age is an interval level variable measured in years. Education (1-8) and income (1-9) are ordinal-level variables capturing SES.

The LMS allows for further classification of respondents based on their place of residency. While Jefferson County was once divided into city and county prior to consolidation, a new residential classification scheme is being advocated by the elites of Louisville Metro (Louisville-Jefferson County Metro, 2006). The post-consolidation *Comprehensive Housing Strategy* attempts to divide the city-county into three concentric rings of neighborhoods. These are demarcated by the area's two beltways—the inner beltway (I-264) known as the Watterson Expressway and the outer beltway (I-265) named the Gene Snyder Expressway. The three rings are thus the areas (1) inside the inner beltway; (2) between the two beltways; and (3) outside the outer beltway up to the county line. The report states that these correspond to the "urban core and 1st suburban ring"; "2nd suburban ring"; and "3rd suburban ring," respectively (Louisville-Jefferson County Metro, 2006, 7). I simply refer to these areas as (1) urban and original suburban; (2) inner/older suburban; and (3) outer/newer suburban and rural. The inner-ring suburbs contain 1950s suburbs, many with ranch houses, and numerous shopping complexes.

The outer-ring includes new high-end subdivisions as well as preexisting family farms. Outside the outer beltway could be described, to borrow Sharp and Clark's (2008) language, as the "rural-urban fringe" or where the "country and the concrete" meet.

I use the respondents ZIP codes to identify their ring of residence. In cases where a ZIP code crosses a beltway, I assign it to the area containing the majority of the ZIP code. Alternatively, LMS respondents may be coded with their distance from the CBD given their ZIP codes. I use MapQuest to calculate the distance from each ZIP code to the downtown ZIP code (40202).

The 2006 GSS lacks any indicator of urban, suburban, or rural residence except in the past tense—an item called "RES16," which asks "Which of the categories on this card comes closest to the type of place you were living in when you were 16 years old?" The responses include rural, farm, suburb, and various city sizes. In today's economy, there is no reason to expect that people currently live in the same setting in which they were raised.

Descriptive Statistics

I include descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, and range) for all variables in Tables 3.7 through 3.12. I divide them by type of variable (independent, dependent); level of analysis (neighborhood, individual); and dataset, for the individual-level variables (LMS, GSS). Table 3.7 contains the descriptive statistics for neighborhood-level dependent variables. Table 3.8 includes the descriptive statistics for individual-level dependent variables from the LMS. Table 3.9 consists of the descriptive statistics for individual-level dependent variables from the GSS. Table 3.10 contains the

descriptive statistics for neighborhood-level independent variables. Table 3.11 includes the descriptive statistics for individual-level independent variables from the LMS. Finally, Table 3.12 consists of the descriptive statistics for individual-level independent variables from the GSS.

From a cursory analysis of the descriptive statistics, several initial findings are evident. I separate these into descriptions of: (a) Louisville neighborhoods; and (b) a comparison of Louisville (LMS) and the nation (GSS).

Neighborhoods. From Table 3.7, the average neighborhood (proxied by census tract) contains approximately three churches while 23 neighborhoods have no churches and five neighborhoods, all urban or black inner suburbs, have more than ten. The neighborhood with the most churches, Russell (tract 002400), has 23. This together seems to suggest that the church database is not lacking in African American churches, as many scholars claim of the RCMS data (Finke and Scheitle, 2005). At a minimum, my database certainly includes a multitude of churches in black neighborhoods. The average neighborhood has one congregation per 1,000 inhabitants, although the top two neighborhoods, again both black urban neighborhoods, have four and five. These findings are consistent with the literature on black "religious districts," which finds that black neighborhoods are often "overchurched," meaning they possess too many churches given the local population and its available resources (McRoberts, 2003).

The average neighborhood contains nearly nine acres devoted to church use, which accounts for approximately one percent of total land area. Three tracts contain over fifty acres of religious land use, two of these exceeding 100 acres. One of these tracts (010706) contains Southeast Christian Church's campus, which itself covers 102

Table 3.7: Descriptive Statistics for Neighborhood-level Dependent Variables

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Number of churches (tract)	170	3.03	2.97	0	23
Number of churches (zip)	32	17.09	10.96	3	50
Churches per 1,000 persons (tract)	170	.82	.79	0	5.07
Churches per 1,000 persons (zip)	32	1.04	1.14	.27	6.49
Churches per sq. mi. (tract)	170	3.49	5.08	0	35.38
Churches per sq. mi. (zip)	32	2.82	3.30	.18	16
Percent of religious land use (tract)	170	.84	1.24	0	12.37
Percent of religious land use (zip)	32	.72	.78	.03	4.55
Neighborhood religiosity (zip)	32	2.39	.34	1.59	3.17
Neighborhood church attendance (zip)	32	3.24	.46	2.03	4.07
Persons per square mile (tract)	170	3,856	2,498	115	11,231
Persons per square mile (zip)	32	2,867	1,773	50	6,946

Table 3.8: Descriptive Statistics for Individual-level Dependent Variables, LMS

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Relgious Identification					
Roman Catholic dummy	805	.24	-	0	1
Southern Baptist dummy	805	.19	-	0	1
Black Protestant dummy	805	.18	-	0	1
Other Protestant dummy	805	.13	-	0	1
Other Christian dummy	805	.10	-	0	1
Non-Christian dummy	805	.03	-	0	1
Unaffiliated dummy	805	.13	-	0	1
Religiosity Index	805	.00	1.00	-.2.94	1.36
Political Ideology					
Conservatism	805	3.10	1.15	1	5
Political Identification					
Support for Bush	440	2.63	1.32	1	5
Support for Bush dummy	440	.30	-	0	1
Homosexuality Opposition	805	3.19	1.41	1	5
Sex Education Opposition	382	.09	-	0	1
Adult Entertainment Opposition Index	805	.00	1.00	-2.17	1.22
City-County Consolidation					
Vote? dummy	710	.59	-	0	1
Vote for? dummy	417	.71	-	0	1
Merger Support Index	709	.00	1.00	-2.14	2.09
Support for Abramson	440	3.56	1.06	1	5

Table 3.9: Descriptive Statistics for Individual-level Dependent Variables, GSS

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Relgious Identification					
Roman Catholic dummy	4512	.27	-	0	1
Southern Baptist dummy	4512	.07	-	0	1
Black Protestant dummy	4512	.09	-	0	1
Other Protestant dummy	4512	.35	-	0	1
Other Christian dummy	4512	.02	-	0	1
Non-Christian dummy	4512	.04	-	0	1
Unaffiliated dummy	4512	.16	-	0	1
Religiosity Index	2996	.00	1.0	-2.25	1.68
Political Ideology					
Conservatism	4483	3.13	1.25	1	5
Political Identification					
Support for Bush dummy	4512	.43	-	0	1
Homosexuality Opposition	1999	3.45	1.81	1	5
Sex Education Opposition	1960	.11	-	0	1
Redistribution Support					
Solve problems of big cities	1343	2.35	.70	1	3
Assistance to big cities	1349	1.86	.75	1	3
Combined problems/assistance	2692	2.10	.76	1	3
Political Trust Index	1410	.00	1.0	-2.28	3.21

Table 3.10: Descriptive Statistics for Neighborhood-level Independent Variables

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Distance to the CBD in miles (zip)	32	9.83	5.24	0	18.72
Distance to the CBD in miles (tract)	170	7.04	4.03	0	18.58
Percent of nonwhite persons (tract)	170	25.35	29.51	1.37	99.43

Table 3.11: Descriptive Statistics for Individual-level Independent Variables, LMS

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Relgious Identification					
Roman Catholic dummy	805	.24	-	0	1
Southern Baptist dummy	805	.19	-	0	1
Black Protestant dummy	805	.18	-	0	1
Other Protestant dummy	805	.13	-	0	1
Other Christian dummy	805	.10	-	0	1
Non-Christian dummy	805	.03	-	0	1
Unaffiliated dummy	805	.13	-	0	1
Religiosity Index	805	.00	1.00	-.2.94	1.36
Political Ideology					
Conservatism	805	3.10	1.15	1	5
Sex					
Female dummy	805	.51	-	0	1
Race					
Black dummy	795	.21	-	0	1
Age in years	788	48.27	17.78	18	96
Education	805	4.22	1.80	1	8
Income	699	4.93	2.70	1	9
Employed fulltime dummy	805	.46	-	0	1
Married dummy	805	.46	-	0	1
House dummy	805	.75	-	0	1
Location					
Distance to the CBD in miles	805	10.21	4.91	.00	23.85

Table 3.12: Descriptive Statistics for Individual-level Independent Variables, GSS

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Relgious Identification					
Roman Catholic dummy	4512	.27	-	0	1
Southern Baptist dummy	4512	.07	-	0	1
Black Protestant dummy	4512	.09	-	0	1
Other Protestant dummy	4512	.35	-	0	1
Other Christian dummy	4512	.02	-	0	1
Non-Christian dummy	4512	.04	-	0	1
Unaffiliated dummy	4512	.16	-	0	1
Religiosity Index	2996	.00	1.0	-2.25	1.68
Political Ideology					
Conservatism	4483	3.13	1.25	1	5
Sex					
Female dummy	4512	.54	-	0	1
Race					
Black dummy	4512	.13	-	0	1
Age in years	4496	45.34	16.55	18	89
Education	4512	4.08	1.845	1	8
Income	3806	5.46	2.69	1	9
Employed fulltime dummy	4512	.53	-	0	1
Married dummy	4512	.56	-	0	1
House dummy	4512	.72	-	0	1

acres and is compared to a "minitown" due to its variety of secular services (Brown, 2002). This results in over 12 percent of this tract given over to "religious" use, defined by church ownership of the land. Questions of multiple uses present on church grounds permeate the legal literature on megachurches (Evans-Cowley and Pearlman, 2008; Galvin, 2006; Mertes, 2005). The other tract (010306), located in Northeast Jefferson County, has four churches claiming twenty or more acres—although this amounts to less than two percent of the tract's land. The average lot size of the city's seven megachurches is 26 acres. The average tract has 3.5 churches per square mile, while several urban tracts have church densities exceeding ten per square mile. Russell and a diverse, historic neighborhood of Victorian homes near the University of Louisville (Old Louisville, 005100) are the most-dense neighborhoods—with 28 and 35 churches per square mile, respectively.

From Table 3.10, one can see that Louisville is still a very segregated city (also see Cummings and Price, 1997; Hudson, 2004). Some urban census tracts are nearly 100 percent composed of African Americans, while the average tract has 25 percent and the lowest tract has nearly none (just over one percent). The average neighborhood is seven miles from the downtown while the farthest fringe communities are almost 20 miles out from the CBD.

Comparison. Tables 3.8 and 3.11 report means for Louisville and Tables 3.9 and 3.12 report means for the nation from the GSS. In terms of religious identification, Louisville contains more Southern Baptists (19 percent versus 7 percent) and Black Protestants (18 percent versus 9 percent) than the nation as a whole—evidence of its southern context and urban demographics. Despite its Roman Catholic heritage,

Louisville contains slightly fewer Catholics than the nation (24 percent versus 27 percent). The same is true of the unaffiliated—13 percent of Louisville's adult population claims no affiliation while 16 percent of adults across the nation do the same. This would seem to indicate that Louisville tends to be slightly more religious in its identification than the nation due to its Bible belt location. I suggest that this difference is even more pronounced because I think the LMS unaffiliated category is slightly inflated by the inclusion of non-denominational evangelicals claiming Christianity is not their "religion." I explore Louisville's religious landscape further in the following chapter.

Politically, Louisville is slightly less conservative and less supportive of President Bush than the nation. While Kentucky is a "red state," Jefferson County is a "blue city." This is again demonstrated by slightly less opposition to homosexuality and sex education in public schools in Louisville. Just shy of two-thirds of adult residents voted in the 2000 city-county consolidation referendum with seven of ten casting their ballot in support.

On the control variables, the GSS is slightly more female (54 percent versus 51 percent) and a little less African American (13 percent versus 21 percent) than the LMS. The average age is also slightly older in the LMS than the GSS, although both are in the mid-to-late 40s. The Louisville sample is a little more educated, on average, but averages less income—an odd urban paradox. More of the national respondents are married and employed full-time. Finally, a full three-quarters of the LMS respondents live in a house, compared with 72 percent in the national sample. This is a bit unusual for an urban area but reflective of Louisville's distinctive architecture. The city consists largely of small

"shotgun" houses for those with minimal income and larger Victorian homes in historic neighborhoods. The suburban areas feature mid-sized ranch homes, larger, newly-built development homes, and original farm houses.

Statistical Methods

This study uses both descriptive and inferential statistical techniques to address the research questions. I first calculate basic univariate descriptive statistics and examine differences of means. I ultimately make use of multivariate modeling techniques including linear regression, or ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, and binary logistic regression, or logit regression. Before addressing the individual research questions, I describe the two regression approaches. The following sections then describe the models constructed to answer each respective research question.

Linear Regression. The purpose of linear regression is to find a linear relationship between a dependent variable and one or more explanatory variables. The multiple linear regression (MLR) equation, in simple matrix form, is as follows:

$$\boldsymbol{y = X\beta + \varepsilon,}$$

where y is the dependent variable, X is a vector of independent variables, and ε is the error term, which captures the effects of all omitted variables.

Various procedures have been developed for parameter estimation and inference in linear regression. The simplest and most common is ordinary least squares (OLS), which estimates β by minimizing the sum of squared prediction errors, also known as residuals. Despite the relative simplicity of a linear regression model estimated by OLS, many scholars, particularly political scientists, still rely solely on or begin their analyses

with OLS regression (Krueger and Lewis-Beck, 2008). Krueger and Lewis-Beck (2008, 4) write that OLS "remains the principal multivariate technique in use by researchers publishing in our best [political science] journals." OLS regression analysis is based on several assumptions that can be referenced in any statistics text (see Berry, 1993 for a concise discussion).

Logistic Regression. The Binary Logistic Regression Model (BLRM) is an appropriate model if the dependent variable is dichotomous, reflecting whether an event occurs or does not occur (Pampel, 2000). The BLRM thus estimates the probability of an event occurring. The linear probability model (LPM), performing OLS with a binary dependent variable, has several problems (Johnson, Joslyn, and Reynolds, 2001). For one, it generates nonsensical predicted y-values (i.e., probabilities) that are negative or greater than one at extreme values of the independent variable. In addition the LPM is an inappropriate functional form because Xs may have diminishing returns as the predicted probability nears 0 or 1 (i.e., taking the form of an S-shaped curve). The LPM generates heteroscedastic errors and thus biased standard errors and tests of significance (*t*)—in other words, the model predicts better near probabilities of 0 and 1. Finally, the LPM also results in non-normally distributed errors, which can lead to biased standard errors. There are two assumptions for the BLRM: (1) cases must be independent and (2) the model must be correctly specified, without omitted variable bias. The multivariate BLRM model, simplified, is written:

$$\textbf{Prob(event)} = \mathbf{1/(1 + e^{-Z})},$$

where Z is the regression equation, $\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \ldots \beta_k X_k$; k is the total number of independent variables in the model; and e (~=2.7818) is the base of the natural logarithm.

Prob(event) is the probability that the event will occur. BLRM uses a Maximum Likelihood (ML) algorithm to arrive at a solution.

Specific Models. I initially examine descriptive statistics on Louisville's religious past using available data from 1906 to 2000. Using the LMS and church location data, I divide the city into three rings and compare: means on church attendance and religiosity; proportions of the four highlighted religious traditions; and the number of churches, churches per capita, church density, and religious land usage. I construct a bivariate linear regression model to calculate a "density gradient" for churches—that is, the percent churches decline with each additional mile from the city center (see Clark, 1951 for population equivalent). I create several map figures using Arc-GIS to better illustrate the distribution of religion across Louisville Metro.

I construct individual-level MLR models predicting religiosity in Louisville (LMS) and the nation (GSS). I compare significant variables and coefficients across the two models. I specify regression models from the LMS and GSS for each of the four political variables. I use MLR to compare Louisville to the nation on political conservatism and attitudes on the morality of homosexuality. I again compare significant variables and coefficients. I use BLRM to compare Louisville and the nation on support for President Bush and sex education in public schools. I compare significant variables and predicted probabilities. The key independent variables in all of the models are religiosity and religious identification. To test for religious differences on another key local moral issue, that has no GSS counterpart, I specify a MLR model to predict attitudes on adult entertainment. I use BLRM to calculate probabilities of voting in the consolidation referendum and voting in favor of merger. Furthermore, I construct MLR

models predicting the merger index and favorability towards Abramson. I use MLR to predict attitudes towards national urban policy and political trust from the GSS.

Since the GSS redistribution question was worded differently when asked of two subsections of the sample, I conduct a Chow test. A Chow test assesses whether regression coefficients are equal across two subsamples (Chow, 1960). If respondents can be divided into two distinct samples, one can write:

$$\boldsymbol{y = X\beta_1 + \varepsilon;}$$

$$\boldsymbol{y = X\beta_2 + \varepsilon,}$$

where y is the dependent variable, X is a vector of independent variables, ε is the error term, and β_1 and β_2 are parameters to be estimated for each subsample. The null hypothesis to test is:

$$\mathbf{H_0: \beta_1 = \beta_2}$$

The Chow test statistic is calculated as follows:

$$\boldsymbol{F = \frac{[ESS_c - (ESS_1 + ESS_2)]/k}{(ESS_1 + ESS_2)/(n - 2k),}}$$

where F is the test statistic, ESS_c is the error sum of squares for the combined model, ESS_1 is the error sum of squares for the first subsample, ESS_2 is the error sum of squares for the second subsample, k is the number of estimated parameters, and n is the total sample size. The resulting test statistic is distributed $F(k, n–2k)$.

If I reject the null of equal coefficients, then the two samples are distinct and cannot be combined. If I do not reject the null, the responses are similar enough to combine the sample into one and perform MLR predicting the combined variable.

