The railroads of Kentucky 1861-1865.

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THE RAILROADS OF KENTUCKY
1861 - 1865

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty
Of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
Of Master of Arts

Department of History

By

Jessie Munday

1925
In studying and teaching history, I have been convinced that the transportation facilities of a country have helped or hindered its political, industrial, and commercial development.

In this thesis, I have endeavored to show the value of the railroads of Kentucky during the political conflict known as the Civil War.

I have consulted a number of historical records and have tried to select from them, the most convincing proofs. Articles consulted are listed in the bibliography at the close. This thesis was prepared in connection with a seminar course at the University of Louisville, on "Kentucky during the Civil War".

"The Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 1861-1865", by Dr. R. S. Cotterill, discusses very carefully the history of the Louisville and Nashville during the War. Therefore, I have not discussed that road in this thesis.

Jessie Munday
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INTRODUCTION
In the decade preceding the Civil War, the railroads in Kentucky, as in many of our other states, had begun to prove, indisputably, their value from a commercial viewpoint. From 1861-1865, the railroads, instituted to further the development of peaceful pursuits and progressive plans, played their parts in the great political conflict between the North and the South. In this great struggle, the railroads of Kentucky assumed a conspicuous place.

There were several railroads in operation, in Kentucky, during the Civil War. Probably, the most noted of all those railroads was the Louisville and Nashville, whose record, during the War, has already been recorded. (1) Another of these roads was the Louisville and Frankfort, connecting the two cities from which it acquired its name. Another road extended from Lexington to Frankfort and was known as the Lexington and Frankfort. A fourth railroad, the Kentucky Central, connected Covington and Lexington. A leased branch of the last named railroad extended from Lexington to Nicholasville. The Mobile and Ohio had been constructed from Mobile, Alabama, to Columbus, Kentucky, and, hence, crossed the extreme western corner of Kentucky.
The early history of the two railroads, known as the Louisville and Frankfort and the Lexington and Frankfort, dates back to the incorporation of the Lexington and Ohio Railroad Company by an act of the Kentucky Legislature, January 27, 1830. According to this act, the Lexington and Ohio Railroad Company was given all right necessary to construct a railroad from Lexington to one or more points on the Ohio River. (2)

By an act of the Legislature, February 2, 1833, the Company was given power to go through Louisville to the Ohio River at points which seemed advisable. (3)

One and one half miles of the road had been completed by August 1, 1832. The road was formally opened August 14, 1832. In the winter of 1835, the "First iron horse dashed into Frankfort with a train of cars at its heels, drawn all the way from Lexington. Frankfort and Lexington were now connected". (4)

Work at the other end of the line was not so satisfactory. The road from Portland to Louisville was finished in 1838 and a steam railway service instituted. However, after several years, a locomotive exploded and that end of the line discontinued its work. (5)

The railroad was sold, January, 1842, the company having been default. The State became the
purchaser. (6) The road between Lexington and Frankfort was leased by an act of March 9, 1843, by the Board of Internal Improvements, to Philip Swigert and William McKee, for seven years, dating from March 13, 1843. (7) McKee died and, by a legislative act of February 29, 1848, the State became his substitute for two years. (8)

The Louisville and Frankfort Railroad Company was incorporated by an act of the Legislature, March 1, 1847, with power to build a railroad from St. Clair Street, Frankfort, to one or more points on the Ohio. Power was also given to construct branches. This new company purchased, February 29, 1848, the rights of the part of the old Lexington and Ohio Railroad between Frankfort and Louisville. (9) The road from Frankfort to Louisville was completed December 13, 1851, with the terminal at Louisville instead of Portland. The depot was on Jefferson between Brook and Floyd Streets. (10)

The part of the railroad between Lexington and Frankfort was purchased by the Lexington and Frankfort Railroad Company which was incorporated by an act of the Legislature, February 28, 1848. Power was given, by this act, to construct the road from Lexington to one or more points on the Kentucky river in or near Frankfort. (11) Provision was also made that the Louisville and Frankfort and the Lexington and Frankfort railroads should be operated as a
continuous line between Lexington and Louisville, the net profits to be divided between the two companies.

(12)

Beginning July 1, 1859, the whole line from Lexington to Louisville was operated as one road under the control of an executive committee of six members. Thus the old Lexington and Ohio Railroad, the first built in Kentucky and the first west of the Alleghany Mountains, disappeared. Instead, there appeared two railroads, the Louisville and Frankfort and the Lexington and Frankfort. The last two, although they were separate roads during the War, were operated as one. The available reports, in many cases, deal with the roads as with one system.

A few facts pertaining to the early history of the Kentucky Central will help to locate the field through which that road operated during the War. The history of the road may be traced to the incorporation of the Licking and Lexington Railroad Company, by an act of the Kentucky Legislature, March 1, 1847. According to this act, the proposed road was to begin at or in Newport or Covington, to proceed through or near Falmouth, Cynthiana, and Paris to Lexington. Branch roads were also permissible. (13)

An act of the Legislature changed the name of the company to the Covington and Lexington Railroad Company in 1849. (14) The Legislature passed an act, March 10, 1856, to amend the charters of the Covington
A stone sill which formed a part of the old Lexington & Ohio track. Straps of iron were fastened along the top of such sills.
and Lexington and Lexington and Danville, a railroad which had been chartered but not constructed, so as to make it possible to have the two railroads adopt the name of the Kentucky Central Railroad. This name, however, did not effect the separate corporate name or responsibilities of either company. There were, therefore, two divisions of the Kentucky Central. The first division extended from Covington to Lexington and the second was to extend from Lexington to the Tennessee line. (15) The road from Lexington to the Tennessee line, however, had not been constructed further than Nicholasville.

