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SUPPORT OF POLICE CONSOLIDATION: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF
PERCEIVED COMPLEXITY

By

John C. Reed, Jr.
B.S., University of Louisville, 1985
M.S., University of Louisville, 2001

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty of the
College of Arts and Sciences of the University of Louisville
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Urban and Public Affairs
University of Louisville
Louisville, Kentucky

May 2013

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A Dissertation Approved on

March 6, 2013

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Steven G. Koven

Mark Austin

George Higgins

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, Dorothy Elizabeth Reed (1911-2010) who always stressed the importance of education. She frequently said, “Education is something no one can take from you.” Thank you for your unconditional love and support throughout my life and for believing in me when I had doubts in myself. You made my life meaningful and joyous.

I also want to dedicate this dissertation to the love of my life, Cynthia J. Smith. Without the generosity of your love, support, and patience, I would have never completed this writing.

My accomplishments are not a reflection of what I have done, but a reflection of the love you both have shown me. Thank You!

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I would like to thank my Dissertation Chair, Dr. Cynthia Negrey, for her support, guidance, and encouragement throughout this process. I would also like to thank the other members of my committee, Dr. Mark Austin, Dr. George Higgins, and Dr. Steven Koven for their comments and assistance with this endeavor. Each of you has provided me with the counsel and encouragement to realize a goal that few achieve.

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ABSTRACT

SUPPORT OF POLICE CONSOLIDATION: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF PERCEIVED COMPLEXITY

John C. Reed, Jr.

May 11, 2013

This dissertation is an examination of how police officers' perceptions of the complexity in merging Organizational Change Components (OCCs) related to the consolidation of the Louisville Division of Police (LDP) and Jefferson County Police Department (JCPD) in 2003 impact support for police consolidation. This study focused on five primary OCCs: 1) culture(s), 2) policies and procedures, 3) communications, 4) collective bargaining contracts, and 5) re-defining patrol division boundaries.

The population consisted of officers who were currently employed by the Louisville Metro Police Department (LMPD) and were affiliated with either the former LDP or the JCPD in 2003 when these departments were merged to form LMPD. The entire population of 669 police officers was invited to participate in this study and complete a survey. The survey resulted in 390 respondents, a 58.2% response rate. Police officers hired post-consolidation were not included in the population for this study.

The dissertation was divided into six chapters comprising monocentrism and polycentrism, history of the LMPD consolidation, diffusion of innovation theory, and complexity theory. Chapter I provides an overview of the study. Chapter II explores monocentric and polycentric forms of government and police departments. It also

focuses on diffusion of innovation theory in consolidation efforts and how complexity plays a significant part of innovation. Chapter III gives an overview of the merger of the LDP and JCPD. This chapter further explores the nature of the OCCs used in merging the two police agencies. Chapter IV, V, and VI cover the methods utilized, findings, and discussion of the findings respectively.

A stepwise regression analysis was conducted utilizing current support for consolidation as the dependent variable. Six models were tested. The findings indicate that officers' perception of the complexity of merging OCCs was a significant predictor of current support for consolidation. Additionally, officers' prior support for consolidation and officers' satisfaction with the results of the merged OCCs were also significant predictors of current support for merger. In comparison, prior support was the strongest predictor of current support followed by satisfaction.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
DEDICATION.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.....	iv
ABSTRACT.....	v
LIST OF TABLES.....	xi
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
Background of Study.....	1
Statement of Problem.....	5
Outline of Chapters.....	7
II. LITERATURE REVIEW.....	9
Government Consolidation: The Pros and Cons.....	9
Monocentrism vs. Polycentrism.....	11
Police Consolidation.....	17
Perspectives of Consolidation.....	21
Public Choice Perspective.....	27
The Dilemma of Law Enforcement Consolidation.....	30
The Structure of Consolidation.....	36
Structural Change: Complexity and Control.....	36
Types of Consolidation.....	38

	Transitional Events Affecting Implementation of Consolidation.....	39
	Diffusion of Innovation Theory.....	42
	Complexity Theory.....	50
	Organizational Complexity and the Environment.....	64
	Implications of Complexity Theory for the Innovation of Police Consolidation.....	68
	Summary.....	71
III.	LOUISVILLE METRO POLICE DEPARTMENT – THE HISTORY OF CONSOLIDATION.....	78
	Constructing the New LMPD.....	86
	Previewing Support for Consolidation of LMPD.....	87
	Initial Planning and Formal Combination Stage.....	96
	The Consolidation of Departmental Operations.....	108
	Stabilization Stage.....	126
IV.	METHODOLOGY.....	128
	Background of Study.....	128
	Significance of Study.....	130
	Overview of Organizational Change Components.....	131
	Purpose of Study.....	135
	Description of Variables.....	137
	Survey Instrument.....	149
	Survey Population.....	154
	Descriptive Characteristics of Population.....	157

	Demographics/Descriptive Characteristics of Respondents.....	158
	Analysis/Predictions.....	161
	Data Analysis for Research Hypotheses.....	162
	Evaluation of Research Methods.....	164
	Internal Validity.....	164
	External Validity.....	166
V.	FINDINGS.....	168
	Data Collection.....	168
	Descriptive Statistics.....	169
	Data Transformation.....	181
	Descriptive Statistics Post Data Transformations.....	183
	Data Analysis and Model Development.....	187
	Additional Analysis.....	199
VI.	DISCUSSION.....	206
	Policy Implications.....	222
	Limitations of Study.....	227
	Future Studies.....	229
	Conclusion.....	231
	REFERENCES.....	234
	APPENDICES	
	A. Recruitment Materials.....	246
	Pre-recruitment E-mail Sent to Population.....	247
	Invitation E-mail to Population.....	249

Follow-up Email to Population.....	252
B. Survey Documents.....	254
Survey Instrument.....	255
C. Tables.....	267
Table 12 - LDP OCC Satisfaction Responses.....	268
Table 13 - JCPD OCC Satisfaction Responses.....	269
Table 15 - LDP OCC Complexity Responses.....	270
Table 16 - JCPD OCC Complexity Responses.....	271
Table 17 - Descriptive Statistics.....	272
Table 18 - Correlation Matrix.....	273
Table 20 - Model Summary Statistics for Current Support.....	279
Table 22 - Model Summary Statistics for Overall Support.....	280
Table 24 - Model Summary Statistics for Satisfaction.....	281
Table 26 - Model Summary Statistics for Satisfaction w/Demographics.....	282
Table 28 - Model Summary Statistics for Prior Support.....	283
CURRICULUM VITAE.....	284

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	PAGE
1. LDP and JCPD Support for Merger (1998 Study).....	88
2. LDP Officer Perceptions of Affected Conditions After Consolidation.....	90
3. JCPD Officer Perceptions of Affected Conditions After Consolidation.....	91
4. LDP Officer Perceptions of How Operations Would Be Affected By Consolidation.....	92
5. JCPD Officer Perceptions of How Operations Would Be Affected By Consolidation.....	93
6. LDP Officer Perceptions of Outcomes Affected By Consolidation.....	94
7. JCPD Officer Perceptions of Outcomes Affected By Consolidation.....	95
8. Demographic/Officer Characteristics of Population.....	158
9. Demographic/Officer Characteristics of Respondents.....	160
10. Psupport and Csupport Combined and By Former Department.....	170
11. Combined OCC Satisfaction Responses.....	175
12. LDP OCC Satisfaction Responses.....	268
13. JCPD OCC Satisfaction Responses.....	269
14. Combined OCC Complexity Responses.....	180
15. LDP OCC Complexity Responses.....	270
16. JCPD OCC Complexity Responses.....	271
17. Descriptive Statistics.....	272
18. Correlation Matrix.....	273

19. Current Support Regression Models.....	193
20. Model Summary Statistics for Current Support.....	279
21. Overall Support Regression Models.....	197
22. Model Summary Statistics for Overall Support.....	280
23. Satisfaction Regression Models.....	201
24. Model Summary Statistics for Satisfaction.....	281
25. Satisfaction Regression Models with Demographics.....	203
26. Model Summary Statistics for Satisfaction w/Demographics.....	282
27. Prior Support Regression Models.....	204
28. Model Summary Statistics for Prior Support.....	283

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background of Study

Throughout the country, government consolidation has been the topic of many discussions among scholars, researchers, policy-makers, government leaders, and advocates of both monocentric and polycentric views of government. Typically, proponents of government consolidation advertised effectiveness and efficiency as the cornerstone to their argument. While many governmental entities conduct research on effectiveness and efficiency, little comparative research exists after a consolidation takes place (Durning, 1992). Durning (1992) notes that researchers “have not provided enough in the way of empirical insights into what happens after city and county governments merge” (p. 1). Since city-county mergers occur infrequently, there is much work to be done in the study of governmental consolidation, in addition to the sub-units of government that also join together as a result of the overall merger.

Change exists in all organizations, especially during a consolidation. Many changes can lead to complex issues. As a result, government consolidations are complicated. Most organizational change efforts are overwhelming because of the many ways an organization can change (Glenn and Malott, 2004). During consolidations, governments can change structurally, operationally, administratively, and procedurally. For example, during a consolidation, governments can change structurally by eliminating

certain levels of management or supervision or by having certain departments reporting to different agency bureaus than they had prior to the merger. This also holds true for different subunits within government. These subunits include the different agencies in government that are part of the larger governmental unit and provide services to citizens such as police, fire, public works, sanitation, etc.

There are a myriad of terms used in the research to describe consolidation (i.e., merger, unification, consolidation, etc.). For the purpose of this research, the terms merger and consolidation will be used interchangeably.

The primary focus of this study is the consolidation of a subunit of Louisville Metro government, the Louisville Metro Police Department (LMPD). The Louisville Metro Police Department came into being with the consolidation of the Louisville Division of Police and the Jefferson County Police Department in 2003. When the Louisville Division of Police, with an authorized strength of 723 sworn officers and 324 civilians, merged with the 450 sworn officers and 247 civilians from Jefferson County Police Department, (Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission, 1998), it resulted in the newly formed Louisville Metro Police Department which, overnight, became the 41st largest police department in the nation (Department of Justice, 2007). According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2007), the Louisville Metro Police Department was in the top 0.4% of law enforcement agencies in the nation with 1,000 or more sworn personnel.

Consolidation of police forces is not a new phenomenon. In Kentucky, the City of Lexington merged with Fayette County as a metropolitan government in the early 1970's. As a result, the individual police agencies unified as one. Las Vegas, Nevada completed a comparable consolidation about the same time when the county, city, and

three neighboring smaller jurisdictions combined their police agencies into the now Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. In Pennsylvania, the York Regional Police Department was established when several jurisdictions joined to create their own police force. In 1993, Charlotte City Police and the Mecklenburg County Police Department merged. There was also a 1994 merger of the New York Housing Authority Police and the Transit Authority Police into the New York City Police Department. These are just a few examples of agencies that have considered and undertaken department consolidation.

But, prior to this, in 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice surmised that "law enforcement in the country was fragmented, complicated, and frequently overlapping" (p. 119). Based on this premise, the President's Commission suggested that jurisdictions should take action focused on uniting police services in order to provide effective and efficient service.

In many communities, almost all stakeholders enter into discussions of consolidation with preconceptions about the value, if any, of joining together agencies. These discussions have either a positive or negative set of expectations. At the forefront of these expectations are the positive attributes of effective, efficient, and less costly government. In opposition, the negatives often cited are that larger governments are far less efficient and effective than smaller units of government. Additionally, smaller units of government are seen as providing a more personalized service to the consumer or citizen. The Louisville merger was no different.

The stakeholders of Louisville and Jefferson County discussed some of the same issues related to government consolidation. While doing so, police department consolidation was of primary interest. During early discussions, proponents of the

departmental consolidation in Louisville asserted that increased efficiency through combined records and communications would result from a merger. Reductions in supervisory personnel were also cited as an advantage and this, in turn, would increase the number of patrol officers. Additionally, many cited standardized recruitment practices and training procedures as a positive benefit of consolidation.

Those opposed to police department consolidation proposed increased costs, particularly because of the start-up costs of reorganization, planning, and standardizing equipment, and possible need for a new building to house the combined agencies. Some cited a loss of identity, inter-agency jealousies, and issues related to parity in that officers of different departments had different compensation and benefit packages. Others opposed to the consolidation noted that a departmental merger would result in impersonal service and would have a negative effect on service levels.

At the conclusion of all of these discussions, consolidation was seen as a viable choice for Louisville. A referendum to consolidate governments successfully passed in November 2000 (Jefferson County Kentucky Clerk's Office/Election Center, 2000).

No matter what the reason for consolidation, satisfactory law enforcement service and protection is in large part contingent upon the attitudes of employees. Attitudes and perceptions of employees change during consolidations or transitional events, such as mergers, where rules are changed, agencies are restructured, or there are different interpretations of culture (Sheppard, Lewicki and Minton, 1992). The attitudes and perceptions of employees during these events can have both positive and negative effects on the organization (Greenberg and Colquitt, 2005). In private organizations, these events have increasingly been understood as a significant reason for merger failures

(Cartwright and Cooper, 1993). Cameron and Quinn (1999) note that the failure rate of most planned organizational change initiatives is dramatic. In fact, successful organizational change has proved a very elusive creature, with many studies reporting a very high failure rate, sometimes 80% or above (Beer and Nohria, 2000; Brodbeck, 2002; Bryant, 1998; Burnes, 2004; Clarke, 1999; Harung et al. 1999).

However, the attitudes and perceptions of personnel, specifically police officers, can change over time. Attitudes and perceptions are not stable and are formed as a result of many factors including, but not limited to, experience, education, social interaction or influence, communication, environment, and persuasion. A police officer's perception of the complexity of merging organizational change components (OCCs) relating to police department consolidation is anticipated to affect attitudes and perceptions regarding support for consolidation. For this reason, the Louisville Metro Police Department consolidation and police officers' perceived complexity of merging organizational change components should be studied in order to offer detailed insight for future government mergers and consolidation of governmental sub-units such as police departments.

Statement of Problem

Prior to the merger of the Louisville Division of Police (LDP) and the Jefferson County Police Department (JCPD) in 2003, the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission (LJCCC) (1998) conducted a survey on the perceptions and attitudes regarding police consolidation. This survey was distributed to members of the LDP, JCPD, the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office, other police departments that were in incorporated areas in Jefferson County, and citizens. The survey, directed at the police

employees, focused on whether or not the consolidation was supported by sworn officers. According to the findings, 82.1% of LDP sworn personnel were in favor of the consolidation while 89.9% of JCPD sworn personnel were opposed to consolidation.

The survey also measured the attitudes and perceptions of employees related to 1) the effects of merger on the individual officer, the organization, and the citizens, 2) outcomes expected from consolidation, and 3) priorities of issues to be addressed by consolidation. Demographic information for the respondents was also captured. Since the consolidation of the LMPD in 2003, only one follow-up study has been conducted related to perceptions and attitudes, whether changing or not, of the police department members regarding the agency's consolidation.

Many components/factors/issues were considered in forming the LMPD. Organizational change components considered in forming the LMPD involved departmental culture(s), policies and procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and re-defining patrol division boundaries. While all of these OCCs existed in the respective organizations prior to the consolidation, they all were merged, redefined, and/or structured to meet the needs of the newly formed LMPD. Implementing each of these OCCs, either alone or in their entirety, is a very difficult undertaking. Often, employees are not aware of the complexities involved in consolidating sub-units of government or of implementing these components/factors.

The ease with which organizational entities unite depends on the number of entities and their diversity. Dooley (2002) notes that in most cases, it is usually easier to make connections between like elements in comparison to unlike elements.

Dooley (2002) defines organizational complexity as the amount of differentiation that exists within different elements constituting the organization. In this connotation, complexity is generally comparable to variety. Complexity impacts how easy it is for organizational members to make sense of their current perceptions, and the type of effort that is needed to determine and implement effective action (Dooley, 2002).

No studies exist in which a retrospective survey has been conducted in reference to complexity, specifically the perceived complexity of merging the OCCs and how that perceived complexity affects support for government consolidation. This study will focus primarily on the consolidation of a subunit of the Louisville Metro government, the Louisville Metro Police Department. The police department is usually the largest function of all governments and is the most costly (Conser, *et al.*, 2003). Police practitioners are always looking for ways to increase effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. As previously mentioned, the attitudes and perceptions of employees can influence the effectiveness and efficiency of the departmental operations. This study was undertaken to determine if police officers at LMPD: 1) support the police department consolidation, 2) if they do support consolidation, to what degree, and 3) whether or not their perception of the complexity of merging the OCCs integral to the success of consolidation affects their support of the consolidation.

Outline of Chapters

This section outlines the remaining chapters of the study and details their content. Chapter II contains a review of relevant literature, information and related studies that are associated with government consolidations and, more specifically, police department consolidations. Literature regarding complexity theories and organizational change will

also be reviewed. Chapter III will provide a succinct synopsis of the Louisville-Jefferson County Police Department consolidation, the consolidation process, and an explanation of Organizational Change Components used to measure the perceived complexity of police officers before and during the LMPD consolidation. Chapter IV outlines the methodology used in this study. Chapter V will discuss the findings, and Chapter VI will a discussion of the research, as well as the study's limitations. Also included are recommendations for future inquiry, policy implications, and the closing remarks or conclusion to this study.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

The theoretical framework for this study draws from the literature in four distinct areas including 1) government consolidations, 2) police mergers, 3) innovations, and 4) complexity. The research draws extensively on the works of Rogers (2003) regarding the diffusion of innovation and more specifically, the attribute of complexity during an innovation such as a police consolidation.

Government Consolidation: The Pros and Cons

The debate concerning the pros and cons of consolidation are well documented (Lowery and Lyons, 1989). Advocates of the consolidation of governments claim that fragmented local governments create inefficiencies that can be ameliorated through consolidation of government services and functions (Lyons, 1977). Opponents to consolidation center their argument in the public choice school based on the work of Tiebout (1956) and Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961). In their research, they propose that smaller bureaucracies may be more efficient than larger bureaucracies that replace them.

No matter if one is for or against consolidation of government, the fact remains that problems in government exist and identifying problem cause and effect, in addition to finding solutions to these issues, is an arduous task, one in which there is little agreement by the experts (Wyly, Glickman, and Lahr, 1998). Many attribute the issues

encountered in metropolitan areas to the failure of local governments to attend to significant regional problems. The problems viewed by researchers include, but are not limited to, sprawl, poverty, differences in socioeconomic status, etc. (Rusk, 2003, 1999; Wyly, Glickman, and Lahr, 1998). Thus, annexation, municipal consolidation, city-county consolidation, etc. are seen as the answer by some and viewed as necessary to successfully and effectively attend to the problems of the metropolis (Jones, 1942; Rusk, 2003, 1999).

In an effort to address these issues, many believe that government consolidation is the best choice. While conceptually, this perceived solution might make sense, it is one of the least-implemented structural reforms in local government body (Johnson and Leland, 2000).

In fact, nationally, while more than 100 referenda have been put to the voters, only 32 have resulted in some type of consolidation, i.e., regional or city-county consolidation. Some of the most notable are New York (1898), Nashville (1963), Jacksonville (1968), Lexington-Fayette County Kentucky (1974), Wyandotte County-Kansas City (1997), Louisville (2003), and Indianapolis (2007). While these are some of the examples, it is by no means an all inclusive list.

Advocates of government reform argue that consolidation promotes effectiveness and efficiency, equity, accountability, and a reduction in the growing disparities between central cities and suburbs (Rusk, 2003, 1999). However, consolidation is viewed skeptically by some as empirical support for these effects is contradictory. Government consolidation, while not viewed as mainstream, is seen as a workable option by those

advocating government reforms. While this alternative is supported by some, it is not preferred by all.

Monocentrism vs. Polycentrism

There are two established views that dictate thought on what type of government should be established for cities. On one hand, proponents of monocentric government or consolidation contend that metropolitan areas with many fragmented governments result in service duplication, diseconomies of scale, and other inefficiencies making it virtually impossible to effectively solve municipal problems common to all (Studenski, 1930).

Other proponents cite the inability of core cities to expand their borders. Accordingly, this accounts for continued economic decline and an inability to work regionally, in conjunction with other areas/jurisdictions, to boost economic development (Rusk, 1999, 2003). Other shortcomings of fragmented government include a decreasing competitiveness in an ever increasing global economy (Peirce, 1993).

Supporters of a monocentric government contend that each urban area should be governed by a centralized single-government (see Taylor, 1911; Goodnow, 1900; Wilson, 1885, 1887). Consolidation also enhances a regional perspective and increases the prospects for regional cooperation in economic development (Staley, 2005). According to Stephens and Wikstrom (2000), a centralized or general-purpose government based upon the efficiency and effectiveness principles of scientific management should provide all local public services.

On the other hand, advocates of polycentric government believe in the theory of Public Choice. They believe that local control is important to citizens and lower costs are not likely to result from consolidation. The theory is based more on economically

grounded motives rather than the traditional public administration concerns that structured consolidation (Schneider, 1986). These theorists suggest that consolidation limits competition between smaller divisions of government. This perspective challenged the basic principle of advocates of consolidation in that “bigger and fewer” administrative units would provide more cost-efficient, specialized and improved services (Bish and Ostrom, 1974; Ostrom, 1971).

Supporters of public choice argue that the competition among jurisdictions is thought to provide more choices for residents and results in more efficiency in the levels of service that are provided. It also results in uniformity within communities in that residents will value public services similarly. Tiebout (1956) states that this uniformity provides for community stability in that no individual can be made better off by moving because the market is efficient and does not require political solutions to provide the optimal level of public goods (Tiebout, 1956). Therefore, competition between varieties of local producers of public services is eliminated, and when faced with poor quality or higher taxes, recipients can “vote with their feet,” choosing the services that best suit their needs (Tiebout, 1956). This results in more responsive and efficient levels of service provision (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren, 1961).

Ostrom and Whitaker (1973) assert that public choice advocates fear that in the search for efficiency and economy at the metropolitan or regional level, the desires and values of the citizen will be minimized or disregarded entirely. While issues related to effectiveness and efficiency stand out in the readings on consolidation, there appears to be a lack of empirical evidence supporting or denying the effectiveness and efficiency of one form of local government over another. However, an emerging acknowledgement

exists on the part of theorists that local governments cannot handle all regional problems. Therefore, it is believed that some type of regional government or governance is needed to address regional issues (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren, 1961).

Today, scholars of urban affairs that advocate consolidation reform endorse a type of hybrid system that is two-faceted - providing regional or system-maintenance services/infrastructure (i.e., water, sewers, and mass transportation) which retain existing cities and towns, providing lifestyle services tailored to the communities they currently serve (i.e., elementary and secondary public education) (Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000). Even so, differences should be identified to determine what problems are inherent in a metropolitan area and what problems can be attributed to the government structure in and of itself (Banfield and Grodzins, 1958).

Both monocentric and polycentric views are debated by theorists. Advocates of consolidation cite examples of cities such as Jacksonville, Portland, Baton Rouge, Miami, Nashville, and Indianapolis, to name a few, as examples of the advantages and ultimate successes of consolidation. Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) assert that there are many positives to monocentric government. They are as follows:

1. Promotes a sense of regional identity and introduces a regional factor into the local policy process.
2. Promotes economic development and attracts large companies to their region, resulting in substantial private investment and additional jobs.
3. Implements a substantial degree of governmental modernization, administrative centralization, and functional integration, resulting in service efficiencies and savings in governmental operations.

4. Provides a more uniform and better quality of system-maintenance services throughout their regions and promotes more orderly regional development and growth.
5. Credited with being innovative in their operations (i.e., Indianapolis being in the forefront in incorporating the concepts of competition and privatization into the delivery of public services; Jacksonville developing structures to facilitate citizen participation in government; and all five metropolitan governments having made novel use of taxing and service districts).

There are also negatives associated with consolidation. Persons in opposition to consolidation oftentimes point to same cities cited by advocates of consolidation and have used them as examples of why not to consolidate government. Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) point to examples such as:

1. Implementing only partial consolidations such as allowing for the continuing existence of a variety of local governmental units.
2. Failing to encompass the entire socioeconomic metropolitan region.
3. Increasing government expenses and taxes paid by citizens over the years despite promoting metropolitan government as a way of enhancing local governmental efficiency.
4. Cities inconsequential ability to redistribute wealth in response to the economic and social problems of the disadvantaged.

Conversely, polycentric government has played an important part in shaping the current dispute regarding metropolitan governance. The focus of its role has been an evolution of the more important insights that have led to a more informed understanding

of metropolitan governance. Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) cite the contributions of polycentric government to include:

1. Moving the attention away from the structure of the metropolitan government towards the focus on individual needs and preferences.
2. Eroding the legitimacy of totally consolidated metropolitan government, endorsing instead a hybrid type of federative or two-tier governmental structure.
3. Widening the discussions by stressing the positive features and consequences flowing from the polycentric character of government in the metropolis.
4. Noting the maximization of economies of scales in terms of service delivery requires governmental units of varying geographical size for the provision of various services.
5. Providing a more sophisticated understanding of the functional operation and service-rendering role of government.
6. Pointing out that the most important need in the metropolis is not the establishment of a regional government, but rather, the institution of neighborhood governments while also being able to show an impact and express policy preferences on a neighborhood level.

At the same time, public choice has been criticized for (Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000):

1. Too much emphasis on the belief that citizens are rational and make decisions based upon self-interest.
2. Not providing a way in which citizens can directly communicate their public policy preferences to elected officials.

3. Placing too much emphasis on individuals' ability to "vote with their feet"—not taking into consideration constraints placed on individuals.
4. Not considering the deed for redistributive politics in the metropolis, whereby the more affluent sectors of the metropolitan area provide a financial subsidy to fund services for citizens dwelling in disadvantaged areas.
5. Not substantiating the debate of efficiency and effectiveness of services.
6. Being excessively parochial, by downplaying the regional responsibilities.
7. Placing too much emphasis/trust in the local government to deliver services and, in its defense of polycentrism, fails to acknowledge the perplexing maze of service arrangements and the undermining of accountability.

Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) cite three generalizations that can be made regarding consolidations. First, service problems such as sewer, water, fire and police protection, and/or primary and secondary public education were the catalyst for consolidation. Secondly, consolidations tend to be partial in nature. In other words, they usually do not include all governmental entities. For example, the consolidation of Louisville and Jefferson County in 2003 excluded more than 80 small municipalities (Savitch and Vogel, 2004a) and the volunteer fire departments throughout Jefferson County did not merge with the Louisville Division of Fire, a "career" fire organization. At the time of this writing, this consolidation of fire protective service has yet to occur. Third and finally, consolidations generally have vigorous government support from the political leaders. This support is grounded in more efficient and effective government and attracting new businesses to the area and is integral to garnering government and community support for the policy.

