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Race and city-county consolidation : black voting participation and municipal elections.

Angela Stallings Hagan
University of Louisville

RACE AND CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATION: BLACK VOTING PARTICIPATION AND MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

By
Angela Stallings Hagan

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By

Angela Stallings Hagan
B.A., University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, 1997
MPA, University of Louisville, 1998

A Dissertation Approved on

April 8, 2009

by the following Dissertation Committee

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Dissertation Co-Director

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Dissertation Co-Director

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my husband

Kenneth H. Hagan, Jr.

and to my parents

Ronald E. Stallings

and

Alice A. Stallings

who have given me unconditional support

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ABSTRACT

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Despite the fact that few large metropolitan areas have had city-county consolidations, interest remains high in these mergers as a means of restructuring urban government. Evaluation literature on city-county consolidations generally focuses on the criteria of efficiency and efficacy, not equity. Economic growth, cost savings, and tax levels and service provision are discussed more than the distribution of resources and power. There is a particular dearth of literature on political equity as it pertains to racial minorities. This study attempts to fill that void through the examination of black political participation levels prior to and following the four large-scale city-county consolidations in the last century: Nashville-Davidson County; Jacksonville-Duval County; Indianapolis-Marion County; and Louisville-Jefferson County. A common argument against consolidation is that it dilutes minority voting strength since urban minority populations have historically been concentrated in central cities. It is posited that black voter participation will decrease following consolidation due to a perception of loss of power. Further, sub-hypotheses positing that participation will vary among black voters according to socioeconomic status are explored. Mixed results are found in terms of turnout over time among the cities.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION/LITERATURE REVIEW

There has long been a debate over the structure of urban government. In terms of the manner in which metropolitan governments are organized, there are two major schools of thought: polycentrism and consolidation. Polycentrism is associated with a "fragmented" form of government, consisting of many small units of government, whereas consolidation is concerned with a small number of local governments.

The consolidationist movement started out in the early twentieth century as a "good government" movement of sorts, determined to clean up corruption and reform local systems rife with machine politics. Beginning in the 1960s, a high rate of government proliferation spurred by suburban and special district growth added fuel to the consolidation movement, whose advocates believed that a high number of governments was ineffective and inefficient (Savitch and Vogel 1996; Stephens and Wikstrom 2000).

Adherents to the polycentric approach decry the use of terms like "fragmented" and "crazy quilt" patterns of government, preferring the notion of local public economies in the form of complex networks of governance. Public choice theorists such as Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961) and Parks and Oakerson (1989) argue for a market-based view in which citizens "vote with their feet" by choosing the area within the larger area that most closely matches their taxation and service provision preferences, which in turn leads local governments to be more efficient in order to remain competitive. Moreover, in response to criticisms that the lack of a strong central metropolitan government leads to conflict which bars progress, Bish and Ostrom (1973, p. 94) say that can be viewed as a positive factor because "[f]ragmentation of authority does increase levels of visible conflict. But visible conflict may bring out information, clarify issues and encourage a search for mutually agreeable solution."

Since the beginning of the reform debate, few large metropolitan areas have undergone

government consolidation in any form. The issue is typically decided by voters, although there are exceptions, such as Indianapolis' consolidation with Marion County. The number of large areas with successful city-county consolidation referenda can be counted on one hand: Nashville-Davidson County (1962); Jacksonville-Duval County, Florida (1967); Indianapolis-Marion County (1969); and most recently, Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky (2000).[1] Between the Jacksonville and Louisville consolidations, there have been some medium and smaller cities—Lexington-Fayette County, Kentucky (1972), Athens-Clarke County, Georgia (1990), and Kansas City-Wyandotte County, Kansas (1997) for example--- that have merged with their counties. For the most part, however, failures heavily outweigh successes in city-county consolidation efforts. Since the 1947 consolidation in Baton Rouge, there have been fewer than 30 city-county mergers in any size metropolitan area.[2]

The low number of cases and uniqueness of each case contributes to a lack of comparative studies, making generalizations difficult. Most consolidation has been in the form of city-county mergers, and those are no more than a few dozen, including areas much smaller than Nashville-Davidson County and Jacksonville-Duval County, Florida. Evidence in support of consolidation's beneficial effects, mostly based on cases of city-county merger, is often inconclusive, with researchers acknowledging mixed results or often using associative evidence in lieu of analysis based in quasi-experimental designs or other research with controls for various factors that might affect outcomes (Bish and Ostrom 1973; Savitch and Vogel 1996; Stephens and Wikstrom 2000). Similarly, many arguments of the public choice school tend to be largely theoretical without extensive empirical support, though some studies have shown negative results such as increased taxes and costs or a decrease in services (Benton and Gamble 1983; Condrey 1994); Stephens and Wikstrom 2000).

Over the 30 years between the Indianapolis and Louisville mergers, debates about the merits of "fragmented" versus consolidated governments continued, with scholars evaluating the

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[1] Some, such as Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) might include the 1947 consolidation of Baton Rouge, Louisiana and its parish. However, it was not a city over 250,000, like Nashville, Jacksonville, Indianapolis, or Louisville.

[2] Condrey (1994) notes that there were only 20 between 1947 and 1994. Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) mention Augusta-Richmond County, Georgia and Kansas City-Wyandotte County, Kansas in the 1990s.

limited number of cases available for study. The debate has never really been resolved (partially due to the lack of cases for making generalizations), and the arguments remain much the same.

The New Regionalism

In contrast, however, urban socioeconomic realities *have* changed, and students of urban government have shifted their focus to reflect today's urban condition. Population and job shifts from cities to suburbs and exurbs have presented fiscal challenges for central cities that have lost tax bases, and smaller governments outside of the cities may lack the resources to efficiently and effectively provide key services to constituents. Moreover, global economic competition has forced regions in the U.S. and abroad to compete in the realm of economic development, so it is no longer simply a question of cities versus suburbs. In fact, many scholars would say that central cities and surrounding parts of metropolitan areas share problems ranging from traffic congestion to job retention to provision of water and sewer services and must band together to deal with them. Regional scholars such as Peirce (1993) and Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom (2001) feel that the global marketplace renders cities and metropolitan regions much more important. Strategies for improving cities' fiscal, social, and environmental health should be designed and implemented on a regional level rather than by individual municipalities that really share common interests and challenges. Specifically, the New Regionalism movement arose in the 1990s as scholars began to question how to govern urban areas in order to address these concerns. This movement goes beyond the old reform debate of simply how to structure government, asking what means of *governance* are most appropriate. Do we need to change our governments, or rather, the way in which we govern? Should the arrangements be formal structures or informal systems? Of the New Regionalists, Rusk (1995; 1999) is the most focused on government structure.

Interdependence of core central cities, their suburbs, and exurbs provides an impetus for a renewed focus on regional governance that waned with public choice theory and criticisms of federal initiatives such as that of the council of government (COG) movement.

The abstract force of globalization, with its accompanying economic restructuring and

trend toward geographic decentralization in urban areas, is often linked to the rising importance of cities and their regions over the past two decades (see Savitch and Kantor 2002, e.g.).

Joel Garreau (1988) documents the growing trend in the development of edge cities and the decline of central cities in metropolitan regions. Although he does not seem to find much fault with this new urban form of these seemingly self-sufficient, self-contained places of work, residence, and retail, Peirce et al .(1993), Rusk (1995; 1999), Downs (1995), Dreier et al. (2001), and others are quite alarmed at the increasing levels of racial and income segregation, environmental consequences of "sprawling" growth, and challenges to economic development they associate with detachment of cities and suburbs.

Cities and their suburbs are economically interdependent. Competition between core cities and other parts of the metropolitan area can actually hurt the region overall. Regions with large income inequalities between the cities and suburbs grow less than other regions, and the incomes of central cities and the suburbs tend to rise and fall together (Savitch et al. 1993; see also Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom 2001).

Savitch and Vogel (1996) review regional governance arrangements, providing a useful framework ranging from various forms of "metropolitan government," to "mutual adjustment," to "avoidance and conflict." Rather than enumerate and address every specific strategy that is described, which would be an exhaustive task, I will group them in the following categories along the government-governance spectrum of paths to new regionalism:

1. Formal Government Consolidations involving the City: Referring to a single-tiered government, these strategies primarily consist of merger of a major city and the county within which it is contained. Another approach is the annexation of unincorporated areas by a city. Very few city-county consolidation referenda have passed, and annexations are fairly uncommon. Both are heavily dependent on state legislatures, which make rules regarding municipal government structures.

2. Multi-tiered Government: In practice, there are only a handful of these forms, which include two-tiered and three-tiered governments. The two-tiered is a federative approach, involving a metropolitan agency and local agencies, in which regional functions are organized and

carried out separately from more local functions. Miami-Dade County is the primary example. The three-tiered approach involves local governments, a metropolitan agency, and the state government. The only two examples are Minneapolis-St. Paul's Metropolitan Service District, well-known for its regional revenue-sharing arrangement, and Portland, Oregon's Metropolitan Service District, known for its regional planning work.

3. Linked Functions and Complex Networks/Examples of "Mutual Adjustment": Cities such as Louisville (prior to its recent consolidation) and Pittsburgh serve as examples of regions that are not completely "fragmented," yet not consolidated. Louisville voters approved in 2000 a city-county government that will took effect in 2003. Prior to 2003, Louisville and its home county, Jefferson, had many linked functions, arrangements that Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) categorize with terms such as *joint powers agreements*, e.g. their city-county planning commission, and *special districts*, e.g. the Transit Authority of River City. Pittsburgh has complex networks in which public-private cooperation promoted economic development opportunities. Voluntary, relatively informal cooperation in forms such as a council of government and business organizations such as chambers of commerce, were relied upon.

4. Status quo/"avoidance and conflict/public choice/polycentrism: These alternatives were previously described in the first section.

Evaluations and Criteria

On what basis are we to evaluate the various alternatives for metropolitan governance? In the literature, evaluations are commonly based on the ability to effectively deliver services in an efficient manner. Yet, government remains charged with equal protection and treatment of its citizens. Therefore, we might conclude that criteria for evaluation of metropolitan governance arrangements should include equity in addition to efficiency and efficacy. In fact, these criteria are often discussed in the literature on government and governance. Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom (2001) cite efficiency, environmental, economic competition, and equity as arguments for regionalism. Savitch and Vogel (1996) note that consolidationists base their arguments on efficiency, cost, service delivery, economic growth, and social reform. Rusk (1995; 1999), for

example, believes that consolidated urban structures yield racial integration.

The efficiency criterion is a major selling point for consolidation and has been commonly studied, with researchers analyzing taxes and costs before and after consolidation (e.g., Benton and Gamble 1983; Condrey 1994).

In terms of effectiveness, proponents of city-county consolidation often claim that service delivery is improved with this type of consolidation. Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) credit the consolidated city/county governments of Nashville, Jacksonville, and Indianapolis with providing more effective and uniform services in their regions, particularly in the areas of mass transportation, sewers, and water, and land-use planning. They also laud the multi-tier approach of Portland. Research on bureaucracy and privatization of government has demonstrated some functions, particularly capital-intensive services such as planning and infrastructure, are more effectively, efficiently, and equitably carried out on a regional basis, whereas other more labor-intensive services such as police protection and garbage collection, may be best left to smaller or special jurisdictions to coordinate (Wilson 1989; Savas 2000). Prominent regionalists, however, have emphasized that informal arrangements, while they may have good intentions, lack the authority and power to achieve goals and objectives (Dreier et al. 2001, e.g.). Perhaps this is why more formal structural reorganizations, i.e. consolidations, although they face political challenges, continue to be seen as integral strategies.

In terms of equity, Rusk (1995; 1999), Peirce et al. (1993), and Dreier et al. (2001) find grave racial and income disparities in areas lacking regional governance and government. Rusk claims that segregation is lower in consolidated areas. The three-tier arrangement in Minneapolis-St. Paul was able to redistribute tax revenues across the region. Savitch and Vogel (1996; 2000b) also point to the success of the Louisville-Jefferson County Compact for sharing an occupational tax between the poorer central city and the wealthier suburbs, though it proved in 2000 to be politically unpopular because of concerns about unfair treatment of the suburbs, which contain a greater number of residents but received a disproportionately lower amount of revenues.

The "new regionalism" movement has tended to be less focused on structure than with

functioning, although prominent urbanist David Rusk has stressed the importance of city boundaries in addressing severe socioeconomic problems faced by many U.S. cities. In *Cities Without Suburbs* (1995), he analyzes "elastic" and "inelastic" cities, claiming that the former, comprised of those that can increase their area—and thereby population and tax base—through annexation or consolidation with other municipalities have and will fare better than inelastic cities. He continues the consolidation theme in *Inside Game, Outside Game* (1999), emphasizing the superiority of single "big box" government structures over multiple "little boxes" in pooling resources, setting policies, and arranging service provision.

Rusk makes this claim about merger of central cities and the counties in which they reside: "Without city-county consolidation, which lifted both cities out of slow erosion, the current status of Nashville and Indianapolis would probably be not much different from that of Louisville and Milwaukee" (1995, p. 25).

Some research offers a basis to cast some doubt as to the necessity of municipal consolidation to improve socioeconomic conditions. Sancton (2000) refers to two Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) reports that suggest that job growth and economic recovery may "relate only indirectly to structural arrangements" and can be accomplished without consolidation. [3] Savitch and Vogel (2000a; 2004) have shown pre-consolidation improvements in indicators of disparity and increased investment in Louisville.

Reorganization, Race, and Poverty

The literature on public choice and metropolitan government has tended to focus on studies of efficiency and efficacy criteria to the detriment of equity concerns, particularly those relating to racial minorities and the low-income population. Marshall (1972) laments the lack of coverage of minority concerns in the early literature on reform and consolidation:

> [A]ll these treatments of metropolitan reform have at least one trait in common—they have not focused on its impact on minorities. The actual or projected effects of reorganization on blacks, browns, Indians, and Puerto Ricans are considered superficially, if at all. Individual works sometimes include subsections on the way Negroes have voted on reform proposals and their attitudes toward reform, but

[3] A 1988 ACIR report examined the central city of St. Louis and the county containing it. A 1992 report analyzed Allegheny County and Pittsburgh.

> most of the space is typically devoted to discussions of implications for suburbs and central cities. Of course the term central city often encompasses minorities, but it includes many other interests such as downtown businessmen and white residents. So the racial and ethnic aspects of reorganization are too often implicit rather than explicit. Minority interests are given much less attention than majority interests (p. 10).

He makes a case for the study of consolidation's impact on minorities, adding,

> As we have become aware that race and ethnic issues are central to a wide variety of urban problems, reorganization must be expressly reexamined in these terms. Since metropolitan reform involves changes in the divisions of power and rewards, the stakes for minorities are potentially very high (p. 10).

Although Marshall's observations were made in 1972, one could make a similar assessment of the state of the literature three decades later. Indeed, several studies on the political and economic impacts of metropolitan reorganization have included sections or subsections on black electoral representation or central city services, but there are few works on reform and consolidation that focus on the impacts of racial minorities. Harrigan and Vogel (2000, p.365-367) review the literature for impacts of consolidation on minorities, noting that most of the studies that discuss race seem primarily concerned with minority vote dilution.

Owen and Willbern (1985) and Lyons (1977) briefly discuss race, focusing on black opposition and electoral outcomes, in their analyses of city-county consolidations in Indianapolis and Lexington. Owen and Willbern (1985) describe pre-consolidation attitudes by Indianapolis's black leaders as mixed, with some enthusiastic about the potential to bring tax revenue into the city but others concerned about dilution of voting strength. They paint a positive picture, however, of minority electoral representation in post-consolidation Indianapolis-Marion County Unigov, citing greater proportional representation of blacks and the continued appointment of blacks to high administrative offices. They also claim that even though the Republican party wrested power away from the Democrats, with whom blacks have typically identified, blacks have leadership in the minority Democratic Party. Moreover, they believe that the fact that Republican mayoral candidates getting more black votes post-consolidation "suggests a substantial level of black acceptance of Unigov" (p. 199).

In contrast, others have found that blacks have suffered politically in Indianapolis. A

1992 conference paper by William Blomquist claims that black political influence was considerably diluted.[4] Over 90 percent of black votes were for Democratic candidates. In a city in which Democrats did not have an overwhelming majority, the black vote became an important base of support and allied the retention of Democratic power. Blomquist says that after Unigov, suburban Republicans took control and blacks became a "minority within a minority." In addition, he claims that the voting advantage of Republicans contributed to a decline in Democratic voter turnout by discouraging voters. Moreover, in another study of Indianapolis, Blomquist and Parks (1995), while they don't refer to race specifically, find that there is little evidence or even evidence to the contrary that central-city residents got better services or an equitable redistribution of the financial base. Pre-consolidation satisfaction with public services was not substantially different between the city and county balance outside the city. Moreover, Blomquist and Parks claim that suburban Republicans who captured Indianapolis's land and population were the primary beneficiaries of tax/finance base sharing:

> This remaking [of downtown], however, was not made possible by an inflow of new tax dollars from the suburbs; rather, most of the public costs accrue to residents of the pre-Unigov city, especially those who live in the Center Township. The combination of service-delivery financing via special district and TIF-ing downtown has given Center Township residents the highest tax burdens in the consolidated city-county. The Unigov consolidation did not give central-city residents access to a wider tax base. It gave suburban leaders access to the central-city base with which to pursue development projects chosen by them, not by city residents (1995, p. 53).

Their analysis is interesting in terms of potentially negative political impacts upon minorities. What would have been more interesting, however, is if Blomquist and Parks had analyzed the extent to which central-city residents, particularly minorities, had benefited from the economic growth the Indianapolis-Marion County experienced.

Lyons (1972) treats the issue of race in consolidation campaigns in a short section in his book on the Lexington-Fayette County, Kentucky merger. He notes that it is difficult to find hard evidence to either confirm or reject hypotheses on voter reactions by race. Some findings have shown that "central-city blacks tend to resist being politically and governmentally consolidated

[4] Cited in Harrigan and Vogel (2000): Blomquist, W. (1992). "Metropolitan organization and local politics: the Indianapolis-Marion County experience." Paper presented at April 9-11, 1992, annual meeting

with predominantly white fringe areas"; however, he notes, there are not many cases of large majorities against merger among central-city blacks. An Augusta, Georgia consolidation was only narrowly defeated even though the city was 50% black. In Nashville and Jacksonville, he adds, merger passed although there was a solid black majority in opposition in Nashville but not in Jacksonville. The higher approval by blacks in Jacksonville could have been influenced by the high probability of more annexations if the merger didn't pass. In Lexington, 85% of blacks lived in the central city but constituted a relatively small proportion—about 15%--of the population. Lyons says blacks had little to gain from opposition and faced at worst slight dilution of voting power. As was the case in Jacksonville, failure of merger would very likely mean more annexations and the at-large electoral system, under which blacks had not reached a critical mass of representation, would continue.

Swanson (2000) says that Jacksonville's consolidation with Duval County diluted the black vote because the inner city was 40 percent black but the population in the merged city-county was only about 25 percent black. He notes (p. 234) that blacks gained "a degree of access, representation, and influence, although suburban white interests continued to be politically dominant." This is consistent with Swanson's earlier analysis of Jacksonville, in which he says that black representation on the city council is more or less proportionate to blacks' share of the population, but notes that the number of Republican seats is increasing and that white suburbanites wield power (Swanson 1996). Moreover, he suggests that race played a part in garnering support for consolidation. Increased racial and economic segregation contributed to social unrest that made business and civic leaders uncomfortable. "Although race was a latent issue," he claims, "some white leaders understood the need to dilute the influence of black inner-city residents" (p.235).

Seamon and Feiock (1995, p. 1745) claim that "[i]n the short run, access of minorities can be guaranteed by drawing one or more minority districts, but in the long-run minority representation is diluted." Their study of the impact of consolidation upon political participation is designed to address a void in the literature. Examination of voter turnout in Jacksonville and

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of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago.

Duval County over 33 years, 14 prior to consolidation and 19 thereafter, reveals that consolidation had a statistically significant negative impact on both average and high voter turnout, reducing the figures by 17.6 and 18 percent respectively (Seamon and Feiock 1995). Although Seamon and Feiock do not address voter data by race, they suggest that the decrease in participation merits further research as to whether consolidated government disenfranchises "historically underrepresented groups" (1995, p. 1750).

Swanson (1996), in addition to discussing the political impacts of consolidation on minorities, treats the issue of socioeconomic equity. Supporters of consolidation in Jacksonville emphasized "textbook" principles in reorganization: economic efficiency, administrative effectiveness, political accountability, and socioeconomic and political equity (p. 234). "Urban reformers," he says, "tend to emphasize effectiveness and efficiency, with some reference to accountability (with better representation of minorities on the City Council), but with virtually no reference to the equity and the needs of lower-income families" (p. 234). Although merging the inner city population with the suburban county population into the new consolidated area statistically diluted socioeconomic concerns such as poverty, disparities between residents of the inner city and suburban residents, as well as those between blacks and whites, remain considerable. Swanson says Jacksonville remains one of the country's most segregated metropolitan areas. His comparison of indicators such as poverty, educational attainment, median family income, employment rates, and the number of female-headed households reveals that residents of the "urban core" have the highest rates of poverty, unemployment, and single-parent families and the lowest levels of education and income. Moreover, black families were disproportionately low-income compared to whites.

The lack of attention to impacts upon minorities and the poor in central cities is somewhat ironic given that Rusk prescribes consolidation as a remedy to the segregation of such persons in cities, which he calls perhaps the most pressing problem the metropolitan United States faces. Regionalists such as Neil Peirce agree that regional approaches to government and governance are necessary to address the racial and economic segregation. In one of the few examinations of metropolitan organization focusing solely on race, john a. powell (2000) is adamant that a

federated regional system is necessary to alleviate the socioeconomic problems associated with isolation and concentration of poor minorities in central cities.

Some scholars and other proponents of consolidation have questioned the prioritization of black representation in central cities over the reorganization of metropolitan government, claiming that it is preferable to have some influence and share in a stronger, more viable urban government rather than dominate a financially-distressed, declining city (Krefetz and Sharaf 1977; Rusk 1995,1999). Their claims and policy recommendations, however, are based largely on theory rather than based on empirical research or statistical analysis. For his comparison of "elastic" and inelastic" cities in *Cities Without Suburbs*, Rusk grouped 14 cities into seven pairings based on similar numbers of new homebuyers from 1950-1990 and black percentage of total population. Does this make sense as the major basis of comparability? Some of the pairings represent cities from the same region of the county, but is it fair to compare Houston with Detroit or Syracuse with Albuquerque? Since segregation measures tended to be higher in the "elastic" cities, Rusk concludes that consolidation (since many cities have limited ability to annex outlying areas) is necessary. Swanson's 1996 analysis of socioeconomic disparities in Jacksonville provides reason to test the assertion that metropolitan consolidation as a form of regional governance will improve the lot of inner city minorities and the poor.

The Need for Literature on Race and Consolidation

As a "path to the new regionalism," consolidation, in particular city-county consolidation, remains an important research topic in the field of urban and public affairs. The Fall 2000 *State and Local Government Review* symposium focused on "paths to the new regionalism," included three articles on consolidation. *Public Administration Quarterly*'s Summer 2000 symposium asked: "Is city-county consolidation good policy?" Prominent urban scholar David Rusk promotes city-county consolidation as a means to better governance. Cities such as Memphis and Pittsburgh have been re-considering consolidation in the wake of the 2003 merger of Louisville and Jefferson County, Kentucky governments.

The urban governance literature focused on the theme, "Does structure matter?" offers

relatively few studies on structure and its impact upon racial groups. Altshuler *et al.* (1999) note that the claim by Rusk, Neil Peirce, and others that structure does matter in the case of consolidated government and the well-being of minorities and low-income people is a relatively untested claim in need of empirical research.

This study seeks to begin to fill the research void by examining whether and how city-county consolidation has affected blacks politically, particularly in terms of voter participation.

Voting Literature, Blacks, and Consolidation

Interestingly, in addition to a dearth of literature on impacts of consolidation on minorities, there is also a noted lack of emphasis on consolidation's impact on voter participation, note Seamon and Feiock (1995), who discuss reasons that consolidation may impact political access and participation:

> First, voters may perceive that individual political actions, particularly voting, have less consequence in larger government. The influence of particular community interests in diluted by expanding the size of the jurisdiction. Second, reforms making local government more professional and bureaucratic may result in citizens perceiving that metro government is unresponsive to individual or local needs...Third consolidation may also increase the importance of big money in local elections. Numerous studies show that campaign spending is the most important factor in predicting outcomes in a variety of kinds of local elections. By increasing the cost of pursuing office, consolidated government may make public office less available to those without personal wealth or access to special interest money (p. 1746).

Seamon and Feiock (1995) found in their time-series analysis that consolidation reduced average voter turnout by 17.6% in Jacksonville-Duval County, Florida. Their analysis did not include a breakdown by race.

Voter turnout is a primary indicator of political participation, which reflects both citizen interest in as well as a sense of power in the political arena. Enfranchisement allows citizens to register their opinions and preferences by voting for the candidates they feel best represent their interests. Election of the preferred candidate, in theory, benefits the citizen when the elected official makes policy decisions in the interest of the citizen. Various factors affect levels of general voter turnout, including the type of election, *i.e.*, offices at stake, key issues at stake, particular candidates, and competitiveness of the election.

