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Democratization and Democratic Peace

By

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and

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I. Introduction

The theory of democratic peace states that democratic countries will not go to war with other democratic countries (Rasler 2005). A country must first consolidate to a democracy before it can experience the benefits of democratic peace; therefore, how will the previous regime affect the transition process? Taking previous regime into consideration would assist transitioning governments by determining if certain types of regimes are more likely to have a successful democratic transition (Schneider 2004). Determining how democratization is affected by the prior government would be useful for transitioning governments, policymaking in foreign affairs, diplomatic relations between countries, stability of regions, peacemaking, prevention of war, and the theory of democratic peace.

In foreign affairs, studying the likelihood of a successful transition would aid communications between countries during and after the regime change. In the international system, an approximation of democratization would lessen the instability often associated with a transitioning government, particularly if chaos spreads to other areas in the region. This would allow other actors in the international system to be prepared for conflicts within a region that could stem from regime change (Mansfield 2002). Peacemaking would also be more efficient for the same reason, state and non-state actors could delegate resources and have organized efforts that coincide with certain checkpoints in the transition process. War would be more preventable in the international system and specifically within countries if transitioning democracies were closely studied.

This study will incorporate *The Polity Project IV* Democracy values from 1978 to 2000 and prior government type to examine the relationship that exists between previous regime type and successfulness of democratic transition. This provides my study with 40 countries that will

be analyzed using their score at the start of democratic transition and their score ten years after the transition begins. After showing the connection between the type of government a country had before it democratized and democratization success, I will discuss the potential broader impacts that my findings have for the theory of democratic peace using two case studies. I will then conclude with suggestions to improve future research.

II. Literature Review

The Democratic Peace Theory traces back to Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers, where he discredited the idea and questioned if representative governments were less prone to conflict in comparison to monarchies (Hobson 2011). He argued the same aspects of monarchies that perpetuate wars are present in representative government, and affect nations and kings the same way, including catalysts such as fury, animosity, vengeance, envy, etc. (Hobson 2011). In international relations, Hamilton's apprehension about democratic peace has been overlooked in favor of Immanuel Kant's philosophy.

Kant's proposition is that representative governments are less likely to engage in conflict because the people make decisions, therefore they will be unlikely to partake in a conflict that will have strong repercussions (Bueno de Mesquita 1995). Those holding positions of power in non-democratic states will be more predisposed to participate in war even for insignificant reasons, because they themselves will not be affected by the human costs of war (Levy 1988). Non-democratic states are also more likely to participate in war because their government does not hold them responsible in elections nor must they answer to a structure of checks and balances (Levy 1988).

Previous regime type should be studied to better explain the democratic transition process and to serve as a more helpful theoretical foundation for the study of historical wars. The majority of research has relied primarily on studying how states behave as the main causes of conflict in the global system (Hagan 1994). However, domestic level politics in democratic countries must be examined to strengthen the theory of democratic peace.

The relationship between type of government and the likelihood of engaging in war can be examined to understand the lack of war between democracies and the democratic transition process. The type of government that a state has affects its foreign policy in two ways. Primarily, domestic politics impacts the kind of leaders that rule and the views regarding global matters those leaders will possess (Bueno de Mesquita 1999). Second, when the leader assumes power, the type of government a state has will contribute to how the state views its national interest and how it can best carry out those goals (Lake 2003). The relationship between a states' government and its likelihood of engaging in war is a crucial aspect of research for the democratic transition process and democratic peace.

The variation in levels of resistance to the leader or regime can have effects on less significant policy concerns to more significant aspects, such as opposing the administration or even denying the validity of the government structure itself (Hagan 1994). Changes of government structure are more likely to be peaceful if they occur from inside the society, as opposed to being brought on by a destructive military intrusion (Palfreeman 2002). There is a belief that the more democratic states there are, the less likely conflict and disorder are to exist (Rasler 2005). Overall, an examination of previous government type will likely foreshadow how well a government can transition to democracy.

The smoothness of the transition process and the likelihood of the transitioning state becoming a full democracy are both affected by the previous regime. The two main types of government that will be analyzed for democratic transition success are presidentialism and parliamentarianism. Presidentialism is less conducive to democracy and parliamentarianism is more conducive to democracy (Mainwaring 2003). Presidentialism is more prevalent in Latin America and Africa, whereas parliamentarianism is more common in Europe and previous colonies of Britain (Mainwaring 2003).

