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May 7 1931
HNS*

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE

GENERAL ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 1903-1908

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty
Of the Graduate School
Of the University of Louisville
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
Of Master of Arts

Department of History

By

Catherine Archer Little

1930

EVS.

20 Aug '30

GENERAL ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 1903-1908

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CHAPTER I

PREVIOUS ANTAGONISMS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND RUSSIA

GENERAL ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 1903-1908

CHAPTER I

PREVIOUS ANTAGONISMS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND RUSSIA

Great Britain has proved herself sufficient to counteract Russia in her Balkan enterprises on more than one occasion. In mentioning the War for Greek Independence, we must remember that political aspirations of the Tsars and a series of wars had made the Russians and the Turks traditional enemies and that Great Britain entered the war in order that Russia might not unduly profit at the expense of the Turks. In 1841, Great Britain was in a great way responsible for the Treaty of the Straits which closed the Dardanelles in time of war. In 1853, Turkey and Russia again went to war, and the following year Great Britain and France formally joined Turkey, Sardinia joining the Allies in 1855. They met with rather unexpected resistance, and it was not until 1856 that Russia was forced to submit. At the meeting of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the Tsar, quite naturally, was afraid that a congress of such jealous diplomats would re-examine and reconstruct the very satisfactory treaty of San Stefano,

so as to rob him of the spoils of conquest. Lord Beaconsfield, by threatening Russia with war, succeeded in persuading the reluctant Tsar to submit the entire question to the conference, and he had the good fortune to turn the tables to the interests of Great Britain and Austria-Hungary.

After the negotiations of 1878, Great Britain began to realize that the expansion of Russia in the Balkans was not a weighty hindrance to Great Britain and her interests there, which were being effaced by rising conflicts between Austria and Russia in the struggle of forces of Pan-Slavism against Pan-Germanism.¹ The chief argument of the Conservatives under Disraeli had been that Constantinople was the important bulwark of the Suez Canal and the protector of the routes into Asia Minor, Egypt and the Indian Empire. These fears had been greatly exaggerated throughout the Conservative regime, for Russia was too weak internally for such an enterprise, and such aggressive plans would have frightened even Russia herself.² In 1880, Disraeli, with his ideals and

¹ Charles Seymour. The Diplomatic Background of the War 1870-1914, p. 197.

² S. A. Korff. Russia's Foreign Relations During the Last Half Century, p. 29.

policies, was annihilated and the Liberals headed by Gladstone came into power. Gladstone never feared Russia as Disraeli had, and his antipathies were adverse to those of his Conservative opponent. He hated Turkey and praised Russia for her defense of Pan-Slavism. After the Congress of 1878, England was working to weaken the Turkish Empire without unnecessarily increasing the Russian influence there.

It was in Bulgaria that England, with the assistance of Austria, challenged Russian aspirations. The Bulgars were obsessed by a keen spirit of nationalistic patriotism and their proud and independent attitude caused Russia to adopt a decidedly unfriendly attitude. Prince Alexander, by refusing to be the tool of the Tsar, found himself opposed and checkmated by Russia in public and private affairs, and finally in 1886, he was forced to abdicate the throne. Russia showed much open hostility toward the Bulgarian peoples, but the latter were successful in holding their own by grasping the support they received from Austria and England. This did not help to create a friendlier feeling between the great Slav power and Great Britain. Germany welcomed this growing amity of her ally and England with enthusiasm, mainly to counterbalance Russia, and she urged Austria on so

that German prestige was ruined with the former
¹
 country.

The interests of all the great Powers in the Eastern question was recognized by Central Europe. Certain of the European states desired that the Ottoman power not be entirely destroyed but weakened instead, while others desired that it be reaffirmed. To each and every power it has been a matter of vital importance that the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles not be held by one strong power. The Russians had to consider that Great Britain would never consent to their control and occupation of Constantinople in addition to Russia having the Persian capitol, Tehera, within her sphere of influence. It seems they had no doubt as to this,² though to secure Byzantium for herself had been the dream of Russia since the days of Peter the Great and Catherine II.

The Russians have displayed much sentiment in claiming Constantinople as the source from which Russian civilization was derived; and when one studies Russia's position geographically and economically, one feels she was justified in all her

¹
 Korff. op. cit. p. 32.

²
 B. Siebert - G. A. Schreiner. Introduction to
Entent Diplomacy and the World. p. xxiii.

endeavors to gain control within the confines of her southern neighbor. Strategically, the control of the Dardanelles would give her absolute mastery of the northeastern part of the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea would thus be transformed into a Russian lake, from which her battleships might emerge freely and fully equipped for battle, and to which they might retreat in time of dire distress. Economically, the Russian control of the Straits would give a self-protected outlet for her food and grain-stuffs which she exports from Odessa. Russia has become the "granary of Europe," and if the Straits were to be closed to her, it would mean an economic paralysis to a most important part of the Russian Empire.¹

Another important factor has to be considered if we are to believe that Russia was extremely desirous of winning Constantinople. Although Mother Nature has been extraordinarily good to her in many respects, she has laid a heavy handicap upon her in another. Russia has no ice-free port on an open sea which can be utilized the whole year round. This mighty Empire needed and was ever seeking an outlet to a sea that did not freeze. By far the largest part of the world's commerce is sea-borne; the

¹
Seymour. p. 198.

oceans are the great highways of commerce.¹ With a very few exceptions, every nation, no matter how great or how small, has its own individual ports on this great thoroughfare. But Russia, with the most extensive territory and an enormous population, had no outlet under her own control; not one where she could keep a fleet that would not be frozen up in the winter.² Russia has been thwarted in all her efforts to reach the ocean waterways for she has always found herself blocked. It was in vain that Peter the Great moved his capitol from Moscow to the Baltic, for the latter has been closed by the rise of Germany. She was barred by England under Disraeli in the Near East from access to the Mediterranean. The British Alliance with Japan had deprived Russia of the outlet of Port Arthur in the Far East and her only hope of ever gaining access to the Pacific, except on an ice-bound coast has been cut off by Japan. Her ambitions in the Persian Gulf were sacrificed to Great Britain by the treaty of 1907. For all these failures, Russia felt that one success would atone; the winning of control over the Dardanelles.³

¹ Sir Edward Grey. Twenty-Five Years. Vol. 1, p. 54

² Ibid.

³ Seymour. p. 199.

As Count Kapnist remarked in May, 1897: "Russia needs this gatekeeper (portier) in Turkish clothes for the Dardanelles, which under no circumstances ought to be opened. The Black Sea is a Russian mare ¹clausum."

Thus we see that for Russia, the extension of her influence in the Near East has, in recent years, become more important. On the other hand, Great Britain has given up her fear of Russia in the last twenty-five years with a most kindly complaisance. Before she had purchased the controlling interests in the Suez Canal, Great Britain felt that Russian control of the Balkans and the Straits would hinder her route to India. When she established a practical protectorate over Egypt a few years later, she began to think her path was safe. Egypt is "the key to the East," and just as long as British influence was assured there, Russian power in the Near East might be regarded with little indifference. ²As the century came to a close, Germany began to come into the lime-light as a more dangerous rival than Russia, and the great statesmen of England believed that the advance of the Great Central Power in the Near East

¹
Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914. Vol. XII, p. 285.

²
Seymour. p. 199.

could best be met by encouraging, and at least not discouraging, the claims of Russia.

When Russia found herself blocked in the Near East, she turned to the Central East for a possible outlet to the sea. This movement was regarded with consternation by British India, for they thought surely that the enterprising Tsar would turn in descent upon India and gain absolute control of the Persian Gulf. It was in the 1860's that the armies of Russia took possession of Bokhara and established themselves upon the borders of Afghanistan. Russian threats became more pointed during the next ten years. The Russian army was marching towards the frontier, and two plans had been drawn up by General Skobelef for the invasion of India. Russia was distracted by much local trouble and her determination wavered. The following year, a British expedition under Roberts entered Afghanistan and restored much of the former British influence. Although Russia declared she would not interfere with British interests and her special position in Afghanistan, the leading statesmen still felt that the presence of Russian merchants there was an indication that the danger was not over yet. Until the early part of the twentieth century, the Russian plots and intrigues in this district were still maintaining the atmosphere of enmity between the two nations.

In 1905, Mr. Balfour, in his speech of May 11 on Imperial Defence, identified the "problem of the British Army" with the defence of Afghanistan. Russia, he declared, was making steady progress toward Afghanistan, and railways were under construction which could only be strategic. War was improbable, but these factors altered the position. India could not be taken by surprise and assault. A war on the North-West Frontier would be chiefly a problem of transport and supply. England must therefore allow nothing to be done to facilitate transport. Any attempt to make a railway in Afghanistan in connection with the Russian strategic railways should be regarded as an act of direct aggression against England. Mr. Balfour continues: "I have, however, not the smallest grounds to believe that Russia intends to build such a railway. If ever attempted, it would be the heaviest conceivable blow at our Indian Empire. As long as we say resolutely that railways in Afghanistan should only be made in time of war, we can make India absolutely secure. But if we, through blindness or cowardice, permit the slow absorption of the country, if the strategic railways are allowed to creep close to our frontier, we shall have to maintain a much larger army."¹

¹ Quoted. Gooch, History of Modern Europe, p. 374.

It was Persia that was the real danger point between the two nations. The Persian Government was very inefficient, their finances were in a deplorable condition, and internal disorders pervaded. For these reasons Persia was not only open to foreign interference, but she positively invited and attracted it. Here Russia carried on a successful financial and commercial development which did not tend to take away any of the British fears or jealousy of the influence which Russia exercised in the Central East. Teheran, in the northern part of Persia, was the capital and the seat of the Central Government; it was within easy striking distance from Russia, while it was quite out of British reach. Through the skill of Russian financiers, the Russian Loan Bank became the sole creditor of Persia, which placed Russia on quite a sound foundation for political advantages.¹ Russian advances toward the border of India were very sensitive and dangerous points to the British. It seems that Russia's design was not decided because of the power of her own momentum and by the internal weakness of Persia.² The consistent policy of Russia

¹ G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley. British Documents On the Origins of the War 1898-1915. Vol. IV, No. 321 (a), p. 367.

² Grey. Vol. I, p. 148.

in Persia has been gradually and imperceptibly to establish a "veiled protectorate" by subjugating it commercially and financially; isolating it as far as possible from all contact with foreign influences; appropriating its revenues as the security for political loans; preventing it from progressing or developing its resources, except through Russian agencies; and then, having reduced the Shah to a state of complete vassalage and impotence, to rule through him and in his name, by means of authoritative Russian advisers, from the Caspian Sea to the Gulf and from the Turkish to the Indian frontiers.¹ The British policy in Persia was constantly in direct opposition to Russia. She wished to keep Persia as a buffer state rather than a direct policy of colonization. On May 15, 1903, Lord Lansdowne stated in the House of Lords that the British policy in the Persian Gulf was to protect and promote British trade in those waters, and while her efforts were not directed towards the exclusion of the legitimate trade of other Powers, she "should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other power as a very grave menace to

¹
Cit. G. & T., Vol. IV, p. 371. (Parl. Deb., 4th Ser., Vol. 121, p. 1348).

British interests, and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal."¹

The Government of Persia realized that the only hope for recovery lay in maintaining and aggravating bad relations between Great Britain and Russia, and the atmosphere at Teheran was one of distrust and dislike. The diplomats of both countries realized that it was necessary to reach some sort of agreement, for they had come very often to the verge of war because of their mutual misunderstanding. Russia was France's ally; Great Britain had a policy of agreement with France, and a policy of counter-alliances against Russia. There was no third power near the Indian frontier to aid England in the oppression and control of Russian advance. Thus it seems that some sort of agreement with Russia would be the natural and necessary complement of the British agreement with France.² Such was the situation, and it was evident that nothing less than a cordial agreement could prevent it from getting worse. "Unless the mists of suspicion were dissolved by the warm air of friendship, the increasing friction would cause Britain and Russia to drift toward war."³

¹ Sir A. W. Ward and Gooch, The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. III, pp. 320-321.

² Grey. Vol. I, p. 141.

³ Ibid. Vol. I, p. 149.