Factors specific to particular jurisdictions, i.e., issues, circumstances, expectations, openness to consolidation, etc., have also been shown to have an effect on the level of consolidation that takes place within a jurisdiction (IACP, 2003). Consequently, each consolidation has the potential, and maybe the probability, to impact each departmental entity and its employees differently. Even though these factors likely affect the success rate(s) of monocentric government, the focus of scholars has been directed more on issues of effectiveness and efficiency. This is particularly the case in private organizations where the interest of the aforementioned factors outweighs the integration process of departments and employees relating to consolidation (Cartwright and Cooper, 1993). This is primarily due to the fact that private organizations are profit driven. One department of particular interest, due in part to its role as representatives of the civil power of government (Dempsey and Forst, 2010), is the police department.

Police Consolidation

Consolidation of police services around the country has taken many forms. Since the 1950s, consolidations have occurred in communities ranging from small towns to large cities (IACP, 2003). They have also taken place due to a myriad of different reasons and/or situations. According to Hamby (1992), variables influencing the consolidation of police agencies include general government consolidation, a public safety/government crisis, financial concerns or the need for enhanced cost efficiency, the pressure of governmental leadership, the influence or local of community leadership, and periods of high growth which have an impact on the delivery of government services.

Consolidation of police forces is not a new phenomenon. In fact, there are many examples of consolidation around the country, some of which occurred in larger cities

(IACP, 2003). In California, in 1954, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department began to contract services with the neighboring city of Lakewood. Las Vegas, Nevada completed a comparable consolidation about the same time when the county, city, and three neighboring smaller jurisdictions combined their police agencies into the now Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department in 1973. In Kentucky, the City of Lexington merged with Fayette County as a metropolitan government in the early 1970's. As a result, the individual police agencies unified as one. In Florida, the City of Jacksonville and Duval County in 1968 went so far as to totally combine their governments to form a single agency under the name, the City of Jacksonville in 1968. In Pennsylvania, the York Regional Police Department was established when several jurisdictions joined to create their own police force. In 1993, Charlotte City Police and the Mecklenburg County Police Department merged. There was also a 1994 merger of the New York Housing Authority Police and the Transit Authority Police into the New York City Police Department. Most recently, in 2003, as a result of a government consolidation, the city of Louisville, Kentucky, combined with Jefferson County and, as a result, created the Louisville Metro Police Department. These are just a few examples of agencies that have considered and undertaken department consolidation.

When police agencies were first formed in the United States, leaders were being responsive to the social issues of the time and police officers served at the discretion of the dominant political institution of the time (O'Brien and Marcus, 1979). Due to the political nature of government and the reasons for which police agencies were established, police departments have become complex, autonomous and somewhat inflexible and unresponsive to the needs of other governmental entities. Rather than

working hand in hand to combat problems, this has resulted in, at a minimum, duplications of efforts and questions of the effectiveness and efficiency of the current system.

Even after law enforcement had been in existence for some time, in 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice surmised that "law enforcement in the country was fragmented, complicated, and frequently overlapping" (p.119). Based on this argument, the President's Commission made the following proposal:

Each metropolitan area and each county should take action directed toward the pooling, or consolidation, of police services through the particular technique that will provide the most satisfactory law enforcement service and protection at the lowest possible cost (p. 119).

An estimated 17,976 state and local police agencies were in existence in the United States in 2004 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2007). The Bureau of Justice Statistics also noted that almost 50 % of these departments employed fewer than 10 full-time officers and nearly a third (31%) employed fewer than 5 officers. Only 6% of law enforcement organizations employed more than 100 officers with 12% employing just one full-time officer or only part-time officers. Nearly all local police departments (98%) were operated by a single municipality. The remainder were operated by a county or tribal government, or served multiple jurisdictions under a regional or joint arrangement (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2007).

Jurisdictions contemplating consolidation efforts anticipate the production of a higher volume of police services, lower response time, reduced overtime, reduced duplication of effort, and lower overall operating costs (IACP, 2003). There is also anticipation of increased agency status, resources, and capacity. The quality of policing is expected to rise under consolidation as a result of more efficient and coordinated use of personnel, more flexibility to meet hours of peak demand, enhanced training opportunities, and improved management and supervision (IACP, 2003).

Those opposing police department consolidation cite loss of autonomy in the community, and reduced oversight and supervision of a consolidated agency covering several jurisdictions. Opponents also assume that the personal nature of policing in their community will be lost, that response times may not be lowered, but rather increase. There may also be increases in costs to the smaller community. Additionally, some minority groups may feel like they will lose equal representation and therefore, reduced services.

Even though there are many factors to consider regarding consolidation, controversy is almost always at the forefront of these efforts. While some agencies such as Jacksonville, Las Vegas, and Louisville have consolidated and endured the process, others such as Brisbane, California and Winston-Salem, North Carolina have not. In fact, some of the cities failing at consolidation have selected to “deconsolidate” their agency and return to their previous status due to high cost of operation, the high cost of liability insurance, and police credibility (IACP, 2003). Outcomes of consolidation almost always vary from the expectation of what consolidation can bring to the table. These variances are dependent on many factors. For this reason, communities and, more specifically,

police agencies, undertaking consolidation efforts must painstakingly investigate the matter prior to making any decision.

For the most part, arguments for consolidating continue to primarily revolve around efforts to produce and provide services more efficiently and effectively. Taking into consideration the issues confronting contemporary police agencies (i.e., budgetary constraints, inadequate resources, and crime prevention and control), consolidation is still viewed as a practical solution.

Perspectives on Police Consolidation

Since the turn of the twentieth century, proponents of “good government” have advocated consolidation (Rusk, 1995). As early as 1920, advocates of consolidation recognized the potential problems associated with fragmented local law enforcement agencies (Fosdick, 1920). Advocates argued that fragmented governments and their sub-units were unable to adequately serve their constituents. Delehunt (1977) suggests that as a result of the large number of jurisdictions, there exists a “maze” of governments and officials that have divergent objectives. Fosdick (1920) argued that police consolidation in metropolitan areas would undoubtedly produce beneficial results in the United States. Proponents of consolidation continued the discussions by citing various arguments in support of the concept of consolidation (Smith, 1940). Promoters argued that we cannot continue the fiscal strain of supporting law enforcement agencies that are not efficient and cost effective.

While all of these arguments are valid, one important consideration, not to be forgotten, is crime. Police departments are charged with preventing and controlling crime. Many advocates of consolidation believe that we are losing the war on crime.

While this is not sufficient evidence in and of itself to argue for consolidation, it is one of the core issues regarding consolidation

Arguments also focused on the complexity of fragmented police agencies.

Because of these complexities, police agency fragmentation is said to cause confusion to consumers. For example, *many* jurisdictions would cause a need for *many* physical facilities. Consumers would not know where to go to access services. Ultimately, this would be expensive due to the fact that at least one police facility would be needed for each different agency. Additionally, there would be competition between agencies which could inhibit effective work production.

These issues are compounded for smaller agencies and their governing entities in providing and delivering services to citizens (IACP, 2003). Rusk (1995, p. 1) notes that “parochial political boundaries continue to fix the operations of each law enforcement department to its own particular area.”

According to Herley (1989) and Wickum (1986), the foundation of this argument is based on the assumptions that:

1. Many small municipalities cannot afford to support their own police forces at an adequate level of funding. Those attempting to do so risk their capacity to provide adequate public services in other areas of responsibility.
2. Small police departments cannot recruit, train, and retain highly qualified personnel. There is a tendency to lose these officers to larger, better paying organizations where opportunities for advancements and skill development abound.

3. Small police departments are sometimes not sufficiently professional and modernized to serve the needs of the community.
4. Supervision and administration are sometimes inadequate in small police agencies, thereby adding to the liability costs of the jurisdiction.
5. The existence of many small forces, for example in a metropolitan area, can lead to confusion among citizens about jurisdiction and to professional jealousy.
6. Formal and informal coordination among multiple police departments is generally lacking or insufficient.

Consolidation is especially attractive to city and county decision-makers in regions with numerous smaller police agencies, where fragmentation or redundancy in policing may be present and where fiscal challenges exist (IACP, 2003; Wickum, 1986). Agencies can work together pooling resources, both equipment and personnel, to accomplish tasks that are common to or affect each jurisdiction. Proponents argue that the consolidations of police services will (IACP, 2003):

1. Increase efficiency through a reduction of duplicate services.
2. Increase effectiveness by eliminating political tampering.
3. Lessen the ability of criminal activity to move from one jurisdiction to another.
4. Increase professionalism and lower turnover rates by providing more opportunities in the merged agency.

Various government-initiated national commissions have supported consolidation. These include the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (Wickersham Commission, 1931) which was charged with investigating corruption activities in government (police). The Wickersham Commission drew a strong

correlation between fragmented systems of policing and the corruption within the ranks of police agencies.

The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 1967, in its work, *Task Force Report – The Police*, examined how we police our society. It made several observations regarding the impact of the fragmentation of law enforcement agencies and how this interferes with the provision of effective police services (President's Commission, 1967, p. 96). The Commission viewed fragmentation as a fundamental problem that resulted in a general lack of crime prevention and control. Individualism among police departments was seen to negatively affect police cooperation and coordination, particularly for intelligence sharing.

The National Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1971) determined that smaller police agencies (10-person or fewer) have difficulties in providing primary services such as full time patrols and investigative services, in addition to staff functions of a police department such as communications, records management, and laboratory services.

The National Advisory Commission on Standards and Goals published a comprehensive report, *Report on Police*, in 1973. This report investigated and identified minimum staffing levels for police departments, i.e., what is the optimal size of a police agency? The Commission concluded that smaller agencies (10 or fewer) should consolidate for effectiveness and efficiency.

There were also other studies that were funded by the federal government, specifically the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (United States Department of Justice). In one such study, Koepsell and Girard (1979),

investigated the limited use of consolidation of police agencies and, in particular, focused on the transition of smaller agencies that were part of a fragmented system working into a consolidated arrangement. Koepsell and Girard (1979) cited issues such as relationships between governmental units, fiscal and managerial planning, legal mandates, and feasibility of merged services to name a few. Koepsell and Girard (1979) concluded that smaller agencies were costly and ineffective and cannot provide adequate professional, specialized law enforcement services. They further concluded that consolidation removes jurisdictional boundaries and conflicts, prevents duplication of efforts/services, and maximizes tax dollars.

Other studies advocating consolidation include Krimmell, 1997; Lyons and Lowery, 1989; and Dowding and Hindmoor, 1997. There is also a California-based study supporting the consolidation movement (see Wickum, 1986; Herley, 1989). In general, these studies primarily focused on the increased efficiency and effectiveness that comes from consolidation. Other reasons specifically noted are enhanced communications, reduced duplication in investigations, greater purchasing power, and improved training, crime analysis, and records management.

Wickum (1986) conducted a study that was state-based and focused on contracting for police services as a means of regionalizing (consolidating) law enforcement services under a single agency umbrella. The thesis of this research addressed disbanding existing smaller city police departments in favor of a single, larger force (Wickum, 1986). During his research, he identified different types of resistance that the Chief of Police, City Manager, residents, and elected officials might encounter

when given the option of eliminating their police force and joining a larger entity.

Wickum identified several forms of resistance that might include:

1. Loss of local control;
2. The inability to control costs;
3. Local concerns ignored by the new agency;
4. The head of the larger agency not residing in the jurisdiction;
5. A loss of local identity from not having their own police department;
6. The inability of the city to control the quality of the police officers in the new agency;
7. Fear that levels of service would decline;
8. An inherent distrust by cities when dealing with other units of government.

Peter Coolly (1975) summarizes the many of the points made toward a pro-consolidation perspective. They include:

1. Many small municipalities cannot afford to support their own police at an adequate level of funding.
2. Small police departments cannot recruit, train, or retain highly qualified personnel.
3. Small police departments are not sufficiently professional; and modernized to serve the needs of their communities.
4. Supervision and administration are inadequate in small police agencies.
5. The existence of many small police forces in a metropolitan area leads to confusion and rivalry.
6. Formal and informal coordination among police departments in metropolitan areas is lacking or insufficient.

Even though there is research and support towards consolidation, there is still opposition from many.

Public Choice Perspective

Many supporters of the public choice perspective believe that advocates of consolidation primarily base their arguments on efficiency and economy which imply that bigger and fewer administrative units will provide more cost-efficient, specialized, and improved services (Christenson and Sachs, 1980). However, they also argue the importance of local control to citizens and that lower costs are not likely to result from consolidation. They support this argument citing differences in pay and issues related to longevity are difficult to address during consolidation.

Others fear the loss of community autonomy. They are also concerned about reduced oversight and supervision of a consolidated police department spanning several towns or cities. They assume that the personal character and the individuality of policing in their community will vanish and that response times may not be lowered, the desires and values of the citizens will be minimized or disregarded entirely, and that costs to the smaller community may increase (Ostrom, 1971). As previously mentioned, the expectations versus the actual reality of consolidation outcomes may vary greatly depending upon many factors. Still, the advocates of public choice view the tens of thousands of units of government and jurisdictions in the United States as many different public firms or public enterprises (Bish and Ostrom, 1974). This, in turn, produces an economy which exists to not only provide citizens with public goods and services, but also public safety.

There are some basic assumptions that must be understood in how public choice advocates view law enforcement and, in particular, the services they provide. Some basic assumptions of this type of thinking were developed by Ostrom in 1971. They are as follows:

1. citizens are consumers;
2. government activity is the production and provision of public goods and services;
3. institutional arrangements for making decisions that affect the production, provision, and consumption of public goods and services have a critical influence on the performance of public entities (Ostrom, 1971).

Bish and Ostrom, (1974) assert that public choice proponents discriminate between public and private goods. With private goods, consumers choose what products to purchase and how many to buy. These goods can be withheld to some degree by increasing the cost of goods. Hence, they are not available to everyone.

Public goods such as police services, fire services, sanitation, etc., are seen differently. These goods are provided to everyone and are available to all comers to enjoy (Bish and Ostrom, 1974). No individual can be excluded from the provision of these services. Therefore, these services are supplied to all in a jurisdiction; they are not seen by public choice proponents as a duplication of services.

In their 1976 publication, Ostrom and Smith tackle the issue of consolidation theorizing that police services are best provided in small governmental jurisdictions. They conducted both interviews and surveys with citizens and police officers in the St. Louis metropolitan area and found that:

1. size did not matter on most indicators of effectiveness and efficiency;

2. smaller departments rate higher than their larger counterparts in community relations;
3. the education level of officers in the smaller departments, a possible indicator of professionalism in an agency, was no less than that of others in the larger departments.

However, even with their findings favoring public choice and promoting the practicality of smaller police agencies, they did not totally eliminate the possibility that some smaller agencies should be eliminated and combined with medium sized departments such as St. Louis (Ostrom and Smith, 1976).

Another study conducted by McDavid (2002), examined the 1996 consolidation of three departments in Halifax, Canada. He found that after consolidation, the number of sworn officers decreased resulting in higher workloads for personnel. The study compared data from surveys, interviews, and budget and manpower reports before and after the consolidation. Service levels, as measured by the number of officers serving the population, also decreased. Expenditures on police services increased primarily due to union negotiations which included substantial salary increases. Consolidation was found to have no effect on crime rates. The study also looked at perceptions of citizens relating to the quality of policing services before and after consolidation. The majority of respondents (78.1%) in each year surveyed believed that the quality of police services stayed the same (McDavid, 2002).

Even though many advocates of consolidation argue the point of smaller agencies not being able to provide adequate police services, and, as previously mentioned, Ostrom and Smith (1976) did not eliminate the possibility that some smaller agencies

should be abolished and combined into medium-sized agencies, smaller governmental entities providing police services feel differently. Bollens and Schmandt (1982) found different results in a study conducted in the Chicago metropolitan area, with nearly 350 locally sustained agencies (police agencies). This study showed that regardless of the size of financial resources, they regarded themselves as capable of providing adequate law enforcement within their boundaries.

The Dilemma of Law Enforcement Consolidation

Citizens in any community enter into discussions of consolidation with preconceptions about the value of consolidating agencies and police services. These thoughts and ideas can be either present positive or negative expectations. Policy makers and police administrators are confronted with two schools of thought.

Advocates of the consolidation of governments claim that fragmented local governments create inefficiencies that can be minimized or alleviated through consolidation of government services and functions (Lyons, 1977). National and state advisory boards, along with police administration experts, advocate that more effective, efficient, and less costly law enforcement is feasible, only if numerous small, local departments are eliminated.

Proponents of public choice believe that smaller bureaucracies may be more efficient than larger bureaucracies that replace them. Police chiefs and administrators of small departments argue that small departments provide the personal type of police services necessary and requested in the communities they serve.

Additionally, negative preconceptions and a possible source of resistance could potentially follow a proposed consolidation. These include (see IACP, 2003; Herley, 1989; Wickum, 1986; Hogan, 1980; Ostrom and Whitaker, 1973):

1. Senior, supervisory, and line officers alike may be threatened by consolidation and aggressively resist change.
2. Consolidation is likely to increase costs, particularly because of the start-up costs of reorganization, planning, and standardizing equipment, and possible need for a new building to house the combined agencies.
3. Officers in line for promotion or advanced assignment in one agency may find they are outranked for these opportunities by their peers in the other agency.
4. Loss of identity.
5. Distrust between departments and inter-agency jealousies.
6. Issues of parity between officers of different departments that were merged and who had different compensation and benefit packages.
7. Impersonal service.
8. A negative effect on service levels.
9. Viable methods of cost sharing would be difficult.

Also, governance of the newly created agency, once consolidation has occurred, may face other challenges such as (see IACP, 2003; Herley, 1989):

1. Loss of control by smaller communities.
2. Confusion on the part of citizens about how and where complaints are sent.
3. Loss of personal interaction by the community with local law enforcement.

4. Fragmented oversight of the newly combined law enforcement agency by local community councils and mayors.
5. Recruitment and retention issues.
6. Promotional opportunities.
7. Insurance costs.
8. Training costs.
9. Costs of technology (i.e., combining communication systems).
10. Investigative services provided
11. Purchasing orders (i.e., new cars, uniforms, etc.).

Consolidation also affects the attitudes of both police officers and civilian employees, in addition to community members. Police chiefs and administrators may more than likely have to contend with the perceptions and attitudes of officers opposing the consolidation. Pay, promotional opportunities, benefits, and training opportunities are just a few of the issues that affect the perceptions of police officers and their attitudes. For example, in a study, conducted in 1998 before the consolidation by the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission, 82.1% of LDP's sworn personnel were in favor of the consolidation while 89.9% of JCPD's sworn personnel were opposed to the consolidation. This was, in part, due to the fact that the LDP officers thought they would benefit financially from the consolidation while JCPD's officers anticipated that they would more than likely see declines in their financial well-being. This was partially true in both instances in that LDP officers increased their salaries while some parts of the JCPD officer's benefit package were reduced. Conversely, in another example, McAninch and Sanders (1988) conducted a survey of 102 police officers (the entire

population of officers) in Bloomington and Normal, Illinois and found that the majority of the officers believed that a consolidated department would operate more economically, more effectively address local crime, and eliminate duplicate services and equipment.

However, the issue in question still exists about whether or not fragmentation actually produces an insurmountable number of harmful side effects. Community stakeholders that are facing an upsurge in fiscal constraints and diminishing levels of service delivery are investigating the pros and cons of consolidating governments and sub-units of government or centralizing the provision of services as a possible solution to these woes (Dolan, 1990). Halter (1993) provides three factors as the basis of most consolidations that occur. These include:

1. Occurring between very small cities or one considerably larger than the other;
2. Occurring when cities face a severe population decline;
3. Occurring when delivery and/or financial problems were present.

Wickum (1986) supports these presumptions and cites high costs, liability concerns, and a lack of police credibility as elements leading to discussions of consolidation.

Most studies on the topic of police consolidation are indecisive as to whether or not one school of thought dominates. This might be because of the different factors, circumstances, and issues that affect each consolidation, in addition to the different types of consolidation. When so many different “variables” affect this type of research, it is often difficult to generalize the findings in studies. Two studies conducted by the same researcher demonstrate this point.

In 1988, a study of police services in Michigan conducted by Gyapong and Gyimah-Brempong focused on estimating the demand for inputs in municipal police

departments. The operating assumption for their paper was that police decision-makers choose inputs to maximize output subject to budget and technology constraints (Gyapong and Gyimah-Brempong, 1988). As in all police agencies, the measurement of police output is difficult. Unlike private businesses, police departments do not produce output for sale. As a result, only a few output measurements exist. These include clearance rates, rates of conviction, and number of arrests.

For their study, Gyapong and Gyimah-Brempong measured the number of arrests for each of the eight Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) index crimes. The eight FBI index crimes are homicide, rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson.

Gyapong and Gyimah-Brempong (1988) used cross sectional data from 130 municipal police departments serving cities with populations of 5000 or more in the state of Michigan. This data collected was from 1984 and 1985 and there were 260 observations available for estimating the model.

They found that their estimate of economies of scale positively indicated increasing returns to scale, but was not statistically significant. In an earlier study in 1987, Gyimah-Brempong found statistically significant diseconomies of scale (average costs increasing as the number of arrests increase) in the average police department in Florida using 1982 and 1983 data from 256 departments in municipalities with populations of 5,000 or more. To test for economies of scale in small, medium, and large cities, he divided the sample and determined that police departments in large cities (41 of the 256 cities in the dataset) experienced statistically significant diseconomies of scale for police services, while police services in small and medium cities did not exhibit

significant economies or diseconomies of scale. Although this is only one study, the results suggest that there may be a maximum limit for the size of a police department.

As previously mentioned, different factors, circumstances, and issues affect each consolidation, in addition to the different types of consolidation for each jurisdiction. Many of these factors include, but are not limited to, political, financial, technological, legal, services, etc. Therefore, administrators must be prudent in not focusing on one variable to the exclusion of others (i.e., cost savings masking deterioration of service quality) (Staley, 2005).

Even though economics play a major role in the arguments for and against consolidation, economics should not be the sole determining factor in the consideration of consolidation. How well local governments match; the flexibility of decision-makers to implement necessary changes; who is elected to the new government; and the implementation decisions of the policy makers—are all contributing factors in a consolidation (Durning and Nobbie, 2000).

As the perceptions and attitudes of employees are important, it would follow that the needs, satisfactions and wants of employees are also important. Staley (2005) asserts that employees represent one the most powerful or, at least, influential constituencies in an electoral process and whose influence should be taken into account when implementing public policy. This is of particular reason why consideration should be given to the issues and concerns of employees. Studying the issues and concerns of employees, in addition to their attitudes and perceptions, is necessary to fully understand the potential impacts of consolidation.

The Structure of Consolidation

Three crucial factors make up the structure or composition of consolidation. These include the degree of structural change, the type of consolidation, and the actual stage of the consolidation.

Each of these factors can differ from one consolidation to another depending on several variables. These variables are particular to different jurisdictional consolidations and are dependent upon circumstances and issues related to each consolidation.

Structural Change: Complexity and Control

As one might imagine, consolidation involves structural change. This involves integrating some or all functions and activities (IACP, 2003). These changes usually involve structural changes in the aspects of control and complexity of an organization.

Robbins (1987) defines structural complexity as the extent of differentiation within the organization. This differentiation includes the extent of specialization or division of labor, i.e., number and types of specialized units and/or functions. Krimmel (1997) cites specialized services such as a canine unit, investigative unit, and juvenile services that were added after a consolidation.

Differentiation, according to Robbins (1987), also includes the number of levels in the organization's hierarchy. In other words, does the organizational structure have many levels or has the structure been flattened? An example would be that a flattened structure promotes better communication.

Finally, Robbins (1987) cites the extent to which the organization's units are dispersed geographically. Are the organization's units more centrally located or are they decentralized?

Based on Robbins' analysis and on works conducted by Langworthy (1986) and Bayley (1992), it follows that complexity has three basic components:

1. Vertical differentiation, which focuses on the nature of the hierarchy within an organization;
2. Functional differentiation, which measures the degree to which tasks are broken down into functionally distinct units;
3. Spatial differentiation, or the extent to which an organization is distributed geographically.

MaGuire (2003) defines structural coordination and control as the means by which an organization achieves a level of control within the organization. This includes administration intensity, formalization, and centralization.

Administration intensity addresses the relative size of an organization's administrative component (Langworthy, 1986; Monkkonen, 1981). It can include administrative and/or staff functions such as budgeting, fleet management, human resources, etc.

Formalization is defined as the extent to which an organization is governed by formal written rules, policies, standards, and procedures (Hall, Hass, and Johnson, 1967). In other words, are formalized structures governing the operations of the agency or are they of an informal nature?

Centralization is the degree to which the decision-making capacity within an organization is concentrated in a single individual or small select group (MaGuire, 2003). In years past, decision making was conducted only at higher levels. MaGuire (2003)

asserts that new ways of thinking have encouraged administrators to push decision-making to the lowest levels.

No matter what type of consolidation an organization undertakes, it will encounter these factors. Consequently, the type of consolidation will ultimately influence the degree to which these factors will affect it.

Types of Consolidation

The extent to which organizational change can vary is substantially different across consolidations. This is due to the fact that motives and types of consolidations differ widely. IACP (2003) asserts that consolidation is a matter of degree and documents the different variations of consolidation that include:

1. Functional—two or more agencies combine selected functional units, such as emergency communications, dispatch, or records.
2. Cross Deputyization/Mutual Enforcement Zones / Overlapping Jurisdictions—agencies authorize each other's officers to pool resources and improve regional coverage, for example, permitting a city police officer to make arrests in the county and a sheriff's deputy to make arrests in the city.
3. Public Safety—city or county governments may unite all police, fire, and emergency medical services agencies under one umbrella.
4. Local Merger—two separate police agencies form a single new entity. The agencies may be in small communities or metropolitan areas.
5. Regional—a number of agencies combine to police a geographic area rather than a jurisdictional one.

6. Metropolitan—two or more agencies serving overlapping jurisdictions join forces to become one agency serving an entire metropolitan area.
7. Government—a city and surrounding county consolidate their entire governments, creating a “metro” form of government for all citizens.

IACP (2003) notes that no one form of consolidation is superior to others. They assert that the type selected for implementation depends on the needs, expectations, and degree of cooperation among the stakeholders in each particular jurisdiction (IACP, 2003). As one might expect, the type of consolidation selected for each jurisdiction can have a different impact on different jurisdictions and more specifically, the different stakeholders in the particular jurisdiction (i.e., administrators, citizens, and employees). This is also dependent on the needs for the consolidation and the degree of disruption incurred by jurisdiction by the consolidation.