There are several mechanisms of presidentialism that make it less favorable to democracy in comparison with parliamentary systems. In presidential regimes, the leaders have strict terms, whereas in parliamentary systems, there is less rigidity (Mainwaring 2003). It is also harder to get rid of the chief executive in a presidential system, whereas in parliamentary systems, the prime minister has the power to conduct a vote of no confidence or even dismiss the parliament to conduct new elections (Mainwaring 2003). The lack of flexibility in leadership for presidential systems, contrasts with parliamentary systems where there are processes to allow for votes of no confidence or dissolution (Mainwaring 2003). The instruments exist in a parliamentary system that allow change of leadership when it is needed are similar to those which are present in a democracy.

If there is a national emergency in presidential regimes, it is extremely difficult to remove the president because it would threaten national leadership and there are not mechanisms in place to remove the sitting president; a coup is often resorted to (Mainwaring 2003). Like democratic systems, parliamentary systems are well-suited to dealing with crises because of constitutional mechanisms that allow for quick decisions to be made (Mainwaring 2003).

Presidential systems have an internal struggle of between wanting a powerful and sound leader but also fearing a leader that has too much authority, a fear which is less characteristic of parliamentary and democratic regimes because of the checks and balances that exist (Linz 1990). A country with a presidential regime will likely experience a more difficult transition to democracy compared to a country that is transitioning to a democracy from a parliamentary system because parliamentarianism is more similar to democratic government.

In 1979, Ecuador began the transition to democracy, but it has struggled with the transition of administration of all levels of government (Harbers 2001). Before Ecuador transitioned to a democracy, it was a presidential regime. In April 2005, the public engaged in mass upheavals to protest the unrepresentative leadership of Lucio Gutierrez which caused the Gutierrez government to be replaced with the previous vice-president Alfredo Palacio (Harbers 2001). The protests to remove President Lucio Gutierrez are evidence of insufficient mechanisms for removing a president, which is due to the previous presidential regime in Ecuador. Although Vice President Palacio pledged to initiate conversations with the public about improving government, there was widespread unfavourability among the public with the political leadership (Harbers 2001). The transition in Ecuador demonstrates political problems and previous regime influence on democracy. Due to insufficient mechanisms for transition, the advantageous impacts that democratization was intended to bring were threatened (Harbers 2001). In addition to Ecuador, many countries in Africa also began to transition to democratic government.

In Africa, the shift to democratic government is occurring at different speeds with varying results, which are likely dependent on type of previous regime. There are different variations of transition to democratic government in Africa. In Benin, Congo, Gabon, Mali, and Niger, the transition has taken place in which the public designates a temporary government with

a dual authority (Martin 1993). The president lacks substantive capabilities and is a leader in name only. The prime minister is chosen by a coalition to serve as the head of government and is responsible for the transition under the supervision of a legislative body (Martin 1993). It establishes local level elections and executive elections, which will allow for the next leader to be democratically elected (Martin 1993).

Benin, Congo, Gabon, Mali, and Niger were all presidential regimes before they began transitioning to a democracy. Each country chose leaders with dual authority, which is more characteristic of parliamentary regimes and democratic regimes. This hybrid between systems will aid the transition process, but the transition is less smooth than it would have been if Benin, Congo, Gabon, Mali, and Niger had all transitioned to a democracy from a parliamentary system (Mainwaring 2003).

Another type of government change that has occurred in African states is transition through multi-party elections. In February 1998, Senegal experienced a transition of regime via multiparty elections (Martin 1993). Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe also experienced this transition in March 1991 (Martin 1993). Most recently, Zambia experienced this transition to democracy in October 1991 (Martin 1993). Ethiopia, Cameroon, Ghana, and Kenya experienced a “co-opted” transition to democracy. The sitting president took action to let multiparty elections take place in time. The president had influence over the news, election mechanisms, and economic power to prevent his rivals from getting elected and to keep himself in power. The president’s actions contrast sharply with the civil liberties characteristic of democratic governments.

In Bukina Faso, Guinea, and Nigeria, an overseen democratization took place, meaning a martial administration maintains in total control of the process of democratization, which is

purposely drawn out (Martin 1993). In some states, the transition to representative government has been challenging because of the blatant defiance of the sitting leader or because prevalent regional conflicts disrupted the process. Michael Clough observed that the potential for representative government in Africa is stronger than it was thirty years ago, simply because people in Africa realize the negative impacts that stem from the lack of a democratic government (Martin 1993). It is important to note the vast majority of countries in Africa that transitioned to democracy were formerly under presidential systems of government, which helps to explain why there was difficulty transitioning to a democracy (Mainwaring 2003).