In Thibet, the territorial aspirations of the two countries clashed. Aggression and unneighbourly conduct on the part of the Thibetan peoples were the immediate causes of the Convention signed at Calcutta on March 17, 1890, by Great Britain and China; but the relations between the Government of India and that of Thibet were in no way improved by this convention. Trade was impeded, letters from the Viceroy were unanswered, and Russian intrigues were suspected. In a dispatch dated January 8, 1903, the Government of India argued that British interests were "seriously imperilled by the absolute breakdown of the Treaty arrangements hitherto made through the medium of China, by the obstructive inertia of the Thibetans themselves, and still more by the arrangements freshly concluded with another Great Power to our detriment."¹ India urged an expedition to Lhasa and the appointment of a British resident there. The Younghusband Mission crossed the frontier and marched into Lhasa on August 3, 1904. A month later, on September 7, Thibet signed an agreement agreeing to observe the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, to erect boundary pillars, to open trade marts in three places, to maintain an agent at each of the places, Gyantse, Gartok, and Yatung, to

¹ Op. cit. G. & T., Vol. IV. (Ed. Note), p. 305.

forward communications, to keep open the roads leading to them, and to raze all forts on the routes to the capitol. The ninth and last article was aimed at the Russian menace:

The Government of Thibet engages that without the previous consent of the British Government,-

- (a). no portion of Thibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any Foreign Power;
- (b). no such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Thibetan affairs;
- (c). no Representatives or Agents of any Foreign Power shall be admitted to Thibet;
- (d). no concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any Foreign Power, or the subject of any Foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government;
- (e). no Thibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or

assigned to any Foreign Power, or the subject of any Foreign Power.

Younghusband thus secured all his political and economic requirements, and he acquiesced in Article VI that the indemnity which was fixed at £ five hundred thousand be payed in seventy-five annual instalments.

This change necessitated that Great Britain shall continue to occupy the Chumbi valley until the indemnity shall be paid.¹ Russia viewed the Convention very unfavorably as she had the Younghusband Mission, but she was too weakened by war in Manchuria to offer any serious resistance.² In this way we see how the Russian menace on the northern part of the glacis was warded off, and further negotiations between Great Britain and Russia were interrupted by the advent of war between Japan and Russia. It was not until 1906, that further conciliatory negotiations were begun.

Russian and British ambitions clashed so directly in the Far East that at the end of the nineteenth century the rivalry was of such intensity as to make the danger of open conflict imminent. Russian history in the Far East goes back to the seventeenth century, when in her first expansion to the Pacific sea-board, she

¹ G. & T. Treaty Text. pp. 314-317.

² G. & T. Vol. IV, pp. 319-320.

founded the town of Okhotsk. Into the vast territory which Russia thus claimed, poured roving bands of Cossack frontiersmen, gold-seekers, fur-hunters, traders, political out-laws and discontented serfs. Siberia, they discovered, was not a land of "milk and honey." The north was an inhospitable expanse of marches, frozen in winter; forests of central Siberia might delight the hunter but not the farmer; and while in the south farming was possible, extreme heat in summer and biting cold in winter made life unpleasant. Nor was the Russian desire for a Pacific port satisfied with Okhotsk, ice-bound in winter. Hoping to discover more fertile farm-lands and seeking for a better sea-port, Russian explorers, adventurers, and settlers began in the seventeenth century to invade the valley of the Amur River, in northern Manchuria, which was then held by the emperor of China. Russia did not begin her attack on the integrity of China until the middle of the nineteenth century, when, in pursuit of an ice-free port, she began to extend her possessions southward. In 1860 Russia established the naval base of Vladivostok at the southern end of a strip of land known as the Maritime Province, which had been acquired from China. But Vladivostok is not an ice-free harbour and Russia

looked still further south for further accessions of territory. Even before the close of the nineteenth century, Russian merchants had begun to settle in the cities of Chinese Manchuria. After 1895, when Russia intervened to keep Japan out of southern Manchuria, it appeared inevitable that Manchuria, with its naval base at Port Arthur, and possibly Korea also, would ultimately fall under Russian domination. Japan, however, by the War of 1904-1905, forced the Russians to renounce Port Arthur and Korea.

Great Britain first became interested in the Far East in 1842. Up to that time, China had maintained her isolation from the rest of the world. Foreigners were prohibited from trading in all ports except Canton, and here the restrictions were so rigid that no country was able to carry on a regular commerce. No foreign ambassadors or consuls were allowed to reside in China. But the time came when the Chinese Government found itself powerless to prevent European merchants from trafficking in Chinese ports, Christian missionaries from preaching their gospel, and foreign capitalists from building railways, opening mines, and erecting factories within China. In 1840 this wall between the ancient oriental world and the modern world was broken down in the so-called Opium War which was

waged by Great Britain against China. It grew out of a quarrel between the Chinese Government, which had prohibited the importation of opium, and the British traders at Canton, who insisted on smuggling opium from India to China. In June, 1840, a British fleet attacked the Chinese coast and captured the cities of Canton, Amoy, Ningpo, Shanghai, and Chin-Kiang. Finally the emperor was compelled to sign the treaty of Nanking (1842), whereby the four ports of Amoy, Ningpo, Foochow, and Shanghai, in addition to Canton, were thrown open to foreign traders. Great Britain also secured the island of Hongkong.

During the next twenty years Great Britain acquired many other privileges, including the right to maintain British consuls in the ports designated by the treaty, and a rapid increase was made in her Far Eastern trade and her influence on the Pacific grew proportionally. Great Britain's victory was rapidly shared by traders from other nations, and Chinese trade grew by leaps and bounds. Great Britain remained the predominant power in the Far East, on the one hand because of her possession of Hongkong, which had become the most important naval and commercial base on the Pacific coast, and on the other hand because of her innate initiative and activity.

Meanwhile the progressive little island empire of Japan was beginning to claim a share in the spoliation of the Chinese Empire. Japan's policy of isolation, to which she had long adhered, was broken down as a result of Commodore Perry's visit in 1854, when he brought them the wonderful inventions of Western civilization. Japan soon entered into negotiations with foreign nations. Japan became a modern power within two decades, whose material efficiency was proven by her victories over China in 1894 and over Russia in 1904-05.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, by continual interference in Korean affairs, the Japanese embroiled China in a series of quarrels. Finally, when China sent troops to Korea at the invitation of the King, and reasserted her claims to suzerainty over the kingdom, a body of Japanese soldiers seized the king and prepared for war with China (1894). The war, known to history as the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, was simply a succession of catastrophies for the over-confident China. The triumphant Japanese forces were ready to advance on Peking when peace was made by the treaty of Shimonoseki, 17 April, 1895. In addition to a war indemnity of \$157,940,000, Japan obtained from China the title to the island of Formosa

and to the Liao-tung peninsula, including the coveted naval base of Port Arthur, and important commercial concessions. Wei-hai-wei, moreover, was to be held by Japan until the treaty stipulations had been faithfully executed. China renounced all claim to the Kingdom of Korea, which now gradually passed under the tutelage of Japan.

Japan's gains were grievous to Russia, and she was not long allowed to enjoy the fruits of her victory. For Russian expansionists had hoped eventually to annex Manchuria, Korea, and Port Arthur, in this way, giving to Russia an ice-free outlet in the Far East and predominance in northern Asia. To this ambition the treaty of Shimonoseki spelled defeat. The Russian government, therefore, resolved to tear up the obnoxious treaty. It was not difficult to gain the cooperation of Germany and France, and all acting together, they invoked the principle of Chinese integrity, and forced Japan to surrender her conquests on the mainland. Japan swallowed her disappointment, yielded to their demands, and renounced the acquisition of the Liao-tung peninsula and Port Arthur. But the Japanese were furiously disappointed, and they long remembered who had cheated Japan of the fruits of victory.

The whole affair was a European intrigue for intervention in the Far East. Russia profited most from

the coup. Russian influence became all powerful in Peking; and Russian capitalists loaned China \$80,000,000. Russia secured the right to carry her trans-Siberian railway across Chinese Manchuria to Vladivostok,--- a right which practically gave Manchuria into Russia's hands, since Russian infantry and cavalry would accompany the railway into Manchuria. Furthermore, Russia obtained a lease (1898) of Port Arthur and the neighboring harbor of Talien-wan, which were immediately linked up by railway with the trans-Siberian system. The telegraph lines of Korea were likewise connected with the Siberian lines. It is rather obvious that Russia once more regarded Manchuria, Korea, and the Liao-tung peninsula as her "sphere of influence." The Germans in 1897 seized the bay of Kiao-Chau in the province of Shan-tung, with the flimsy excuse that only in this manner could Germany obtain satisfaction for the murder of two German missionaries in China. The real intention of the Germans became clear, however, when they extorted a ninety-nine year lease of Kiao-chau and began to fortify the place as a base for German power in the province of Shan-tung.

The steady advance of Russia in the Far East had been the cause of much anxiety to the British Statesmen, and they realized that their supremacy in the Far

East was threatened.¹ Much of the northern Chinese trade was falling into Russian hands, and in the meantime Russia had been increasing her military hold on Manchuria. It looked as though Russia might annex Manchuria, and Great Britain knew that this meant the closing of Manchuria to British trade.

It was just at this time that Great Britain was very occupied in South Africa with the Boer War, and she realized that she needed an ally very badly in the Far East. Japan, like Great Britain, was beginning to feel the effects of absolute isolation. Negotiations were carried on in London by Lord Lansdowne and Baron Hayashi, the Japanese Ambassador, and in January, 1902,² a treaty was signed for five years. The two governments recognized the independence of China and Korea; but they authorized each other to safeguard their special interests by intervention if threatened either by the aggression of another Power or by internal disturbances. If either power in defence of such interests, became involved in war, the other would maintain strict neutrality. If, however, either were to be at

¹ G. & T. Vol. II. pp. 89-91.

² G. & T. Vol. II. pp. 89-137, (diplomatic negotiations and correspondence covering entire making of the treaty).

war with two Powers, its partner would come to its¹ assistance.

The Anglo-Japanese treaty did not stipulate that Great Britain should assist Japan in a war against Russia, but it naturally resulted in an increase of animosity between the two rivals. Through this alliance Japan was given prestige which no other Oriental country had ever attained, and Great Britain was strengthened socially and politically by the knowledge that she did not stand alone.

As it became more and more clear that the Russian government intended practically to annex Manchuria, the resentful Japanese resolved to check their rival by force of arms. The Russo-Japanese war resulted in 1904-1905, and victory again attended the Japanese. By the treaty of Portsmouth (5 September, 1905) Russia acknowledged the Japanese interests as supreme in² Korea, and yielded to Japan some 500 miles of railway. Great Britain took no part in the war, but her sympathies were for her Ally and against her enemy of such duration. It was at this time that the possibilities of open conflict between England and Russia was most imminent since the Berlin Congress of 1878. War was

¹
G. & T. Vol. II. pp. 115-139 complete treaty draft.

²

Sir Sidney Lee. King Edward VIII. Vol. II. Chap. XII.

avoided between the two nations by the skillful diplomacy of diplomats on both sides, for negotiations were beginning to be made for some sort of Anglo-Russian Entente.¹ The Anglo-Russian trade was increasing and neither nation wished to impair it. Another important factor was that both nations were well aware of the benefits which Germany would reap from an open conflict between Great Britain and Russia. "In the extraordinary development of Germany is to be found the explanation of the continual and successful efforts of the diplomats to avoid an open break between Russia and England."²

It was not quite so easy to create a new friendship with Russia as it had been with France. Something was always happening that alienated British sympathy and stirred British indignation against Russia. The change of Government in England from Conservative to Liberal in the early part of 1906 probably delayed the negotiations with Russia, as the Liberals were much more suspicious of the autocratic Tsar than were their predecessors. The establishment of the institution of a Duma had done a little to make even the British Liberals more sympathetic.³ A large amount of money

¹ Seymour. p. 132

² G. & T. Vol. IV, pp. 220-227.

³ Ibid.

was needed by the governing classes of Russia to keep the Duma at bay, and to tide the country through the aftermath of financial depression which resulted from the war with Japan. When Witte became Prime Minister on October 20, 1905, he at once began negotiations¹ for an international loan. It was expected that France would contribute the largest share, but her hands were tied by the Morocco crisis, and it was not until after the Algeciras Conference that the contract for the loan was signed on April 3. The money was used to terrorize the Duma and the enterprise was successful. Representatives of the Duma visited London to take part in a meeting of the International Parliamentary Representatives. This would be a golden opportunity for the British Prime Minister to make a friendly reference to Russia.² The news of the suspension of the Duma reached London on the eve of the meeting, and the occasion turned from one most auspicious to one extremely awkward. The one feature which saved the situation was that the Tsar had not abolished the Duma, but had only suspended it. Campbell-Bannerman added to his inaugural address a resonant warning to the Russian Government and a message of hope to the

¹ Count Witte. Memoirs. Vol. I, Chap. XI.