Each of the aforementioned types of consolidation are complex and an innovation that goes through various stages or a series of transitional events. These stages or transitional events impact the implementation of consolidation and the “final product.”

Transitional Events Affecting the Implementation of Consolidation

Kranz (1985) defines organizational transition or “transition events” in private organizations involved with organizational change. The following components of change do not focus or target the individual, but rather groups, work units, divisions, or those with certain organizational standing. However, even so, the individual is still somewhat affected by the innovation, especially in the case of consolidation.

Components of change include situations where continuity is threatened or changed and, more specifically, where internal or external conditions call for a rethinking of the organizational structure, functions, and/or role constellations and change (Kranz,

1985). When changes are openly announced or when a beginning date or even a timeline for the change is either formally publicized or broadly expected, these transitions become events.

These transitional events occur in stages in both private organizations (mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and in public organizations (consolidations, mergers, unifications). In the private sector, Seo and Hill (2005) analyzed mergers and acquisitions and identified four stages of implementation. They include

1. The pre-merger stage;
2. The initial planning and formal combination stage;
3. The operational combination stage;
4. The stabilization stage.

The pre-merger or pre-consolidation stage begins with the inquiry of consolidation and starts with the examination of a possible merger. It usually ends with the official announcement of the merger. Included in this stage of implementation is planning and discussions among top managers and executives regarding a possible merger (Garpin and Herndon, 2000). Also discussed during this stage are rumors that may develop regarding the merger among employees (Ivancevich, Schweiger, and Power, 1987). During this stage, it is probable that organizations will remain relatively stable (Buono and Bowditch, 1989).

After the merger is formally announced, the initial planning and formal combination stage begins. This stage usually ends once the former organizations have been legally disbanded and a new organization has been created, many times with a new moniker. The conception of a new vision, new goals, and joint committees and teams to

make decisions regarding management changes, staffing plans, and new organizational structure comprise this stage.

Integrating organizational functions and operations occurs in the operational combination stage. Garpin and Herndon (2000) note that exchanges between the associates of the combined organizations are extended from top administrators and multiparty committees to general work units and day-to-day operations. Budgets, physical work space, work assignments, and reporting responsibilities are restructured during this stage. Employees are encouraged to learn new, innovative ways of conducting business while meeting newly revised performance standards. They are also influenced to adopt new value and belief systems (Marks and Mirvis, 1992). This stage is lengthy in terms of time due to the impact on all aspects of the merged organization, i.e., procedural, cultural, role related, etc. It usually takes much longer than managers typically expect, sometimes years (Buono and Bowditch, 1989). During this stage, structural complexity and structural control are altered.

The stabilization stage is the last stage of the consolidation process and in this stage, operational integration is completed. Evolution is common in almost all consolidations. Even though changes, modifications, and corrections may continue at this stage, the organization stabilizes and customs, roles, and organizational routines are stabilized.

As noted, transitional events affect the implementation of consolidation. A transition is defined as the process or instance of changing from one state, form, or activity to another. As such, consolidations are innovations that are complex and can be

perceived differently by individuals depending upon the particular attributes of the innovation.

Diffusion of Innovation Theory

The initiation of efforts toward consolidation of police agencies is a difficult undertaking. These efforts may take many years before their “full” adoption. Oftentimes, this is because of how those affected by the change perceive the change and attributes of the change. In other words, how officers perceive and view the change will affect their willingness to adopt the new idea(s) or innovation(s) such as with consolidation.

Diffusion of innovation theory provides a useful framework for studying the process of support for innovations or consolidation. Diffusion research has determined that the manner in which adopters perceive the attributes of an innovation such as consolidation is critical. In fact, these perceptions account for 49 – 87% of the variance in whether or not they adopt the innovation (Rogers, 1995).

Rogers (2003) asserts that diffusion is needed for success in making major changes. He defines diffusion as “the process in which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system” (p. 5). In other words, diffusion is a special kind of communication that is associated with the distribution of messages that are viewed as new ideas. Additionally, he defines communications as “a process in which participants create and share information with one another in order to reach mutual understanding” (p. 5).

Diffusion is similar to a type of social change. It is a form of change that takes place in the structure and function of a social system. When a change of magnitude

occurs, such as a police department consolidation, the entire social system of the entity is changed.

Based on the definition of Rogers (2003), four main elements exist in diffusion. These include 1) communication channels, 2) time, 3) the social system, and the innovation. For purposes of this paper, the main focus will be directed toward the element of innovation and more specifically the attribute of complexity related to an innovation. However, a brief description of the remaining elements and attributes of innovation will be given.

One of the elements existing in diffusion is a communication channel. A communications channel is used to transcend messages from one individual to another. It is how messages get from one individual to another. The view of the innovation is reliant upon this communication and depends on the nature of the communication. According to Rogers (2003), the process involves 1) an innovation, 2) an individual or other unit of adoption that has knowledge of, or has experienced using, the innovation, 3) another individual or another unit that does not yet have knowledge of, or experience with, the innovation, and 4) a communication channel connecting the two units.

Time is another important element in diffusion. Rogers (2003) notes that time is involved in diffusion in 1) the innovation-decision process, 2) innovativeness, and 3) an innovation's rate of adoption.

The innovation-decision process is the progression through which an individual passes from first being informed of an innovation, to the development of an attitude toward the innovation, to a decision to accept or disallow, to implementation and use of the new idea, and finally to affirmation of this decision (Rogers, 2003).

Innovativeness, according to Rogers (2003), is the rate at which an individual or other unit of adoption is “earlier” than others in adopting the innovation. Rogers (2003) refers to some individuals as the “late majority.” Research has shown these individuals to be of lower socio-economic status, rarely uses mass media channels, and learns most of what they know from their peers (Rogers, 2003). Many individuals who had reached higher levels of the organization at LDP, JCPD and ultimately LMPD had more awareness, experience and were more educated than others of lower rank. These individuals, some of which might have been part of the implementation committees, were the first to accept the innovation of consolidation earlier in the process and worked to make the merger a success. Others who did not have the educational background, awareness or experience, in many cases, were slower to accept or adopt the innovation.

Rate of adoption is the third variable in which time is involved. It is the relative speed at which an innovation is adopted by individuals of the social system. As one might expect, the rate of adoption is slow at first, but as time passes, more and more individuals accept the innovation. The rate of adoption is usually measured by the length of time required for a certain number of the individuals within a system to adopt the innovation. It should be noted that while individuals adopted the consolidation of the LMPD on a certain date, January 6, 2003, not all individuals accepted the merger at that time.

Interrelated units that are engaged in shared problem solving to achieve a common goal is known as a social system, another element of diffusion (Rogers, 2003). The LMPD was such a social system in that its common goal was the innovation of a consolidated agency. Members of a social system include individuals, groups,

organizations and/or sub-systems. Members of a social system usually form and work collectively to combat or solve a common problem.

In all social systems, diffusion takes place. Diffusion is affected in these systems as they structure a boundary and the diffusion works within it. How the structure affects diffusion, the roles of opinion leader and agents of change, types of innovation decisions, and consequences all affect diffusion (Rogers, 2003). It should be noted that structures can be both formal and informal.

One aspect of the theoretical framework for this research is based in the element of innovation and more specifically, complexity related to innovation. Innovation refers to a concept or procedure that is viewed as new by a person that is accepting it. It does not actually need to be new as dictated by time. Rather, it just needs to be perceived as new by the individual accepting it. For instance, the police department consolidation was an innovation that had occurred many times in the past in other jurisdictions. However, it was new to all personnel at LDP and JCPD. The perceptions of members of the societal group, in relation to the character of the innovation, affect how quickly it is adopted.

Rogers (2003) suggests that five attributes of innovation exist. Perceived attributes include 1) relative advantage, 2) compatibility, 3) trialability, 4) observability, and 5) complexity.

Relative advantage relates to the extent to which an innovation is viewed as better than the one currently in existence. The view of the member is primary to this assessment. The higher the perceived relative advantage, the more likely the innovation will be adopted (Pankratz, et al., 2002).

Compatibility is how the innovation is observed in terms of consistency relating to existing values, past experiences, and the needs, wants, and satisfactions of the individuals who will be adopting the innovation. If an innovation is contrary to existing values and norms, new or revised ones will need to be implemented prior to initiating the innovation. This is done for two reasons. First, values guide behavior. If values are consistent with the innovation, it will be easier to achieve or implement. Secondly, individuals will look for consistency between the innovation, values, and norms and if new values aren't established and consistent with the innovation, they will notice inconsistencies and that will hinder implementation of the innovation.

Trialability relates to whether or not the innovation can be tested on a controlled basis. Utilizing an incremental approach will prevent uncertainty.

Observability relates to whether or not results of the innovation are visible to all. If results can be seen, the innovation is more likely to be accepted.

The final attribute of an innovation such as a police department consolidation and the focus of this research is complexity. Complexity addresses the perceived view of whether or not the innovation is complicated to understand or difficult to utilize. Complex innovations are difficult to implement and are adopted more slowly than ones that are viewed as simple (Rogers, 2003). Pankratz, et al. (2002) also notes that innovations perceived as complex are less likely to be adopted. Additionally, in a meta-analysis of the relationship between the characteristics or attributes of an innovation, Tornatzky and Klein (1982) note complexity as one of the attributes having the most consistent significant relationship across a broad range of innovation types.

Most of the innovations regarding the consolidation of LDP and JCPD such as culture(s), communications, redefining patrol boundaries, policies and procedures and collective bargaining contracts were complex to merge or redefine due to many facets and intricacies of these components. To add to this complexity, each of the former agencies had their own unique way of conducting business. Further compounding the issue is that personnel of all ranks might not have perceived these complexities.

Some innovations are quickly understood by most members of an organization; other are more complicated, complex and are adopted more slowly. Typically, according to Rogers (2003), new ideas that are simpler to understand are adopted more rapidly than innovations that require the adopter to develop new skills and understandings. This is particularly the case with a police department consolidation.

According to Rogers (2003), complexity can be a very important obstacle to adoption or support for an innovation. For those having experience with consolidation, merger might have been viewed less complex. However, few, if any, with LMPD had any experience with a police department consolidation and might not have perceived the complexities of the innovation and the consolidation of certain organizational change components.

One of the fastest growing areas of interest in recent years, related to organizational change, has been in the continuous transformation model which seeks to apply complexity theories to organizational change (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Fitzgerald, 2002a; Hock, 1999; MacIntosh and MacLean, 2001). New advancements in the area of complexity science focus on innovative ways in which we conceptualize and operationalize complexity (Anderson, 1999; McKelvey, 1997). Complexity science is

grounded in the belief that all organizations are “complex” and that this attribute is a culmination of behavior on the part many members acting in simple ways on local information (Dooley, 2002). The information provided adds to the concept of complexity and the degree of complexity in relation to an organization. While all organizations are complex, every organization has a different level of complexity depending upon organizational components, factors, structure, individuals, and the like.

Most fundamental is that organizations are complex because the people comprising the organizations are complex. Schein (1980) asserts that individuals are complex because they vary greatly in age, gender, their histories and experiences, and their beliefs and desires. In addition to interpersonal diversity, it is possible that people in the organization also fill various roles. For example, a commanding officer on the police department may hold the rank of Major and be a manager, mentor, instructor, a team member, or a friend. The transition between these roles may not be noticeable. However, all of these variances of individuals and their roles add to the complexities of the organization.

Complexity is an important concept that has been studied by scholars of many different disciplines such as systems theory, cybernetics, synergetics, and the like. However, even today, we are a long way from consensus about what such as concept actually involves (Horgan, 1995; Edmonds, 1999). The failure of determining one definition is that the concept of complexity is complex (Kitto, 2008). As such, there is no single objective definition of complexity.

In an attempt to define complexity, researchers have attempted to understand the more straightforward concept of simplicity. Researchers have studied simple systems

which have, at least by their definition, been removed from the environment. The technique of *reduction* has been used and consists of dividing or splitting complex problems into smaller, more manageable components. The solutions to these smaller issues are then transferred back to a larger solution which represents the original system (Kitto, 2008).

Reduction has been attempted at police agencies. At LMPD during consolidation, personnel often divided problems into smaller components in order to make them more manageable. For example, when consolidation first occurred, both the LDP and JCPD training academies were working on smaller components of merging the entire training units such as recruit training and in-service training. However, when both groups reconvened, there were often scheduling conflicts between the two components.

Many times, when reduction was used during the merger innovation and the smaller components of the problem were again matched with the elements of the larger problem, solutions failed to work. This was due to the fact that there was little interoperability between components during the problem-solving phases. As Kitto (2008) notes, *reduction* lends itself more to the natural sciences than to the social sciences.

Therefore, as the application of complexity has transcended from the natural sciences to the social sciences, many researchers have developed definitions for it based on their particular discipline and its (complexity) application to that discipline. Some of these definitions are noted below.

Complexity Theory

Complexity theory or theories is an all encompassing term for a number of different theories, thoughts, and research programs that originated in scientific disciplines such as meteorology, biology, physics, chemistry, and mathematics (Rescher, 1996; Stacey, 2003). As there are a vast number of different theories and not just one, many are influenced by their own particular discipline. Hence, it must be recognized that any particular definition of complexity is influenced by the perspective of the original discipline (Burnes, 2005). Therefore, for purposes of this paper, Black's (2000) use of the term "complexity theories" rather than complexity theory will be followed to highlight the many different viewpoints among researchers.

Complexity theories are increasingly being seen by academics and practitioners as a way of understanding organizations and promoting organizational change (Bechtold, 1997; Black, 2000; MacBeth, 2002) such as during a police department consolidation. Complexity theories are utilized in the natural sciences to argue that chaos is a necessary condition for the growth of dynamic systems, but that these systems are prevented from destruction by the presence of "simple order-generating" rules (Gell-Mann, 1994; Gould, 1989). When these theories are applied to organizations, proponents argue that organizations, like complex systems in nature, are dynamic, non-linear systems, and they too are governed by a set of simple "order-generating" rules (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Lewis, 1994; MacIntosh and MacLean, 2001).

A consolidating police agency meets this criterion in that the organization is characterized by continuous change, activity or progress. Additionally, because of the

non-linear nature of the system, rules are devised in order to provide some form of focus, restraint, and/or order.

In agreement, Stacey et al (2002) assert that the key to survival is for all organizations to develop a set of rules which keep the organization operating “on the edge of chaos.” Too much stability results in absence of change while too much chaos creates an overwhelming atmosphere where change cannot occur.

At the time of merger in 2003, the entire organization was chaotic. Many changes such as restructuring, personnel movement or reassignment, information gathering and the like were occurring very quickly and this was chaotic in and of itself. However, order-generating rules such as who would make certain decisions were established in order to implement change. The decision-making process was similar to each of the former departments in that a hierarchical system was utilized, but unlike some of the decision-making in the former departments, every bit of information needing a decision did not need to be sent to the Chief of Police for approval. The new system was more streamlined in that individuals of lower ranks such as committee chairs were empowered to make decisions. This assisted in the consolidation efforts.

Many different definitions of complexity exist among researchers. Corning (2002, p. 56) asserts that “in short, contradictory opinions abound.” Even though there are many competing ideas and theories, three key ones are most cited: chaos theory; dissipative structures theory; and the theory of complex adaptive systems (Stacey *et al*, 2002).

Chaos theory is resultant from research conducted on weather systems by Lorenz (1993). Lorenz (1993) defined chaotic systems as processes that appear to advance

according to chance, even though their behavior is in fact determined by precise laws. Chaos theory involves dynamic systems that are continually changing themselves in an irreversible and thus evolutionary manner (Bechtold, 1997; Haigh, 2002).

According to the theory, small changes in the environment, especially during the innovation of police consolidation, can be augmented by chaos which in turn causes instability. This instability is integral to the converting of an existing pattern of behavior into a new more suitable one. In an organization and more specifically, a police department involved in consolidating organizational change components, the changes causing instability can be planned, spontaneous, or anywhere in between. They can also be induced by individuals or factors in the environment, either intentionally or unintentionally.

During organizational consolidations as in the case of LDP and JCPD, changes such as reorganizing patrol boundaries cause chaos and in turn, instability as this change caused other changes to occur such as reporting practices, changes in police reporting areas (PRAs), and statistical reporting for crime analysis. These changes in many instances were non-linear in that they did not seem to be based in logic and many times, did not make sense. Additionally, these changes happened very quickly. This added to the complexity of the process. For example, when redefining patrol boundaries, the process for statistical reporting related to crime analysis changed. Crime analysts requested information in a more timely fashion; earlier in the week than before the adjustment to the boundaries. While no one could understand why this had to occur, it worked for the organization and seemed to work better.

Systems may also encounter instability and reach notable places where they self organize to produce a varied configuration of behavior pattern (Burnes, 2005). Stacey (2003) refers to these configurations as dissipative structures.

The dissipative structures theory recognizes that unless energy is fed in from the outside, structures will “dissipate.” Dissipative structures are similar to chaotic systems. According to Prigogine (1997), a dissipative structure is a somewhat constant configuration that operates in harmony with non-linear logic. Styhere (2002) goes on the note that in certain positions, the structure can attract considerable external pressure, while in others it can be completely changed by even the smallest disturbances. These structures can also experience periods of instability and at certain points, reorganize to form a structure or behavior that cannot be foretold from knowledge of the prior condition, but rather from an internal dynamic. (Stacey, 2003).

For LMPD, one of the outside forces providing energy for the departmental consolidation was the larger government consolidation. During the merger of LDP and JCPD, political and community considerations influenced the organizational structure of the agency. While the LMPD structure was like in nature with LDP and JCPD and was somewhat harmonious, many of the changes were considered by personnel to be decisions of non-linear reasoning. This was because many personnel were not aware of the process of consolidation and did not perceive the complexities involved in the process.

The chaos theory and the dissipative structures theory focus on entire sets and populations. In contrast, the complex adaptive systems approach attempts to make

meaning of the behavior of the individual elements of systems and populations (Stacey *et al*, 2002).

A complex adaptive system (CAS) consists of many different components, or “agents”, working together with one another under a set of rules so as to improve their behavior and, in turn, the behavior of the group which they compromise. These systems require each agent to modify its behavior to that of other agents (Stacey, 2003). Put another way, behavior in a complex adaptive system is not influenced by a single entity, but rather simultaneous and corresponding actions of agents within the system itself. Learning takes place during this interaction. In this system, all of the CASs, form a larger system which “learns its way into the future” (Stacey, 1996, p. 183). As individuals or sets of individuals learn, so do their groups. As these groups or sub-systems learn, they evolve (Stacey, 1996).

The CAS does not operate exclusively in the environment, but rather with other CAS’s as part of a system. Goldstein in Zimmerman et al. (1998, p. 270) refers to self-organizing as:

“a process...whereby new emergent structures, patterns, and properties arise without being externally imposed on the system. Not controlled by a central, hierarchical command-and-control center, self-organization is usually distributed throughout the system.”

Organizations are also complex adaptive systems. In these systems, groups and individuals form to affect influences over economic, political, and societal systems. All of these systems work collectively to evolve.

In government consolidations, several complex adaptive systems exist. These systems may be formal or informal. In these systems, sub-units are comprised of other sub-units and so on until a group level of individuals in a particular organization is reached. Complexities are part of the sub-units and the entire system and their behavior(s) are influenced by the simultaneous and corresponding actions of agents within the system itself. Each of the individuals in these groups interacts and learns from one another.

For example, during the LMPD consolidation, several individuals from units with LDP and JCPD (i.e., criminal investigation, evidence technicians, training, etc.) merged their activities to include, policies, structures, goals, procedures and the like. While all of the different units worked independently from one another, they all interacted at some point in time. Many informal individual groups formed to affect influence over systems. Learning took place during this interaction and the sub-units evolved causing in turn, the organization to evolve.

All of these systems work in unison to evolve and, as individuals are involved, complexity is viewed by many researchers as applying to human systems (Stacey, 1996). Adding even more credence to this thought is the fact that no research has shown to nullify the importance of human characteristics.

All of these theories have differences. The primary difference is that the chaos dissipative structures work to build mathematical models at the macro level. To the contrary, while complex adaptive systems theory works toward the same goal, it utilizes an individual-based approach. In this theory, rules are not constructed for the whole

population, but for interaction for the individual entities or units making up a system. From this, theorists explain the behavior of the population as a whole (Burnes, 2005).

Police agencies involved in consolidation have elements in common associated with all of these theories (i.e., chaos theory, dissipative structures theory, and complex adaptive systems). In using LMPD as an example related to the aforementioned theories, the department is comprised of elements from each of them.

LMPD was a dynamic system that was always fluid during and after the consolidation phase. As new initiatives related to consolidation were implemented, the organization was constantly changing and evolving. Some of the changes involved complex initiatives such as consolidating or redefining cultures, policies and procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts and patrol boundaries to name a few. All of these changes were complex. In addition, because of the consolidation, the department displayed complex patterns of behavior. This not only happened at the organizational and group level, but also at the individual level. While these behaviors were chaotic, restraining rules that governed behavior were established that would allow for innovation, but at the same time discourage excessive behaviors.

During the consolidation process, small changes caused instability. These changes included initiatives as small as redefining a single policy. Changes such as this, while seemingly small, were complex.

During the LDP and JCPD consolidation, energy or changes also culminated from the outside environment as with dissipative structures. There were also components of complex adaptive systems encountered during the LMPD consolidation. Individuals worked and learned from other members of the LMPD system, especially in specialty

units such as narcotics, communications, investigations, etc. These systems worked with other systems as part of the entire larger system, LMPD.

From the theories of complexity and, more specifically, the concept of chaos and order, chaos is seen as arbitrary or the absence of order, but is actually a form of order (Arndt and Bigelow (2002). Fitzgerald (2002a) asserts that chaos and order are not opposites to choose from, but rather like attributes of such systems and within these systems of chaos, there may exist some order that is hidden and less obvious than the randomness that is observed. Fitzgerald (2002a) also notes that non-linear systems contain both their own sense of instability and order. Tetenbaum (1998) summarizes the concept stating that chaos and order describe a complex, unpredictable, and orderly disorder in which patterns of behavior disclose in irregular, but similar forms.

Such forms of chaos and order exist in organizational consolidation. For example, during the merger of LDP and JCPD, the Chief of Police had a mantra of “Sooner is better.” At each of the former departments, issues were handled, but not with the same expediency or urgency as with LMPD. While the process was chaotic for personnel at the inception of merger, order evolved and it became a normal part of conducting business.

Three types of order-disorder in complex systems have been identified by Stacey (2003): stable equilibrium; explosive instability; and bounded instability. *Stable equilibrium* and *explosive instability* are complex systems not viewed to be able to convert themselves in order to survive. For organizations to survive, they must be flexible, not too stable and at the same time not be overly unstable. Organizations in these categories are not able to convert themselves to adapt to changes in the internal and

external environment. Only the *bounded instability* complex system is considered as being capable of this transformation. If systems stagnate, they eventually die.

Under bounded instability complex systems, the conditions exist somewhere between the verge of order and chaos. The term used to describe this condition is the “edge of chaos”:

Complex systems have large numbers of independent yet interacting actors. Rather than ever reaching a stable equilibrium, the most adaptive of these complex systems keeps changing continuously by remaining at the poetically termed “edge of chaos” that exists between order and disorder. By staying in this intermediate zone, these systems never quite settle into stable equilibrium but never quite fall apart. Rather, these systems, which stay constantly poised between order and disorder, exhibit the most prolific, complex and continuous change. ... (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, p. 29).

When a complex system is on the edge of chaos, the system’s creativity, growth, and useful self-organization are optimal. But some organizations go too far. Keeping an organization from going to the extreme is accomplished by *order-generating* rules.

The most complex systems display order through a process of self organization (Burnes, 2005). This is accomplished by a simple set of order-generating rules, which allow limited chaos while providing comparative order (Frederick, 1998; Lewis, 1994; MacIntoch and MacLean, 2001; Stacey *et al*, 2002).

As previously mentioned, organizations have many sub-units and consequently many individuals working alone and in unison with others. During the innovation of government consolidations, these complex systems of individuals are continually changing and are usually in a state of flux somewhere between stability and confusion. This in turn caused complexity.

At LMPD, during the consolidation process, individuals were empowered to think “outside of the box” and develop solutions to factors such as policies, redefining patrol boundaries, and consistency among collective bargaining contracts. In attempting to solve these complex issues, many times individuals made decisions that could harm the agency. In order to prevent decisions that would cause irreparable harm, rules were developed that generated order in the processes.

Kauffman’s (1995) “rugged landscapes” is another complexity theory that states that complex adaptive theories evolve so that “goodness” or condition in the dynamic environment can be maximized to its fullest extent. The concept behind this theory maintains that the achievement of a system can be represented by a “landscape” where coordinates represent the organizational design, and the height of the topography represents organizational well-being. The highest point in this landscape and its associated well-being rate could be considered the best possible state for the system. When the well-being landscape is simple, it is relatively simple to optimize organizational performance. Administrators are responsible for assessing and identifying important factors and how they should be arranged so that the overall configuration of the organization complements the contingencies of the environment.

At LMPD, factors were identified by the Chief of Police, command staff, officers, and citizens so that the configuration of the department complemented the contingencies of the environment. A computerized statistics program to prevent and reduce crime, COMPSTAT, was identified as a major factor in the environment that influenced the configuration of the department. Preventing crime was a major concern of the community. Configurations of units in the department were established based on decentralization so that commanders in patrol divisions could address crime issues in their area of responsibility. This “landscape” was not simple due to the many different departmental components involved in this process. Accordingly, organizational well-being was difficult to realize until the culture of centralization was altered.

Conversely, if the “landscape” is complex, as in the case of police consolidations, organizational well-being may be more difficult. Complexities such as this exist where optimality of the organizational system is determined by tightly coupled components (Kauffman, 1995). When individual components can be optimized without any connectivity or consideration for another, the “landscape” is considered to be simple. If individual components of the organization play a part in the overall well-being of the organization in a variety of means, the optimal organization configuration becomes difficult to find (Dooley, 2002). Therefore, it follows that the extent to which constituent elements are interdependent on each other is a determining factor relating to an organization’s complexity.

While not all elements in a police organization are interdependent, there are a multitude of elements that are. For example, while centralized investigative units work independently from patrol division in their function of follow-up investigations, they are

still interdependent for preliminary investigative reports, court testimony, initial evidence protection, initial scene security, etc.