Although there has been a profusion of research on the democratic peace to guide foreign policy, there is not enough incorporation of previous regime type regarding transition to a democracy. Prior government needs to be researched in culmination with democratizing countries. My proposed study would address the impact of previous regime using polity values from the Polity Project. The Polity Project is the most relied upon source for studying governmental shifts and for examining the outcomes of government influence (Marshall 2016). It codes governmental aspects of countries in the world to create “comparative, quantitative analysis” (Marshall 2016). The polity values will then be analyzed in conjunction with previous regime type of countries that are transitioning to a democracy. The polity scores are well suited to be an indicator of how democratic a society is and will serve as a credible component to my research design.

III. Hypotheses

My hypothesis is countries with presidential systems will be less likely to consolidate to a democratic state after the ten-year transition period. I also expect countries that had parliamentary systems will be more likely to consolidate to a more democratic state after the ten-

year transition period. Therefore, I expect the theory of democratic peace will be more applicable to countries that are fully consolidated and those that are not fully consolidated will be more likely to engage in conflict. The theory of democratic peace will not be as applicable to unconsolidated democracies because the tumultuous transition period caused by the lack of consolidation, prevents the peace that will ensue. The validity of the theory of democratic peace and prior system of government has been addressed in the literature review. Through an assessment of the validity of the theory of democratic peace, gaps in research were found when studying the previous government of states at the domestic level. By focusing on previous regime in transitioning democracies, one will see that the positive effects of a democracy cannot be felt by the recently transitioned state until the transition period ends. This will also allow the former government system to be studied to see which is more conducive to democracy from comparing polity values; presidentialism or parliamentarianism.

As measured by polity values, I expect countries that began with a parliamentary system of government will be more likely to transition to a more democratic state and those that began with a presidential system will be less likely. The polity values range from 1-21, with 21 being a full democracy. I will compare countries that start with a presidential system and those that start with a parliamentary system. Countries that began with a presidential system of government will be less likely to achieve a higher score after they transition because the previous presidential regime will hinder democracy. Countries that have a parliamentary system before transitioning to a democracy will likely have a higher score, because of a more successful transition. I also predict countries which began with a presidential system will be more likely to regress and those that began with a parliamentary system will be less prone to regression.

By examining two unidimensional constructs, the results will ideally be complex yet unambiguous. Utilizing the constructs of previous regime type and polity score, the question of does previous regime impact democratic transition, will be answered. The theory that will emerge will be logically consistent because the constructs are consistent with each other and rely on rational concepts.

Ideally the results will lead to a theory with explanatory power and will explain the reality of transitioning democracies well. The theory will be falsifiable, meaning it can be empirically tested and disproved. A study conducted in the same manner could show the opposite correlation, thus disproving my theory. Lastly, the theory will have parsimony because it will rely on only two variables to explain it. Using the variables of previous regime and democratic transition success after ten years will lead to a theory that contains a generalizable explanation of reality. In terms of international relations, the theory will be applicable across countries, regions, and hemispheres, making it generalizable for other contexts, settings, and populations under presidential or parliamentary systems.

Iv. Research Design, Data, and Measurement

To analyze the effect of previous regime on the transition process, I will use polity values from The Polity Project. The Polity project is centered on regime changes that occur in counties and uses three objectives to measure government legitimacy: “personal (executive recruitment), substantive (directiveness and responsiveness-executive constraints), and participation (political competition)” (Marshall 2016). The Polity IV project includes 162 modern countries, as measured in December 2006 (Marshall 2016). Throughout the years, the project undergoes modernization in data compilation and coding to preserve reliability and harmony in the dataset

(Marshall 2016). The polity values will provide another element of credibility to my research and allow me to compare how previous regimes influence democratic transitions.