² Grey. Vol. I, p. 149.

Russian people. "La Duma est morte. Vive la Duma!", which did not facilitate the work of Grey, Hardinge¹ and Nicolson. Finally though, the gulf was bridged, owing apparently more to the eagerness and pressure of² the British, rather than the Russian, Foreign Office.

Later in the same year (1906) there was a suggested visit by a British naval squadron to Cronstad. This aroused much dispute among the Liberals in the House of Commons and caused embarrassment in the Foreign Office likewise. For Great Britain to have cancelled the fleet's visit would have been a rebuff to Russia which would have prejudiced further the relations between the two countries. Finally the suggestion was vetoed by the Emperor Nicholas II, and his reasons³ given in a telegram of July 12, 1906, to King Edward.

These incidents go to show what a difficult and delicate business it was to put the relations of Great Britain with Russia on a sure foundation which would be solid and yet friendly. Also the internal affairs of Russia rendered a most unfavorable attitude

¹ Lee. Vol. II, pp. 566-568.

² This at any rate was the impression of German observers; of G. P., Vol. XXV, 5, 21, 54, 67.

³ G. & T., Vol. IV, ed. note, p. 241.

to friendly negotiations; but British remonstrance did no good. A British Government had once addressed some remonstrance to Russia about internal affairs, and the Russian Government had retorted with remarks¹ about the state of Ireland. There were also discovered plots and intrigues which were meant to sow seeds of suspicion in the Russian minds against² Great Britain.

Nevertheless, it was still very essential that both countries come to some sort of agreement, the one with the other. It was in 1907, that the negotiations were finally taken seriously in hand,--- but we will leave the story of these negotiations for a later chapter.

¹ Grey. Vol. I, p. 152.

² Ibid. Vol. I, p. 152ff; G. & T. Vol. IV, pp. 228-229.

CHAPTER II

FACTORS DRAWING ENGLAND AND RUSSIA TOGETHER

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When war was threatened between Great Britain and Russia over the Dogger Bank incident,¹ there were two factors which prevented the outbreak then. One was the Anglo-French Entente which was just then crystallizing; the other was the fear of France and England that a Russo-German entente would be established. The Kaiser had been encouraging and inspiring the Tsar to believe that "Russia must and will win" in the war with Japan, and he very warmly urged upon Russia a Russo-German entente as he was very anti-British.² This was a source of great anxiety for France, for it was a menace to her and the Franco-Russian Entente of 1891, which ripened into the Alliance of 1894. This rapprochement between them, in spite of the fundamental contrast between the republican and absolutist form of government at Paris and St. Petersburg, was the obvious counter-balance to the Triple Alliance, and now it might very

¹ W. & B. Vol. III. pp. 332 ff.

² Korff. p. 39.

easily fall to pieces and leave France isolated on the continent again. The Franco-Russian Alliance was aimed primarily at Germany, should the latter attempt any sort of aggressive policy, but it did not arouse much suspicion across the Rhine, for Germany felt secure in the strength of the Triple Alliance. On the other hand, if Russia were to ally herself with Germany, the Triple Alliance would become a Quadruple Alliance, and the balance of power in Europe would totter. Arbitration was the only possible solution in such a case as that of the Dogger Bank, and it was in this means that France was entirely successful. As soon as England consented to arbitrate the case, the danger of war was over and the future Entente was made possible.¹ After this, France set herself to building up the long desired alliance between the three powers and against Germany.

It was this intense fear which actuated the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Delcassé, to bring heavy pressure to bear upon England in order to keep peace with Russia. He made up his mind, and kept it for his seven years in office, to bring England and France into

¹
Korff. p. 39.

effective accord. This was his policy throughout his tenure in office, and to him all credit is due for the initiating of the Anglo-French Entente.¹

In the spring of 1903, King Edward made his first formal visit to Paris as King, and was well received, though until the time of his arrival, the press and public opinion were rather dubious as to his reception. The German Ambassador to France, in a letter dated April 20, 1903, to Count von Bulow, described the situation very adequately:

"The nearer we approach towards the day of the King of England's arrival, the more energetically do the nationalist papers oppose an Anglo-French Alliance..

"From my own observations I had gained the impression that the journey of King Edward will lead to a detente in the up-to-now not very favourable relations between France and England at which they aim strongly at the Quai d'Orsay, and that France still holds fast now, as before, in the first line to a Russian alliance.

"The general impression is this: 'King Edward will be given a courtly and a brilliant reception, but it will not come up to the same inspired enthu-

¹ Lee. Vol. II, p. 216.

siasm as was witnessed during the visit of the Tsar.¹"

In one of his very tactful speeches in which he knew how to combine flattering appreciation and hearty personal good-will, by means of which he won so many personal friends, the King declared to the French people:

"It is hardly necessary for me to say with what sincere pleasure I find myself once more in Paris, which, as you know, I have very frequently visited in the past with a pleasure that continually increases, with an affection strengthened by old and happy associations that time can never efface....

"The days of conflict between the two countries are, I trust, happily over, and I hope that future historians, in alluding to Anglo-French relations in the present century, may be able to record only a friendly rivalry in the field of commercial and industrial developments, and that in the future, as in the past, England and France may be regarded as the champions and as the homes of all that is best and noblest in literature, art, and science.

"A Divine Providence has designed that France should be our near neighbour, and, I hope, always a

¹
G. P. Vol. XVIII. p. 482.

dear friend. There are no two countries in the world whose mutual prosperity is more dependent on each other. There may have been misunderstandings and causes of dissension in the past, but all such differences are, I believe, happily removed and forgotten, and I trust that the friendship and admiration which we all feel for the French nation and their glorious traditions may in the near future develop into a sentiment of the warmest affection and attachment between the peoples of the two countries. The achievement of this aim is my constant desire, and, gentlemen, I count upon your institution and each of its members severally who reside in this beautiful city and enjoy the hospitality of the French Republic to aid and assist me in the attainment of this object."¹

Germany alone looked upon the very cordial reception of King Edward with mistrust and suspicion, and in a letter of June 2, 1903, to Bulŕw, the German Ambassador wondered if it was not a blow at Germany, and he considered the visit "a most odd affair",² but it was one of the greatest forward steps in the creation of the Anglo-French Entente.

¹
Lee. Vol. II. p. 237.

²
G. P. Vol. XVII. pp. 590-594.

The negotiations finally culminated into three separate conventions, which, though they were of different significance, comprised one single diplomatic instrument. The credit for initiating the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 must be given to M. Delcassé; the credit for bringing the negotiations to a successful culmination must be given to Lord Lansdowne and M. Cambon; and finally the credit for influencing public opinion both in England and France, and the credit for the creating of the proper atmosphere necessary for the completion of such a treaty must go to King Edward VII.¹

This Alliance between France and England was an inevitable result of circumstance. In the face of the growing conflict between Japan and Russia, culminating in the outbreak of war between the two nations in February, 1904, and because of the fact that Great Britain was allied to Japan and France to Russia, it was evidently very important that friendly relations should be established with France in order to prevent the war in the Far East from spreading into Europe and to keep it from involving England and France against one another. England earnestly hoped to blot out the numerous causes of friction which had

¹ Lee. Vol. II. p. 254.

so frequently brought her to the verge of war with France in the past.¹ On the other side France was determined that she would not be brought into the war because of the territorial ambitions of her Slavic ally in the Far East. France wanted to be friendly with England in order to build up an alliance with power enough to counterbalance the Triple Alliance. Russia had not given the support to France and seemed to be of less value to her than had been anticipated at the time of the formation of the Alliance. "Delcassé had no thought of abandoning the alliance with Russia, but he believed that closer relations with England would help to compensate France for the lessened value of the Franco-Russian Alliance."²

The Anglo-French Entente was followed by very important but secret naval and military arrangements, which gradually came to be, in fact if not in form,³ a most vital link in the system of secret alliances. In these conversations, the French and British naval

¹ Op. cit. Grey. Vol. I. p. 48ff.

² Fay. The Origins of the World War, Vol. I. p. 137.

³ Ibid. Vol. I. p. 192.

and military authorities tended to draw up plans for joint action in case Germany were to cause a European war. It was stated that these conversations were not to be binding to either Government,¹ though Mr. Fay argues that they came to involve mutual obligations² which were just as entangling as a formal alliance.

The rather sudden reconciliation of Great Britain and Russia was encouraged and facilitated by the feelings each of the nations held for Germany. Great Britain was afraid of the rapid economic development of Germany, and she believed that she was directly threatened by the German world policy.³ Her suspicions were greatly aroused against Germany by the Krüger telegram trouble in South Africa, and though it was not a diplomatic incident, it had its effect upon the contour of the British mind. Late in 1895, Dr. Jameson attempted a raid into the Transval territory of South Africa, which ended in failure in a few days. President Krüger, who was watching for the maturation of the plot, arrested the leaders and had them sentenced to heavy penalties, all of which were

¹ W. & G. Vol. III. p. 347.

² Fay. Vol. I. p. 192.

³ Ibid. Vol. I. pp. 192ff.

ultimately remitted. The commotion created by the raid was suddenly intensified by a more significant sensation which was created by a telegram from the Emperor William II to President Krüger. On January 3 the Kaiser dispatched the following telegram to Krüger: "I heartily congratulate you on the fact that you and your people, without appealing to the aid of friendly Powers, have succeeded by your unaided efforts in restoring peace and preserving the independence of the country against the armed bands which broke into your land." "I express to Your Majesty my deepest gratitude for Your Majesty's congratulations," replied the President. "With God's help we hope to continue to do everything possible for the existence of our Republic."¹ Mr. Gooch further points out the indignation which the Kaiser's telegram excited in England. He quotes the Morning Post as saying: "The nation will never forget this telegram, and it will always bear it in mind in the future orientation of its policy." The suspicion grew, later on, that Germany had been encouraging President Krüger in his increasing uncompromising attitude in order to create more trouble for Great Britain in South Africa,² and the recollection of the

¹ Quoted. Gooch, History of Modern Europe. p. 218ff.

² W. & G. Vol. III. p. 264.

telegram strengthened and antagonized the suspicion in later and more dangerous years.

The British Government from 1895 to 1905 was under the control of the Conservative Party --- that party which traditionally extolled imperialism, a big navy, and a vigorous foreign policy. They were frightened at the rapid growth industrially and commercially, and the emergence of Germany as a World Power did not moderate this fright. Germany, who was supported by William II, began about the close of the nineteenth century, to build a large navy which compelled Great Britain, if she was to retain her maritime supremacy, to hasten her naval building and increase her expenditure. These policies caused the former friendly relations between the two countries to give way to popular jealousy, recrimination and fear.

German suspicion of England was definitely aroused at the time of the Second Hague Conference 1906-1908, because she feared that Great Britain was trying to impede naval development to her own benefit. The Kaiser remained hostile throughout to the issue of disarmament, and when it was raised in the Conference, opposition to it was voiced by the German delegates. Sir John Fisher had just reorganized and strengthened the British fleet in 1904 with his policy of "Ruthless,

Relentless and Remorseless!"¹ This was about the time that the German navy was beginning to grow in power and Admiral Tirpitz was advocating a "risk navy." "It seemed to prevent Germany from catching up in strength at a moment when England still enjoyed a marked naval superiority."² Long before Great Britain began to have suspicion of the German navy, Germany was skeptical and felt alarm at the size of the British fleet, but the Kaiser talked only of Germany's need for a navy which would contribute powerfully to make strong the feeling of unity in the mosaic pattern of the empire but which was not intended for attacking others.³ Admiral von Tirpitz did not anticipate the psychological effect his "risk navy" would have upon Great Britain. Every increase in the navy of Germany, instead of frightening the British into making concessions, tended to increase their opposition and their determination to keep the wide margin of the naval superiority of Great Britain

¹ John A. Fisher. Memoirs and Records. Vol. II, p. 135.

² Fay. Vol. I, p. 233.

³ Eric Brandenburg. From Bismark to the Great War. (Eng. Trans. - Adams), p. 191.

which was considered vital to the safety and existence¹ of the British Empire.