The property, rights, and franchises of the company were sold, October 5, 1859. R. B. Bowler, as director, was real purchaser. Bowler and several others formed a joint stock company, January 1, 1861, for operating the road. (16)

On January 1, 1863, the title was vested in Q. A. Keith and William Ernst who were to hold as trustees, for interested parties, for the uses stated in a deed executed to them by Bowler and wife, January 30, 1863. (17) The association controlled that part of the Kentucky Central, known as the First Division or Covington and Lexington Railroad, until the close of the War.

The Covington and Lexington and its successor, the Kentucky Central, operated, under
three leases, during the War, the road known as the Maysville and Lexington Railroad. The latter had been incorporated by three acts of the Legislature, in the decade preceding the War. It was sold under foreclosure, April 23, 1856, to a committee of bondholders who recognized the company, December 4, 1856 and was operated as, previously stated, during the period of the Civil War. (18) The part of the road from Paris to Lexington, 17.69 miles, was completed before the outbreak of the War but the section from Paris to Maysville was not completed until after the close of the War.

Thus the Kentucky Central, as referred to in this article, embraces the Covington and Lexington Railroad, the leased Maysville and Lexington Railroad, and the section of railroad from Lexington to Nicholasville.

The Mobile and Ohio Railroad Company was incorporated in Alabama, February 3, 1848 and completed the railroad, as far as Columbus, Kentucky, by April 22, 1861.

At the opening of the War, a railroad extended from Paducah into Tennessee. The citizens of Paducah had voted to build a branch road from Paducah to the Mobile and Ohio but the road was not completed.
In addition to the roads mentioned, a number of other roads or branches had been projected. Among the incompleted roads, was the Henderson and Nashville, which was not finished until after the War.

Kentucky, therefore, had railroad facilities at the beginning of 1861 which, necessarily, would play a part in the conflict between the North and the South.
At the beginning of the Civil War, the Louisville and Frankfort, consisting of 65 miles of road, and the Lexington and Frankfort, 29 miles in length, constituted two very important links in the chain of railroads extending through Kentucky. This chain of railroads was made possible because Lexington was not only the terminus of one of the roads just mentioned but also of the Kentucky Central which made northern connection through Lexington while Louisville was a terminus of both the Louisville and Frankfort and the Louisville and Nashville. Louisville was a storage place for supplies. Although the railroad connection past outlined was rather indirect, in times of war, all available methods of transportation are reverted to regardless of whether they may or may not have been previously used as the most practical route. Thus the Louisville and Frankfort and Lexington and Frankfort played their part as connecting links and served the Union cause during the War.

As these two separate roads were operated as one under a body of directors during the War, this article will consider the two simultaneously.

The rolling stock of the two roads was limited, consisting, at the beginning of the War of 5 baggage cars, 10 passenger cars, 45 house freight cars, 18 house stock cars, 50 open stock cars, 43
At the beginning of the Civil War, the Louisville and Frankfort, consisting of 65 miles of road, and the Lexington and Frankfort, 29 miles in length, constituted two very important links in the chain of railroads extending through Kentucky. This chain of railroads was made possible because Lexington was not only the terminus of one of the roads just mentioned but also of the Kentucky Central which made northern connection through Covington while Louisville was a terminus of both the Louisville and Frankfort and the Louisville and Nashville. Louisville was a storage place for supplies. Although the railroad connection just outlined was rather indirect, in times of war, all available methods of transportation are reverted to regardless of whether they may or may not have been previously used as the most practical route. Thus the Louisville and Frankfort and Lexington and Frankfort played their part as connecting links and served the Union cause during the War.

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The rolling stock of the two roads was limited, consisting, at the beginning of the War of 5 baggage cars, 10 passenger cars, 49 house freight cars, 18 house stock cars, 50 open stock cars, 43
platform cars, 18 construction cars, 20 hand ballast cars, 26 hand cars, and 13 locomotives. (19)

During the period of Kentucky's neutrality policy, the Louisville and Frankfort and the Lexington and Frankfort were effected by Kentucky's attitude toward the War. The states north of Kentucky looked with suspicion at their southern neighbor and made efforts to prevent articles being shipped to Kentucky for fear that those articles would proceed to the seceded states. Naturally, the business of the Louisville and Frankfort and the Lexington and Frankfort was interfered with.

A group of Cincinnati citizens declared that any person, in that city, who sold or shipped provisions or contraband articles of war to any state which had not declared its loyalty to the government, was a traitor. (20) Thus they tried to stop trade with Kentucky and the South. The governor of Ohio issued orders, in April 1861, that the presidents of railroads in Ohio examine freight going toward any seceded state and the legislature of that state declared it treason to send military provisions to enemies of the United States. (21) Committees were appointed by the legislature of Indiana to investigate regulations necessary in regard to shipping grains and provisions on the different railroads. (22)
An order was given by Salmon P. Chase, May 3, 1861, to seize railroad cars whose destination was a place under insurrectionary control. (23) This order also affected the two roads. Some of the people of Kentucky tried to stop trade. A meeting was held, in April, at the Court House in Louisville for those who were opposed to shipping. A Letter from a citizen of Louisville appeared in a Cincinnati paper, in April, asking the people of Cincinnati not to ship grain and provisions to Louisville for, according to the letter, those provisions would go south. (24) Thus, during the period of neutrality, there was a strong effort on the part of some to stop trade over the railroads leading into Kentucky and to Louisville, the supply station for the Louisville and Nashville Railroad.