Conclusion

This chapter covered in detail the data and methodology of this study. The remaining chapters present the findings, organized into three chapters on "congregants, culture, and consolidation," respectively; and finally the implications for research, religion, and politics/policy.

CHAPTER IV

LOUISVILLE'S RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE

Introduction: Religious Congregations in Louisville

Louisville's present and future lie in its past. This is true of Louisville's demographics, politics, economics, and social relations. It is also true of its religious ecology. For over two hundred years, the people of Louisville—whites, free blacks and enslaved blacks—have flocked to their chosen houses of worship, whether Protestant, Catholic or Jewish. This rich religious heritage still exists today and is as important to Louisville's society as ever. This short review emphasizes Louisville's three largest religious traditions—Roman Catholics, Baptists (and their Stone-Campbell breakaway group), and Black Protestants—which together have historically (and presently) dominated the religious scene.

Louisville's first church, under the supervision of the Episcopalians, was built in 1803, twenty-five years after the area's first settlement at the Falls of the Ohio (Wickendon, 1921). The second church constructed in 1811 was the first Catholic church in Louisville (Ibid). A French Priest was active in Louisville as early as 1794, while the first sermon in the area may have been preached by Baptist Squire Boone, brother to the famous frontiersman and folk hero Daniel Boone (Ibid). Early on, Baptist, Catholic, and black congregations succeeded at demonstrating their presence in Louisville, alongside several other Protestant denominations (Episcopalian, Methodist, Presbyterian).

The Catholic Church established the Diocese of Kentucky in 1808 (Wickendon, 1921). The first Catholic church in Louisville was built on Main St. in 1811 (Ibid). Originally, the Diocese was centered south of Louisville in nearby Bardstown but moved to Louisville in 1841 because the local Bishop "found that Bardstown was not gaining in importance" (Ibid, 12). Early Catholic congregations founded in Louisville catered to particular ethnicities such as Germans (St. Boniface, 1836) and the French (Notre Dame de Port, or the Church of Our Lady in Portland, 1841). Wickendon (1921) documents a variety of Catholic contributions to education and social services in Louisville, including the creation of hospitals and orphanages. Catholic schools still have a particularly strong presence in modern-day Louisville.

Baptists, and the splinter movement including Christian Churches and the Disciples of Christ, also made an early impression on Louisville. The first Baptist congregation in Jefferson County was the Baptist Church of Beargrass founded in 1784 near the Shelbyville Pike (Wickendon, 1921). In 1803, Kentucky's Baptists founded the Long Run Baptist Association covering Jefferson as well as neighboring Shelby, Spencer, Bullitt, and part of Hardin counties (Ibid). Wickendon (1921, 16) cautions that, in traditional Baptist fashion, "This association was merely a gathering for consultation and advice." Hudson (1998, 45) labels Long Run "a rather loose association of Baptist churches in the [Louisville] region." The First Baptist Church of Louisville was established in 1815, which later split into other white Baptist, black Baptist, and Christian Church congregations (Wickendon, 1921).

Wickendon (1921, 21) writes that while "The Baptists of Louisville [are] now very powerful in the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC), [they] had no part in its

organization, which occurred in 1845 in Augusta, Georgia." The conventions' creation was a protest against the American Baptist Home Mission Society's refusal to allow a slave-holder's participation in missions (Ibid). Foreshadowing events to come, the Charleston Mercury newspaper wrote, "When we are forced out of the church by the Northern fanatics we shall next be forced out of the Union by the same nefarious arts" (quoted in Wickendon, 1921). A month after its creation, Kentucky's Baptist churches renounced the northern Baptists and pledged their allegiance to the SBC. Louisville gained its prominence in the convention when the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, founded in 1859 under the pro-slavery leadership of James P. Boyce, moved from Greenville, South Carolina to Louisville in 1877 (Ibid). In 1921, the President of the seminary, Dr. E. Y. Mullins, ascended to the presidency of the SBC, forever cementing Louisville's prominence in the convention (Ibid).

The Disciples of Christ were founded in 1810 by Alexander Campbell and his father Thomas in Pennsylvania, breaking ties with the Baptist church according to Wickendon (1921). The Campbell's later merged with former Presbyterian minister Barton Stone, a Kentuckian who began the Christian Church, in 1832 (Davis, 1915). Together, these churches are known as the Stone-Campbell or Restoration movement—united around common ideals of restoring the early church's emphasis on regular communion and the necessity of baptism of believing adults by immersion, apart from denominational division and creeds (Ibid). Alexander Campbell visited Louisville in 1824, delivering a passionate speech, and by 1825 various Louisville Baptists followed his lead by "break[ing] the loaf every Lord's Day and…attend[ing] regularly to the contribution for the poor" (Wickendon, 1921, 52-53).

Today, the Christian Church and Southern Baptists have much in common—religiously, socially, and politically—particularly in Louisville. Alexander Campbell (1970, xv) penned a work titled *The Christian System*, which refers to Christianity as a "system" likened to the human body or universe, for the purpose of "communicating a correct knowledge of the Christian Institution." Campbell (Ibid, vii) praises Luther's "effort to dethrone the *Man of Sin,*" in reference to the Roman Catholic Pope, but equally condemns the various "Protestant Popes, who gradually assimilated the new church to the old." According to White (1972, 102), the Disciples of Christ denomination sprung from this tradition has "retained sufficient emphasis on local autonomy to prevent them from developing a genuine formal structure." Today, the Christian Church is undoubtedly the second largest mostly white Protestant presence in Louisville—with over 80 congregations and tens of thousands of adherents, largely due to Louisville's largest congregation, Southeast Christian Church. With the conservative turn in the SBC, the two groups share many mutual interests, such as emphasis on congregational polity, baptism by immersion following a confession of faith, and Biblical primacy/inerrancy.

Southeast Christian Church began in 1962 with 77 charter members, originally meeting in a basement and then elementary school (Southeast Christian Church, 2007). The church outgrew two other buildings, officially growing to megachurch size in 1985 and first achieving "Gigachurch" attendance, exceeding 10,000 average weekly attendees, in 1990 (Ibid; *Southeast Outlook*, 2008). In 2007, Southeast ranked sixth nationally in size and seventeenth in reputation (*Outreach Magazine*, 2007; *Church Report*, 2007). The church calls an over one-hundred acre campus home, complete with several structures, a 9,000 seat sanctuary, a full-service café, Christian bookstore, and a

50,000 square-foot exercise facility, among countless other congregational amenities (Brown, 2002). The church even produces an Easter Pageant that rivals Broadway and Hollywood (Smith, 2008). One of the other four majority white megachurches is a Christian Church, two are Southern Baptist, and one is Pentecostal (Assembly of God).

The two remaining megachurches are associated with the black Baptist tradition. Black Protestantism has always been strong in Louisville, even in the days of slavery. In the early and mid-1800s, blacks were forced to choose between "either their master's church, a separate African American branch of their master's church (i.e., separate but not independent), the 'invisible institution' of slave religion, or little or no religion at all" (Hudson, 1998, 44). Early denominations seeking to evangelize the black population of America included the Baptists and Methodists (Kolchin, 1993; Lincoln and Mamiya, 1990; Raboteau, 1978). Eventually, black Baptists and black Methodists successfully founded their own independent denominations—such as the African Methodist Episcopal church, founded in 1816 by Richard Allen (Lincoln and Mamiya, 1990). Today, black Protestantism is the third largest tradition in Louisville following Roman Catholicism and the Southern Baptist Convention (Jones, et al., 2002; Department of Sociology, 2006).

During the early 1920s, University of Louisville graduate student Homer E. Wickendon (1921) wrote that there were 269 churches in the city, including 38 Catholic (two of which were black), 72 Baptist (including 40 black), 14 Episcopal (one black), and 16 Christian Churches (three black). Wickendon tracked the number of congregations in Louisville from 1800 to 1920, providing a count for every ten years. There existed only a handful of churches prior to the 1830s with the population of congregations at approximately 60 by the Civil War. In 1860, there were eight independent African

American churches in Louisville (Hudson, 1998). In the two decades following the war, the number of Louisville churches more than doubled to over 120. This count again doubled between 1880 and 1920. While this rate of increase slowed during the twentieth century, the total exceeded 500 congregations by 1980 (Jones, et al., 2002).

Figure 4.1 features the approximate locations of the over 500 Christian congregations in Louisville today. Churches are distributed randomly within the census tracts that house them. Each dot represents a single church. One can see that the census tracts located immediately adjacent to the downtown, particularly in the African American dominated west end, feature the highest density of church buildings. As one moves farther out to the more sparsely populated fringe, churches thin out.

Religious Identification in Louisville

Table 4.1 reports Census data on religious adherents in the City of Louisville from 1906 to 1936. Approximately two-thirds of the population was religiously affiliated over this thirty-year period. Catholics composed forty percent of the population around the turn of the century but dropped to just under one-quarter from 1916 to 1936. This large presence of Catholics distinguishes Kentucky from other parts of the South—and is due to northern Kentucky's location at the base of the "German Triangle," with points in nearby Cincinnati, Ohio; St. Louis, Missouri; and Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Ownby, 2005). A geographic analysis of the dominant religious traditions in U.S. counties finds that Louisville is the boundary between Southern Baptist territory, stretching north from the Gulf of Mexico, and German Catholic territory coming down from the central Midwest

(Jones, et al., 2002). Around one-third of the early-1900s population held a non-Catholic, primarily Protestant, affiliation.

Figure 4.1: Dot Density Approximation of Church Locations in Louisville Metro

Table 4.1: Louisville Religious Adherents, 1906-1936 (Percent of Population)

Year	1906	1916	1926	1936
Religiously affiliated	68.7	56.5	62.4	59.3
Religiously unaffiliated	31.3	43.5	37.6	40.7
Roman Catholic affiliation	39.7	23.3	23.9	24.1
Non-Catholic affiliation	29.0	33.2	38.6	35.3
Population Estimate	214,330	229,410	271,318	313,411

Source: Stark and Bainbridge (1996)

Table 4.2 features data on religious adherence in Jefferson County, Kentucky—now consolidated Louisville Metro—covering the latter half of the twentieth century. Catholics have remained at around one-quarter of the population from the 1950s to the present. Southern Baptists are consistently about one-sixth (16-17 percent) of Jefferson County's population. Southern Baptists compose about one-third of religious adherents in the Kentucky-Tennessee region, more so than even other parts of the South (Ownby, 2005). Other Protestants appear to grow from the 1970s to 1990 and then decline sharply prior to 2000. The RCMS data is reliable when one compares within a tradition—so long as a denomination does not alter the way it counts members—but amorphous categories like "Protestants" may shift over time due to the inclusion of different denominations with each iteration of the RCMS. Furthermore, the population not counted in 1990 amounted to one-third while nearly half are uncounted in 2000. While this may be seen as a decline in religious adherence, it is just as likely that several denominations ceased reporting membership data to the RCMS study team or it may reflect increasing

Table 4.2: Louisville-Jefferson County Religious Adherents, 1952-2000 (Percent of Population)

Year	1952	1971	1980	1990	2000
Southern Baptist	13.8	16.8	17.0	17.1	15.6
Other Protestant	15.8	14.6	19.2	26.0	14.1
Total Protestant	29.6	31.4	36.2	43.1	29.7
Roman Catholic	25.8	22.5	24.0	23.5	22.6
Population Not Counted	42.8	45.9	39.1	32.1	45.4

Source: Jones, et al., 2002

identification with non-denominational congregations, which the RCMS does not reliably count.

To establish the reliability of the 2006 LMS data on religious identification, I compare the proportions responding with each religious denomination to the 2000 RCMS and the 2000 LMS, which also asked a simplified religious preference question. The comparison is contained in Table 4.3. The numbers for the major traditions—Catholics and Southern Baptists—are similar across the data sources, again reflecting approximately one-quarter and one-sixth, respectively, of the total population of Jefferson County. A discrepancy does exist when one tallies total Protestants. While the 2000 RCMS reports only 30 percent Protestant, the 2000 and 2006 LMS datasets report nearly half and over half, respectively. This is easily resolved because the RCMS underreports Protestants due to not counting most African American and independent Protestants. The religious preference question asked in the 2006 LMS included more categories, including several ambiguous ones, which make comparison with the 2000 LMS difficult. While certainly an improvement over the simplistic 2000 response categories, the 2006 LMS

added open-ended categories which capture disparate denominations and neglected to include specific non-Christian religious categories like Judaism.

Table 4.3: Comparison of 2000 RCMS and 2000/2006 LMS Estimates of Religious Adherence

Dataset Year	RCMS 2000	LMS 2000 (Unweighted)	LMS 2006 (Weighted)
Southern Baptist	15.6	-	18.5
Black Protestant	-	-	18.0
Other Protestant	14.1	-	13.0
Other Christian	-	-	10.4
Total Protestant	29.7	44.6	59.9
Roman Catholic	22.6	26.1	23.6
Other Non-Christian	2.0	-	3.3
Jewish	-	0.7	-
Other	-	21.8	-
Population Not Counted	45.4	-	-
Unaffiliated/None	-	6.9	13.2
Evangelical Protestant	21.6	-	-
Mainline Protestant	8.5	-	-

Table 4.4 compares the presence of religious traditions in Louisville with the nation using 2006 LMS and GSS data. Louisville has comparable proportions of Roman Catholics, non-Christian religious traditions, and the religiously unaffiliated. The non-Catholic Christian population is slightly higher in Louisville due to elevated evangelical Protestant proportions. Since the LMS does not ask an evangelical identification question, I compare Southern Baptists and other Protestants/Christians. Louisville has

over twice the proportion of Southern Baptists as the nation. The percentage of other Protestants and Christians in Louisville is only about two-thirds as much as their representation in the nation as a whole. In addition, Louisville has twice as many Black Protestants when compared with their proportion in the national population.

Table 4.4: Comparison of Louisville's Major Traditions with the Nation (% of pop)

	Louisville	Nation
Roman Catholic	24%	27%
Southern Baptist	19%	7%
Black Protestant	18%	9%
Other Protestant/Christian	23%	37%
Total Non-Catholic Christian	60%	53%
Non-Christian	3%	4%
Unaffiliated	13%	16%

Source: LMS and GSS (both 2006)

Louisville's Religious Urban Ecology

Table 4.5 captures the religious ecology across the three rings of Louisville Metro—urban, within the inner beltway; inner suburban, between the inner and outer beltways; and outer suburban, beyond the outer beltway. While neighborhoods in urban Louisville average over one church per 1,000 residents, this number falls to 0.6 in the older suburbs and rebounds slightly to nearly 0.8 in the newer fringe suburbs. Church density—churches per square mile—declines tenfold with distance from the center,

dropping from an average of 6.2 in the urban core to 0.62 at the county's edge. Figure 4.2 illustrates this decline in church density by mapping churches per square mile for each census tract. The densest neighborhoods are located within the inner beltway, while the communities outside the outer beltway are all within the lowest category. While there may be less church structures per square mile, church campus size grows with distance from the central city. Urban churches average just over one acre while inner and outer suburban churches tend to each cover about five acres. Churches are less frequent sights at the fringe but, when seen, are likely to cover more ground or hold more land.

Table 4.5: Comparison of Congregational and Individual Religious Variables' Means by Urban Ring

Ring	Urban	Inner Suburban	Outer Suburban
Number of churches	3.51	2.58	3.35
Churches per 1,000 persons	1.10	0.61	0.76
Churches per sq. mi.	6.22	1.88	0.62
Percent of religious land use (% of acreage)	0.73	1.00	0.50
Average church campus size (acres)	1.27	4.88	5.14
Religiosity	-0.10	0.10	-0.02
Church attendance	3.19	3.24	3.23
Southern Baptist (% of pop)	14.9	21.7	18.4
Roman Catholic (% of pop)	18.1	27.7	24.6
Black Protestant (% of pop)	31.0	14.8	5.3
Other Protestant (% of pop)	9.3	13.5	17.4
Other Christian (% of pop)	6.0	9.4	17.9
Other Non-Christian (% of pop)	5.0	1.3	4.3
Unaffiliated (% of pop)	15.7	11.6	12.1



Figure 4.2: Church Density in Louisville Metro by Census Tract

Table 4.5 also presents individual level data on affiliation and religiosity in Louisville from the 2006 LMS. Both Catholics and Southern Baptists are most-highly represented in the inner-suburbs, claiming respective 22 and 28 percents of the population here. As a percentage of total population, they both claim higher proportions in the outer suburbs than the urban core. Interestingly, if one calculates the share of each

tradition residing within each ring (not shown in Table 4.5), the distributions are nearly identical. Forty-six percent of both traditions live in the inner suburbs while the remainder of each is divided between the urban area and the outer suburbs, each claiming between 26-28 percent of each tradition. Figure 4.3 highlights the residential distributions of both Southern Baptists and Catholics. This visual representation confirms that while both traditions are concentrated in the inner suburbs, they each spread proportionally over most of the county's land area.

Black Protestants are concentrated in the inner-city while other Protestants and other Christians make up higher proportions of the two suburban rings. Non-Christians make up nearly five percent each in the urban and outer suburban rings, while only accounting for one percent in the inner suburbs. While highest in the central city, the religiously unaffiliated account for a steady 10-15 percent of the population per ring.

Average religiosity, based on the factor score index, peaks in the inner suburbs and is lowest in the urban core—perhaps supporting a "backward bending" relationship like that found by Azzi and Ehrenberg's (1975) analysis of religiosity and income. Average church attendance, one component of the religiosity index, is statistically identical across all three rings—with all three average scores corresponding to attendance just over once per month.

Figure 4.4 maps the mean religiosity score for each ZIP code. The urban core boasts some of the highest scores in the African American west end, while the more affluent east end drags the urban average down with the lowest religiosity in the entire county. Other African American and inner suburban ZIP codes are also highly religious.