The Polity Project uses an eleven-point scale (0-10) to measure how democratic a country is and assigns it a score between 1 and 21, contingent upon how it scores on the eleven measures (Marshall 2016). The Democracy score is derived from how the Polity project defines democracy, as containing three vital and connected aspects (Marshall 2016). The first is the existence of establishments and mechanisms that allow the public to convey their opinions regarding various policies and regarding those in power (Marshall 2016). The second is the presence of legal restraints that curtail the strength of the executive (Marshall 2016). The third is the promise civil freedoms to all people, including in political engagement (Marshall 2016). The table below lists the variables and the weight each is assigned:

Authority Coding	Scale Weight
<i>Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP):</i>	
(3) Election	+2
(2) Transitional	+1
<i>Openness of Executive Recruitment (XROPEN):</i> only if XRCOMP is Election (3) or Transitional (2)	
(3) Dual/election	+1
(4) Election	+1
<i>Constraint on Chief Executive (XCONST):</i>	
(7) Executive parity or subordination	+4
(6) Intermediate category	+3
(5) Substantial limitations	+2
(4) Intermediate category	+1
<i>Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP):</i>	
(5) Competitive	+3
(4) Transitional	+2
(3) Factional	+1

Polity values will be used to determine how previous regime type will impact democratic transition. The polity values at the start of the democratic transition for all transitioning states

from 1978 to 2000 will be identified. Then the polity value will be taken for the country ten years after the transition to a democracy has begun. A period of ten years was chosen because previous research has studied democratic transitions over time spans as short as one year to those spanning as long as ten years (Mansfield 2002). An interval of ten years will allow for sufficient observation of regime change.

These two values will be compared to see if a difference exists between them. A positive difference between the initial score and the score ten years later will show a more successful transition. A negative difference between the initial transition and ten years after the transition took place will indicate the country had an unsuccessful transition because it regressed to a less democratic state. A difference of zero, meaning the country had the same score before and after the ten-year post transition period, will be analyzed in two ways: If the country had a score of 17 or above, maintained the same score after it transitioned, and did not regress, this will signal the previous regime did not hinder the transition process. If the country did not have a score of 17 or above, maintained the same score after it transitioned, this will signal the previous regime hindered the transition process.

The former government system of all transitioning countries will be identified as either presidential or parliamentary using the Freedom House World Reports from 1978-2000. Presidential systems will be coded as 1 and parliamentary systems will be coded as 0. This allows one to see if a correlation exists between the type of regime and how democratic the country became after it transitioned. It is expected that a correlation will emerge between presidential regimes and a smaller score difference, along with a correlation between larger score differences and parliamentary regimes. As established in the literature review, presidential regimes are less predisposed to democracy and therefore will have a more challenging transition

period. Whereas parliamentary systems are more like democratic systems and will have a successful transition period. If there is a correlation, it will show the impact of previous regime on democratic transition and can be used to predict how well a country will be able to transition to a democracy.

For the correlation between prior government and democratic transition, the Pearson's Chi-square test p-value will be examined to see if the relationship is statistically significant. A lower value (0.05 or less) will indicate a statistically significant relationship, meaning the probability the observed relationship is a product of random distribution of values is less than .05 (or the x value it generates). This would mean the observed relationship would be generalizable across international relations from this study.

The design will consist of quantitative data from the Polity Project, because this will make observations less ambiguous. Quantitative data will facilitate the comparison of data, which will be essential for my research design. The chi square test will be used to see if a relationship exists between two variables, facilitating a bivariate analysis. The first variable will be type of regime, either presidential or parliamentary. The second variable will be Democracy currently, meaning is the country a democracy ten years after the transition begins. The quantitative analysis will bivariate because it will include two variables simultaneously. The results will be interpreted to see if there is a correlation between type of previous regime (presidential or parliamentary) and success of democratic transition. Case studies will be conducted after the results to establish implications on how the findings will impact the theory of democratic peace.

Strengths in my research design include the measurement criteria, which will increase reliability. The Polity Project values are credible and widely relied upon. Levels of measurement

for length of time are straightforward and will provide reliable results. For the date ten years after when a country began transitioning, this will be unobtrusive research because it will be a historical analysis of when the country democratized. This will be time and cost efficient, because it will not involve conducting surveys or experiments. A portion of the study could be repeated if needed, allowing for a test-retest method. A test-retest method will involve taking the same measurement more than once to check reliability. Historical analysis also prevents a large degree of bias because in this case the researcher would have no effect on the subject being studied.

In terms of reliability, the polity score could be used multiple times to measure the same construct and the results would be identical. The polity values from 1978 to 2000 could be collected again and compared with polity values ten years after the democratic transition began. Reliability also stems from a lack of subjectivity in the research and using quantitative measures with the polity values.