In the case of organizational consolidation related to policies and procedures, many complexities arise in policies because of the interdependency in them. As an example, when developing policy for evidence collection, such policies involve sub-units such as investigators, patrol officers, labs, evidence technicians and the like. All of these interdependent elements make for complex environments.

Glenn and Malott (2004) liken organizations to ecosystems in that they possess complex interdependencies among organizational systems and their interconnected contingencies. They cite three types of organizational complexity: environmental, component, and hierarchical complexities.

The environment outside of the organization is constantly changing and causing many internal changes sequentially causing complexities within the organization. These changes include product or service development, mergers, consolidations, government regulations, warfare, and bankruptcies (Glenn and Malott, 2004). Such was the case for the innovation of the consolidation of LDP and JCPD.

Changes in the external environment have an impact on the internal workings of the organization. Internal changes in the organization can also impact the external environment. Organizations that do not adapt to changes in the external environment are subject to falter.

In the case of the innovation of police consolidation of LDP and JCPD, the external environment dictated the merger. The government of the newly merged Louisville Metro was established by a referendum vote in 2001. However, other external

environmental considerations affected the merger of LDP and JCPD. These included, but are not limited to political considerations, service demands, and external funding sources such as federal and state grants.

Component complexity is caused by the number of elements that comprise an organization. These elements may exist as equals or in a hierarchical manner. Component complexity depends on both the numbers of people participating in processes, in addition to the number of processes. Therefore, the organization's complexity is greater when the organization has more subsystems and/or larger numbers of interlocking behavioral contingencies (Glenn and Malott, 2004). Efforts must be systemized or risk increases of component complexity, redundancy, and inefficiency (Malott, 1999).

There are many sub-systems in a police agency. During the consolidation process of LMPD, many sub-systems existed and included investigations, operations, and administration in addition to a multitude of sub-units within each of these. This in itself made the organization and the merger process very complex. The complexity was compounded during the innovation of consolidation in that all of these sub-units were involved in merging organizational change components.

Hierarchical complexity is determined by the number of system levels in the organization. In other words, almost all entities are made up of systems and sub-systems (Glenn and Malott, 2004). Some of these sub-systems may also have sub-systems and this process can continue with systems bifurcating.

The more levels in an organization, or, the "taller" the organization, the more hierarchical complexity it has. Hierarchical complexity is usually affected by component

complexity (Glenn and Malott, 2004). For example, in a police department, the number of Patrol Divisions (e.g. geographic patrol areas) may be expanded from eight to ten. As a consequence, more Division commanders would be needed. Because of the added functions of each Division, additional management/supervisory levels would be needed to effectively manage this change/modification.

Most hierarchical structures are assembled to mirror their organizational structures. As noted by Glenn and Malott (2004), these structures may be defined by geography, content, form, life expectancy, or seasonality. In police agencies, these structures are defined by geography, function, or a combination of both geography and function (Conser, et al., 2003).

Related to hierarchical complexity is the fact that as the organization gets taller, or as management levels increase, the behavior of those in higher levels of management becomes increasingly unrelated to critical components of the interconnected contingencies of lower levels. This adds to organizational complexity and the complexity of merging organizational change components in that the performance at the lower levels depends on the behavior of higher levels and if such disconnect exists, complexity abounds and organizational failure thrives.

This often happens in police agencies in that police officers note this disconnect between managers and the rank and file. Because there are so many levels of management, information intended for either officers or top management is often filtered. Communication occurs, but it is often not effective communication. This adds complexity to the consolidation process and organization especially if the officers don't

understand what the manager wants or needs. Conversely, if management does not understand the wants and needs of officers, the same chance for complexity exists.

Complexity theory is a relatively new science (Arndt and Bigelow, 2000).

Because these theories are primarily based in the natural sciences, proponents can cite the work of prominent researchers to champion their cause. However, much of the work is controversial. Many writers have expressed doubts about the validity of complexity theories (Hiett, 2001). Most evidence explaining complexity comes from computer simulation models and not from empirical studies (Kauffman, 1993). However, Lissack and Richardson (2001) assert that it is difficult to build meaningful computer models of human behavior. As a result, while these complexity theories can be utilized in the study of organizational theory, researchers must be cautious in their application.

Organizational Complexity and the Environment

Organizational environments are complex, especially during the innovation of a police consolidation. Thus, organizational complexity is seen as a response to complexity within the internal and external environment (Dooley, 2002). The internal environment consists of the processes and technologies that make up the most basic operations of the department. For example, during an innovation such as a police consolidation, organization change components such as culture(s), policies and procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and re-defining patrol division boundaries are internal to the organization and are all complex issues that are usually merged, revised, redefined and then re-implemented. The external environment includes customers, markets and basically associations that influence the responses of the organization. During the innovation of police consolidation, external influences adding

to complexity include political considerations, labor unions, community members, businesses and special groups to name a few. According to Dooley (2002), the complexity of both the internal and external environments can be described along three dimensions: its differentiation or variety, its dynamic properties, and the complexity of its underlying causal mechanisms.

A police agency would be considered to be a complex organization that's internal and external environments are complex. First, in terms of differentiation, a police department's clients are very diverse in many terms (i.e., gender, ethnicity, age, type of client, etc.). In assessing the department's clientele, the perpetrators are diverse as are the victims. Even those in the community who are not directly affected by crime are diverse. Thus, diverse responses are needed for the different individuals.

Secondly, the internal and external environments of the police department are varied (i.e., community, departmental, legal, etc.) adding to the complexity. Each of these environments requires different assessments and responses to issues.

Third, police agencies and the environments in which they operate are dynamic in nature. Both the internal and external environments are constantly changing. For example, in policing, technological advances have been continually evolving, are complex and have required constant changes in policies and procedures and the ways police respond to clientele.

Finally, causal mechanisms for the police organization are not simple. Adoption and diffusion processes are complex and sometimes unpredictable.

Such is the case of a consolidated police agency. A policing agency in the process of merging organizational change components such as culture(s), policies and

procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and patrol division boundaries is even more complex.

Organizations usually arrange themselves so that they can react to environmental emergencies. Thus, a complex environment requires a complex organization (Thompson, 1967). For example, the structure in a police agency is very complex and is established based on geographic area, function, or a combination of both (Conser, *et al.*, 2003). Departments are structured in this fashion so that it can respond to needs of both the internal and external environment. In the case of LMPD, the department is structured by both area and function which is a factor causing a degree of even more complexity.

Thompson (1967) asserts that this follows the general principle within systems theory called “requisite variety”, which states that the complexity of a control system must be at least as great as the complexity of the system that is being controlled. However, the organization in and of itself is usually less complicated than the organization’s environment. Even so, complex organizational change components such as culture(s), policies and procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and re-defining patrol division boundaries are related to the environments of police departments that are consolidating.

Still, the organizations make an effort to complement their complexity with the environment through differentiation. The differentiation into smaller units, the differentiation of center/periphery, the differentiation of conforming versus deviant behavior, hierarchical differentiation, and functional differentiation are ways an organization attempts to match its complexity with the external environment (Luhmann, 1995). While this differentiation may be viewed as complementary, it causes even more

complexity. This is especially true in consolidated police agencies where there is a variety of differentiation. Other factors such as turbulence, hostility, diversity, technical complexity and restrictiveness may all lead to environmental complexity (Khandwalla, 1977).

Internal environments and the complexity of those environments result in differences in organizational complexity. Organizational change components, in addition to other methods, procedures, and processes that require action on the part of organizations are more and more complex as organizations get more complex. Over time, this complexity has necessitated more specialists to understand the causal system(s).

However, in many cases, individuals involved in the organization do not perceive the complexity of these issues. This has the potential of affecting the attitudes of personnel. In police organizations, many of the specialists are persons of higher rank or individuals with a vast amount of experience. Personnel such as patrol officers and officers in the lower supervisory ranks often do not perceive the complexities of issues such as organizational change components that are being merged during the innovation of consolidation. As such, greater effort is required toward integration and coordination, again adding to the variety of tasks that the organization must do to function effectively (Dooley, 2002). This addition of tasks also adds to complexity and to the perception of complexity relating to organizational change components.

Complexities in public organizations exist as a response to their institutional environment. Powell (1988) states that public organizations “located in environments in which conflicting demands are made upon them will be especially likely to generate

complex organizational structures with disproportionately large administrative components and boundary spanning units” (p. 126). This is done in an effort to better manage the complexities of the organization and its environment.

Police agencies model this comment in that organizational structures are very complex hierarchical structures. Due to the fact that most police agencies are structured by area and function, some of the functions such as homicide, robbery, burglary, etc. span different jurisdictional boundaries. As such, administrative components within the organization are increased due to the many specialized functions and the areas they cover. The more components an organization has, the more complex the organization is and the more complex the organizational change components are that are used to manage the organization (i.e., policies and procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, etc.). This complexity is emphasized even more when merging OCCs during the innovation of police consolidation.

Implications of Complexity Theory for the Innovation of Police Consolidation

The theory that organizations are complex, non-linear systems whose members can shape their present and future behavior through unprompted self-organizing is debated by organizational theorists and practitioners alike (Arndt and Bigelow, 2000; Bechtold, 1997; Fitzgerald, 2002a; Lewis, 1994; Macintosh and MacLean, 2001; Stacey, 2003). Similar to complex systems of nature, organizations must also modify themselves so that they can survive and prosper.

Such is the case with consolidated police organizations. In order to survive and prosper, consolidated police organizations must adapt to the internal and external

environment during their evolution. They must become more efficient and effective while merging services and continually adapting to increasing service needs.

Much of the complexity literature is based on a chaotic platform. In successful organizations, conditions exist somewhere between the verge of order and chaos. The term used to describe this condition is the “edge of chaos.” The most complex systems display order through a process of self organization (Burnes, 2005). This is accomplished by a simple set of order-generating rules, which allow limited chaos while providing comparative order (Frederick, 1998; Lewis, 1994; MacIntoch and MacLean, 2001; Stacey et al, 2002).

Police agencies experiencing the innovation of consolidation are like in nature. Many complex sub-units or self organizing systems exist in all police agencies. These complex systems consist of many individuals who work alone and also with others. The coexistence of the self organizing systems also creates complexities. In turn, these complexities are further increased by the task at hand. It is the relationship between these components or sub-units within the system and the tasks they are completing, in addition to the number of them and their degree of difficulty that determines their complexity. However, oftentimes, individuals in the organization do not perceive the intricacies of these complexities.

Organizational change components encountered during the consolidation of a police department such as culture, policies and procedures, communications, contractual concerns, and redefining patrol boundaries are all complex issues. Complexity increases in addressing these factors due to their many facets and the number of sub-units in the organization. As part of a system, the sub-units often never acquire stable equilibrium.

To the contrary, they keep changing continuously in a state of chaos that exists in an intermediate zone somewhere between order and disorder. By doing so, these systems tend to survive and engage in continual and complex change. Due to the many complexities involved in the innovation of a police consolidation, police officers might not perceive the difficulty in merging the OCCs thereby ultimately affecting their attitude toward support of the merger.

Thomas (2003) asserts that the many controversies associated with the study of organizations have yet to be determined. However, complexity theories can offer some insight into organizational change and the complexities of the innovation of a police department consolidation.

The diffusion of innovation is critical to any new idea. The attribute of complexity regarding an innovation is of primary importance in understanding a police consolidation such as the LMPD merger. It is even more critical when addressing major undertakings such as organizational change components (i.e., culture(s), policies and procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and redefining patrol boundaries). This is especially true related to an individual's perception of the complexity of merging the OCCs. However, in the case of LMPD, most involved in the consolidation might not have perceived the difficulty in merging the OCCs due to the fact that they have never encountered such an innovation. While consolidation is not a new concept, it is entirely a new idea/thought for members of the newly formed Louisville Metro Police Department.

Summary

The nature of metropolitan areas and the issues related to them are both complicated and multifaceted. Many of the issues and problems associated with cities and metropolitan areas point to the failure of fragmented local governments to tackle issues such as sprawl, socioeconomic disparities, and concentration of poverty that affect the entire region. Jones (1942) asserts that in order to correct these issues/problems, governments must rely on some form of regional government which involves some form of consolidation or cooperation between local governments. While this course is seen as necessary to effectively address and respond to the problems of the metropolis (Jones, 1942), this issue is not without controversy.

In the study of government, two prominent thoughts influence the literature related to government consolidation: monocentric government and polycentric government. Debates over these forms of government and which one is superior date back to the 1930's. Proponents of consolidation argue of the inefficiencies and ineffective nature resulting from the duplication in governmental services caused by the fragmented nature of local government (Rusk, 2003, 1999; Peirce, 1993; Studenski, 1930). Public choice proponents assert that single unit governments are unresponsive, cumbersome, ineffective, and inefficient in delivering services, thereby decreasing competition for services (Bish and Ostrom, 1974; Tiebout, 1956). Stephens and Wikstrom, (2000) support this proposition stating that when consolidations do occur, service problems exist and consolidations are usually incomplete, but are shown strong support by a mayor and council.

Research is plentiful relating to which form of local government is more economical. In reviewing the research, there appears to be some agreement among the monocentric and polycentric scholars that local governments are unable to handle all of the problems in a metropolitan area (see Stephens and Wikstrom). Nonetheless, researchers have conducted few studies focusing on the impact government consolidation and its effects on sub-units of the government and its employees after the integration of the entities. One of the entities or sub-units in question is the police department.

As noted by IACP (2003), consolidation proponents assert that a police agency merger would produce 1) a higher volume of police services, 2) lower response times related to calls for service, 3) reduce overtime, 4) reduce duplication of effort, and 5) lower overall operating costs. They continue that consolidation of police agencies would ultimately save money, produce greater efficiency and flexibility in response to crime, and provide for greater opportunities for advancement for both sworn and civilian personnel (IACP, 2003). Those who oppose consolidation are anxious that merging police agencies would result in loss of community independence and reduced oversight and supervision (IACP, 2003).

Police consolidations are similar to government consolidations in that many studies have focused on the economic factors of consolidating police agencies. Similarly, both government consolidation and police consolidation research has resulted in inconclusive findings as to which type of law enforcement departmental structure (consolidated or fragmented) is most effective and efficient in addressing the needs of government, citizens, and the community. Ostrom and Smith (1976) state that there appears to be a consensus that smaller agencies should consolidate.

The majority of police consolidations occur with smaller agencies. These usually occur when 1) cities experience a population decline and 2) delivery and/or financial problems are present (Halter, 1993). Wickum (1986), in support, notes other factors such as high costs, liability concerns, and a lack of police credibility as elements leading to discussions of consolidation.

Consolidations involve organizational change that requires the integration of some or all parts of the original organizations' functions and activities. This integration of functions and activities varies in degrees from one type of consolidation to the next (IACP, 2003).

Understanding the contextual bases or dynamics in which a consolidation occurs (i.e., structural complexity and structural control, type of consolidation, and stages of a consolidation) can provide insight into the complexities of the process. It can also add to knowledge related to how the organization, employees and their rarities and perceptions are affected.

The initiation of efforts toward consolidation of police agencies is a difficult undertaking. How changes are made is integral to the process. Diffusion of innovation theory, along with complexity theory provides some insight into the consolidation process.

Diffusion is a special kind of communication that is associated with the distribution of messages that are viewed as new ideas. Diffusion is integral to the innovation of police consolidation in that it not only communicates new ideas, but also the complexities associated with them.

Diffusion is similar to a type of social change. It is a form of change that takes place in the structure and function of a social system such as the Louisville Metro Police Department. When a change of magnitude occurs such as a police consolidation and the merging of organizational change components, the entire social system of the entity is changed. Not only is the merging of OCCs complex, but the change in and of itself is complex.

Based on the definition of Rogers (2003), four main elements exist in diffusion. These include 1) communication channels, 2) time, 3) the social system, and 4) the innovation. A communications channel is used to transcend messages from one individual to another. Time, according to Rogers (2003), is involved in diffusion in 1) the innovation-decision process, 2) innovativeness, and 3) an innovation's rate of adoption. Interrelated units that are engaged in shared problem solving to achieve a common goal is known as a social system (Rogers, 2003). Innovation is viewed as a concept or procedure that is viewed as new by a person that is accepting it. One of the most significant attributes related to an innovation such police consolidation is complexity.

In reviewing the literature, it is clear that there are many perspectives as to the basis of complexity and the research ranges from cursory to well-considered. Most of the literature is conducted by researchers who are not experts in the fields whose findings they report. Therefore, in transcending complexity theory from the natural sciences to the social sciences, one must begin with an "act of faith" (Wheatley, 1992).

Complexity is an important concept, but one in which there is no consensus about what such as concept actually involves (Horgan, 1995; Edmonds, 1999). As mentioned,

the application of complexity began with the natural sciences and is now being used by the social sciences. As such, definitions have been based on the discipline of study. Even so, complexity theories are utilized more and more to understand organizations (Bechtold, 1997; Black, 2000; MacBeth, 2002).

Complexity theorists argue that chaos is a necessary condition for the growth of dynamic systems, but that these systems are prevented from destruction by the presence of “simple order-generating” rules (Gell-Mann, 1994; Gould, 1989). Organizations, such as police agencies during a merger, are seen as such due to the fact that they, like complex systems in nature, are dynamic, non-linear systems and they too are governed by a set of simple “order-generating” rules (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Lewis, 1994; MacIntosh and MacLean, 2001). The key to survival then, is for all organizations to develop a set of rules which keep the organization operating “on the edge of chaos” (Stacey et al., 2002).

Such is the case of the LMPD consolidation. During the consolidation process, the LMPD was constantly changing and dynamic in nature. Many of the organizational change components that were merged or changed such as cultures, policies and procedures and collective bargaining contracts to name a few, were complex in and of themselves. During this dynamic time, rules were developed to preserve order in the organization.

Many different theories and their definitions exist among complexity researchers. Three key ones are most cited; chaos theory; dissipative structures theory; and the theory of complex adaptive systems (Stacey *et al*, 2002).

Chaos theory involves small changes in the environment that are followed by chaos causing instability. Instability causes a change of behavior into a new more suitable one. In the innovation of the LMPD consolidation, the merging of organizational change components involved changes causing instability.

The dissipative structures theory recognizes that unless energy is fed in from the outside, structures will “dissipate.” Structures experience periods of instability and reorganize to form a structure from an internal dynamic. (Stacey, 2003). External “energy” was fed in from the outside during the innovation of consolidating the LDP and JCPD. Much of this energy in the external environment was a result of government merger, community concerns and political considerations.

In contrast, to the aforementioned theories, the complex adaptive systems approach attempts to make meaning of the behavior of the individual elements of systems and populations (Stacey *et al*, 2002). Complex adaptive systems (CAS) consist of many different components that work together under one set of rules so as to improve their behavior and the behavior of the group which they compromise. Such is the case of merging the different organizational change components throughout many different sub-units during the innovation of merging the police department

Component complexity is caused by the number of elements and is dependent upon both the numbers of people participating in processes, in addition to the number of processes. Therefore, the organization’s complexity is greater when there are more subsystems and/or interlocking behavioral contingencies (Glenn and Malott, 2004).

Hierarchical complexity is determined by the number of system levels in the organization. The more levels in an organization, or, the “taller” the organization, the

more hierarchical complexity it has. Additionally, hierarchical complexity is usually affected by component complexity (Glenn and Malott, 2004).

LMPD had elements in common with all of these theories. Chaos existed within the organization causing instability. Also, many different sub-systems existed within the organization that worked together to accomplish issues. Additionally, energy was many times fed into the organization during consolidation from the external environment. Finally, the organization was hierarchal in nature.

Complexity theory is a relatively new science (Arndt and Bigelow, 2000). Because these theories are primarily based in the natural sciences, much of the work is controversial. Even though researchers must be cautious in using these models, complexity theories can offer some insight into organizational change.

While the diffusion of innovation is applicable to police department consolidations, it is unreasonable to assume that all individuals would accept the innovation. During the consolidation of LDP and JCPD, many systems were complex. In most cases, individuals had no experience or perception of the complexity involved in merging organizational change components that were a substantial part of the innovation of the consolidation. For innovations, especially police department consolidations such as LMPD, issues such as the complexities of organizational change components within the system of consolidation and officers' perceptions of the complexity of OCCs being merged or changed during merger are believed to have an affect on attitudes toward acceptance of the consolidation.

CHAPTER III

LOUISVILLE METRO POLICE DEPARTMENT –

THE HISTORY OF CONSOLIDATION

Government leaders are always looking for ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of government. Likewise, police practitioners look for ways to improve their operations in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. In any community contemplating consolidation, almost all stakeholders enter into discussions with preconceptions about the value, if any, of joining together agencies. These discussions have either a positive or negative set of expectations. The Louisville merger was no different.

In the years preceding 2000, there was much discussion regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of government in both the City of Louisville and Jefferson County, Kentucky. Many of these discussions date back to the late 1970's and the early 1980's when the first talks of government consolidation took place. These discussions eventually led to a "merger" referendum in 1982 and 1983. However, the merger of Louisville and Jefferson County governments was defeated on both occasions.

Many of the talks involving merger revolved around police services and the merger of the two largest police agencies in Jefferson County, the Louisville Division of Police and the Jefferson County Police Department. In fact, discussions of a police merger in Jefferson County date back to the early 1950's. In a series published in 1967 by the Courier-Journal, a Louisville newspaper, it is noted that a police department

merger was recommended by a Jefferson County Grand Jury for the purpose of “greater efficiency and better policing” (Courier-Journal, 1967).

In 1961, renewed efforts rekindled to consolidate the two departments under the leadership of County Judge Marlow W. Cook and Mayor William O. Cowger, both of whom vowed during their individual campaigns to consolidate the two agencies. When elected, they worked together to establish a committee to study the two departments merging. They also contracted with the International Association of Chiefs of Police (I.A.C.P.) to perform an initial study of how the departments would merge. As a result of this study, IACP determined that the merger was practical, but there would need to be several unique modifications in state legislation.

Police consolidation was again discussed in 1965 between County Judge Marlow Cook and then Louisville Mayor Kenneth Schmied. These conversations carried over to 1966 when a Jefferson County Citizens Advisory Committee made a proposal “urging that the City and County Police Forces be replaced by a county-wide police department.” (Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission, 1998, p. 1-5). Advocates of this consolidation anticipated, and hoped, that the IACP study of both police agencies would produce the basis for a comprehensive consolidation study for both departments.

During early discussions, proponents of the departmental consolidation in Louisville brought attention to the many reasons they were pro-consolidation, including increased efficiency through combined records and communications. Reductions in supervisory personnel were also cited as an advantage and this, in turn, would increase the number of patrol officers. This would be accomplished by converting supervisory positions in the budget to police officer positions thereby decreasing the number of

supervisors and adding to the number of police officers who would be assigned to street duty. Another reason for the consolidation was standardized recruitment practices and training procedures. Ultimately, all of the aforementioned reasons were said to be the impetus for improving morale among sworn officers (Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission, 1998). However, there would need to be changes in legislation, especially as it related to the different and distinct pension systems each department had at the time.

As time passed, more effectiveness was sought in government, and the center of the debate in consolidating police departments evolved into merging the Louisville and Jefferson County governments. In 1982 and 1983, the community voted on consolidating governments and the bill was defeated, largely, in part, due to the difference in community opinion and apprehension that community representation and services to certain portions of the community would be reduced. This perception permeated western Louisville and the southern and southwest areas of Jefferson County (Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission, 1998). These areas were comprised of mostly lower income or lower-middle income residents and, particularly in the West End, African-Americans. As discussions evolved regarding the merger, talks focused on redefining political boundaries or areas. Under the City of Louisville and the Jefferson County governments, each of the aforementioned areas had substantial representation in their respective political systems. However, these residents believed that their representation in the metro government would be diminished if merger took place since their areas might be incorporated with other areas in larger, newly created political jurisdictions.

As a result of this vote defeating the consolidation of governments, Louisville and Jefferson County established a cooperative agreement to advance economic and

community growth within the overall corporate boundaries. In 1986, Mayor Jerry Abramson and County Judge/Executive Harvey Sloane negotiated the Cooperative Compact Agreement. This twelve-year agreement provided for the sharing of revenues and taxes, in addition to dividing the economic responsibility for agencies that had been mutually funded by both governments. The agreement also limited annexation of unincorporated areas of Jefferson County.

Even though the Cooperative Compact Agreement was signed, discussions still lingered regarding police agency consolidation and especially, certain units in the police departments, two of which were the Narcotics Units and the Youth Bureaus. In 1987, the Crimes against Children Unit was created to consolidate the Youth Bureaus of both agencies and the Missing and Exploited Children's Unit of the Jefferson County Police Department. This was done in order to take a community-wide approach to crimes against children and also to improve communications and intelligence sharing between the Louisville Division of Police and the Jefferson County Police Department. In 1990, the Metro Narcotics Unit was established. This unit, a consolidation of both departments' narcotics units, was also established to enhance community-wide drug enforcement efforts and increase the flow of information between both agencies.

In 1994, the Jefferson County Governance Project was established by the Jefferson County Judge/Executive David Armstrong, the Mayor of the City of Louisville Jerry Abramson, the County Commissioners, and the Louisville Board of Aldermen. The "committee" was petitioned to study governmental institutions and make recommendations to ensure the efficient delivery of governmental services to enhance

and support future growth and development (Jefferson County Governance Project, Final Recommendations, January 1996).

Part of the study also involved a review of information, in addition to making a proposal regarding specific governmental tasks and services. A group was established to specifically study the public safety function in 1995. Their mission was:

“To determine how the structure of the following agencies positively or negatively influences the efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and responsiveness of their respective services and policies. The purpose of the group is to conduct an in-depth investigation and analysis of the current public safety structures and their efforts on the delivery of services and on policy making” (Issues Summary, Public Safety Study Group, September, 1995).

This 30-member Public Safety Study Group concentrated on the services provided by the Jefferson County Police Department, the Louisville Division of Police, suburban city police departments, the Sheriff’s Office as it related only to their policing responsibilities, the Louisville Division of Fire, and Jefferson County Fire Districts, Louisville and Jefferson County Emergency Medical Service (EMS) Units, Jefferson County Corrections, and Louisville/Jefferson County Disaster and Emergency Services. The services of the agencies were evaluated, in addition to issues related to training, 911 and radio communications, jurisdictional matters, pay, wages, policies, collective bargaining, and duplication of services (Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission, 1998).

In 1995, the *First Cut Preliminary Recommendations* of the Jefferson County Governance Project (October, 1995) legitimized police department consolidation. However, the consolidation included a recommendation to include small city police agencies. This recommendation was altered appreciably following extensive discussions

and opposition prepared by those who feared that a merged department would reduce service delivery to smaller cities and all but eliminate enforcement of 5th and 6th class city ordinances.