Figure 4.3: Relative Location of Southern Baptists and Roman Catholics by ZIP Code Dot Density



Figure 4.4: Religiosity Index Means by ZIP Code

The bulk of the eastern and southern portions of the county are mildly religious, with the eastern portion demonstrating greater religiosity levels than the bulk of the southern county.

Table 4.6 reports the results of four bivariate linear regression models calculating density gradients for population and churches, each by census tract and ZIP code. The coefficients on distance from the CBD are the rates at which population or churches decline with each additional mile from the city center (Clark, 1951). The results show that the population is more sprawled than the houses of worship. More specifically, churches per square mile decline more sharply with distance from the city center than the population per square mile. Results are consistent whether one employs census tracts or ZIP codes, although the ZIP code models each boast a higher adjusted R-Square statistic.

Table 4.6: Population and Congregation Density Gradients by Tract and Zip

Dependent Variable	Constant	Coefficient on Distance from CBD	Adj. R-Square
LN(persons per sq. mi., tract)	9.008	-0.142	0.437
LN(persons per sq. mi., zip)	8.983	-0.134	0.500
LN(churches per sq. mi., tract)	2.209	-0.208	0.518
LN(churches per sq. mi., zip)	2.146	-0.167	0.674

NOTES: Constants and coefficients are all significant at .001 level; Constants are predicted values of LN(density) at the CBD; Coefficients are the rates at which density declines with distance from CBD

Religiosity in Louisville and the Nation

Tables 4.7/8 and 4.9/10 present the findings of OLS regression models predicting the individual religiosity index using 2006 data for Louisville (LMS) and the nation

(GSS), respectively. Model 1 in Table 4.7 is equivalent to the lone model in Table 4.9. The findings on almost all independent variables' effects are nearly identical. Age, political conservatism, and the female, black, married, and house dummy variables are all statistically significant and positive with similar magnitudes. Income and the fulltime employment dummy are not significant in either model. One difference between the two models is the effect of education. While not significant in the LMS model, education is significant and positive in the GSS model. Both models explain near one-fifth of the variation in religiosity.

Model 2 in Table 4.7 includes an additional variable unique to the local dataset—miles from the CBD—which is not present in the GSS. While distance from the CBD is significant and positive, signifying an increase in religiosity with distance from the city center, it does little to alter the model—all other variables' effects maintain significance and remain similar in magnitude and the adjusted R-Square increases by a mere 0.005.

Tables 4.8 and 4.10 compare local and national models including religious tradition dummy variables and excluding the black dummy variable due to excessive multicollinearity with black Protestant. The most significant finding from these tables is that while Southern Baptists are more religious than Catholics in the nation, there is no significant difference in religiosity between them in Louisville. The inclusion of religious tradition dummies in the models predicting religiosity raises the adjusted R-Squares above 0.4 in both the local and national models.

Table 4.7: Predicting Individual Religiosity in Louisville (LMS)

	Model 1			Model 2		
Independent Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient
(Constant)	-1.744***	.189	-	-1.863***	.195	-
Female	.502***	.072	.244	.492***	.072	.240
Black	.632***	.091	.249	.677***	.093	.266
Age	.013***	.002	.218	.013***	.002	.214
Education	-.001	.023	-.002	.004	.023	.007
Income	.000	.018	-.001	-.007	.018	-.019
Fulltime	-.046	.080	-.022	-.051	.080	-.025
Married	.319***	.080	.155	.313***	.080	.152
House	.164‡	.087	.070	.151‡	.087	.064
Conservatism	.161***	.030	.183	.150***	.030	.171
Distance to CBD	-	-	-	.018*	.008	.086
F	22.677***			21.102***		
Adj. R-Square	.223			.228		
N	681			681		

NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. ***p<0.001.

Table 4.8: Predicting Individual Religiosity in Louisville (LMS), Contd.

	Model 3			Model 4		
Independent Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient
(Constant)	-1.081***	.181	-	-.940***	.175	-
Female	.354***	.063	.173	.354***	.063	.173
Age	.010***	.002	.166	.010***	.002	.166
Education	.008	.020	.014	.008	.020	.014
Income	-.014	.015	-.038	-.014	.015	-.038
Fulltime	.077	.071	.038	.077	.071	.038
Married	.259***	.070	.126	.259***	.070	.126
House	-.014	.076	-.006	-.014	.076	-.006
Conservatism	.109***	.026	.125	.109***	.026	.125
So. Baptist	.142	.094	.054	-	-	-
Black Prot.	.506***	.099	.188	.365***	.103	.135
Catholic	-	-	-	-.142	.094	-.059
Other Prot.	.106	.106	.034	-.036	.114	-.012
Other Christ.	.240*	.114	.070	.099	.120	.029
Non-Christ.	-.424*	.170	-.078	-.565**	.174	-.104
Unaffiliated	-1.282***	.109	-.420	-1.424***	.113	-.466
F	34.538***			34.538***		
Adj. R-Square	.406			.406		
N	689			689		

NOTE: *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. Model 3 reference category is Roman Catholic. Model 4 reference category is Southern Baptist. Black is excluded due to multicollinearity with Black Protestant.

Table 4.9: Predicting Individual Religiosity in the Nation (GSS)

	Model 1		
Independent Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient
(Constant)	-1.390***	.090	-
Female	.370***	.037	.187
Black	.656***	.057	.213
Age	.005***	.001	.086
Education	.023*	.011	.044
Income	-.007	.008	-.018
Fulltime	-.059	.039	-.030
Married	.224***	.040	.113
House	.147**	.043	.067
Conservatism	.196***	.014	.254
F	59.845***		
Adj. R-Square	.173		
N	2525		

NOTE: *p<0.05. **p<0.01. ***p<0.001.

Table 4.10: Predicting Individual Religiosity in the Nation (GSS), Contd.

	Model 2			Model 3		
Independent Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient
(Constant)	-.703***	.079	-	-.322**	.095	-
Female	.248***	.031	.125	.248***	.031	.125
Age	.002‡	.001	.028	.002‡	.001	.028
Education	.041***	.009	.076	.041***	.009	.076
Income	-.017*	.007	-.046	-.017*	.007	-.046
Fulltime	-.063‡	.033	-.032	-.063‡	.033	-.032
Married	.147***	.033	.074	.147***	.033	.074
House	.081*	.035	.037	.081*	.035	.037
Conservatism	.114***	.012	.147	.114***	.012	.147
So. Baptist	.381***	.064	.096	-	-	-
Black Prot.	.682***	.061	.185	.301***	.079	.082
Catholic	-	-	-	-.381***	.064	-.172
Other Prot.	.192***	.038	.094	-.189**	.063	-.092
Other Christ.	.146	.105	.021	-.235*	.116	-.035
Non-Christ.	-.056	.077	-.012	-.437***	.093	-.090
Unaffiliated	-1.287***	.048	-.476	-1.668***	.070	-.617
F	139.722***			139.722***		
Adj. R-Square	.435			.435		
N	2525			2525		

NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. Model 3 reference category is Roman Catholic. Model 4 reference category is Southern Baptist. Black is excluded due to multicollinearity with Black Protestant.

Summary and Discussion

Louisville's religious ecology is largely composed of Roman Catholics, representing a quarter of total persons, and Southern Baptists, composing one-sixth of the population. These proportions have remained remarkably consistent throughout the twentieth century. While the Catholic figure is similar to the percentage in the nation, Louisville contains over twice the Southern Baptists as the national norm. This is a product of the evangelical religious subculture of the South, which contrasts with larger numbers of mainline Protestants in other regions of the country. This is the major difference between Louisville and the nation. To establish the exact differences, better data must be collected that captures the full range of Protestant traditions in Louisville—including mainline, evangelical, Pentecostal, black, and independent/nondenominational. Current data sources either exclude certain denominations/traditions or fail to differentiate among the major traditions within Protestant Christianity.

Turning to the examination of religious geography in Louisville, I find that religiosity generally increases with distance from the city center—although the inner suburbs exhibit greater religiosity than the outer suburbs. This is confirmed by the finding that both Catholics and Southern Baptists appear to dominate this middle zone of the city-county more so than the center or fringe. Church attendance is generally low across all three regions—corresponding to an average attendance at just over once per month. This is, though, higher than the national average, which is less than once per month and thus consistent with the Bible belt image and evangelical emphasis on religious participation. Church facilities, while more centralized than the population as a

whole, are larger in the outer suburbs due to the availability of land. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom on megachurch locational decisions.

Predictive models of religiosity in Louisville and the nation are largely comparable—with similar directions and magnitudes of variables' effects and analogous R-Squares, which describe the amount of variation in religiosity explained by the models. The adjusted R-Square statistics are each around one-fifth in the original models, but catapult to over two-fifths when religious tradition is included as a predictor. It seems that despite some differences in affiliation and religious culture, Louisville's population exhibits similar patterns as the nation as a whole. One interesting finding is that while Southern Baptists are more religious than Catholics in the nation, in terms of the religiosity index, there is no difference between them in Louisville once one accounts for other socio-demographic factors. This seems to suggest that Louisville's Catholics are more traditional, or at least more dedicated to their faith than Catholics nationwide. This is again consistent with the picture of Louisville as more faithful than the country as a whole, despite the influences of seemingly unconventional urban culture.

CHAPTER V

CULTURE WAR IN LOUISVILLE AND THE NATION

Introduction: Culture War in Louisville

Culture war is a concept introduced (or at least popularized) by James Davison Hunter (1991) in his book by the same name. In writing his book, Hunter (1991, 34) argues that "America is in the midst of a culture war that has had and will continue to have reverberations not only within public policy but within the lives of ordinary Americans everywhere." Religion plays a central role in this conflict—pitting "Christian fundamentalists, Orthodox Jews, and conservative Catholics…against their progressive counterparts for control of American secular culture" (Hunter, 1991, back cover). Religion influences public debate in the southern states more so than any other U.S. region, an area dominated religiously and often politically by evangelical Protestants—referred to as the "Southern Religious Establishment" (Wilson and Silk, 2005).

The culture wars came to a head nationally during the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections and the resulting two administrations of President George W. Bush. The media harped on issues separating cultural conservatives from their progressive opponents. Religious actors, particularly evangelical Protestants and other brands of the conservative faithful, were ever-present in the discussion of elections, politics, and policymaking. While the national scene is often emphasized in media accounts, one cannot lose sight of the fact that many, if not most, culture war battles take place at the local level (see for examples, Deckman, 2004; Djupe and Olson, 2007; Sharp, 1999; 2004; 2005). Like

other U.S. communities, Louisville faces numerous local political issues where religion is certain to influence the debate. These include moral arguments over homosexuality and gay rights, sex education in public schools, and pornography and adult entertainment. Louisville presents a particularly interesting case study of all three issue areas.

Gay rights are a very important issue facing Louisville. From 2000-2006, the six years prior to the Louisville Metro Survey, Louisville experienced the highest percentage increase in unmarried same-sex households in the U.S., a recognized proxy for gay couples (Brown 2007; Gates 2007; see Florida, 2005, 94). While once discrete and hidden, Louisville's gay community has emerged to take an active role in the community since the 1970s (Williams, 2001). The lesbian community founded a branch of the Metropolitan Community Church in 1972 (chartered 1985), which formerly met at the First Unitarian Church before purchasing its own building (Ibid). Also in the 1970s, a chapter of Dignity—a support group for gay Catholics—was founded in Louisville (Ibid; also see Davidson, 1987). In the 1980s, the gay community formed an advocacy coalition (Gays and Lesbians United for Equality, or GLUE), a gay newspaper, and a local television program to bolster their cause (Ibid). While gay rights legislation faced difficulties, the Louisville Board of Alderman eventually passed an ordinance by a vote of 7-5 in January, 1999 banning workplace discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (Ibid). These legislative efforts faced steady opposition from religious conservatives (Ibid). Savitch and Vogel (2004) report that gays organized against Louisville's merger with Jefferson County based on fears that the consolidated entity would reflect a power shift to the suburbs, which are generally seen as less sympathetic to the fight for gay rights and anti-discrimination legislation.

I must note in this discussion that there is a vibrant debate amongst American Christians, and Christians worldwide, on whether Christianity should condemn (if at all) homosexuality as an orientation in general or homosexual activity on its own. This sometimes takes the form of the classic distinction "love the sinner, hate the sin," language which has crept into the academic lexicon (Mak and Tsang, 2008). Thus, many Christians now accept homosexual orientation but, even so, do not permit homosexual activity among committed believers, including clergy members. Other Christian denominations have openly welcomed the gay and lesbian communities (Summers, 2007).

Sex education in Louisville and Kentucky's public schools is another controversial issue. Because Kentucky received abstinence-only funding from federal Title V grants from 1997 to 2008, the Jefferson County School District's (JCSD) sex education instructors "can mention STDs, but not how to use a condom or how to access birth control" (Ungar, 2008; also see *LEO*, 2008). JCSD's abstinence funding, $79,000 (10 percent) of the state's total $817,000, goes to the Teen Youth Program of Encouragement (TYPE) where instructors discuss "self-esteem and healthy relationships" with sex-segregated middle-schoolers (Ungar, 2008). Instructors sometimes ask students to sign "virginity pledges," a practice allegedly causing teens to practice unsafe sex when they do become sexually active because they "believe using a condom means sex is pre-meditated, enhancing feelings of guilt" (*LEO*, 2008). The teachers can discuss safe-sex only if a teenager asks a question, and typically the response is given after the session's conclusion. More-comprehensive education is only available for students who are already pregnant or parenting (Ungar, 2008). Local health department officials, nonprofit

and progressive activists, and professors of medicine at the University of Louisville are among the opponents of Kentucky's abstinence-only sex education (Ungar, 2008; *LEO*, 2008). The recently-elected Democratic Governor Steve Beshear has not announced any intention to forego receiving federal abstinence-only funding, which requires a match of $3 for every $4 received (*LEO*, 2008). Recent evidence does suggest, however, that abstinence-only sex education initiatives may persuade a significant portion of participating teenagers to delay sexual activity and, as such, constitute worthy investments of education dollars (Jemmott, Jemmott, and Fong, 2010; Stein, 2010).

Sex-oriented business regulation has also been a hot-button concern—even one of the "most contested decisions" facing the post-consolidation Louisville Metro Council (Savitch, Tsukamoto, and Vogel, 2008, 447). The adult entertainment issue has rallied religious congregations into political action, including the Southeast Christian megachurch. Savitch, et al. (2008, 446-447) note that Southeast Christian "has substantial voting power and the capability to influence public opinion, especially on issues of vice and morality." They further write that, "Large evangelical Christian organizations have come to the political fore by demonstrating their clout in both local elections and state referenda; they have also successfully campaigned against vice in downtown strip clubs" (Savitch, et al., 2008, 448). The ROCK organization, which stands for Reclaim Our Culture Kentuckiana, was formed in March 2004 to "defend and sustain the Judeo-Christian principles upon which our country was founded" (Birke, 2007). ROCK formed as a result of a series of stories in Southeast Christian's weekly newspaper, the *Southeast Outlook*, which "described how sexually oriented businesses had spread from downtown like poison ivy, and reported that 60 such businesses were

operating inside Jefferson County" (Ibid). ROCK, led by director Bryan Wickens, an attorney with the conservative Alliance Defense Fund, seeks support from Louisville-area churches to fight adult entertainment venues, including strip clubs and pornographic retailers (Ibid). They do this by lobbying and educating local governments in Kentucky and Indiana, reaching out to addicts and "women caught up in the pornography industry," and otherwise promoting Christian values (Ibid).

While the South is considered a highly-conservative area, with portions simultaneously holding membership in the oft-mentioned Bible belt, it does seem that the South contains urban areas that are considerably less conservative as a whole or that express a form of repressed hedonism. In one unscientific investigation of *Google* search terms, Louisville ranks among the top-five U.S. cities for searches of: "wife swapping," "girls gone wild," "anal sex," and "masturbation" (*Classically Liberal*, 2008). Interestingly, Louisville's residents are number one in searches for "homosexuality" (Ibid). This may signify a large homosexual presence or, more likely, a general interest in the topic, positive or negative. Birke (2007) quotes ROCK director Wickens as stating that, "We've had more than one expert tell us that [the Louisville] area is one of the most saturated with sexually oriented businesses in the country."

This chapter constructs regression models comparing the determinants of public opinion on these prominent culture war issues in Louisville with the nation. I explore political conservatism, support for former President George W. Bush, and perspectives on homosexuality, sex education, and one local-only issue—adult entertainment.

Data Analysis and Comparison

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 compare MLR models predicting individual political conservatism in Louisville and the nation, respectively. Table 5.1 contains a second, non-comparable model with the addition of distance to the CBD. The national model explains more variation in conservatism than the local model (12.4 versus 5.2 percent) and includes many more statistically significant predictors. Findings are similar on three independent variables: religiosity (strong positive), house dummy (positive), and fulltime employment dummy (not significant). The remaining six predictors are not significant in the LMS model but significant with varying effects in the GSS model. Education and the female and black dummy variables are negative while age, income, and the married dummy are positive. The signs on the LMS predictors are the same except age and income, which are both negative. The inclusion of the distance to the CBD variable in Table 5.1, Model 2 enhances the model's predictive power—the change in adjusted R-Square is .015, raising the explained variation to 6.7 percent. This variable, which measures suburbanization, has a significant, positive effect on conservatism.