From my research, I intend conclusions will be drawn between type of previous government and successfulness of democratic transition. The results of my study will have policy implications primarily for transitioning governments, foreign affairs, stability of regions, peacemaking, and prevention of war. It will impact diplomatic relations and alliances between countries, because democratic countries are more likely to align themselves with other democratic countries.

V. Research and Findings

As established in the literature review, presidential systems are less conducive to a democracy in comparison to parliamentary systems. To test this, the polity scores from 1978 to

2000 were used. Only states that had a score of 17 or higher were included in the measure. A score of 17 or higher indicated the state was a democracy (Chiozza 2003). There was a total of 40 states that began with a score of 17 or higher, see *Appendix*. The democratic score at the time of transition was taken and the score was taken again after 10 years (Mansfield 2002). The difference between the two numbers was taken and recorded as a positive number, no change (score stayed the same), or as a negative number. The states that had a positive score change, meaning they became more democratic were categorized as “Yes” in the table under “Democracy Now” along with states that did not experience a score change. States that scored a lower score after they transitioned were categorized as “No” in the table under “Democracy Now”.

Democracy Now	Parliamentary	% of Total	Presidential	% of Total	Total
Yes	14	42.4%	19	57.6%	33
No	0	0.0%	7	100.0%	7
	14	35.0%	26	65.0%	40

$Chi^2 = 4.569$

$Pr = .033$

From the table, the results show all 14 states that started with a parliamentary system either stayed the same or became more democratic, as measured by the polity value. The majority of states that started with a presidential system became more democratic or stayed the same. However, 7 states that began with a presidential system of government did regress to a less democratic state. The results demonstrate that parliamentary systems are very unlikely to regress to a less democratic state after they transition. This is due to the similarities that exist between parliamentary systems and democratic systems of government.

The results also show that presidential systems are more likely to regress when compared with parliamentary systems. This is due to presidential systems being less conducive to a democracy because of the differences between the two systems of government. The chi square test indicates the significance of government system for transition to a democracy because it shows that parliamentary systems foster democracy and presidential system are less likely to experience a successful transition to a democracy. The Pr value is .033, which is statistically significant because it is less than .05. This indicates that the results are not simply due to chance.

VI. Potential Broader Implications of the Empirical Results

In the last 30 years, there has been a plethora of research on democratic peace and use of these discoveries in foreign policy discussion and application (Doyle 1983). The collapse of the Berlin Wall, the victory of democracy over communism, and the domination of liberal thought have been cited as reasons for the increase of research on democratic peace (Hobson 2011). However, states that do not become fully democratic and remain in transition, pose a problem for international relations because they have a higher risk of becoming involved with disputes with other regimes (Mansfield 2002). If a state has a higher likelihood of engaging in war during its regime change, then it will not be able to experience the benefits of democratic peace. Democracies that are not fully transitioned are more likely to engage in conflict because “the effect of incomplete democratization on conflict arises from the monadic properties of the transitional state” (Mansfield 2002).

The military conduct of democratic states differs significantly from non-democratic states, meaning democratic states will not go to war with another democratic state (Rasler 2005). Democracies are less predisposed to using intimidation with military or economic threats to maintain peace through balance of power (Rasler 2005). Public attitudes at the domestic level in

democratic regimes prevent alliances with contentious states and abrupt changes in alliances may be needed to keep balance of power in the global system or the military alliances that could be needed to prevent war (Rasler 2005). The need for transparency in democracies in foreign affairs, often overshadows the need for confidentiality (Hollyer 2011).

In the last 200 years, the amount of wars that have occurred between democracies have been zero to a couple, contingent on how democracy is described, which is a negligible divergence from research that relied on meticulous empirical studies (Hagan 1994). Overall, in conflicts where major powers take part, democratic regimes always fight on the same side (Hobson 2011). The lack of war between democracies is the closest thing to law in global politics (Levy 1988).

When democratic states do engage in war, they are more likely to win, and there are two theories that offer explanations of this (Lake 2003). First, they are better at fighting wars compared with non-democratic states because it is easier for citizens under a democracy to unite against a war (Lake 2003). Also, democracies are more likely to win wars because they are more strategic about determining when to start a war and are better prepared for war (Rasler 2005). A study of all the wars that occurred from 1816 to 1982 between states, demonstrates those started by democratic states are more likely to be won by the democratic state (Reiter 1998).