After further discussions, the *Final Recommendations* of the Jefferson County Governance Task force was published in January 1996. The following recommendations were included under the police category:

1. Support a long term vision of a single equitable, police protection system for all of Jefferson County. It is expected that this may take years; therefore it is recommended that supportive discussions begin and that government endorse ongoing efforts to implement friendly mutual consolidation of suburban city police departments.
2. Law enforcement agencies should be able to communicate through the use of a common communications system.
3. Establish a shared Records Information System disseminating information regarding complaints, statistics, and data analysis for use by all departments including the Department of Corrections.
4. Consistent hiring and training standards should be required for all law enforcement officers within the Jefferson County lines. A regional training facility should be established, located in Jefferson County, which coordinates content (including cultural diversity) for use by all law enforcement agencies (p.8).

It is important to note that these recommendations were included in the "Alternative Opinions" section of the Final Report due to the fact that it was an item that failed to receive support by at least 70% of the Task Force members who were present. Support was primarily focused on merging the Jefferson County Police Department and the Louisville Division of Police. A modified recommendation provided "smaller city police departments with the "option to negotiate with the new government to be part of

the new metropolitan police department (Jefferson County Governance Project, 1996, p. 17.)”

Following the aforementioned recommendations, an attitude survey was conducted in 1998 by the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission. One part of the survey targeted citizens residing in both the City of Louisville and Jefferson County. The construction and distribution of the survey emphasized not only a representative demographic sample, but also provided for equal input from residents of both jurisdictions.

The survey was performed by telephone calls to the respondents. Times the calls were made varied for approximately five-weeks during the late spring of 1998. Telephone calls were made until a proportionate sample was realized. The sample attained included approximately half of the respondents from the City of Louisville and half from Jefferson County. A total of 1,873 surveys were completed. City of Louisville residents represented 50.7% (951) of the sample. Jefferson County residents residing outside of the city limits, yet within the jurisdiction of Jefferson County represented 49.2% (922) of the sample.

According to the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission Report (1998), most respondents to the survey (69.7%) reported that they were aware of the anticipated consolidation. Approximately half of all residents (52%) supported consolidation while 8% opposed consolidation. A relatively large proportion of the respondents (39.9%) were undecided. City resident respondents (55.7%) were more likely than Jefferson County residents (48.3%) to support consolidation. Consolidation was opposed more by Jefferson County residents (11.3%) than by City residents (4.9%).

In general, most of the respondents, whether a resident of the City of Louisville or Jefferson County, supported consolidation. Support for consolidation was much more prominent than opposition against consolidation.

After failing to pass a referendum on consolidation on three different occasions (1956, 1982 and 1983) the citizenry of Louisville and Jefferson County, by a vote of 54% to 46%, successfully passed a referendum to consolidate their governments in November 2000 (Jefferson County Kentucky Clerk's Office/Election Center, 2000). In 2003, the newly formed government was the first consolidation of a major metro area in three decades, increasing the population size of Louisville from the 65th largest city to the 26th largest city in the nation (Infoplease, 2008).

Many of those against consolidation were apprehensive over the perceived adverse impact to both suburban and urban residents. Consolidation drew considerable concern from primarily minority communities in the "old" City of Louisville due to the power realignment resulting from structural changes (Savitch and Vogel, 2004a, b). Many proponents cited that consolidation would enhance economic development in the area due to a now unified front to address economic development efforts.

The passing of the consolidation referendum was attributed to several factors. Most noteworthy was the support of current and former political leaders whose backing was acquired due to the "lowering of expectations" (Allegheny Institute, 2005). Also, consolidation was defeated in the past due to 80 small municipalities in Jefferson County being required to dissolve. The consolidation vote in 2000 would exempt these cities from any dissolution. This was considered to be a necessary concession for the

aforementioned municipalities in order for the consolidation to take place. Thus, only the City of Louisville would be absorbed into the larger consolidation.

The consolidation of services, departments, or authorities, in an effort to save money, was never an important topic of discussion prior to the Louisville-Jefferson County consolidation (Allegheny Institute, 2005). House Bill 647 (see Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2000) authorized the consolidation of government and left all former county-level offices untouched. The offices of the County judge-executive, justices of the peace, and County commissioners had their powers limited, but were intact. The consolidated government also left untouched fire protection districts, sanitation districts, water districts, and all other special taxing or service districts. The aforementioned services would operate as they did prior to consolidation with the same power and duties and would maintain funding by the new government as they had prior to the consolidation.

Even though there were discussions prior to the consolidation occurring, no formal commitments were made to consolidate sub-units/departments or functions in order to save money. However, sub-units of government continually felt the pressure from political leaders to do so.

Constructing the New LMPD

Perhaps the most prominent, and certainly the largest departmental consolidation in the newly formed Louisville Metro government was between the Louisville Division of Police (LDP) and Jefferson County Police Departments (JCPD). Both agencies have a distinguished history of dedicated service to the citizens of Louisville and Jefferson County. The Louisville Division of Police came into being in 1806 and just prior to

consolidating with the JCPD had an authorized strength of 723 sworn officers and 324 civilian personnel. JCPD began its operations in 1868. Prior to consolidation, JCPD had an authorized strength of 450 sworn officers and 225 civilian personnel. Both of these agencies, prior to the consolidation in 2003, were autonomous with the exception of the previously mentioned Crimes Against Children Unit which consolidated in 1987 and the Metro Narcotics Unit established in 1990 (Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission, 1998).

The actual consolidation process or the steps to consolidating the LDP and the JCPD are primarily undocumented or limited at best. The information, for the purposes of this paper, was secured from a 1998 report conducted by the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission, and staff presentations from the former Chief, Robert White, and his staff. These documents outline the consolidation of LDP and JCPD and provide a brief summation of the issues, decisions, and events that occurred.

Previewing Support for the Consolidation of LMPD

In 1998 and prior to government consolidation, the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission conducted several surveys in order to determine the support for consolidation, in addition to the fiscal, administrative, and operational presumptions of consolidating LDP and JCPD. Part of this study, as previously mentioned, focused on citizens residing in the City of Louisville and Jefferson County. This research also included a survey attempting to ascertain the perceptions and attitudes of each department's personnel. The population surveyed consisted of the 1,722 sworn and civilian personnel comprising both LDP and JCPD. Of the 1,722 sworn and civilian personnel, 1,210 responded to the survey - a 70% response rate. Of the respondents, 685

(57.4%) were from LDP and 508 (42.6%) were from JCPD. It should be noted that the difference in the total numbers is reflective of the number of persons responding to a particular or specific question.

This survey did not address all of the questions of attitude and perceptions of police officers toward or against consolidation, such as perceptions of complexity in merging organizational change components. However, it did offer some insight into issues of concern that police officers and civilian personnel had regarding the possibility of consolidation.

One question that was presented in the survey to police officers assessed their support for the consolidation of LDP and JCPD. Table 1 displays the results for support for the merger and a comparison between LDP and JCPD sworn personnel.

Table 1 - LDP and JCPD Support for Merger*

	LDP Sworn	JCPD Sworn
Very strongly in favor of a merger	39.0% (199)	2.1% (8)
Mostly in favor of a merger	30.4% (155)	2.7% (10)
Mildly in favor of a merger	12.7% (65)	5.3% (20)
Mildly opposed to a merger	4.3% (22)	4.0% (15)
Mostly opposed to a merger	5.1% (26)	11.2% (42)
Strongly opposed to a merger	8.4% (43)	74.7% (280)

*From 1998 Study by Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission

Based on the findings of the survey, 82.1% of the LDP sworn personnel were in favor of consolidation (39.0% very strongly in favor of a consolidation, 30.4% mostly in favor of a consolidation, and 12.7% mildly in favor of a consolidation). However, 89.9% of the JCPD sworn personnel were opposed to consolidation (74.7% strongly opposed to a consolidation, 11.2% mostly opposed to a consolidation, and 4.0% mildly opposed to a consolidation).

The survey also assessed perceptions and attitudes on how the consolidation would affect the officer in the following areas: 1) pay, 2) uniform and equipment expenses, 3) promotion opportunity, 4) health insurance, 5) access to take-home vehicle, 6) supervision, 7) training, 8) pension, 9) safety, 10) access to specialized assignments, and 11) pride in the job. Table 2 represents the findings related to LDP sworn personnel.

Table 2 depicts the beliefs of LDP personnel who thought that most items would remain about the same under a consolidated department. LDP personnel listed only two of the aforementioned items as possibly being better: pay (77.2%) and health insurance (57.3%). They did not believe that any of the other items listed above would deteriorate under a consolidated department.

Table 3 lists the finding related to the sworn personnel of JCPD. Contrary to LDP personnel, JCPD personnel believed that most items would get worse under a consolidated department, including their pay (59.7%), uniforms and equipment expenses (61.8%), promotional opportunity (62.7%), health insurance (76.0%), access to take-home vehicles (63.8%), supervision (52.7%), access to specialized assignments (59.0%), and pride in job (60.3%). No items were rated by JCPD personnel as having the potential

to be better under a consolidated department. In fact, they listed only three items (training, pension, and safety) as likely to remain about the same.

Table 2 – LDP Officer Perceptions of Affected Conditions After Consolidation*

Area	Much Better	Somewhat Better	About the same	Somewhat Worse	Much Worse
Your Pay	35.3% (232)	41.9% (275)	20.7% (136)	1.4% (9)	.8% (5)
Your uniforms & equipment expenses	18.7% (109)	30.5% (178)	43.4% (253)	4.8% (28)	2.6% (15)
Your promotion opportunity	7.1% (44)	11.7% (73)	48.2% (300)	20.2% (126)	12.8% (80)
Your health insurance	27.5% (176)	29.8% (191)	40.6% (260)	1.6% (10)	.6% (4)
Your access to take-home vehicle	19.4% (103)	13.9% (74)	63.2% (336)	2.1% (11)	1.5% (8)
Your supervision	5.8% (37)	5.6% (36)	77.5% (496)	7.7% (49)	3.4% (22)
Your training	5.8% (37)	11.4% (73)	73.9% (475)	7.2% (460)	1.9% (12)
Your pension	10.6% (67)	18.1% (115)	69.6% (442)	1.1% (7)	.6% (4)
Your safety	9.0% (58)	14.2% (91)	69.4% (446)	5.8% (37)	1.7% (11)
Your access to specialized assignments	6.5% (39)	15.4% (92)	55.8% (334)	15.7% (94)	6.7% (40)
Pride in job	8.2% (53)	15.3% (99)	68.6% (445)	4.9% (32)	3.1% (20)

*From 1998 Study by Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission

Table 3 – JCPD Officer Perceptions of Affected Conditions After Consolidation*

Area	Much Better	Somewhat Better	About the same	Somewhat Worse	Much Worse
Your Pay	3.7% (18)	6.5% (32)	30.1% (147)	29.4% (144)	30.3% (148)
Your uniforms & equipment expenses	2.5% (11)	2.3% (10)	33.3% (144)	29.2% (126)	32.6% (141)
Your promotion opportunity	3.4% (16)	7.7% (36)	26.2% (123)	21.3% (100)	41.4% (194)
Your health insurance	1.5% (7)	1.3% (6)	21.3% (102)	17.9% (86)	58.1% (279)
Your access to take-home vehicle	1.7% (7)	.5% (2)	34.0% (137)	23.8% (96)	40.0% (161)
Your supervision	1.7% (8)	1.5% (7)	44.2% (212)	24.2% (116)	28.5% (137)
Your training	2.1% (10)	4.4% (21)	53.4% (257)	17.7% (85)	22.5% (108)
Your pension	1.1% (5)	1.1% (5)	59.4% (282)	16.8% (80)	21.7% (103)
Your safety	1.5% (7)	2.5% (12)	53.2% (256)	19.3% (93)	23.5% (113)
Your access to specialized assignments	3.1% (14)	6.0% (27)	31.8% (143)	23.8% (107)	35.2% (158)
Pride in job	2.3% (11)	2.0% (10)	35.5% (173)	24.8% (121)	35.5% (173)

*From 1998 Study by Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission

Finally, officers were asked how the operations (i.e., cost of running the police department, efficiency of running the police department, coverage of all high crime areas, leadership, cooperation among units, training resources, and forensic resources) would be

affected by a consolidated department. Table 4 represents the results of the survey related to LDP.

Table 4 – LDP Officer Perceptions of how Operations would be affected by Consolidation*

Area	Much Better	Somewhat Better	About the same	Somewhat Worse	Much Worse
Cost of running the police department	16.4% (108)	39.5% (260)	29.3% (193)	10.5% (69)	4.3% (28)
Efficiency of running the police department	21.5% (142)	33.6% (222)	28.7% (190)	10.7% (71)	5.4% (36)
Coverage of all high crime areas	15.9% (106)	31.1% (207)	40.5% (269)	8.0% (53)	4.5% (30)
Leadership	8.4% (55)	16.2% (106)	59.5% (389)	10.9% (71)	5.0% (33)
Cooperation among units	17.3% (115)	28.1% (186)	35.4% (235)	12.7% (84)	6.5% (43)
Training resources	14.8% (97)	34.7% (228)	44.4% (292)	4.3% (28)	1.8% (12)
Forensic resources	12.5% (78)	26.5% (165)	57.6% (358)	2.3% (14)	1.1% (7)

*From 1998 Study by Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission

The majority of LDP personnel rated the cost of running the police department (55.9%) and efficiency of running the police department (55.1%) as likely to improve under a consolidated department. No operations were seen by LDP personnel as declining under a consolidated department. They listed leadership (59.5%) and forensic resources (57.6%) as the two areas they believed as likely to remain about the same.

Table 5 represents beliefs of JCPD sworn officers related to the operations of a merged police agency.

Table 5 – JCPD Officer Perceptions of how Operations would be affected by Consolidation*

Area	Much Better	Somewhat Better	About the same	Somewhat Worse	Much Worse
Cost of running the police department	3.3% (16)	8.4% (41)	20.8% (102)	25.9% (127)	41.6% (204)
Efficiency of running the police department	3.7% (18)	7.3% (36)	15.1% (74)	28.3% (139)	45.6% (224)
Coverage of all high crime areas	4.6% (22)	9.9% (48)	34.0% (164)	18.8% (91)	32.7% (158)
Leadership	2.0% (10)	2.7% (13)	34.6% (169)	27.3% (133)	33.4% (163)
Cooperation among units	3.5% (17)	7.8% (38)	30.0% (146)	25.1% (133)	33.7% (164)
Training resources	3.7% (18)	10.5% (51)	48.6% (235)	18.6% (90)	18.6% (90)
Forensic resources	3.4% (16)	9.2% (43)	60.3% (282)	11.8% (55)	15.4% (72)

*From 1998 Study by Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission

Personnel with JCPD rated all operations as likely to decline or get worse under a consolidated department with two exceptions, training resources and forensic resources.

Respondents were also asked to access the importance of certain outcomes related to a police consolidation. The outcomes related to the consolidation included unified law enforcement delivery, elimination of duplication of services, improved access to information, more opportunity to serve in specialty units, creation of a nationally recognized agency, and elimination of jurisdictional disputes. Table 6 represents the findings of LDP personnel.

As depicted in Table 6, LDP personnel rated improved access to information as the most important possible outcome (92.7%), followed by elimination of duplication of

Table 6 – LDP Officer Perceptions of Outcomes affected by Consolidation*

Outcome	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not Very Important	Not at all Important
Unified law enforcement service delivery	52.0% (342)	36.6% (241)	9.7% (64)	1.7% (11)
Elimination of duplication of service	56.9% (377)	34.9% (231)	6.9% (64)	1.2% (8)
Improved access to information	64.3% (425)	28.4% (188)	6.4% (42)	.9% (6)
More opportunity to serve in specialized units	23.0% (145)	41.6% (262)	31.7% (200)	3.7% (23)
Creation of nationally recognized agency	29.4% (192)	34.4% (225)	27.7% (181)	8.6% (56)
Elimination of jurisdictional disputes	57.2% (378)	28.9% (191)	10.1% (67)	3.8% (25)

*From 1998 Study by Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission

service (91.8%), unified law enforcement service delivery (88.6%), and elimination of jurisdictional disputes (86.1%). The creation of a nationally recognized agency was last in importance to LDP personnel with 63.8% of the respondents believing it was either very important (29.4%) or important (34.4%).

Table 7 depicts the responses of JCPD personnel who also assessed the importance of outcomes related to a police consolidation, such as unified law enforcement delivery, elimination of duplication of services, improved access to information, more opportunity to serve in specialty units, creation of a nationally recognized agency and elimination of jurisdictional disputes.

As displayed in Table 7, JCPD personnel, like LDP personnel, rated improved access to information as the most important possible outcome (79.3%), followed by elimination of duplication of service (64.7%), unified law enforcement service delivery

Table 7 - JCPD Officer Perceptions of Outcomes affected by Consolidation*

Outcome	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not Very Important	Not at all Important
Unified law enforcement service delivery	35.2% (161)	27.3% (125)	21.8% (100)	15.7% (72)
Elimination of duplication of service	29.3% (129)	35.4% (156)	22.2% (98)	12.2% (58)
Improved access to information	42.7% (194)	36.6% (166)	12.8% (58)	7.9% (36)
More opportunity to serve in specialized units	17.9% (77)	31.9% (137)	33.3% (143)	16.8% (72)
Creation of nationally recognized agency	16.3% (73)	26.2% (117)	27.5% (123)	30.0% (134)
Elimination of jurisdictional disputes	28.2% (127)	28.0% (126)	25.1% (113)	18.7% (84)

*From 1998 Study by Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission

(62.5%), and elimination of jurisdictional disputes (56.2%). They, just as LDP personnel, believed that the creation of a nationally recognized agency was last in importance, 42.5% of the respondents believing it was either very important (16.3%) or important (26.2%).

Personnel from both agencies were additionally asked to rate the importance of issues needing resolution in order for consolidation to work. Both LDP and JCPD personnel rated a need for reconciling: 1) pay disparity (92.2%), 2) radio communications, and 3) other technological differences (91.2%). Seen as most important was reconciling union/Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) contract differences (89.2%).

In reviewing the findings of the survey of police officers conducted by the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission in 1998, differences were revealed in

how each particular department's personnel perceived the proposed police consolidation. As stated earlier, although it does not address or identify all issues, it does provide a basis or foundation in understanding some of the perceptions and attitudes about consolidation.

Initial Planning and Formal Combination Stage

After the consolidation referendum was passed in 2000, announcements were made by political leaders that the governments of Louisville and Jefferson County would consolidate, in addition to the LDP and the JCPD police departments. In November 2002, Mayor Jerry Abramson was elected as the first mayor of the consolidated government. Mayor Abramson had previous political experience as an Alderman and also as a 3 consecutive term mayor of the City of Louisville. In January 2003, the Louisville Metro government was established and began operations. Subsequently, a nationwide search was conducted by the Southern Police Institute at the University of Louisville, and Chief Robert White was selected and sworn into office on January 5, 2003 as the first chief executive of the Louisville Metro Police Department.

One of the first steps in planning for this innovation, the consolidation of LPD and JCPD, was to assemble several of the commanders from each of the former agencies to start the planning process for the merger of both agencies. During this time, issues such as equipment, policies and procedures, communications, Division realignments, departmental mission and values, and culture were discussed, in addition to the complexity of consolidating them.

During this phase, Chief White was also considering staff appointments (Major, Lieutenant Colonel, and Deputy Chief). Chief White requested all commanding officers to submit position papers for these positions. As part of this process, commanding

officers interested in staff positions were to identify the two biggest challenges facing consolidation and to identify, in their opinion, the future direction of the department (LMPD). After the papers were submitted to the Chief, he scheduled interviews so that he could meet with potential candidates for the staff positions. Following the interviews with each commanding officer, a project manager (“merger manager”) was selected to oversee the consolidation along with the selection of a command staff—consisting of three Assistant Chiefs holding the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Soon after these selections, the organization was re-structured and an organizational chart was created to identify the proposed structure of LMPD. This structure consisted of five major functional or operational branches: 1) Chief’s Office, 2) Administrative Bureau, 3) Patrol Bureau, and 4) Support Bureau, and 5) Special Investigations.

Figure 1 and 2 depicts the organizational structure of the former LDP and JCPD respectively. Figure 3 portrays the organizational chart of the newly formed LMPD.

Challenges inherited by the new command staff were ever present. Many of these inherited challenges presented issues to consolidation efforts. All of these challenges were complex in nature. Much of the complexity came from working under circumstances where people had never worked. For example, neither personnel from the former LDP or JCPD had ever been involved in consolidating two large police agencies. Due to personnel having no experience with a previous police department consolidation, they might not have perceived the complexities in addressing merger efforts and in particular, merging the organizational change components.

First, neither administration with the former Louisville Division of Police or the Jefferson County Police Department made plans, at least formally, for consolidation

Figure 1

JCPD ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

Revised: August 1, 2002

Figure 2

Figure 3

Louisville Metro Police Department Organizational Chart

Current as of 12-10-04
Research and Development Unit

during the two years prior to the actual consolidation. Some of the unit commanders with each of the former agencies did attempt to talk with each other regarding the consolidation and how some of the particular units would merge, but there was no formal process for planning and no details of the complexities in merging units were ever discussed. In fact, because of having no first-hand experience with merger and the innovation of consolidating police agencies, personnel might not have perceived these complexities. To add to the problem of communicating with each other was the fact that in some cases, there was little support from the staff(s) of the former agencies to even talk about the future consolidation.

Secondly, two budgets were inherited, each of which would expire within six months. Prior to the second half of the 2002/2003 fiscal year budget, many of the funds were expended for planned purchases because of the uncertainty of the budget(s) after January 1, 2003. Combining these budgets was a complex undertaking in that several line items from each budget were different. JCPD had some line items that LDP did not have and visa versa. Command staff members with each of the former agencies might not have perceived the complexities of merging these budgets because they had no first-hand knowledge of the other former department's budget.

At the time of merger, the Louisville Division of Police had an operating budget of \$56,421,887 and a capital budget of \$1,200,670 totaling \$57,622,557. The Jefferson County Police Department had an operating budget of \$39,757,300 and a capital budget of \$435,000 totaling \$40,192,300. LDP had interagency charges and bond payments while JCPD did not. JCPD had an equipment budget of \$1,322,300. LDP had no such budget category. JCPD's contractual and supplies budget(s) were \$532,127 and

\$1,036,985 more than LDP's respectively. Personnel costs for LDP were \$15,455,617 more than JCPD (\$45,566,317 compared to \$30,110,700).

Consolidating and building a new LMPD budget was complex. This was due to different accounting practices such as how purchasing was conducted, how accounts were paid, and to which line items goods purchased were assigned and encumbered. If officers weren't aware of the different categories of each of the former budgets, those in management positions from the other agency(s) might not have perceived the complexities involved.

Third, when the departments consolidated, many of the bureaus, units, squads and the like, in addition to the equipment belonging to them, came in sets of two (i.e., police departments, communication sections, fleet services, specialty teams/squads, training units, press relations, etc.). Some of this equipment from these bureaus, units, and squads was compatible, some was not. For example, many of the recording devices used for the Hostage Negotiating Team(s) were compatible, while radio communication systems were not. Each department utilized different radio systems. LDP used a UHF system and JCPD used a VHF system. These systems could not easily be used for officers from each agency to communicate with one another. This caused complex issues of communications for everyday duties. This was especially true for large details such as the Kentucky Derby. Careful considerations were given to every personnel assignment during large events/details to ensure proper communication and safety for officers. If management personnel and line officers did not perceive the complexities involved in merging these systems, they probably didn't understand the implementation of personnel decisions using communications as a basis for these assignment determinations.

Fourth, there were two different distinct sets of policies, procedures and rules. Many of the policies for each agency were different. One example of this relates to arrests out of the state of Kentucky. JCPD personnel, if in pursuit, could make an arrest of a felony in Indiana. LDP personnel were prohibited by policy from making any arrests out of the state of Kentucky. Another example of different policies is that JCPD officers could seek an arrest or traffic warrant without permission of a commanding officer. LDP officers first needed approval of an officer of the rank of sergeant or higher to obtain an arrest warrant or traffic warrant. Merging policies that were common to all LMPD personnel was a complex undertaking. Many personnel might have lacked a perception of the difficulty of this process.

To complicate the consolidation process even further, there were 11 union contracts (i.e., FOP Lodge 6 - three contracts; FOP Lodge 14 - two contracts; Teamsters - three contracts; American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees - one contract; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers - one contract; and the School Guard Association - one contract). To consolidate these contracts and to make them consistent with one another was a very complex matter. Many of the differences in contracts included contract duration, salary differences, benefit differences, management prerogatives, transfer rights and the like. Personnel from the different former agencies might not have been aware of the vast differences in the different contracts. For example, the transfer rights of officers with JCPD incorporated a 10 day notice prior to any transfer, unless an emergency existed. LDP had no such contractual clause. The JCPD Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) contract also did not include lieutenants, captains, majors, or lieutenant colonels in its provisions. While LDP's FOP contract did not

include captains, majors, or lieutenant colonels in its provisions, it did include lieutenants. Additionally, in another example of contractual differences, the JCPD contract provided for legal representation for officers who were sued as a result of action within the line of duty. LDP's contract offered no such provision. Sworn personnel, especially officers, might not have perceived the different complexities of these contracts, nor the complexities in consolidating them to meet the needs of both the Louisville Metro government and the officers.

Finally, consideration had to be given to uniforms and equipment. The type of uniform (i.e., patch, badge, hats, etc.) was a controversial issue for officers as were the particular weapons and tools (i.e., guns, batons, etc.) that would be used by them. Controversy even continued over the design of markings on the police vehicles (i.e., logos and placement of them, etc.). As an example, controversy erupted over whether or not to utilize a gun belt with a buckle. Former JCPD personnel used a gun belt without a buckle while LDP's personnel had gun belts with buckles. Ultimately, a gun belt with a buckle was chosen for the LMPD uniform. This change in uniform, while seemingly simple, was complex in nature and also controversial. In Grant's (2010) study on organizational justice, one of the respondents notes:

"you can talk to any county officers and it has kind of become a joke, what did we get from merger, thirteen buttons and a Santa Claus belt from merger, that's what the county got out of it" (p. 184).

Also, determining what type of weapon would be used was controversial and complex due to the fact that JCPD personnel purchased their own weapons while LDP personnel had their weapons purchased by the police department (LDP). This caused great controversy in that at one point in time, LDP personnel were asked to pay the

government back for their weapons. This resulted in threats of law suits and grievances by the FOP. Determining what weapon system to use, to include caliber of weapon, was a process of which personnel might not have perceived its complexity.