Tables 5.3 and 5.4 look at BLRMs predicting support for President George W. Bush in Louisville and the nation, respectively. The dichotomous LMS variable is based on those responding in support for Bush in an "approval rating" type question. The dichotomous GSS variable is based on those who voted for Bush in 2004 added to those who would have voted for Bush had they voted or been eligible to vote. In the Louisville model, the female and black dummy variables are significant and negative, while conservatism, religiosity, and the fulltime employment dummy are all significant and

Table 5.1: Predicting Individual Conservatism in Louisville (LMS)

	Model 1			Model 2		
Independent Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient
(Constant)	3.091***	.222	-	2.800***	.236	-
Female	-.030	.093	-.013	-.039	.093	-.017
Black	-.032	.119	-.011	.058	.121	.020
Age	-.002	.003	-.029	-.002	.003	-.032
Education	-.007	.029	-.010	.003	.028	.004
Income	-.000	.022	.000	-.013	.022	-.029
Fulltime	-.125	.100	-.053	-.132	.099	-.056
Married	.116	.102	.050	.107	.101	.046
House	.190‡	.109	.071	.166	.109	.062
Religiosity	.254***	.048	.223	.235***	.047	.206
Distance to CBD	-	-	-	.032**	.010	.136
F	5.170***			5.875***		
Adj. R-Square	.052			.067		
N	681			681		

NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. **p<0.01. ***p<0.001.

Table 5.2: Predicting Individual Conservatism in the Nation (GSS)

Independent Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient
(Constant)	3.217***	.108	-
Female	-.261***	.050	-.102
Black	-.554***	.077	-.139
Age	.004*	.002	.050
Education	-.085***	.014	-.123
Income	.021‡	.011	.044
Fulltime	-.020	.053	-.008
Married	.238***	.053	.093
House	.102‡	.057	.036
Religiosity	.349***	.026	.269
F	40.677***		
Adj. R-Square	.124		
N	2525		

NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. ***p<0.001.

Table 5.3: Predicting Individual Support for Bush in Louisville (LMS)

	Model 1		Model 2	
Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
(Constant)	-3.590***	.780	-3.546***	.804
Female	-.784**	.281	-.788**	.282
Black	-1.603***	.415	-1.622***	.425
Age	.013	.009	.014	.009
Education	.011	.090	.010	.090
Income	-.033	.070	-.032	.070
Fulltime	.685*	.317	.693*	.319
Married	.091	.303	.097	.304
House	.206	.342	.210	.343
Conservatism	.672***	.123	.674***	.123
Religiosity	.833***	.178	.839***	.181
Distance to CBD	-	-	-.006	.030
-2 Log likelihood	357.727		357.681	
Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square	.342		.342	
N	369		369	

NOTE: *p<0.05. **p<0.01. ***p<0.001.

Table 5.4: Predicting Individual Support for Bush in the Nation (GSS)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error
(Constant)	-2.671***	.255
Female	-.166‡	.099
Black	-2.124***	.208
Age	-.003	.003
Education	-.019	.028
Income	.080***	.021
Fulltime	-.103	.103
Married	.061	.103
House	.188‡	.113
Conservatism	.748***	.043
Religiosity	.311***	.052
-2 Log likelihood	2731.596	
Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square	.340	
N	2567	

NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. ***p<0.001.

positive. The remaining variables are not significant, including distance from the CBD which is added in Model 2 and has no net impact on the model. The model for the nation is similar—with a nearly identical Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square at 0.34. Most significant variables and their effects are the same except for the following differences: income is significant and positive, the fulltime dummy is not significant, and the house dummy is significant and positive. The positive effect of conservatism is strengthened in the national model, while the positive religiosity effect is cut by more than half.

Tables 5.5 and 5.6 examine MLR models predicting beliefs about the morality of homosexuality in Louisville and the nation, respectively. Again, Model 2 in Table 5.5 includes the distance to the CBD variable. The LMS and GSS models are very similar, both predicting 27 percent of the variation in beliefs about homosexuality's morality. Most independent variables' effects are comparable. Education, income, and the female dummy are significant and negative—meaning that women and individuals with higher socio-economic status are less likely to commit to the view that homosexuality is wrong. On the other hand, conservatism, religiosity, and the married dummy are significant and positive—meaning that married, more-conservative, and more-religious persons are more likely to claim homosexuality is wrong. Fulltime employment status is not significant in either model. Age and the house dummy are only significant in the national model but have similar positive effects, though not statistically significant, in the Louisville model. The glaring difference is the black dummy variable, which is significant and positive in the GSS model but does not approach significance in the LMS model. Consistent with the findings on religiosity and conservatism, the distance to the CBD variable is

Table 5.5: Predicting Individual Beliefs that Homosexuality is Wrong in Louisville (LMS)

	Model 1			Model 2		
Independent Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient
(Constant)	3.031***	.266	-	2.783***	.274	-
Female	-.683***	.099	-.242	-.693***	.098	-.246
Black	.089	.125	.025	.182	.128	.052
Age	.004	.003	.045	.003	.003	.042
Education	-.113***	.030	-.142	-.103**	.030	-.130
Income	-.043‡	.023	-.082	-.056*	.023	-.107
Fulltime	.025	.106	.009	.015	.105	.005
Married	.222*	.108	.079	.215*	.107	.076
House	.135	.116	.042	.113	.115	.035
Conservatism	.248***	.041	.205	.230***	.041	.191
Religiosity	.506***	.051	.368	.491***	.051	.357
Distance to CBD	-	-	-	.034**	.010	.117
F	26.987***			25.894***		
Adj. R-Square	.276			.287		
N	681			681		

NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<0.01. ***p<0.001.

Table 5.6: Predicting Individual Beliefs that Homosexuality is Wrong in the Nation (GSS)

Independent Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient
(Constant)	3.108***	.200	-
Female	-.461***	.080	-.126
Black	.583***	.127	.102
Age	.007**	.002	.064
Education	-.185***	.023	-.185
Income	-.069***	.017	-.102
Fulltime	.082	.084	.022
Married	.263**	.085	.072
House	.156‡	.091	.038
Conservatism	.326***	.032	.228
Religiosity	.533***	.042	.291
F	64.219***		
Adj. R-Square	.274		
N	1673		

NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. **p<0.01. ***p<0.001.

significant and positive in Table 5.5, Model 2 with an increase of .011 in the adjusted R-Square.

Tables 5.7 and 5.8 contrast BLRMs predicting opposition to public school sex education in Louisville and the nation, respectively. Both models find a significant negative effect of income and a significant positive effect of conservatism but agree on little else, despite similar Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square statistics just below 0.2. In Louisville, status as a female exerts a significant negative effect on opposition to sex education. In the nation as a whole, female status has no significant effect while age, religiosity, and living in a house all exert significant positive influences on personal opposition to sex education. Thus, religiosity is a significant factor in national opinion but apparently has no influence on public opinion about the sex-ed issue in Louisville. In Model 2 from Table 5.7, the addition of the distance from the CBD variable has no major impact on the model's fit or findings.

Table 5.9 presents an MLR regression model predicting opposition to adult entertainment in Louisville. Because this is another culture war issue, it is expected that the investigation of a possible religious effect is pertinent. Consistent with this assumption, the inclusion of the religiosity index as a predictor in Model 2 increases the adjusted R-Square by .079 over Model 1. Age, conservatism, and the female and married dummies are statistically significant and positive while the black dummy variable is negative. The remaining variables—education, income, distance from the CBD, and the fulltime employment and house dummy variables are not significant. The inclusion of the religiosity index in Model 2 removes the significant effect of conservatism while

strengthening the negative effect of the black dummy variable. Religiosity is the most powerful predictor of opposition to adult entertainment in one's neighborhood.

Table 5.7: Predicting Individual Opposition to Sex Education in Louisville (LMS)

	Model 1		Model 2	
Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
(Constant)	-2.965*	1.257	-3.022*	1.286
Female	-1.015*	.480	-1.011*	.480
Black	-.601	.607	-.567	.627
Age	.017	.014	.017	.014
Education	-.032	.139	-.031	.139
Income	-.357**	.127	-.361**	.129
Fulltime	.485	.560	.486	.559
Married	.508	.488	.506	.488
House	-.331	.527	-.340	.528
Conservatism	.496*	.195	.490*	.197
Religiosity	.265	.256	.265	.256
Distance to CBD	-	-	.010	.048
-2 Log likelihood	163.747		163.702	
Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square	.195		.195	
N	330		330	

NOTE: *p<0.05. **p<0.01.

Table 5.8: Predicting Individual Opposition to Sex Education in the Nation (GSS)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error
(Constant)	-4.829***	.527
Female	.023	.181
Black	.368	.255
Age	.010‡	.006
Education	-.058	.054
Income	-.072‡	.040
Fulltime	.158	.193
Married	.241	.202
House	.627*	.243
Conservatism	.536***	.080
Religiosity	.549***	.107
-2 Log likelihood	952.149	
Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square	.179	
N	1696	

NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. ***p<0.001.

Table 5.9: Predicting Individual Opposition to Adult Entertainment in Louisville

	Model 1			Model 2		
Independent Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient
(Constant)	-1.384***	.200	-	-.789***	.203	-
Female	.453***	.074	.222	.296***	.073	.145
Black	-.176‡	.096	-.070	-.392***	.095	-.155
Age	.015***	.002	.256	.011***	.002	.187
Education	.003	.023	.005	.002	.022	.003
Income	.019	.018	.051	.022	.017	.058
Fulltime	-.081	.082	-.040	-.065	.078	-.032
Married	.284**	.082	.139	.184*	.079	.090
House	-.079	.089	-.034	-.127	.085	-.054
Conservatism	.072*	.031	.083	.025	.030	.028
Distance to CBD	.009	.008	.043	.003	.008	.016
Religiosity	-	-	-	.319***	.038	.321
F	14.961***			21.495***		
Adj. R-Square	.170			.249		
R-Square Change	-			.079		
N	681			681		

NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001.

Summary and Discussion

The models included in this chapter have uncovered some interesting findings on the culture war in Louisville and the nation. Louisville does not exhibit many of the socio-demographic differences that characterize the national culture war. On political ideology, differences in race, gender, age, and SES do not predict conservatism in Louisville like they do in the nation. Nonetheless, most variables' signs confirm conventional knowledge of the U.S. political landscape. While there are distinct differences in the Bush support variables between the datasets, the local and national models are remarkably similar. It does seem that conservative ideology is more important in shaping national support for President Bush while religiosity is more important in the Louisville context, a finding again consistent with Louisville's more-religious nature.

On the moral issues, Louisvillians and Americans are similar on their views of the morality of homosexuality. The main difference lies in the views held by blacks. Holding other variables equal, blacks in the nation are significantly more likely to hold that homosexuality is immoral—a finding consistent with recent political events, including blacks' overwhelming support of Proposition 8's ban on same-sex marriage in California's November 2008 election (although actual levels of support are debated; see Wildermuth, 2009). However, in Louisville, black opinions are statistically indistinct from the population as a whole, *ceteris paribus*. This is a surprising finding considering Louisville's religious nature. Interestingly, a comparison of means shows that urban blacks in Louisville are slightly more conservative, less religious, and less against homosexuality when compared with blacks nationwide. While these differences are not

pronounced, they do conflict with conventional thinking—which would predict that Louisville's blacks are less conservative but more religious given their urban and southern contexts, respectively. This finding on homosexuality may mean that support for same-sex marriage may also be higher among Louisville's black community than elsewhere, a theory that could be tested by analyzing survey data on the 2004 referendum in which Kentucky voted to add a same-sex marriage ban to the state's constitution (*USA Today*, 2004).

On opposition to sex-education, the Louisville and national models are very different despite similar proportions of variation explained. One glaring difference is the non-significance of religiosity in the local model. On opposition to adult entertainment, religiosity is the most powerful predictor. Its inclusion in the model raises the explained variation by nearly one-third of its former value. It would be interesting to compare this local model to a national counterpart, although similar questions are unavailable in the 2006 GSS.

Religiosity, the key variable in this chapter's set of tables, is positively correlated with conservative culture war positions in all regression models included in this chapter, except the local model predicting sex-education support. It is, though, positive in direction in the local sex education model. In all other models, including the national sex education model, the variable is significant at the .001 level. Thus, religiosity has proved to be the primary driver of the culture war even when controlling for demographics, SES, and political ideology. While many variables retain their significance, when religion is included in the models it often dampers conservatism's effect. For example, in Table 5.9 predicting adult entertainment opposition, conservatism exerts a weak but statistically

significant positive effect. When religion is included in the model, it removes significance from conservatism, has a stronger effect, and contributes to better model fit. Thus, religiosity is demonstrated to be a very important predictor of public opinion on several prominent moral and political issues in both Louisville and the nation.

CHAPTER VI

RELIGION AND CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATION IN LOUISVILLE

Introduction: Recent Political History and Consolidation Debate in Louisville

In the latter part of the twentieth century, Louisville and Jefferson County went through the various intra-metropolitan rescaling stages from: (a) interjurisdictional competition and annexation wars; to (b) regional revenue sharing under a city-county compact to; (c) full-blown merger of the city with the surrounding suburban/rural county (Savitch and Vogel, 2000; 2004). This chapter explores the recent debates over regionalism culminating in the 2000 consolidation referendum and the city-county merger in 2003; and analyzes data predicting participation and vote in the referendum and attitudes on the merged government.

Political and business elites have attempted to amalgamate the City of Louisville and surrounding Jefferson County through city-county consolidation or annexation of large unincorporated portions of the county since the 1950s (Savitch and Vogel, 2000). Their plans have repeatedly failed—consolidation was rejected in both 1982 and 1983 referenda. An earlier effort to annex significant portions of the county in the 1950s called the Plan for Improvement, or Mallon Plan, also failed due to rejection by suburban voters by a 2-1 margin (Ibid).

Attempts at consolidation in the 1980s were motivated by the city's declining share of the county's population, down from three-quarters to one-third over the latter half of the twentieth century, and tax base and revenues (Savitch and Vogel, 2000). As a

result of deindustrialization and suburbanization, Louisville also housed a disproportionate number of the county's poor and minority residents. Project 2000, an organization of business elites in cooperation with the mayor and county judge-executive, pushed the state legislature in the early 1980s to establish a charter commission that would study and propose city-county merger. With an exemption in place for the 90-some legally-classified "lower-class" cities in the county, the legislature created the commission (Ibid; Schulman, 1987). The resulting plan was defeated at the polls by less than 1,500 votes. Despite a seemingly more "palatable" plan successfully placed on the ballot the following year, consolidation was again defeated, by a margin of over 5,000 votes.

The major opponents of merger each year were a coalition of African Americans from Louisville's west end and the white working class in the south end of the city and the unincorporated area of southwest Jefferson County (Savitch and Vogel, 2000). Despite recent battles over busing, these strange bedfellows were brought together by the possibility of merger (Ibid; Schulman, 1987). Savitch and Vogel (2000, 200), two local academics, partially attribute consolidation's defeat to fears of a "conspiracy among the 'downtown' and [affluent] 'east end' establishment," with consolidation serving as the backbone of the "community power structure's agenda" (also see Schulman, 1987). According to Schulman (1987, Lo3), this unlikely marriage was the result of the fact that,

> …two generations of Southwest county whites felt they had been treated by the city establishment and by East Enders as second-class, hillbilly bumpkins, perennially on the short end for roads, sewers, and representation on city-county boards and commissions. And for many blacks, still only in transition to educational, economic, and participatory equality, nothing short of commanding evidence would retrieve a nagging worry that government consolidation might mean some loss of newly won, black political power.

Other coalition supporters included the NAACP, local police lodges, 18 state representatives, and five city aldermen.

In 1985, Louisville made an effort to annex all of the remaining unincorporated parts of Jefferson County. As a result, the county agreed to a "compact" with the city that enabled tax sharing, better division of agencies/functions, and a moratorium on further annexations and incorporations (Savitch and Vogel, 2000). The compact reorganized metropolitan governance, allowing the city and county to reduce their rivalry, cooperatively plan for economic development, and provide public services in a more-efficient manner (Ibid).

Despite the seemingly successful compact, local elites bolstered by the Louisville area's daily newspaper, the *Courier Journal*, again placed city-county merger on the agenda in the 1990s (Savitch and Vogel, 2004). The Jefferson County Governance Project, including a citizens' task force, was created in 1994 to study local governance and make recommendations for future restructuring. In 1996, the task force rejected consolidation as a strategy in favor of a "transfer of many services and revenues from the city to the county and reorganization of county government" (Savitch and Vogel, 2000). The state legislature did not enact the task force recommendations. In 1998, the compact was renewed for another ten years beyond its original 12-year term with few changes—including the same tax-sharing formulas and moratorium on new annexations and incorporations (Ibid). The renewal eliminated a joint city-county office of economic development, shifting its functions into the hands of a public-private partnership, Greater Louisville, Inc. (GLI), which doubles as the Chamber of Commerce (Ibid).

The area's state legislative delegation subsequently created a new Task Force on Local Government (TFLG), which in addition to the delegation included the city's mayor and board of alderman, the county judge-executive, the fiscal court, and representatives from the small suburban cities. In late 1999, the mayor and judge-executive jointly proposed the merger of city and county governments. The TFLG voted in favor of the proposal in early 2000 and the Kentucky General Assembly passed a bill authorizing consolidation during the Spring 2000 session. According to Savitch and Vogel (2004), consolidation's supporters closely mirrored Molotch's (1976) growth machine players—including corporations, developers and realtors, lawyers, other professionals, the newspaper, and state, city, and county politicians (both Democrat and Republican).

A merger referendum was placed on the ballot for the November 2000 general election. At the time of the referendum, there were 116 governments in Louisville—the City plus 85 small cities and 29 special districts. As a political concession, these other governments were again exempted from merger (Savitch and Vogel, 2004). While opponents and casual observers believed consolidation would again fail, Savitch and Vogel (2004) identify three key changes that altered the environment and debate since merger was last considered in the 1980s. Middle and upper-class suburbs had emerged, stocked with voting professionals sympathetic to the "government as business," corporate-style rhetoric. Louisville's governing coalition, which pushed for consolidation, is categorized as a developmental or corporate-centered regime (Stone, 1989; Savitch, Tsukamoto, and Vogel, 2008). Secondly, voters believed allegations that Louisville was and would be falling behind its consolidated big-city neighbors: Indianapolis, Indiana and Nashville, Tennessee. Furthermore, "failure to merge" may

have resulted in also-consolidated Lexington-Fayette County, the home of the University of Kentucky, surpassing Louisville as the largest city in Kentucky following the 2000 Census (Savitch and Vogel, 2000). This time 54 percent of Jefferson County voters approved city-county consolidation. The vote was countywide, despite some calls to allow the city its own, separate vote (Savitch and Vogel, 2004). Religious actors may have played a significant role in supporting or opposing consolidation in Louisville, but there is no known, direct evidence.