The annual reports for the two roads for the fiscal year, embracing the first part of 1861, showed a decrease in the earnings as compared with those of the preceding year. Yet, notwithstanding the efforts that were made to stop trade, Superintendent Gill stated in his report that while a large portion of the decrease was due to the decrease in passenger receipts caused by the political conditions, yet, at the same time, there were comparatively good receipts from articles of produce. (25) However, it
was necessary to reduce the wages and salaries of the employees of the road that year.

After the period of neutrality came to an end, there seemed no doubt that the Louisville and Frankfort and the Lexington and Frankfort railroads would support the Union Cause. Edward D. Hobbs, the president of the roads from 1855-1867, was said to be energetic, skillful in business, sound in judgment, and of excellent character. Samuel Gill, the superintendent, was a strong Union man. Both men seemed to co-operate with the plans of the North.

The military campaigns embracing Kentucky, in 1861, involved the railroads in the southern part of the State rather than those in the northern section. In the year 1862, however, the Confederates showed that they realized the importance of the railroads, in Northern Kentucky, as connecting links and endeavored to break the lines of communication. Hence the Louisville and Frankfort and the Lexington and Frankfort suffered.

One of the leaders in attacks upon the railroads was John Morgan. On July 8, 1862, he crossed the Cumberland River into Kentucky on his first raid. He routed a force at Tompkinsville and, within a few days, marched through Glasgow, Lebanon, Springfield, Harrodsburg, Lawrenceburg, and Versailles to Midway. At the latter place, the telegraph operator
was captured, desired information was received from Federal headquarters, and misleading messages about Confederate activities forwarded, causing a change in Federal plans and creating excitement in important cities along the railroads between Louisville and Lexington. Troops had been sent, from Harrodsburg, to burn the railroad bridges and prevent troops being sent from Louisville and Cincinnati to interfere at Midway.

The train, bound for Louisville, which left Lexington on July 15, 1862, received information, the other side of Midway, that the railroad track had been torn up. The train returned to Lexington. No trains ran between Frankfort and Lexington on the fifteenth, sixteenth, or seventeenth. After the railroad track near Midway had been repaired, the Confederates had visited it again and had torn up a part of the track causing the delay in transportation.

Not only were these railroads effected during Morgan's raid, in 1862, but again, in the fall of that year, they became involved in a military campaign. During the invasion of General Bragg and General Kirby Smith, the Confederate forces showed their desire to control the railroad communication with the North.

In the latter part of the summer of 1862, General Kirby Smith entered Kentucky through Big
Creek Gap. (27) He proceeded toward Richmond. The road was about $25,000. (11) While the roads were in the hands of the Confederates, naturally all bus- retreated toward Lexington. By September 1, 1862, Lexington had been evacuated by the Federals and occupied by General Smith. (28) There Morgan joined the Confederates on September 4, 1862. The Federals abandoned Frankfort and other important posts, leaving the Louisville and Frankfort and the Lexington and Frankfort in the hands of the Confederates. Within a short time, General Kirby Smith joined General Bragg at Frankfort. General Don Carlos Buell entered Louisville in the latter part of September. At the end of that month, the Confederates held Frankfort and Lexington. During the month of September and a part of October, therefore, the Louisville and Frankfort and the Lexington and Frankfort, for nearly the entire length, were in the hands of the Confederates. The rebels, at one time, ran a passenger train between Lexington and Frankfort with the locomotive Jefferson. (29)

After the battle of Perryville, Bragg retreated from Kentucky and the roads passed out of Confederate hands.

During the occupancy of the roads by the Confederate troops "all the bridges (save the one over Elkhorn), one water-station, several hand cars, and three or four sets of telegraph instruments were destroyed by burns." (30) The cost of repairing the road was about $25,000. (11) While the roads were in the hands of the Confederates, naturally all bus-
destroyed by them". (30) The cost of repairing the roads was about $26,500. (31) While the roads were in the hands of the Confederates, naturally all business ceased, material loss was caused, and the roads were not able to carry on their part in the great strife.

In his annual report, for these roads for the fiscal year embracing the latter part of 1861 and the early part of 1862, Mr. Hobbs called attention to the small net earnings. The superintendent's report of the earnings for that same year showed a reduction of 26 per cent for transportation of passengers and 36 per cent for transportation of freight. Mr. Gill explained the reductions as due to the political trouble, destroying communication with the South and suspending travel. (32)

In his annual report, September 1, 1863, embracing the latter part of 1862 and the early part of 1863, President Hobbs called attention to the fact that there had been an increase of receipts from transportation of passenger and freight and that the increase was due, in part, to shipment of food and supplies, necessary for carrying on War. There seemed to be a decrease in shipments of foodstuffs for the roads, due to the road in repairing damage done in the fall of 1862 during the occupancy by the Confederates. (33)

The reports of shipment for the fiscal year 1862 as compared with that of the fiscal year
1861 show a decrease in shipments of meat, hemp, lumber, iron, steel, coffee, sugar, flour, wool, cotton, shingles, laths, cars of sand and brick, by agricultural implements, coal, and several other articles. An increase is shown in the shipment of wheat, corn, and barley. (34) This helps to prove the statement that there was a decrease in receipts from shipment of ordinary freight during the latter part of 1861 and early part of 1862 as a result of unsettled conditions and the elimination of trade with the South. On the other hand, there was an increase in shipments of foods needed during the War.