In order to ease the process of making these complex decisions and changes, 20 committees were created to address contracts, training, uniforms, policies and procedures, mission and values statements, criminal investigations and the like. The membership in each committee was varied and consisted of both sworn and non-sworn personnel.

Approximately 225 committee members volunteered to serve on a committee of their choice. An effort was made to allow personnel to serve on the committee of their choosing which led to membership being relatively stable. Some committee members were selected or appointed based on their expertise in the particular area being researched. Usually one commanding officer was chosen by the Chief of Police to chair each committee. All of the committees were diverse in that they were comprised of individuals from different agencies who were of different ranks. Persons serving were also a diverse group based on gender and ethnicity. This was done in an effort to solicit a variety of views on subject areas and to get “buy-in” from the officers and personnel at all levels.

The committees were charged with 1) identifying the tasks or components to be merged, 2) identifying best practices in the particular area of concern, 3) developing actions to merge the particular tasks or components, 4) prioritizing the actions identified to merge the particular tasks or components, and 5) quantifying or assigning a cost to merge the tasks or components of the departments. Within the first year of merger, the committees made 171 recommendations to the Chief of Police for merging the tasks or

components of the departments of which 28 were omitted due to them not being feasible to implement.

The representatives on these committees served dual purposes. In addition to facilitating the decision-making processes, they also were a communication conduit to personnel serving in their units and bureaus.

Staff officers, working at the direction of the Chief of Police, developed a strategic plan to assist in identifying issues and concerns that would need to be resolved for a successful consolidation. As part of this process, the Chief of Police, the Chief's staff, officers, and civilian personnel all provided suggestions and/or recommendations as to the most important issues/concerns that needed to be addressed in consolidating LDP and JCPD. Some of this information gathering was formal in nature as it related to management and supervisory personnel. The Chief of Police and Lieutenant Colonels talked with management and supervisory personnel, and unit commanders were asked to submit written assessments of their area(s) of command, along with suggestions and recommendations of how to merge them, in writing. However, some of the information gathering was informal and collected at roll calls and while in informal settings. Additionally, some of the changes such as policies and procedures, communications systems, budget considerations, facility consolidation and the like were mentioned in the recommendations contained in the 1998 merger report by the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission.

The particular committee(s) researching the issues/concerns was/were responsible for making recommendations regarding the resolution of specific issues, determining

costs associated with the changes, and identifying priorities within ninety days. Some of the more prominent issues that were considered by the committees included:

1. Development of a new mission statement and values statement for the Department
2. Identifying departmental cultural differences and changes
3. Legal and contractual collective bargaining considerations
4. Budget and funding considerations
5. Organizational structure
6. Operations (including patrol and investigations)
7. Facilities
8. Specialty units
9. Recruitment and training
10. Workload analysis and personnel development
11. Communications
12. Information technology
13. Policy/General Directive Manual changes
14. Community outreach/involvement/education

Other issues taken into consideration included:

1. The makeup of the original staff (initially half city and half county)
2. A review of existing units to determine duplication in functional responsibility
3. Impact of organizational change
4. Degree of decentralization of the department

5. Development of a strategic planning process
6. Development of a Standard Operating Procedure for the department
7. Identifying cultural differences
8. Integrating the payroll system
9. Developing a Standard Operating Procedure for Metro Government

Human Resources

The Consolidation of Departmental Operations

When the LDP and JCPD merged in January 2003, Robert White was appointed as the first Chief of Police for the newly formed LMPD. Some of the more prominent issues were changed directly as a result of consolidation. These included development of a new mission statement and values statement for the Department, legal and contractual collective bargaining considerations, budget and funding considerations, facility considerations and consolidation, specialty units, recruitment and training, communications, information technology, and policy/General Directive Manual changes.

Other changes were based indirectly on consolidation and directly on the Chief's beliefs and perceptions as to how a consolidated police agency should operate. These beliefs and perceptions were based on his experience with other police agencies and his educational experience and knowledge. Changes such as community outreach/involvement/education, organizational structure reconfiguration, workload analysis and personnel development, equalization of workload, and the decentralization of personnel from specialty units to the patrol divisions were all concerns and strategies of the Chief of Police, but also a necessary part of a consolidated professional police agency.

Culture was an organizational change component that was at the forefront of the minds of the Chief and top commanders of the new police department. As in any organization, culture is important. The LMPD consolidation attempted to merge the best practices from the LDP culture and the best practices from the JCPD culture to create an even better LMPD culture. The “best” practices were determined by the direct experiences of personnel, reviews of professional literature, and evaluating the practices of the former departments, in addition to other police agencies. As a result, a roadmap for the culture of LMPD was defined. As such, “culture” was established as an independent variable along with “mission and values” and “decentralization of personnel.” Merging the cultures of both of these agencies was a very complex undertaking.

Each agency had its own mission and values statement. LDP’s mission was to:

“deliver quality services and provide public safety to our community in an effective, responsive, and professional manner” (Feasibility Study on Local Police Consolidation, p. 1-9).

The values statement:

“reflects those qualities in our community and in our lives that we cherish and dedicate our service to uphold” (Feasibility Study on Local Police Consolidation, p. 1-9).

The values statement included:

Partnership - We believe that effective policing is accomplished by establishing a police/community

partnership to identify problems and to engage in problem-solving activities that reduce crime and the fear of crime.

Responsibility – We have a responsibility to honor a commitment to involve the community in all policing activities that impact the quality of life in our community.

Integrity – We hold ourselves and others accountable to maintain the highest degree of integrity, to present a professional demeanor, to obey all laws and ordinances, and to serve as role models to our community.

Dignity – We shall partially enforce all laws and ordinances, afford respect and dignity to all persons, and safeguard individual rights that are guaranteed by the Constitution.

Excellence – We must constantly strive to achieve excellence and remain flexible enough to admit and learn from our mistakes.

The LDP values statement was designed for the first letter of all of the values to spell the word “pride”. This word was the impetus for the development of the values statement.

The mission statement of JCPD’s was:

“Committed to providing the highest quality of police service and public safety by empowering our members and community to work in partnership with the goal of

improving the quality of life in Jefferson County, while maintaining respect for individual rights and human dignity” (Feasibility Study on Local Police Consolidation, p. 1-11).

JCPD’s organizational values were:

Integrity – We are committed to nurturing and further developing the public trust by holding ourselves accountable to the highest ethical standards founded on honesty and strong moral character.

Dedication – We are devoted to providing the highest quality of law enforcement service to the citizens of Jefferson County to further enhance the quality of life.

Professionalism – We are committed to providing a highly skilled, well-educated, disciplined work force devoted to the highest standards of performance.

Fairness – We are committed to treating members of the community and the department in a consistent, equitable, unbiased manner which fosters mutual respect.

Teamwork – We are committed to working in a coordinated, cooperative effort with the community and each other to identify and resolve issues which impact the welfare of our community.

A merged or redefined mission statement had to be constructed so that officers would know what they needed to do. The mission statement let officers and citizens know where the agency was going. It was a roadmap for the agency. In other words, what was the LMPD intending to accomplish; where was it going.

The values of the organization also needed to be developed. Each former agency had values statements. However, they needed to be merged or redefined. Values are integral to an agency's operation. Values guide behavior of personnel.

Related to the culture was the Chief's decentralization policy which was also a vast cultural difference. While decentralization is an issue of organizational structure, it influences procedures, which in turn induces habit forming behavior. At this level, behavior becomes a characteristic of the organization's culture. Both LDP and JCPD were accustomed to centralized specialty units. For example, units such as the homicide squad, crimes against persons unit, and the crimes against property unit were all centralized at the respective city and county headquarters. All of these units were part of each department's criminal investigation section (CIS). If assistance was needed from a patrol division, requests were made to the particular centralized specialty unit for them to respond to a specific problem under their purview. To the contrary, Chief White wanted all Division Commanders to have the resources needed to address any problem they had in their particular Division. Consequently, many centralized units were abolished and personnel from these specialty units were transferred to the patrol divisions. This was a monumental undertaking in the organizational structure and ultimately the culture of the police department, far different from what had ever been experienced. Decentralization affected many personnel causing low morale which will be discussed later in this chapter.

As an example related to the general culture of LDP and JCPD, the JCPD officers had a culture of not coming into the police substations for off-going roll call. Rather, they would go out of service from their vehicle when their shift ended. The LDP personnel came to the substation for off-going roll calls. This was done to make sure all of the officers were safe and allowed them time to turn in all of the paperwork or reports that were generated during their shift. In consolidating, a single, uniform method of off-going roll calls had to be established that would satisfy organizational needs and a majority of personnel. Ultimately, officers were required to return to their respective police substations for off-going roll calls.

The policies and procedures of both the LDP and the JCPD had to be combined or reconfigured to meet the application(s) of LMPD's. Policies and procedures, administrative reporting practices, types of weapons used were also independent variables which provided general guidelines for all personnel.

When the implementation of merger first began, policies from both LDP and JCPD were used. During the infancy of LMPD, all JCPD and LDP policies were used. Committees were established to review all policies and to merge or redefine them. Policies that were considered to be "high risk" policies, such as use of force and vehicle pursuits, were the first to be reviewed and either merged or redefined to meet the needs of the LMPD. Most of the departmental policies that affected the entire departments were complex in nature to merge or redefine.

All administrative reporting practices were merged. All reporting forms such as overtime, injuries, court compensation, damage to equipment and the like were reviewed and either refined, revised, or restructured for use at LMPD. In some instances, forms

from either LDP or JCPD were used if they met the needs of LMPD. Some changes to these forms were as subtle as adding new departmental logos to them. In some cases, forms or formats from either LDP or JCPD were used as long as they met the specific applications of LMPD. Depending on which agency's forms/formats were used, confusion existed with the members of the other agency whose form/format was not utilized. However, in many cases, entire forms were revised or redeveloped. Developing only one particular form for use by personnel of LMPD was complex in that systems and procedures such as personnel and finance had changed after the consolidation.

When devising a policy on which service weapons would be carried by patrol officers, many issues came to light. To begin, the JCPD personnel carried Sig Sauer semi-automatic 9 mm pistols while LDP personnel carried Glock 40 caliber semi-automatic pistols. In addition to these differences, the LDP purchased weapons for their personnel while JCPD required each officer to purchase his/her own weapon. The choice in weapon not only caused the obvious problems in terms of complexity, it also caused even smaller problems in deciding what types of holsters would be carried which affected what types of belts would be used and what type of ammunition pouches. All of these issues were very complex to implement as not only the decisions were difficult, but cost was a factor, not to mention the unions were both formally and informally involved in the decisions.

Communications at the time of merger were handled by a UHF system (LDP) and a VHF system (JCPD). Communications, 10-codes and car numbers were all independent variables that allowed for effective radio communication between officers during emergency situations.

When the LDP and JCPD were merged, the systems of both agencies did not “talk” to one another unless a “link” was tripped to allow conversation. This only occurred in very emergent situations such as disasters. A way to merge or restructure the communication systems of both agencies needed to be developed so that effective communications could take place by all officers.

At the time of the consolidation, the JCPD utilized the entire 10-code system and the LDP personnel did not. The LDP personnel only utilized approximately 10-12 10-codes. Rather than using words on the radio, 10-codes were established to shorten radio transmissions and for confidentiality purposes. For example, a 10-75 and a “bomb threat” mean the same thing. However, when transmitting on a radio that is not encrypted or open for all to hear, the 10-code is more appropriate in that it takes less time to transmit on the radio and it adds a degree of confidentiality that can reduce panic for those listening to a scanner monitoring police radio channels. The use of all of the 10-codes, approximately 100 of them, was confusing to LDP personnel. It was a complex process to redefine and merge what was being utilized by both of the former police agencies and adapt it to LMPD.

Additionally, the car numbers utilized by each agency were entirely different. For example, patrol officers with the JCPD were each assigned car numbers. Car numbers at LDP were shared. If an officer with LDP needed to get on the radio when they were off duty, they used their assigned code number instead of a car number. Off-duty JCPD personnel would use their assigned car number as it was exclusive to the officer to who it was assigned.

The collective bargaining contracts were of great concern to officers and management. At the time of the consolidation, 11 contracts existed with different pay rates, benefit packages, and miscellaneous contractual provisions. Many of these contracts were merged or redefined to provide parity and also minimize the number of contracts that existed. Therefore, collective bargaining contracts, employee rights, and pay were included as independent variables.

Salaries for officers were one of the biggest issues to address during the consolidation. In fact, parity was one of the reasons LDP personnel were supportive of the merger as JCPD personnel made more in salary before the merger (Grant, 2011). LDP personnel anticipated that their salaries would rise after consolidation to parity with former JCPD officers.

Employee benefits also needed to be reconciled to be equal and fair for all personnel of the newly formed LMPD. Vacation time accumulation, sick time accumulation and the like were different for each agency. All of these issues were redefined and/or merged through contractual negotiations.

Another critical and important consideration by LMPD involved the restructuring of police divisions. Before the consolidation of LDP and JCPD, LDP operated with six patrol divisions while JCPD operated with four. The restructuring of patrol boundaries was an arduous task that was complex. Personnel might not have perceived the difficulties of redefining the patrol divisions. Many of the complex considerations included, but were not limited to, geographical boundaries, calls for service, crime statistics, population size, area size, equal distribution of workload, population density, and type of area, i.e., residential, commercial or manufacturing.

The restructuring of boundaries resulted in eight patrol divisions, each of which would be commanded by a Major. Some of the newly formed divisions required larger numbers of personnel while others required fewer. For example, some divisions such as the Fourth and Second Divisions were smaller in size, but required more personnel than the Third and Eighth Divisions. This was primarily due to the fact that personnel numbers were based on considerations such as calls for service, self-initiated calls, population size, population density, type of area (residential, commercial, manufacturing, etc.) and geographical size. Many of the smaller Divisions, in terms of geographical size, resulted from denser populations causing more calls for service in these areas.

As a result, some of the officers in each of the former city and county districts were reassigned. Voluntary requests for reassignment to the newly formed divisions were honored first so that the personnel needs of the particular division could be accommodated. Less than 50 requests for transfer were submitted, primarily by officers wanting to leave inner city divisions and transfer to suburban divisions. After voluntary requests were fulfilled, approximately 100 involuntary reassignments took place. These reassignments of personnel accounted for some of the former city officers being assigned to former county areas and some county officers being assigned to former city areas.

At the time of the LMPD consolidation, there were 10 patrol districts, six districts, 1 – 6, in LDP's jurisdictional area and four districts, Adam, Baker, Charlie, and David districts, in JCPD's jurisdictional area. All of these areas needed to be redefined after the consolidation. The number of patrol districts for a city the size of Louisville Metro was too great. Patrol boundaries, geographical size, and equalization of workload were independent variables.

For example, when the patrol boundaries were redefined, geographical size was a paramount consideration. In Jefferson County, all of the patrol areas were larger in geographical size in that the population was sparse in those areas and calls for service were much less than in the LDP jurisdiction, thereby decreasing the workload of officers assigned to those areas. In other words, because of less workload, the geographical area an officer patrolled was larger. Conversely, LDP patrol areas were somewhat smaller in size due to population density and many more calls for service. For example, LDP's 2nd patrol district, located in the downtown area or central business district of the former City of Louisville was much smaller in geographical size than JCPD's districts. This was due primarily to the large daytime population and ultimately more calls for service originating from the downtown businesses and offices. The consideration of geographical size was also important so that officers would not have too far to drive to respond to the needs of or calls from citizens.

When redefining the patrol boundaries, equalization of workload was an important factor for consideration and was very complex to define. Consideration for calls for service was contemplated in redefining patrol boundaries. Calls for service were defined as emergency or non-emergency calls made to the 911 communications center where an officer was dispatched to the problem location. Examples of calls for service were report runs, traffic accidents, disorderly persons, and the like. The self-initiated activities of officers were also considered. Self-initiated activities include actions such as traffic violations/violators, stopping suspicious persons, and checking businesses to determine whether or not they are secure after business hours. More specifically, self-initiated activities are initiated by the officers while calls for service are initiated by the

911 communications section. Additionally, boundaries had to be realigned to equalize workload in each district. This was sometimes difficult due to geographical boundaries, neighborhood considerations and the like.

As previously mentioned, one of the first considerations toward the innovation of consolidating the operations of LMPD was whether or not to decentralize a large number of functions and personnel to the patrol divisions. The impetus of this thought began with the Chief of Police. When LDP and JCPD consolidated, information was gathered from personnel that led to the conclusion that each patrol division did not have the personnel to address certain issues such as narcotic investigations. The Chief of Police wanted all patrol divisions to be “self-sufficient”.

Ultimately, the decision was made to decentralize the department. This was a complex process that involved a thorough review of all functions and units within the department, especially those functions and units that were centralized. The inquiries were performed so that an informed decision could be made in reference to what functions/units would remain centralized and which would be decentralized. By decentralizing functions/personnel to the divisions, commanders in each Division would be held responsible for preventing, responding to, and investigating criminal activity. However, as both former agencies were mostly centralized and neither had experienced decentralization in the past, the perceived complexity of this process was limited at best.

Resulting from this decision was the decentralization of personnel from several units, in addition to the elimination of some units. The LDP units disbanded were the Stolen Property and Recovery Squad Unit (SPARS) and the Street Crimes Unit. Disbanded JCPD Units were the Major Case Squad and Domestic Violence Unit. Other

centralized units were downsized such as the Criminal Investigation Division which is comprised of specialty units such as Homicide, Sex Crimes, Robbery, and Crimes Against Children.

The most notable among officers was the decentralization of the Narcotics Unit. Several officers were reassigned from this unit to the patrol divisions to address street-based narcotics. This unit had a complex make-up in that it had many sub-units such as street corner enforcement, major case, diversion, asset forfeiture and the like. Additionally, the decentralization entailed a complex process involving all levels of supervision to determining who would leave the unit to go to the patrol divisions and who would stay. Sergeants interviewed personnel, reviewed their personnel files and activities, and selected the detectives who would leave the unit. Lieutenants would engage in the same process for sergeants and would choose which of them would be transferred. Finally, the commander of the unit would interview the lieutenants and assess their management abilities to determine who would be sent to the patrol divisions.

This was a complex task that was very unpleasant for all involved. If personnel had perceived the complexities involved, they might have had a better understanding of the issues and tribulations associated with the innovation of decentralization.

These decentralizations resulted in about 100 police officers being reassigned into the patrol divisions (Courier-Journal, 2003). This initiative was concerning for the officers and the police union due to the fact that 1) many officers did not want change because they were familiar or liked their position/job, 2) there was a sense of entitlement to some specialty positions in both departments and 3) many officers had no experience with a Chief of Police from an outside agency and consequently, new ideas that were

different from LDP or JCPD. In fact, employee morale has been most notable. The Courier-Journal newspaper (2004) noted that following the consolidation, morale was at an “all time low”.

Morale was low after the police department consolidation. There seemed to be many causes for the morale plummeting, including an outside Chief being selected, his belief of holding officers accountable, lack of leadership, change occurring in the organization and parity issues to name a few.

In a qualitative study on organizational justice, Grant (2010) interviewed 40 police officers with LMPD after the merger. The 40 officers were comprised of both former LDP and JCPD personnel.

In general reference to the merger, one officer who was interviewed noted:

“Everything plummeted, morale plummeted, production plummeted, a lot of finger pointing. COs were pointing at each other, lieutenants were pointing at sergeants, sergeants pointing at lieutenants, lieutenants pointing at majors and vice versa all the way up and down. It’s a blame game” (p. 153).

Another officer stated:

“I don’t know that morale has ever been the same since merger. I mean we all get along but I don’t hear people say how much they love to come to work. We used to say it all the time, man I love coming to work this is so much fun, I love working with these people. I think a lot of people have bad attitudes about it still and it still lingers and you’re like quit your bitching, you know it’s been seven years, I mean you don’t think about it as merger but I think it’s a result of merger that people are still complaining about stuff” (p. 153).

Some officers were dissatisfied that a Chief of Police was selected from outside of the LDP and JCPD ranks. Many officers believed that the Chief should have been selected from either the JCPD or the LDP. Low morale even permeated the higher ranks of officers (lieutenants, captains, majors, lieutenant colonels) in that many of these

individuals believed that they had an opportunity to be the first Chief of Police for LMPD. One of the officers that Grant (2010) interviewed stated:

“I think that (selecting an outside Chief) did a lot for morale (low) when he brought in an outsider but then again it brought both sides together. Now we’re both (LDP and JCPD personnel) going to hate this guy” (p. 145).

Many other officers’ comments were like in nature. According to Grant (2010), many officers believed that the consolidation was managed well, but did not believe that the administration, in its decision-making processes, showed respect and support for its officers. According to these officers, this has contributed to the current low morale on the department (Grant, 2010).

Low morale was also caused by the Chief’s attempts to hold officers accountable for their actions. While this occurred, officers believed that the administration failed to hold its commanders accountable for their actions. These perceptions were a contributing factor in the distrust officers had for the administration and the officers’ low morale. One of the officers interviewed by Grant (2010) notes:

“They’re (officers) just not happy with the administration because from what I understand, it looks like the administration is more so trying to fire them rather than trying to help them. That’s just like this court stuff we’re going through now. Everybody’s getting these days and 48 hour notices and writing letters and stuff because the news media wrote an article and got everything stirred up” (p. 165).

Another officer in Grant’s (2010) study states:

“Out of the biggest headaches on the department, that would have to be it... how they disperse the disciplinary. What applies to officers don’t apply to them (commanders)” (165).

Another reason for the low morale of officers was the perceived lack of leadership. According to Grant (2010), officers indicated that they felt consolidation was

managed well, but that there had been little leadership by the command staff. Officers also believed that there had been little or no respect for and support of officers in the department. They further believed that the administration has been out of touch with its officers throughout the process. In Grant's (2010) study, one officer notes:

"That's what I'm saying there's just that lack of respect. You know what I think this would fix a lot of things, there are a lot of little things I've done to make the department merge better but I think this is number one. If we had a leader like the mayor's office or something like that somebody that supported us and said these are my guys, these are my girls, this is my police department then we would do whatever they asked" (p. 165).

Another cause of low morale, especially among JCPD officers, was parity. As LDP personnel earned lower salaries than their JCPD counterparts, JCPD officers did not receive a decent pay raise when the two agencies merged while LDP officers showed increases in their pay to give them parity with JCPD officers. Additionally, JCPD officers had cost increases in their insurance benefits while former LDP personnel did not. Changes were also made to the take-home car policies related to when vehicles could be driven. As a result of new policies, former JCPD personnel were restricted more in the use of the vehicle than they had been accustomed. To the contrary, former LDP personnel were allowed more use of the take home vehicles than they previously experienced. All of these changes meant that JCPD personnel actually lost money which ultimately added to their lowered morale.

Low morale also resulted in decreases in work productivity. Some police officers continued to work, but only did a minimal amount of work. Grant (2010) notes that respondents in his study indicated that while there were unhappy officers on the department, they attempted to stay focused. The following quotes are a sample of the responses given by LDP and JCPD officers in Grant's study.

“I just kept doing what I was supposed to do. Some stuff I was alright with other things I didn’t necessary agree with but I’m a professional you just adapt and overcome and continue doing your job. It’s not going to change the way I police, you know. No changes changed the way I police or look at things” (p. 154).

“So you’re putting somebody who had been comfortable now in an uncomfortable position which is not necessarily a bad thing. I saw a lot of unhappy people. I was fairly new so I didn’t have a lot of experience on how things ran, what departments did what and such. I was young, excited and eager to ride the streets. I mean I just think you can’t force feed adults they’re going to rebel against you; they might not do it out in the open but behind closed doors they’re not going to eat what you’re feeding them. They got lazy and didn’t want to go out and do stuff, they would just spin and grin is what we called it, just out riding around in their cars spinning their tires and just grinning” (p. 154).

“Some responded better. I mean you’ve still got a lot of officers that are very professional and will always be professional whether they like what’s going on or not. They’ve got a job to do and that’s what they’re going to do. But then you’ve got others that are crying malcontent that were probably never really happy before we merged and never going to be happy. Well of course the work slows down when all you want to do is get together and fuss. It wasn’t about locking up bad guys anymore they were just angry” (p. 154).

“Yeah I think there were some people who laid down and quit working, I mean there were some people of course who retired, they were able to retire. without a doubt no matter what you do it’s going to happen whenever you have change. I think for the most part people stayed focused and did their job and moved on with it but there were a lot of people yeah it definitely affected their work product” (pp. 154-155).

While morale was low during the process of merging LDP and JCPD, in 2010, it was still considered to be low as noted in Grant’s study on organizational justice.

In 2012, a new Chief of Police, Steve Conrad, was hired. Chief Conrad was a former LMPD assistant chief. Time will tell whether or not his tenure will make a difference in officer morale.

Other changes of innovation in consolidation included the JCPD Community Relations Unit, the Training Division, and the Police Academy (all one unit) being not

only consolidated, but also geographically relocated. This move created great controversy among officers and was a very complex part of the consolidation process. The JCPD Community Relations Unit was located at Southfields in eastern Jefferson County on a 62 acre tract of land. The JCPD unit was moved into the city limits to the LDP Training Academy and the property at Southfields was put up for sale by Mayor Abramson. By moving the JCPD Community Relations Unit, former JCPD officers would have to travel across town to the former City's training unit location. This caused morale issues because JCPD personnel were partial to the Southfield's facility and the move was a change for former JCPD personnel. Additionally, the sale of the Southfields property caused further morale issues in that former JCPD officers felt that all of the things belonging to the JCPD were being sold or given away. Personnel at the time the departments merged in 2003 might not have perceived how complex, controversial, and difficult this consolidation of units would be.

Two additional units with JCPD, Vehicle Impoundment and the Police Garage, were transferred to the former City of Louisville Public Works Department. Again, the physical locations of the garages were on opposite ends of town. Some JCPD officers had to drive their vehicles to the opposite end of town for routine service and vehicle maintenance. This was also the case for some LDP officers in that they had to drive into the County areas to get their vehicles serviced.

Many officers with each of the former departments also had the same mechanics service their cars for several years. Many officers had become good friends with their mechanics. This consolidation was an innovation for officers and Public Works crews and was complex to implement. This caused morale issues for officers. This was

possibly due to the fact that they might not have perceived the complexities of the innovation.