Kenneth Thompson, who has written on the importance of voting, particularly for blacks, comments,

> "The century-long history of black attempts to achieve the right to vote and white attempts, particularly in the South, to deny them that right illuminates the stakes involved. Voting is no mere privilege, nor is it just an act of symbolic significance. The right to vote is a fundamental political right because, as the Supreme Court has ruled, it is "preservative of all rights." (*Reynolds* v. *Syms*, 377 U.S. 533, 1964). Since exercise of the franchise is an essential means by which our citizens ensure that those governing will be responsible, denial of access to the ballot box ultimately results in the denial of other fundamental rights." (Thompson 1982, p. 2).

The passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in 1965 gave minorities, especially blacks, legal recourse to fight race-based discrimination and voice their political choices. Restrictions on voting had included tactics such as literacy requirements, residence requirements, poll taxes, grandfather clauses, and the white primary (Alt 1984; Davidson & Grofman 1994).

Thompson's 1982 examination of the impact of the VRA focuses on political participation and the voting behavior of blacks. This analysis relies on Census biennial post-election surveys of households. Samples are large but problematic because data are self-reported and respondents are also asked about the voting behavior of other household members. He notes that attempts to validate the national data at the local level with local registration and election data show "consistent overreporting" for both blacks and whites, although it is slightly higher for blacks. However:

> "...though the absolute levels of black electoral participation reported in the Census data are likely to be higher than in reality, the trends from year to year appear to reflect actual progressions reliably, owing to the relative constancy with which black citizens overreport their electoral participation..." (Thompson 1982, p. 6)

Thompson (1982) notes that there was a 1964-1980 downward national trend in electoral participation among the population in general. Southern blacks were the only group to reported a net gain in participation in those years, which he attributes to the VRA. The trend

> "...suggests the early impact of the Voting Rights Act was to stimulate black registration, voting efforts and candidacy by blacks who, for the first time, saw a realistic possibility of electoral success in certain districts" (Thompson 1982, p.16).

Interestingly, in Florida and Tennessee—both states in which a city-county consolidation occurred in the 1960s—voting registration rates for blacks were at their peak, about 60 percent, prior to the VRA. It had risen quickly since the 1940s, when "no southern state had a black voter registration rate above 7 percent." (Alt 1984, p. 354).

Even though the VRA may have helped empower blacks politically and enhance their electoral participation on a national and regional level, particularly in the South, metropolitan government structure also may have had an impact. Harrigan and Vogel (2003) note that "[c]reation of metropolitan governments threatens minorities—especially African Americans—with dilution of their voting power" (p. 273).

> "The techniques most likely to dilute African American voting influence were probably annexation and at-large elections. Annexation is felt to reduce African American influence when a city annexes suburban white residents and thereby decreases the proportion of the city's electorate that is African American. At-large elections, it is charged, enable the white majority to minimize if not prevnet African American representation on the city council" (Harrigan & Vogel 2003, p. 121).

In general, studies have concluded that district/ward versus at-large representation and elections can make a positive difference in African American representation. However, scholars such as Charles S. Bullock charge that ward elections amount to "little more than token representation" and can trade off substantive representation because racial barriers may be enforced with ward systems with their descriptive representation (Harrigan & Vogel 2003, p. 123).

Grofman and Davidson (1994) found at-large elections in majority-white cities with black population of at least 10 percent to have a "deleterious effect" on black representation. In cities that elected by district, "black officeholding was practically nonexistent in council districts less than 40 percent black but...it was close to 100 percent of all officeholders in districts greater than 60 percent black" (p.320).

Alford & Lee (1968) found that nonpartisan elections and reformed government structures (defined in terms of council-manager or appointed mayor versus elected mayor-council) tend to reduce voter turnout. Their earlier findings were supported by later work by Karnig and Walter (1983), who did, however, see a regional improvement in voter turnout in the South, which they attribute to the VRA.

In general, political participation has tended to be equated with voter turnout (Leighley 1995). Leighley reviews the participation literature on the "standard socioeconomic model" (SES), mobilization theory, and rational choice theory. The widely-accepted SES model, developed from the seminal work of Verba and Nie (1972), holds that participation is driven by time, money, skills and civic orientations. Education and income are key variables, as is occupation. Higher socioeconomic status people are more likely to participate. Most of the evidence on mobilization model focuses on voter turnout. Motivations for mobilization include close or competitive elections, high campaign spending, and multiple races on the ballot. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) also discuss party contacting, electoral competitiveness, social movements, voluntary associations, and group memberships. Verba and Nie (1972) also find active memberships in associations, particularly political organizations, affect turnout. Rationality choice theory weighs the costs and benefits of participation. Positive aspects of participation include broad societal benefits, such as preservation of democracy, and individual benefits, such as the minimization of the probability of a least preferred candidate winning.

Although Leighley urges that research be conducted on other forms of political participation such as joining groups, campaigning, and making direct contacts, she notes that "lack of appropriate data on participation other than voting makes it nearly impossible to assess the consequences of the types of participation that are probably most likely to have a direct influence on government officials" (Leighley 1995, p. 196).

However, it remains important to study voting participation. Work by Hill and Leighley (1992) and others has shown that "who votes matters." For example, higher levels of turnout among the poor are associated with higher welfare benefits.

Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) tested five participation theories—Socioeconomic Status, Psychological Resources, Social Connectedness, Group Identity or Consciousness, and Group Conflict—across four racial/ethnic groups—Anglos, African-Americans, Asian-Americans, and Mexican-Americans—using data drawn from a statewide public opinion survey in Texas. Psychological Resources refer to factors such as political interest and trust in government. Social Connectedness relates to factors such as organizational involvement, church attendance, marital

status, homeownership. Group conflict refers to competition for resources, hostility, or fear, e.g., the conflict seen between whites and blacks in the South in the earlier twentieth century.

Testing Socioeconomic Status (SES) using education and income and Social Connectedness using homeownership, length of residence, and marital status, the SES and Psychological models were strongly supported. The Social Connectedness model was partially supported; homeownership was significant only for some groups (not blacks or white) and marital status was not significant for any. Intergroup distance as measure of group identity was significant for blacks and Asians, although the relationship was opposite that predicted: if one feels more distant from other groups, one participates less (Leighley & Vedlitz 1999).

Other research has shown more of a connection between blacks' social connectedness and group identity and their political participation. Racial group consciousness has been linked to mobilization by Verba and Nie 1972 and Shingles 1981. Dawson, Brown, and Allen (1990) found that blacks with higher socioeconomic status and religious guidance are more likely to participate in political process in the form of voting, campaigning, and contacting public officials. Exposure to black media sources and a racial-identity belief system also contributed to increased involvement in the political system by blacks, although SES and religiosity were the two major predictors of voting. Religiosity was measured based on questions from 1980 National Survey of Black Americans: how often read religious books, watch or listen to programs, pray, ask someone to pray for you, and how religious would you say you areas. Racial beliefs were measured by closeness to black mass groups such as church, working, rich, poor, etc., elite groups, black autonomy, positive sterotypes, negative stereotypes.

Murray and Vedlitz (1977) note that black participation has been shown in the literature to be higher than one would expect given the lower SES of blacks. They used census data and precinct level electoral data to examine how SES variables within racial groups might affect voting participation. Precincts were chosen because they tend to be racially and economically homogeneous. Registration rates were about the same for blacks and whites in the mid-1970s, and turnout differences between blacks and white were relatively small. A gain in black participation versus white could not be explained entirely by SES since black SES did not

considerably increase relative to white SES. Murray and Vedlitz indicate that the gain might support the idea that "blacks participate at much higher levels in political affairs than one would expect given their relative socioeconomic status in American society" (p. 1067). A positive relation between higher SES and voting was found for blacks, although less pronounced than for whites.

Murray and Vedlitz (1977) offer two hypotheses in concluding comments. First, as Verba and Nie (1972) have posited, blacks participate more because of their awareness of blacks as a deprived group. Secondly, blacks may be better organized than whites in the communities in the study, leading to higher levels of registration and voting than expected. Observers in those five communities "thought that local blacks were more highly organized for electoral politics than were local whites" (p. 1071).

More recent research on black voter turnout as a form of political participation, a Census Bureau working paper, examined black voter turnout in congressional elections, analyzing differences in black turnout by various demographic factors. In general, black voter participation increased with factors such as age, educational attainment, and income, although it began to decrease once passing middle age, middle income, and baccalaureate education levels (Gaither & Newburger 2000).

CHAPTER II

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

Research Premise and Methodology Overview

There are many questions about the impact of consolidation on minorities; however, the aim of this study is to begin to fill the literature void by examining how consolidation has affected blacks politically, particularly in terms of voting participation. This examination takes the form of a collective case study analyzing three truly large, metropolitan cities before and after consolidation with their home counties. Included in the pre-post analysis are Nashville-Davidson County, and Jacksonville-Duval County, and the more recent Louisville-Jefferson County consolidation. Indianapolis–Marion County was also intended for inclusion but for various reasons had to be excluded (see Appendix B).[5] These cities have been selected because they are the only cases of city-county consolidation of this size in the past century, according to Harrigan and Vogel (2003):

> "Counting Louisville, there have been only four successful consolidations in larger cities (250,000 or more people) since the early 1900s: Nashville-Davidson County (1962), Jacksonville-Duval County (1967), and Indianapolis-Marion County (1969)" (p.259-260).

Essentially, analysis of these sites would exhaust the population of large-scale consolidations, similar to the approach of Skocpol in a 1979 study of social revolutions (as cited in Feagin, Orum, & Sjoberg 1991). Other smaller consolidated city-counties would not be comparable.

Scale is an issue for political impact in these cities because they each initially contained over a quarter-million persons and sizeable black populations, e.g., pre-consolidation Jacksonville was approximately 40 percent black. Moreover, each city significantly increased its size with the consolidation of a county that added at least 100,000 "suburbanites." Moreover, the suburban

[5] Analysis of Indianapolis is limited due to restrictions on data and the availability of maps, so this study focuses on the three other cities and includes discussion of Indianapolis-Marion County in the appendix.

areas tend to be white and more largely Republican-leaning than the central city. Harrigan and Vogel (2003) note that "African Americans are primarily Democratic and concentrated in the central city" (p. 275). One might expect consolidation, then, to have a considerable impact on black voting power and consequently, participation.

Furthermore, it is important to focus analysis of voting behavior of blacks on the metropolitan cities that consolidated in the second half of the twentieth century because the federal legislation in the 1960s set the stage for greater political equity of racial minorities.

A common criticism of the case study approach is that it lacks generalizability. According to Yin, "case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical positions and not to populations or universes" (1974, p.23 as cited in Snow and Anderson 1991 p.165). He cited their utility in clarifying theory. Earlier work by Eckstein (1975) also outlined the value of case studies in building and testing theory, such as the "crucial case" or "most-likely" and "least-likely" fit case.

Improved validity may be an advantage of case study. Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg (1991, p. 19) state: "Although the case study must rely on a good deal of judgment, exercised by the observer, the great strength of this form is that it does permit the observer to assemble complementary and overlapping measures of the same phenomena." The advantage comes from using multiple sources of data.

This study employs both quantitative and qualititative forms of data, with quantitative examination of pre-consolidation and post-consolidation election data complemented by qualitative contextual analysis. According to Babbie (2001, p.344), "[t]he most effective evaluation research is one that combines qualitative and quantitative components."

The *mixed methods* approach, as it has come to be called, is increasingly employed in social science research (Creswell 2003). Of the three forms Creswell discusses—*sequential*, *concurrent*, and *transformative*—this study takes an approach most similar to the sequential form, though in a different order, featuring qualitative discussion followed up with quantitative analysis.

The quantitative portion of the research is based on voter participation data from precincts with a majority black population. In addition, levels of both descriptive and substantive representation for blacks are discussed, in terms of the number of blacks elected pre- and post-

consolidation and partisan electoral representation; representation may provide some insight into voter participation.

The study is also informed by qualitative analysis that explores the context for results seen in the quantitative analysis. Babbie notes that problems of validity might result because content analysis is "limited to the examination of recorded communications" (2001, p. 315). However, Babbie cites advantages of content analysis, including that it is economical, and it also allows the study of processes occurring over a long period of time.

Review of archived newspaper articles and publications of local groups with an interest in government and/or race issues provide a more contextual basis for understanding how the governmental structure affected blacks politically, i.e., in terms of voter participation and involvement with the electoral process. Some select interviews with local experts supplement the data in Nashville and Jacksonville.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The overarching question is "How does city-county consolidation affect black voter participation in local government elections?" There are three possibilities: it is not affected, it decreases, or it increases. Because the impact of consolidation on blacks' voting behavior has not been substantially treated in the literature, it is difficult to hypothesize the effects. Given the scale of the four consolidations and the resulting possible dilution of minority voting strength, *some directional change* should be expected. The participation literature has shown that blacks may behave differently from whites due to factors such as racial group identity (Verba and Nie 1972; Murray and Vedlitz 1977; Shingles 1981; Dawson, Brown, and Allen 1990). Blacks may have been mobilized by a perceived threat to their voting strength as a result of consolidation, for example.

The independent variable in this study, however, is the consolidation of the central city and its county. Therefore, it is hypothesized that, post-consolidation, black voting behavior would decrease in accordance with the consolidation literature, as in Seamon and Feiock's 1995 study of general voting behavior. Black voters may have been discouraged by the dilution of their

voting power and consequently stayed home from the polls.

This study's primary hypothesis is that black voter turnout in local government elections decreases following large-scale consolidations. We should see decreasing levels of black voter participation over time, beginning with the election preceding consolidation and including a minimum of two to three post-consolidation local government elections. Decreased levels of voting participation may also coincide with a decrease in descriptive or substantive representation due to the scale of the consolidations and the number of suburban whites and Republicans added to the electoral base. Lower black voter turnout would likely have a detrimental effect on black representation.

Several secondary hypotheses stem from the primary question and hypothesis. Because consolidation's impact on black voting has been largely unexamined, it is important to begin to apply black voting behavior theories in an examination of consolidation and black voting. The participation literature has also shown that the Socioeconomic Status (SES) model holds for blacks and that there may also be a Social Connectedness role; therefore, we might expect to see variations among blacks according to various demographic and/or socioeconomic variables. Along with a hypothesized decrease in black voting participation, there may be decreases seen among subgroups of blacks. In essence, the lower the SES, the further consolidation might dampen black voting behavior. In this study, for example, majority black precincts with lower family incomes may have lower turnout rates than majority black precincts with higher incomes.

Each sub-hypothesis addresses how black voter turnout may vary by characteristics including education, income, poverty, tenure, and age. A directional hypothesis is specified for each.

In terms of education, the hypothesis is that black voter turnout decreases with less education.

For income, the hypothesis is that black voter participation decreases as income levels decrease.

Both of these variables are key components of the widely-accepted Socioeconomic Status participation model, which has been shown to hold for the general population as well as for

blacks (Dawson, Brown, & Allen 1990; Leighley & Vedlitz 1999, for example).

It is hypothesized that, in terms of poverty, black voter turnout is lower among poverty households. Although poverty is not a component of the SES model, poverty is closely associated with income. Blacks, particularly central city blacks, also tend to have high poverty rates.

In terms of household tenure, the hypothesis is that black voter turnout is higher among owners than among renters. Homeownership is often considered a measure of Social Connectedness. Although the work of Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) did not find a significant relationship between tenure and participation for blacks, there may be a connection, particularly since lower-income households are not typically homeowners. Moreover, it is interesting to examine the tenure relationship for blacks given lower homeownership rates for blacks relative to whites.

Finally, it is hypothesized that black voter turnout is depressed among younger populations. The voting literature holds that participation increases with age for whites and the general population. Age is a crucial variable to examine for blacks given that the black population is a younger population, so the voting age population tends to be smaller for blacks than for whites.

All sub-hypotheses are consistent with previous voter participation literature, which holds that older persons, those who have more education and income, and homeowners are more likely to vote (Bass & Kasper 1999).

Data and Operationalization

The methodology of the study is built on pre-post consolidation election analysis of three large consolidated city-counties: Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee; Jacksonville-Duval County, Florida; and Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky. Aside from Indianapolis-Marion County, which was intended for inclusion but for various reasons had to be excluded (see Appendix B), these cities are the only ones of their size to have undergone a consolidation, which essentially exhausts the population of large urban consolidations. Smaller city-county

consolidation sites, such as Athens-Clarke County, Georgia and Kansas City-Wyandotte, Kansas, would not be comparable.

Nashville, Jacksonville, and Louisville share a similar development pattern in terms of black political representation in municipal government and steps toward local government reorganization.[6] For each of those three cities, there was a long period without any black representation at the local level. In Nashville and Jacksonville, blacks had served in local government in the late 1800s and early 1900s, but there were decades-long breaks. In Louisville, the first black representative was elected to the Board of Aldermen in the 1940s. Nashville filled its 40-year void in 1951, but Jacksonville didn't have a breakthrough in black representation until the late 1960s, earlier in the year in which a consolidation referendum passed. Moreover, each city had a history of government restructuring or proposals to do so. Both Nashville and Louisville

Figure 2.1
Nashville Reorganization Timeline



had previous failed city-county consolidation attempts. Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 show the timelines for representation and restructuring milestones in each of the three cities, along with

[6] Indianapolis differs in that consolidation happened directly as a result of an act of the state legislature, not following a public referendum.

elections preceding and following the successful consolidation referenda.

Figure 2.2
Jacksonville Reorganization Timeline



Figure 2.3
Louisville Reorganization Timeline



In each site—with the exception of Indianapolis due to limitations on available maps and data—voter data are analyzed for the last one or two municipal elections including a mayoral race

preceding the consolidation and a minimum of two to three municipal mayoral elections following the consolidation. Moreover, Nashville, Jacksonville, and Louisville are each matched with a comparable non-consolidated city within their respective states, as a control of sorts. Voting turnout data are obtained through local government offices and/or local newspaper archives.

Local election data are examined at the lowest possible level, the precinct, unless data availability issues require substitution of a larger level, with the unit of analysis as majority black voting precincts. A simple majority is greater than 50 percent. The voting rights literature references a "65 percent rule" (e.g., Swain 1995). The iterature on residential segregation by race utilizes a 60 percent "hypersegregation" criterion (Massey & Denton 1993). Segregation data have also tended to show a "racial tipping point" in which whites would prefer not to live in a neighborhood; polls have indicated that the median white's ideal neighborhood is 75 percent white, 25 percent non-white. Moreover, data show that the median black lives in a neighborhood that is 52 percent black (Easterly 2004.) While a simple majority could have sufficed for the purpose of this study, especially since that is the basis on which consolidated government plans have counted majority black districts, 70 percent is used as a cut-off because of the high degree of residential segregation in the study sites; the vast majority of black areas are above 70 percent black.

Because local voter data are not generally available by race, black districts are determined by matching voting precincts to their respective Census tracts for which socioeconomic and demographic data are available. Since the demographic data are not available for the individual voters, analysis is limited to black district descriptive statistics such as the average, median, and range of the socioeconomic characteristics of district households.

Specific socioeconomic characteristics data examined in detail include those outlined in the research questions and hypotheses section: education, income, and household tenure. Data for these variables is collected from Census summary data for the units of analysis. Education will be based on aggregate levels of educational attainment, including percentages with "less than high school," "some college," etc. Income is based primarily on median household income.

Tenure is based on percent owners and/or percent renters. Poverty and age, initially planned for examination, have been removed due to data restrictions.

For the qualitative portion of the analysis, select interviews with local consolidation experts (in Nashville and Jacksonville), newspaper articles, and various local publications related to the consolidation and post-consolidation elections help inform the interpretation of the study's findings. The latter are particularly useful for the older consolidations since many of the local leaders at the time of the consolidations may no longer be living.

CHAPTER III

NASHVILLE-DAVIDSON COUNTY BACKGROUND

Nashville was the first of the study cities to undergo a city-county consolidation. A 1962 public referendum was successful following previous attempts to reorganize local government through consolidation and annexation. At the time of consolidation, blacks comprised over one-third of the city's population, and the support of the black community was considered essential to the passage of the referendum. This chapter chronicles black politics and representation in Nashville prior to consolidation, offers background on local government and the push for consolidation, and provides an overview of post-consolidation black political power and participation.

BLACK POLITICS AND NASHVILLE GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO CONSOLIDATION

In the post-Civil War period through 1900, blacks held 77 elected or appointed public positions in Tennessee, 19 of whom were elected to the state's general assembly and 25 of whom served in city governments. Few blacks were elected or appointed to any state, county, or municipal office in Tennessee for most of the period between 1900 and 1965. Scott (1964) attributes the phenomenon to apathy and a lack of organization.

> But for the most part, the majority of Negroes in Tennessee followed the line of least resistance and made no attempts to participate in the political affairs of the state. It was further evidenced during this sixty-five year period that Negroes in Tennessee made feeble efforts in presenting themselves as candidates for political positions, whether elective or appointive. Those who made announcements and presented themselves for office, in most cases were subjected to the most feeble political support from the Negroes in their voting district. With reference to the apathy among Negro voters, the *Nashville Banner* quoted a panel of Negro political and civic leaders of Nashville and Davidson County as saying, 'The Negro must loose his apathy toward politics and voting if he is to enjoy first class citizenship.' ...It would seem that Negroes were divided into numerous political camps and small organizations throughout the state and overlooked the political advantage of voting as a solid group (Scott 1964, p. 89).

Democratic Nashville is described as having two factions, one of which was more "sympathetic" toward blacks. Black candidates ran for Nashville City Council and were defeated in 1939 and 1943. No black was elected to municipal office in Nashville from 1912 until after 1950. By then, some strong black political organizations had begun to develop in Tennessee, including the City-County Democratic League of Nashville and Davidson County, which organized with only five members in 1938 and swelled to over 6,000 members by 1950 (Scott 1964). In 1951, two black men, Alexander Looby and Robert Lillard, were elected as council members in Nashville. Looby won in the general election against another black man; there were no white candidates in the fifth ward's first district. Blacks ran in four other districts, but among those only Lillard won, in a run-off race in the second ward's third district. Scott (1964) notes that three new black candidates in addition to Looby and Lillard ran for office in other districts in 1955 but were defeated.

Moody (1965) notes that blacks comprised 37.9 percent of the "core city" population and "there were none outside Nashville" (p. 44).

Black politics in Nashville in the 1950s and 1960s are characterized by Moody (1965) as "somewhat atypical" and "difficult to categorize." Moody adds,

> There are Negro ward bosses who serve as the flunkies of white politicians; there is a traditional Negro political machine, bearing some similarities to the Dawson machine of Chicago; there are individual Negro leaders with great personal prestige but little organizational apparatus; and there is a group of middle class Negroes who have been able to develop an effective political organization of their own (Moody 1965, p. 44).

Nashville was considered a "center of Negro higher education" with Fisk University, Meharry Medical College, and Tennessee A & I (Moody 1965, p.44).

1960 Census data show that the black population was concentrated near the central business district,

> "on the western bank of the Cumberland River, on the eastern side of the loop made by the river. The Negro district runs westward along this loop, bounded roughly to the north by Jefferson Street. South of West End Avenue (or Broadway) the Negro district begins near 17th Avenue (the actual line of demarcation is probably Division Street) and runs eastward to the river" (Moody 1965, p. 45).

The push for consolidation

Prior to consolidation, the separate entities of Nashville and Davidson County were governed by a city council and strong mayor, and a county court and executive judge, respectively. Democrats dominated the political scene in Middle Tennessee, but "party struggle play[ed] a very limited part in local government" (Booth 1963, p. 12).

Nashville and Davidson County consolidated following a successful public vote in 1962. Voters had previously rejected a proposal in 1958. In both instances, a dual majority was required. In 1958, city residents supported the plan, but residents of the outlying county did not. In 1962, residents of the county heartily supported the consolidation, but the plan passed with limited support in the city (Booth 1963).

Interest had grown in government reform as the Nashville population began to shift outside of the central city into the outlying portions of 533-square-mile Davidson County. Consequently, the city was losing its tax base of wealthier residents and supporting a mostly low-income black population, while the county was not prepared to handle urban services to the rapidly growing population. A large portion of the county outside Nashville was not served by key urban services. A sewer system was missing in many areas and street and sidewalk infrastructure could not keep pace with growth. Police, fire, and garbage services were offered on a small-scale and subscription basis (Booth 1963).

Robert Horton, a former Planning Commission staff member and later special assistant to former Davidson County judge and Nashville mayor Beverly Briley, said that although consolidation had been discussed in a 1952 report he helped write for the Community Services Commission, consolidation had not generated much public interest until Briley gave a speech at the Rotary Club in 1955 (Bucy 1995, Horton interview transcript).

Harry Lester, a member of the Tennessee General Assembly elected in 1957, said that he became aware of the issue of consolidation in Nashville and Davidson County "when people in the city became fearful that a black could get elected mayor" (Bucy 1995, p. 5 of Lester interview transcript).