The reports of shipment given for fiscal year 1863 (35) as compared with the reports of shipments for 1862 show a decrease in lumber, iron, steel, rope, sugar, flour, wool, lime, cement, cars of brick and sand, agricultural implements, coal, and several other articles. They show an increase in shipment of wheat, meat, coffee, corn, salt, and a few additional articles. This shows that the increase in receipts was due in part to shipment of food and supplies, necessary for carrying on War. There seemed to be a decrease in those articles such as lumber, brick, agricultural implements, and articles used in times of peace in industrial development. (37) A mail had been torn during the year 1862, a number of soldiers were carried on the two roads. Hence conclusions may
be drawn that, in the latter part of 1862 and early part of 1863, the Louisville and Frankfort and the Lexington and Frankfort, although interfered with by Confederates, played their part in the War through the shipment of troops, government stores, and things necessary for the continuation of the War. After 1862, no well planned military campaign took place in Kentucky. However, traces of the War were felt during the remaining years of the Conflict.

Great excitement prevailed in the early part of 1863, on the routes of the Louisville and Frankfort and the Lexington and Frankfort roads because of anticipated attacks by the rebel forces part under John Morgan. On February 21, 1863, a regiment of Morgan's cavalry, led by Colonel Roy S. Cluke, pursued a Federal force from Richmond to Lexington. (36) Morgan's cavalry appeared at several towns not far distant from the railroads. Morgan, himself, passed through Kentucky on his raid into Indiana but did not touch either of these roads.

However, during 1863, bands of guerillas caused trouble on these lines. For example, the east bound train on July 1, 1863, was thrown from the track just west of Christianburg. (37) A rail had been torn from the track by the rebels. The engineer saw the trouble in time to save the lives of his
passengers but the train ran off the track. The 
guerillas rifled the mail bags. The passengers were 
searched for firearms and valuables and then ordered 
off the train. Two cars were burned.

On July the seventh, the Louisville train 
left Frankfort on time but was compelled to remain at 
Eminence for twenty-four hours. Rebels were on all 
sides and wires cut above and below Eminence. Troops 
were sent up to relieve the train and it continued on 
its way to Louisville. (38)

Conditions of the trade of the roads as 
shown by the annual reports for the early part of 
1863 have been discussed. The annual reports in 1864, 
which embraced the latter part of 1863 and first part 
of 1864, show the earnings increased. The president 
called attention, however, to the fact that the ex-
penses had been increased in a greater ratio. He also 
mentioned the fact that the business of the railroad 
had been affected first by the guerilla raids which 
caused a loss of about $15,000 or $16,000. He cited 
the fact that another interruption had been caused by 
changing the gauge from four feet eight and one-half 
inches to five feet, in the fall of 1863. (39) This 
change had been ordered by the National Government in 
order that the gauge of the Louisville and Frankfort 
and the Lexington and Frankfort railroads would be the 
same as that of the Kentucky Central and Louisville
and Nashville. This change caused a cessation of business entirely for twelve days and a partial interference with freight for nearly three months.

The superintendent, in his reports for the fiscal year 1864, showed there was received for transportation an increase over the previous year of 36 4/10 per cent for passengers, 36 3/10 per cent for

law had been causing trouble. On February 26, 1863, there were shipped 6,000 barrels from Louisville to the Contraband Association at Cincinnati (44).

The changing of the gauge to agree with the Louisville and Nashville proved that the National Government considered the Louisville and Frankfort and the Washington and Frankfort important lines in the transportation system.

John Morgan made his fifth and last raid into Kentucky in the summer of 1864. Morgan said that
and Nashville. This change caused a cessation of business entirely for twelve days and a partial interference with freight for nearly three months.

The superintendent, in his reports for the fiscal year 1864, shows there was received for transportation an increase over the previous year of 38 4/10 per cent for passengers, 36 3/10 per cent for troops, 35 per cent for ordinary freight, and 110 per cent for government stores.

He explained the increase, from ordinary sources, as partially due to increased tariff of charges for transportation of passengers and freight, but he also spoke of the need of a further increase.

The railroads, during 1863, continued to carry soldiers and prisoners. They also transported refugees from the interior of the state where guerillas had been causing trouble. On February 20, 1863, there were shipped 6,000 garments from Louisville to the Contraband Association at Cincinnati.

The changing of the gauge to agree with the Louisville and Nashville proved that the National Government considered the Louisville and Frankfort and the Lexington and Frankfort important links in the transportation system.

John Morgan made his fifth and last raid into Kentucky in the summer of 1864. Morgan said that
his idea in making the raid was to break the railroad from Cincinnati to Lexington and then attack the Louisville and Frankfort and the Louisville and Nashville. (42)

Morgan sent Captain Jenkins, June 7, 1864, to destroy the railroad between Louisville and Frankfort to prevent reenforcements being sent. (43) It seemed probable that Frankfort would be attacked. Railroad connection with Louisville having been re-established, public papers were sent by train from Frankfort to Louisville on the ninth. The train was attacked by guerillas but the guard succeeded in protecting it. The road was obstructed with rails every two hundred or three hundred yards. Nevertheless, the train reached Louisville. (44)

Lexington was captured June the ninth. The surrender of Frankfort was demanded but not obtained. The smaller Benson bridges were burned during June. (45) The presence of the enemy made it difficult to secure labor for the railroads and interfered with the operation of the road.