The futility of such superabundant armaments and great naval expenditures was realized by a few of the great diplomats of the time, but mob psychology seemed to demand it, and all negotiations which were made for disarmament were ruthlessly rejected by Germany. In a speech on December 21, 1905, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman had lamented the great expenditures on armaments: "A policy of huge armaments keeps alive and stimulates and feeds the belief that force is the best, if not the only, solution of international differences. It is a policy that tends to inflame old sores and to create new sores We want relief from the pressure of excessive taxation, and at the same time we want money for our domestic needs at home, which have been too long starved and neglected, owing to the demands on the tax payer for military purposes abroad. How are these desirable things to be secured, if in time of peace our armaments are maintained on a war footing?" The inevitable result of this policy was realized when war finally broke out in 1914.

Germany was largely responsible for Russia's aggressive policy in the Far East which finally culminated

¹
Fay. Vol. I. p. 235.

in a shattered dream of Russian domination in China and Manchuria. When she saw the futility of a Far Eastern enterprise, Russia turned towards the Balkans and the Straits for an outlet. Here she was halted when her ambitions conflicted with Germany's desire to have control of territory extending from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. One could hardly conceive of the forces of Pan-Slavism not conflicting with those of Pan-Germanism in the Near East.

It was felt in the Russian diplomatic circles that there was a growing change in the Russian sentiment towards Germany after the Russo-Japanese War and the sympathy which formally pervaded between the two was waning. In a letter of 13 June, 1905, Sir Charles Hardinge writes to the Marquess of Lansdowne: "The impression seems to prevail that the German Emperor has been fishing in troubled waters and that having displayed excessive friendliness towards Russia while there was a hope that Russian arms might yet be victorious, and having profited by this appearance of friendliness to float a Russian loan on highly advantageous terms for German financiers, and to obtain large orders for military and naval stores of every kind, the fulfillment of which had strained to the utmost the obligations of Germany as

a neutral Power, His Majesty has diverted his sympathy from Russia to Japan as the rising power with whom it would now be more profitable to enter into closer and more friendly relations."¹ He reiterates in this letter several other factors which helped to widen the breach between Russia and Germany, ---the Morocco question and the Kaiser's telegram to the Russian Emperor concerning the necessity of the French Government to come to some agreement; the unwarranted attack on the honour and integrity of the Russian army; and finally the fall of M. Delcassé was regarded in Russia as an act backed by Germany. These incidents, and the restlessness and feverish energy of the German Emperor, helped to impress the Russian Emperor of the little dependence which could be placed on Germany, and he began to realize the necessity of having a strong ally to help defend his Eastern front.

Izvol'ski saw that Russia was very weakened by her disastrous conflict with Japan in the Far East, and he realized that in comparison with the ever growing prestige of the Triple Alliance, the Franco-Russian Alliance appeared very insignificant. As it stood, then, to be of any vital significance, it needed the strength

¹
G. & T. Vol. IV. p. 197.

which closer relations with Great Britain would give to both France and Russia and their Alliance. Russia, in her very weakened condition, feared a renewed attack from Japan in the Far East, for Japan had made very humiliating demands after the war, and was ~~not~~ suspected to be preparing for a new struggle. Russia realized her only chance for rehabilitation lay in long years of peace. To do this, it was necessary to keep Japan quiet and pacified, and Russia undertook to reach this goal by making a friendly agreement with Japan concerning spheres of interests in Manchuria. England was the natural bridge between Russia and Japan, for the latter had been England's ally since 1902, and an rapprochement with Japan would give a more solid basis and impetus to the Franco-Russian Alliance.

Russia was confronted by the possibility of another danger --- that of a conflict of interests with Great Britain in the Near and Central East. Russians still remembered the Crimean War, and the strained circumstances in 1878 when the Straits were threatened by the British Fleet. In 1885 the Pendjeh affair nearly culminated in war between the two countries, and more recently the various incidents of the Russo-Japanese War had inflamed the old but popular feelings of

antagonism between the two countries. If Russia were to have another conflict with Great Britain, it would cast her (Russia) into the clutches of Germany and would endanger the now weak Franco-Russian Alliance¹ which Russia had made the foundation of her policy. Russia would have an opportunity to strengthen her own international position if she could become friends with England and forget past antipathies, and she might be able to establish a more active policy in the Balkans. Such an agreement would be welcomed by France, who, in her position in the heart of European broils, would be glad to see her new and her old friend becoming allies. It was with these thoughts in his mind that Izvolski determined upon the program of his policy as he became the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1906.

After the Russo-Japanese War the relations between Russia and England were gradually improving. At the close of a long letter to the Marquess of Lansdowne, on September 6, 1905, Sir Charles Hardinge gives a very good survey of the general Anglo-Russian relations from the war until the writing of the letter. He says: "I need hardly remind Your Lordship of the campaign of malicious lies and misrepresentations which was initia-

¹
Fay. Vol. I. p. 215.

ted against Great Britain simultaneously with the outbreak of war and which lasted during the first year of its progress, commencing with the reported utilization of Wei-hei-wei as the base from which the Japanese fleet made their attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur on the 8th of February and culminating with the accusations levelled against the Hull fishermen of complicity in an attack by imaginary torpedo-boats on the Baltic fleet, nor is it necessary for me to recapitulate all the serious incidents which have occurred during the past eighteen months and which on more than one occasion have strained the relations existing between the two countries almost to the breaking point. During all this period the position of His Majesty's Embassy has been one of difficulty while that of British subjects residing in Russia has not been without personal risk, owing to the bitter hostility and incitement of the Chauvinistic press against England and all that was English. The firm attitude of His Majesty's Government in openly refuting the baseless charges made against their policy and officials, the determined remonstrances addressed to the Russian Government against the illegal actions of their naval officers,

and finally the temperate proposal of arbitration after an unprecedented outburst of warlike indignation owing to the unfortunate incident on the Dogger Bank, which was eventually proved to have been an unwarrantable attack on harmless British fishing-vessels, thus avoiding what would have been a useless and unprofitable war, all these causes have tended to impress the Russian Government and Russian public opinion with a more favourable idea of the dignity and impartiality with which His Majesty's Government faithfully discharged their obligations of neutrality not only towards Russia but also towards their Japanese allies. The loyalty of His Majesty's Government to that of France during the recent Morocco incident had also afforded a useful object lesson which has had due effect, and I have no hesitation in asserting my opinion that during the past six months there has been a decided improvement in public sentiment towards England, that the bitter hostility which was daily displayed in the Russian press had almost entirely disappeared, and that the relations between the two countries are now on a more friendly footing than has been the case since the outbreak of war."

¹
G. & T. Vol. IV. p. 199.

Great Britain had witnessed the Russian reform movement of 1905 with much sympathy and anticipated the opening of the Duma in 1906 with satisfaction. As we saw in the previous chapter,¹ the failure of this enterprise caused a bridge between the two countries which was important but which was soon counteracted, and negotiations for an alliance of some sort were continued between Russia and Great Britain.

Some of the leading statesmen of Great Britain realized the advantages which were to be gained by a substitution of cooperation with Russia for the former deadlock in the imperialistic aims of each country in Asia. King Edward favored an agreement with Russia, for he realized that there could be no permanent security while Russian and British designs were in conflict in Persia, Afghanistan, and China. Since the early days of 1904, he had lost no opportunity of encouraging and furthering a cordial understanding between them on these three important questions.²

Sir Edward Grey acknowledged that reconciliation and negotiations with Russia were hard, but he recognized the fact that this mighty Empire needed and was

¹ See above. pp. 24-26.

² Lee. Vol. II. p. 564.

ever seeking an outlet to a sea that did not freeze. He enumerated the many incidents in which Russia was blocked when she was striving for an outlet in the Near East, Central and Far East and wondered if it was "possible ever to have peace, and quiet, or indeed to have anything but recurrent friction with Russia on such terms."¹

Sir Charles Hardinge was another ardent advocate of a rapprochement with Russia. In 1904 he was British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, but was recalled in 1905 to become Permanent Under Secretary. He made a great effort both in St. Petersburg and London that his recall should present him with an opportunity to work with greater accord that the Anglo-Russian relations should be a greater success. When he came back to London he influenced Sir Edward Grey with much pro-Russian sentiment and he was backed by Sir Arthur Nicolson, who took his place at St. Petersburg.²

¹ Grey. Vol. I. p. 54.

² Ibid. Vol. I. p. 155ff.

CHAPTER III

GENERAL ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 1903-1907

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GENERAL ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 1903-1907

Part I

The First Stages of the Anglo-Russian Rapprochement 1903-1904

It was clearly recognized both at home and abroad that the Anglo-French Convention which was just being projected at the end of 1903, required a fuller and better understanding between Russia and England in order to be a success. There were many difficulties which stood in the way of such negotiations. The rather curious diplomatic circle of European states caused much confusion. To a casual observer of diplomacy, it seemed as if Europe was about to be divided into two camps --- Germany, Austria and Italy versus Great Britain, France and Russia.¹ The greatest point of difficulty in such an arrangement of camps lay in the fact that the antagonisms between Japan and Russia were becoming more intense, and Russia felt the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to be a thing which was not to be trusted.

¹ Lee. Vol. II. p. 281.

King Edward was rather skeptical, and though he had had a life-long suspicion of Russia, he began to turn his attention towards such negotiations as would be deemed necessary for friendlier relations. Count Benckendorff, the new Russian Ambassador at London, was his guest at Windsor in November 1903, and a few days later he told Lord Lansdowne that he "had been very much impressed by the earnestness of the King's conversation with him in favour of a friendly understanding."¹

In a letter to the Marquess of Lansdowne dated November 22, 1903, Mr. Hardinge writes of a conversation he had with Count Benckendorff which threw some light on the aspirations of Russia in Asia, and how far and what possible concessions Russia would make in order to meet British views. Mr. Hardinge explained to him the British policy in Asia --- that for many years it had been the maintenance of the status quo, while that of the Russian government had been aggressive in China, Persia and Afghanistan. The Russian Ambassador said that the time was riper now (1903) than it had been at any time for twenty years or more, for a friendly understanding between

¹Quoted. Lee. Vol. II. p. 281.

England and Russia. He presented the Russian idea that Manchuria should be discussed as a question where Russian interests were preponderant, Central Asia from the point of view of the defense of Indian interests, and Persia as a country where both England and Russia have important and equal interests. The entire conversation from the Russian point of view showed that the questions had been formally discussed by the Count and Count Lamsdorff, the¹ Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In a conversation which the Marquess of Lansdowne had with Count Benckendorff on November 25, 1903, the British points of view were presented. Russia would be expected to recognize in the most formal manner the status of Afghanistan as absolutely within the sphere of British influence. In Thibet, Great Britain expected Russia to recognize that it was within the British sphere because of its geographical position. Russia was to abstain from sending agents into both Afghanistan and Thibet. Regarding the Far East, Great Britain recognized Russia as the predominant power in Manchuria, and there would be no British interference with Russian control of her Manchurian railway. On the other hand, Great Britain

¹
G. & T. Vol. IV. pp. 184, 185, 186.

expected her trade privileges to be recognized in all parts of the Chinese Empire with equal consideration¹ and treatment.

King Edward watched the growing breach between Russia and Japan with much anxiety, for Russia openly displayed her reluctance to evacuate Manchuria or to formally recognize the independence of China and Korea. On New Year's Day, 1904, the King expressed his grave anxieties to the Prime Minister respecting the situation in the Far East.

"It looked to him that if France should join Russia in the coming conflict, then we should be bound to take part with Japan. But if France stood out, the King agreed with the Prime Minister, it was only in the improbable contingency that Russia would crush Japan that any question of England's intervention² would arise."

When Japan's patience was exhausted and they were convinced it was impossible to reach a peaceful understanding with Russia, the Government severed diplomatic relations on February 3, 1904, and five days later the Mikado declared war on Russia. There was some propa-

¹
G. & T. Vol. IV. pp. 186, 187, 188.

²
Quoted. Lee. Vol. II. p. 282.

ganda spread in St. Petersburg that Japan had been encouraged and backed by Great Britain in taking these drastic steps, but the King prepared a message for the Tsar which pointed out that England had "maintained a scrupulously correct attitude," and that the idea that England had instigated Japan or given her direct assistance¹ was an unfounded error.