The separate planning commissions in Davidson County and Nashville recommended

consolidation in a joint October 1956 report. In 1957, the Davidson County legislative delegation introduced an act to authorize a charter commission to study government reform in Davidson County. It was subsequently approved, and the mayor and judge appointed members, including a "Negro" councilman. The charter commission introduced a reform proposal calling for a 21-member metropolitan council. The state legislature enacted a constitutional amendment allowing a vote on the issue, requiring approval of the measure separately in both the county and the city (Booth 1963).

The referendum was defeated in June 1958, with the city approving and the county balance rejecting the plan. Supporters included both large newspapers—the *Tennessean* and the *Nashville Banner*—the Chamber of Commerce, the mayor and county judge, the League of Women Voters, and other citizens groups in the Citizens Committee for Metro Government. Booth (1963) notes that, perhaps due to the influence of the black councilman supporting consolidation, the "two precincts dominated by Negro residents only narrowly voted against adoption. Some observers considered this a moral victory, for it had generally been assumed that the Negro voters of Nashville would strongly oppose consolidation" (Booth 1963, p.65). Vocal opposition came mostly from county/suburban teachers groups, firefighters, and police in the last week before the vote. According to Booth (1963), a lack of ardent pro-consolidation campaigning to educate the public and gain strong support was probably a major factor in the defeat. He also notes that many city council members and county magistrates would have lost positions, since the 22 council member positions and 53 magistrate positions would have been reduced to a 21-member metropolitan council.

Following the failed referendum, Davidson County raised taxes and Nashville began to annex areas in order to address financial woes. The *Tennessean* renewed its support of a consolidated government, while the *Banner* opposed further efforts, opining that the people had spoken. When the city annexed some industrial areas in 1958 and some residential areas in 1960, interest in Metro was revived by some concerned citizens. In 1961, a preliminary referendum question asked voters to ratify a legislative act to activate a new commission to prepare another charter for consolidated government. The referendum passed in August, and a

charter commission consisting of the same members as in 1958, plus two new members, was appointed and introduced a new charter in 1962 (Booth 1963).

The major difference between the 1958 and 1962 charters was the composition of the council. Forty council members would be elected, 35 from districts and five at large. In addition, a vice mayor would be elected at large, creating a 41-member council with a strong mayor for Nashville Metro. The 1962 referendum passed in both the city and the county, although the support base was nearly a reverse from 1958, with the county balance strongly supporting Metro and support in the city narrower. Campaigning by both supporters and opponents was enthusiastic and began early, unlike the previous effort. This time the mayor and one of the big newspapers were strong opponents of Metro, while supporters in the Citizens Committee for Better Government included many of the previous supporters such as the Tennessean, Chamber of Commerce members, and the League of Women Voters (Booth 1963).

The 1962 charter commission had 10 members. Eight of them had previously served in 1958. Those eight included two blacks: G.S. Meadors, "a retired Negro druggist," and Z. Alexander Looby, "a popular Negro attorney and city councilman" (Hawkins 1966, p. 71).

"The major issues were once again the disposition of the schools, representation on the Metro council (including the question of Negro representation), the nature of the two taxing districts, and the provisions relating to pensions, civil service, and other employee matters" (Hawkins 1966, p. 73).

Representation issues

When the state legislature amended the constitution to allow cities and counties to consolidate and authorized a charter commission, Robert Horton was assigned to work for the Charter Commission. Among the key issues the commission debated was the size of the council and the number of at-large members. Horton said that black commission member Alexander Looby wanted more districts and fewer at-large seats, basically conveying that, "you are going to need to be able to say to the black community that this is not just a device to eliminate our right to representation" (Bucy 1995, p. 10 of Horton interview transcript).

George Barrett, prominent attorney and consolidation advocate, recalled a meeting with black leaders Avon Williams and Charlie Johnson. He and his colleagues made the argument that

> '...you can either cooperate and help create this and you'll have some significant voice. If you let it happen through annexation, the city will just continue to spread out to the white suburbs and the black vote will be diluted.' The blacks would have a smaller percentage of the seats if annexation continued. The argument for the blacks was that you could be enlightened and cut yourself a deal or you could be unenlightened and left out. 'It was one of those times when your interests and the public interests merges' (Bucy 1995, p. 5 of Barrett interview transcript).

Beverly Briley, Davidson County judge-executive who served as Nashville's mayor from 1963 to 1975, said that Alexander Looby's support of consolidation was critical. So respected was Looby that Briley felt he could have been Nashville's first black mayor if he had opposed consolidation (Bucy 1995). Another Charter Commission member, businessman Victor Johnson, recalls advising Looby,

> If we don't have Metropolitan government for Nashville, the core city will atrophy and whoever is the first black mayor will have nothing but trouble. It is much better in your lifetime and in my lifetime, for this community to grow and prosper economically and the lot of the blacks will improve with it (Bucy 1995, p. 2 of Johnson interview transcript).

David Scobey, who was elected to an at-large seat on the first metropolitan council and later served as Vice-Mayor, said that Johnson helped convince Looby to support consolidation and that many people believed Looby could be the mayor. He was seen as "the key to the black community" (Bucy 1995, p. 5 of Scobey interview transcript).

In public hearings in October 1961, Robert Lillard, a black attorney who was a city councilman, spoke. "It was understood, of course, that Lillard represented those Negroes who were concerned lest consolidated government cancel their growing strength in the old city. If automatic reapportionment could be achieved, plus representation based strictly upon population, the Negroes' cause would obviously be better served" (Hawkins 1966, p. 74).

"District boundaries were drawn up so the 29 of them were predominantly white and 6 predominantly Negro. (Some Negroes charged, however, that the lines were located in such a manner as to give them six possible representatives and no more in the foreseeable future). Automatic reapportionment was also included in the charter" (Hawkins 1966, p. 75).

The 1962 charter commission redrew the council district lines to create six majority black districts after an earlier plan would have made it difficult for blacks to win in any district.

The charter was filed for referendum on April 2, 1962, but on April 18 some opponents filed a suit in chancery court claiming the charter and enabling legislative act were unconstitutional. These opponents included Robert Lillard, the mayor of Belle Meade, and the former commissioner of Forest Hills. Their attempt was unsuccessful (Hawkins 1966).

In the 1962 campaign, the opposition was led by Nashville Mayor Ben West. West had a strong political machine from which to rally opponents in the city. Proponents emphasized the possibility of further annexation and also tried to portray the city government as bloated and corrupt. Opponents said Metro's promises would be hard to keep and that it would not end "duplication, overlapping, and fragmentation" (Hawkins 1966, p. 89). Among key proponents were the Chamber of Commerce, the League of Women Voters, members of the Charter Commission, the Council of Jewish Women, the Nashville Tennessean, the Davidson County Association of Fire and Police Departments, the Citizens Committee for Better Government, the Tennessee Taxpayers Association, County Judge Beverly Briley, the Nashville Vice-Mayor, some labor leaders, and "Negro intellectuals," among others. Key opponents included members of Nashville fire and police departments, officials in small cities, the Nashville Building and Trades Council, the Nashville Banner, Mayor Ben West, and "Negro traditionalists" (Hawkins 1966).

In terms of black support and opposition to Metro, "Negro traditionalists" and "Negro intellectuals" are distinguished as follows:

> The terms 'traditionalists' and 'intellectuals' are used here solely for classificatory purposes and to illustrate the different approaches each group takes toward politics. No pejorative connotations are intended by the author. Thus the latter term is used simply because the group has a high percentage of university professors. The 'traditionalists' presumably view Negro political progress in much the same way that traditional ward politicians view progress—in terms of job-giving public projects in their districts. The newer 'intellectuals,' on the other hand, are supposed to have a much broader view of Negro progress. They think of expanding Negro political, educational, and employment opportunities in almost every sphere, and at least on a statewide basis (Hawkins 1966, p. 91).

Fisk University and Meharry Medical College were traditionally-black colleges located in Nashville. Some of their professors, including Vivian Henderson of Fisk, were proponents of Metro. Other prominent intellectuals included the president of the NAACP, attorney Avon

Williams, and Z. Alexander Looby.

> Professor Henderson was probably the most active of this group. In addition to his television appearance, he spoke to a number of gatherings sponsored by the CCBG and affiliated organizations. His theme—indeed the theme of most of this group—was that Metro was really a question of good government versus antiquated government. Metro, he felt, was in the interest of a better community, without whose growth all would suffer. Considerations of this sort, many argued, took precedence over the fact that consolidation would dilute the voting power of the Negro community (Hawkins 1966, p. 97).

In terms of black opposition, Hawkins offers these comments on the traditionalists:

> [L]arge numbers of 'traditionalist' Negroes, led by City Councilman Robert Lillard, looked upon Metro as a dilution of their voting strength. Lillard used his own organization to combat Metro and to stress this undesirable future. According to Lillard himself, his organization sent out in his district some three thousand mimeographed leaflets stressing the loss of Negro voting strength under Metro. Similar leaflets were distributed in other districts by Negro Boy Scouts under the direction of the Davidson County Democratic League. In addition Lillard made frequent personal appearances, often to debate Metro proponents." (Hawkins 1966, p. 101).

The Davidson County Democratic League was a black organization set up to increase black voter registration. It later publicly opposed consolidation.

In discussing the racial variable in terms of Metro support, Hawkins (1966) cites an unpublished 1962 research paper by Boardman Stewart of the Political Science Department at Vanderbilt University. According to Hawkins, Stewart

> determined the percentage of nonwhites in each of the city's forty-two precincts. Inasmuch as census tract boundaries do not coincide with precinct boundaries in Nashville, this was almost a Herculean task. Briefly, Stewart's procedure was to fit the census data (white and nonwhite), presented block by block in terms of census tracts, into the precincts. This in turn involved a good deal of field work to determine exact boundaries. His procedure disclosed that thirteen precincts, all in the old City of Nashville, had a majority of 'nonwhites.' The per cent of nonwhites varied from 57.9 to 98.9. The vote in these precincts (using planning commission data) compared with that in the remainder of the precincts in the old city... Only two precincts with a nonwhite majority supported Metro. Both were in the councilmanic district of Z. Alexander Looby...In striking contrast, the three precincts in Councilman Robert Lillard's district returned pro-Metro votes of only 32, 21, and 39 percent. The reader will recall that a majority of Negro voters also voted against consolidation in 1958. Only one of Looby's precincts was in the yes column in 1958, and none of Lillard's was (Hawkins 1966, p. 132-133).

Hawkins comments that the voting dilution message must have reached significant numbers of blacks and that the low educational level of blacks may have also been a factor because of the difficulty in understanding the "complex issue" of consolidation.

Stewart's paper was his master's thesis, which was never completed and was

subsequently lost.[7]

Vanderbilt University Political Science honors student Peter Moody (1965) describes four black politicians, each representative of a "type." "Good Jelly" Jones is called an Uncle Tom, Robert Lillard a machine boss, Z. Alexander Looby a black intellectual without an organization, and Avon Williams a "rather militant person who is president of an effective political organization of militant Negroes" (p. 46).

Lillard is described as a "true Negro boss." Lillard led the Davidson County Democratic League (DCDL) and had ties to Mayor Ben West and the old city machine. West Indies native Looby was a "life-long Republican." Looby was well-liked, probably the most respected member of the Negro community" (Moody 1965, p. 48-49). Avon Williams, Looby's junior law partner, headed the Davidson County Independent Political Council (DCIPC). The DCIPC was a progressive organization that dreamed of building a coalition of blacks, labor, and poor whites.

The DCDL and the DCIPC represented two "contending" factions of black politics in Nashville. "If the DCDL is a group of professional politicians organized to practice professional politics, the DCIPC is a group of middle class Negroes organized to raise the status of the Negro through political action..." (Moody 1965, p. 50).

Nashville showed characteristics of both northern and southern politics, which made the situation for blacks mixed. "In Nashville there exists a highly articulate Negro middle class. In the North such a class is ineffective because of class antagonism—the middle class cannot relate to the rest of the Negro community. In the South, however, this line is blurred, perhaps because of the greater amount of overt color prejudice" (Moody 1965, p. 52).

POST-CONSOLIDATION BLACK POLITICAL POWER AND PARTICIPATION

Voters in Nashville and Davidson County approved consolidation with a dual majority in August 1962. Five blacks were elected to the first Metropolitan Council in Nashville in November 1962: Alexander Looby, Robert Lillard, Harold Love, John Driver, and Mansfield Douglas. Looby and Lillard had served since 1951. Love had been elected to city council in a special election in

[7] Author telephone interview with Boardman "Bo" Stewart of Franklin, Tennessee, October 11, 2005.

1961 following annexation (Scott 1964). A white woman with family ties to the black community, was the sixth council member from the majority black districts (Moody 1965).

How did blacks feel about Metro? One would have expected them to oppose it given the population dilution. Blacks comprised 19.22 percent of Davidson County, but one-third of Nashville prior to the annexations. However, blacks were split on Metro along factional lines. Lillard opposed it. Looby supported it. Many politically active blacks, particularly those involved with the DCIPC (though the DCIPC took no official position), felt the plan was inevitable and that they should be on the winning side. Williams and the DCIPC used the issue of potential vote dilution as a catalyst to register more black voters once the plan passed (Moody 1965).

Mansfield Douglas, a black man elected to the first metro council, said he believed that many blacks voted for consolidation in 1962 as a way to "get back at" Mayor Ben West for his decision to close city swimming pools out of fear of racial confrontations (Bucy 1995).

Moody (1965) reviews findings from a survey conducted by Vanderbilt University professor Daniel Grant in 1964. Forty-one blacks, 16 percent of the random sample of Davidson County registered voters, were included. In terms of who most benefited from Metro's adoption, 1.8% of whites and 4.8% of blacks said blacks did. Interestingly, 4.8 percent of blacks also felt blacks were "harmed most" though no whites did. Results may have been biased, particularly those for blacks, since whites interviewers were asking the survey questions.

Moody (1965) claims that blacks were able to use "concurrent voting," working in alliance with other groups, to maintain their political strength. With one exception (1962 mayoral election), he notes that DCIPC candidates carried the county. The DCIPC aligned itself with the metro machine, distinct from the old city machine. Perhaps, too, the DCIPC's post- Metro efforts to register blacks helped to mitigate the voting strength dilution resulting from joining "lily white" outlying Davidson County with the black population concentrated in the central city.

However, others believe that the lot of blacks did not improve with Metro. Fate Thomas, a political organizer who worked in the Criminal Court Clerk's Office when Nashville consolidated and later became long-time sheriff of the consolidated government, felt consolidation ultimately hurt the black community. In an interview with Carole Bucy, he referred to the size of the black

voting population being 29 percent but that a black councilman-at-large had never been elected (Bucy 1995).

Mansfield Douglas, a black member of the first metropolitan council, also felt that consolidation did not help blacks.

> 'Frankly, I never did have a lot of enthusiasm for consolidation the governments because it would diminish the percentage of the minority population and would place the interests of minorities at a disadvantage and I think that it did that. Metropolitan government has provided the ability to make significant progress economically. I don't think that minorities have necessarily shared in that progress in terms of what it has been able to achieve...' (Bucy 1995, p 2 of Douglas interview transcript).

CHAPTER IV

NASHVILLE-DAVIDSON COUNTY DATA AND ANALYSIS

Race was a major issue in the push for consolidation in Nashville. The black community was divided in its support, organized into two distinct factions. This chapter examines black voter turnout in the two mayoral elections prior to consolidation and the three mayoral elections following the consolidation and finds an increase in turnout following the consolidation. Moreover, a brief comparison to unconsolidated Memphis is included, along with some possible explanations for changes in participation levels.

Data and availability issues

Nashville voter registration data for the study years were generally unavailable at any unit smaller than the city. Moreover, voter turnout data on a precinct or even representative-district level were not available for all years from the local elections commission or other government archives. In some cases, voter data published in newspapers had to be consulted as a data source.

Furthermore, the lack of detailed maps at a precinct level for post-consolidation years meant that representative-district units, rather than precincts, had to be matched to Census tracts.[8] Council districts consist of multiple precincts. Finally, contrary to the case in Jacksonville, where Census and electoral geographic boundaries were more closely aligned, many of Nashville's majority black tracts both split precincts with other tracts and are split among precincts in pre-consolidation years as well as split council districts with other tracts in post-consolidation years. However, no tracts are actually split among wards prior to consolidation and

[8] Pre-consolidation maps on file at Nashville-Davidson County Metro Archives. Metro council district map as published in 1962.

relatively few tracts are split among council districts post-consolidation; that is, majority-black tracts tend to fall entirely within one ward or district, though they may constitute less than 100% of the district boundary.[9]

With detailed maps generally unavailable and geo-coding altogether unavailable, the matches of Census tract geography to electoral boundaries was achieved primarily through close eye-level scrutiny of large-scale electoral maps and smaller Census tract maps, but, in a few cases, it was achieved through electronic scanning and image layering of tract and election precinct/district maps. Therefore, analysis will lack some precision. Figure 4.1 shows an example of eye-level matching of Census and electoral geography in Nashville. The 1966 electoral map was a large poster size in its original form that was photocopied in small sections and stitched together. Census tract street boundaries were then hand-drawn on the map. Appendix A discusses the technique for electronic matching.

A lack of precision also stems from the fact that tracts split precincts/districts with other tracts and often comprise less than an entire district. Fortunately, in many cases, the splits occur with other majority-black tracts because the patterns of residential segregation by race mean the bulk of black tracts are contiguous. Therefore, "supertract" groups of majority-black tracts can be analyzed for a higher degree of precision. Otherwise, one must accept the caveat that voters had to be assigned to Census tracts based on an estimate of the tract's geographic composition of a precinct or district.

Nashville data

Voters approved the consolidation of Nashville and Davidson County in a June 1962 referendum. The new metropolitan government took effect in April 1963, with the election for metropolitan officials taking place in November 1962. Mayoral elections immediately prior to and following the June 1962 consolidation approval were held in Nashville in 1955, 1959, 1962, 1966, and 1971. The year 1951 is also notable, particularly in terms of black voting interest. In that year, at least one black was assured a seat since there were no white

[9] In 1962 and 1966, only three majority black tracts were split between two council districts. In 1971, only

Figure 4.1
1966 Nashville Electoral Boundaries with Hand-drawn Tracts



candidates in the first district of the city's Fifth Ward and this was the first time that district members were voted upon solely by residents of the district instead of all districts within a ward (*Nashville Banner*, 9 May 1951, Nashville voters have three election choices). Moreover, it was the first local election since 1871 to be held without a poll tax (*Nashville Tennessean*, 1 March 1951, City's may vote to be tax free). However, another new law requiring all registered voters to vote in the precinct in which they reside caused some confusion, especially when thousands of voters were mailed cards advising them of new polling places only two days prior to the May 10, 1951 election (*Nashville Tennessean*, 9 May 1951, 10,500 get notices of new voting places). Nevertheless, two blacks, Alexander Looby and Robert Lillard, were elected to the Nashville City

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one such tract was split.

Council in 1951, Looby in the initial election and Lillard in the May 24 run-off election.

During the 1950s, there were ten Census tracts in Nashville with a black population over 50 percent: 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 16, 19, 24, 26, and 27. All but Tract 26 had a black population over 70 percent. In the 1960s, there were twelve majority black tracts: all those from 1950 plus tracts 25 and 35. All but Tract 35 had a black population over 70 percent, though its percentage, 69.67 percent, could be rounded to the 70 percent cut-off criterion employed for this analysis. Following the 1970 Census and the consolidation, tracts were renumbered. In 1970, there were 18 tracts in Nashville-Davidson County with a black population over 50 percent: 118, 119, 127, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 148, 160, 162, 163, 170, and 171. All but tracts 140 and 171 had black population proportions over 70 percent. Moreover, all but 127 and 171 appear to fall within the former city boundary.

Table 4.1
Composition of 70% Majority Black Tracts in Nashville-Davidson County, 1950-1960

Tract	1950 Percent Black	1960 Percent Black
3	97.53	99.09%
4	93.41	98.95%
5	96.98	99.43%
10	75.90	91.01%
11	82.39	89.80%
16	81.64	89.18%
19	86.02	92.63%
24	96.15	98.93%
25	Not majority	70.87%
26	64.43	91.30%
27	99.48	99.99%

In the 1955 election, turnout was relatively high compared to previous municipal elections in Nashville, with 48.45% of registered city voters going to the polls. In that year, almost 24 percent of voters in majority black areas participated. Turnout in black tracts varied widely, ranging from 10.43 percent to 65.71 percent, although the range low and high seemed to be extreme outliers since half of the tracts had turnout within a few percentage points of the turnout for all black tracts (see Table 4.3).

Table 4.2
Composition of 70% Majority Black Tracts in Nashville-Davidson County, 1970

Tract	1970 Percent Black
118	75.09%
119	78.24%
127*	71.47%*
136	99.00%
137	90.45%
138	99.44%
139	96.37%
141	99.08%
142	98.72%
143	99.35%
144	98.74%
148	97.71%
160	98.76%
162	85.37%
163	91.39%
170	73.11%

Note: Tract 127 was located outside former Nashville city boundaries.

Table 4.3
1955 Nashville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts

Tract	Total Voted	1950 Voting Age Population	Tract Level Turnout
3	471	4517	10.43%
4	786	3594	21.87%
5	696	3790	18.36%
10	345	1683	20.49%
11	479	2185	21.92%
16	837	3733	22.41%
19	1290	4184	30.83%
24	223	1291	17.27%
26	1927	2932	65.71%
27	619	4443	13.94%
"Supertracts"			
TOTAL 3, 4, 26, & 27	3803	15486	24.56%
TOTAL 10 and 24	568	2974	19.10%
TOTAL ALL BLACK TRACTS	7673	32352	23.72%

Election turnout in 1959 showed a drop-off among blacks, from 23.72 to 16.65 percent. Although voter registration for Nashville's entire city was unavailable for 1959, it is apparent that overall voting levels—and likely overall turnout—also dropped; a total of 32,943 voters participated city-wide in the 1955 mayoral election, while only 24,287 participated in 1959.[10] Turnout in the black tracts ranged from 6.12 percent to 33.77 percent, which was a smaller range than in 1955 (see Table 4.4).

Table 4.4
1959 Nashville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts

Tract	Total Voted	1950 Voting Age Population	Tract Level Turnout
3	395	4517	8.75%
4	395	3594	11.00%
5	232	3790	6.12%
10	210	1683	12.48%
11	573	2185	26.22%
16	479	3733	12.83%
19	647	4184	15.45%
24	210	1291	16.27%
26	990	2932	33.77%
27	1254	4443	28.21%
"Supertracts"			
3, 4, 26, and 27	3034	15486	19.59%
10 and 24	420	2974	14.12%
TOTAL ALL BLACK TRACTS	5385	32352	16.65%

The first election for the new metropolitan mayor and council was held in November 1962 following the June 1962 referendum approval by voters. Turnout among blacks in 1962 was higher than in 1955, but still considerably lower than overall turnout, at 21.93 percent compared to over 63 percent in Nashville-Davidson County. Turnout in black tracts ranged from 12.80 percent to 41.75 percent, although over half of the tracts were within a few percentage points of the total turnout for all black tracts (see Table 4.5).

The 1966 metropolitan election was historically significant because it was the first time

[10] *Nashville Banner* (1955, May 13). Vote in citywide races. *Nashville Tennessean* (1959, May 15). Vote

that there was a run-off in the mayoral election. Given that interest, in addition to this being the first election for municipal offices following the passage of civil rights and voting rights legislation, one might have expected a notable increase in black turnout. Yet, turnout in the majority black tracts was merely 22.25 percent, only fractionally higher than 1962 turnout. Overall turnout did decrease from over 63 percent in 1962 to 58.10 percent in the 1966 run-off election in which the mayor's race was decided. Turnout in black tracts ranged from 10.86 percent to 39.39 percent, but over half tracts had turnout within a few percentage points of the total turnout for all black tracts (see Table 4.6).

Table 4.5
1962 Nashville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts

Tract	Total Voted	1960 Voting Age Population	Tract Level Turnout
3	876	3962	22.11
4	730	3375	21.61
5	323	2008	16.09
10	323	908	35.59
11	642	1760	36.45
16	642	3261	19.67
19	423	3303	12.80
24	323	774	41.75
25	329	949	34.67
26	888	3217	27.59
27	1033	5966	17.32
"Supertracts"			
3, 4, 25, and 27	2968	14252	20.83%
5, 10, and 24	969	3690	26.26%
11 and 16	1284	5021	25.57%
TOTAL ALL BLACK TRACTS	6943	31662	21.93%

In 1971, overall voter turnout in the election for mayor fell to 56.08 percent. However, voter turnout in majority black tracts soared to approximately 37 percent. The figure is also approximately 37 percent when the 70 percent majority black tract that fell mostly outside of the former city boundary, Tract 127, is excluded. This finding is contrary to expectations that black

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by precincts.

turnout would have decreased following consolidation, particularly since overall turnout also

Table 4.6
1966 Nashville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts

Tract	Total Voted	1960 Voting Age Population	Tract Level Turnout
3	931	3962	23.50%
4	804	3375	23.82%
5	252	2008	12.57%
10	252	908	27.79%
11	693	1760	39.39%
16	693	3261	21.26%
19	359	3303	10.86%
24	252	774	32.60%
25	305	949	32.11%
26	961	3217	29.86%
27	1121	5966	18.79%
"Supertracts"			
3, 4, 25, and 27	3161	14252	22.18%
5, 10, and 24	756	3690	20.49%
11 and 16	1386	5021	27.60%
TOTAL ALL BLACK TRACTS	7045	31662	22.25%

decreased. Some factors to consider are that Census tracts were redrawn and completely renumbered following the 1970 Census. Moreover, Nashville Metro council districts were also redrawn following the 1970 Census according to the charter's requirement. There were more black tracts in 1971 following the 1970 census, and the turnout between black tracts ranged widely, from 15.48 to 69.25 percent (see Table 4.7).