Case studies on two conflicts will be conducted to demonstrate the importance of fully transitioned democratic countries to experience the benefits of democratic peace. One conflict escalated to a war and the other conflict was able to be resolved without a war. The first conflict is the Anglo-Boer War, which took place from 1899-1902 (Nasson 2002). The Anglo-Boer was fought between Britain and the Boer states in Africa. It has been widely studied as an influential war and because of how it demonstrates British imperialism (Price 2014). The Boers in South

Africa fought against Britain in a violent war but lost and the British Empire grew (Nasson 2001).

The Anglo-Boer War was the result of a long-standing conflict between the British citizens residing in South Africa and the local people residing in South Africa, known as the Boers (Judd 2003). The discovery of gold in South Africa caused the conflict to intensify as both regimes wanted to control the gold mining and profits (Judd 2003). Britain needed a government in South Africa that would fully cooperate with its demands and allow the British Empire to maximize its profits, but Kruger, the president of the Transvaal in South Africa, was averse to these increasing imperialist ventures of Britain (Judd 2003).

Although attempts were made to resolve the disputes, the British and Boer regime failed to compromise and in September 1899, the British Cabinet agreed to send 10,000 men to South Africa to convince the president of the Transvaal to concede (Bossenbroek 2018). Lord Salisbury, the prime minister of Britain, was unconvinced Kruger would yield to the demands of the British Empire and knew Britain would likely go to war over what he considered unworthwhile domains (Bossenbroek 2018). Kruger offered an ultimatum if the 10,000 troops were withdrawn, but Britain refused, and the war began on October 11, 1899 (Bossenbroek 2018).

Although Britain had a highly trained army, the Boers had several advantages because they had significantly more men than the British, every man had a horse and gun, and the war was fought on their home turf (Bossenbroek 2018). Winston Churchill wrote “We have greatly underestimated the military strength and spirit of the Boers” (Bossenbroek 2018). In May 1902, after three years of fighting, the Boers surrendered to the British and signed a peace treaty which gave Britain the defeated territories (Judd 2003).

The second conflict is the Fashoda Crisis which took place in 1898 between Britain and France (Schultz 2001). Around 1880, tensions began to rise between Britain and France, increasing financial prospects of both nations made them more averse to each other and both countries became more aware of their territories in Africa (Chassaigne 2002). The disagreement started when an Anglo-Egyptian military reached the town of Fashoda in Eastern Africa and discovered a small French army was already present in the town (Schultz 2001). This confrontation caused a conflict to arise over the territorial control for Britain and France in the Nile valley of Africa (Schultz 2001).

The foreign minister of France, Delcasse, met with a British ambassador, Monson, and was optimistic about the two countries coming to a compromise because France wanted to be an ally of Britain (Eubank 1960). Delcasse offered to withdraw French troops if Salisbury, the British prime minister, would guarantee France could have access to the Nile (Eubank 1960). Britain refused to allow the French to access the Nile and tensions began to escalate as both sides increased the presence of their troops in nearby towns (Eubank 1960). Delcasse had to pivot from “uncompromising colonial expansionist to a calculating accommodationist, pursuing French interests...without risking outright conflict with Britain” (Chassaigne 2002). Delcasse then began to receive reports that the British troops and naval forces outnumbered those of the French (Eubank 1960).

Eventually the French realized they would be unable to fight Britain and accepted Salisbury’s offer of withdrawing their troops in Fashoda to prevent a war (Eubank 1960). The Minister of France wrote "In view of the precarious conditions and the state of health of the personnel in the Marchand mission, the government has decided that the mission will leave Fashoda. You can communicate this decision verbally to Lord Salisbury” (Eubank 1960). The

French troop withdrawal allowed Britain to claim Fashoda (Schultz 2001). This conflict could have escalated to a war, like the Anglo-Boer War had, but it did not. Britain and France were able to deescalate the conflict and avoid a war.

The theory of democratic peace explains why a war broke out between Britain and the Boer states in Africa and why the conflict between Britain and France did not escalate to a war. The Anglo-Boer war involved Britain, a consolidated democratic state that had successfully transitioned from a parliamentary regime, and the Boer states, unconsolidated states in South Africa with presidential systems. The Fashoda Crisis took place between Britain and France, two fully consolidated democracies that had successfully transitioned from parliamentary systems. The disagreement in South Africa escalated to a war because the conflict took place between an unconsolidated nondemocratic state and a consolidated democratic one. The theory of democratic peace only applies to two fully consolidated democratic regimes; therefore, it could not prevent the Anglo-Boer War.