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to analyzing consolidation turnout and support using both MLR and BLRMs and discussing the findings.

Data Analysis

Table 6.1 predicts turnout in the 2000 Louisville city-county consolidation referendum, employing a BLRM. This and subsequent consolidation models are presented in two base forms—Model 1 without the religiosity index and Model 2 with it. This strategy allows one to gauge the impact of religiosity's inclusion on other variables' effects and the model's predictive power. I will primarily discuss the findings of the specification containing the religiosity index except when highlighting any major changes wrought by its inclusion. I then run further specifications with religious tradition added. The inclusion of religiosity in Table 6.1, Model 2 has minuscule impact on model fit—raising the Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square from 0.31 by a mere 0.003 to 0.313. Religiosity is positive in direction but not statistically significant. Several major socio-economic variables are significant and positive in both specifications: education, income, and the house dummy. Furthermore, two demographic variables are significant in both as well:

age is positive while female is negative on turnout. The remaining variables did not significantly affect one's initiative to vote in the referendum: conservatism, suburbanization (distance from the CBD), fulltime employment, marital status, and the black dummy.

Table 6.2 adds dummy variables for religious traditions to Model 2 from Table 6.1. The black dummy variable is excluded from the models in Table 6.2 due to high multicollinearity with the black Protestant dummy because such a large proportion of Louisville's black population identify as Protestants. Interestingly, these variables' inclusion has little impact on the model. No religious traditions are significantly different from Southern Baptists or Catholics, nor are Southern Baptists or Catholics significantly different from one another in terms of turnout. The Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square exhibits minuscule improvement. The only change in independent variable significance is conservatism, which becomes significant at the 0.1 level and retains its negative sign.

Table 6.3 reports results of a BLRM predicting electoral support for city-county consolidation in the same referendum. This model explains less of the variation (0.129) than the turnout model. Again, religiosity does not exert a significant impact. The Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square remains identical in Model 1 and 2. The only significant predictor of consolidation vote is education, which is positive. However, a model with education only (not shown) explains just half the variation explained by the full model (0.065).

Table 6.4 adds dummy variables for religious traditions to Model 2 from Table 6.3. The inclusion of religious tradition increases the explained variation by 6.1 points to nearly one-fifth. The black dummy variable is again excluded due to multicollinearity.

With the inclusion of religious tradition, the house dummy joins education as a significant predictor but is negative. Education remains positive with a somewhat weakened effect. When including the religious tradition dummy variables, this and subsequent tables present two models—one excluding Catholics and one excluding Southern Baptists. This allows one to compare the two traditions to one another and all others. The coefficient on Catholic in Model 4 is naturally the mirror image (i.e., opposite sign but same magnitude) of the coefficient on Southern Baptist in Model 3. The key finding from Table 6.4 is that Southern Baptists lent significantly less electoral support to consolidation than Roman Catholics—they were indeed less likely to report voting in favor of consolidating city and county in Louisville. The predicted probability, holding other independent variables constant at their means, of a Catholic voting in favor of consolidation is 0.740; whereas the predicted Pr[vote=1] for a Southern Baptist is 0.541. In comparison to Catholics in Model 3, other Protestants were significantly more likely to support consolidation and non-Christian faiths were significantly less likely. When compared with Southern Baptists in Model 4, black and other Protestants and the unaffiliated were significantly more likely to vote in favor of consolidation than Southern Baptists. A full ordering of religious traditions is unnecessary because several categories include potentially unrelated traditions due to ambiguity in the LMS question wording.

Figure 6.1 explores the distribution of consolidation referendum voters throughout the metropolitan region. This map again uses the dot density function to approximate actual residential locations. "Yes" voters outnumber "no" voters by about 2-1. Many of the supportive voters came, as they have historically, from the eastern urban and

suburban areas. Supporters reside in all areas of the county, although the west and south ends appear much more balanced by opposing voters.

Table 6.1: Predicting Individual Consolidation Referendum Participation in Louisville

	Model 1		Model 2	
Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
(Constant)	-4.215***	.600	-3.954***	.627
Female	-.363‡	.199	-.438*	.206
Black	.057	.250	-.036	.260
Age	.046***	.006	.044***	.007
Education	.391***	.071	.391***	.071
Income	.136**	.050	.137**	.050
Fulltime	.307	.219	.314	.220
Married	.178	.218	.131	.221
House	.546*	.238	.529*	.239
Conservatism	-.098	.083	-.120	.085
Distance to CBD	.001	.022	-.001	.022
Religiosity	-	-	.151	.110
-2 Log likelihood	649.080		647.188	
Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square	.310		.313	
N	602		602	

NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001.

Table 6.2: Predicting Individual Consolidation Referendum Participation in Louisville, Contd.

	Model 3		Model 4	
Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
(Constant)	-3.884***	.660	-4.015***	.644
Female	-.412*	.207	-.412*	.207
Age	.044***	.007	.044***	.007
Education	.387***	.071	.387***	.071
Income	.147**	.051	.147**	.051
Fulltime	.322	.224	.322	.224
Married	.085	.221	.085	.221
House	.580*	.239	.580*	.239
Conservatism	-.140‡	.085	-.140‡	.085
Distance to CBD	.005	.022	.005	.022
Religiosity	.155	.122	.155	.122
So. Baptist	-.131	.298	-	-
Black Prot.	-.158	.319	-.028	.332
Catholic	-	-	.131	.298
Other Prot.	-.325	.340	-.194	.357
Other Christ.	-.353	.354	-.222	.368
Non-Christ.	.258	.572	.389	.580
Unaffiliated	-.182	.389	-.051	.405
-2 Log likelihood	650.834		650.834	
Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square	.317		.317	
N	609		609	

NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. Model 3 reference category is Roman Catholic. Model 4 reference category is Southern Baptist. Black is excluded due to multicollinearity with Black Protestant.

Table 6.3: Predicting Individual Electoral Support for Consolidation in Louisville

	Model 1		Model 2	
Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
(Constant)	.886	.824	.812	.857
Female	-.012	.253	.011	.263
Black	.102	.353	.135	.368
Age	-.004	.009	-.004	.010
Education	.338***	.084	.334***	.085
Income	.025	.069	.026	.069
Fulltime	-.086	.295	-.089	.295
Married	.171	.304	.182	.306
House	-.607	.376	-.604	.377
Conservatism	-.152	.102	-.145	.104
Distance to CBD	-.045	.028	-.043	.029
Religiosity	-	-	-.050	.156
-2 Log likelihood	389.915		389.813	
Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square	.129		.129	
N	403		403	

NOTE: ***p<0.001.

Table 6.4: Predicting Individual Electoral Support for Consolidation in Louisville, Contd.

	Model 3		Model 4	
Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
(Constant)	1.648‡	.913	.768	.891
Female	-.029	.269	-.029	.269
Age	-.009	.010	-.009	.010
Education	.267**	.085	.267**	.085
Income	.060	.071	.060	.071
Fulltime	-.134	.304	-.134	.304
Married	.133	.315	.133	.315
House	-.718‡	.394	-.718‡	.394
Conservatism	-.172	.109	-.172	.109
Distance to CBD	-.050	.029	-.050	.029
Religiosity	-.010	.178	-.010	.178
So. Baptist	-.880*	.352	-	-
Black Prot.	.253	.437	1.133*	.445
Catholic	-	-	.880*	.352
Other Prot.	.806‡	.473	1.686***	.484
Other Christ.	-.163	.439	.717	.453
Non-Christ.	-1.166‡	.692	-.286	.697
Unaffiliated	.203	.578	1.084‡	.581
-2 Log likelihood	381.001		381.001	
Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square	.190		.190	
N	410		410	

NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. Model 3 reference category is Roman Catholic. Model 4 reference category is Southern Baptist. Black is excluded due to multicollinearity with Black Protestant.

Tables 6.5 and 6.6 contain four MLR models predicting individual approval of the consolidated government in the years since merger was completed in 2003. The dependent variable is the consolidation index derived from PCA. The base model, Model 1, accounts for just over 12 percent of the variation in attitudes toward the consolidated government. In Table 6.5, the four economic variables wield the largest impacts on consolidation approval—but two are positive (education and income) and two are negative (fulltime and house). Alone, these four variables account for ten percent of the explained variation (model not shown). In addition, age is positive while conservatism, distance from the CBD, and the black dummy are negative. Gender and marital status are not significant. Religiosity is significant and positive in Model 2. Its inclusion in the model amounts to less than one percentage point in adjusted R-Square change.

Table 6.6 adds in the religious tradition dummy variables and increases the amount of explained variation to just below 14 percent. The black dummy is once more eliminated due to multicollinearity with black Protestant. Catholic is the reference category in Model 3 while Southern Baptist is the reference in Model 4. Again, Southern Baptists express less approval of consolidation than Catholics. Furthermore, black Protestants are lower still. In Model 4, other Protestants and Christians and non-Christians express even greater (positive) differences with Southern Baptists. If one restricts the model to only respondents identifying as Catholics and Southern Baptists, with all independent variables from Model 2 plus a Southern Baptist dummy (model not shown), the coefficient on Southern Baptist is -0.256*—nearly identical to the coefficient when the full sample is analyzed. The adjusted R-Square for the model limited to Catholics and Southern Baptists is 0.160, greater than for the full sample.

Figure 6.1: Relative Location of Consolidation Referendum Voters by ZIP Code Dot Density

Table 6.5: Predicting Individual Approval of Consolidated "Louisville Metro" Government

	Model 1			Model 2		
Independent Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient
(Constant)	-.224	.217	-	-.070	.228	-
Female	.014	.078	.007	-.029	.081	-.014
Black	-.185‡	.103	-.075	-.244*	.106	-.099
Age	.006*	.002	.106	.005*	.002	.089
Education	.109***	.025	.196	.110***	.025	.197
Income	.064**	.020	.174	.066**	.020	.179
Fulltime	-.229**	.087	-.115	-.221*	.087	-.111
Married	.049	.089	.025	.016	.090	.008
House	-.481***	.098	-.206	-.502***	.098	-.215
Conservatism	-.063‡	.033	-.074	-.077*	.033	-.091
Distance to CBD	-.017‡	.009	-.081	-.018*	.009	-.088
Religiosity	-	-	-	.092*	.042	.094
F	9.553***			9.166***		
Adj. R-Square	.123			.129		
R-Square Change	-			.006		
N	609			609		

NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001.

Table 6.6: Predicting Individual Approval of Consolidated "Louisville Metro" Government, Contd.

	Model 3			Model 4		
Independent Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient
(Constant)	.075	.240	-	-.193	.228	-
Female	-.057	.080	-.029	-.057	.080	-.029
Age	.004‡	.002	.073	.004‡	.002	.073
Education	.104***	.025	.187	.104***	.025	.187
Income	.056**	.020	.153	.056**	.020	.153
Fulltime	-.215*	.087	-.108	-.215*	.087	-.108
Married	.024	.090	.012	.024	.090	.012
House	-.451***	.097	-.192	-.451***	.097	-.192
Conservatism	-.075*	.033	-.089	-.075*	.033	-.089
Distance to CBD	-.019*	.008	-.095	-.019*	.008	-.095
Religiosity	.095‡	.049	.097	.095‡	.049	.097
So. Baptist	-.268*	.115	-.108	-	-	-
Black Prot.	-.343**	.127	-.131	-.075	.129	-.029
Catholic	-	-	-	.268*	.115	.116
Other Prot.	.034	.131	.011	.302*	.139	.100
Other Christ.	.073	.142	.022	.341*	.150	.102
Non-Christ.	.123	.216	.023	.391‡	.221	.072
Unaffiliated	-.051	.154	-.017	.217	.159	.072
F	7.067***			7.067***		
Adj. R-Square	.136			.136		
N	616			616		

NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. Model 3 reference category is Roman Catholic. Model 4 reference category is Southern Baptist. Black is excluded due to multicollinearity with Black Protestant.

Figure 6.2 maps the consolidation index means by ZIP code. Approval is lowest in the African American urban west end, south end, and rural parts of the southeastern county. The working class, inner suburbs exhibit medium levels of support while the affluent urban and suburban east ends express the highest consolidation approval ratings.

Because the LMS lacks a measure of partisan identification, I do run vote choice and approval models with a control variable capturing Republican Party affinity (models not shown). This variable is a factor score of support for Bush and Republican Governor Fletcher. The sample size is reduced significantly, to below 200 in one case, enough to make these models questionable. In the vote choice model, this Republican variable is not significant. In the approval model, the variable is a strong positive predictor (.703**) and does increase the explained variation to beyond one-fifth. Its inclusion removes significance from the religiosity and affiliation variables and greatly strengthens the negative impact of conservative ideology.



Figure 6.2: Merger Index Means by ZIP Code

Further Analysis

To test if consolidation vote or the index serve as proxies for other variables, Tables 6.7 through 6.12 employ MLR models with the same independent variables to predict three different dependent variables: individual attitudes about redistribution to central cities (ordinal), political trust (PCA score), and views of a prominent personality, Mayor Abramson (ordinal).

Tables 6.7 and 6.8 use the GSS to predict support for expanding redistribution to "big cities." The Chow test statistic (F=28.491) is statistically significant at the 0.001 level, thus I reject the null hypothesis of equal regression coefficients and conclude that coefficients indeed differ when performing regressions with "expanding assistance" versus "expanding spending to solve the problems" of large central cities. Thus, one cannot combine the respondents to the two GSS variables into a single measure and sample for regression analysis. I choose to present regression findings for one of the two variables, "expanding assistance," because the effect of religiosity is strongest in this model. However, the effect of religiosity still fails to reach statistical significance, nor does its inclusion vastly alter Model 2 (over Model 1) in Table 6.7. Religiosity's addition to the model does somewhat weaken the significant negative effect of conservatism and strengthen the significant positive effects of female and black. All other variables are not significant in either model, except marital status which is negative and significant at the 0.1 level in Model 1. Both models' adjusted R-Square statistics are low, approximately 0.04.

Table 6.8 features two models nearly identical to Table 6.7, Model 2 but without the black dummy and with the religious tradition dummy variables. Again, Model 3

Table 6.7: Predicting Individual Support for Expanding Assistance to the "Big Cities" (GSS)

	Model 1			Model 2		
Independent Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient
(Constant)	2.137***	.106	-	2.098***	.110	-
Female	.135**	.045	.090	.146**	.046	.097
Black	.180**	.069	.076	.199**	.071	.084
Age	-.002	.001	-.035	-.001	.001	-.032
Education	-.013	.013	-.031	-.012	.013	-.029
Income	.013	.010	.047	.013	.010	.047
Fulltime	.001	.047	.001	-.001	.047	-.001
Married	-.080‡	.048	-.053	-.074	.048	-.049
House	-.027	.052	-.016	-.024	.052	-.014
Conservatism	-.080***	.017	-.138	-.074***	.018	-.128
Religiosity	-	-	-	-.030	.024	-.040
F	6.282***			5.817***		
Adj. R-Square	.039			.040		
R-Square Change	-			.001		
N	1169			1169		

NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. **p<.01. ***p<0.001.

Table 6.8: Predicting Individual Support for Expanding Assistance to the "Big Cities" (GSS), Contd.

	Model 3			Model 4		
Independent Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient
(Constant)	2.202***	.112	-	2.048***	.137	-
Female	.136**	.045	.091	.136**	.045	.091
Age	-.001	.001	-.020	-.001	.001	-.020
Education	-.006	.013	-.014	-.006	.013	-.014
Income	.011	.010	.041	.011	.010	.041
Fulltime	-.001	.047	-.001	-.001	.047	-.001
Married	-.079	.048	-.052	-.079	.048	-.052
House	-.023	.052	-.014	-.023	.052	-.014
Conservatism	-.071***	.018	-.124	-.071***	.018	-.124
Religiosity	-.018	.029	-.024	-.018	.029	-.024
So. Baptist	-.155	.094	-.051	-	-	-
Black Prot.	.023	.089	.008	.178	.115	.064
Catholic	-	-	-	.155	.094	.094
Other Prot.	-.217***	.055	-.139	-.063	.092	-.040
Other Christ.	-.446*	.188	-.069	-.291	.202	-.045
Non-Christ.	-.245*	.109	-.068	-.090	.134	-.025
Unaffiliated	-.120	.080	-.057	.034	.112	.016
F	4.965***			4.965***		
Adj. R-Square	.048			.048		
N	1169			1169		

NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. Model 3 reference category is Roman Catholic. Model 4 reference category is Southern Baptist. Black is excluded due to multicollinearity with Black Protestant.

Table 6.9: Predicting Individual Political Trust (GSS)

	Model 1			Model 2		
Independent Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient
(Constant)	-.575***	.143	-	-.492**	.150	-
Female	.040	.058	.020	.029	.058	.015
Black	-.420***	.084	-.143	-.451***	.086	-.154
Age	.000	.002	.003	.000	.002	-.005
Education	.060**	.017	.107	.059**	.017	.106
Income	.032*	.014	.086	.032*	.014	.086
Fulltime	.027	.060	.014	.026	.060	.013
Married	-.083	.064	-.041	-.088	.064	-.043
House	-.081	.068	-.036	-.094	.069	-.042
Conservatism	.097***	.023	.121	.087***	.024	.108
Religiosity	-	-	-	.054‡	.030	.054
F	9.206***			8.613***		
Adj. R-Square	.058			.060		
R-Square Change	-			.002		
N	1197			1197		

NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. * p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. Religiosity index is limited to two items (worship attendance and strength of religious preference) because other items were not asked of those respondents asked the political trust questions.