Boardman Stewart, who wrote a Vanderbilt University paper on black support of Metro, recalled in a 2005 telephone interview that "if it was a racially-defined election, then blacks turned out; if not, they didn't".[11]

In the 1971 election, segregationist candidate Casey Jenkins was squaring off against incumbent Beverly Briley in the runoff election. The two had been narrowed from an initial field of nine candidates in the first election. Jenkins had made concerns about busing a hot-button issue

[11] Author telephone interview with Boardman "Bo" Stewart of Franklin, Tennessee, October 11, 2005.

(*Nashville Tennessean*, 7 August 1971).[12] Jenkins's candidacy and strong showing in the earlier election may have served to rally black voters.

Table 4.7
1971 Nashville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts

Tract	Total Voted	1970 Voting Age Population	Tract Level Turnout
118	1287	2981	43.17%
119	427	1898	22.51%
127*	2521	3640	69.25%
136	1541	6400	24.08%
137	1884	4103	45.92%
138	471	1789	26.33%
139	785	2293	34.23%
141	443	881	50.28%
142	534	3450	15.48%
143	534	2642	20.21%
144	1290	2575	50.08%
148	785	2408	32.62%
160	524	1730	30.27%
162	984	2188	44.98%
163	984	2033	48.40%
170	984	2781	35.39%
"Supertracts"			
118 and 119	1714	4879	35.13%
137,138, and 139	3140	14585	21.53%
141-144	2801	9548	29.34%
162, 163, and 170	2952	7002	42.16%
148 and 160	1309	4138	31.63%
TOTAL ALL BLACK TRACTS	16200	43792	36.99%

Note: Tract 127 was located outside the former Nashville city boundary.

Turnout for the entire local electorate in contests in which a mayor was elected was not available for all of the study years, although a trend of increase over time can be seen in Figure 1. In 1955, overall turnout was approximately 48.45 percent.[13] Turnout data were not available for 1959 and 1962 from either local government or newspaper sources. In 1966 and 1971, turnout

[12] Editorial appearing in the *Nashville Tennessean*, 7 August 1971.
[13] 1955 overall turnout figure based on Nashville Banner accounts published in table on May 13, 1955 and in article: Hatcher, J. (1955, May 12). Only ½ voters expected to go to polls today. *Nashville Banner*, A1.

approached 60 percent, at 58.10 and 59.00 percent respectively. Runoff election contests for mayor were held for the first time in 1966 and again in 1971. Turnout was essentially the same for both the initial and runoff elections in both of those years.

With the exception of the seven percentage point decrease between the 1955 and 1959 elections, black voter turnout in Nashville remained fairly level over the study period until the 1971 election. There was virtually no increase in black voter turnout—less than half a percent--between the 1962 and 1966 elections, when one might have expected black participation to have increased following the 1965 Voting Rights Act. It is still possible that the legislation might have increased black turnout. Because turnout data for all Nashville city voters was unavailable for 1962, it is a possibility that turnout decreased for all voters between 1962 and 1966, but that voting rights legislation stimulated black turnout to keep it level. Figure 4.1 illustrates turnout trends over time, while Table 4.8 lists the figures.

Figure 4.2



Table 4.8
Comparison of Turnout Over Time, Nashville

Year	Black Turnout	Overall Turnout
1955	23.7%	48.5%
1959	16.7%	n/a
1962	21.9%	n/a
1966	22.3%	58.1%
1971	37.0%	59.0%

Unconsolidated Memphis as a Comparison

Because Nashville consolidated not long before passage of the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act, new rights for blacks may have increased political participation of blacks, particularly voting participation, and especially in the election years immediately prior to and subsequent to the legislation. Unconsolidated Memphis makes an ideal control in terms of checking for possible effects in Nashville because both are in the same state, both have considerable black populations—though Memphis's is much larger—and both have considered consolidation.

In Memphis, black political organization was stronger than in Nashville and other large Tennessee cities in the early 1900s, but weakened from the 1920s through the 1960s:

> Negroes in Memphis and Shelby County between 1900 and 1925, during the first part of the [1900-1965] period were more aggressive in politics and governmental affairs than were Negroes in Nashville, Chattanooga,and Knoxville. Through the efforts of the late Robert (Bob) Church, Waymon Wilkerson, LeRoy McCoy, J. T. Settles, and Bert M. Roddy in organizing the Lincoln Leagues, Negroes in Memphis and Shelby County became a dynamic and potent force in political affairs in Shelby County during the period...During the latter part of the period, 1925 through 1965, Negroes in Memphis and Shelby County lost most of the political aggressiveness that was once generated among the Negro voters during the period from 1900 to 1925 (Scott 1964, p.117).

According to Scott (1964), black voter apathy was apparent when black insurance executive Dr. J. E. Walker ran for the Memphis City Board of Education in 1951 and was defeated handily. Walker received only 7,433 votes, under eight percent of all votes cast although blacks

comprised nearly 19 percent of registered voters. In 1955, another black candidate, Rev. Roy Love, also ran for the school board, but received 19,501 votes, over 260 percent the number Walker had received four years prior, signaling possible growing black political will (Scott 1964).

Others, however, paint a different picture of black political participation in Memphis.

Black voter registration and participation in Memphis was already relatively high in the 1940s and 1950s, perhaps due in large part to the powerful Edward Crump political machine, which relied heavily on blacks and foreign-born residents, populations with which it could trade favors and exploit, for its power base (Tucker 1980). Large gains in black registration were also seen in the 1950s. A 77 percent increase between 1951 and 1955 brought the number of registered blacks to 39,000. Blacks represented about 25 percent of all registered voters while comprising around 37 percent of the population. By 1959, over 57,000 blacks were registered to vote, representing one-third of all registered voters, bringing that figure close to proportionate with their population percentage (Silver and Moeser 1995).

In 1951, approximately one-third of registered blacks in Memphis voted in the local election. Voter turnout of Memphis blacks in local elections tended to hover in the 30 to 40 percent range until 1959 (Silver and Moeser 1995). The Crump Machine had collapsed in 1954 with Crump's death. Although he had given some civil service jobs to blacks, segregationist Crump had not picked any blacks to run for local office (Tucker 1980). In the 1959 mayoral election, however, five blacks were running for local offices, including public works commissioner, at which the strongest chance of a black winning local office was seen. Stakes were high, as no black had been elected to local office since 1879. Black voter turnout was an astonishing 63 percent, though white turnout was also "substantial" (Wright 1993). In 1963, black turnout could be estimated as being at least 50 percent.[14] In that year, a very close race for Division 3 City Judge pitted popular black attorney and minister Benjamin Hooks against white candidate Ray

[14] Estimate based on the two *Memphis Press-Scimitar* articles, one stating that there were 69,697 blacks registered to vote and the other stating that "about 35,000" of the votes for Hooks were "negro votes." Porteous, C. (4 November 1963). Farris, Hinds each predicts '65,000 will vote for me.' *Memphis Press-Scimitar*, page 21; Porteous, C. (8 November 1963). City Hall will have a new look: three are new on 5-man commission. *Memphis Press-Scimitar,* page 1.

Churchill. The story was even picked up by the *New York Times.*[15] Despite continued gains in black registration, black turnout had fallen to 39 percent, compared to 66 percent for whites, in the 1967 Memphis mayoral general election despite the fact that a black candidate was running for mayor (Wright 1993). Run-off election data were not considerably different: 40 percent for blacks and 60 percent for whites. Wright (2000) attributes lower 1967 turnout and apparent black apathy to the fact that highly-popular segregationist candidate and former mayor Henry Loeb, Jr. was running and the perception that the black candidate, A. W. Willis, was not strong. Consequently, blacks gave more of their support to William Ingram, the most "black-friendly" of the other white candidates. In 1975, black turnout in the general mayoral election was 36 percent compared to 64 percent for whites, although run-off turnout was 56.5 and 59.1 percent respectively (Wright 1993).

Figure 4.3



What can be gleaned from black voting participation in unconsolidated Memphis in regard to the possible impact of the Voting Rights Act upon participation in consolidated Nashville? One might have expected black participation in Memphis to have increased following voting rights

[15] *New York Times* (8 November 1963). Negro in Memphis loses in close vote. Reprinted from *New York*

legislation; however, the opposite was true, at least in terms of municipal races. Figure 4.2 depicts black voter turnout in Memphis. In Nashville, black voter participation was generally unchanged in the election immediately following the Voting Rights Act but jumped nearly 50 percent for the next election. Although there may be some error due to limitations on data availability, in both cases, the trends and particular circumstances suggest that other exogenous factors, such as particular issues and candidates (as in the case of 1971 with segregationist candidate Casey Jenkins), in the election(s) played a stronger role.

Socioeconomic Factors

The wide range in turnout in the black tracts for given election years also lends itself to further analysis. It is possible that election-specific factors played a role, such as the race in a particular district, but the fact that lower turnout and higher turnout numbers seem to be concentrated in some of the same areas over time suggests that voter characteristics might play a role. As hypothesized, socioeconomic differences between the tracts might explain some of the difference in turnout. Initial plans for this dissertation called for exploration of income, poverty levels, educational attainment, age, and housing tenure as contributors to spatial differences in black participation levels. Due to data availability restrictions, however, age has been removed. The Census reports for 1970 did not include median age on a tract basis; rather, population by age groups was reported. Therefore, only a median age group, with a range of multiple years, could be calculated, and the usefulness thereof was minimal. Moreover, any analysis of the poverty population must be restricted to post-1960s elections, since the concept of a poverty line was established in the 1960s and data were not reported for the 1960 Census.

It was hypothesized that as educational attainment increased, voter participation would increase. The 1971 election is not included in the table since the census tract numbering system and map changed; therefore 1950 and 1960 tracts would not be comparable across the table. Measured in terms of years of education for the population 25 and older, the data are somewhat contrary to expectations. In 1955, for example, the two traces with the most highly-educated

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Times online archive service.

residents had the lowest turnout rates, though several in the middle of the education range were also in the middle of the turnout range. In 1959, 1962, and 1966, the data were also mixed with some exceptional extremes but mostly middling tendencies (see Table 4.9). Though it is not included in the table, the same is true for 1971. Overall, however, educational attainment might not explain much of the difference in voting turnout among black tracts.

It was hypothesized that as income increased, voter turnout would increase. Income was measured in terms of tract median household income as a percentage of city median household income. The 1971 election is not included in the table since the census tract numbering system and map changed; therefore 1950 and 1960 tracts would not be comparable across the table. Although there were some mixed results, in all years, including 1971, the highest income levels had the highest turnout rates and the lowest were among the lowest (see Table 4.10). Overall, however, due to the small number of tracts and the fact that there were multiple exceptions to the expectations, it appears that income may not explain much of the difference among turnout in black tracts.

Table 4.9
Comparison of Educational Attainment (median for population 25 and older) and Voter Turnout by Tract, Nashville 1955 – 1966

Tract	Years Education 1950	Turnout 1955	Turnout 1959	Years Education 1960	Turnout 1962	Turnout 1966
3	9	10.43%	8.75%	8.9	22.11%	23.50%
4	8	21.87%	11.00%	8.5	21.61%	23.82%
5	7.4	18.36%	6.12%	6.9	16.09%	12.57%
10	7.5	20.49%	12.48%	8	35.59%	27.79%
11	8.4	21.92%	26.22%	8.8	36.45%	39.39%
16	7.2	22.41%	12.83%	7.9	19.67%	21.26%
19	7.6	30.83%	15.45%	8	12.80%	10.86%
24	6.2	17.27%	16.27%	7.6	41.75%	32.60%
25	*	*	*	7.8	34.67%	32.11%
26	7.6	65.71%	33.77%	8.6	27.59%	29.86%
27	9.7	13.94%	28.21%	10.2	17.32%	18.79%

Table 4.10
Comparison of Household Median Income (as percentage of area median income) and Voter Turnout by Tract, Nashville, 1955-1966

Tract	Household Income, % of Area, 1949	Turnout 1955	Turnout 1959	Household Income, % of Area, 1959	Turnout 1962	Turnout 1966
3	62.67%	10.43%	8.75%	55.02%	22.11%	23.50%
4	59.84%	21.87%	11.00%	58.31%	21.61%	23.82%
5	56.49%	18.36%	6.12%	65.24%	16.09%	12.57%
10	60.84%	20.49%	12.48%	66.27%	35.59%	27.79%
11	92.98%	21.92%	26.22%	73.60%	36.45%	39.39%
16	74.19%	22.41%	12.83%	73.53%	19.67%	21.26%
19	65.29%	30.83%	15.45%	65.90%	12.80%	10.86%
24	60.00%	17.27%	16.27%	55.72%	41.75%	32.60%
25	*	*	*	54.09%	34.67%	32.11%
26	97.02%	65.71%	33.77%	91.71%	27.59%	29.86%
27	44.03%	13.94%	28.21%	39.28%	17.32%	18.79%

Tenure status, as measured by the homeownership rate, showed mixed correlations with turnout over the years. In 1955, some of the tracts with highest homeownership rates had the lowest turnout rates, counter to the hypothesis that homeownership and voting participation are directly correlated. There were more direct correlations in 1959. Data were mostly mixed in 1962 and 1966 (see Table 4.11). The 1971 election is not included in the table since the census tract numbering system and map changed; therefore 1950 and 1960 tracts would not be comparable across the table. Although it is not included in the table, 1971 showed mostly mixed results as well. Although the tract with the highest homeownership rate also had the highest turnout, some of the lowest in terms of homeownership showed some of the highest turnout rates. Therefore, tenure may not be very useful in explaining the difference in turnout among black tracts.

Nashville in Summary

Black voting in Nashville did not follow the hypothesized decrease in turnout following the consolidation of the city of Nashville and Davidson County, at least during the study period. Rather, there was an upward trend. Table 4.12 outlines change over time and possible factors.

Table 4.11
Comparison of Tenure (homeownership percentage) and Voter Turnout by Tract, Nashville, 1955-1966

Tract	Percent Owned 1950	Turnout 1955	Turnout 1959	Percent Owned 1960	Turnout 1962	Turnout 1966
3	45.59%	10.43%	8.75%	40.07%	22.11%	23.50%
4	13.42%	21.87%	11.00%	9.74%	21.61%	23.82%
5	16.93%	18.36%	6.12%	21.68%	16.09%	12.57%
10	16.62%	20.49%	12.48%	19.79%	35.59%	27.79%
11	37.05%	21.92%	26.22%	38.82%	36.45%	39.39%
16	31.78%	22.41%	12.83%	28.87%	19.67%	21.26%
19	26.99%	30.83%	15.45%	24.19%	12.80%	10.86%
24	16.53%	17.27%	16.27%	17.20%	41.75%	32.60%
25	*	*	*	32.68%	34.67%	32.11%
26	51.32%	65.71%	33.77%	63.85%	27.59%	29.86%
27	55.62%	13.94%	28.21%	40.86%	17.32%	18.79%

Table 4.12
Black Turnout Changes and Possible Explanations

Time Period	Change	Factors/Notes
1955-1959	**- 7 percent**	**Lack of interest among total population; overall voting also down**
1959-1962	**+5.2 percent**	**Possible "first blush effect" of consolidation**
1962-1966	**+0.4 percent**	**Virtually unchanged; nothing of note**
1966-1971	**+14.7 percent**	**Segregationist candidate for Mayor rallies black voters**

A five percent increase was seen in the first election involving the mayoral race (1962) following the merger. Since there was virtually no change between the1962 election and 1966, it is possible that the 1962 election was a sort of "first blush" effect from the consolidation, with public interest in the "new" government. The lack of a decrease in the next election might be attributable to effects of civil rights and voting rights legislation keeping turnout level when it might have decreased. However, there was a large increase, nearly 15 percent, among black voters in the next election. Since general turnout was virtually unchanged, it seems that some racial factor was at play.

Unconsolidated Memphis was utilized as a comparison to check for possible effects of

the Voting Rights Act and Civil Rights Act, both passed shortly after the Nashville consolidation, upon black voter turnout in Nashville. Since Memphis actually saw a decrease in black voter turnout in the same time period—pre- and post-Voting Rights Act--other factors may have had a stronger effect on black turnout in Nashville. In the case of the large jump in turnout between 1966 and 1971, contextual analysis makes a case for interest in the mayoral race, in which an outspoken segregationist was running for mayor. The candidacy and campaign of segregationist Casey Jenkins may have served to rally black voters and drive them to the polls in significantly increased numbers.

In terms of the differences in turnout among black voting districts, the socioeconomic variables examined did not consistently explain variations. There were some correlations between turnout and income, education levels, and tenure, respectively. However, many notable exceptions to expectations make it likely that other factors, whether socioeconomic or political, such as the strength of a particular race in a district, may have played stronger roles.

CHAPTER V.

JACKSONVILLE-DUVAL COUNTY BACKGROUND

Jacksonville was the second of the study cities to undergo a city-county consolidation. A 1967 public referendum was successful following previous attempts to reorganize local government through consolidation and annexation. At the time of consolidation, blacks comprised over 40 percent of the city's population (with some projections that the city was well on its way to becoming majority-black), and the support of the black community was considered essential to the passage of the referendum. This chapter chronicles black politics and representation in Jacksonville prior to consolidation, offers background on local government and the push for consolidation, and provides an overview of post-consolidation black political power and participation.

BLACK POLITICS AND JACKSONVILLE GOVERNMENT NINETEENTH CENTURY TO 1967

Historically speaking, Jacksonville could be considered a black city because of its larger-than-average black population percentage. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, blacks were a majority of the city's population. In the 1930s and 1940s, blacks comprised over one-third of Jacksonville's residents. By 1960, over 40 percent of the population was black. Although the city consolidated with the county in 1968 following a 1967 referendum, the old city boundaries had a population that was over 47 percent black in 1970. Even after Jacksonville's physical area and population increased with its consolidation with mostly white Duval County, blacks still comprised about 28 percent of the entire Duval County population in 2000, with the largest concentrations of that population remaining within the inner city census tracts.

Between 1865 and 1907, 13 blacks were elected to local offices in Jacksonville. There were also 16 blacks elected from Jacksonville to serve in the Florida state legislature during the

1865-1900 period (Bartley 2000).

Racist backlash to black political participation followed in the early 1900s. White Democrats began using tactics such as purging blacks from registration lists, employing a white primary, levying poll taxes and otherwise circumventing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Bartley (2000) notes that the white tactics led to a 69 percent decrease in black voting in Florida and that no blacks in Jacksonville were elected to local office for sixty years, from 1907 until 1967. Moreover, the state legislature mandated at-large voting in Jacksonville, which made it difficult for black voters to elect black candidates. Even though there was a ward-based representation system, the ward representatives were elected at-large (Bartley 2000).

Blacks had identified with the Republican Party in the 1800s and early 1900s; that was Abraham Lincoln's Republican Party. They started identifying more closely with the Democratic Party after the New Deal. Post-World War II, the white Democrats in Florida rewrote party membership guidelines to exclude blacks. This procedure was actually upheld by the Supreme Court in *Grovey v. Townsend* (1935) due to it being a "private act by private citizens" (Bartley 2000).

In 1946, blacks were 21% of Jacksonville's registered voters. Moreover, there were 12,000 black Democrats registered by 1947. Black leaders led drives to register them as Democrats, in spite of what whites Florida Democratic leaders had previously done. Decisions by the U.S. Circuit Court and the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held and upheld that blacks must be allowed to register as Democrats (Bartley 2000).

Jacksonville government underwent a reorganization in 1951. The executive branch consisted of a stronger chief executive mayor and five-member city commission. The legislative branch consisted of a nine-member council representing districts but elected at-large. A seven-member county commission was also elected at-large.

Black candidates entered Jacksonville city council races in 1951 and throughout the 1950s but were unsuccessful. There was some optimism about the 1959 city council elections, and growing black voting clout served to rally whites. The *Florida Times-Union* and *Jacksonville Journal* newspapers advised whites to turn out to vote. The *Times-Union*, a "consistent opponent

of African-American political participation," actually "advised city officials to annex Jacksonville's surrounding areas to reduce Black political influence" (Bartley 2000, p. 53). This would have diluted black voting strength by adding 147,000 new white residents.

"Suburban growth also contributed to new political realities. If Whites continued their flight from Jacksonville, minorities would be left to run the city. The process had almost created demographic parity as the city council elections approached. In 1940 there were 82,798 Whites and 28,798 African-Americans in Jacksonville. By 1960, there were 118,286 Whites and 82,525 African-Americans" (Bartley 2000, p. 123).

In 1967, the first black representatives since 1907 were elected to the city council. They were women: Mary Singleton and Sallye Mathis. They would have to run again the same year for new seats in new districts for a new council in a consolidated city-county government in which blacks comprised much less of the population than they had in the former city.

LOCAL PROBLEMS AND THE PUSH FOR CONSOLIDATION

As has been well documented in the literature, pre-consolidation Jacksonville was plagued by a host of problems, including the possibility of school disaccreditation, air and water pollution, sewer capacity issues, inadequate police and fire protection outside city limits, bloated government budgets and increasing taxes, rising crime rates, slum housing in the city, and more (Martin 1993; Stephens and Wikstrom 2000).

Rapidly shifting residential patterns contributed heavily to the problems. The population in the county balance increased from 99,512 to 327,000 from 1950 to 1965, a drastic change of over 228 percent in just 15 years. During the same period, the city population decreased by 3.2 percent—from 204,517 to 198,000—while the budget grew from $23.9 million to $94.8 million, an increase approaching 300 percent. The city budget, plagued by a winnowing tax base, was shouldering the burden of rapid growth in the county (Martin 1993).

Because of fiscal strains on the city and county, reformers began looking to alternative forms of government. Plus, on a more subtle level, concerns about race and political power were probably also a factor (Swanson 2000).

In January 1965, the state legislature authorized a 50-citizen committee to study government in Jacksonville. The Duval County legislative delegation named the members. Four blacks were appointed to the committee, including Earl Johnson, an attorney who became the commission's secretary as well as liaison with the black community (Crooks, October 26, 2005 e-mail; Martin 1993).

Annexation was discussed as a possible means to alleviate the fiscal crisis. Consolidation was thrust to the forefront in 1965 with the "Yates Manifesto," a one-sentence recommendation from a panel of business and civic leaders convened by Claude Yates. Yates was a retired vice president of Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company in Florida and had begun serving as president of the Jacksonville Chamber of Commerce. The statement called upon the Duval County delegation of the Florida legislature to prepare an enabling act for Duval citizens to vote on the consolidation of government within Duval County. (Martin 1993)

The Local Government Study Commission released its report and recommendations in May 1966. The chairman of the Study Commission, J.J. Daniel, was also a member of the Florida Publishing Company board of directors. Daniel urged Florida Publishing Company vice president Robert Feagin to involve the local newspapers in the consolidation campaign. Richard Martin [author] was contracted to develop and conduct Jacksonville Journal and Jacksonville Times-Union campaigns to "educate the whole community on the nature of its problems and the reasons why consolidation was needed to solve them..." (Martin 1993, p. 97).

Martin (1993) describes a series of legislative events between "Black Hats" and "White Hats" in the Duval delegation, with the Black Hats opposed to the consolidation plan and attempting to subtly ensure the failure of the plan with political maneuvering, including trying to put through the unamended plan, which would likely be rejected by voters. Eventually, a few key changes, including reducing the consolidated governing body from 21 to 19, with five members elected at-large and 14 being district-based.

After 18 months, the report *Blueprint for Improvement* was released with findings and recommendations, including a consolidated city-county government. Twenty problem areas were highlighted: "disaccredited schools; significant water and air pollution; high crime rate; loss of

property values in Jacksonville; inadequate land use patterns; high comparative cost of government; lack of public confidence in government; low voter registration; economic stagnation; traffic problems; low wages and a relatively unskilled work force; poor sewage facilities county-wide; inadequate water facilities in the outlying areas; poor fire protection in outlying areas; inefficient sanitation system for outlying areas; an unworkable tax assessment policy; inadequate prison facilities and parole procedures; inadequate and wasteful governmental purchasing procedures; huge gaps in library services in outlying areas; and racial unrest" (Bartley 2000, p. 141-142).

Enabling legislation was introduced in mid-1967. The plan originally called for a 21-member city council. The figure was later amended to 19, including 14 district-elected members and five additional council members elected at large. Blacks were in the majority in three districts.

There was concern that blacks had the most to lose with consolidation, as their political clout was finally beginning to grow with voting rights and civil rights legislation and their increasing population percentage in Jacksonville. "In 1967, African-Americans made up over 42 percent of the city's population and held nearly 40 percent of the voting strength. But Blacks held only two of nine city council seats. Consolidation would dilute Black political strength because it would be reduced to 28 percent of the total population and 26 percent of the voting strength. African-Americans would have to accept three districts in a 14-district city run by a 19-member council. African-Americans virtually abandoned hope of winning any of the five at-large seats to be created under consolidation (Bartley p. 143)."