According to Chief White, division commanders in an agency the size of LMPD should have resources at the division level to work on any crime problem. He also believed that officers in the divisions needed to interact with the public in a positive way. Pursuant to a 2003 newspaper article in the Courier-Journal, Chief White stated that officers needed to focus on preventing crime and establishing relationships with the community. His philosophy for the merged agency revolved around four main tenets: 1) crime prevention, 2) crime control, 3) community involvement, and 4) respect for all people. He strived to place more officers closer to the community to address crime issues and to build community partnerships. As a result of this philosophy relating to larger agencies, more police officers would be placed on the streets in the patrol divisions.

Stabilization Stage

As there has been only one study following the consolidation of LDP and JCPD, documentation of stabilization is limited at best. Therefore, determining exactly when or if, approximately or otherwise, this stage occurred is difficult to ascertain. However, a summary of the accomplishments of the consolidation include:

1. The departmental reorganization led to the downsizing or elimination of many centralized criminal investigative units and their investigative functions were reallocated to the patrol divisions. Likewise, personnel from these centralized units were reassigned to the patrol divisions.

2. New policies, standard operating procedures, and rules were designed and implemented allowing for one set of operating rules for the officers of LMPD.
3. The department was able to provide for some connectivity of the former LDP and JCPD communication systems. This enabled police officers, no matter their assignment, to communicate with one another.
4. The former LDP and JCPD fleets were merged. This merger accounted for the review and assessment of all vehicles and resulted in some older vehicles being taken out of service. It also allowed for the assignment of more take-home vehicles to officers who previously did not have one. The ultimate result of this merger has been reduced vehicle costs.
5. The number of labor contracts has been reduced and officers of the same grade are receiving like wages and benefits.

The aforementioned list summarizes just a few of the accomplishments of the LMPD merger. All of these changes were complex in nature. The changes were complex for the majority of issues related to consolidation as there were always unforeseen considerations in the process of innovation. Officers might not have perceived the complexities involved in this innovation. Had the complexity of innovation been perceived, officers may not have been as supportive of consolidation prior to it. Even though there have been success stories, concerns, problems, and issues such as culture, policy issues, perceived fairness, and the like still exist related to the consolidation.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents information regarding the methodology that was utilized for this research study. The chapter is divided into several sections: 1) background of the study, 2) significance of study, 3) overview of organizational change components (OCC), 4) purpose of study, 5) description of variables, 6) survey instrument utilized, 7) survey population, 8) descriptive characteristics of population, 9) Demographic/descriptive characteristics of respondents, 10) analysis/predictions, 11) data analysis for the research hypotheses, and 11) evaluation of the research methods.

Background of Study

The purpose of this study was to explore police officers' perceptions of the complexity in merging organizational change components (OCCs) and how this perception affects officer attitudes toward supporting or opposing a consolidated police agency. The main focus of this study was the Louisville Metro Police Department (LMPD).

In 2003, the Louisville Metro Police Department came into being with the consolidation of the Louisville Division of Police and the Jefferson County Police Department. As a result of the consolidation, the Louisville Metro Police Department was in the top 0.4% of law enforcement agencies in the nation with 1,000 or more sworn personnel (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2007).

Prior to the merger of the Louisville Division of Police (LDP) and the Jefferson County Police Department (JCPD) in 2003, the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission (LJCCC) (1998) conducted a survey on the perceptions and attitudes of police officers regarding police consolidation. This survey was distributed to members of the LDP, JCPD, and the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office. The statistics reported for purposes of this research relate only to the LDP and JCPD.

The survey focused on whether or not the consolidation was supported by sworn officers. According to the findings, 82.1% of LDP sworn personnel were in favor of the consolidation while 89.9% of JCPD sworn personnel were opposed to consolidation.

The survey also measured the attitudes and perceptions of employees related to 1) the anticipated effects of merger on the individual officer, the organization, and the citizens, 2) outcomes expected from consolidation, and 3) priorities of issues to be addressed by consolidation, as discussed in the previous chapter. Demographic information for the respondents was also captured. Since the consolidation of the LMPD in 2003, one follow-up study has been conducted to measure the perceptions and attitudes, whether changing or not, of the police department members (sworn officers) regarding the agency's consolidation.

Many factors/issues/components were considered in forming the LMPD such as culture(s), policies and procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and re-defining patrol division boundaries. All of these components or factors were very complex and were an integral part of the LMPD merger.

Oftentimes, employees of agencies do not perceive the complexities involved in consolidating sub-units of government or, more specifically, implementing these OCCs.

Therefore, in an effort to understand the complexity of the organizational change components, officers' perceptions of that complexity, and how this perception affects the support for the consolidation, this research was undertaken.

Significance of Study

The results of this research will assist those who are considering undertaking police consolidation, or those who have already done so, to understand some of the more prominent issues that influence consolidation success: 1) employee perception of the complexity of merging the OCCs and 2) the attitudes and perceptions of employees. It will further provide organizational leaders with insight into the perception of officers regarding the complexity of organizational change components and its effects on change within their organizations. Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) assert that the ability to manage change is, or should be, a core organizational competence. Currently, minimal scholarly research exists that focuses on police officers' perception of the complexity of merging the OCCs and how this perception of complexity affects attitudes toward merger. Also lacking is research that focuses on case-specific comparable data.

Given the role of police officers in society, attitudes and perceptions of police officers can have a significant impact on the organization, its supervisors, and the community (Grant, 2011). These attitudes and perceptions change over time and, depending on transitional and operational efficiency, can either positively or negatively affect the organization.

Studies of consolidated governments usually describe thoroughly how the consolidations came about but are less successful in distinguishing between changes that follow consolidation and the changes that are caused by consolidation (Carver, 1973).

This especially holds true for changes that occur in attitudes and perceptions. Identifying the changes in attitudes and perceptions of police officers that were caused by consolidation requires a comparison to what happened after consolidation. It would also be beneficial to determine what would have happened if consolidation had not occurred. However, methods are lacking to accurately determine a future that failed to occur.

Thus, because of the difficulty in determining the impacts of government consolidations, some researchers have turned to survey research to gain insights into the effects of consolidation (Durning and Nobbie, 2000). This research was designed to survey the people who are most likely to experience the effects of consolidation and/or who influenced the consolidation by their supportive or opposing views, attitudes, and perceptions.

As previously mentioned, there is a data set that exists from a 1998 study conducted by the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission about support for the LMPD merger. From this data set, some comparative information was gathered that allowed the researcher to investigate and report some of the changes of attitudes and perceptions of LMPD officers that have occurred over time. Insights gained from this research are expected to make a valuable contribution to this field of knowledge and will serve as a basis for the development of a guide for meaningful discussion and analysis of police consolidation efforts.

Overview of Organizational Change Components

The consolidation case selected for this study, the Louisville Metro Police Department, provided a unique context in which to describe and understand how the perception of complexity related to certain factors or components may influence support

for the consolidation process. Support for consolidation was assessed by using organizational change components developed for this study that were integral to the LMPD consolidation process and the operation of the organization.

Any police department consolidation is a complex task. It can impact employees, management, political leaders, and citizens of the community. Consolidation necessarily involves structural change, integrating some or all parts of each of the original organizations' functions and activities (IACP, 2003). Changes in both the structural complexity and structural control of an organization could occur during the consolidation process.

Robbins (1987) notes that structural complexity is the extent of differentiation within the organization. This includes the degree of specialization, or division of labor, the number of levels in the organization's hierarchy, and the extent to which the organization's units are dispersed geographically.

When the LDP and the JCPD consolidated, a multitude of transformations occurred that included structural, administrative, and operational changes. In an effort to measure the most important or dynamic changes or considerations, a list of components or factors was developed in order to determine an officer's perception of complexity related to consolidating organizational change components. Culture(s), policies and procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and re-defining patrol division boundaries are all organizational change components that were important to a successful police department consolidation. These OCCs affected all police employees and they all had some knowledge of them by word of mouth, written departmental notification, or departmental meetings. However, officers may not have perceived the

complexity of them in their application or implementation in terms of the actual consolidation.

Many dynamic variables affect organizations and our work in them (Glenn and Malott, 2004). The aforementioned changes or OCCs were “dynamic” in nature in that consolidating, redefining, or changing them and ultimately implementing them was a complex process that had an everlasting affect on LMPD.

One can assume that these organizational change components not only affected the organization, but also the employees and their attitudes and perceptions. The particular OCCs, culture(s), policies and procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and re-defining patrol division boundaries, were selected because 1) all police officers within the LMPD had a vested interest in each of them, and 2) each officer on the department was aware of the OCCs and understood that changes would be implemented regarding them.

As in any organization, culture is important. Cameron and Quinn (1999) assert that in companies, the most powerful factor they all highlight as a key ingredient in their success, is their organizational culture. As such, when the LMPD consolidation process began, the Chief of Police had discussions regarding the new LMPD culture with employees of both the former LDP and JCPD. During these discussions, he advised employees that he wanted to develop a new culture that incorporated the best from the LDP culture and the best from the JCPD culture to create an even better LMPD culture. This combined culture would be integral to LMPD and would affect all officers.

The policies and procedures of both the LDP and the JCPD would have to be combined or reconfigured to meet the needs of the newly formed LMPD. These new

policies and procedures provided general guidelines for all personnel and added consistency, in terms of operations, to the LMPD.

Communications at the time of merger were handled by a UHF system (LDP) and a VHF system (JCPD). Both of these systems had a “linking loop” that would allow for combined radio communication between officers during emergency situations. However, for day-to-day activities, there was no interconnectivity between officers in the same division or between officers in different divisions. Officers had acute awareness of this problem and wanted it corrected. This was also a major issue that was continually brought to the forefront of conversations by Fraternal Order of Police.

The collective bargaining contracts were of great concern to officers and management. At the time of the LMPD consolidation, officers and civilians alike were doing the same jobs or duties and were being paid different salaries. At the time of the consolidation, 11 officer, supervisor and civilian contracts existed with different pay rates, benefit packages, and contractual provisions that governed things such as days off, vacation days, sick time, promotion and the like. Officers and civilian employees were very cognizant of this OCC and looked for expedient contract resolution after consolidation.

At the time of the LMPD consolidation, there were 10 patrol districts, 6 in the former City of Louisville limits and 4 in the jurisdiction of Jefferson County. In order to equalize workload and provide for some expediency in response to calls for service, it was necessary to redefine, restructure, and merge patrol boundaries. As this OCC affected all officers, they were keenly aware of the change about to take place.

Even though there was awareness on the part of officers about the aforementioned OCCs, it is uncertain whether or not they actually perceived the complexity involved in their consolidation and implementation in the newly formed LMPD. It was also uncertain how the officers' perception of the organizational change components and the difficulty involved in merging them affected their attitudes in supporting the LMPD consolidation.

Purpose of Study

The specific purpose of this study was to examine the Louisville Metro Police Department consolidation and the police officers' perceptions of the complexity of merging the OCCs integral to consolidating the LDP and JCPD into one department. This study further identified how an officer's perception of the complexity of merging the OCCs affected their attitudes toward the police department merger and, in particular, their support for or against consolidation. Certain portions of this data, specifically parts addressing support of merger, were compared to the results from a survey conducted in 1998 by the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission (LJCCC). The 1998 survey was distributed to police officers from the LDP and the JCPD and measured support for the police department consolidation.

The literature review also demonstrated the need for a better understanding of the effects of an employee's perception of the complexity of merging OCCs on their attitudes and perceptions in relation to their support of police consolidation. No studies have been conducted in police departments concerning a police officer's perception of complexity related to merging organizational change components during a consolidation and how the perceived level of complexity affects support for consolidation.

The study of complexity is a relatively new science and, like any new science, is not fully accepted within the scientific community (Arndt and Bigelow, 2000). The origins of complexity theories lie in attempts of meteorologists to build mathematical models of weather systems (Lorenz, 1993). Only recently have these theories transcended from the natural sciences to the social sciences. In terms of their application (complexity theories) to organizations, it is only in the last decade that a sufficient body of academic work has been amassed to allow those studying organizations to recognize the potential of complexity theories (Burnes, 2005). Even so, research regarding an officer's perception of complexity in merging organizational change components during the consolidation of a police agency is non-existent.

In response, this study (1) examined the level of police officer support for consolidation and how it has changed since 1998, before the LMPD consolidation, (2) compared police officers' perception of the complexity of merging organizational change components in the consolidation process and how their perception of the complexity affected their attitudes and perceptions toward the consolidation, and 3) determined how the police officers' perception of the complexity of merging the OCCs affected support for or against police consolidation.

The study was conducted by means of a written survey instrument that consisted of 32 questions and was distributed to police officers who were currently working for the LMPD and were working for either the LDP or the JCPD when the LMPD consolidation occurred in 2003. The survey sought to elicit information regarding a police officer's perception of complexity pertaining to the organizational change components (culture(s), policies and procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and re-defining

patrol division boundaries) which were an important part of the consolidation. Rather than selecting a sample from the population, the entire population was surveyed. The population consisted of 669 police officers who, as previously mentioned, worked for either the LDP or the JCPD at the time of the police department consolidation in 2003. The study was conducted using the aforementioned survey, in addition to the results of a survey of police officers conducted in 1998 by the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission (LJCCC) measuring attitudes toward merger.

A quantitative examination was conducted utilizing regression analysis models and the results of this study were compared, in part, with the findings of the 1998 study. The results of the survey were also analyzed comparing police officer perception of complexity in merging OCCs to the support of consolidation.

The hypotheses for this study were as follows:

1. Police officers' perceived complexity of organizational change components is related to attitudes toward police consolidation.
2. The greater officers' perceived complexity of organizational change components, the less support for police consolidation.

Description of Variables

The variables for this study were divided into five categories: 1) support, 2) merger experience and participation, 3) satisfaction, 4) perceived complexity, and 5) demographic information/officer characteristics. The dependent variable for this study was support for consolidation.

The support category included two variables (Questions 1 and 2). One variable, support for consolidation prior to the actual consolidation of LDP and JCPD, was included for comparative purposes with the study conducted by the Louisville – Jefferson County

Crime Commission in 1998. The other variable in this section, current level of support for the consolidation of the two agencies, was the aforementioned dependent variable.

For purposes of the merger experience and participation section (Questions 3, 4, 5, and 6), variables were selected to determine an officer's experience with and participation in the consolidation process. Question 3 measured the independent variable (IV), experience, nominally. Question 4 also measured the IV, service on a merger committee, nominally. Question 5 provided a listing of the different merger committees on which the respondent might have served. Finally, Question 6 measured information the respondent might have received from others who served on a committee. This IV was also measured nominally.

The third section of the questionnaire specifically addressed satisfaction with the merged organizational change components (Questions 7 – 22). Responses were ordinal measures utilizing a 7-point Likert scale. These variables were selected for this section in the following manner. When the LDP and the JCPD consolidated, a multitude of changes occurred. In an effort to measure the most important dynamic changes or considerations, a list of components or factors was developed in order to determine the perceived complexity of consolidating what were termed organizational change components (OCCs). Culture(s), policies and procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and re-defining patrol division boundaries were all considered to be OCCs that were important to a successful police department consolidation.

These changes or organizational change components were dynamic in nature. They were selected because of their importance to the organization, the employees, and the citizens of the community. The OCCs selected also had a lasting effect on all involved in the consolidation process. Due to the importance of the OCCs and their

effect on all employees, one can assume they also affected the attitudes and perceptions of employees.

The particular OCCs were selected because each police officer had knowledge or awareness of the components through different mediums (i.e., word of mouth, written departmental notification, or departmental meetings). Each officer on the department also understood that changes would be implemented regarding them. However, while officers were aware that these organizational change components would be merged or redefined during the implementation of the consolidation, they may not have perceived the complexity of them in their application or implementation in terms of the actual consolidation. Additionally, these OCCs were chosen due to fact that all police officers within the LMPD had a vested interest in each of them.

In addition to the “primary” organizational change components, culture(s), policies and procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and re-defining patrol division boundaries, two supplemental components were included in conjunction with each OCC that were implemented during the consolidation. These two components listed under each OCC were similar in nature to the OCC itself. For example, under the OCC of culture, mission statements and values and decentralization were included because of the cultural nature of these components. Additionally, each of the two additional components was dynamic, had a lasting effect on all personnel, and were complex to merge and/or redefine. It should be noted that it was possible that these variables worked individually or in concert to affect a police officer’s support of police consolidation.

As in any organization, culture is important. The LMPD consolidation attempted to merge the best practices from the LDP culture and the best practices from the JCPD culture to create an even better LMPD culture. The “best” practices were determined by the direct experiences of personnel, reviews of professional literature, and evaluating the practices of the former departments, in addition to other police agencies. As a result, a roadmap for the culture of LMPD was defined. As such, culture was established as an independent variable along with mission and values and decentralization of personnel. Merging the cultures of both of these agencies was a very complex undertaking.

Prior to merger, each agency had its own mission and values statement. LDP’s mission was to:

“deliver quality services and provide public safety to our community in an effective, responsive, and professional manner” (Feasibility Study on Local Police Consolidation, p. 1-9).

The values statement:

“reflects those qualities in our community and in our lives that we cherish and dedicate our service to uphold” (Feasibility Study on Local Police Consolidation, p. 1-9).

The values statement included:

Partnership - We believe that effective policing is accomplished by establishing a police/community partnership to identify problems and to engage in problem-solving activities that reduce crime and the fear of crime.

Responsibility – We have a responsibility to honor a commitment to involve the community in all policing activities that impact the quality of life in our community.

Integrity – We hold ourselves and others accountable to maintain the highest degree of integrity, to present a professional demeanor, to obey all laws and ordinances, and to serve as role models to our community.

Dignity – We shall partially enforce all laws and ordinances, afford respect and dignity to all persons, and safeguard individual rights that are guaranteed by the Constitution.

Excellence – We must constantly strive to achieve excellence and remain flexible enough to admit and learn from our mistakes.

The LDP values statement was designed for the first letter of all of the values to spell the word “pride”. This word was the impetus for the development of the values statement.

The mission statement of JCPD’s was:

“Committed to providing the highest quality of police service and public safety by empowering our members and community to work in partnership with the goal of improving the quality of life in Jefferson County, while maintaining respect for individual rights and human

dignity” (Feasibility Study on Local Police Consolidation, p. 1-11).

JCPD’s organizational values were:

Integrity -- We are committed to nurturing and further developing the public trust by holding ourselves accountable to the highest ethical standards founded on honesty and strong moral character.

Dedication -- We are devoted to providing the highest quality of law enforcement service to the citizens of Jefferson County to further enhance the quality of life.

Professionalism – We are committed to providing a highly skilled, well-educated, disciplined work force devoted to the highest standards of performance.

Fairness – We are committed to treating members of the community and the department in a consistent, equitable, unbiased manner which fosters mutual respect.

Teamwork – We are committed to working in a coordinated, cooperative effort with the community and each other to identify and resolve issues which impact the welfare of our community.

A merged or redefined mission statement had to be constructed so that officers would know what they needed to do. The mission statement let officers and citizens

know where the agency was going. It was a roadmap for the agency. In other words, what was the LMPD intending to accomplish; where was it going.

The values of the organization also needed to be developed. Each former agency had values statements. However, they needed to be merged or redefined. Values are integral to an agency's operation. Values guide behavior of personnel.

Decentralization was a vast cultural difference. While decentralization is an issue of organizational structure, it influences procedures, which in turn induces habit forming behavior. At this level, behavior becomes a characteristic of the organization's culture. Both LDP and JCPD were accustomed to centralized specialty units. For example, units such as the homicide squad, crimes against persons unit, and the crimes against property unit were all centralized at the respective city and county headquarters. All of these units were part of each department's criminal investigation section (CIS). If assistance was needed from a patrol division, requests were made to the particular centralized specialty unit for them to respond to a specific problem under their purview. To the contrary, Chief White wanted all Division Commanders to have the resources needed to address any problem they had in their particular Division. Consequently, many centralized units were abolished and personnel from these specialty units were transferred to the patrol divisions. This was a monumental undertaking in the organizational structure and ultimately the culture of the police department, far different from what had ever been experienced.

As an example related to the general culture of LDP and JCPD, the JCPD officers had a culture of not coming into the police substations for off-going roll call. Rather, they would go out of service from their vehicle when their shift ended. The LDP

personnel came to the substation for off-going roll calls. This was done to make sure all of the officers were safe and allowed them time to turn in all of the paperwork or reports that were generated during their shift. In consolidating, a single, uniform method of off-going roll calls had to be established that would satisfy organizational needs and a majority of personnel. Ultimately, officers were required to return to their respective police substations for off-going roll calls.

The policies and procedures of both the LDP and the JCPD had to be combined or reconfigured to meet the application(s) of LMPD. Policies and procedures, administrative reporting practices, types of weapons used were also independent variables which provided general guidelines for all personnel.

When the implementation of merger first began, policies from both LDP and JCPD were used. During the infancy of LMPD, all JCPD and LDP policies were used. Committees were established to review all policies and to merge or redefine them. Policies that were considered to be “high risk” policies, such as use of force and vehicle pursuits, were the first to be reviewed and either merged or redefined to meet the needs of the LMPD. Most of the departmental policies that affected the entire departments were complex in nature to merge or redefine.

All administrative reporting practices were merged. All reporting forms such as overtime, injuries, court compensation, damage to equipment and the like were reviewed and either refined, revised, or restructured for use at LMPD. In some instances, forms from either LDP or JCPD were used if they met the needs of LMPD. Some changes to these forms were as subtle as adding new departmental logos to them. In some cases, forms or formats from either LDP or JCPD were used as long as they met the specific

applications of LMPD. Depending on which agency's forms/formats were used, confusion existed with the members of the other agency whose form/format was not utilized. However, in many cases, entire forms were revised or redeveloped. Developing only one particular form for use by personnel of LMPD was complex in that systems and procedures such as personnel and finance had changed after the consolidation.

When devising a policy on which service weapons would be carried by patrol officers, many issues came to light. To begin, the JCPD personnel carried Sig Sauer semi-automatic 9 mm pistols while LDP personnel carried Glock 40 caliber semi-automatic pistols. In addition to these differences, the LDP purchased weapons for their personnel while JCPD required each officer to purchase his/her own weapon. The choice in weapon not only caused the obvious problems in terms of complexity, it also caused even smaller problems in deciding what types of holsters would be carried which affect what types of belts would be used and what type of ammunition pouches. All of these issues were very complex to implement as not only the decisions were difficult, but cost was a factor, not to mention the Fraternal Order of Police unions were both formally and informally involved in the decisions.

Communications at the time of merger were handled by a UHF system (LDP) and a VHF system (JCPD). Communications, 10-codes and car numbers were all OCCs that allowed for effective radio communication between officers during emergency situations.

When the LDP and JCPD were merged, the systems of both agencies did not "talk" to one another unless a "link" was activated by the communications section to allow conversation. This only occurred in very emergent situations such as disasters. A

way to merge or restructure the communication systems of both agencies needed to be developed so that effective communications could take place by all officers.

At the time of the consolidation, the JCPD utilized the entire 10-code system and the LDP personnel did not. The LDP personnel only utilized approximately 10-12 10-codes. Rather than using words on the radio, 10-codes were established to shorten radio transmissions and for confidentiality purposes. For example, a 10-75 and a “bomb threat” mean the same thing. However, when transmitting on a radio that is not encrypted or open for all to hear, the 10-code is more appropriate in that it takes less time to transmit on the radio and it adds a degree of confidentiality that can reduce panic for those persons listening to a scanner monitoring police radio channels. The use of all of the 10-codes, approximately 100 of them, was confusing to LDP personnel. It was a complex process to redefine and merge what was being utilized by both of the former police agencies and adapt it to LMPD.

Additionally, the car numbers utilized by each agency were entirely different. For example, patrol officers with the JCPD were each assigned car numbers. Car numbers at LDP were shared. If an officer with LDP needed to get on the radio when they were off duty, they used their assigned code number instead of a car number.

The collective bargaining contracts were of great concern to officers and management. At the time of the consolidation, 11 contracts existed with different pay rates, benefit packages, and miscellaneous contractual provisions. Many of these contracts were merged or redefined to provide parity and also minimize the number of contracts that existed. Therefore, collective bargaining contracts, employee rights, and pay were included as independent variables.

Salaries for officers were one of the biggest issues to address during the consolidation. In fact, parity was one of the reasons LDP personnel were supportive of the merger as JCPD personnel made more in salary before the merger (Grant, 2011). LDP personnel anticipated that their salaries would rise after consolidation to parity with former JCPD officers.

Employee benefits also needed to be reconciled to be equal and fair for all personnel of the newly formed LMPD. Vacation time accumulation, sick time accumulation and the like were different for each agency. All of these issues were redefined and/or merged through contractual negotiations.

At the time of the LMPD consolidation, there were 10 patrol districts, six districts, 1 – 6, in LDP's jurisdictional area and four districts, Adam, Baker, Charlie, and David districts, in JCPD's jurisdictional area. All of these areas needed to be redefined after the consolidation. The number of patrol districts for a city the size of Louisville Metro was too great. Patrol boundaries, geographical size, and equalization of workload were independent variables.

For example, when the patrol boundaries were redefined, geographical size was a paramount consideration. In Jefferson County, all of the patrol areas were larger in geographical size in that the population was sparse in those areas and calls for service were much less than in the LDP jurisdiction, thereby decreasing the workload of officers assigned to those areas. In other words, because of less workload, the geographical area an officer patrolled was larger. Conversely, LDP patrol areas were somewhat smaller in size due to population density and many more calls for service. For example, LDP's 2nd patrol district, located in the downtown area or central business district of the former City

of Louisville was much smaller in geographical size than JCPD's districts. This was due primarily to the large daytime population and ultimately more calls for service regarding the downtown businesses. The consideration of geographical size was important so that officers could respond in a timely fashion to the needs of or calls from citizens.

When redefining the patrol boundaries, equalization of workload was an important factor for consideration and was very complex to define. Consideration for calls for service was contemplated in redefining patrol boundaries. Calls for service were defined as emergency or non-emergency calls made to the 911 communications center where an officer was dispatched to the problem location. Examples of calls for service were report runs, traffic accidents, disorderly persons, and the like. The self-initiated activities of officers were also considered. Self-initiated activities include actions such as traffic violations/violators, stopping suspicious persons, and checking businesses to determine whether or not they are secure after business hours. More specifically, self-initiated activities are initiated by the officers while calls for service are initiated by the 911 communications section. Additionally, boundaries had to be realigned to equalize workload in each district. This was sometimes difficult due to geographical boundaries, neighborhood considerations and the like.