As the war became more bitter, relations between the King of England and the Tsar of Russia also became more strained, for there were many people in England who eagerly anticipated a Japanese victory. The King remained firm in his desire to supplement the Anglo-French Entente by an Anglo-Russian understanding, and he found a staunch friend in M. Alexander Izvolsky, who, as I have said before, made his policy that of better relations with Great Britain.² On April 14, the King took a very definite step towards the promotion of an Anglo-Russian rapprochement, when he had his first conversation with M. Izvolsky discussing political situations and the relations between Great Britain and Russia.³

¹ Lee. Vol. II, p. 283 & 285: "mais vous pouvez 'être sûr,'" ajouta Sa Majesté, "que moi et mon gouvernement, nous ne négligerons aucun effort pour localiser la crise et pour en faciliter la prompt solution."

² See above. p. 44.

³ Lee. Vol. II. p. 284.

The negotiations which were afoot for a better Anglo-Russia understanding were further aided by Sir Charles Hardinge, the new British Ambassador to St. Petersburg. He went to Russia, the bearer of good sentiments from the King, and he assured Count Lamsdorff of Great Britain's firm intention to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality during the progress of the war in the Far East, and the earnest desire of the British Government to resume, at a more suitable time, the exchange of views which had been begun before the war, with a view of reaching an agreement on all questions of issue and dispute between the two Governments.¹ On several occasions the tension between the two was very near the breaking point. In July, 1904, public opinion in England was gravely excited by the way in which Russia exercised the right of search of neutral vessels for contraband of war. Two cruisers of the Russian Volunteer Fleet, the Smolensk and Petersburg, had disguised themselves as merchant ships and when they passed out of the Black Sea, they resumed their guise as warships in the Red Sea, and were arresting British and German vessels on the principle that they were carrying ammunition, even though their cargoes were bound for neutral ports.

¹ Sir C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne. May 18, 1904. G. & T. Vol. IV. p. 191.

Both countries issued a strong protest to the Russian Government, Great Britain resolving to stop, by force, if necessary, any Russian prize going through the Dardanelles into the Black Sea. Sir Charles Hardinge wrote to the King reassuring him of Russia's willingness to meet the British demands.¹ He was always desirous of pursuing ways of conciliation consistent with the due assertion of his country's rights, and his natural irritation over Russia's error in pressing her claims against contraband interrupted but briefly his political advances to Russia.²

Once again the prospect of an Anglo-Russian rapprochement was thwarted, this time by an incident which looked at one time as though it were going to plunge the two countries into open conflict. Mistaking several British fishing vessels on the Dogger Bank for Japanese vessels, the Russian Baltic Fleet, on the night of October 21, 1904, opened fire on them. Severe damage, loss of life and many injuries resulted, but the Russian Fleet passed on without rendering any assistance. The indignation in England was extremely intense but the two governments kept their heads, and the Tsar sent a message that since he had no news of the catastrophe,

¹
Cit. Lee. Vol. II. p. 297.

²
Ibid. Vol. Vol. II. p. 298.

he could only explain the incident as a regrettable misunderstanding. He sincerely regretted the loss of life and would render adequate compensations to the sufferers as soon as the mystery was solved. It was very fortunate that the Russian government did not try to escape the consequences of the Admiral's error, and the British government showed no intention of proceeding to extremities, even though public opinion was still in a state of excitement. To the ambassadors of both countries go the honours of peaceful arbitration, for they exerted every nerve to avoid an open rupture. It was agreed between the two governments that England should submit its case to the Hague Tribunal, and without much difficulty, Sir Charles Hardinge¹ was able to arrange satisfactory terms of reference.

¹ Lee. Vol. II. p. 301ff.

Part II

The Situation Arising from the Peace of Portsmouth
and the Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

After the fall of Port Arthur, President Roosevelt unofficially, but in vain, advised Russia to make peace. On May 31, after the crowning victory of Tsushima, Japan secretly asked the President to invite the belligerents to negotiate. On June 8, he issued the invitation, offering to arrange the time and place. The Peace Mission met at Portsmouth on August 10, 1905, and each party submitted its terms of peace in writing. A deadlock resulted for Russia refused to pay an indemnity or to surrender interned ships. Finally Japan moderated her terms, and on August 29 an agreement was reached, and the Treaty of Peace was signed at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on September 5, 1905.

The war with Japan found no favour outside the
military circles in Russia,¹ and an insurrectionary
fervour stimulated the people and brought them into
open conflict with the Tsar's government. He did not
take advantage of the conciliatory advances which he

¹
G. & T. Vol. IV. p. 198.

might have made to his people, and he never recovered the prestige he lost by this lack of foresight. Russia's capacities were at a low ebb for a long time after Japan's triumphant victory, and it was under these circumstances that several Russian ministers abandoned their traditional suspicion of England and expressed their willingness to act with her in a limited series of circumstances.¹ France's failure to assist Russia in her Far Eastern conflict hardly goes to encourage Russia to make another alliance with another Western European Power. Yet the King of England still clung to the idea that an English understanding with Russia would be the surest basis of peace and would remove in the near future other sources of suspicion and distrust between the two countries.

One important result of the Russo-Japanese war was the revision and restatement of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. Though the earlier treaty was concluded for only five years, this new compact of wider scope, was signed in London on August 12, 1905, for ten years. The objects of the two Powers, the Preamble declared, were to maintain peace in Eastern

¹
Lee. Vol. II. p. 309.

Asia and India, to preserve the common interests of all Powers in China by incurring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations, and to maintain the territorial rights and the defence of the special interests of the signatories in Eastern Asia and India. Article II provided that, if either party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial right or special interests by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, the other should come to its assistance. The special interests of the signatories in Eastern Asia and India were set forth in Article III and IV: "Japan, possessing paramount political, military and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes her right to take such measures as she may deem necessary provided that they are not contrary to the principle of all nations. Great Britain, having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions." This new Treaty, besides handing over Korea to Japan, introduced two principles of vital importance to Great Britain. In the first place

the scope of the agreement was extended to embrace India, in this way correcting what was generally regarded as the inequality of advantage under the pact of 1902. In the second place, each was to come to the assistance of the other, if attacked by a single Power --- a provision which not only increased Great Britain's liabilities, but involved her in the obligation, under certain circumstances, to intervene in a struggle between her ally and the United States.¹

The arrangement was regarded with some concern in Russia, but as a whole was not received by the press in an unfriendly manner. Sir C. Hardinge surveys the press criticisms thus: "The effect of its publication had been to a certain extent discounted by the earlier announcements made in the press as to its general tenour, from which it was evident that the reactionary organs were annoyed at the conclusion of the agreement, some of them, such as the "Novoe Vremja," advocating a counter-combination with Germany or America, while the references made in the liberal press have been of a generally friendly character.

"The 'Russ' which receives inspiration from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and may now be regarded

¹
W. & G. Vol. III. pp. 336-337.

as the organ of that department, holds that the real significance of the agreement depends upon the interpretation to be attached to such terms as 'Eastern Asia' and 'special interests' mentioned in Article II and IV, and the necessity is indicated of a comprehensive statement of the extent and nature of English aims in Asia. If the policy of England is actuated by peaceful motives and the maintenance of British rights and interests already existing, then no difficulty need be experienced in arriving at an agreement between England and Russia.

"Other liberal organs express the hope that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance will prove the futility of further adventures in the Far East and that Russia will henceforth devote her attentions to internal reform and the more pressing problems awaiting solution in Europe and the Near East.

"Although the manifestations of ill-humour of the German press have been re-echoed in the 'Novoe Vremja' and other reactionary journals, it is fully realized that a Russo-German understanding in Asia as a counterpoise to the Japanese Alliance might jeopardise Russian aspirations in the Near East and would most certainly weaken the Franco-Russian

Alliance in Europe."¹

Though that Anglo-Japanese Treaty came rather as a shock to the Russian public, it did not retard the slow progress of the Anglo-Russian rapprochement. Count Witte exerted much anti-British feeling in his anger at the conclusion of the agreement, and though Count Lamsdorff outwardly showed a desire to continue negotiations with Great Britain for a better understanding, it was felt he had come under the influence of Count Witte.² The latter realized that if it were possible to remove the misunderstandings in regard to Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet, Russian interests would be well-served. He made it plain that Russia needed peace, but in doing so, she could not afford to prejudice existing relations with any other Continental Power. Count Witte noted that "I feared any agreement with Great Britain would arouse the jealousy of Germany. As a result, we would perhaps be forced into making an agreement with that country too, and be cheated in the end. It was owing to my opposition that the (Anglo-Russian) agreement was not concluded before 1907."³

¹ G. & T. Vol. IV. pp. 202, 203.

² G. & T. Vol. IV. p. 207.

³ Witte. Vol. I. p. 432.

Part III

The Rapprochement

Under the New British Administration,

December 1905 - May 1906

It was during this period that the incidents which I have enumerated above,¹ transpired, and helped to delay the negotiations of a rapprochement between England and Russia --- the change in England from a Conservative to a Liberal form of government, the French loan to Russia, the suspension of the Duma, and Campbell-Bannerman's rather curt reply.

It was in the early part of 1906 that Witte made his very sudden departure in his Foreign Policy. He is said to have told Mr. Dillion, British Journalist, that it was his opinion that the friendship and sympathy of England was now of the greatest value to him and to Russia.² If England were to see her way into making some sort of agreement, he would undertake himself to arrange for the settlement of all difficulties existing between the two countries, in the form of a satisfactory treaty. Sir Edward Grey was anxious for a settlement of all questions at issue when there was

¹ See above. pp. 24-26.

² G. & T. Vol. IV. p. 219

a reasonable hope that a solution which would be both satisfactory and permanent could be reached. While such a situation was being arrived at, he expressed the hope that no action would be taken by either country which would render a solution of the existing problems more difficult.¹ Count Benckendorff expressed the personal opinion that if England were to agree to a dual arrangement with Russia concerning the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, an agreement on the other questions with England would be popular in Russia, especially if it contained a provision which could be published and which would appear to give Russia her longed-for commercial outlet to the Persian Gulf.² In January 1906, there was no indication on the part of the Russian Government as to what it was prepared to give in exchange for the favours it desired.³

It was expected that relations between the two countries would be much improved by the institution

¹ Ibid. Vol. IV. p. 222.

² Ibid. Vol. IV. p. 222.

³ Ibid. Vol. IV. p. 224.

of the Duma, for the reactionary party in Russia who opposed it, had done all in their power to stir up popular feeling against Great Britain.¹

In May 1906, the German Ambassador, by the order of his Government, said that they would be very glad of any arrangement between England and Russia as to their reciprocal interests in Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and Thibet, which did not damage German interests.² On May 24, Sir Edward Grey was asked concerning an alleged agreement arrived at between His Majesty's Government and Russia. He made the following answer: "I cannot make any statement about the alleged agreement as described in the Press, because such an agreement does not exist. But I may add that there has been an increasing tendency for England and Russia to deal in a friendly way with questions concerning them both as they arise. This has on more than one occasion lately led the two governments to find themselves in co-operation. It is a tendency which we shall be very glad to encourage and which, if it continues, will naturally result in the progressive settlement of questions in which

¹ G. & T. Vol. IV. p. 226.

² Ibid. Vol. IV. p. 231.

each country has an interest, and in strengthening
friendly relations between them."¹

¹
Ibid. Vol. IV. p. 232.

Part IV

The Period of the Making of the Convention 1906-1907

The internal situation in Russia grew rapidly worse after the suspension of the Duma. It was an irretrievable struggle between the revolutionary forces and Tsarism. The New Prime Minister soon took things in hand, though, and his wise policy appeared to appease Russia, for there were indications of a period of peace in that country. By this time, diplomats in the capitols of both countries had asserted their willingness to assist in the fulfillment of the King's ideal, but much opposition was yet to be encountered elsewhere. Distrust of Russian motives was still very actively alive in India, and the proposed settlement of disputes and conflicting claims in regard to Afghanistan, Persia and Thibet incited the suspicions and hostility of British officials in India.

"It was impossible." as Mr. Morley, then Secretary of State for India, recorded, "for the Indian government to be indifferent, and it would have been unreasonable to expect that government at once to approach it with a friendly mind. Russia had for most of a century been the disturber of peace in

Central Asia, and a menace to the external security of our Indian power. There was, therefore, nothing to surprise us in the frowns of incredulity, suspicion, and dislike with which the idea of an Anglo-Russian agreement was greeted at Simla.¹ Later, though, he very wisely pointed out that the question of an entente was a policy of the home government, for there could not be two foreign policies.