Pro-consolidationists argued that at least consolidation gave blacks some guarantee of representation because of district-based voting. Some blacks said that the bigger picture was more important that representation, that problems needed to be fixed. Urban League officials and the NAACP backed consolidation. The *Florida Star* never took an official position (Crooks 2004).

Since blacks comprised nearly 40 percent of the city's registered voters, black community leader Clanzel Brown and Councilwoman Sallye Mathis led the drive in the "Negro" areas. Mary Singleton was opposed to consolidation. Renewed emphasis later had to be given to courting

black voters when some changes made to proposed council district lines placed Mary Singleton into the same district as Sallye Mathis. Both were serving as city council members after being elected earlier in 1967; they were the first blacks to be elected to local offices in decades.

A necessary technical revision to the council district map placed—inadvertently or intentionally?—Mary Singleton into a district already occupied by Sallye Mathis. Some leaders, including Wendell Holmes of the NAACP and Sallye Mathis, charged that "Black Hat" legislators had tried to sabotage the consolidation campaign efforts by upsetting the black community (Martin 1993).

Pat Caddell, a high school student serving as an aide to Representative Shultz, came up with a plan that placed the two women in different districts (Crooks 2004; Martin 1993). When the legislature approved the plan, the Times-Union ran the headline "Negro leaders endorse consolidation for Duval." The article mentioned Dr. W.W. Schell, vice president of the Greater Jacksonville Economic Opportunity and president emeritus of the Jacksonville Urban League, was chairing a group of black leaders campaigning for consolidation.

Mary Singleton continued her opposition, claiming consolidation would reduce black representation and dilute black voting strength.

"Negroes controlled approximately 40 percent of the Jacksonville vote. Under consolidation that percentage would be significantly reduced. Furthermore, population trends showed a shifting of white middle- and upper-class families out of the city and a polarization of Negroes within the city...Conversely, there could be no doubt that strong support for consolidation developed among segments of the white population of Duval County because of a fear that Negroes might one day control the city government. There were whites who believed that if this trend continued the city might soon have a Negro mayor" (Martin 1993, p. 156).

Former city official and black community leader Alton Yates commented,

> "There was a tremendous fear through the city that Jacksonville was rapidly becoming a black city. Blacks comprised, I want to think, about 42-44 percent of the population. It was largely believed that the city was getting close to electing a black mayor...But white flight as far as the tax base had already started fleeing to the suburbs. So, it was very important for the consolidation charter to pass in my opinion for that reason" (Jacksonville Public Library 2006).

It was pointed out that with at-large voting, there was no guarantee that white suburbanites couldn't prevent blacks from winning council seats. Consolidation, its supporters insisted, would at least guarantee at least 3 of the 14 district-based seats and give blacks an opportunity to run in the five at-large contests.

Although there were some prominent black leaders supporting consolidation, two black newspapers opposed it, according to Martin (1993). The *Advocate* spoke out against it. The *Florida Star*, published by Eric Simpson, didn't endorse consolidation editorially, though it presented both sides (Crooks 2004); Martin apparently considers lack of endorsement to be opposition. "For many Negroes the choice between the old ways and consolidation wasn't hard to make. They had only to look around—at the open drainage ditches, the privies, shanties, unpaved streets, and rundown schools—to make up their minds" (Martin 1993, p. 158). One major factor in garnering more support, black and white, for consolidation may have been some local government scandals (Crooks, October 2005 interview). City government corruption was uncovered by local media in 1965 and 1966. City officials had done such things as purchase luxury automobiles for city officials on a non-competitive basis, charge personal purchases to city accounts, and award insurance contracts to friends and political supporters without regard to pricing or need. (Crooks 2004).

Local television station WJXT helped create support for government reform with its series of investigative documentaries including one on police department mismanagement and another called "Government by Gaslight," describing overlapping, confusing layers of local government. In 1965 a special exposé type report uncovered a scandal in the procurement of the city's automobile fleet. A series on the city's insurance programs aired in 1966, again documenting possible fraud, and, at the least, gross mismanagement of taxpayers' dollars. WJXT continued its investigative reporting on "questionable city practices and programs (Martin 1993, p. 75)." Martin suggests that WJXT's charges prompted Circuit Court Judge Marion W. Gooding to call on May 17, 1966, for a grand jury investigation. When the grand jury process was completed in early November, two of the five city commissioners, four of nine city council members, the city auditor and the recreation chief had been indicted (Martin 1993).

Scholar Bert Swanson agrees that the Jacksonville reformers' move to professionalize the government and leave behind the corruption was a key factor, however; "under the surface, racism was a big factor. There were projections that the city could become half-black as early as 1972. Although the reformers were keyed in on professionalization, they were savvy in playing up—or at least not doing much to downplay—people's fears, such as racial concerns" (Swanson interview October 24, 2005).

James Crooks also notes that Louis Ritter, mayor from 1965-67, did not win re-election in 1967 despite popularity and a good relationship with the African American community. Ritter had appointed the first blacks to city policy-making and advisory boards and agencies. Instead, Tanzler won on a reform ticket. "White middle-class residents voted for him in substantial numbers to overcome organized party and African American support for the incumbent" (Crooks 2004 p. 51). In 2006, former mayor Lou Ritter commented in retrospect, "One of the main reasons why people overwhelmingly voted for consolidation is because they did not want to see a black man serving as mayor, and it split the community greatly" (Jacksonville Public Library 2006). On August 8, 1967, voters in Jacksonville and Duval County, Florida approved a referendum to consolidate the two governments into one Greater Jacksonville. Elections for officeholders in the new government were held later that fall, and the new government was officially installed in October 1968. Over 86,000—86,079---Duval County residents voted. Consolidation was approved 54,493 to 29,768. Within the city, the vote was 19,534 for, 9,677 against. In the County balance, it was 30,858 and 17,192, respectively.

Perhaps surprisingly, the margin was much closer among blacks than for all voters. Blacks countywide voted 4,433 for, 3,117 against. In the county balance only, the black vote was 1,487 for, 963 against (Martin 1993). Almost 65 percent voted for consolidation. Black Jacksonville had supported it 59 to 41 percent, whereas the whole population of the old city was in favor nearly 2 to 1 and in Duval County 64 to 36.

> "Though critics still remained, the larger community, including both African Americans and previously reluctant suburbanites, came close to a consensus, a major accomplishment in a city plagued by racial, economic, educational, environmental, and political divisions. Still, among the critics were an undetermined yet substantial number of people who voted against consolidation for the very reason Mary Singleton feared: the dilution of black political power.

> This fear, that whites intended for consolidation to dilute black Jacksonville's political power, became a belief among many local African Americans. Historian Abel A. Bartley describes the fears of Frank Hampton, Mary Singleton, and newspaper editor Eric Simpson at the time. Almost thirty-five years later, attorney A. Wellington Barlow and newspaper editor Isiah Williams repeated the concerns. African American supporters at the time, however, saw a trade-off. They acknowledged white dominance into the foreseeable future with consolidation but accepted the half loaf of guaranteed district seats on city council and the promise of improved urban services so badly needed in the neglected urban core under the old regime. They also saw the possibility that if African Americans did become a majority in the future, state legislators might still annex enough white suburbs to maintain control, without a referendum. As a result, most black leaders "saw consolidation as the lesser of two evils." (Crooks 2004 p. 57-58).

POST CONSOLIDATION BLACK POLITICAL POWER AND PARTICIPATION

Primary elections were held October 24, 1967. Blacks ran in District 8 (Sallye Mathis), the old Third Ward; District 7 (Oscar Taylor, "Tank" Tankersly, and Rev. Earnest Newman); and District 11 (Mary Singleton). Earl Johnson decided to run for an at-large seat. Mathis won handily and did not face a run-off (held if leading candidate did not receive a majority) or a Republican in the general election. Tankersly and Taylor had a run-off election, with Taylor winning. Singleton faced no opposition in the primary. Johnson was able to beat conservative white candidate Roger West in the run-off. Although voting was "light" for the November 7 run-off elections—turnout was less than 50 percent—voting was high in the Johnson-West race, with 67,000 of 76,518 voters making a choice in that contest. Johnson won 36,925 to 30,104 (Bartley p. 149).

In the December 5 general election, only two blacks had Republican opponents, Johnson and Taylor. However, Taylor, Johnson, Singleton, and Mathis were all elected to the consolidated city-county government. Bartley notes that "[more] voters cast ballots in the group five at-large race than in any other council race" (2000, p. 150), which probably had to do with racial concerns.

Looking back on the pro-consolidation vote, blacks may have felt that they basically had to choose between power in a declining city or sharing in potential recovery and growth. "In 1968 Johnson explained his support [of consolidation] by saying: " 'The wealth was leaving Jacksonville. Population as a whole was declining. There just was no good reason why we

should keep what government we had. The Negro had more to lose by opposing consolidation. We had to think about what happens to a city all black. Would industry come? Would tourists? Would it become a citywide slum?' " (Bartley 2000 p. 152).

There was some black opposition to consolidation that continued years afterward. In 1969, local NAACP president Lynwood Lee said Jacksonville was "pussy-footing around" with urban renewal projects and public housing was among the worst in the South. He added that, "We are paying city taxes and not getting city benefits" (Martin 1993, p.314, quoting Lee from a March 22, 1969 Times-Union article).

In an October 1, 1978 *Times-Union* article by Randolph Pendleton entitled "Has merger benefited blacks?" Frank Hampton and Eric Simpson claimed that the black position had not progressed but regressed and that blacks had lost political strength, and thereby economic power. Earl Johnson, formerly an ardent consolidation supporter, said that he was not sure he would support it "[k]nowing what I know now." Johnson felt the government efforts to improve black neighborhoods were not nearly enough, and that resources weren't going there due to decreased black political strength (Martin 1993). In 1981, Johnson was quoted in the *Jacksonville Journal* as saying that "[r]etrospectively, I note a number of towns that did turn Black and were able to grow as such" (Martin 1993 p.152).

Swanson (interview 2005) agrees that although the consolidation gave blacks some "real access," in perpetuity they are going to be a minority. Moreover, he believes consolidation has "created a schizoid polity. There's not much contact between city blacks and suburban whites."

A 1973 study by Joan Carver found that black leaders were not as enthusiastic as white leaders, but felt they had "much greater accessibility" than in the past (Crooks 2004). At the 1977 First Conference on Jacksonville History at the University of North Florida, Carver commented that consolidation's "general thrust had been favorable to the interests of blacks," although she expressed some reservation (cited by Crooks 2004). Crooks explains:

> "On the one hand, black participation throughout government had increased due to the election of district representatives to city council and the commitment of top city officials to appoint blacks to positions of responsibility. Blacks were making white officials aware of black needs. Further, the willingness of the consolidation government to accept federal dollars provided resources to expand public health and public housing programs in the black community. On the other

> hand, consolidated government had little interest in legislating equal job or housing opportunities. Further, the city's low-tax, low-spend policies meant fewer social services in the minority community, where they were greatly needed," (Crooks 2004 p. 208).

Crooks summarized other black opinion expressed at a 1993 University of North Florida Humanities Council symposium "Race Relations in Jacksonville Since Consolidation." The event, organized by Crooks and fellow UNF History professor Carolyn Williams, included eight African Americans on the panel of 11 participants. Crooks noted: "Jacksonville's African Americans, who comprised one-quarter of the population, did not see equity or equal opportunity as a consequence of consolidated government. Twenty-five years later, many blacks still looked for its benefits."

Black concerns about having a voice in the consolidated government have persisted. The Jacksonville Community Council Inc. (JCCI) conducts an annual *Quality of Life in Jacksonville: Indicators and Progress* report in collaboration with the University of North Florida. Survey data show that Jacksonville residents continue to believe felt racism is a community problem, with nearly two-thirds of blacks and over half of whites agreeing (JCCI 2002). Furthermore, a 2000 survey revealed that "far fewer Black respondents believed that local government gives equal representation to the interests and concerns of all racial and minority groups..." (JCCI 2002, p. 10). This same 2002 report also profiled the case of consolidation as an example of continued racial differences in perceptions of discrimination, noting that "[b]lacks are more likely to stress white fears about the growing population and political power of blacks in the pre-consolidated City of Jacksonville as driving the consolidation movement" (p. 9).

More recently, in February 2007, a group called the Jacksonville Leadership Coalition called for the abolition of consolidated government in Jacksonville to "make city government and police more responsive to minorities' concerns and needs" (Brumley/*Florida Times Union* February 10, 2007).

Swanson (2000) cites Feiock, Seamon, and Dorsey (1994): "Electoral participation in Jacksonville was low and declined after consolidation." Feiock, Seamon, and Dorsey (1994) conducted a time series analysis of electoral participation, 14 years before and 19 years after

consolidation. They found that turnout in Jacksonville decreased by about 18 percent, which was more than the decrease in other Florida urban counties.

> "Although consolidation tends to favor the core more than the periphery, the merger in Jacksonville reversed this notion. The black vote was diluted by consolidation; before the merger, over 40 percent of the population in the inner city was black, but in the new polity only one-quarter of the population comprised blacks. Although central-city blacks gained an increased tax base and a degree of access, representation, and influence, suburban whites continued to dominate politically." (Swanson 2000)

Crooks said it is "still controversial about why consolidation became such a big issue. African-Americans said it was to prevent the city from becoming majority-black. Why, then, did 60 percent of blacks vote for consolidation? The population was 42 percent black in 1967 and was on its way to becoming majority-black in the early 1970s. One reason for support of consolidation was a county government "powerless" to provide urban services (Crooks interview Oct 25, 2005). Crooks said, "I personally feel that the consolidation election was strongly influenced by indictments, particularly as shown on local television exposés. Petty corruption had not been a big concern, though, before the exposes on the scandals." Equally important factors were the disaccreditation of the schools and the county's lack of infrastructure following rapid growth. (Crooks interview Oct 25, 2005).

CHAPTER VI

JACKSONVILLE-DUVAL COUNTY DATA AND ANALYSIS

Race was a major issue in the push for consolidation in Jacksonville. The black community was divided in its support, and concerns about racial, political, and social equity under a consolidated government continue in Jacksonville. This chapter examines voter turnout in the two elections involving the mayor's race prior to consolidation and three following the consolidation and finds that turnout did decrease following the consolidation. A brief comparison to unconsolidated Tampa is included, along with some possible explanations for changes in participation levels.

Voters approved the consolidation of Jacksonville and Duval County in August 1967 and the new government took effect in 1968. Local elections involving a mayoral race to be considered in this study include two prior to consolidation, held in 1963 and in the spring of 1967, and three after consolidation, 1971, 1975, and 1979.

Preliminary research revealed that voter registration data by race were available on a precinct level in 1963 and in 1968 (which might offer a close approximation for 1967 elections, though precincts may have changed slightly). Majority black precincts, as indicated by precinct-level registration by race, had a very low average turnout of 4.4 percent in the 1963 general election. Conversely, majority black precincts had a turnout of roughly 53% in the 1967 general election. This dramatic difference led to the question, "Is this difference due to the fact that civil rights and voting rights legislation post-dated the earlier election, or were there other factors, such as corruption scandals and the problems with schools and municipal services that created an interest for voters?" Two questions subsequently arose as a way to gauge the relative impact federal legislation may have played: Was black turnout considerably lower than overall turnout? Was black registration also low?

Voter turnout in Jacksonville and Duval County was characteristically low for many years preceding consolidation (*Blueprint for Improvement* 1966). Overall turnout in the 1963 general election was 12 percent; in 1967, 53 percent. The 1967 overall turnout and black turnout were basically the same. For 1963, there had been a difference of 7.6 percent, which may not be out of line with the literature showing turnouts generally being lower for blacks than for whites. Moreover, registration among blacks, at least according to 1963 and 1968 Duval County Supervisor of Elections records, was closely in line with blacks' population percentage. Blacks comprised 33.8 percent of city registered voters in 1963. In 1968, black were 40 percent of city registered voters and 20 percent of county voters.

If there weren't huge differences in turnout by race and black registration didn't spike dramatically, it may be safely concluded that the impact of civil rights and voting rights legislation upon the difference in participation levels between 1963 and 1967 general elections was relatively minimal. What then, caused the jump from 12 percent to 53 percent in overall voting turnout? Searches of newspaper archives revealed that mayors were not always necessarily elected in the general elections in Jacksonville.

Although the original intent in the research design was to look at turnout in general elections, Jacksonville's unique political environment requires the examination of primary elections in lieu of general elections for certain years. Because the vast majority of voters in both Jacksonville and Duval County were registered as Democrats throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, depending on the number and popularity of candidates, mayors were more or less elected in the primaries for some years. In 1963, for example, 95.7 percent of registered voters within Jacksonville city limits were Democrats. That year, the mayor was elected in the first of two primaries held. In 1968, Democrats still comprised 94.4 percent of city registered voters and over 90 percent of Duval County voters. However, the mayoral election in 1967 was decided in the general election following an initial primary and a second run-off primary. Table 6.1 profiles voter registration and turnout and types of elections in which the mayoral winner was decided, for each of the five election years. Data for 1971 and after reflect the larger population of the consolidated city.

Table 6.1
Voter Registration and Participation Profile
Jacksonville Mayoral Elections 1963-1979

Year	White Registered Voters	"Colored" Registered Voters*	Blacks as percent of registered voters	Voter turnout (all voters)	Election Type
1963	45935	24107	34.4%	62%	1st primary
1967	44046	29153	39.8%	62%	2nd primary
1971	164894	43216	20.8%	59%	1st primary
1975	177364	52165	22.7%	40%	General
1979	183332	56701	23.6%	37%	General

Source: Duval County Supervisor of Elections Office unnamed file of local election summary cards. The term "colored" is used on the cards.

In 1960, there were seven census tracts within the city of Jacksonville that were at least 70% nonwhite; two tracts, 2 and 5, had simple majority-black populations but did not have black populations over 70 percent black recorded until the 1970 Census. Additionally, there were four census tracts in Duval County in the Lake Forest-Riverview area (northeast of the city boundary) that were greater than 70% nonwhite: 107, 114, 115, and 116. In 1970, there were 13 tracts that were over 70% nonwhite.[16] Although this study is focused on the city of Jacksonville pre- and post-consolidation, it might be beneficial to include examination of black electoral participation in those majority-minority tracts outside the former city boundaries areas because the Lake Forest-Riverview population represented 25 percent of the nonwhite population in Duval County in 1970 (Florida Publishing Company 1973). However, tracts outside of the former city boundary did not vote in the city elections in 1963 and 1967. Table 6.2 profiles the population of majority black Census tracts.

Over the five mayoral election cycles in Jacksonville, two occurring pre-consolidation and three post-consolidation, turnout among blacks and turnout among all voters followed similar patterns, though black turnout initially was different. Tables 6.3 through 6.7 offer detailed tract-specific turnout information for 70% majority-minority tracts for each of the years. Figure 6.1 presents a summary of black and overall turnout over the time period.

[16] This figure includes tracts formerly outside city boundaries that became part of the newly-consolidated city-county.

Table 6.2
Composition of 70 % Majority Black Tracts in Jacksonville-Duval County

Tract	1960 Percent Black	1970 Percent Black
Pre-consolidated city boundary		
2	**54.8%**	**76.4%**
4	94.8%	94.0%
5	**54.1%**	**70.1%**
15	99.1%	99.4%
16	99.9%	100.0%
17	100.0%	99.9%
18	98.3%	98.6%
28	84.9%	98.1%
29	100.0%	99.9%
Included in city post-consolidation:		
107	74.3%	87.5%
114	95.6%	99.8%
115	84.5%	89.7%
116	98.4%	98.7%

Source: Florida Publishing Company (1973, November). *Census tract data of Duval County.* Percent nonwhite. Note: Census data show that the nonwhite population in Jacksonville was almost exclusively black during those years.

For the 1963 election, four of the city's seven majority-minority tracts had precincts that were split: Tract 15 and Tract 16 shared a precinct, and Tract 17 and Tract 18 split a precinct. The remaining tracts, 4, 28, and 29, contained precincts which were basically coterminous with tract boundaries. Any spillover of precinct boundaries was limited to a handful of blocks and/or a negligible fraction (10% or less) of the precinct area.[17] It should be noted that four additional Duval County tracts—107, 114, 115, and 116--immediately outside the city boundary were majority-minority; however, residents of those tracts were neither represented by nor voted for city elected officials. For the three city tracts with no split precincts, voter turnout, based on the total number of voters from all precincts within a tract divided by the voting age population (age 18 and over) in the tract, ranged from 31.27 percent to 40.60 percent. When precincts of tracts 15, 16, 17, and 18 were combined into one "super-tract," turnout was 26.26 percent for that area.

[17] Precinct maps for all five election cycles were obtained from the Duval County Supervisor of Elections office.

For all seven majority-minority tracts, voter turnout was approximately 31.93 percent. A summary is presented in Table 6.3.

Table 6.3
1963 Jacksonville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts

Tract	Total Voted	1960 Voting Age Pop.	Tract-Level Turnout
Total 4	1908	4699	40.60%
Total 15		6240	
Total 16		4535	
Total 17		4464	
Total 18		3303	
TOTAL 15, 16, 17, 18 combined	4869	18542	26.26%
Total 28	2172	6945	31.27%
Total 29	3387	8450	40.08%
TOTAL ALL BLACK TRACTS	**12336**	**38636**	**31.93%**

In the 1967 election, three of the seven majority-minority tracts had split precincts: 16, 17, and 18. Tract 16 shared a precinct with Tract 17. Tract 17 shared two precincts with Tract 18. When precincts of tracts 16, 17, and 18 were combined into one "super-tract," turnout was 32.38 percent. Turnout for the four tracts without split precincts ranged from 30.64 percent to 48.45 percent. For all seven majority-minority tracts, voter turnout was 37.07 percent. A summary is presented in Table 6.4.

The 1971 election was the first election to include the office of mayor in the consolidated government. Although a second 1967 municipal election for local offices was held following the August consolidation referendum, a new mayor was not elected at that time. In 1971, there was a total of nine majority-minority tracts within the pre-consolidation city boundary, plus the four tracts in the county balance, for a total of 13 majority-minority tracts in Jacksonville-Duval County. In the former city, Tract 2 and Tract 5 were added to the seven majority-minority tracts from the 1960 Census. In 1971, precincts were generally coterminous with tract boundaries, with minimal

Table 6.4
1967 Jacksonville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts

Tract	Total Voted (all precincts)	1960 Voting Age Pop.	Tract-Level Turnout
Total 4	1440	4699	30.64%
Total 15	2597	6240	41.62%
Total 16		4535	
Total 17		4464	
Total 18		3303	
TOTAL 16, 17, 18 combined	3407	12302	32.38%
Total 28	2775	6945	39.96%
Total 29	4094	8450	48.45%
TOTAL ALL BLACK TRACTS	**14313**	**38606**	**37.07%**

spillover. Turnout for all tracts in the former city was a combined 36.91 percent, with turnout in individual tracts ranging from 14.64 to 44.63 percent. Turnout for tracts outside the former city boundary was 36.86 percent, with individual tract turnout ranging from 24.44 to 46.58 percent. Turnout for all 13 majority-minority tracts in the county was approximately 36.90 percent. Turnout levels in the county balance excluded, the former city boundary turnout represents a small decrease of .08 percent from 1967 levels even though one might anticipate great voter interest in the election of the first "metro" mayor.

Data for 1971 were re-checked for possible errors. Of the five mayoral election years being examined, 1971 was the only year in which a complete and contiguous large-scale city and/or county precinct map was unavailable. Rather, precincts had to be matched with the majority-minority tracts based on a Supervisor of Elections office collection of 8.5 by 11 sheets of maps containing some hand-drawn precinct boundaries and surrounding areas in addition to some printed precinct boundaries on street maps. For this analysis, Census tract boundaries were hand-drawn onto these sheets to determine the tracts into which the precincts fell. Results were

checked against a Supervisor of Elections office file of precinct boundary changes made in the 1970s as well as a list of polling place addresses for the 1971 election. Moreover, the overall voting turnout trend also reflected a small decrease between these years, so the black turnout data are not out-of-line. The 1971 election is summarized in Table 6.5.

Table 6.5
1971 Jacksonville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts

Tract	Total Voted	1970 Voting Age Pop.	Tract-Level Turnout
Total 2	1146	2957	38.76%
Total 4	1153	3300	34.94%
Total 5	946	2446	38.68%
Total 15	2195	5510	39.84%
Total 16	634	1693	37.45%
Total 17	617	4214	14.64%
Total 18	891	2248	39.64%
Total 28	3277	9044	36.23%
Total 29	4245	9512	44.63%
TOTAL FORMER CITY	**15104**	**40924**	**36.91%**
Total 107	1311	3667	35.75%
Total 114	1076	2310	46.58%
Total 115	931	3810	24.44%
Total 116	1717	3866	44.41%
TOTAL CO. BALANCE	**5035**	**13653**	**36.88%**
TOTAL ALL BLACK TRACTS	**20139**	**54577**	**36.90%**

For the 1975 election, none of the 13 majority-minority tracts had precincts that were notably split with other tracts. Figure 6.1 shows a section of the 1975 map with hand-drawn Census tracts. Turnout, based on the total number of voters from all precincts within a tract divided by the voting age population (age 18 and over) in the tract, ranged from 8.35 to 35.83 percent among the nine central city tracts, whereas the four county tracts ranged from 34.48 to 38.14 percent.