The guerillas were also active during 1864. On June, the eighth, west of Smithfield, a train was thrown from the track. The locomotive was injured and three cars burned. The track was cleared and the trip continued on the ninth of June. It was neces-
sary to carry a guard because the road between Eminence and Frankfort was so endangered. (46)

On the tenth, three cars and several cattle guards were burned. (47) In December 1864, two freight trains were thrown from the track and many cars were destroyed. One passenger train was thrown from the track. (48)

In spite of the proximity of the enemy, the Louisville and Frankfort and the Lexington and Frankfort continued to transport troops, government supplies, and prisoners in 1864.

The annual reports for the year ending June 30, 1865, embracing the latter part of 1864 as well as the early part of 1865, show the gross receipts of the roads had increased over the past year but the net proceeds were about the same. (49) The earnings from transportation of government stores and troops formed 23 per cent of the business. (50)

Bands of guerillas continued to hover around the roads in 1865. For example, Sue Munday dashed into Midway on February 2, 1865 and burned the railroad depot. (51) However, the roads continued to operate, serving in much the same way as they had done in 1864.

The annual reports of shipments, during 1864 and 1865, show an improvement over the shipments during the years 1862 and 1863. They showed an in-
crease in shipment of corn, barley, iron, steel, flour, 
and several other articles. (52) Probably, the removal, to a
limited extent, of trade restrictions was partly responsible for the increase. However, when the ship-
ments of the fiscal year 1865 are compared with those of the year ending June 30, 1861, a decrease is shown 
in most cases; increases being noted, however, in ship-
ments of wheat, iron, steel, flour, potatoes, tobacco, 
cattle, horses, corn, and a few other things. This would indicate that the Louisville and Frankfort and the Lexington and Frankfort, during the War, carried food supplies needed for soldiers; such articles as iron and steel, needed in repairing bridges and other-
wise; and other articles needed for military activities. At the same time, certain other articles of trade were not handled as extensively as before the War. Again, the roads served the Union cause by transporting soldiers and prisoners of War.

During the War, these railroads, doubtless, rendered their greatest service in transporting soldiers and supplies within the state from one place to another. On the other hand, they evidently served as connecting links between the North and South in conjunction with the Kentucky Central and Louisville and Nashville. The Louisville and Frankfort terminal
at Louisville was changed so that the cars of that road could use the same depot as the Louisville and Nashville. This change, together with the altering of the gauge to five feet, that used by the Louisville and Nashville, made it possible to transport cars from one road to the other. Thus the Louisville and Frankfort and the Lexington and Frankfort played their part in the great conflict between the North and the South.
Chapter II

The Kentucky Central Railroad
Like the Louisville and Frankfort and the Lexington and Frankfort, the Kentucky Central served the Union cause during the War as a link in the line of communication through Kentucky. Extending as it did from Covington to Lexington, a distance of 99 miles, it was so situated as to form the link between cities north of the Ohio, and Lexington. Thus it completed the chain of railroad connection formed by the Lexington and Frankfort, the Louisville and Frankfort, and the Louisville and Nashville, leading into the South. In addition to the 99 miles of road from Covington to Lexington, the Kentucky Central controlled 12 miles of railroad from Lexington to Nicholasville.

During the period of neutrality, the trade of this road, like that of the Louisville and Frankfort and the Lexington and Frankfort, was affected by the attitude of Kentucky's northern neighbors. All efforts made by Ohio and Indiana to stop the shipment of provisions into Kentucky for fear of those provisions reaching the seceded states interfered with the shipments over the Kentucky Central.

However, this unfriendly attitude did not prevent the operation of the road and, from the beginning, it rendered assistance to the Union cause. On May 7, 1861, the guns for the Home Guards of
Fayette, Clark, and Montgomery, and Bourbon counties were shipped over the Kentucky Central from Covington. The shipment was quietly planned. Someone was stationed in the telegraph office at Covington to prevent any information about the shipment, being delivered. The guns were loaded on wagons in Cincinnati. Citizen volunteers in Cincinnati were trying to prevent contraband articles being sent into Kentucky without special permission. As Lieutenant Nelson, in charge of the guns, proceeded to the ferry, some of those volunteers tried to stop him. Nelson informed them that they had no power to stop an officer of the United States government. The guns were shipped across the river. The train was then loaded and left at eleven o'clock that night. The next morning the guns were unloaded at Paris and Lexington for distribution over several counties. (53)

Later, plans were made to send some guns from Cincinnati through Covington, over the Kentucky Central to Lexington, and from thence to Camp Dick Robinson. When the train, carrying the guns, reached Cynthiana, the conductor saw a crowd at the depot. Fearing that the guns would be seized, he returned to Covington with the train. The guns were sent by boat to Louisville and carried over the Louisville and Lexington. (54)
and about The military campaigns in Kentucky, in 1861, did not affect the road directly. However, much armed discussion took place in regard to a proposed extension of the road to aid in military plans for the campaign in East Tennessee. President Lincoln wished a railroad constructed to Cumberland Gap or Knoxville. He seemed to prefer a railroad to Cumberland Gap from Lexington or Nicholasville or to the Tennessee line from Lebanon. Congress, however, decided it was not advisable to construct such a military road. During 1861, the Kentucky Central transported a number of soldiers from place to place within the State, free of charge. Thus, during 1861, the Kentucky Central proved its loyalty to the Union by transporting troops and arms. Special reference