Table 6.10: Predicting Individual Political Trust (GSS), Contd.

	Model 3			Model 4		
Independent Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient
(Constant)	-.440**	.155	-	-.639***	.181	-
Female	.018	.058	.009	.018	.058	.009
Age	.000	.002	.002	.000	.002	.002
Education	.062***	.018	.112	.062***	.018	.112
Income	.029*	.014	.078	.029*	.014	.078
Fulltime	.008	.061	.004	.008	.061	.004
Married	-.078	.064	-.038	-.078	.064	-.038
House	-.078	.069	-.035	-.078	.069	-.035
Conservatism	.085***	.024	.106	.085***	.024	.106
Religiosity	.053	.041	.053	.053	.041	.053
So. Baptist	-.199‡	.116	-.054	-	-	-
Black Prot.	-.554***	.110	-.165	-.355*	.137	-.105
Catholic	-	-	-	.199‡	.116	.085
Other Prot.	-.068	.076	-.032	.131	.111	.062
Other Christ.	-.021	.184	-.003	.178	.201	.028
Non-Christ.	-.562**	.172	-.097	-.362‡	.192	-.063
Unaffiliated	-.088	.113	-.033	.111	.146	.042
F	6.272***			6.272***		
Adj. R-Square	.062			.062		
N	1197			1197		

NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. * p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. Religiosity index is limited to two items (worship attendance and strength of religious preference) because other items were not asked of those respondents asked the political

Table 6.11: Predicting Individual Approval of Louisville's Mayor Abramson

	Model 1			Model 2		
Independent Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient
(Constant)	3.131***	.288	-	3.125***	.306	-
Female	.007	.108	.003	.008	.111	.004
Black	-.092	.141	-.035	-.090	.148	-.034
Age	.013***	.003	.211	.013***	.003	.212
Education	.046	.037	.073	.046	.037	.073
Income	.038	.027	.097	.038	.027	.097
Fulltime	-.087	.120	-.041	-.087	.120	-.041
Married	-.180	.122	-.085	-.179	.125	-.084
House	-.106	.130	-.044	-.106	.130	-.044
Conservatism	-.138**	.047	-.150	-.137**	.048	-.150
Distance to CBD	.008	.011	.036	.008	.012	.036
Religiosity	-	-	-	-.003	.059	-.003
F	3.453***			3.131***		
Adj. R-Square	.061			.058		
R-Square Change	-			-.003		
N	380			380		

NOTE: **p<.01. ***p<0.001.

Table 6.12: Predicting Individual Approval of Louisville's Mayor Abramson, Contd.

	Model 3			Model 4		
Independent Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient
(Constant)	3.518***	.320	-	3.012***	.307	-
Female	-.053	.111	-.025	-.053	.111	-.025
Age	.011**	.003	.189	.011**	.003	.189
Education	.027	.036	.043	.027	.036	.043
Income	.025	.027	.064	.025	.027	.064
Fulltime	-.019	.119	-.009	-.019	.119	-.009
Married	-.181	.121	-.086	-.181	.121	-.086
House	-.053	.128	-.022	-.053	.128	-.022
Conservatism	-.141**	.047	-.154	-.141**	.047	-.154
Distance to CBD	.003	.011	.016	.003	.011	.016
Religiosity	-.057	.065	-.055	-.057	.065	-.055
So. Baptist	-.506**	.164	-.189	-	-	-
Black Prot.	-.217	.177	-.078	.290	.181	.104
Catholic	-	-	-	.506**	.164	.204
Other Prot.	.067	.179	.022	.573**	.190	.186
Other Christ.	.111	.195	.032	.618**	.205	.178
Non-Christ.	-.192	.349	-.028	.314	.359	.046
Unaffiliated	-.494*	.197	-.163	.013	.206	.004
F	385			385		
Adj. R-Square	.090			.090		
N	3.373***			3.373***		

NOTE: **p<.01. ***p<0.001. Model 3 reference category is Roman Catholic. Model 4 reference category is Southern Baptist. Black is excluded due to multicollinearity with Black Protestant.

omits Catholic while Model 4 excludes the Southern Baptist dummy. The percent of explained variation rises slightly to 4.8 percent with the inclusion of religious identification. Southern Baptists and Catholics do not differ in their support for expanding assistance to central cities. In fact, Model 4 shows that Southern Baptists do not differ from any other religious traditions. In Model 3, other Protestants and Christians and Non-Christians are demonstrated to have significantly less support than Catholics for expanding assistance. Conservatism and female status retain their significant, respective negative and positive effects while all other variables are nonsignificant.

Tables 6.9 and 6.10 present MLR models predicting political trust from the GSS. The variables included in Table 6.8 together predict about 6 percent of the variation in the index of public trust in political leaders. In Model 1, income, education, and conservatism are statistically significant and positive, while the black dummy is significant and negative. These patterns hold in Model 2 with the addition of religiosity to the model. Religiosity is positive, though the effect is weak and only significant at the 0.1 level. Religiosity improves model fit by 0.002 or 0.2 percentage points. The religiosity index used in these models is a PCA score limited to two items: frequency of worship attendance and strength of religious preference. Other religious items were not asked of those GSS respondents asked the political trust questions which compose the dependent variable index.

Table 6.10 again removes the black dummy and adds the religious tradition dummy variables to the model. The adjusted R-Square is again improved by just 0.002. Southern Baptists possess less political trust than Catholics, although the coefficient is

weak and only significant at the 0.1 level. Not surprisingly, black Protestants and non-Christians are significantly lower in trust than both Catholics and Southern Baptists. The remaining traditions do not differ from either denomination.

Tables 6.11 and 6.12 use the LMS data to construct models predicting support for Louisville's Mayor Abramson, consolidation entrepreneur and first post-consolidation mayor. In Table 6.10, only two variables significantly alter support for the mayor—age, which is positive, and conservatism, which is negative. The inclusion of religiosity does not alter these effects and, with its complete insignificance, actually harms model fit, lowering the adjusted R-Square from 0.061 to 0.058.

Table 6.12 presents models predicting Abramson support without the black dummy but with religious tradition dummies. The inclusion of religious identification improves the percentage of explained variation by three points to nine percent. Southern Baptists and the unaffiliated lend significantly less support to Abramson than Catholics (Model 3). In Model 4, Catholics, other Protestants, and other Christians have significantly higher levels of support than Southern Baptists.

If indeed a polity replication effect is present, I would expect that those parishioners with more exposure to church activities and cues would exhibit greater (Catholic) or lesser (Southern Baptist) levels of support for consolidation than those minimally involved with the tradition. Regression models restricted to either the Catholic or Southern Baptist traditions' members do not find a significant effect on the religiosity index as an independent variable (models not shown). However, Figures 6.3 and 6.4 present data on the general relationship between consolidation support and religious participation and salience, respectively, for both Catholics and Southern Baptists.

Figure 6.3 shows that Catholics that attend church more frequently tend to offer higher levels of support for the merged government than those who nominally attend. The Southern Baptist relationship is unclear. Those attending every other week offer the highest support, while those attending once a month and every week are about equally lower. Those who attend nominally—every few months—offer the lowest support for the regime, which is also true of Catholics. A church attendance variable is significant and positive (0.118*; Std. Err. 0.056; Beta 0.184) in a regression model restricted to Catholics but is not significant in a model restricted to Southern Baptists.

Figure 6.3: Merger Index Means by Church Attendance for Southern Baptists and Catholics



Figure 6.4 displays merger support and its relationship to religious salience for each tradition. Here, Catholics again demonstrate a positive relationship between religiosity (salience) and support for consolidated government. The relationship for Southern Baptists is again unclear. Consolidation support declines as one moves from

"slightly important" to "important" but then rebounds slightly for those in the "very important" category. Importance of religion is not significant in Catholic or Southern Baptist-only regression models (not shown).

Figure 6.4: Merger Index Means by Religious Importance for Southern Baptists and Catholics



Summary and Discussion

This chapter presents the results of my investigation into whether religiosity affects individual political behavior and public opinions on issues of local institutional design as it does moral political issues. Furthermore, does religious affiliation affect behavior and opinions about consolidation in Louisville? Religiosity and religious identification both failed to attain statistical significance in the model predicting consolidation referendum turnout. However, theoretically key predictors like political

ideology and African American status were also not significant in the base model. SES is the most important set of predictors in the turnout model.

Religiosity also does not affect one's vote in the consolidation referendum. Education is the only significant predictor, although the other variables double the model's predictive power when included. Religious tradition does, however, greatly improve model fit and demonstrates significant differences between traditions. The key finding is that Catholics are 37 percent more likely to vote for consolidation than Southern Baptists, holding other factors equal. This difference exists despite nearly identical residential patterns and no significant difference in ideological means. The other traditions are ambiguous because the composition of each category is unknown.

The traditions significantly enhance the model predicting consolidation support using an index composed of six items. Southern Baptists again demonstrate lower levels of support for the consolidated government, controlling for other influences. Once again the findings on the other traditions are unclear. For the lone tradition for which the real composition is known—black Protestants—the findings are equally unclear. In the consolidation vote model, black Protestants were more likely to vote for consolidation than Southern Baptists; but in the approval model, black Protestants are significantly lower than Southern Baptists when compared to Catholics. This finding suggests that black Protestants picked up on the traditional black opposition to consolidated government, for fear of power dilution and distrust of power reasons, but nonetheless supported consolidation at greater levels than white Southern Baptists.

To weed out possible "noise" wrought by the inclusion of these other ambiguous religious categories, I ran a model restricted to Louisville's Southern Baptists and

Catholics. The differences between them hold, and are remarkably equivalent in size. Furthermore, this restricted model explains a greater amount of variation in consolidation support.

Religiosity is also a significant, positive predictor of one's views of the consolidated government. It is a more powerful predictor than political ideology, residence, and select demographic characteristics (marital status, age, and sex) and on par with race. It nonetheless fails to compare with the predictive power of the four indicators of SES—including education, income, fulltime employment, and single-family home. It is unclear why these variables split their effects—education and income are positive, which is expected, but fulltime and house are negative. It must be noted that, while correlated, these variables do capture disparate aspects of SES. For examples, some LMS respondents with higher levels of education and income may not work full-time (such as stay-at-home parents/spouses) nor live in a house (like high-end apartment or condo-dwellers). The consolidation approval model seems superior to the vote model because it is based on an interval dependent variable and captures a wider range of opinion than the dichotomous vote model. This MLR model brings out significance in several variables hypothesized to play a role in the consolidation referendum that are not significant in the vote model. It is also important to recall that individuals do not always report their electoral support accurately. This is likely a factor in the LMS since support for consolidation is reportedly higher than the actual electoral support. Consolidation is popular enough locally that respondents may feel pressure to say they supported it electorally, but then are more free to express their opinions honestly when asked to pick among a range of values when gauging individual facets of consolidation.

This chapter also includes models testing whether consolidation vote/support serve as proxies for other variables—stances on redistribution to central cities, political trust, and views of Louisville's Mayor Abramson. I conclude that consolidation is not a proxy for redistribution. This model, based on the national GSS sample, finds no statistically significant difference between Catholics and Southern Baptists. One may argue that this model should be restricted to the South or Midwest, or even these regions' metropolitan areas, so the respondents are more similar to Louisville's population. I believe that this comparison is adequate because the bulk of the nation's Southern Baptists reside in the southern states. One would think that, when restricted to the South, it would make sense if Catholics and Baptists thought similarly due to the region's distinctive subculture. At the national level, with the inclusion of northern, Midwestern, and western Catholics, it seems that distinctions would boil to the surface more easily. The finding that Catholics and Southern Baptists do not differ significantly on redistribution, I believe, is conclusive evidence that the public does not view consolidation as a proxy for redistribution of suburban resources.

The findings on public trust and Mayor Abramson require greater examination. When examining trust of political and governmental leaders at the national level, Southern Baptists are less trusting than Catholics—however the differences are at the 0.1 level of significance and would be ignored as not significant by many other social scientists. This suggests that differences in political trust may partially be driving views on consolidation among the two traditions. I would argue, however, that differences in public trust are the result of the same forces shaping denominational polity, and thus preferences for similar forms of governance in other institutions. It is clear that early

Protestants were less trusting of Catholic leadership and thus created forms of church government that relied on higher bodies only consultatively, if at all. Today's congregational churches likely retain the distrust that motivated their forebears to establish local, autonomous control of their religious houses.

The model predicting support for Mayor Abramson finds sharp differences between Catholics and Southern Baptists. In fact, the direction mirrors the findings on consolidation vote and approval but is strengthened. The difference between the two traditions rivals the effects of age and political ideology as the most important variables in the model. This effect perhaps captures the same dynamics motivating differences on consolidation in general because Mayor Abramson is seen as the driver of consolidation and, as the head of consolidated government, it is only natural that the same effects would arise in this model as the consolidation models. Of course, others may argue that differences on consolidation merely capture differences in opinions about Abramson—due to his personality, religious preference, partisan affiliation, or political ideology. I favor the former explanation because it is consistent with a theory of polity replication. I do not think these findings contradict my theory but instead bolster its applicability. The Abramson model is, I believe, capturing preferences for consolidation in addition to general personality preferences. It does seem odd that Abramson's support does not mirror consolidation support—the Abramson model doubles the effects of age (positive) and conservatism (negative) but fails to find significance on the key SES variables that indeed motivated consolidation support. This may be due to consolidation receiving support outside Abramson's loyal supporters—urban Democrats—in the Republican and corporate-minded suburbs, for example.

When examining the effects of religious participation, I conclude that greater exposure to church activities and greater levels of religious salience are more important in shaping consolidation views in Catholics than Southern Baptists. Catholics may care more about the issue of consolidation, perhaps due to the strong Catholic educational institutions in Louisville promoting the Catholic worldview and polity replication. Participation in a church's institutional structure is more-important in hierarchical polities like the Catholic Church (McMullen, 1994). McMullen (1994, 724) argues that "a congregational polity cannot mobilize individual behavior or attitudes to the same extent as an episcopal polity can…because of its particular myth of ecclesiastical authority embedded in its institutional structure." He admits that this argument may seem counterintuitive—because one "might expect the more 'democratic' congregational polity…to allow for the free flow of information, facilitating members' knowledge about organizational policy" (Ibid). McMullen adds:

> It is precisely the lack of legitimated hierarchical authority promoted by a congregational polity (i.e., a loosely structured institution) that severs the connections between the local church and national leadership. The institutional myth of local church autonomy prevents mechanisms from being socially constructed to facilitate the movement of information between institutional levels, as well as the interest and motivation for even listening to what is being said "from on high" (Ibid).

Concerning the Catholic Church, one of the two denominations under study here, McMullen (1994, 724) writes:

> …one might expect that the greater bureaucratic maze maintained by the institutional myth of ecclesiastical authority would clog communication channels; but instead, those myths have socially constructed the motivation for parishioners to be aware of church policy, exactly because they acknowledge as legitimate the authority of the episcopal authority.

My findings further support McMullen's assertions.

CHAPTER VII

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

This dissertation's theory and findings hold implications for social science, church structures, and policymaking. I discuss each in turn and then offer concluding remarks and recommendations for future work.

Implications for Academic Research

This research has several implications for the social scientific study of urban and metropolitan governance, societal and governmental institutions, and religious organizational structures. I will first discuss the renewed importance of religion to the study of urban politics. Secondly, I will review institutional implications.

I began this dissertation recalling the past importance of religious phenomena, its banishment from academic discourse, and its recent resurgence in the social sciences. I have personally lamented religion's continued absence in urban studies here and elsewhere (Ambrosius 2008a; 2009a). In one exception, Sharp (2007) theorized that religious and other cultural forces likely impact urban elections indirectly, rather than directly and substantively, by shaping the prospective electorate and turnout. However, this research argues that religion does affect urban political outcomes beyond partisan allegiance and electoral participation. In fact, neither religiosity nor religious affiliation

significantly altered participation in Louisville's consolidation referendum. Instead, religion's effect was indeed substantive. Religiosity, an important variable affecting national elections, is the key driver of the culture war in Louisville and other American communities. In addition, religiosity—although failing to rival SES—indeed influences views of city-county consolidation on par or greater than most socio-demographic characteristics, including race. Controlling for political ideology, which also serves as a proxy for partisan identification, does not damper religiosity's influence.

Furthermore, religious affiliation continues to play a role in communities' debates over local governance. This is validation that the Catholic-Protestant division dominating ethno-religious theory in the early to mid-twentieth century still is relevant when one examines issues of institutional design, issues that do not really appear in national elections but feature prominently in local referenda (see Freeman, 1958 for a historical example). Differences between traditions must receive further examination using better-specified data sources and multiple methods.

This dissertation extends the understanding of religious polities as institutions pioneered by McMullen (1994) and others. It further shows how New Institutionalism can enhance the urban politics field. Other scholars have called for investigation of New Institutionalism's implications for urban politics (Lowndes, 2001; 2009). While somewhat unorthodox due to its emphasis on religious institutions' roles in urban politics, this study fulfills these goals. It also suggests psychological political effects of voluntary institutional association/membership. McMullen's (1994) work was partially motivated by a desire to understand religious institutions as differentiated from other institutions because of their voluntary nature. My suggestive findings beg for further

exploration of the links between religious denominations' structures and individual preferences for institutional design in all realms of politics and society—beyond metropolitan governance to federalism and states' rights, the United Nations and international law, and a host of other policy/issue areas.

Implications for Religious Organizations

Despite their historical (and profound) differences, Roman Catholics and Baptists have engaged in a series of recent talks meant to identify common elements of their faiths and areas for future dialogue (Radano, 2007). It is clear to observers that any efforts at reconciliation will face difficulty in moving past the inflammatory rhetoric of the past and the vast doctrinal and cultural divide (Freeman, 2009). As Monsignor John Radano (2007) notes, "Baptists will hesitate to join in a call for *structural* unity or *doctrinal* unity"—the two legs of the church, polity and conceptions of the Ultimate (emphasis added; see earlier citations in Chapter II).