Voter turnout was 25.56 percent in the former city tracts and 36.32 percent in the county remainder tracts, with an overall turnout of 28.25 percent, which represents a considerable decrease from 1971 as well as the 1963 and 1967 turnout levels. Table 6.6 presents a summary of the 1975 election.

In 1979, again, none of the 13 majority-minority tracts had precincts that had major splits with other tracts. Turnout ranged from 4.15 to 34.25 percent among the nine central city tracts,

Table 6.6
1975 Jacksonville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts

Tract	Total Voted	1970 Voting Age Pop.	Tract-Level Turnout
Total 2	808	2957	27.32%
Total 4	663	3300	20.09%
Total 5	525	2446	21.46%
Total 15	2123	5510	38.53%
Total 16	182	1693	10.75%
Total 17	352	4214	8.35%
Total 18	223	2248	9.92%
Total 28	2207	9044	24.40%
Total 29	3376	9512	35.49%
TOTAL FORMER CITY	**10459**	**40924**	**25.56%**
Total 107	1331	3667	36.30%
Total 114	842	2310	36.45%
Total 115	1453	3810	38.14%
Total 116	1333	3866	34.48%
TOTAL CO BALANCE	**4959**	**13653**	**36.32%**
TOTAL ALL BLACK TRACTS	**15418**	**54577**	**28.25%**

whereas the four county tracts ranged from 11.67 to 34.07 percent. Voter turnout was 23.65 percent in the former city tracts and 26.70 in the county remainder tracts, with an overall turnout of 24.41 percent, which represents another decrease. Moreover, 1979 turnout levels, at least in

the majority-minority tracts, are the lowest of the five years examined. Table 6.7 summarizes the 1979 election.

Figure 6.1
1975 Jacksonville Electoral Boundaries with Hand-drawn Tracts



Turnout for the entire local electorate in contests in which a mayor was elected was 62 percent in 1963, 62 in 1967, 59 in 1971, 40 in 1975, and 37 percent in 1979. Participation decreased slightly in 1971 despite it being the first election in which a "metro mayor" was elected and voters in the "suburban" areas had a voice in city government. Overall voter participation then dropped dramatically for the 1975 and 1979 elections. Black voter participation also decreased over the span of 1963 to 1979 (see Figure 6.1 and Table 6.8). However, it actually increased considerably before falling. In the former city (including tracts 29 and below), turnout in the black tracts increased by over 5 percent between 1963 and 1967. Voting in the majority black

Table 6.7
1979 Jacksonville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts

Tract	Total Voted	1970 Voting Age Pop.	Tract-Level Turnout
Total 2	608	2957	20.56%
Total 4	459	3300	13.91%
Total 5	482	2446	19.71%
Total 15	1887	5510	34.25%
Total 16	415	1693	24.51%
Total 17	175	4214	4.15%
Total 18	201	2248	8.94%
Total 28	2486	9044	27.49%
Total 29	2965	9512	31.17%
TOTAL FORMER CITY	**9678**	**40924**	**23.65%**
Total 107	428	3667	11.67%
Total 114	787	2310	34.07%
Total 115	1276	3810	33.49%
Total 116	1154	3866	29.85%
TOTAL CO BALANCE	**3645**	**13653**	**26.70%**
TOTAL ALL BLACK TRACTS	**13323**	**54577**	**24.41%**

tracts remained essentially level from 1967 to 1971 before decreasing to pre-1960s levels in 1975 and 1979. When former "county balance" areas were included in the consolidated government, voting in the corresponding majority black tracts was initially about the same as in the former city, but was higher in 1975 and 1979.

What might explain some of the differences in turnout levels? In terms of total voting population participation, it might have been expected that the 1971 election would have sparked an interest and spiked participation since it was the first election for a "metro mayor." Although there had been a second local election in 1967 (the first had been in the spring) following passage of the consolidation referendum in August, mayor had not been among the offices up for election. The 1975 drop may be have a factor of the newness of consolidated government

wearing off, or, as hypothesized, a feeling of vote dilution, being "small fish in a big pond,"

Figure 6.2



among the electorate. In 1979, the mayor was elected in the general election contest between Democrat Jake Godbold and Republican Don Brewer. Turnout was actually several percentage point higher, however, for the first (42.9 percent) and second (45 percent) primary races, which included Godbold, who had succeeded former mayor Hans Tanzler six months prior to fill the remaining term, and Lew Brantley, former state Senate president (Drane, H. 1979, 22 April. And then there were two... *Florida Times-Union*, page 1.). Republicans only accounted for 4,489, or 2.25 percent, of the 199,994 registered voters in Duval County in 1979, which meant that by the time of the general election, there wasn't much of a contest for mayor (Supervisor of Elections office file of registered voters and voter turnout summary cards).

In terms of the slightly different trend in voting participation in the majority black tracts, the increase between 1963 and 1967 may be related to Civil Rights and Voting Rights legislation occurring in the interim as well as the fact that two strong black female candidates were running for council positions in 1967. It is difficult to determine which might have had a stronger role. On

Table 6.8
Comparison of Turnout Over Time, Jacksonville

Year	Black Turnout	Overall Turnout
1963	31.9%	62%
1967	37.1%	62%
1971	36.9%	59%
1975	28.3%	40%
1979	24.4%	37%

Note: Black turnout data based on author's calculations. Overall turnout data are as recorded in Documents in the office of the Duval County Supervisor of Elections.

one hand, Florida was one of two Southern states with high levels of black voter registration prior to the Voting Rights Act (Alt 1994). However, the number of black registered voters in Jacksonville increased from 24,107 to 29.153, a 17 percent change from 1963 to 1967. The number of white registered voters in Jacksonville fell four percent from 45,935 to 44,046 during the same period, which may be explained by white population shifts to the suburbs.

The lack of a notable drop-off in Jacksonville in 1971 might be a rallying response to the fact that the percent of the population and of registered voters that were black was dramatically decreased as a result of the consolidation. For example, in 1967, blacks were nearly 40 percent of the registered electorate, but under 21 percent in 1971.

Unconsolidated Tampa as a Comparison

In unconsolidated Tampa, which might be used as a control to check for effects of the Voting Rights Act on black turnout in Jacksonville, overall voter turnout pre- and post-Voting Rights Act in Tampa mayoral elections fell from 71,065 in 1963 to 60,879 in 1967 (Smith, F. *Tampa Tribune* Sept. 26 1963 Page B-1 City race unaltered; Cox, B. September 28, 1967 *Tampa Tribune*, Greco strides through city in post-election happiness, Page 2-B.). The 1963 turnout was a near record 62 percent for the city (*Tampa Tribune*, 26 September 1962, "It's bigger than

men," Page 12-A). Moreover, based on limited data available on precinct-level voter registration by race, black voter turnout in mayoral elections also decreased from 1963 to 1967. For the 10 city precincts in which blacks comprised over 50 percent of registered voters, turnout fell from 59.57 percent in 1963 to 42.80 percent in 1967. When a 70 percent black registered voter criterion is used, there are six "black" city precincts. Turnout in those Tampa precincts also fell between 1963 and 1967, from 56.60 percent to 41.55 percent.[18] Many attribute the high turnout in 1963 to interest in two events occurring the day preceding the 1963 election: indictment of three incumbent council members plus the release of a report recommending zoning reform (Smith, F. Sept. 25, 1963, *Tampa Tribune*, Nuccio beats Lane by 1,910 votes; Page 1-A).

Figure 6.3



Figure 6.2 depicts black voter turnout over time in unconsolidated Tampa for the elections preceding and following the Voting Rights Act. At the same time voting increased in Jacksonville pre- and post-Voting Rights Act, it decreased in Tampa. Hence, federal legislation may not necessarily have played as major a role in black turnout as other factors.

[18] Calculations are based on precinct-level registration data available from the Hillsborough County

Socieconomic Factors

The fairly wide range in participation among the majority black areas lends itself to further analysis. Of course, it is possible that competition for other local offices unique to that area, such as council member, may have affected the levels. It is noteworthy, however, that the lowest participation levels seemed to be concentrated in the same areas over time. Therefore, it is essential to look at demographic differences between the areas.

Initial plans for this dissertation called for exploration of income, poverty levels, educational attainment, age, and housing tenure as contributors to spatial differences in black participation levels. Due to data availability restrictions, however, age has been removed. The Census reports for 1970 did not include median age on a tract basis; rather, population by age groups was reported. Therefore, only a median age group, with a range of multiple years, could be calculated, and the usefulness thereof was minimal. Moreover, any analysis of the poverty population must be restricted to post-1960s elections, since the concept of a poverty line was established in the 1960s and data were not reported for the 1960 Census.

It was hypothesized that as educational attainment increased, voter participation would increase. Measured in terms of median years of education attained by the population 25 and older, data from the 1960s and 1970s, reported in Table 6.9, didn't show any obvious correlation with turnout. In several cases, the relationship was unexpected, i.e. areas with lower educational attainment had some of the higher turnout rates.

Similar to educational attainment, income did not show an obvious strong correlation to voter turnout. It was hypothesized that as income increased, voter turnout would increase. Table 6.10 data reveal some unexpected instances, such as Tract 18 in 1971 with one of the lowest household income as percent of area median but turnout among the highest.

Tenure status, as measured by the homeownership rate, showed some stronger direct correlation, as hypothesized, in the 1960s and 1970s elections. Although it was not the case in

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Supervisor of Elections Office and precinct-level actual votes reported in the *Tampa Tribune*.

Table 6.9
Comparison of Educational Attainment (median for population 25 and older) and Voter Turnout by Tract, Jacksonville, 1963 – 1979

Tract	Yrs. Educ. 1960	Turnout 1963	Turnout 1967	Yrs. Educ. 1970	Turnout 1971	Turnout 1975	Turnout 1979
4	7.5	40.60%	**30.64%**	8.1	34.94%	20.09%	13.91%
15	8.5	n/a	n/a	10	39.84%	38.53%	34.25%
16	7.8	n/a	n/a	8.6	37.45%	**10.75%**	**24.51%**
17	6.9	n/a	n/a	8.3	14.64%	8.35%	4.15%
18	7.6	n/a	n/a	8.3	39.64%	**9.92%**	8.94%
15/16/17/18	n/a	26.26%	32.38%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
28	8.1	31.27%	39.96%	10.1	36.23%	24.40%	27.49%
29	8.5	40.08%	48.45%	8.4	44.63%	35.49%	31.17%
107	n/a	n/a	n/a	11.6	35.75%	36.30%	**11.67%**
114	n/a	n/a	n/a	12	46.58%	36.45%	34.07%
115	n/a	n/a	n/a	8.9	24.44%	**38.14%**	33.49%
116	n/a	n/a	n/a	11.2	44.41%	34.48%	29.85%

Source: *U.S. Censuses of Population and Housing 1960. PHC(1)-66 Jacksonville, Fla. SMSA.*

Table 6.10
Comparison of Household Median Income (as percentage of area median income) and Voter Turnout by Tract, Jacksonville, 1963-1979

Tract	Household Income % of Area, 1959	Turnout 1963	Turnout 1967	Household Income % of Area, 1969	Turnout 1971	Turnout 1975	Turnout 1979
4	50.69%	40.60%	**30.64%**	43.65%	34.94%	20.09%	13.91%
15	67.74%	n/a	n/a	59.82%	39.84%	38.53%	34.25%
16	45.07%	n/a	n/a	39.88%	37.45%	**10.75%**	**24.51%**
17	40.67%	n/a	n/a	32.99%	14.64%	8.35%	4.15%
18	41.70%	n/a	n/a	36.53%	39.64%	**9.92%**	8.94%
15/16/17/18	n/a	26.26%	32.38%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
28	68.93%	31.27%	39.96%	65.30%	36.23%	24.40%	27.49%
29	68.84%	40.08%	48.45%	61.02%	44.63%	35.49%	31.17%
107	n/a	n/a	n/a	102.30%	35.75%	36.30%	**11.67%**
114	n/a	n/a	n/a	122.30%	46.58%	36.45%	34.07%
115	n/a	n/a	n/a	51.31%	24.44%	**38.14%**	33.49%
116	n/a	n/a	n/a	91.37%	44.41%	34.48%	29.85%

Source: *U.S. Censuses of Population and Housing 1960. PHC(1)-66 Jacksonville, Fla. SMSA.*
Median income as percent of area calculated from *Table P-1* data.

every majority black tract, there were some notable examples. In 1963 and 1967, e.g., Tract 28 and Tract 29 had the highest rates of homeownership and among the highest turnout rates, though Tract 4 was an exception, with a much lower turnout rate but similar turnout rate. In the 1970s, 114 and 116 had high homeownership rates and high turnout. Tracts, 16, 17, and 18 had low homeownership rates and low turnout. Tract 108 seems an anomaly with the second highest homeownership rate but one of the lower turnout rates. Moreover, there are several instances of tracts with homeownership rates in the middle of the range with a wider range of turnout rates. Table 6.11 presents detailed homeownership data.

Table 6.11
Comparison of Tenure (homeownership percentage) and Voter Turnout by Tract, Jacksonville, 1963-1979

Tract	Percent Owned 1960	Turnout 1963	Turnout 1967	Percent Owned 1970	Turnout 1971	Turnout 1975	Turnout 1979
4	39%	40.60%	**30.64%**	45%	34.94%	20.09%	13.91%
15	48%	n/a	n/a	47%	39.84%	38.53%	34.25%
16	16%	n/a	n/a	21%	37.45%	**10.75%**	**24.51%**
17	7%	n/a	n/a	10%	14.64%	8.35%	4.15%
18	5%	n/a	n/a	7%	39.64%	**9.92%**	8.94%
15/16/17/18	n/a	26.26%	32.38%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
28	60%	31.27%	39.96%	60%	36.23%	24.40%	27.49%
29	63%	40.08%	48.45%	56%	44.63%	35.49%	31.17%
107	n/a	n/a	n/a	84%	35.75%	36.30%	**11.67%**
114	n/a	n/a	n/a	93%	46.58%	36.45%	34.07%
115	n/a	n/a	n/a	58%	24.44%	**38.14%**	33.49%
116	n/a	n/a	n/a	79%	44.41%	34.48%	29.85%

Source: *U.S. Censuses of Population and Housing 1960. PHC(1)-66 Jacksonville, Fla. SMSA.* Homeownership rate calculated from *Table H-1* (owner-occupied as percent of all housing units).

Jacksonville in Summary

Black voter turnout in Jacksonville followed a general trend of a decrease, at least for the study years. The decrease mirrored an overall decline in voter turnout following the consolidation of Jacksonville and Duval County. Table 6.12 outlines changes in black voter turnout and possible explanations. Black turnout had increased by over five percent between 1963 and 1967, when two black representatives were elected to the old city government following a decades-long

drought of municipal descriptive black representation.

Turnout among blacks was only 0.2 percent lower, virtually unchanged, in the first mayoral election following consolidation, although overall turnout decreased by about three percent. It is possible that there were effects of the Voting Rights Act that prevented larger changes in participation levels; however, the difference between overall turnout and black turnout was not alarming. Moreover, since turnout did not increase in unconsolidated Tampa during

Table 6.12
Black Turnout Changes and Possible Factors

Time Period	Change	Factors/Notes
1963-1967	+5.2 percent	Two strong black candidates for council positions
1967-1971	-0.2 percent	If any "first blush effect" occurred, there would likely have been a larger decrease
1971-1975	-8.6 percent	Newness of consolidation worn off; possible feelings of loss of voting strength
1975-1979	-3.9 percent	Consistent with overall decrease

the pre- and post- voting rights legislation elections, it is likely that the consolidation and/or other local factors were at play in the changes in Jacksonville turnout.

As in Nashville, the socioeconomic variables examined did not appear to consistently explain variations in turnout among the black electoral districts. There were some apparent correlations between turnout and income, education levels, and tenure, respectively, with tenure showing the strongest possibilities. However, several exceptions make it likely that other factors, such as the strength of a particular race in a district, may have played stronger roles.

CHAPTER VII

LOUISVILLE-JEFFERSON COUNTY BACKGROUND

Over three decades after the last large-scale U.S. city-county consolidation (Indianapolis in 1969-70—see Appendix), a referendum to consolidate Louisville and Jefferson County was successful in 2000 after a long history of efforts to reorganize local government, including two previous failed consolidation referenda. At the time of the consolidation campaign, blacks comprised nearly one-third of the Louisville population, and the support of the black community was considered essential to the passage of the referendum. This chapter chronicles black politics and representation in Louisville prior to consolidation, offers background on local government and the push for consolidation, and provides an overview of post-consolidation black political power and participation.

BLACK POLITICS AND LOUISVILLE GOVERNMENT PRE-CONSOLIDATION

As part of a Civil War border state in which many identified with the South (including slave trade businesses in the 1860s), Louisville, Kentucky had a legacy of segregationist values that was apparent well into the twentieth century (Yater 2001). At the turn of the century, Louisville ranked seventh in the nation in terms of the number of black residents—over 39,000—and blacks comprised over 19 percent of the population. That proportion hovered in the upper and mid-teens until the period between 1960 and 1990, when the city's population of black residents shifted from approximately 18 percent to almost 30 percent. The trend is largely attributable to a white population outflow to suburban areas, while the number of blacks increased slightly in the city (Cummings & Price 1997). By 2000, the black population proportion was nearly one-third. Louisville was historically, and remains today largely segregated residentially, with blacks primarily concentrated in the "West End," (just west of downtown), a few neighborhoods immediately south and southeast of downtown, and an enclave in the somewhat suburban

Newburg area just south of I-264; the segregation index, though, has decreased somewhat from the 1970s to the present.

Kentucky may be considered part of the South as a Civil War border state, but, in contrast to many parts of the South, post-Civil War blacks in Louisville were never denied the right to vote (Braden 2001). However, during the Reconstruction period and well beyond, blacks did not have much political influence in Louisville. In 1917, the NAACP helped black leaders overturn a segregation ordinance and blacks helped Republicans regain political control of the city. Between 1917 and 1931, Republicans relied on the black vote to help maintain their power (Cummings & Price 1997). However, because the Republicans generally did not follow through by supporting blacks once the elections were complete, blacks began to sever ties with the party. Blacks organized the Lincoln Independent Party in the early 1920s, and although the party was unable to get any candidates elected, it elevated the political clout of blacks in the community and was a factor in getting blacks onto the police force and into the fire department (Hudson 2001). In the 1930s, black had "significant political breakthroughs" as "shifting political alliances" encouraged both the Democratic and Republican parties to sponsor black candidates (Yater 2001, p. xxvi). Because Democrats had a black man running for state representative, black votes helped the Democratic slate win the mayor's office after a long stint of Republican control (Yater 2001).

In 1945, Eugene S. Clayton became the first black elected to Louisville's Board of Aldermen. Several others followed, including Louise Reynolds, Lois Morris, and the Rev. W.L. Hodge (Hudson 2001). Beginning in the 1950s, civil rights progress helped pave the way for blacks to increase their political clout. All library branches were desegregated by 1952, and public parks followed shortly thereafter. Schools were integrated without incident in 1956 (Yater 2001). Though there were some high racial tensions in the 1960s and 1970s, including the movement for open housing (an act was passed in 1967), a race riot that erupted in 1968, and the contentious 1975 school busing order as a measure to desegregate schools, blacks continued to make steady political progress. By 1962, there was consistently one black alderman on the 12-member Board of Aldermen. Following the dramatic civil rights progress in the mid-

1960s, with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the number of blacks on the Board of Alderman doubled to two, or 17 percent. By the mid-1970s, blacks comprised one-fourth, and by 1982, one-third of the Board of Aldermen (Cummings & Price 1997).

Consolidated Louisville-Jefferson County is unique by comparison to the other large cities in terms of black political power in that blacks had achieved proportional representation in the city decades before the merger of the two local governments. This feature can be attributed in part to the fact that Louisville's consolidation happened nearly four decades after passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In the early 1980s, when two consolidations were rejected by the public, African-Americans comprised about 28 percent of the city's population and held four of the 12 positions (33 percent) on the city's Board of Aldermen.

Louisville and Jefferson County have a long history of efforts to reform the local government. Most of the efforts focused on city-county consolidation. In the late 1940s, County Commissioner E. P. White urged city-county consolidation and Mayor Leland Taylor said that merger was eventually certain to happen. In the early 1950s, the Kentucky constitution and tax laws were cited as barriers to consolidation. The 1956 Mallon Plan sought to expand Louisville's boundaries by 46 square miles but failed at the polls due to a dual-majority requirement for the suburbs and the city. Another expansion plan, the Morton-Wyatt Plan, failed to clear the Kentucky General Assembly in 1970. When a plan for city-county consolidation endorsed by both the mayor and the county judge-executive was rejected by the Kentucky General Assembly in 1980, the city tried to annex parts of Jefferson County (Vogel 1994).

In 1982, enabling legislation for city-county consolidation passed the General Assembly and was placed on the November ballot. It was defeated by a narrow margin. With a few minor changes, the plan was presented as a referendum again in 1983. It was also defeated due to a dual-majority requirement. In both cases, the city supported consolidation and the county opposed it. However, African-Americans, whose population base was concentrated mostly in the city, clearly opposed merger. Clayton and Hagan (2003) show that of 38 majority-black precincts in 1983, all but one voted against consolidation.

An alliance of blacks in the city's west end and blue-collar whites in Louisville's south end and southwestern Jefferson County was a major factor in the defeat of the 1982 and 1983 merger proposals. Both groups shared concerns about the motives of power elites in the east end and the business community driving the efforts (Vogel 1994; Cummings & Price 1997). The coalition was somewhat ironic in that just a few years prior to this joint effort, the two groups were at odds over the busing issue (Braden 2001). Blacks in particular were opposed to the effort because of fears that they would lose newly-gained political power and influence through population dilution in a merged government. Blacks had organized an influential political action committee, PAC-10, in 1981, and one of its "notable successes" was organizing black voters against the merger efforts (Braden 2001). Black opposition was led by attorney Darryl Owens (who later became a county commissioner) and State Senator Georgia Davis Powers. Both had been members of the Charter Commission that drafted the merger legislation in 1982 (Vogel 1994).

More annexation attempts by the city occurred throughout the early 1980s until Louisville and Jefferson County entered into "The Compact," a 12-year agreement for a moratorium on annexation, shared financial responsibility of several local government agencies, and occupational tax revenue sharing, in 1986 (Vogel 1994). With concern about the longevity of The Compact, local leaders had already begun to look again at restructuring local government in the early 1990s. In 1994, the Jefferson County Governance Project was established, and a citizen task force appointed. The citizen task force made a recommendation against city-county consolidation and proposed a reorganization that transferred more resources and political power to the county. The proposal was not acted upon by the legislature. The Compact was renewed in 1998, but later that year, the state legislative delegation from Jefferson County established the Task Force on Local Government, which consisted of state and municipal officials from Jefferson County and Louisville. By the fall of 1999, city-county consolidation was once again proposed (Savitch and Vogel 2000a).

The health of the economy and economic development and tax base concerns have long been a reason cited for consolidation, but other factors may have been at play.

> It is unclear whether the impetus for local government reorganization in the community really stems from economic development concerns or if concern for

> economic development has become the vehicle to sell local government reorganization. The business community has long favored merger in this community. It is also unclear whether it is really economic development or some other issues that led the mayor and county judge to favor merger or other metropolitan government schemes. The most common explanation provided by both business leaders and the mayor and judge for local government reorganization is that a community must have one common vision and leader and that this is not the case in Louisville and Jefferson County (Vogel 1994, p. 31).

LOCAL PROBLEMS AND THE NEW PUSH FOR CONSOLIDATION

As the end of The Compact between Louisville and Jefferson County had loomed, relatively little effort was placed into consideration of renewing the agreement as compared to a renewed focus on city-county consolidation efforts. It had been renewed in 1998, but city-county consolidation was already on the minds of leaders (Savitch and Vogel 2000a). In 2000, new enabling legislation for city-county consolidation was passed by the Kentucky General Assembly. The original plan was for a special election for the public referendum; however, "pro-merger legislators agreed to change the merger vote from a single-issue special election scheduled in May 2001 to the November 7, 2000 presidential election," a tactic that would result in larger turnout and "limit the amount of time the public would have to debate the merger issue and mount significant opposition to it" (Clayton and Hagan 2003, p. 9).

Prominent local proponents of the 2000 merger referendum, including business leaders, the chamber of commerce, and the major local newspaper, the *Courier-Journal*, were typical of supporters in other city-county consolidation cases. In addition, the mayor, the county judge-executive, the immediate past mayor and county judge-executive, and U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell, a past county judge-executive, also endorsed merger. A sophisticated, well-funded pro-merger campaign called Unity outspent the opposition group, Citizens Organized in Search of Truth (COST) by a large margin, approximately $1.25 million to $70,000 (Clayton and Hagan 2003; Shafer 2000). Strong opponents included County Commissioner Darryl Owens, an African American, as well as the majority of the Board of Aldermen, some police and fire fighter groups, some of the smaller suburban city governments, some neighborhood associations, and a variety of progressive activist groups such as the NAACP and the Kentucky Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression.