Conversely, the conflict between Britain and France was able to be resolved because both states were fully consolidated democracies and came to an agreement. Britain and France behaved similarly as democratic countries and wanted to avoid a war, as the Democratic Peace theory predicts. The theory of democratic peace is applicable to fully consolidated democratic regimes, not transitioning or unconsolidated regimes. The transition period does not negate conflict and the benefits of democratic peace can only be felt if states in conflict are fully transitioned to a democracy.

VI. Further Analysis

Regarding validity, gaps in the research stem from not being able to determine every aspect of a country that could potentially influence its ability to transition to a democracy. Previous regime type is just one variable that impacts how well a country can become democratic. The polity scores provide a numerical value for how democratic a country is, but do not capture all factors that could potentially influence how well a country can transition to a democracy. There is no measurement of the strategic culture of a country. Citizens often hold certain beliefs that create a strategic culture based on what will best benefit their people in foreign and military affairs (Doyle 1983). The strategic culture of a country would likely influence how smoothly and successfully a country would be able to transition to a democracy. Without being able to gauge the strategic culture of a country, this creates a limitation. This could potentially cause a lack of face validity because the measure of how democratic a country is does not include the underlying construct of strategic culture which could potentially play a role.

Another methodological limitation that causes a hindrance to research is the transition period for a democracy is difficult to measure, including how smooth or rough the transition is. The polity questions do not ask about how well a country is transitioning because the questions are meant to measure how democratic a country is. Without being able to accurately measure what a country's transition entails, the research is limited in what conclusions can be drawn from it. The closest aspect to transition that is measured in the research design is length of time from onset of transition. Length of time is not an adequate indicator of transition because it only includes number of years. In the process of democratization, there are subjective and arguable indicators for transition stages that cannot be included in the independent variable, length of time for example.

The process of democratization is multifaceted and nebulous. It is difficult to decide at what point a country becomes a democracy, because of the many steps that must first occur. Scholars are not in agreement for what constitutes the start of a democratic transition or what it means to be a fully transitioned democracy. The lack of consensus on these standards could cause my research to be conducted without the polity project and use different dates for the start of transition, which could then cause results which are different from my own. Future research could improve upon my research by creating a database of agreed upon dates for the start of a democratic transition. My research could be conducted again with this uniform database and hopefully similar conclusions would be reached.

Appendix

Country	Date of Transition	Score Change	Presidential/Parliamentary
Hungary	1990	0	Parliamentary
Madagascar	1992	-2	Presidential
Ecuador	1979	0	Presidential
Estonia	2000	0	Parliamentary
South Africa	1994	0	Presidential
Thailand	1992	0	Parliamentary
Mongolia	1992	1	Presidential
Spain	1978	1	Parliamentary
Uruguay	1985	1	Presidential
Niger	1992	-3	Presidential
Argentina	1983	-1	Parliamentary
Senegal	2000	-1	Presidential
Bulgaria	1990	0	Parliamentary
Chile	1989	0	Presidential
Dominican Rep	1996	0	Presidential
Lesotho	1993	0	Parliamentary
Philippines	1987	0	Presidential
Croatia	2000	1	Parliamentary
Panama	1989	1	Parliamentary
Poland	1991	1	Presidential
Cape Verde	1991	2	Presidential
Sudan	1986	-14	Presidential
Nigeria	1979	-12	Presidential
Haiti	1990	-9	Presidential
Mali	1992	0	Presidential
Brazil	1985	1	Presidential
Peru	1980	1	Presidential
Turkey	1983	1	Parliamentary
Yugoslavia	2000	1	Presidential
Ghana	1979	-13	Presidential
Russia	2000	-2	Presidential
Zambia	1991	-1	Presidential
Bangladesh	1991	0	Parliamentary
Benin	1991	0	Presidential
Dominican Rep	1978	0	Presidential
Guyana	1992	0	Parliamentary
Honduras	1982	0	Parliamentary
Malawi	1994	0	Presidential
El Salvador	1984	1	Parliamentary
Indonesia	1999	2	Presidential

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