The Kentucky Central, like the Lexington and Frankfort and the Louisville and Frankfort, was affected by Morgan's raid in 1862. When Morgan was planning his attack on Midway, he sent troops to burn railroad bridges and prevent troops being sent from Cincinnati and Louisville to interfere with his plans. This caused great alarm. The Kentucky Central transported a special train of soldiers from Ohio to Lexington. (56) Morgan entered Cynthiana, on the Kentucky Central, July 17, 1862. He burned the railroad depot
and about 200 muskets. (57) All employees, except those

During Morgan's raid, 3 bridges were burned. Telegraph instruments and 18 cars were destroyed. Ten tons of iron rail had to be rerolled. The damage amounted to $26,750. (58) At that time, the railroad was under government control but the troops, which had been guarding the road, had been removed. (59)

During the invasion of General Bragg and General Kirby Smith, in 1862, General Heth was sent along the line of the Kentucky Central to a position where he could threaten Covington. He reached this position September 6, 1862 and occupied it for several days. (60)

In spite of the damages done to the railroad in 1862, operation continued until September. Provisions of war were carried on the road. Special reference was made by the press to a ten-inch motor, capable of throwing a hundred and twenty-eight pounds, which was at the depot of Kentucky Central in Covington, awaiting shipment into Kentucky. (61)

It was seen, September 13, 1863, after a report had been given by Mr. Bowles, that it would be some time before the railroad could be operated. It was agreed that, in order to reduce expenses, all officers of the road, except the superintendent and secretary, would be dismissed and the salaries of all, except that of the secretary, would be discontinued.
It was further decided that all employees, except those necessary to repair the road, would be dismissed. (62) Later the superintendent's salary was continued and a "train master" was appointed. (63) The road was in operation again in 1863.

Great excitement prevailed along the line of the Kentucky Central during the early part of that year because of anticipated attacks by Morgan. Naturally, this made the operation of the road more difficult.

The question of building a railroad to the Tennessee line again caused much concern in 1863. Nicholasville, the southern terminal of the Kentucky Central, was involved. The agitation was caused by the plans and orders of General Burnside, who desired such a military road constructed. However, this road was never built.

The Kentucky Central was seriously affected during Morgan's last raid into Kentucky in 1864. On June 8, 1864, Morgan sent Major Chenowith to cut the Kentucky Central Railroad from Lexington to Covington. Chenowith succeeded in burning Keller's bridge, north of Cynthiana, the Townsend bridge, and several others. (64) On the ninth, the Confederates moved to Lexington. The depot of the Kentucky Central, in that city, was burned. (65)

On June 10, 1864, some Ohio troops under Colonel J. P. Asper were sent by General Hobson, from
Covington, to proceed by train to Cynthiana. When the train was within about one mile of Cynthiana, the burned Keller's bridge was discovered. The troops were taken from the train and found, within a short time, that they were surrounded by rebels. General Hobson arrived but, after a brave defense, the Federals were forced to surrender on the eleventh.

Morgan had burned the bridges on the Kentucky Central to prevent troops following by railroad while he carried out his plans to plunder and burn Cincinnati. (66)

Morgan reached Cynthiana June 11, 1864. On the twelfth, General Burbridge drove the Confederates from Cynthiana. Morgan's forces being routed, the Confederates left the State and the Kentucky Central. (67)

During these raids, the damage done to the road from Covington to Lexington had suffered a loss of about $200,000. (68)

Notwithstanding these attacks, the Kentucky Central continued to prove of service in transporting soldiers, prisoners, and supplies.

During 1865, the road suffered from anticipated attacks of guerillas. Yet it continued to operate.

Thus, the Kentucky Central played its part in the Civil War. Although unable to operate, at
times, during the greater portion of the period of the War, it served as a connecting link between the northern cities of Ohio and Lexington and transported soldiers, arms, and provisions.

Chapter III

The Mobile and Ohio Railroad
The Mobile and Ohio, extending as it did from Mobile, Alabama, to Columbus, Kentucky, was located, except for a few miles, within the Confederate States. Yet the short distance, across the western corner of Kentucky, made the railroad a line of communication with the North. Columbus was not only a railroad terminal but it was also an important center on the Mississippi River. Twenty miles above the city, was Cairo, an important point because it was the terminus of the Illinois Central and was located at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. Thus, Columbus, the northern terminal of the Mobile and Ohio, by means of the Mississippi River and Cairo, was connected with the Ohio Valley and cities of the Northwest.

However, the Mobile and Ohio did not play an important part, in Kentucky, during the War, as did some of the other railroads. In the western part of the State, the waterways rather than the railroads became the center of the campaigns.