Unity supporters argued that merger was desperately needed and predicted a negative future outlook for the Louisville area if the city and county were not consolidated into the City of Greater Louisville. Pro-merger arguments included that merger was necessary to increase efficiency and effectiveness by eliminating duplicate services and lowering the ratio of citizens to legislators in the county by forming many relatively small council districts (Prior to consolidation, Fiscal Court, the county's governing body, was comprised of three county commissioners and the county judge-executive).

Opponents were concerned about issues such as preservation of public service jobs such as police and fire positions, urban service districts, and minority political representation. The issue of minority political representation was particularly notable because none of the proposed districts had been drawn prior to the vote as they had in Nashville and Jacksonville, so black voters had no guarantees. Supporters of merger accused opponents of trying to protect their own jobs and of spreading fear about merger based in "myths." Beginning October 1, 2000, and leading up to the election, the *Courier-Journal* began running daily "Myths About Merger" sections, purporting to debunk the myths, on the editorial pages.

Whereas in the 1982 and 1983 merger attempts, vocal black support was essentially nonexistent, some prominent black leaders did endorse the consolidation in 2000, including Louisville Urban League president Ben Richmond, former deputy mayor and chamber of commerce executive vice president Bill Summers IV, and wealthy entrepreneur Charlie Johnson. Moreover, the *Louisville Defender*, a black community newspaper, surprised many with its endorsement. Blacks in support of consolidation claimed the need to grow rather than stagnate or decline economically was even more important than black political representation. After announcing his support in February, Johnson, however, withdrew his support in June primarily due to concerns about representation (McDonough 2000). The plan called for 26 council districts, of which there would likely be a maximum of five or six majority-black districts, and there were no guarantees of those numbers. Said Johnson,

> "I said I was for merger if all issues could be worked out in a fair and equitable way. I have not seen that the issues have been worked out. We need to get back to the drawing board and work out the details of this so that most people can be satisfied" (McDonough 2000).

The consolidation referendum passed with a dual majority and an overall vote of approximately 54 percent for the consolidation. Clayton and Hagan (2003) note that the margin of support in the county increased significantly between the 1983 and 2000 votes. Most African Americans lived in the city in both of those elections, and a larger proportion of blacks voted against merger in 2000 than did in 1983, an increase of 6.9 percent from 74.8 percent against in 1983 to 81.7 percent against in 2000 (Clayton and Hagan 2003).

POST CONSOLIDATION BLACK POLITICAL POWER AND PARTICIPATION

A unique provision of the merger legislation was that the representative districts were to be drawn not by elected officials, as is generally the case, but by a geography professor at the University of Louisville. Moreover, it also required that the Jefferson County Fiscal Court adopt the plan created by the geographer without making any amendments (Clayton and Hagan 2003). It did, however, allow for public hearings on the plan.

Professor Bill Dakan drafted several versions for public comment before submitting the final version in July 2001. The major point of concern was the number of majority black districts, particularly since the U.S. Department of Justice was investigating whether the merger referendum passed into law violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (McDonough 2001, June 9). The initial plan, introduced in June, included five majority black districts with a sixth minority influence district including both blacks and Hispanics. In early July, other drafts for public comment reduced the number of minority districts to four, increased them to five, and added a sixth in the course of a few days in early July. The final plan included five majority black districts and a sixth minority district comprised of roughly 45 percent African Americans and 6 percent other non-white races (McDonough 2001, July 6).

Blacks were elected to six of 26 council seats following the first metropolitan government election in 2002, a number repeated in the 2006 election. In terms of descriptive representation, this means that blacks continue to exceed proportional representation in local government in Louisville, holding approximately 23 percent of the council seats while comprising roughly 19 percent of Jefferson County's population. In terms of substantive representation, though, power

dynamics may have shifted for blacks. For several decades, blacks have identified strongly with the Democratic Party after the Republican Party shifted away from its party of Lincoln/Civil War era roots. As noted by Clayton and Hagan (2003), prior to consolidation, all 12 members of Louisville's Board of Aldermen were Democrats. The merging of the city and county governments split the power base among parties by incorporating suburbs more likely to vote Republican. In fact, on the first council, Republicans won 11 of the 26 seats (42 percent), a number maintained in the 2006 election.

CHAPTER VIII

LOUISVILLE-JEFFERSON COUNTY DATA AND ANALYSIS

As in Nashville and Jacksonville, race was a major issue in the push for consolidation in Louisville. The black community was divided in its support, with some black business and civic leaders campaigning for the consolidation and others speaking vociferously against it due primarily to concerns about representation. This chapter examines voter turnout in the two elections involving the mayor's race prior to consolidation and two following the consolidation and finds that, contrary to expectations, voter turnout increased over time. Moreover, a brief comparison to unconsolidated Covington is included, along with some possible explanations for changes in participation levels.

Mayoral elections immediately preceding and following the consolidation were held in November 1989, November 1993, November 1998, November 2002, and November 2006. Prior to what would have been a 1997 mayoral election at the end of a third and final four-year term for incumbent mayor Jerry Abramson, there was a state-mandated transition in the election cycle to place local and federal elections on the same cycle. The 1992 constitutional amendment meant that the winner in the 1993 mayoral race would serve a five-year term, with the next mayoral race occurring in 1998 (Goodwin 1993). Because the Jefferson County Board of Elections was unable to locate precinct boundary maps and precinct-level turnout reports for 1989, this study will examine only two elections prior to city-county consolidation, 1993 and 1998. Figure 8.1 depicts a section of the large poster-size 2002 electoral map with Census tracts drawn.

Figure 8.1
2002 Louisville Electoral Boundaries with Hand-drawn Tracts



In 1990, there were 23 Census tracts in Jefferson County with populations over 70 percent black. However, the boundaries of two of those tracts, 113.02 and 128.01, were located entirely or mostly outside of City of Louisville boundaries in Shively and the Newburg neighborhood respectively. In 2000, there were two fewer 70 percent black tracts in Jefferson County, for a total of 21. One of those, 113.02, was located outside the former city boundary in the Newburg area, site of a large subsidized housing development. Table 8.1 lists the majority black tracts.

Table 8.1
Composition of 70% Majority Black Tracts in Louisville-Jefferson County, 1990-2000

Tract	1990 Percent Black	2000 Percent Black
4	81.02%	73.93%
6	88.20%	94.17%
7	95.43%	96.03%
8	97.94%	97.84%
9	94.77%	96.99%
10	97.79%	98.76%
11	98.32%	96.38%
12	93.71%	97.90%
13	99.52%	*
14	99.56%	96.49%
15	95.27%	93.72%
16	90.93%	92.34%
17	99.34%	92.57%
18	98.20%	95.55%
20	93.53%	*
24	95.74%	92.97%
27	96.09%	86.62%
28	92.96%	83.88%
30	91.33%	95.07%
35	73.84%	78.52%
62	73.43%	83.00%
Outside former City boundary		
113.02	84.77%	87.90%
128.01	74.26%	*

Note: Tracts marked with an asterisk (*) denote that a majority black population or the tract was no longer extant.

Over the four mayoral election cycles in Louisville, two occurring pre-consolidation and two post-consolidation, turnout among blacks and turnout among all voters followed the same pattern, although turnout in the majority black tracts remained at levels several percentage points below the overall turnout levels. Tables 2 through 5 offer detailed tract-specific turnout information for 70% majority-minority tracts for each of the years. Figure 8.1 presents a summary of black and overall turnout over the time period.

In 1993, overall local turnout was approximately 41.3 percent. The black turnout rate was less than half that, at 20.14 percent. Turnout in black tracts varied widely, ranging from 6.01 percent to 46.4 percent, although the range low and high seemed to be extreme outliers since half of the tracts had turnout within a few percentage points of the turnout for all black tracts (see

Table 8.2).

Table 8.2
1993 Louisville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts

Tract	Total Voted	1990 Voting Age Population	Tract Level Turnout
4	679	3247	20.91%
6	334	1338	24.99%
7	595	2294	25.94%
8	500	1862	26.85%
9	215	1864	11.51%
10	390	2026	19.25%
11	974	2953	32.98%
12	282	1690	16.66%
13	425	916	46.40%
14	207	1930	10.70%
15	464	2539	18.27%
16	428	2348	18.23%
17	363	1992	6.01%
18	76	1259	20.58%
20	260	1261	15.46%
24	297	1918	21.56%
27	512	2375	28.46%
28	432	1518	6.06%
30	132	2170	29.72%
35	336	1129	11.16%
62	165	1479	17.44%
TOTAL ALL BLACK TRACTS	8076	40107	20.14%

For the 1998 election, overall local turnout was approximately 48.4 percent. The black turnout rate also increased, but continued to lag behind the overall level by nearly 20 percentage points at 29.81 percent. Turnout in black tracts varied widely, ranging from 8.08 percent to 65.72 percent, although the range low and high seemed to be extreme outliers since nearly half of the tracts had turnout within a few percentage points of the turnout for all black tracts (see Table 8.3).

Table 8.3
1998 Louisville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts

Tract	Total Voted	1990 Voting Age Population	Tract Level Turnout
4	1004	3247	30.92%
6	506	1338	37.82%
7	962	2294	41.94%
8	799	1862	42.88%
9	313	1864	16.77%
10	600	2026	29.60%
11	1223	2953	41.42%
12	403	1690	23.85%
13	602	916	65.72%
14	263	1930	13.63%
15	706	2539	27.81%
16	65	2348	28.32%
17	370	1992	18.56%
18	102	1259	8.08%
20	417	1261	33.07%
24	325	1918	16.94%
27	741	2375	31.20%
28	745	1518	49.08%
30	278	2170	12.79%
35	391	1129	34.59%
62	541	1479	36.58%
TOTAL ALL BLACK TRACTS	11956	40107	29.81%

In 2002, the first "metro" election, overall local turnout was approximately 52.5 percent. The black turnout rate increased again, too, yet remained over 17 points behind at 35.29 percent. Turnout in black tracts varied widely, ranging from 12.49 percent to 69.95 percent, although the range low and high seemed to be outliers of sorts since several of the tracts had turnout within a few percentage points of the turnout for all black tracts (see Table 8.4).

In 2006, overall local turnout was approximately 53 percent, virtually unchanged from 2002. The black turnout rate, at 38.34 percent, gained some ground against the overall turnout rate. However, several pieces of missing data for 2006 make comparison difficult. For two-thirds of the 19 Census tracts, turnout information for some of the precincts matching the tracts, according to the available map, was unavailable on the precinct turnout report for 2006. This may mean that the map was an incorrect version or that election data were incomplete. However, the available

Table 8.4
2002 Louisville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts

Tract	Total Voted	2000 Voting Age Population	Tract Level Turnout
4	1382	3621	38.17%
6	503	1002	50.20%
7	812	2176	37.29%
8	1226	1752	69.95%
9	620	1666	37.21%
10	907	1967	46.11%
11	1209	2711	44.60%
12	1147	2248	51.02%
14	282	807	34.94%
15	685	2213	30.95%
16	686	2236	30.68%
17	226	1810	12.49%
18	443	1222	36.25%
24	*	3590	*
27	*	2317	*
28	725	1371	52.88%
30	580	1996	29.06%
35	*	1136	*
62	282	1500	18.80%
TOTAL ALL BLACK TRACTS	13178	37341	35.29%

Note: Asterisk (*) denotes partial missing data/incomplete information.

data for the majority black tracts indicate a continuity of trend, which may lend some credibility to the map.

Over the study period, the trend in voter turnout in the majority black tracts mirrored that of overall local turnout (see Figure 8.1). A nine-percent jump in the black tracts and a seven-percent jump overall occurred between 1993 and 1998, when the election for mayor was on the same ballot as federal offices, which would have been expected; turnout has historically been higher for state and national office elections than for local offices. Moreover, both overall turnout and turnout in the black tracts increased by four to five percentage points between 1998 and the first metro election. Finally, only a minor increase—less than one percent—was seen overall between 2002 and 2006, although the few available data for the black tracts indicates a three-percent gain; that figure may be an artifact of too few cases.

Table 8.5
2006 Louisville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts

Tract	Total Voted	2000 Voting Age Population	Tract Level Turnout
4	1343	3621	37.09%
6	*	1002	*
7	*	2176	*
8	*	1752	*
9	*	1666	*
10	*	1967	*
11	*	2711	*
12	1178	2248	52.40%
14	434	807	53.78%
15	707	2213	31.95%
16	689	2236	30.81%
17	*	1810	*
18	383	1222	31.34%
24	*	3590	*
27	*	2317	*
28	*	1371	*
30	*	1996	*
35	*	1136	*
62	*	1500	*
TOTAL ALL BLACK TRACTS	4734*	12347*	38.34%*

Note: Asterisk (*) denotes partial missing data/incomplete information.

Fifteen of the tracts experienced continued increases in voter turnout over time, although two of the tracts, 13 and 20, didn't exist in 2000 and two more tracts, 27 and 35, only had two years of complete data for comparison, and data on only three cycles were available for six others, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 28. Furthermore, it is also notable that for tracts 12 and 14, the amounts of increase in turnout were much larger than the overall trends, e.g., turnout more than doubled for each between 1998 and 2002.

Although this study is not including the 1989 election, some background context from the 1989 election and overall turnout can inform the analysis of Louisville-Jefferson County. In 1989, the incumbent mayor, Democrat Jerry Abramson was running for re-election to a second term. He was able to run again after a 1986 constitutional amendment that made Abramson "the first mayor in this century who had the right to succeed himself" (McDonough, November 8, 1989). When he had won his first term in 1985, turnout in all of Jefferson County for municipal elections

was 41 percent. Because of a 20 percent decline in the Jefferson County voter rolls and the lack of serious opposition—there was no Republican candidate, only a little-known independent—to the popular Abramson, numbers of voters at the polls were expected to be lower. A large portion of the decline in voter registration was attributed to actions by state and local election officials. State officials purged about 50,000 Jefferson County voters because they had not voted in the prior four years. Local officials dropped another 25,000 after their voter registration cards could not be delivered. The largest decline, however, was among black voters. The number of black registered voters dropped about 25 percent between 1985 and 1989 after sustained growth in the 1970s and early 1980s achieved in part by NAACP voter-registration drive efforts (McDonough November 6, 1989). However, there had been some broad interest in the local race for Jefferson County Judge-Executive, which made news for candidates David Armstrong and John G. Heyburn II each raising and/or spending over a million dollars (McDonough, November 8, 1989). Moreover, there had been a degree of public controversy after the Louisville Board of Aldermen voted to raise their own pay by 40 percent, an unpopular move vetoed by Mayor Abramson (McDonough, November 7, 1989).

The 1993 election would be the last time that Jerry Abramson could run for Louisville mayor. A 1986 constitutional change limited mayors to three terms (Goodwin 1993). Abramson had remained very popular and did not face strong opposition; he defeated the Republican candidate, Tommy Klein, by a margin of greater than four-to-one. Overall turnout was 41.3 percent.

In 1998, the very popular Abramson was unable to run for mayor again, and popular two-term County Judge-Executive David Armstrong decided to run for mayor. Even though polling indicated that it wasn't a tight mayoral race, turnout was expected to be higher than in the previous mayoral contest because it was coinciding with a federal election, with former baseball star Jim Bunning running for U.S. Senate and Congresswoman Anne Northup seeking a second term (Shafer 1998). Overall voter turnout was 48.4 percent.

The 2002 election was the first for the new "metro" government and the second to coincide with a federal election. Former Louisville mayor Jerry Abramson handily won the

Democratic primary and faced only moderate competition from Republican Jack Early, but all 26 council seats were at stake. Overall turnout in the county, which closely mirrors the metropolitan boundary with the exception of some small cities enclosed within, was 52.5 percent, representing a small bump post-consolidation.

In 2006, there was another metro mayor race, this time with Abramson facing tougher competition from popular Republican council member Kelly Downard. Additionally, half of the metro council seats were up for grabs due to the staggered election cycle (13 seats elected every two years) outlined in the metropolitan charter. Countywide turnout was 53 percent.

Figure 8.1



Unconsolidated Covington as a Comparison

The unconsolidated city of Covington, located in northern Kentucky in the Cincinnati, Ohio metropolitan area, might be used as a comparison to consolidated Louisville-Jefferson County as a means of screening for possible voter turnout effects of consolidation. According to the main hypothesis, one might expect that the voting pattern would be different in the two sites, with voting decreasing over time in Louisville's municipal elections and at a minimum decreasing

Table 8.6
Comparison of Turnout Over Time, Louisville

Year	Black Turnout	Overall Turnout
1993	20.14%	41.3%
1998	29.81%	48.4%
2002	35.29%	52.5%
2006	38.34%	53.0%

at a smaller rate in Covington. However, Louisville has shown a small increase in overall voter turnout and slightly larger increase in black voter turnout post-consolidation. In Covington, voter turnout decreased considerably and consistently in the four elections leading up to 2008, with the largest decrease occurring between 1992 and 1996, when turnout dropped twenty points from 75.7 percent to 55.7 percent. Further declines occurred in 2000 (51.4 percent) and again in 2004 (47.7 percent). Jefferson County, Kenton County, and Kentucky each saw an overall decrease over the same time period beginning with a precipitous drop in 1996; however, each gained back some of the losses to end up no more than 10 to 13 percent down over time, compared to the difference of 30 percent in Covington. It could be that lack of strength in local races in Covington translated into lack of voter interest, or it could be a change in demographics in Covington. Figure 8.2 depicts Covington overall voter turnout over time, which follows the opposite trend of Louisville turnout (see Figure 8.1). The fact that Covington's mayoral elections were held concurrently with presidential elections, however, as well as the fact that none of the elections were held in coinciding years, makes comparison to Louisville difficult.

Socioeconomic Factors

As in Jacksonville and Nashville, the wide range in turnout in the black tracts for given election election years in Louisville lends itself to further analysis. It is possible that election-specific

Figure 8.2



factors played a role, such as the race in a particular district, but the fact that lower turnout and higher turnout numbers seem to be concentrated in the same areas over time suggests that voter characteristics might play a role. As hypothesized, socioeconomic differences between the tracts might explain some of the difference in turnout. Initial plans for this dissertation called for exploration of income, poverty levels, educational attainment, age, and housing tenure as contributors to spatial differences in black participation levels. Due to data availability restrictions, however, age has been removed. The Census reports historically have not included median age on a tract basis; rather, population by age groups has been reported. Therefore, only a median age group, with a range of multiple years, could be calculated, and the usefulness thereof was minimal. Moreover, any analysis of the poverty population must be restricted to post-1960s elections, since the concept of a poverty line was established in the 1960s and data were not reported for the 1960 Census. Since age and poverty were not analyzed in the context of elections adjacent to the earlier consolidations, they are also excluded from the analysis of Louisville.

It was hypothesized that as educational attainment increased, voter participation would

increase. Tract level educational attainment data for Louisville were reported differently than the data reported for Nashville and Jacksonville in the 1960s and 1970s. Rather than a median year of schooling, e.g., 10.7, data were grouped into categories of highest level completed, such as less eighth grade, less than high school, some college, etc. For the case of Louisville, turnout by educational attainment is examined in terms of the percent of the population 25 and older that has completed an associate degree or higher. In each of the majority black tracts, educational attainment levels were low, at best slightly over half of the county-wide level. The data are somewhat contrary to expectations. In 1993, for example, higher levels of attainment corresponded with higher turnout levels and lower levels of education with lower turnout levels just about as many times as it didn't, although several in the middle of the education range were also in the middle of the turnout range. The situation was much the same in 1998 and 2002, with data mixed with occasional exceptions/extremes but mostly middling tendencies. Too much information was missing from 2006 for analysis purposes (see Table 8.7). Overall, educational attainment might not explain much of the difference in voting turnout among black tracts.

It was also hypothesized that as income increased, voter turnout would increase. Income was measured in terms of tract median household income as a percentage of area median household income. Although there were some mixed results, in all years, the higher income levels had the higher turnout rates and the lowest were among the lowest (see Table 8.8). It should be noted, however, that the highest incomes did not always equal the highest turnout. In some cases, the top four or five in income were several spaces apart when ranked by turnout percentage. Overall, due to the small number of tracts and the fact that there were multiple exceptions to the expectations, it appears that income may not explain much of the difference among turnout in black tracts.

Tenure status, as measured by the homeownership rate, showed mixed correlations with turnout over the years, although of the three socioeconomic variables being analyzed, there were fewer exceptions to expectations. For example, in 1993, 1998, and 2002, two-thirds of the top

Table 8.7
Comparison of Educational Attainment (median for population 25 and older) and Voter Turnout by Tract, Louisville, 1993-2006

Tract	Percent with associate or higher 1990	Turnout 1993	Turnout 1998	Percent with associate or higher 2000	Turnout 2002	Turnout 2006
4	15.79%	20.91%	30.92%	14.91%	38.17%	37.09%
6	14.05%	24.99%	37.82%	9.23%	50.20%	**
7	6.83%	25.94%	41.94%	12.44%	37.29%	**
8	15.95%	26.85%	42.88%	17.25%	69.95%	**
9	12.39%	11.51%	16.77%	20.66%	37.21%	**
10	8.92%	19.25%	29.60%	9.2%	46.11%	**
11	14.54%	32.98%	41.42%	17.87%	44.60%	**
12	8.87%	16.66%	23.85%	16.11%	51.02%	52.40%
13*	10.74%	46.40%	65.72%	*	*	*
14	4.4%	10.70%	13.63%	13.33%	34.94%	53.78%
15	9.57%	18.27%	27.81%	12.94%	30.95%	31.95%
16	8.78%	18.23%	28.32%	12.26%	30.68%	30.81%
17	5.52%	6.01%	18.56%	11.94%	12.49%	**
18	7.34%	20.58%	8.08%	7.63%	36.25%	31.34%
20*	11.9%	15.46%	33.07%	*	*	*
24	3.4%	21.56%	16.94%	10.11%	**	**
27	6.17%	28.46%	31.20%	7.71%	**	**
28	7.76%	6.06%	49.08%	9.62%	52.88%	**
30	4.01%	29.72%	12.79%	5.52%	29.06%	**
35	2.13%	11.16%	34.59%	3.14%	**	**
62	2.64%	17.44%	36.58%	6.9%	18.80%	**
Jefferson County	24.57%	41.3%	48.4%	30.42%	52.5%	53.0%

Note: Asterisk (*) indicated tract did not exist that year. Double asterisk (**) indicated missing data.

three in terms of tenure were also in the top three in terms of turnout. In 2006, there were too few tracts with complete data for comparison. Again, as with educational attainment and income, there were many in the middle of the range in terms of percent of residents who owned their home that were mixed in terms of expectations, and there were a couple of outliers, such as tracts 15 and 30 (see Table 8.9). Therefore, although tenure appears to have a closer relationship to turnout than income and education, it may not be useful in explaining the difference in turnout among black tracts. It is possible, then, that specific races, i.e., candidates, may have played a role in the turnout levels.

Table 8.8
Comparison of Household Median Income (as percentage of area median income) and Voter Turnout by Tract, Louisville, 1993-2006

Tract	Household Income, % of Area, 1989	Turnout 1993	Turnout 1998	Household Income, % of Area, 1999	Turnout 2002	Turnout 2006
4	89.15%	20.91%	30.92%	66.93%	38.17%	37.09%
6	54.36%	24.99%	37.82%	44.30%	50.20%	**
7	61.85%	25.94%	41.94%	67,63%	37.29%	**
8	99.86%	26.85%	42.88%	73.83%	69.95%	**
9	49.15%	11.51%	16.77%	67.62%	37.21%	**
10	51.47%	19.25%	29.60%	44.02%	46.11%	**
11	73.75%	32.98%	41.42%	60.15%	44.60%	**
12	63.64%	16.66%	23.85%	68.91%	51.02%	52.40%
13*	83.05%	46.40%	65.72%	*	*	*
14	19.70%	10.70%	13.63%	53.28%	34.94%	53.78%
15	57.24%	18.27%	27.81%	55.33%	30.95%	31.95%
16	61.44%	18.23%	28.32%	79.65%	30.68%	30.81%
17	74.82%	6.01%	18.56%	58.08%	12.49%	**
18	36.21%	20.58%	8.08%	35.54%	36.25%	31.34%
20*	41.72%	15.46%	33.07%	*	*	*
24	32.61%	21.56%	16.94%	39.37%	**	**
27	31.30%	28.46%	31.20%	39.41%	**	**
28	44.76%	6.06%	49.08%	60.15%	52.88%	**
30	18.45%	29.72%	12.79%	17.09%	29.06%	**
35	18.45%	11.16%	34.59%	15.42%	**	**
62	23.83%	17.44%	36.58%	32.86%	18.80%	**

Louisville in Summary

Black voter turnout in Louisville increased steadily over the study years. The trend mirrored an overall climb in voter turnout that continued following the consolidation of Louisville and Jefferson County. Table 8.10 outlines changes in black voter turnout and possible explanations. The largest increase in black voter turnout, nearly 10 percent, occurred between 1993 and 1998, when state legislation required the municipal elections to coincide with federal elections cycles. It is not surprising to see higher turnout for higher offices.