In October, the new Russian Foreign Minister, M. Izvolsky, was in Paris, and the King, who considered him a very close friend, suggested that he be invited to London to discuss Anglo-Russian relations. Sir Edward Grey said: "We agreed however that this would not be desirable yet: it would give rise to rumours in excess of the truth; negotiations were not ripe for a visit here, and to press him to come would give an impression that we wanted to hustle him."²

In spite of all the difficulties of opposition and delay, negotiations were seriously taken in hand in February 1907. On March 6, Campbell-Bannerman wrote the King concerning Grey, who had reported the

¹ Quoted. Lee. Vol. II. p. 569.

² G. & T. Vol. IV. p. 251.

propitious trend of negotiations with Russia in Persia and other places of dispute. Two weeks later the King was delighted to hear from him again that Grey was extremely optimistic of an agreement with Russia concerning Asiatic affairs, though the question of the Dardanelles still remained unsettled. In that same month a Russian squadron was received with enthusiasm at Portsmouth. At the King's suggestion, the Russian officers and crew were given a very cordial welcome. Thus gradually, Grey and Izvolsky, by very tactful diplomacy, and backed by their respective sovereigns, removed every hindrance to an agreement between England and Russia.

Sir Charles Hardinge, who kept in constant communication with the King, wrote on August 27, 1907, that Izvolsky was hastening negotiations, and that the Russian Government had expressed the desire that the agreement be signed and ratified by the King of England and the Tsar of Russia. Five days later Sir Arthur Nicolson and M. Izvolsky signed the draft Convention at the Russian Foreign Office, and on September 23, ratifications, properly signed by the King and the Tsar, were exchanged, and the Anglo-Russian¹ Entente was in being.

¹
Diplomatic correspondence. G. & T. Vol. IV. pp. 232-304. General survey of negotiations, Lee. Vol. II, pp. 278-314, 564-573.

CHAPTER IV

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OR CONVENTION OF
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On August 7, 1907, Sir Arthur Nicolson and Izvolsky, representatives of Great Britain and Russia respectively, signed a convention at Petrograd relating to Persia, Afghanistan and Thibet.¹ Though this pact was more limited in sphere than that of 1904, it accomplished much the same results by removing the causes of antagonisms between the two historic rivals.

The pact began:-

"His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russians, animated by the sincere desire to settle by mutual agreement different questions concerning the interests of their States on the Continent of Asia, have determined to conclude Agreements destined to prevent all cause of misunderstanding between Great Britain and Russia in regard to the questions referred to."

The first and most important of the three agree-

¹
G. & T. Vol. IV. p. 502.

ments concerned Persia. "The Governments of Great Britain and Russia having mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations;

"Considering that each of them has, for geographical and economic reasons a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in certain provinces of Persia adjoining, or in the neighborhood of, the Russian frontier on the one hand, and the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the other hand; and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict between their respective interests in all the above mentioned provinces of Persia;

"Have agreed on the following terms:-

I. Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favour of British subjects, or in favour of subjects of third Powers, any concessions of a political or commercial nature --- such as concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc., --- beyond a line starting from

Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Ispahan, Yezd, Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the concessions referred to.

II. Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for herself and not to support, in favour of Russian subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any concessions of a political or commercial nature --- such as concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc., --- beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, Birjand, Kerman, and ending at Bunder Abbas, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar concessions in this region which are supported by the British Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Russia engages not to seek the concessions referred to.

III. Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without previous arrangement with Great Britain, the grant of any concessions whatever to British subjects in the regions of Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Articles I and II.

Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards the grant of concessions to Russian subjects in the same regions of Persia.

All concessions existing at present in the regions indicated in Articles I and II are maintained.

IV. It is understood that revenues of all the Persian customs, with the exception of those of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, revenues guaranteeing the amortisation and the interest of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the "Banque d' Escompte et des Prêts de Perse," up to the date of the signature of the present Agreement, shall be devoted to the same purpose as in the past.

It is equally understood that the revenues of the Persian customs of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, as well as those of the fisheries

on the Persian shore of the Caspian Sea and those of the Posts and Telegraphs, shall be devoted, as in the past, to the service of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Agreement.

V. In the event of irregularities occurring in the amortisation or the payment of the interest of the Persian loans concluded with the "Banque d' Escompte et des Prêts de Perse" and with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Agreement, and in the event of the necessity arising for Russia to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the first-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article II of the present Agreement, or for Great Britain to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the second-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article I of the present Agreement, the British and Russian Governments

undertake to enter beforehand into a friendly exchange of ideas with a view to determine, in agreement with each other, the measures of control in question and to avoid all interference which would not be in conformity with the principles governing the present Agreement.*¹

In other words, Persia was divided into a large Russian and a small British sphere of influence, with a neutral zone in which the two countries were to have equal opportunities.

The limits of the British sphere of influence in Persia as defined in Article II were the results of the desire of His Majesty's Government to make safe their rather strategic position on the frontier of India. In 1903 it was pointed out that this was a triangle of territory including Seistan, Kerman and Bunder Abbas in order to prevent the possibility of building a railway by Russia to Bunder Abbas or any eastern port. It was agreed that, if the Government of India could obtain this and nothing more for the sum of 500,000L. to be paid to the Persian Government, a good transaction would have been concluded, for it might save India from having to make large increases in naval contributions and military expenditures in the future.

*1

Full text of Treaty. G. & T. Vol. IV. p. 618.

The establishment of a Russian and British sphere of influence, is in fact only a self-denying ordinance, by means of which each of the Governments pledged themselves not to strive for concessions in the other's sphere. Other Foreign Powers were at liberty to seek concessions all over Persia, and the British trade was to be carried on in the Russian sphere as before, the sole restriction on the British enterprise being that British concessions could not be sought in the Russian sphere.

The limits of the Russian zone were defined by the Russian Government, and there were no British concessions within those limits which were not safeguarded.

The line of the British zone from Birjand was not drawn to the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, because it was realized that such a line could have no possible effect on a possible Russian movement towards Afghanistan, but care was taken, during the negotiations, that none of the western frontier of Afghanistan should come within¹ the Russian zone.

In regard to Afghanistan, Great Britain declared

¹
G. & T. Vol. IV. pp. 612-613.

that she had no intention of changing the political status of the country or of interfering in its internal concerns, and would neither take, nor encourage Afghanistan to take any measures threatening Russia, so long as the Ameer fulfilled his obligations. Russia, for her part, recognized Afghanistan as outside her sphere of influence, and promised that all her political relations with the country should be conducted through the British Government.

The complete text concerning Afghanistan is as follows:-

"The High Contracting Parties, in order to ensure perfect security of their respective frontiers in Central Asia and to maintain in these regions a solid and lasting peace, have concluded the following Convention:---

Article I.

His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan.

His Britannic Majesty's Government further engage to exercise their influence in Afghanistan only in a pacific sense, and they will not themselves take, or encourage Afghanistan to take, any measures threatening Russia.

The Russian Government, on their part, declare that they recognize Afghanistan as outside the sphere of Russian influence, and they engage that all their political relations with Afghanistan shall be conducted through the intermediary of His Britannic Majesty's Government; they further engage not to send any Agents into Afghanistan.

Article II.

The Government of His Britannic Majesty having declared in the Treaty signed at Kabul on the 21 st March, 1905, that they recognized the Agreement and the engagements concluded with the late Ameer Abdur Rahman, and that they have no intention of interfering in the internal government of Afghan territory, Great Britain engaged neither to annex nor to occupy in contravention of that Treaty any portion of Afghanistan or to interfere in the internal administration of the country, provided that the Ameer fulfills the engagements already contracted by him towards His Britannic Majesty's Government under the above-mentioned Treaty.

Article III.

The Russian and Afghan authorities, specially

designated for the purpose on the frontier or in the frontier provinces, may establish relations with each other for the settlement of local questions of a non-political character.

Article IV.

His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Russian Government affirm their adherence to the principle of equality of commercial opportunity in Afghanistan, and they agree that any facilities which may have been, or shall be hereafter, obtained for British and British-Indian trade and traders, shall be equally enjoyed by Russian trade and traders. Should the progress of trade establish the necessity for Commercial Agents, the two Governments will agree as to what measures shall be taken, due regard, of course, being had to the Ameer's sovereign rights.

Article V.

The present arrangements will only come into force when His Britannic Majesty's Government shall have notified to the Russian Government the consent of the Ameer to the terms stipulated above.

Great Britain obtained for the first time from Russia in writing and in the form of a definite treaty, some sort of assurance on the following three points:

1. That the Russian Government considered Afghanistan as outside the sphere of Russian influence.
2. That all their political relations with Afghanistan should be conducted through the intermediary of His Majesty's Government.
3. That they would not send any agents into¹ Afghanistan.

Commercial agents could not be appointed in Afghanistan without previous agreement between the British and Russian Governments, and without due regard to the Ameer's sovereign rights.

The necessity of consent of the Ameer to an Agreement relating to Afghanistan was recognized by the late Government, since in the proposals which were submitted by Lord Lansdowne to the Russian ambassador, the following sentence occurred:

"It will be necessary that His Majesty's Government should obtain the approval of the Ameer of Afghanistan before any arrangement dealing with this question is concluded."²

By these negotiations Afghanistan was no longer

¹
G. & T. Vol. IV. p. 613.

²
G. & T. Vol. IV. p. 614.

to be a field for Russian intrigue against India, and the English were freed from a burden which had worried them for a long time.

Thibet was the third country to be dealt with in the problems of the Middle East which were settled by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Both contracting Powers recognized the territorial integrity of Thibet under the suzerainty of China, and agreed not to interfere with the country's internal administration or attempt to secure special concessions there. The land of the Lamas was to remain a barrier between the Russian bear and the British lion in India.

The full agreement concerning Thibet is as follows:

"The Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognizing the suzerain rights of China in Thibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in the maintenance of the status quo in the external relations of Thibet, have made the following Agreement:-

Article I.

The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the territorial integrity of Thibet and to abstain from all interference in its internal administration.

Article II.

In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Thibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Thibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations between British Commercial Agents and the Thibetan authorities provided for in Article V of the Convention between Great Britain and Thibet of the 7th September, 1904, and confirmed by the Convention between Great Britain and China on the 27 th April, 1906; nor does it modify the engagements entered into by Great Britain and China in Article I of the said Convention of 1906.

It is clearly understood that Buddhists, subjects of Great Britain or of Russia, may enter into direct relations on strictly religious matters with the Dalai Lama and the other representatives of Buddhism in Thibet; the Governments of Great Britain and Russia engage, so far as they are concerned, not to allow those relations to infringe the stipulations of the present Agreement.

Article III.

The British and Russian Governments respectively engage not to send Representatives to Lhasa.

Article IV.

The two High Contracting Parties engage neither to seek nor to obtain, whether for themselves of their subjects, any Concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, and mines, or other rights in Thibet.

Article V.

The two Governments agree that no part of the revenues of Thibet, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to Great Britain or Russia or to any of their subjects.

Lord Curzon was very insistent in the House of Lords that Russia was not a power which could be trusted and he seemed very unwilling to grant that the arrangement settled the disputes which had such long standing between the two nations. By this treaty, Anglo-Russian relations were drawn closer together than they had been for a century. The obstacles which had hindered peaceful co-operation were removed, yet the agreement was a bitter pill for the German Foreign Office to swallow.¹ Bismark's policy had always been

¹ Lee. King Edward VII. Vol. II, p. 572.

to maintain friendly relations with Russia and not to hinder Anglo-Russian antagonisms. It seemed that the King was gradually drawing a net around Germany which would eventually strangle her.