Columbus was desired, not so much because of its location as the terminus of the railroad, as for its position on the Mississippi. A direct line of navigation extended from Cairo, east to Columbus, for miles into the South. Columbus, therefore, occupied a commanding position on the line of river communication to the Gulf, a line which was considered
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Columbus was desired, not so much because of its location as the terminus of the railroad, as for its position on the Mississippi. A direct line of navigation extended from Cairo, past Columbus, for miles into the South. Columbus, therefore, occupied a commanding position on the line of river communication to the Gulf, a line which was considered
of paramount importance by both the North and the South. In 1863, General W. T. Sherman revealed his opinion of the Mississippi when he said, "We must never again allow the enemy to make lodgments on its banks with artillery. Therefore, Columbus, Memphis, Vicksburg, and the mouth of the Yazoo must be held with troops." (69)

The Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers also constituted lines of invasion from Kentucky into the South. Hence, the Mobile and Ohio did not play as vital a part as did some of the other railroads. Yet, because Columbus occupied such an important position and was desired by both the Federalists and the Confederates, all methods of attack were reverted to and the Mobile and Ohio Railroad became involved in the campaigns embracing Columbus. (74)

Because Columbus and Paducah were so closely involved in the campaigns, their railroad connections will be considered simultaneously. During the War, the railroad connecting Paducah with Tennessee, ran through Mayfield and Pryors into Tennessee. On April 4, 1853, Paducah voted $200,000 for the construction of the branch from Paducah to the Mobile and Ohio. (70) The road was not completed, however, until the Government, during the War, built from eight to ten miles of the road. (71)

During the period of neutrality, in Ken-
tucky, trade in the western section was affected as was the trade in other parts of the State. The citizens of Illinois, like those of Indiana and Ohio, looked with suspicion upon their southern neighbors and tried to stop provisions being sent to Kentucky for fear that the articles would reach the seceded states. In the early part of 1861, the governor of Illinois ordered some war materials seized at Cairo. Lincoln, afterwards, approved the order. (72)

On September 3, 1861, Confederate troops took possession of Columbus while Federal troops, by September 5, 1861, occupied Paducah as well as Cairo. (73)

When Brigadier-General U. S. Grant entered Paducah, he found evidence that showed some of the citizens were in sympathy with the Confederates. He took possession of the railroad depot. (74)

On September 12, 1861, at a depot on one of these western railroads, was found about twenty thousand dollars worth of stores which, it was supposed, were intended for the Confederates. These stores consisted of flour, lard, coffee, soap, and candles. (75)

By the end of September, 1861, Columbus, Fort Henry, and Fort Donelson were on the Confederate line of defense. In February, 1862, Grant cut the line of defense by capturing Fort Henry on the Tennes-
see River and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River.

Thus, in 1861 and in 1862, the rivers were involved in the campaign to a greater extent than the railroads. (76)

Moreover, the railroads seemed to be located in a territory where the loyalty of the citizens to the Union Cause was often questioned. Therefore, they deserved no protection. On February 20, 1863, General Asboth, commander of the post at Columbus, declared that disloyal citizens on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad encouraged the guerillas to make raids upon that road. He, therefore, ordered that, for every raid made on the road, citizens living the nearest to the scene of the raid, should be arrested and held as hostages until the delivery of the real offenders. (77)

On November 19, 1862, John A. Rawlins, Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of the Tennessee, issued an order saying that freight agents on military railroads should report to post provost-marshall all cotton or other private property shipped by them and, when shipments were made by persons who did not have permits, notice should be given to provost-marshall at Columbus, Kentucky, who would seize the goods for the Government. (78)
In November 1863, General Grant gave orders to seize the Paducah Railroad, to take up and remove the rails to some places in Tennessee. The citizens urged Governor Bramlette to send a protest to Grant. Governor Bramlette sent the protest. (79)

Grant's answer was given November 28, 1863. He said that he considered the "Citizens of Paducah, almost to a man", disloyal and that, therefore, they deserved no favors from the Government. He accused the president of the road of being disloyal. He said, moreover, that the Government and not the citizens of Paducah had completed the railroad. However, he suspended the order for taking up the track, except the part laid by the Government, until the case could be referred to higher authority. (80)

In the year 1864, Paducah and Columbus were affected by raids and consequently the railroads were affected.

In March, 1864, the Federals occupied Paducah, Cairo, Columbus, Hickman, and Union City. (81)

On March 23, 1864, Union City was threatened by Confederate cavalry. On the twenty-fourth, Brigadier-General Brayman, left Cairo, with aid, for Union City. He disembarked at Columbus and took the train for Union City. (82) When within six miles of the city, he learned of its surrender and turned back.
The Confederates went from Union City to Paducah, having been joined by another force. They took Paducah, March 26, 1864, but the Federals fired on them from the boats and the fort. The city was destroyed to a great extent. (83) The Confederates retreated along the line of the railroad toward Mayfield.

On April 14, 1864, a force again attacked Paducah, were driven off, and retreated toward Mayfield. (84)

When Brayman arrived at Cairo as commander, March 19, 1864, he found trade regulations were lax in the District of Cairo. (85) The small forts were places for smuggling contraband articles. (86) The railroad from Columbus to Union City was operated at the expense of the Government. At the same time, it was used to carry supplies which often went to disloyal people or were seized by Confederates. The road from Paducah to Mayfield was operated by its owners and quantities of supplies were carried by it to the Confederates. (87)

General Brayman issued orders, April 2, 1864, stopping trade. (88) He said that all permits for landing goods, supplies, or articles for sale, between Paducah and Memphis, or at those two cities, were suspended until further orders. The commanding officers at Paducah and Columbus were to retain
control of all engines and cars and to permit no trains to run except for military purposes.