Turnout among blacks increased 5.5 percent in the first mayoral election following consolidation, with overall turnout also increasing by over four percent. Overall turnout was nearly level in the next election, although black voter turnout increased again, that time by three

Table 8.9
Comparison of Tenure (homeownership percentage) and Voter Turnout by Tract, Louisville, 1993-2006

Tract	Percent Owned 1990	Turnout 1993	Turnout 1998	Percent Owned 2000	Turnout 2002	Turnout 2006
4	79.81%	20.91%	30.92%	69.45%	38.17%	37.09%
6	56.73%	24.99%	37.82%	51.90%	50.20%	**
7	67.53%	25.94%	41.94%	56.97%	37.29%	**
8	81.24%	26.85%	42.88%	74.24%	69.95%	**
9	53.77%	11.51%	16.77%	53.36%	37.21%	**
10	63.95%	19.25%	29.60%	52.56%	46.11%	**
11	75.20%	32.98%	41.42%	70.36%	44.60%	**
12	72.07%	16.66%	23.85%	71.77%	51.02%	52.40%
13*	77.78%	46.40%	65.72%	*	*	*
14	12.83%	10.70%	13.63%	35.10%	34.94%	53.78%
15	63.55%	18.27%	27.81%	61.57%	30.95%	31.95%
16	68.69%	18.23%	28.32%	59.93%	30.68%	30.81%
17	70.39%	6.01%	18.56%	61.20%	12.49%	**
18	59.19%	20.58%	8.08%	45.48%	36.25%	31.34%
20*	49.21%	15.46%	33.07%	*	*	*
24	38.36%	21.56%	16.94%	29.70%	**	**
27	45.15%	28.46%	31.20%	41.64%	**	**
28	43.51%	6.06%	49.08%	61.22%	52.88%	**
30	2.80%	29.72%	12.79%	0.37%	29.06%	**
35	15.08%	11.16%	34.59%	16.56%%	**	**
62	38.99%	17.44%	36.58%	58.34%	18.80%	**
Jefferson County	64.51%	41.3%	48.4%	64.93%	52.5%	53.0%

percent. It is possible that the first election following consolidation was a first-blush effect related to interest in the new government and voter mobilization generated by the spirited campaign and districting process. If that were the case, it might be expected that future elections would show continued decreases in the level of increase in voter participation and ultimately show decreases in turnout.

Table 8.10
Black Turnout Changes and Possible Factors

Time Period	Change	Factors/Notes
1993-1998	+9.7 percent	Similar trend in overall voting; popular long-serving mayor met term limits, new mayor to be elected
1998-2002	+5.5 percent	Similar trend in overall voting; election coincided with federal election
2002-2006	+3.0 percent	Up slightly more than overall increase; may be related to particular races

As in Nashville and Jacksonville, in terms of the differences in turnout among the black electoral districts, the socioeconomic variables examined did not appear to consistently explain variations. There were some apparent correlations between turnout and income, education levels, and tenure, respectively, with tenure showing the strongest possibilities. However, several exceptions make it likely that other factors, whether socioeconomic or political, such as the strength of a particular race in a district, may have played stronger roles.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

This study examined large-scale metropolitan city-county consolidations in terms of impact of the government reorganization on black voter participation. The primary hypothesis was that black voter turnout in local government elections decreases following large-scale consolidations. Rationale for the hypothesis was that blacks, concentrated in the central city, would perceive dilution of their voting power with the addition of suburban residents to the city voting pool, be discouraged, and therefore not participate.

The hypothesis was tested in three of the four truly large-scale city-county consolidations (Detailed analysis could not be performed for Indianapolis, though data from an existing study indicated a rise in black voter participation that mirrored an overall rise in participation; see APPENDIX B.). Based on the evidence, the data do not support the hypothesis. Table 9.1 outlines the direction of change over the study period in each of the three cities. In only one case, Jacksonville, did black voter turnout experience a notable and consistent post-consolidation decrease.

Table 9.1
Summary: Change in Black Voter Turnout and Support of Hypothesis

City	Change, pre-consolidation to first post-consolidation election	Change, first post-consolidation to second/third post-consolidation election	Hypothesis supported?
Nashville	Increase	Increase	No
Jacksonville	Decrease	Decrease	Yes
Louisville	Increase	Increase	No

Although the data do not appear to support the hypothesis that city-county consolidation negatively impacts black voter turnout, the results of this study do not necessarily indicate that black voters do not perceive a loss of power and change their levels of political participation. A few points should be considered. First, given quality and availability limitations on maps and voter turnout records, as well as the fact that Census and electoral boundaries did not always perfectly coincide, it may be that that data accuracy issues skew actual trends. The types and quality of data available varied among the cities, and in some cases, from year to year in the same city, so some approximations were made. Missing or poor quality data and approximations may have led to errors and inaccuracies or created validity issues. Secondly, decisions in how to operationalize the research may have affected the validity of the study. For example, why choose only elections in which the mayor's race was included? Did the choice to use the election, whether primary or general, or run-off, in which the mayor was elected, mask voter behavior in some way? Finally, comparison of the cities reveals unique circumstances may help explain the differences in outcomes among the sites.

Nashville was the first of the cities to consolidate. It shared many similarities with Jacksonville. First, neither had a black elected to municipal office for most of the first half of the twentieth century, and beyond in the case of the latter. Both cities were reform-minded; annexation either occurred or was a serious threat in both. Moreover, Jacksonville had undergone government reorganization in the early 1950s. Nashville had previously attempted city-county consolidation. Both cities had experienced rapid suburban growth and resulting infrastructure and service provision shortfalls, as well as eroded tax bases in the city. Corruption was cited by merger proponents in both cities, though an actual legal case was made in Jacksonville.

Although Nashville's consolidation occurred prior to national civil rights and voting rights legislation, the study period includes that era. Jacksonville's consolidation occurred in the height of awareness of these issues. Indianapolis's consolidation also happened around the same period, though its situation is unique altogether because the consolidation was not a voter decision; rather it resulted directly from action, considered highly partisan-based, of the state

legislature.

As was the case in Nashville, the black community in Jacksonville was somewhat divided over the consolidation proposal. In Nashville, the two black council members were split among the two black factions in the community, with Looby a proponent and Lillard against it. Similarly, in Jacksonville, Sallye Mathis campaigned for the merger, while Mary Singleton was an outspoken opponent. A key difference between the two cities is that in Jacksonville, the black population was on the verge of becoming a majority. With blacks gaining political power, perhaps the desire to maintain newly-acquired power and potential for more immediate representation (even if it meant a diluted population in the long term) drove blacks to the polls in larger numbers for the first election.

When compared to Louisville's much later consolidation, Nashville does share a few similarities in that both stood to potentially lose black representation if the mergers occurred, though the situation in Louisville was arguably a stronger threat since it was already entirely single-member district-based and black council representation was proportional to population. Blacks in Jacksonville felt it to an extent, too, though they had just elected the first blacks in over five decades months prior to the consolidation; because of "white flight" to the suburbs, blacks were well on their way to comprising half of the city's population, with the potential to elect more black representatives and a black mayor. Even in unique Indianapolis, blacks were concerned about the impending legislative action because the existing system more or less guaranteed one black council member, and they were becoming a larger proportion of the city's population as whites relocated to new suburban developments.

Although Louisville did not share the "crisis" type situations experienced by Jacksonville and Nashville, such as the threat of school disaccreditation or lack of adequate sewer services, there was concern over the looming expiration of The Compact that provided for revenue sharing between the City of Louisville and Jefferson County.

With all the similarities, then, why were the trends in black voter turnout so different for the cities? Turnout in Nashville remained fairly level over time but spiked in 1971. The lack of a decrease between 1962 and 1966 may have been an artifact of voting rights legislation, though

comparative analysis of Memphis indicates that it wasn't a strong factor in municipal turnout. Rather, hot-button issues or individual races may have contributed heavily to the difference. The jump between 1966 and 1971 levels was probably largely attributable to the strong candidacy of a segregationist in the mayoral race run-off.

Jacksonville's political climate was especially unique in that over 90 percent of voters were registered as Democrats, so there were rarely any realistically-contended partisan races/general elections, especially for mayor. The partisan makeup has tended to remain largely-Democrat. The real races were in the primaries and run-offs. Also unlike the other cities, Jacksonville, at over 40 percent black, was on the cusp of becoming majority-black and experienced the highest level of what amounts to minority vote dilution, whether intentional or not; the black proportion of the voting pool was cut by more than half with the consolidation.

Louisville's trend is complicated by the change in election cycles. In the last election prior to consolidation, the municipal election cycle underwent a state-mandated change to coincide with federal elections years. That arguably led to an increase in turnout across the board, as turnout for state and local offices has been shown to generally be higher than for municipal elections. The largest increase was seen between 1993 and 1998, when that change occurred. Still, a slight increase occurred again between 1998 and 2002, when the first "metro" election was held, and again between 2002 and 2006. The trend occurred among all voters as well as among black voters, suggesting that perhaps the increase was a factor of the state and federal races, although there could have been some "first blush" effects of consolidation since the 2002 election was the second to coincide with elections for federal offices.

Although some wide ranges were seen in voter turnout among the black tracts, preliminary analysis of socioeconomic differences yielded mixed results that were sometimes contrary to expectations but mostly across the spectrum. In general, levels of educational attainment, income, and tenure status did not initially appear to explain much of the differences among the areas.

This study contributes to the literature on city-county consolidations by addressing a little-examined topic in the field. Equity for minorities, and minority political participation in particular,

has been one of the major arguments against city-county consolidation, yet few studies have addressed it beyond enumerating the numbers of black elected officials. Three major sets of conclusions can be drawn from the analysis.

First, students of metropolitan government should take away from the analysis that other facets of local politics may be much stronger factors than government structure in terms of the level of voter turnout. A particular "hot button" issue, a scandal, partisan concerns, strength of candidates, or lack thereof, may draw voters or keep them away from the polls.

Secondly, the problems of data availability should impress upon policymakers that detailed election results and election geographies should be a priority for preservation in perpetuity, not disposal after three decades (or only a matter of years in some cases). If physical storage space is an issue, documents may be scanned and stored electronically, which can also help prevent loss in case of deterioration of paper versions.

Thirdly, future research might improve upon this study by extending the study periods for voter turnout by race in consolidated cities. Further analysis could also explore the differences in turnout among black voting districts by examining the particular races in each district for strength of races and interest in candidates and/or conducting survey research on electoral participation of large numbers of individual black voters to be able to conduct rigorous and significant statistical analysis of the relationships between turnout and socioeconomic and other variables. Moreover, more research on voter turnout by race in municipal elections in all types of cities, as opposed to state and local elections, is needed. Finally, future research should include the exploration of other equity concerns beyond electoral representation for minorities in consolidated cities, such as more detailed analysis of the distribution of local resources and services by racial composition of neighborhoods *vis a vis* political representation.

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APPENDIX A

TECHNIQUES FOR MATCHING GEOGRAPHY

Most of the maps utilized for this study—Census or electoral—were not geo-coded to allow more precise comparison and analysis of the overlapping boundary systems. In some cases, available electoral district maps were large scale and clearly marked with street boundaries, which made it relatively easy to compare them to Census tract maps and draw Census boundaries onto the electoral map. This was the case in Jacksonville for all years studied. In other cases, such as some of the years in Nashville for which only small-scale electoral maps were available, a lack of detailed municipal boundaries in the electoral maps made matching them to Census tract geography by "eyeballing" difficult. In those cases, the smaller-scale electoral maps were scanned. Next, using image manipulation software, the electoral map was scaled to match the Census tract map and then added to the Census tract map as an image layer as seen below in Figure A. This type of matching is possible when a common geographic feature and/or municipal boundaries, such as major roads, are marked in both maps. In the case of Nashville, the Cumberland River that snakes along an east-west line just north of downtown, was depicted in both the Census tract map and the metropolitan council district map.



Figure A.

Dual-layer Nashville map showing 1970 Census tract boundaries and council districts

APPENDIX B

INDIANAPOLIS-MARION COUNTY

BACKGROUND

BLACK POLITICS AND INDIANAPOLIS GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO CONSOLIDATION

Prior to consolidation, the separate entities of Indianapolis and Marion County were governed by a mayor-council system with a strong mayor and a county commission respectively (Owen and Willbern 1985). The city generally had a Democrat majority on the nine-member council.

Council members were elected on an at-large, city-wide basis. Each party could nominate six candidates for council. Since blacks comprised over a quarter of the population and could influence election outcomes, both parties typically nominated five white candidates and one black candidate. Each voter was allowed to cast nine votes. All six candidates from the winning party were seated, and the top three from the losing party were also seated. With Democrats in power, it was not uncommon to have one black council member (Pierce 2005).

Unlike prior consolidations in Nashville-Davidson County and Jacksonville-Duval County, and the more recent Louisville-Jefferson County merger, Indianapolis and Marion County consolidated following not a successful public referendum but by an act of the state legislature.

The consolidation was championed by new Republican Mayor Richard Lugar (who later became a prominent U.S. Senator) and passed by a Republican legislature.

> The political setting that ultimately made Unigov's passage possible developed in two stages. First, the power of the Republican Party in Marion County was substantially enhanced by the Republican Action Committee's 1966 party reorganization campaign. This brought a whole company of ambitious and far-sighted newcomers into the party and got many of them elected to city, county, and state offices in the succeeding two years. Mayor Lugar was among them. The second stage was set when a single party got control of all the key instruments of government at both state and local levels in 1968...[P]erhaps the most obvious illustration of the partisan impact on the debate was in the General Assembly. The wholly Republican Marion County delegation was nearly

> unanimous in support, and the large statewide Republican majority assured passage of the Unigov bills (Owen and Willbern 1985, p.101-102).

There had been a "widely held perception by the citizenry that local government was inefficient, ineffective, and unresponsive" according to Stephens and Wikstrom (2000, p. 81). Presumably, this led to the success of Republicans in electing a mayor, Richard Lugar, in 1967, along with a majority of seats on the city council and several county offices. When Republicans also dominated elections for state positions in 1968, a virtual mandate was given for change.

Mayor Lugar formed a Task Force on Governmental Reorganization in the spring of 1968. Forty business and civic leaders were named to the task force, but an executive committee consisting of the city and county council chairmen (both Republicans), Lugar and his deputy mayor, and four others did the bulk of the work and used the larger group as a "sounding board" in four meetings. Two meetings were held with the Marion County legislative delegation and a "blueprint for consolidation" was approved in mid-December (Schreiber, not dated, p.8). Charles Whistler of the executive committee and a group of lawyers assembled under the direction of Lugar drafted a 162-page bill for consolidation that was introduced in the Indiana State Senate on January 21, 1969. The Senate approved an amended bill in February following two public hearings. The House approved the bill on March 5 and the Senate concurred with technical amendments. The "Unigov Act" was signed by the governor on March 13.

Some may consider the reorganization a political power grab. In 1969, Marion County Republican chairman Keith Bulen called it his "greatest coup of all time, moving out there and taking in 85,000 Republicans" (Blomquist and Parks 1995, p. 50; also quoted in Schreiber, not dated). Schreiber (not dated) posits that "Unigov was primarily a political act intended to perpetuate Republican control of Indianapolis city government" (p. 23).

Representation issues

Black leaders in Indianapolis were generally opposed to consolidation on the grounds that it would dilute black political power. Although blacks comprised only about a quarter of the pre-Unigov city population, blacks felt that they had a strong voice and growing power in the dominant Democratic Party in the city. However, there was never a strong black opposition to the

Unigov legislation, just as there was never a highly organized campaign in general against Unigov; only four people from the "black community" spoke against Unigov at legislative public hearings (Owen and Willbern 1985). Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) note that along with Democrats, black leaders, and suburbanites failed to create effective opposition.

> [A] score of Democratic activists opposed the reorganization out of partisan self-interest, perceiving that the reorganization of government would provide the Republicans with a significant advantage in city politics. Second, a number of African-American political leaders opposed the reorganization proposal, concerned that it would dilute the political power of their community and effectively preclude, at least in the short term, the election of an African-American mayor. And, third, many suburbanites who had recently departed from the city negatively viewed the plan because it would once again make them city residents. The strength of these forces opposed to reorganization, however, dissipated over time, due to internal divisions (Stephens and Wikstrom 2000, p. 82).

Frank Lloyd, a well-known black doctor and influential Democrat in the 1960s, commented that blacks lacked organized leadership in general and were divided on Unigov (Pierce 2005; Owen & Willbern 1995).

POST CONSOLIDATION BLACK POLITICAL POWER AND PARTICIPATION

The bill was passed by the state legislature and signed in March 1969, and the new consolidated government took effect on January 1, 1970 (Stephens and Wikstrom 2000).

Consolidated Indianapolis-Marion County had a 29-member council, with 25 seats elected from single-member districts and four members elected at-large. In theory, the new political structure would give black voters a chance to elect more than one black council member, as had been the norm under the old system. Pierce (2005, p. 122) notes that the "percentage of black candidates seated on the county council has increased," though most have been Democrats on a Republican-dominated council.

In terms of political power and participation, Blomquist and Parks (1995) claim that

> What may be Unigov's clearest and longest lasting impact on central-city residents is that the consolidation solidified Republican party control of city government, which had been controlled most often by the Democratic party during the two decades before Unigov. Politically, the Republican-dominated county took over the marginally Democratic city (Blomquist and Parks 1995, p. 50).

Blomquist and Parks (1995) find that the first two elections following Unigov saw increased voter turnout in general but that participation began decreasing considerably thereafter. Participation in local elections had climbed from a low of 41.1 percent in 1959 to 45.2 percent in 1967, when Lugar was elected, then grew to 53.8 percent in 1971. It remained fairly steady in 1975 at 52.4 percent, but had fallen to 33.6 percent just four years later in 1979. Blomquist and Parks attribute the drop-off to the "message that Democrats could not win under Unigov" that was conveyed in 1975 when Democratic candidate Robert Welch lost to Republican William Hudnut despite carrying the pre-consolidation city.

> Turnout in the 1979 municipal elections, and in all municipal elections since, indicates that central-city Democratic voters have adjusted their behavior accordingly. In 1979, 60,000 fewer Marion County residents voted in the mayor's race than had done so in 1975. Yet Hudnut's 1979 vote total was almost identical to that of 1975. In other words, between 1975 and 1979, 60,000 potential Democratic votes disappeared from Indianapolis'[s] municipal elections...Most of that loss occurred in the precincts of the old central city. These voters did not leave the city, nor did many of them leave the voter registration rolls. Most of them continued to vote in state and national elections. (Blomquist and Parks 1995, p. 52).

BLACK POLITICAL PARTICIPATION DATA & ANALYSIS

Data and availability issues

The new metropolitan government took effect in 1970, with the first election for metropolitan officials taking place in November 1971. For consideration in this study, mayoral elections relatively immediately prior to and following the consolidation approval were held in Indianapolis in 1963, 1967, 1971, and 1975.

In 1960, 19 Census tracts in Indianapolis were greater than 50 percent black. Of these, 14 tracts had a black population above 70 percent. There were 35 Census tracts that were over 50 percent black in 1970, 27 of which had a black population over 70 percent.

Although there were no Census tract geographic boundary changes between the 1960 and 1970 Census, the population demographics within the tracts and Marion County appear to have changed considerably. All but one of the 1960 majority black tracts were located within the Center Township, which was also the location of all but three of the 1970 majority black tracts. Center Township, representing the city center and central business district areas and the bulk of

the pre-consolidation Indianapolis boundary, experienced a large overall population decline between 1960 and 1970 of nearly 18 percent, losing nearly 60,000 people in a drop from 333,351 to 273,596. Simultaneously, the black population in Center Township increased by over 18.6 percent, from 89,439 to 106,124, a gain of 16,685 blacks. Together, these two trends brought the black population portion of the central city from 26.83 percent to 38.79 percent.[19]

Stickles (1973) studied black voter participation in the pre-consolidation Indianapolis city in six elections between 1966 and 1972, including the mayoral elections in 1967 and 1971. Grouping precincts into Black (75 percent or greater black), Mixed (25-74 percent black), or White (0-24 percent black), Stickles found that voter participation increased for all categories between 1967 and 1971 (pre- and post-consolidation). Turnout in "black" precincts increased by 10 percentage points, from 45.47 to 55.66 percent. Participation in "white" precincts increased by 12 percent, from 52.46 to 64.57 percent. Differences between the races were much smaller when socioeconomic status in terms of income group and education level was controlled (Stickles 1973).

Although turnout increased for both racial groups, it should be noted that not only did the white turnout percentage increase by more than the black turnout, but the gap between white and black turnout increased from about seven percent to about nine percent.

Unfortunately, complete precinct level data on registration, turnout, and precinct maps that Stickles obtained from the "city-county building in Indianapolis" are no longer available from local or state government sources. An exhaustive effort was made to locate data and maps, with government offices, university sources, newspaper archives, and other sources consulted. The Marion County Election Commission did not house detailed municipal election data prior to the 1980s. The Indiana State Board of Elections and Indiana State Library held only county level figures. Some historical precinct level results were available at the Indiana State Archives, though not for municipal elections. The *Indianapolis Star* newspaper reported precinct level results for some years, by ward only for others, and summaries by race for at least one other.

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[19] Calculations based on data reported in: Department of Metropolitan Development Division of Planning (1984, August). *A decennial statistical profile of Indianapolis-Marion County: 1960, 1970, 1980.* Indianapolis-Marion County, Indiana.

Precinct maps from 1980, but not prior, were also available at the Indiana State Archives. None of the government election data sources had any precinct maps from the 1960s or 1970s. Stan Huseland, an *Indianapolis Star* reporter in the consolidation era and author of a book on Republican boss Keith Bulen, recommended checking with the Indianapolis Historical Society and the archives at University of Indianapolis, where Bulen and Lugar archives are held (Huseland interview, October 27, 2008). Those sources did not have the missing data or maps available. A large collection of Indianapolis government data donated to the historical society by historian George Geib was unavailable to the public at the time of request. Material was also unavailable from the Marion County Democratic and Republican parties. Bredensteiner Imaging, a local print shop in downtown Indianapolis, has large-scale 1971 and 1975 precinct maps, though they are mounted on retractable, pull-down rolls and can only be reproduced without damage by photograph.

The lack of available data would require alternative sources and measures to be employed for analysis of black voter turnout over the 1963-1975 period. In theory, city wards could be used as an approximation. Prior to consolidation, the city of Indianapolis consisted of 32 wards, each containing multiple precincts. Election registration and turnout data in Marion County continued to be reported by wards following consolidation, at least for the study years. *Indianapolis Star* newspaper archives report turnout by ward, and sometimes precinct, for some of the mayoral elections prior to and following consolidation. Since precinct maps are unavailable for the purposes of this study, wards are the smallest municipal geographic area that may be matched to census tracts for voting turnout analysis. However, the wards are larger than census tracts, each containing multiple tracts. Moreover, many of the tracts are split between wards. These two complications together, make any further meaningful analysis of black voter turnout in Indianapolis nearly impossible.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Name: Angela Stallings Hagan

Address: 1306 S. Sixth St.
Louisville, KY 40208

Education:

(2009). University of Louisville, Ph.D. Department of Urban & Public Affairs, concentration in Public Policy and Administration. Dissertation topic, "Race and city-county consolidation: black voting participation and municipal elections."

(1998). University of Louisville, MPA, Public Policy, with Distinction. Title of Thesis, "Lone parenthood, poverty, and welfare policy convergence in the United States and Great Britain."

(1997). University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, B.A. *cum laude* with High Distinction, Economics.

Awards:

2006. Byran T. Jackson Dissertation Research Award, Urban Politics Section of the American Political Science Association.

(2000-2002). University of Louisville, University Fellow in Graduate School.

(1997-1998). University of Louisville, Graduate Research Assistantship, Department of Urban & Public Affairs.

Publications:

Refereed Journals

(Winter 2003, Vol. 9(2). Dewey M. Clayton, Angela Stallings Hagan, "Consolidated Urban Government and Black Electoral Representation" in *Journal of Public Management and Social Policy*
(March 2000). Dewey M. Clayton, Angela M. Stallings, "Black Women in Congress: Striking the Balance" in *Journal of Black Studies.*

Regional

(May 2004). Steven C. Bourassa, Gerard (Rod) Barber, Angela Stallings Hagan, Eric Schneider, and Elizabeth M. Shiels, *Kentucky Housing Needs Assessment: Phase II.* University of Louisville Urban Studies Institute/Kentucky Housing Corporation, on contract for the Kentucky Housing Corporation.

(October 2001). Steven C. Bourassa, Angela Stallings Hagan, Eric Schneider, *Kentucky Housing Needs Assessment: Phase I.* University of Louisville Urban Studies Institute/Kentucky Housing Corporation, on contract for the Kentucky Housing Corporation.

(February 2000). Angela M. Stallings, "Housing Affordability: It's All Relative," for the Metropolitan Housing Coalition, Louisville, Kentucky.

(October 1999). Angela M. Stallings, "A House Divided: Residential Segregation in Metropolitan Louisville*," for the Metropolitan Housing Coalition, Louisville, Kentucky. *Addendum released April 2000.