As a whole, the Agreement was well received. In his letter of September 5, 1907, to Sir Edward Grey, Sir E. Goschen, ambassador to Austria, gives a splendid example of the general acceptance of the text:-

"The news of the signature of the Anglo-Russian Agreement has been favorably received by the Vienna Press. Although any criticism of its contents is not yet possible, the mere fact that England and Russia have come to an understanding relating, as it is generally believed, to the Affairs of Central Asia and Persia, is held to be an event of the greatest political significance and one calculated to still further secure the general peace to which the recent meetings of Sovereigns and leading statesmen have already so largely contributed....."¹

Lord Lansdowne very wisely observed that lasting judgment of the Treaty would be impossible until it was seen how Russia would conduct herself. Russia was in such a position that she needed the goodwill

¹
G. & T. Vol. IV. p. 582.

and confidence of Great Britain. Her defeat in the Far East was very humiliating, and her only means of regaining her fallen prestige was by adding the friendship of Great Britain to the French Alliance. On the other hand, Great Britain had made definite friendly negotiations with France, and she needed assurance from Russia to cope with the rapid maturation of Germany. It was through diplomatic co-operation in various fields that many causes of local friction were removed. The Anglo-French Entente and the Dual Alliance broadened into the Triple Entente, which confronted the Triple Alliance on the European chess-board.¹

CHAPTER V

THE REVAL INTERVIEW, 1908

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The Convention of 1907 between England and Russia and the Reval visits were parts of the same policy, and the latter was necessary in order to cement the new friendship.¹ For some time before the visit, the press of both Paris and St. Petersburg had circulated rumours that a new Triple Alliance was in preparation between England, France, and Russia. Because of the propaganda which was being spread in this manner, on May 27, Sir E. Grey stated in the House of Commons that the King's visit to Russia was on the same lines of those visits which he had made to other sovereigns, and that there was no intention of contracting any new treaty with Russia.²

The proposed visit was warmly welcomed in Russia by the Tsar and his followers, and the Liberals as well. The Tsar is quoted as saying: "I am confident that this meeting will strengthen the numerous and

¹ G. & T. Vol. V. p. 236.

² Lee. Vol. II. p. 586.

powerful ties which unite our Houses, and will have a happy result of bringing our countries closer together, and of maintaining the peace of the world. During the past year several questions of great importance for Russia and Great Britain have been settled satisfactorily. I am certain that Your Majesty appreciates as much as myself the value of these agreements, for, despite their limited scope, they can only aid in spreading between our countries the sentiments of goodwill and mutual confidence."

"I can cordially subscribe to the words of Your Majesty on the Convention recently concluded," replied the King. "I believe it will serve to strengthen the ties which unite our peoples, and I am certain it will lead to a satisfactory settlement of some important matters in the future. I am convinced that it will also greatly aid to maintain the peace of the world."¹

On June 5, 1908, King Edward, Queen Alexandra and the Princess Victoria, sailed from Port Victoria² to pay the long expected visit to the Tsar. The journey to Kiel was very rough, but the canal was

¹ Quoted. W. & G. Vol. II. pp. 398,399; Lee. Vol. II. pp. 591,592.

² For a full account of visit, see Lee. Vol. II. pp. 586-596.

reached on June 7, and there the British royal party was met by Prince and Princess Henry of Prussia. The King landed at the entrance to the canal to inspect the masses of troops which were assembled and the guard of honour. After a short stay, their Majesties left again for Reval and were escorted by a division of German destroyers for some distance from the harbour.

"The smart appearance of the whole of the German North Sea Fleet lying in anchor in the port, gave food for reflection upon the recent German naval program of construction, while the intricate evolutions of the torpedo flotilla, which excited the admiration of all the Naval officers on board the Royal Yacht served as a useful object lesson of the efficiency¹ of the German navy."

The King and Queen arrived off Reval on Tuesday morning, June 9. The weather was delightful and the Tsar, the Imperial family, and the Queen of the Hellenes met their royal guests on board the two Imperial yachts and the cruiser "Almaz," the sole survivor of the large Russian fleet that took part in the battle of Tsushima.

¹
G. & T. Vol. V. p. 237; Hardinge's Report, June 12, 1908. pp. 237-245.

During the course of the visit the King had several interviews with M. Stolypine, the Tsar's chief Minister, "a grave, splendid-looking man with a long beard," and M. Izvolsky, from which the best possible impressions were created on both sides. Hardinge, for his part, had several opportunities of discussing with M. Izvolsky the various questions of foreign policy in which the two countries were particularly interested. Of the interview, he himself says: "I cannot help thinking that this direct exchange of views between the two Foreign Offices will be beneficial and facilitate the solution of most of our pending questions."¹

The question of Macedonian reform entailed a considerable amount of discussion, and gave M. Izvolsky an opportunity of expounding the general policy of Russia towards England and Germany. He explained to Hardinge that in Germany there was much fervor as to the future political developments amongst the Powers. He felt it was imperative that Russia should act with the greatest of prudence towards Germany, so that the latter country would have no cause to complain that the rapidly growing amity between England

¹ Hardinge's Report. G. & T. Vol. V. p. 238.

and Russia had caused a corresponding deterioration of the relations of Russia towards Germany. Izvolsky pointed out that the visit of the French President to London, of the King to Reval, and the impending visit of the President to Russia had not tended to improve the attitude of the already critical Germany, and he feared trouble from Germany over the adoption of the scheme of Macedonian reforms. He hoped that the King's visit to Reval might be consecrated by the announcement of the complete agreement of England and Russia upon the scheme of reforms to be adopted in Macedonia. They came to an agreement about the reforms to be conceded by Turkey to Macedonia, which was a ceaseless peril to the peace of Europe, for it was seething more and more with tyranny and revolt, brigandage and outrage.

More than once the Emperor expressed his great satisfaction at the visit of the King and Queen, which, he said, sealed and confirmed the intention and spirit of the Anglo-Russian Agreement. He expressed the conviction that the friendly sentiments which prevailed between England and Russia could only mature and increase in strength with the progress of time to the mutual advantage of both countries. He realized that there might be occasional divergence of views in small

matters, but the parallelism of the national interests of England and Russia in Europe and Asia would far outweigh any possible results from such trivial differences of opinion.

The King in conversation with the Tsar touched upon family affairs only; political matters were not mentioned. Hardinge says: "It is not for me to touch upon the private aspect of the effect of the King's visit upon the Emperor, and the manifest pleasure shown by the Emperor and the Empress at the meeting again after so long an interval of trial and misfortune to some of their relations to whom they are most attached, but some of the members of the Emperor's suite commented upon the marked difference in the Emperor's spirits and attitude during the King's visit to Reval compared to what they were at the Emperor's recent visit to Swinemünde, where he felt anxiety all the time as to what might be unexpectedly sprung upon him."¹

On the second day of the visit, while the King was on board the Imperial yacht "Standart," His Majesty appointed the Emperor as Admiral of the British Fleet. The honour was quite unexpected and greatly

¹ G. & T. Hardinge's Report. Vol. V. p. 245.

pleased the Emperor. At the official banquet that evening on board the royal yacht, the King proposed the Emperor's health, and the latter was saluted by the British cruisers. To those who recalled the overbearing, and self-confidence of the large Russian Fleet which sailed for Japan in 1904, and of which the sole surviving ship lay at anchor at Reval beside the Emperor's yacht, it was a pathetic and perhaps ironic incident when the Emperor arose and paid the King a counter-compliment by asking His Majesty to do him the honour of becoming an admiral "of our young and growing fleet." As the King warmly accepted the honour, the guns of the Emperor's yacht saluted the new Russian Admiral of the Fleet.¹

Such was a fitting ending to a satisfactory and successful visit whose crowning achievement had been the changing of an atmosphere of Russian suspicion and distrust towards England to one of cordial trust.

One result for which the Reval visit was held to have been a chief contributor was the establishment in October 1908 of the Russo-English Chamber of Commerce at St. Petersburg, which was joined by the influential members of the Duma and the Council of the Empire. Thus it was hoped that the recently

¹ G. & T. Hardinge's Report. Vol. V. p. 245.

declining Anglo-Russian trade would grow. It was widely felt that the Reval Interview helped to force growth of the German idea of King Edward's "encirclement policy." The Kaiser harboured an entirely incorrect opinion of the King in thinking that the latter was "really an ogre who sought with incredible astuteness and success to build a ring of steel around Germany!"¹ In reality King Edward was utterly for peace, and those who saw in his round of visits to the sovereigns of many European countries signs of hemming in of Germany, most conveniently forgot that during the entire length of his reign, he had more meetings with the Kaiser than with any other crowned head in Europe.²

The many various efforts to better the Turkish Government in Macedonia were very futile and tiresome. The British protests against Turkish misrule decreased her influence and was adverse to British commercial interests there. A prevalent humanitarian feeling in England and persisting sympathy for the Christians who were under Turkish dominion was extremely strong, and British political and commercial

¹ Lee. Vol. II, p. 596.

² Ibid.

interests were overborne by it.¹

As each of the other Powers was vitally interested in Macedonian Reforms, it was necessary to deal with all measures in a concert of Powers. The cardinal point of Russian and Austrian Foreign Policy was prestige in the Balkans, and each watched the movements of the other with keen distrust, lest one should gain a slight advantage over the other. Germany was selfishly thinking of her own political and commercial influence and expansion in Turkey, neither of which she would risk for philanthropic reasons. France had just escaped from her difficulties in Morocco, she was rather dubious of more to come, and she wished to avoid trouble elsewhere. She, too, had her commercial interests and refused to lead a Crusade against the Sultan.

It is futile to give an account of the task which the Powers undertook in trying to improve or mitigate Turkish rule in Macedonia.² The Concerted negotiations had progressed to such a point that in the middle of June, King Edward's Government was in such a position to submit a draft note to the Russian

¹ Grey. Vol. I. pp. 166, 167.

² G. & T. Vol. V. pp. 230-231, 248-262, 272-307.

Government which was accepted in principle, and which was also accorded a satisfactory reception by the other Powers. However, before negotiations reached their final stage, the revolution of the Young Turks broke out in Turkey. Fear of the "Reval programme" of reforms had hastened the preparations, and on July 3, 1908, the standard of revolt against the Sultan was raised in Macedonia with astounding success. When it was apparent that the new regime was firmly established, the British and Russian Governments dropped the matter.

The Macedonian Reforms as they had progressed and developed under Russian and British negotiations, though they were not successful in their ultimate aim, were significant as an indication of a reconciliation of English and Russian policies in the Balkans, and were a supplement to the Convention of 1907.

CHAPTER VI

NATURE OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

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NATURE OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

On June 29, 1891, the fact that the Triple Alliance had been renewed was made public and Franco-Russian suspicion was intensified. It was the general opinion in both countries that England was adhering to the Triple Alliance in order to thwart the ambitions of Russia in the Straits. To the Russians it was annoying, because they wished to open up the Dardanelles, and to the French because they had not completed the development of their colonial policy¹ in Western Africa.

The renewal of the Triple Alliance, backed by sympathy from Great Britain, for which no attempt was made for concealment, made it very obvious that if Russia wished to break her isolation, it was necessary that she find a partner in France. On July 23, a French fleet entered Russian waters for the first time since the Crimean War. A new chapter in European history was begun when a warmer reception was given the French at Cronstadt than was usual for official greetings. Before this time, in absolutist Russia, the playing of the Marseillaise had been strictly forbidden, both in public places and in private homes.

¹Fay. Vol. I. p. 111.

During the French visit the prohibition was relaxed, but was re-imposed after their departure, and the news was heralded abroad that "the Autocrat of all the Russians had stood bareheaded while the bands played the marching song of the Sans-culottes of 1793."¹

In France the Cronstadt demonstration was received with much enthusiasm, and it created a very deep impression throughout Europe. The French Government hastened to propose an alliance stipulating that the two governments should agree to consult with one another in case of any danger, and they were to mobilize simultaneously as soon as any one of the Triple Powers should mobilize. Giers was rather skeptical of the designs for recovering Alsace-Lorraine, and it was his desire to make the agreement vague and applicable in Africa and the Far East. While France constantly feared a renewed attack from Germany, Russia, on the other hand, felt no great hostility towards Germany, as her traditional enemy was England. France did not want Russia to have absolute control of the Dardanelles and Constantinople, and in the controversies of North Africa, she did not need Russian support to any extent because it was

¹
Fay. Vol. I. p. 112.

comparatively easy to make compromise agreements with England and Russia.

Because of such a wide divergence of interests, it was some time before the French Government was able to give the Entente a more stable and binding form. It was felt that the Entente should be supplemented by a Military Convention which was to provide that in case of a sudden German aggression, the whole forces of France and Russia should mobilize immediately and work to secure mutual advantage. General Miribel drew up a draft which met Russian desires with a few modifications. It was signed by the Chief of Staff of both countries and approved by the Tsar on August 17, 1892. As yet, it could not be considered as having binding force, for it had not been signed by the Ambassador or Foreign Minister of either country.

A further delay of a year and a half was caused by the desire of the Tsar that absolute secrecy should be preserved, and that the document should be known only to the President and Prime Minister of France. In direct opposition to this was the fact that the French Constitution did not permit the President of the Republic to make secret treaties.