Thus, during the Civil War, the railroads in western Kentucky, did not play as important a part as did the railroads in Central and Northern Kentucky. They were auxiliaries of lines of waterways from a military viewpoint. At times, Confederate sympathizers utilized them for shipping articles. On the other hand, the Union officials found them valuable in transporting troops and used them when necessity arose.
Before the dawn of 1861, the railroads of Kentucky had been considered agents of industrial and commercial advancement. By the close of the War, in 1865, they had proven their value from a military viewpoint. These organizations, intended for advancement of industry and commerce, in times of peace, had been utilized in the great political conflict between the North and the South.

Upon various occasions, they had been subjected to attacks by invading armies and guerrillas. At times, some had seriously affected as to be forced to cease operations. Nevertheless, they had proved valuable in transporting troops, provisions, and government supplies within the State. Several roads, by uniting their strength, had served as connecting links in a chain which made possible the transferring of men and provisions from beyond the Ohio into the South.

The losses incurred during the War, by Kentucky's railroads, with the exception of the Louisville and Nashville, tended to have a depressing effect. No great projections, concerning railroad extension, were undertaken by any except the Louisville and Nashville. No doubt the Civil War, halting as it did railroad expansion for several years, had a permanent effect upon the railroads.
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being responsible, to a certain extent, for the re-organizations that have taken place since 1865.

"Yet, the fact that, during the period of the War, the railroads played their part, must not be forgotten. They helped to bring to a close the period wherein railroads could serve the Country, not as military aids, but as links in the chain of industrial and commercial development.

(2) Edward W. Mines, *Corporate History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and Road in its political strife which, ere long, gave place to a Commercial System* (Louisville, 1909), p. 207.


(5) J. Stoddard Johnston, *Memorial History of Louisville, From its First Settlement to the Year 1896* (Chicago, 1896), 1, 94.

(6) Ibid., p. 208.

(7) Ibid., p. 209.

(8) Ibid., p. 206.

(9) Ibid., p. 211.

(10) Ibid., *Memorial History*, p. 54.


(12) Ibid., p. 211.
(1) The history of the railroad is given by R. S. Cotterill in his "Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 1861-1865" in the American Historical Review, xxix, No. 4, July, 1924.


(3) Ibid., p. 207.


(5) J. Stoddard Johnston, Memorial History of Louisville, From its First Settlement to the Year 1896 (Chicago, 1896), I, 94. p. 286.

(6) Hines, Louisville and Nashville, p. 207.

(7) Ibid., p. 208.

(8) Ibid., p. 208.

(9) Ibid., p. 208.

(10) Johnston, Memorial History, p. 94.


(12) Ibid., p. 211
(13) Ibid., p. 250.

(14) Ibid., p. 250.

(15) Ibid., p. 251.

(16) Ibid., p. 252.

(17) Ibid., p. 252.

(18) Corporate History of the Maysville and Lexington Railroad Company (Ms.), Sheets 1, 2, 3.

(19) Annual Reports of the President and Directors of the Louisville and Frankfort Railroad (Ms.), 1864, p. 22; table 16.

(20) E. M. Coulter, "Effects of Secession Upon Commerce of the Mississippi", in the Mississippi Valley Historical Review, III, p. 286.

(21) Ibid., p. 286.

(22) Ibid., p. 288.

(23) Ibid., p. 290.

(24) Louisville Daily Courier, April 30, 1861.

(25) Annual Reports; Louisville and Frankfort Railroad, 1861, p. 6.

(26) Louisville Daily Democrat, July 16, 1862.


(30) *Annual Reports, Louisville and Frankfort Railroad, 1862*, p. 4.


(33) *Annual Reports, Louisville and Frankfort Railroad, 1863*, pp. 3, 4.

(34) *Annual Reports, Louisville and Frankfort Railroad, 1861*, tables 11, 12; *1862*, tables 11, 12.

(35) *Annual Reports - Louisville and Frankfort Railroad, 1863*, tables 11, 16.


(37) *Annual Reports, Louisville and Frankfort Railroad, 1864*, p. 9.


(39) *Annual Reports, Louisville and Frankfort Railroad, 1864*, p. 4.
(40) Ibid., p. 6.

(41) Louisville Daily Journal, February 20, 1863.


(44) Ibid., p. 49.

(45) Annual Reports, Louisville and Frankfort Railroad, 1864, p. 4.

(46) Ibid., p. 9.

(47) Ibid., p. 9.

(48) Annual Reports, Louisville and Frankfort Railroad, 1865, p. 17.

(49) Ibid., p. 4.

(50) Ibid., p. 15.


(52) Annual Reports, Louisville and Frankfort Railroad, 1865, tables 17, 18.

(53) Speed, Union Cause, p. 101.

(54) Ibid., pp. 114, 120.
(55) Minutes, Board of Control of the Kentucky Central Railroad, (Ms.), March 25, 1861, p. 51.

(56) Louisville Daily Journal, July 15, 1862.

(57) Collins, History of Kentucky, I, p. 103.

(58) Minutes, Kentucky Central, July 21, 1862, p. 117.

(59) Ibid., p. 117.


(63) Ibid., p. 139. Minutes for the Kentucky Central after the close of 1862 are not available.

(64) Collins, History of Kentucky, I, p. 134.

(65) Louisville Daily Democrat, June 11, 1864.


(68) Louisville Daily Journal, June 14, 1864.

(70) Collins, History of Kentucky, I, p. 66.


(75) Louisville Daily Courier, September 12, 1861.


(77) Louisville Daily Journal, February 20, 1863.


(80) Ibid., p. 263.

(81) Id., XXIII, pt. 1, p. 508.

(82) Ibid., pp. 502 - 504.

(83) Ibid.

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