These differences tend to mask a contemporary tendency towards balance in the practice of church polity. Some scholars find that the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) is no longer as decentralized as many other Protestant denominations. In fact, Sullins (2004) labels the SBC "moderately centralized," or less decentralized than over 100 other Protestant denominations—a list which includes many fellow Baptists. Following the liberalizing reforms of Vatican II, the Catholic Church is less centralized than ever, and is feeling pressure for further reforms. While churches with presbyterian polities were once thought of as occupying a middle-ground, this model is largely defunct and these denominations are becoming more and more congregational (see Takayama,

1974). This leaves the poles of polity—each of which is adopting elements of its opposite.

White (1972, 107) wrote a proposition for future review in the 1970s: "Resolution of problems centering around social acceptance by the dominant society will tend to force the churches in the direction of conformity with constituting norms calling for *more decentralized decision-making and greater centralization*" (emphasis added). Thus, even over thirty years ago, the middle-ground was becoming some combination of centralized authority and decentralized decision-making. While the poles of polity remain the same, they are each, to borrow the Hegelian/Marxian triad, navigating toward a synthesis of thesis (centralized) and antithesis (decentralized). This parallels a similar move in other realms of society: from how we live (Old Urbanism versus Suburbanism to New Urbanism; see Bohl, 2000) and how we organize metropolitan governance (Old Regionalism versus Polycentrism to New Regionalism; see Savitch and Vogel, 2009) to how we manage our public sector organizations (Traditional Public Management versus New Public Management/Privatization to a synthesis currently under development; see Norman, 2009). It would seem that somewhat centralized organizations that simultaneously adopt some decentralized elements are best suited to govern our congregations and communities. Churches of all stripes and sizes are moving in the direction of this middle-ground—a balanced polity, or polity synthesis—that gleans best practices from both types. Whether centralization or decentralization will predominate is yet to be determined.

This study finds that pronounced differences do exist today between followers of different religious traditions on seemingly non-spiritual issues. Leaders of religious

denominations and congregations should carefully consider the cues, intentional and unintentional, they are displaying for congregants to absorb. In light of organizational change, do congregations still wish to encourage parishioners to pattern their political opinions after churches' wavering commitments to organizational structures that arose in the past? This is a question that individual traditions must grapple with as we usher in a new political and economic synthesis in light of the 2008 economic crash.

It is clear that political and religious pluralism have been positive for America's development as a liberal democracy. America typifies the so-called "denominational principle;" which "rests on the assumption that all churches are good, and it does not matter to which church one belongs, just so he [or she] belongs" (White, 1972, 104). This ideal is distinctly American—the result of the "institutionalization of the norm of religious pluralism" (Ibid). I believe that despite recent attacks on religion by the "new atheists," religious organizations should continue to take on the role of political participants in the public square—including local elections and referenda on issues like consolidation. I agree with Putnam (2000) that their participation is not only healthy but necessary for vibrant democracy. If Louisville contained a different mix of religious traditions but the same socio-demographic composition, it is possible (maybe even likely) that consolidation would not have been enacted. Religious bodies, no matter the tradition, wield power and must use this power peacefully to craft the better worlds envisioned by each tradition.

Implications for Politics and Policy

My findings allow political entrepreneurs to look beyond class and racial lines to rally support or opposition better, depending on where one sits, for reforms of metropolitan government or governance. For example, class groupings, lower, middle, and upper, particularly among whites, are all divided along religious lines. While lower strata may be more fundamentalist and upper strata more mainline, it is clear that each level of society has elements of many religious traditions. Emphasizing a particular economic sub-group—the poor, the middle class, or the wealthy—in a political or policy campaign is naïve if one does not differentiate potential supporters among each grouping. Because of beliefs about religious and societal authority, it may be wise to target grassroots efforts at particular religious traditions that are predisposed to support one's cause. In addition, any political effort to mobilize the African American community must understand the central role of the black church, especially in inner-city communities.

Republicans have rallied religious publics very well in recent elections; and Democrats are getting better at speaking the language of faith, as demonstrated by their successful 2008 bid for the White House (Pew Forum, 2008). Most would agree that partisan affiliation is not as significant in local elections as it is in national elections. This does not mean that political differences in party or ideology do not matter locally—far from it. But locally, voters may reach across the aisle to support a friend or family member's bid for office or a "common sense" policy strategy originating with the other party. After all, local politics are often more mundane politics (or "sewage without tears" to use one metaphor) that elicit less passionate responses and lower electoral turnout

(John, 2009, 19). But if religious differences exist over non-morality, seemingly mundane issues like whether two independent governments should consolidate, maybe religion matters for a whole host of local issues. Perhaps even sewage.

Recommendations and Conclusion

Recommendations. This dissertation has filled an important gap in the religion and politics and urban politics literatures. I pioneer a link between both religiosity and religious affiliation and local institutional design—namely, city-county consolidation. While providing compelling evidence, I believe this dissertation should be understood as exploratory: as inspiring future research. The results are suggestive of a polity replication effect and discount consolidation as a proxy for redistribution. Future research must better specify all religious traditions for more precise analysis so one can compare across the full gamut of church polities. This includes the churches that still represent the polity extremes, the blended churches, and the regional or presbyterian denominations. This effort requires more-detailed primary survey datasets that use the collection strategy of the General Social Survey (which asks for the specific denomination with which one affiliates) and ask questions about one's organizational preferences. This will establish: (1) if denominational participants do prefer their churches' organizational structure; and (2) if differences exist across a range of institutional design issues. Scholars should also conduct qualitative research, including interviews, participant observation, and content analysis of denominational and congregational documents and communications to bolster the findings of quantitative analyses.

Furthermore, scholars may wish to expand my reasoning beyond religious organizations. This requires asking, are religious organizations unique? While my theory of polity replication is perhaps strongest in religious organizations, due to their very nature and accompanying transcendent experiences, it is likely applicable to other, secular organizations—private, public, or voluntary. Experience with a "successful" (self-identified) organization tends to alter one's thoughts about how institutions or organizations *should* be structured.

McMullen (1994, 724) closes his article on church polity's effect on individual knowledge of church policy with the following passage:

> Although there is the danger in neoinstitutional theory of reifying and anthropomorphizing the "actions" of institutions on individual behaviors, I hope this article has shown how these scripts and rules, myths and rituals become part of an individual's thinking and acting. Continuing research could further delineate the characteristics of tightly structured and loosely structured institutional forms. Evidence suggests that those authority structures operate in similar ways across organizational fields—even in religious organizations with voluntary membership.

I echo McMullen's sentiments.

I also encourage further spatial research on religion's role in the city. While religious ecology is a staple research topic in the sociology of religion, collaboration with urban planning is needed and seems to be building. Interest in New Urbanism, which prizes centrally-located religious houses, spreading knowledge and use of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) software like ArcGIS, and churches' desires to understand their environments and congregants' communities all will drive further interest in religious ecology. This study only explored religious ecology, including the locations of religious followers and places of worship, to understand better the community of Louisville. Because the LMS lacked respondents' addresses, I was unable to assign

geographic coordinates or census tract locations and was instead forced to locate them by ZIP code only. This inhibited detailed statistical analysis beyond the density gradient because the sample size was low (N=32). Future survey research should seek to establish accurate locations, minimally at the census tract or block group levels and preferably at the street or address levels, to better test research questions relating to religious ecology.

Conclusion. It is my hope that this dissertation spawns further work on religion by scholars of urban politics and more work on local politics by scholars of religion. But just as with religious conviction and conversion, altering actions must begin with a change of heart. If readers take away a renewed appreciation of religious forces in American society, particularly urban communities, I consider this dissertation a successful and useful contribution to the literature.

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APPENDIX A
2006 LOUISVILLE METROPOLITAN SURVEY (LMS) QUESTIONS

Government and Politics Questions

GOV01: At the time of the vote for or against the City-County merger in November of 2000, were you living in the City of Louisville, outside of Louisville but within Jefferson County, or somewhere else?
|__| 1. CITY OF LOUISVILLE
|__| 2. JEFFERSON COUNTY BUT OUTSIDE OF LOUISVILLE
|__| 3. SOMEWHERE ELSE
|__| 4. DOES NOT REMEMBER
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

GOV02: Did you vote for the merger, against the merger, or did you not vote at all?
|__| 1. VOTED FOR MERGER
|__| 2. VOTED AGAINST MERGER
|__| 3. DID NOT VOTE
|__| 4. DOES NOT REMEMBER
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

GOV03: Regardless of whether you voted or how you voted, would you say that, overall, the merger has made you better off or worse off, or are you about the same as you would have been without the merger?
|__| 1. BETTER OFF
|__| 2. WORSE OFF
|__| 3. ABOUT THE SAME
|__| 4. DON'T KNOW
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

GOV04: How much of the time do you think you can trust the Louisville Metro government to do what is right? Do you think...
|__| 1. Just about always
|__| 2. Most of the time
|__| 3. Only some of the time
|__| 4. Never
|__| 5. DOES NOT KNOW
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

GOV05: Would you say the Louisville Metro government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?
|__| 1. RUN BY A FEW BIG INTERESTS
|__| 2. RUN FOR BENEFIT OF ALL
|__| 3. DON'T KNOW
|__| 4. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

GOV06: Do you think people in the Louisville Metro government waste a lot of money that we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?
|__| 1. WASTE A LOT
|__| 2. WASTE SOME OF IT
|__| 3. DON'T WASTE VERY MUCH
|__| 4. DON'T KNOW
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

GOV07: Do you think that quite a few of the people running the Louisville Metro government are dishonest, not very many are dishonest, or do you think hardly any of them are dishonest?
|__| 1. QUITE A FEW
|__| 2. NOT VERY MANY
|__| 3. HARDLY ANY
|__| 4. DON'T KNOW
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

GOV08: Compared to five years ago, do you think race relations in Louisville are...
|__| 1. Much better
|__| 2. A little better
|__| 3. A little worse
|__| 4. Much worse
|__| 5. No change
|__| 6. DOES NOT KNOW
|__| 7. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

NAM01: Now I'm going to read a list of names; please tell me how you feel about each of them. Do you feel very favorable, favorable, neutral, negative, or very negative?
George W. Bush
|__| 1. Very favorable
|__| 2. Favorable
|__| 3. Neutral
|__| 4. Negative
|__| 5. Very negative
|__| 6. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE
|__| 7. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

NAM05: Jerry Abramson
|__| 1. Very favorable

|__| 2. Favorable
|__| 3. Neutral
|__| 4. Negative
|__| 5. Very negative
|__| 6. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE
|__| 7. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

LCM01: This next question refers to your political liberalness or conservativeness. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Do you think of yourself as a Liberal, a Conservative, or as middle-of-the-road?
|__| 1. LIBERAL
|__| 2. CONSERVATIVE
|__| 3. MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROAD
|__| 4. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSE

LCM02: Do you consider yourself a strong or not very strong [liberal or conservative]?
|__| 1. STRONG
|__| 2. NOT VERY STRONG
|__| 3. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE
|__| 4. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

Religion and Morality Questions

COM01: Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements about various community issues. Adult bookstores and strip clubs tend to create an unsafe neighborhood. Do you…
|__| 1. Very much agree
|__| 2. Somewhat agree
|__| 3. Somewhat disagree
|__| 4. Very much disagree
|__| 5. No opinion
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

COM02: Communities that have adult bookstores and strip clubs are more likely to have robberies. Do you…
|__| 1. Very much agree
|__| 2. Somewhat agree
|__| 3. Somewhat disagree
|__| 4. Very much disagree
|__| 5. No opinion
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

COM03: Adult bookstores and strip clubs hurt other businesses in the area. Do you…
|__| 1. Very much agree
|__| 2. Somewhat agree

|__| 3. Somewhat disagree
|__| 4. Very much disagree
|__| 5. No opinion
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

COM04: The next set of questions asks about your views and behaviors regarding religion. We hear a lot of talk these days about religion. How important is religion in your life? Is it...
|__| 1. Not at all important
|__| 2. Slightly important
|__| 3. Important
|__| 4. Very important
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

COM05: Over the past 12 months, how often did you attend a religious gathering such as a worship service, Sunday school, or Bible study? Did you attend...
|__| 1. Nearly every week
|__| 2. Every other week
|__| 3. About once a month
|__| 4. Every few months
|__| 5. Never
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

COM07: Do you believe in an afterlife?
|__| 1. YES
|__| 2. NO
|__| 3. NOT SURE
|__| 4. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

COM08: How often do you currently read a religious text such as the Bible, the Torah, or the Koran? Would you say...
|__| 1. Daily
|__| 2. Several times per week
|__| 3. Several times per month
|__| 4. Every few months
|__| 5. Never
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

COM09: How close do you feel to God most of the time? Would you say...
|__| 1. Extremely close
|__| 2. Somewhat close
|__| 3. Not sure
|__| 4. Not very close
|__| 5. Not close at all
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

COM12: Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statements. I would like to be a more religious person. Do you...
|__| 1. Strongly agree
|__| 2. Agree
|__| 3. Not Sure
|__| 4. Disagree
|__| 5. Strongly disagree
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

COM15: Homosexuality is wrong. Do you…
|__| 1. Strongly agree
|__| 2. Agree
|__| 3. Not Sure
|__| 4. Disagree
|__| 5. Strongly disagree
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

COM16: What is your religious preference?
|__| 1. Baptist
|__| 2. Other Protestant denomination
|__| 3. Roman Catholic
|__| 4. A Christian religion not yet mentioned
|__| 5. A non-Christian religion
|__| 6. No religious preference
|__| 7. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

SXED01: Now I'd like to ask you some questions about sex education, a topic that is often debated among communities and in schools. The Centers for Disease Control reports that in 2003, just over 52% of teens surveyed in Kentucky claimed to have had sexual intercourse at least once. How supportive are you of some form of sex education being taught in public schools? Are you...
|__| 1. Very Supportive
|__| 2. Supportive
|__| 3. Not very supportive
|__| 4. Not at all supportive
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

SXED02: The term comprehensive sex education includes discussion on the following: abstinence, prevention of sexually transmitted infections, pregnancy, contraception, and reproductive anatomy and physiology. How supportive are you of comprehensive sex education being taught in public schools?
|__| 1. Very Supportive
|__| 2. Supportive
|__| 3. Not very supportive
|__| 4. Not at all supportive
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

Socio-demographic Questions

DEM01: Which of the following best describes your marital status . . .
|__| 1. Married
|__| 2. Not currently married but living with a partner
|__| 3. Widow or Widower
|__| 4. Divorced
|__| 5. Separated, or
|__| 6. Never married
|__| 7. OTHER
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE
|__| 9. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

DEM02: Do you live in a house, an apartment, a condominium, a mobile home or some other type of dwelling?
|__| 1. HOUSE
|__| 2. APARTMENT
|__| 3. CONDOMINIUM
|__| 4. MOBILE HOME
|__| 5. OTHER
|__| 6. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE
|__| 7. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

DEM04: What is your current age?
|__|__| Years

DEM05: Which of these categories best describes how much education you've completed?
|__| 1. Eighth grade or less
|__| 2. Some high school, but no diploma (INCLUDES 9TH GRADE)
|__| 3. High school graduate/GED
|__| 4. Some college or technical school
|__| 5. Associate's degree
|__| 6. Bachelor's degree
|__| 7. Some graduate course(s) but no advanced degree
|__| 8. Advanced degree
|__| 9. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE
|__| 10. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

DEM06: Please tell me which of the following best describes your job situation last week...
|__| 1. Working full-time
|__| 2. Working part-time
|__| 3. Not at work because of temporary illness, vacation, or strike
|__| 4. Unemployed or laid off

|__| 5. Student
|__| 6. Disabled
|__| 7. Retired
|__| 8. Homemaker
|__| 9. Other
|__| 10. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

DEM07: What race do you consider yourself?
|__| 1. White
|__| 2. African American
|__| 3. Hispanic/Latino
|__| 4. Asian/Pacific Islander
|__| 5. Mixed race
|__| 6. OTHER
|__| 7. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE
|__| 8. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

DEM08: INTERVIEWER: RECORD SEX OF RESPONDENT
|__| 1. MALE
|__| 2. FEMALE

DEM09: I'm going to read some broad income categories. Please stop me when I get to the one that includes your total household income for last year before taxes. Would you say. . .
|__| 1. Less than $10,000
|__| 2. $10,000 to $19,999
|__| 3. $20,000 to $29,999
|__| 4. $30,000 to $39,999
|__| 5. $40,000 to $49,999
|__| 6. $50,000 to $59,999
|__| 7. $60,000 to $69,999
|__| 8. $70,000 to $79,999
|__| 9. $80,000 and above
|__| 10. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE
|__| 11. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

DEM10: What is your zip code? (ENTER 99999 IF UNKNOWN)
|__|__|__|__|__|

APPENDIX B
2006 GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY (GSS) QUESTIONS

Government and Politics Questions

VOTE04: In 2004, you remember that Kerry ran for President on the Democratic ticket against Bush for the Republicans. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in that election?
|__| 1. VOTED
|__| 2. DID NOT VT
|__| 3. INELIGIBLE
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
|__| 9. NA

PRES04: IF VOTED: Did you vote for Kerry or Bush?
|__| 1. KERRY
|__| 2. BUSH
|__| 3. NADER
|__| 6. DIDN'T VOTE
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
|__| 9. NA

IF04WHO: IF DID NOT VOTE OR INELIGIBLE: Who would you have voted for, for President, if you had voted?
|__| 1. KERRY
|__| 2. BUSH
|__| 3. NADER
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
|__| 9. NA