On January 4, 1894, the Tsar gave his approval to an exchange of official diplomatic notes which made binding the Military Convention of August 17, 1892, and it became the basis of the very secret Franco-Russian Alliance. Though no one doubted that an alliance had been concluded, the momentous secret was not officially revealed to the world until January, 1895. As neither the exchange of notes nor the Military Convention, which was signed only by the Military Officials of both countries, was a formal treaty, neither had to be submitted to the French Parliament for ratification. The text of the Military Convention was never made public until it was published in a French Yellow Book in 1918.

The conclusion of the Dual Alliance was an event of great significance not only for the two countries directly concerned, but also for Europe. It was universally recognized that France had recovered from her catastrophic defeat when a first-class Power should seek an Alliance with her. In France, because of the secrecy of the agreement, there was a hope that it might contain some assurance in regard to the recovery of the lost Rhine provinces. Russia was coveting plans for expansion in the Far East, and the proposed Siberian Railway would require the unlimited capital which France was always eager to supply at a

moderate rate. From the viewpoint of European politics, the conclusion of the alliance was a sign that the reign of Bismark had come to an end. The Triple Alliance was stronger than its new rival and its position was not altered so long as Great Britain's sympathy could be counted on. The diplomatic situation would be transformed and the balance of power would be tilted when Great Britain should change her support from the older to the younger group.

The death of Queen Victoria in 1901, and the retirement of Lord Salisbury in 1902, opened the way for two men who were more enthusiastic than their predecessors for closer relations with France --- Edward VII and Lord Lansdowne. As Prince of Wales, the new King had spent much of his time in Paris or on the Riviera. In the spring of 1903, on his own initiative, he paid to Paris his first formal visit as King, and was delighted by his reception. Lord Lansdowne and M. Delcassé were the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs in London and Paris respectively.

Egypt, for more than a quarter of a century, had been the perpetual source of friction between Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay.¹ Objection to British

¹
W. & G. Vol. III. p. 309.

occupation of Egypt had for a long time been the cardinal point of French Foreign Policy. An agreement acceptable to France would be hard to obtain, and yet it was absolutely necessary for Great Britain to have French support for her position to be satisfactory.¹ It was a great relief to England when she received the assurance that "the Government of the French Republic, for their part declare they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in Egypt by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other manner, and that they give their assent to the draft Khedival Decree, containing the guarantees considered necessary for the protection of the interests of the Egyptian bondholders, on the condition that, after its promulgation, it cannot be modified in any way without the consent of the Powers² Signatory of the Convention of London of 1885."

Morocco, on the other hand, was pregnant with trouble for France, and it soon became a diplomatic nightmare for all Europe. Spain had a number of settlements on the north coast of Africa, but she did not wish to acquire any of the inner territory of Morocco. Spain wished only the assurance of retaining

¹ Grey. Vol. II. p. 49.

² Complete Treaty Text. Herbert H. Asquith, The Genesis of the War. pp. 372-376.

her Mediterranean coast line and a few sea ports on the Atlantic coast opposite the Canary Islands, if Morocco were to be partitioned. The French felt that the destiny of their great colony of Algeria, as well as the aspirations for a great North African Colonial Empire, made it important that French control be extended over Morocco, either by police supervision, by a protectorate, or by direct annexation. After the French had taken Tunis from under her grasp, Italy was without colonies and looked towards Morocco. In 1900, France bought the claims of Italy by a direct promise not to interfere with Italian aspirations in Tripoli. England wished to prevent any European Power from establishing a coaling station on the Atlantic coast of Morocco; if she could not acquire Tangier for herself, she was determined not to let it fall into the hands of any other Great Power; and lastly, she did not intend to loose the control of the entrance to the Mediterranean, which Gibraltar for two centuries had assured her, by the Pillar of Ceuta falling into the hands of any other strong European Power. The rapidly increasing commercial interests in Morocco were Germany's chief cause for wishing to preserve her status there,¹ and some Germans wished to es-

¹
Op. cit. Fay. Vol. I. pp. 155-158.

tablish a German Colony in western Morocco. This was opposed by the Kaiser for fear of antagonising England and France.

In the agreement between England and France in 1904, which referred to Egypt and Morocco, were involved Spain and Germany, and to a lesser degree, other Powers. In view of the important French concessions in Egypt, England recognized the special interests of France in Morocco. The Government of Great Britain promised not to hinder French action in Morocco, with a view of maintaining order and assisting the Sultan in making effective reforms in his government. Great Britain was to maintain her treaty rights under the Convention of 1856, and French and British commerce was to enjoy absolute equality for a period of thirty years. France guaranteed that she would not annex any territory or erect fortifications near the Straits of Gibraltar, and that she would prevent any other power from doing so. The principle of commercial liberty was recognized by both countries in Egypt and Morocco, and free passage through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar was assured.

In Article IX of the Anglo-French Convention of

1904, England promised France merely diplomatic support, but this was soon supplemented by momentous but very secret naval and military arrangements, or as Sir Edward Grey calls them, "conversations,"¹ which came to be a most vital link in the system of Secret Alliances. Public opinion demanded some sort of understanding between England and France, something more substantial than mere diplomatic support. Lord Lansdowne and M. Cambon entered into discussions for an exchange of notes, and they seemed to have advanced until the notes had been presented to M. Delcassé for his final approval.² The latter interpreted them as an assurance of a British alliance and armed support, on the strength of which he was prepared to risk a war with Germany, and they became the basis of his arguments while trying to persuade the French Cabinet and President to refuse the German demands in the Morocco crisis. M. Delcassé resigned when President Loubet and the Rouvier Cabinet declined to take the risk of war.³

Sir Edward Grey points out very definitely that the naval and military conversations which began in

¹ Grey. Vol. I. Chapter VI.

² Fay. Vol. I. p. 196.

³ Ibid. Vol. I. p. 197.

1905 under Lord Lansdowne, were not to commit either Government, and involved no promise in support of war.¹ M. Delcassé was so ardent in his desire for a promise of military or naval support if Germany forced war upon France, that he tended to greatly exaggerate the nature of Lord Lansdowne's offer. This is a very dangerous example of either conscious or unconscious interpretations when a country desires something more than mere diplomatic support.

On December 11, 1905, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman formed a Cabinet, in which Sir Edward Grey replaced Lord Lansdowne at the Foreign Office. One of the first tasks which claimed his attention was to quiet the fears of the French.² He could only state his own personal opinion that if the French were attacked by Germany in consequence of a question arising out of the Morocco Agreement, public opinion in England would be moved strongly in favour of France.³ Grey further pointed out to M. Cambon that both England and France might be involved in war if a formal Alliance were formed as a result of the extension of British diplomatic support. He assured M. Cambon, when the latter was summarizing Grey's personal opinions, that: "Much

¹ Grey. Vol. I. p. 74.

² Ibid. Vol. I. p. 74ff.

³ Ibid. Vol. I. p. 75.

would depend as to the manner in which the war broke out between Germany and France. I did not think people in England would be prepared to fight in order to put France in possession of Morocco. They would say that France should wait for opportunities and be content to take time, and that it was unreasonable to hurry matters to the point of war. But if, on the other hand, it appeared that the war was forced upon France by Germany to break up the Anglo-French "Entente," public opinion would undoubtedly be very strong on the side of France. At the same time, M. Cambon must remember that England at the present moment would be most reluctant to find herself engaged in a great war, and I hesitated to express a decided opinion as to whether the strong feeling of the Press and of public opinion on the side of France would be strong enough to overcome the great reluctance which existed amongst us now to find ourselves involved in war. I asked M. Cambon, however, to bear in mind that, if the French Government desired it, it would be possible at any time to re-open the conversation. Events might change, but, as things were at present, I did not think it was necessary to press

the question of a defensive alliance."¹

This long and critical interview between Sir Edward Grey and M. Cambon is significant for several reasons. In the first place, the very strong sympathy which Grey held for France, his very evident desire to render the diplomatic support as far as possible, and at the same time his reticence in making any formal engagement, either written or verbal, which might bind England to war, is all very evident. In the second place, the official military and naval conversations between the British and French Staffs, was approved and confirmed by Sir Edward. In the third place, neither Grey's statement to Cambon, nor his approval of the naval and military conversations, was made with the knowledge and sanction of the cabinet. It was not until 1912 that circumstances caused the military and naval "conversations" to be revealed to the whole Cabinet, and not until Grey's speech of August 3, 1914, that Parliament and the British public had any inkling of them.² In Grey's own words: "It has been necessary to divide on this conversation at length, because it

¹ Grey. Vol. I. pp. 78-79.

² Op. cit. Fay. Vol. I. pp. 207-209.

defines the position that was maintained up to the very outbreak of the war. From time to time, the same question was raised, but never did we go a hairs-breadth beyond the position taken in the conversation with M. Cambon on January 31, 1906."¹

The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, when it is regarded as a complement of the Anglo-French Entente, forms the final phase of the diplomatic revolution which was gradually taking place in Europe. The three Powers, Great Britain, France and Russia were thus united in an entente which was less solid than an absolute alliance, but which exerted equally as much power, and which was of equal diplomatic value. At the beginning of King Edward's reign, there had existed between Great Britain and France, and Great Britain and Russia, sufficient acute points of difference to have caused half a dozen wars. In 1907 each of these conflicting antagonisms had been reconciled, and friendship had taken the place of suspicion and distrust. "The King lost no opportunity at any time of furthering the most cordial relations between his own country and the rest of Europe. His aim was peace and cordial co-operation."²

¹ Grey. Vol. I. p. 79.

² Lee. Vol. II. p. 573.

Thus the removal of local friction between England and Russia was followed, as had been the case with France, by diplomatic co-operation in various fields. The Entente Cordiale and the Dual Alliance developed into the Triple Entente, which confronted the Triple Alliance on the European chess-board.¹ The Alliance between Great Britain and Japan virtually made Japan a fourth member of the Entente, and gave her a position which no Oriental state had ever attained.²

Between the years of 1907 and 1914, there was an increasing strengthening of the bonds of opposition between the two distinct groups in which six great powers of Europe had gradually divided themselves. It has been well said that it was the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 which marks, politically, the era which ended in the peace treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Sevres and where not.³ During the first four years the development was retarded; but beginning with the French occupation of Fez, (spring of 1911), the German threat at Agadir, the Italian seizure of

¹ W. & G. Vol. III. p. 366.

² See above, p. 23.

³ S. & S. p. 459.

Tripoli, Anglo-German naval rivalry, the failure of the Haldane Mission, and the Balkan Wars, it¹ proceeded more rapidly.

Bismark had made it the cardinal point of his foreign policy that Germany should always be on good terms with Russia and that the Anglo-Russian antagonisms should be fostered. After a generation of such fixed ideas, the Convention between Russia and Great Britain was rather a bitter pill for the Foreign Office of Germany to swallow, though the German press received the news of the Convention with apparent indifference as in no way affecting² German interests.

The crystallization of opposition between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente was accentuated³ by four tendencies. Each of the systems of alliances tended to change from an alliance of "peace and amity" to one of defensive character. Just as Germany felt it her duty to back her ally if the latter became involved in a war with Russia, so France felt it her

¹ Ibid. Introduction to Book Three. The Entente and Germany, pp. 459-473 gives a comprehensive and authentic summary of period 1907-1914.

² Lee. Vol. II. p. 572.

³ Fay. Vol. I. pp. 224-226.

obligation to back Russia. While France was trying to strengthen the prestige of the Triple Entente, Germany tried to tighten up the Triple Alliance. The sharp conflicts between Austria and Italy tended to widen the bonds of the Alliance, while England, France and Russia were able to make closer negotiations for both military and naval co-operation because of their proximity of interests. Even though the bonds of both camps were tightened up and strengthened, there still remained within the Entente and the Alliance, more occasions of distrust and suspicion than is ordinarily supposed. Within each group, therefore, special efforts were made to increase the harmony and security and to lessen the friction and suspicion. This was accomplished by bartering and mutual concessions to the selfish aims of the fellow-members. Within both groups of the six important Powers of Europe there was a rapid increase of military and naval armaments. In the opposite camp there resulted an ever-increasing tendency for suspicion, fear and hatred for the opposite camp. This led to greater armaments, and thus, to that vicious circle of steadily increasing war preparations, mutual fears and common suspicion which was ultimately to engulf the world in that yawning chasm of 1914.

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