POLVIEWS: I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale?
|__| 1. EXT. LIB.
|__| 2. LIBERAL
|__| 3. LEAN LIB.
|__| 4. MODERATE
|__| 5. LEAN CON.
|__| 6. CONSERV.
|__| 7. EXT. CON.
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW

|__| 9. NO ANSWER

NATCITY: Spending on solving the problems of the big cities
|__| 1. TOO LITTLE
|__| 2. RIGHT
|__| 3. TOO MUCH
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW

NATCITYY: Spending on assistance to big cities
|__| 1. TOO LITTLE
|__| 2. RIGHT
|__| 3. TOO MUCH
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW

POLSFAIR: In your opinion, how often do public officials deal fairly with people like you?
|__| 1. ALMOST ALWAYS
|__| 2. OFTEN
|__| 3. OCCASIONAL
|__| 4. SELDOM
|__| 5. ALMOST NEVER
|__| 8. CAN'T CHOOSE
|__| 9. NA

KNOWPOLS: Do you think that the treatment people get from public officials in America depends on who they know?
|__| 1. DEFINITELY DOES
|__| 2. PROBABLY DOES
|__| 3. PROBABLY DOES NOT
|__| 4. DEFINITELY DOES NOT
|__| 8. CAN'T CHOOSE
|__| 9. NA

CORRUPT1: In your opinion, about how many politicians in America are involved in corruption? Would you say:
|__| 1. ALMOST NONE
|__| 2. A FEW
|__| 3. SOME
|__| 4. QUITE A LOT
|__| 5. ALMOST ALL
|__| 8. CAN'T CHOOSE
|__| 9. NA

CORRUPT2: And in your opinion, about how many government administrators in America are involved in corruption?
|__| 1. ALMOST NONE
|__| 2. A FEW
|__| 3. SOME
|__| 4. QUITE A LOT
|__| 5. ALMOST ALL
|__| 8. CAN'T CHOOSE
|__| 9. NA

BRIBE: In the last five years, how often have you or a member of your immediate family come across a public official who hinted they wanted, or asked for, a bribe or favor in return for a service?
|__| 1. NEVER
|__| 2. SELDOM
|__| 3. OCCASIONAL
|__| 4. QUITE OFTEN
|__| 5. VERY OFTEN
|__| 8. CAN'T CHOOSE
|__| 9. NA

Religion and Morality Questions

RELIG: What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?
|__| 1. PROTESTANT
|__| 2. CATHOLIC
|__| 3. JEWISH
|__| 4. NONE
|__| 5. OTHER
|__| 6. BUDDHISM
|__| 7. HINDUISM
|__| 8. OTH.EASTRN
|__| 9. ISLAM
|__| 10. ORTH-CHRST
|__| 11. CHRISTIAN
|__| 12. NAT.AMER.
|__| 13. NONDENOM
|__| 18. DON'T KNOW
|__| 19. NO ANSWER

DENOM: IF PROTESTANT: What specific denomination is that, if any?
(other responses deleted)
|__| 14. SO.BAPTIST
|__| 70. NO/NON DEN
|__| 98. DON'T KNOW

|__| 99. NO ANSWER

ATTEND: How often do you attend religious services?
|__| 0. NEVER
|__| 1. < 1 A YEAR
|__| 2. 1 OR 2 YR.
|__| 3. SEV.A YEAR
|__| 4. 1 A MONTH
|__| 5. 2-3 MONTH
|__| 6. ABOUT WKLY
|__| 7. WEEKLY
|__| 8. SEV. A WK.
|__| 9. DK, NO ANS

RELITEN: Would you call yourself a strong (STATED RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE) or a not very strong (STATED RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE)?
|__| 1. STRONG
|__| 2. NOT VERY
|__| 3. SOMEWHAT
|__| 4. NO RELIG
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
|__| 9. NO ANSWER

POSTLIFE: Do you believe there is a life after death?
|__| 1. YES
|__| 2. NO
|__| 8. UNDECIDED
|__| 9. NO ANSWER

PRAY: About how often do you pray?
|__| 1. DAILY +
|__| 2. DAILY
|__| 3. SEV.A WK.
|__| 4. WEEKLY
|__| 5. - WEEKLY
|__| 6. NEVER
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
|__| 9. NO ANSWER

RELACTIV: How often do you take part in the activities and organizations of a church or place of worship other than attending services?
|__| 1. NEVER
|__| 2. <1 A YEAR
|__| 3. 1 OR 2 YR.
|__| 4. SEV.A YEAR
|__| 5. 1 A MONTH

|__| 6. 2-3 MONTH
|__| 7. ABOUT WKLY
|__| 8. WEEKLY
|__| 9. SEV.A WEEK
|__| 10. 1 A DAY
|__| 11. SEV. A DAY
|__| 98. DON'T KNOW
|__| 99. NO ANSWER

RELPERSN: To what extent do you consider yourself a religious person? Are you...
|__| 1. VERY RELIG
|__| 2. MODERATE
|__| 3. SLIGHTLY
|__| 4. NOT AT ALL
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
|__| 9. NO ANSWER

SPRTPRSN: To what extent do you consider yourself a spiritual person? Are you...
|__| 1. VERY SPIRT
|__| 2. MODERATE
|__| 3. SLIGHTLY
|__| 4. NOT AT ALL
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
|__| 9. NO ANSWER

HOMOSEX: What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex -- do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?
|__| 1. ALWAYS WRG
|__| 2. ALMOST AL.
|__| 3. SOMETIMES
|__| 4. NOT AT ALL
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
|__| 9. NO ANSWER

SEXEDUC: Would you be for or against sex education in the public schools?
|__| 1. FOR
|__| 2. AGAINST
|__| 3. DEPENDS
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
|__| 9. NO ANSWER

Socio-demographic Questions

MARITAL: Are you currently -- married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been married?
|__| 1. MARRIED
|__| 2. WIDOWED
|__| 3. DIVORCED
|__| 4. SEPARATED
|__| 5. NEV.MARR.
|__| 9. NO ANSWER

DWELLING: Dwelling type
|__| 1. TRAILER
|__| 2. SING.FAM.
|__| 3. SIDE 2
|__| 4. UP 2
|__| 5. 3-4 UNIT
|__| 6. ROW HOUSE
|__| 7. 5+/3 STOR.
|__| 8. 5+/4 STOR+
|__| 9. COMMERCIAL
|__| 10. OTHER
|__| 98. DON'T KNOW
|__| 99. NO ANSWER

AGE: RESPONDENT'S AGE (AGE)
|__| 98. DON'T KNOW
|__| 99. NO ANSWER

EDUC: RESPONDENT'S EDUCATION: What is the highest grade in elementary school or high school that you finished and got credit for?
|__| 0. NO SCHOOL.
|__| 1. 1ST GRADE
|__| 2. 2ND GRADE
|__| 3. 3RD GRADE
|__| 4. 4TH GRADE
|__| 5. 5TH GRADE
|__| 6. 6TH GRADE
|__| 7. 7TH GRADE
|__| 8. 8TH GRADE
|__| 9. 9TH GRADE
|__| 10. 10TH GRADE
|__| 11. 11TH GRADE
|__| 12. 12TH GRADE
|__| 13. COLL:1 YR
|__| 14. COLL:2 YR

|__| 15. COLL:3 YR
|__| 16. COLL:4 YR
|__| 17. COLL:5 YR
|__| 18. COLL:6 YR
|__| 19. COLL:7 YR
|__| 20. COLL:8 YR
|__| 98. DON'T KNOW
|__| 99. NO ANSWER

DEGREE: Highest educational degree earned by respondent
|__| 0. NOT H.S.
|__| 1. HIGH SCH.
|__| 2. JR. COL.
|__| 3. B.A.
|__| 4. GRAD. DEG.
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
|__| 9. NO ANSWER

WORKING: Last week were you working full time, part time, going to school, keeping house, or what?
|__| 1. FULL TIME
|__| 2. PART TIME
|__| 3. ON LEAVE
|__| 4. UNEMPLOYED
|__| 5. RETIRED
|__| 6. IN SCHOOL
|__| 7. KEEP.HOUSE
|__| 8. OTHER
|__| 9. NO ANSWER

RACE: Respondent's race
|__| 1. WHITE
|__| 2. BLACK
|__| 3. OTHER

SEX: Respondent's sex
|__| 1. MALE
|__| 2. FEMALE

INCOME06: In which of these groups did your total family income, from all sources, fall last year before taxes, that is?
|__| 1. < $1000
|__| 2. $1K -2999
|__| 3. $3K -3999
|__| 4. $4K -4999
|__| 5. $5K -5999

|__| 6. $6K -6999
|__| 7. $7K -7999
|__| 8. $8K -9999
|__| 9. $10K-12.4K
|__| 10. 12.5K-14.9K
|__| 11. $15K-17.4K
|__| 12. 17.5K-19.9K
|__| 13. 20K -22.4K
|__| 14. 22.5K-24.9K
|__| 15. 25K-29.9K
|__| 16. 30K -34.9K
|__| 17. 35K -39.9K
|__| 18. 40K -49.9K
|__| 19. 50K -59.9K
|__| 20. 60K-74.9K
|__| 21. 75K -89.9K
|__| 22. 90K-109.9K
|__| 23. 110K-129.9K
|__| 24. 130K-149.9K
|__| 25. 150K +
|__| 26. REFUSED
|__| 98. DON'T KNOW

CURRICULUM VITA

JOSHUA D. AMBROSIUS

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EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Ph.D., School of Urban and Public Affairs, University of Louisville, May 2010
Fields: Public Policy and Administration (Exam Fields *Passed with Distinction*: Urban/Local Politics and Government, Urban and Social/Poverty Policy, Urban Structures and Institutions, Organizational Theory, Policy Analysis and Evaluation)

M.A., Public Policy, Institute for Policy Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, May 2007
Concentrations: Urban Policy, Management Systems

Cert., Nonprofit Studies, Carey Business School/Center for Civil Society Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, May 2007

B.A., *magna cum laude*, Political Science, York College of Pennsylvania, May 2005
Concentration: International Studies; *Minors*: Religious Studies, Philosophy

Other Educational Experiences

Pollsters and Parishioners: Seminar on Survey Research and American Religion, The Paul B. Henry Institute for the Study of Christianity and Politics, Calvin College, June 2009

Fulbright Summer School, Research Institute for Spatial and Real Estate Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, Vienna, Austria, May-June 2008

RESEARCH & CREATIVE ACTIVITIES

General Research and Teaching Interests

Urban Politics, State/Local Government, Religion and Politics, Public Administration, Public Policy (Urban, Housing, Social, and Environmental), Nonprofit Studies

Peer-Reviewed Publications

Ambrosius, J. D., Gilderbloom, J. I., & Hanka, M. J. (Forthcoming 2010). Back to black…and green? Location and policy interventions in contemporary neighborhood housing dynamics. *Housing Policy Debate*.

Gilderbloom, J. I., Hanka, M. J., & **Ambrosius, J. D.** (2009). Historic preservation's impact on job creation, property values, and environmental sustainability. *Journal of Urbanism: International Research on Placemaking and Urban Sustainability*, 2(2), 83-101.

Other Publications

Ambrosius, J. D. (2009). Why urbanists need religion. *Urban News: Newsletter of the Urban Politics Section, American Political Science Association*, 23(1), 2-6.

Ambrosius, J. D. (2008). *Feeding the lambs: Youth engagement and development activities of southern megachurches*. Durham, NC: Southern Growth Policies Board.

Center for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. (2007). *Ready4Reentry: Prisoner reentry toolkit for faith-based and community organizations*. Washington, DC: United States Department of Labor.

Ambrosius, J. D., et al. (2006). *Neighborhoods left behind in Baltimore's housing boom, Occasional paper No. 30*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Institute for Policy Studies.

Research Grants

Southern Research Fellowship, $1000, Southern Growth Policies Board, 2008

Conference Presentations

Ambrosius, J. D. "'Little Boxes' or Just Boxed In? Limitations on City-County Consolidation and Cooperation in Mid-Sized Cities within Megalopolises." Southeastern Conference on Public Administration (SECOPA) Fortieth Annual Meeting, Louisville, Kentucky, October 2009.

Anacker, K. B., Gilderbloom, J. I., **Ambrosius, J. D.**, & Hanka, M. J. "Capturing Contemporary Housing Dynamics in Jefferson County, KY: The Difference

Operationalization of the Dependent Variable Can Make." Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning (ACSP) Fiftieth Anniversary Annual Conference, Crystal City, Virginia, October 2009.

Hanka, M. J., Gilderbloom, J. I., & **Ambrosius, J. D.** "Race, Suburbs, and Investors: Predicting High-Foreclosure Neighborhoods." Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning (ACSP) Fiftieth Anniversary Annual Conference, Crystal City, Virginia, October 2009.

Ambrosius, J. D. "Four Factors Limiting the Potential of City-County Consolidation and Cooperation in York, Pennsylvania." Pennsylvania Political Science Association (PPSA) Annual Meeting, Elizabethtown, Pennsylvania, March 2009.

Ambrosius, J. D. "Still in the City: Explaining Consolidation's Inability to Develop Fair Share Housing Policy." Kentucky Political Science Association (KPSA) Annual Meeting, Louisville, Kentucky, March 2009.

Ambrosius, J. D., Gilderbloom, J. I., & Hanka, M. J. "Different Data, Different Deal: Comparing Three Sources of Neighborhood Housing Value." Urban Affairs Association (UAA) Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, March 2009.

Hanka, M. J., Gilderbloom, J. I., & **Ambrosius, J. D.** "Race, Suburbs, and Bad Decisions: Predicting High-Foreclosure Neighborhoods." Urban Affairs Association (UAA) Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, March 2009.

Gilderbloom, J. I., Hanka, M. J., & **Ambrosius, J. D.** "Capturing Contemporary Housing Dynamics: Neighborhood Value versus Change." Urban Affairs Association (UAA) Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, March 2009.

Ambrosius, J. D., Gilderbloom, J. I., & Hanka, M. J. "Slumburbia? Distance, Foreclosures, and Suburban Housing Values." Rethinking Transportation for a Sustainable Future Conference, Louisville, Kentucky, October 2008.

Ambrosius, J. D. "Why Urbanists Need Religion." Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (SSSR) Annual Meeting, Louisville, Kentucky, October 2008.

Ambrosius, J. D. "Feeding the Lambs: Youth Engagement and Development Activities of Southern Megachurches." Religious Research Association (RRA) Annual Meeting, Louisville, Kentucky, October 2008.

Ambrosius, J. D., Gilderbloom, J. I., & Hanka, M. J. "Back to Black…and Green? Evidence of a Downtown Housing Boom in Louisville, Ky., 2000-2006." Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning (ACSP)/Association of European Schools of Planning (AESOP) Fourth Joint Congress, Chicago, Illinois, July 2008.

Ambrosius, J. D. "Back to Black…and Green? Contemporary Housing Dynamics in a Medium-Sized U.S. City." Urban and Regional Development & Real Estate Research Conference, *Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien* (WU Wien), Vienna, Austria, May 2008.

Media

Ambrosius, J. D. (2008). City unlikely to attract Baltimoreans (Op-Ed). *York Sunday News*, York, Pennsylvania, February 24.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

University Teaching

Instructor, "Public Administration (POLS 325, undergraduate)," University of Louisville, College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Political Science, Spring 2010

Instructor, "Urban Politics and Government (POLS 305, undergraduate)," University of Louisville, College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Political Science, Fall 2009

Co-instructor with John I. Gilderbloom, "Research Workshop/Seminar (UPA 680, graduate)," University of Louisville, College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Urban and Public Affairs, Spring 2009

Instructor, "God, Government, and the Good: Faith-Based Social Policy in the United States (195.101, undergraduate)," The Johns Hopkins University, Zanvyl Krieger School of Arts and Sciences, Intersession 2006-2007

Research & Management Experience

Research Associate/Fellow, Center for Sustainable Urban Neighborhoods, Urban Studies Institute, University of Louisville, September 2007-Present

Assistant Coordinator, Central Baltimore Partnership; Consultant, Goldseker Foundation (for McNeely Legal Services), Baltimore, MD, September 2006-July 2007

Secretary Elaine L. Chao Intern, United States Department of Labor, Center for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, Washington, DC, May-September 2006

Policy/Strategic Development Intern, Coalition to End Childhood Lead Poisoning, Baltimore, MD, February-May 2006

Research Assistant, Working Poor Families Project, Johns Hopkins Institute for Policy Studies (for Brandon Roberts and Associates), Baltimore, MD, December 2005-February 2006

University Service Experience

Secretary, Ph.D. Student Association, University of Louisville, 2009-2010

HONORS & AWARDS

Pass with Distinction, Public Policy and Administration Ph.D. Field Exam, May 2009

Graduate Research Assistantship, School of Urban and Public Affairs, University of Louisville, 2009-10

Pollsters and Parishioners Seminar Scholarship and Travel Grant, Calvin College, 2009

Best Student Paper Award, American Society for Public Administration, Metropolitan Louisville Chapter, 2008

University Fellowship, Graduate School, University of Louisville, 2007-08; 2008-09

Southern Research Fellow, Southern Growth Policies Board, 2008

Fulbright Travel Scholarship, Fulbright Summer School, Vienna, Austria, 2008

Academic Scholarship, The Johns Hopkins University, 2005-06; 2006-07

Alpha Chi, National College Honor Scholarship Society (all majors), 2005

Pi Sigma Alpha, The National Political Science Honor Society, 2004

Dean's Academic Scholarship, York College of Pennsylvania, 2001-02; 2002-03; 2003-04; 2004-05

Dean's List, York College of Pennsylvania, 2001-2005 (all undergraduate semesters)

PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES

Urban Affairs Association

American Political Science Association
-Urban Politics/Religion and Politics organized sections

Kentucky Political Science Association

Pennsylvania Political Science Association

Society for the Scientific Study of Religion