Even though there was awareness on the part of officers about the aforementioned OCCs, it is uncertain whether or not they actually perceived the actual complexity involved in their merging in the newly formed LMPD. Therefore, all of the aforementioned variables were included in both the satisfaction and perceived complexity sections of the survey.

The fourth section, perceived complexity, was measured with Question 23. Question 23 utilized the same organizational change components as the satisfaction section. This section was intended to measure officer perceptions of complexity in merging the OCCs. Ordinal measures were utilized in a 7-point Likert scale.

Finally, the demographic information/officer characteristic section (Questions 24 – 32) included both independent and control variables, agency affiliation, years experience in law enforcement, years experience with previous agency, current rank and rank when agencies merged. The variables of age, gender, race, and education were also included for comparison purposes.

Survey Instrument

A survey instrument (Appendix A) was utilized that was divided into five sections: 1) support, 2) merger experience and participation, 3) satisfaction, 4) perceived complexity, and 5) demographic information/officer characteristics. The survey instrument consisted of 32 questions.

Only one survey instrument was used for officers of all ranks. While a debate can ensue that officers of different ranks responding to the survey can have varying perceptions of merger, one must realize that the experience of merger was common to both. Even so, a question was included in section five inquiring as to the respondent's current rank and his/her rank at the time of merger.

Pre-test surveys were conducted, and the questions and format were revised as necessary. In order to determine whether the survey questions and format are generating the desired responses necessary to address the research questions, a pretest of the survey was conducted with retired LMPD police officers. Using a purposive sample, these

individuals were selected based upon their knowledge of consolidation and their affiliation as former LDP or JCPD police officers at the time of the LMPD consolidation. The researcher received 32 pre-test surveys from respondents. This survey pre-testing provided an opportunity to address any potential problems and oversights in the survey questions and/or format.

It should be noted that the sections of the survey were not obvious to the respondent. However, the survey was divided into the aforementioned sections for the use of the researcher only.

The first section, support, contained 2 questions addressing an officer's current level of support for the police consolidation that took place in 2003, in addition to the level of support for consolidation prior to the merger in 2003. For the questions in Section I, a 5-point Likert scale was utilized for measurement. Included in the 5-point Likert scale was a neutral answer or response for respondents that were undecided.

Section II, merger experience and participation, consisted of four questions and measured an officer's prior experience with or participation in the merger process. Three questions in Section II of the survey utilized nominal measures and one question (#5) utilized a list of different merger committees on which the respondent could have served. Again, for this section, a neutral answer was provided for those who didn't recall or who preferred not to answer the question.

Section III consisted of 16 questions and measured an officer's satisfaction with the merged organizational change components and sub-components. This section incorporated a 7-point Likert scale ("very satisfied" to "very unsatisfied") and ordinal

measures for analysis. For this section, a neutral answer of “don’t recall/prefer not to answer” was provided.

Section IV consisted of one question comprised of 16 parts. This question measured an officer’s perception of difficulty or complexity at merging the OCCs and sub-components. As with Section III, this section incorporates a 7-point Likert scale and ordinal measures for analysis ranging from “very easy” to “very difficult.” In this section, a neutral answer of “don’t recall/prefer not to answer” was provided.

In Section V (demographic information/officer characteristics), measures included all three measurement types for the remaining 8 questions: nominal, ordinal, and ratio. Section IV sought to gather demographic information and officer characteristics for correlative purposes. In this section, information was sought regarding the respondents’ prior department affiliation, years of experience with LDP or JCPD, total years of law enforcement experience, current rank, rank when LDP and JCPD merged, age, gender, race, and education.

The survey was purposive in nature and distributed via e-mail to the entire population of 669 officers. These officers were selected because they worked for either the LDP or the JCPD prior to the merger of the two departments, but were also part of the consolidation process in 2003 and currently work for LMPD.

The survey was distributed in August 2012 and was available for four weeks for respondents to complete. A brief pre-notice e-mail (Appendix B) was sent to all members of the population via their departmental e-mail address. This pre-notice e-mail invited them to participate in the study and was forwarded a few days prior to the survey being sent to the members of the population. More specifically, the pre-notice e-mail

explained the background and purpose of the study and requested the chosen participants' assistance in completing the survey.

Approximately three days later, an e-mail was forwarded to all members of the population via their departmental e-mail address along with an electronic link to the survey utilizing SurveyMonkey, Inc., an online survey service. Because home addresses for officers could not be secured from the department (confidential information), the questionnaire was forwarded to each member's departmental e-mail address. The SurveyMonkey, Inc. link contained the instructions for completing the survey, the informed consent form, and the survey (see Appendices C).

An introductory letter of invitation was included as part of the aforementioned e-mail outlining information on the researcher and the research study. This invitation included the researcher's name, affiliation, purpose of the study, and the procedures that would take place in the study. As part of the invitation, potential participants were informed that the Chief of Police was notified and that his approval was secured for the study. Participants were also advised that their participation was voluntary. Although total privacy could not be guaranteed, participants were reassured that their privacy was protected to the extent permitted by law. Additionally, the invitations provided information to the participants informing them that although there were no foreseeable risks other than possible discomfort in answering personal questions, there might be unforeseen risks. Participants were informed that although they might not directly benefit from the study, the information learned in the study could be helpful to others. Participants were also advised that there would be no compensation for their time, inconvenience, or expenses for their participation. Information contained in the letter

also included the research subject's rights and where they could present questions, concerns and complaints. Finally, the invitations informed participants that the study had been approved by the University of Louisville's Institutional Review Board.

Participants were allowed as long as necessary to review the informed consent and the survey, until such time that the individual was comfortable in making an informed, personal decision about whether to participate in the study. Potential participants were provided with the contact information to ask the researcher questions related to the study and to ask the University of Louisville's Institutional Review Board questions about their rights. Additionally, the survey included one more attempt to assist the participants by informing them that if they had any questions, before they proceeded with the survey, they should contact the researcher about the informed consent or any other aspects of the research. If they felt uncomfortable about any document or aspect of the research, they could immediately opt out of the study.

Prior to completing the survey, participants could "click" the designated field ("Next" button) of the consent form signifying acknowledgment that they voluntarily agreed to participate in the survey. The consent form assured participants that their responses would remain anonymous.

As officers at LMPD have access to their departmental e-mail off site and away from work, the surveys could have been completed at a location of the participant's choosing. Giving them this opportunity helped to protect the participant's confidentiality and/or privacy in that he/she could have selected a location where he/she felt comfortable completing the survey (i.e., coffee shop, home, office, etc.). Although the time required

to complete the survey varied according to the person taking it, the questionnaire took approximately 10 minutes to complete.

A follow-up e-mail (Appendix B) and another copy of the original survey link on Survey Monkey, Inc. was also forwarded to individuals in the population approximately one week and three weeks after the initial e-mail in order to encourage those who failed to complete the survey to do so. Aside from the aforementioned e-mails and responses to participants' subsequent questions, the researcher had no contact with the study's participants.

Additionally, a closing date was established for completion of the survey. The survey was active for four weeks to allow members of the population to complete the survey at their convenience. Only participants who completed the survey prior to the closing date were included in this study.

This research commenced upon the approval (Appendix D) of the University of Louisville's Institutional Review Board (IRB).

Survey Population

As this was the first survey of personnel since 2003 and after the merger of the LDP and the JCPD, many officers have retired. Therefore, the population selected for this study was 669 sworn personnel who were police officers with the former LDP or the JCPD prior to the consolidation of these departments in 2003.

The officers that were part of this population held the rank(s) of officer through Lieutenant Colonel. Of the population, 435 sworn personnel were employed with the former Louisville Division of Police and 234 officers were formally with the Jefferson County Police Department. Officers who were employed by LMPD, but were not with

either JCPD or LDP, were not selected. Although this group may have had some knowledge and/or minimal experience with a small part of the consolidation process, they were not present throughout the entire consolidation process. Additionally, it is unlikely that these individuals would have had firsthand knowledge of either LPD or JCPD. These two factors would have made it difficult for this particular group to provide responses to the survey questions that would enhance the quality of insight and understanding attempted in this study. Additionally, persons retiring after the consolidation in 2003 were not invited to participate due to the fact that many of their current addresses were not known or available.

In order to conduct this study, a written request was submitted to LMPD's Chief of Police. The purpose of this request was to gain access to the organization and some of the officer information in order to conduct this study. In this request, permission was sought to receive electronic mailing addresses of police officers who were currently working for LMPD and who were previously with the LDP or JCPD at the time of the police merger in 2003. The information that was requested was 1) names of the officers, 2) their prior department affiliation, 3) current assignment, and 4) current e-mail address, current rank, gender and race of the officer. The Chief of Police was advised that the individual information obtained from the LMPD organizational records was to be kept confidential, but that the results of the study would be made available upon request with participants' identifying information removed.

This method was used due to the fact that it provided the best means to capture information necessary to distribute the survey and gather essential demographic characteristics necessary for the collection of pertinent data for this study. These

particular characteristics included: 1) an officer's name, 2) e-mail address, 3) assignment, and 4) the officer's former department affiliation.

As an example, an officer's affiliation with his/her former department can influence his/her attitude regarding merger to include their support for it, or lack thereof. As previously cited, the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission Report (1998) conducted a survey with findings that 82.1% of LDP officers supported consolidation while 89.9% of JCPD officers were opposed to it.

Also, an officer's rank can influence his/her awareness and perception of certain complexities. Consolidating two large organizations resulting from a large government consolidation, involves widespread structural changes. These changes require integrating some or all parts of the original organizations' functions and activities (IACP, 2003). Depending on the degree of consolidation of the structure or the perception of difficulty of redesigning the structure, perception of complexity could be influenced differently by individuals based upon their responsibilities and/or their knowledge of the complexity within a given department at the time of the departmental consolidation.

Based upon these characteristics, two categories of officers were constructed in order to analyze responses. These categories include: 1) former LDP officers and 2) former JCPD officers. These groups were constructed using the information available from and provided by LMPD. This information represented both the current ranks of officers and their rank at the time of consolidation. Given the relatively small number of police officers that held the ranks above sergeant (i.e., lieutenants, captains, majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels), and in order to protect the confidentiality of

participants, these individuals along with sergeants, were categorized as middle-management and/or staff.

Descriptive Characteristics of Population

Descriptive characteristics of the population were captured through information gained from The Louisville Metro Police Department's Human Resource Department. This included information related to department affiliation, gender, race/ethnicity, job title or rank, and education. All of these characteristics are described below with the exception of education. Accurate up to date descriptive characteristics related to education were not available. Therefore, they were not included as part of this description of the total population.

As previously mentioned, the population consisted of 669 sworn personnel. Of this number, 435 or 65% of which were employed with the former Louisville Division of Police and 234 or 34.9% were formally with the Jefferson County Police Department.

Table 8 depicts a breakdown of the gender and race/ethnicity of the population. Additionally, it displays a breakdown of the ranks/job titles of those in the population. Of the 669 sworn officers in the population, the majority of respondents were males (85%). This was true in totality and for both of the former agencies.

When assessing the entire population, the majority of members were Caucasian (86.0%) followed in frequency by Black/African-Americans, Hispanics or Latinos, and Asians. As with the entire population, the same was true for each of the former agencies (LDP and JCPD).

Most members of the population held the rank/job title of patrol officer (67%), followed by Sergeants and then members of middle management. Once again, this trend was consistent for members of each of the former agencies.

Table 8 – Demographic/Officer Characteristics of Population

GENDER	<u>LDP</u>		<u>JCPD</u>	
	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency
Male	85.1%	370	87.2%	204
Female	14.9%	65	18.8%	30
RACE/ETHNICITY				
Asian or Asian-American	0.2%	1	0.9%	2
Black or African-American	13.8%	60	9.4%	22
Hispanic or Latino	0.9%	4	1.7%	4
White (Non-Hispanic)	85.1%	370	88%	206
RANK/JOB TITLE				
Patrol Officer	63%	274	73.5%	172
Sergeant	23.4%	102	20.5%	48
Middle Management	10.1	44	4.7%	11
Staff Officer	3.4%	15	1.3%	3

Demographics/Descriptive Characteristics of Respondents

Demographics and/or descriptive characteristics of the respondents were captured through information gained from the survey instrument which addressed 1) prior police agency affiliation, 2) total years of experience in law enforcement, 3) years employed by LDP or JCPD prior to merger, 4) current rank, 5) rank at the time of merger in 2003, 6) current age, 7) gender, 8) race/ethnicity, and 9) educational level. All of these characteristics are described below. It should be noted that as with any survey, missing values exist. As such, valid percentages are reported.

Of the population of 669 sworn personnel, 390 or 58.2% of the population completed the survey. Table 9 depicts the former departmental affiliations, gender,

race/ethnicity, education, years of experience, years with former agency and current rank of the respondents.

Of the 390 officers that responded to the survey, the majority were former LDP officers. Respondents ranged in age from 31–64 ($M=42.50$) with the majority being males.

In reference to the race/ethnicity, the majority of respondents were White (Non-Hispanic), followed by Black or African-American, American Indian or Alaska Native, and Asian or Asian-American. Five respondents classified themselves as “Other”.

The mean educational level of the respondents was 3.85. Most of those responding to the survey had a Bachelor’s Degree, followed by those having 1 or more years of college, but no degree and those with some college, but less than 1 year. Next were respondents with a Master’s Degree or above and then an Associate’s Degree. Twenty-six persons responding had a high school degree.

The mean experience level was 3.79. Overall, the majority of the respondents had more than 10 years of law enforcement experience at the time the survey was completed. Only 15 respondents had less than 10 years of service. Conversely, at the time of merger, most of the respondents had less than 10 years with their former respective department(s) with a mean of 1.89.

The mean rank of the respondents was 2.26. The majority of respondents were patrol officers and detectives. It should be noted that at LMPD, the classification of “detective” is a job title. Detectives are still considered the same rank as a person with the rank of “police officer.” Sergeants were majority of the supervisors and management

who responded to the survey. At the time the departments were merged, most respondents were patrol officers with a mean rank of 1.552.

Table 9 – Demographic/Officer Characteristics of Respondents

	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
FORMER DEPT. AFFILIATION		
LDP	64.6%	243
JCPD	35.4%	133
GENDER		
Male	85.1%	319
Female	14.9%	56
RACE/ETHNICITY		
American Indian or Alaska Native	1.6%	6
Asian or Asian-American	1.1%	4
Black or African-American	8.9%	33
Hispanic or Latino	1.3%	5
White (Non-Hispanic)	85.7%	318
Other	1.3%	5
EDUCATION		
High School/GED	6.9%	26
Some College, but less than 1 year	10.3%	39
One or more years of college/no degree	28.4%	107
Associate's Degree	7.2%	27
Bachelor's Degree	39.3%	148
Master's Degree or above	7.9%	30
TOTAL YEARS EXPERIENCE		
>5 Years up to and including 10 Years	4.0%	15
>10 Years up to and including 15 Years	36.6%	137
>15 Years up to and including 20 Years	35.3%	132
>20 Years	24.1%	90
YEARS w/FORMER AGENCY		
0 – 5 years	40.7%	153
>5 – 10 years	35.4%	133
>10 – 15 years	19.4%	73
>15 – 20 years	2.9%	11
>20 years	1.5%	6
CURRENT RANK		
Patrol Officer	32.4%	122
Detective	26.5%	100
Sergeant	25.7%	97
Middle Management	13.3%	50
Staff Officer	2.1%	8

Analysis/Predictions

Data collected from the surveys were analyzed using SPSS version 20.0.

Stepwise regression analyses were used to determine prediction values between the independent variables (i.e., officers' perceptions of complexity of merging or redefining policies and procedures, culture, redefining boundaries, etc.) and the dependent variables csupport (current support) and overallsupport (overall support) for consolidation. More specifically, data analysis procedures included the following:

1. Data Coding – Data collected had numeric coding assigned to each level of variables.
2. Exploratory Data Analysis – Descriptive statistics were calculated to screen the data for potential errors and to describe the data and outline the characteristics of the population and the relationships between the variables.
3. Internal Consistency Reliability – Cronbach's alphas were calculated as an estimate of reliability for each scaled variable. An alpha of 0.70 or greater is a measure of consistent reliability and according to Nunnally (1970) a "good" coefficient alpha is one that is .80 or greater.
4. Pearson's r correlations - Coefficients of determination (r^2) were computed in order to determine whether variation in the perception of difficulty of merging the different OCCs (culture, policies and procedures, communications, etc.), for example, predicted variation in rates of support for consolidation.

5. Pearson product-moment correlations – Correlations were examined to determine the relationship between two or more of the variables so that it could be established if changes in one variable (i.e., perception of complexity in merging the OCCs) were associated with changes in support for consolidation. These relationships were used to test this study's hypothesis in determining whether or not police officers' perceptions of complexity in merging the OCCs affected their support for the police department consolidation. Positive or negative relationships were expressed through r -values, ranging from 1 to -1 , respectively.
6. Anova Multiple Regression Analysis – Stepwise (forward) regression analyses were used to explain the relationships between a set of predictor (IV) variables and a dependent variable (support for merger) for explanatory purposes of the study.

Data Analysis for Research Hypotheses

Following are the notations for the constant, unstandardized coefficient, error, and variables related to this study used in the regression analysis for H1 and H2.

Demographics

X_1 = Years Experience

X_2 = Department Years Experience

X_3 = Rank

X_4 = Rank at the time of Merger in 2003

X_5 = Age

X_6 = Race (wvnon = White/non whites)

X_7 = Education

X_8 = Former Police Department

Satisfaction

X_9 = Satisfaction

Complexity

X_{10} = Complexity

Support

X_{11} = Prior Support

Dependent Variables

Y_1 = Current Support

Y_2 = Overall Support

b_0 = Constant

b = unstandardized coefficient

e_1 = error

Hypotheses 1 & 2

H1 Police officers' perceived complexity of organizational change components is related to attitudes toward police consolidation.

H2 The greater officers' perceived complexity of organizational change components, the less support for police consolidation.

Multiple regression analyses using the stepwise method were conducted to explore whether a significant explanatory relationship existed among the demographic variables, prior support, satisfaction with the OCCs, and perceived complexity in merging the OCCs with support for merger (i.e., current support and overall support). When using

overall support (prior support + current support) as the dependent variable, prior support will not be used as a predictor. The stepwise regression model for Hypotheses 1 & 2 used the following equations:

Current Support

$$Y_1 = (b_0 + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4 + b_5X_5 + b_6X_6 + b_7X_7 + b_8X_8 + b_9X_9 + b_{10}X_{10} + b_{11}X_{11}) + e_1$$

Overall Support

$$Y_2 = (b_0 + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4 + b_5X_5 + b_6X_6 + b_7X_7 + b_8X_8 + b_9X_9 + b_{10}X_{10} + b_{11}X_{11}) + e_1$$

Evaluation of the Research Methods

In evaluating the research methods utilized for this study, an examination of both internal and external validity was scrutinized. External validity is increased if the findings of the study are relevant to those subjects and settings beyond the study. Internal validity can be bolstered through the use of reliable instrumentation.

Internal Validity

In assessing issues related to internal validity of this analysis, one of the strengths of the study was that it was conducted in a natural setting of the respondents choosing. Respondents could feel comfortable with their environment and as a result, respond candidly.

An appropriate size population was used for the study. Mundfrom, et al. (2005) asserts that the appropriate sample size or in this case, population size, is 60 to 400, with a minimum of 100.

The procedures used to test the hypotheses were consistent and clear. Additionally, the statistical procedures utilized were appropriate to these the hypotheses. The use of meticulous data analyses (reliability estimates, correlations, stepwise regression, and use of correlational research, etc.) represented a strength and contributed to the internal validity of the study.

Issues related to memory were one of the limitations of this study. The study focused on the efforts of police officers to remember back to 2003, over 9 years ago. The danger of this technique is evident. Sometimes people have faulty memories; sometimes they are less than forthright.

The population, while a strength, was also a limitation. Many of the people who were not surveyed for this research, those who had more experience at the specific time the departments merged and have since retired, would possibly have had different perspectives regarding their perceptions of the complexity of merging the OCCs. This is in part because of their experience level, or rank, at the time of the police consolidation in 2003. The persons interviewed for this research had far less experience at the time of the merger in 2003, and therefore, may have had a different perspective and perception of the complexity of the OCCs.

The Organizational change components selected for this study may vary from department to department during a consolidation. Efforts were taken to select five basic components (i.e., culture(s), policy and procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and redefining patrol boundaries) that would be key or crucial to any consolidation. However, there is no guarantee that these particular organizational

change components would apply to all consolidations and, therefore, it may be difficult to duplicate this study in other jurisdictions.

Another limitation of the study might have been situational contaminants which could not be controlled. It is possible that participants may have consulted with others when completing the survey instrument.

Finally, this study did not seek to measure perception of complexity among those who were hired into LMPD after merger. Even though it has taken several years for the LMPD to stabilize, the focus of this study addresses the attitudes of persons who were employed by either LDP or JCPD at the time that these two departments were consolidated in 2003 and had remained employed until the survey commenced.

External Validity

One of the strengths of the study related to external validity was that the collection of data was in a location of the respondent's choosing. The study was conducted in an environment that was natural to the respondent thereby avoiding threats to external validity that are experienced in other types of research (i.e., laboratory, location of the researcher's choosing, etc.).

The population chosen was also added to the external validity in that it was homogenous to the police department consolidation in Louisville, Kentucky and specifically involving the Louisville Metro Police Department. Also, the population that was surveyed consisted of the average police officer in the department to increase the ability to generalize results.

One of the limitations related to external validity was the Organizational Change Components selected for this research. The OCCs were established by the researcher and

specific to the Louisville Metro Police Department. Generalizing beyond Louisville, Kentucky may be limited depending upon the specific OCCs conducted by other consolidating agencies.

Finally, because of the final data producing respondents in the surveyed population (those agreeing to participate), a selection bias was introduced.

CHAPTER V

FINDINGS

The purpose of this study was to examine the Louisville Metro Police Department consolidation and police officers' perceptions of the complexity of merging the OCCs integral to consolidating the LDP and JCPD into one department. More specifically, this study sought to determine how officers' perceptions of the complexity of merging the OCCs affected their attitudes toward the police department merger and, in particular, their support for the consolidation. One portion of this data, specifically parts addressing support for merger, was compared to the results from a survey conducted in 1998 by the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission (LJCCC). The 1998 survey was distributed to police officers from the LDP and the JCPD and measured support for the police department consolidation prior to it occurring.

The Louisville Metro Police Department provided a unique context in which to describe and understand how the perception of complexity related to certain factors or components influenced support for consolidation. Support for consolidation was assessed by using organizational change components that were "dynamic" in nature in that consolidating, redefining, or changing them and ultimately implementing them was a complex process that had an everlasting effect on LMPD.

Data Collection

As previously mentioned, the entire population of 669 sworn officers with the LMPD who were formerly affiliated with either Louisville Division of Police or Jefferson

County Police Department was surveyed. Surveys were distributed via Survey Monkey, Inc. A total of 390 completed surveys were returned, representing 58.2% of the population. The survey data from the completed surveys was downloaded into an SPSS 20.0 data file via the Survey Monkey, Inc. software program and checked for accuracy. Blank responses and unanswered questions were entered as blank fields in the data file and treated as missing data.

Descriptive Statistics

As mentioned in the Methodology Chapter, the survey was divided into five sections: 1) support, 2) merger experience and participation, 3) satisfaction, 4) perceived complexity, and 5) demographic information/officer characteristics. The descriptive characteristics pertaining to the section on demographic information/officer characteristics was covered in Chapter IV.

The following frequency distributions are reported in aggregate form for each variable. They are then reported by former police department affiliation. It should be noted that the frequencies for all respondents combined include answers from respondents who did not identify their former police department affiliation.

Two variables were contained in the support section. These included prior support (psupport) and current support (csupport). These variables were measured with a 5-point Likert scale (1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=undecided, 4=disagree, and 5=strongly disagree).

In regards to prior support for the merger of LDP and JCPD, respondents were asked to what degree they agreed with the statement that they were supportive of the merger prior to it occurring and prior to the inception of LMPD. Table 10 shows their

responses. Of the combined 389 respondents answering the question, support for or against merger was near equal (44.1% vs. 44.3%). Eleven percent of the respondents were undecided.

When posed with the same statement addressing current support for merger of LDP and JCPD, 56.2% supported consolidation while 33.1% did not. Fifty-eight of the respondents or 10% were undecided.

Table 10 – Psupport and Csupport Combined and by Former Department

	<u>Combined</u>		<u>LDP</u>		<u>JCPD</u>	
PRIOR SUPPORT	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent	N
Strongly Agree	18.7%	73	26.7%	65	4.5%	6
Agree	25.4%	99	34.6%	84	7.5%	10
Undecided	11.3%	44	13.2%	32	5.3%	7
Disagree	17.9%	70	18.1%	44	19.5%	26
Strongly Disagree	26.4%	103	7.4%	18	63.2%	84
CURRENT SUPPPORT						
Strongly Agree	20.3%	79	29.8%	72	4.5%	6
Agree	35.9%	140	41.7%	101	25.0%	33
Undecided	14.9%	58	8.7%	21	12.1%	16
Disagree	14.9%	58	12.0%	29	19.7%	26
Strongly Disagree	18.2%	71	7.9%	19	38.6%	51

When stratified by former department affiliation, Table 10 shows that the majority of LDP officers were supportive of merger prior to it occurring while the majority of JCPD officers were not supportive. In regards to current support for merger, the findings are similar. The majority of LDP officers were currently supportive of merger while the majority of JCPD officers were not.

Four variables were contained in the section regarding merger experience and participation: 1) prior experience with merger (experience), 2) serving on a merger committee (serve), 3) the committee on which the respondent served (committee), and 4)

whether or not officers talked to anyone who served on a committee (talk). For the experience, serve, and talk variables, 1=yes, 2=no, and 3=don't recall/prefer not to answer. For the variable committee, respondents had a choice of 20 committees on which they could have served to select.

When asked if the respondent had any experience with a police merger prior to the LMPD consolidation, 20 (5%) responded that they had prior experience while 366 (94%) did not. Of the 20 who had previous experience with merger, 14 respondents were from the former LDP and 6 were from the former JCPD. The overwhelming majority of respondents from each of the former departments had no experience with merger or the process. Two, or 0.5%, didn't know or preferred not to answer.

When the respondents were asked whether or not they served on any of the merger committees at the inception of LMPD, 42 (11%) acknowledged that they had while 342 (88%) did not. Five, or 1.3%, didn't know or preferred not to answer. Twenty-six, or almost 61.9% of the all of the respondents who served on a committee, were with the former LDP. Sixteen, or 38.1%, of the former JCPD respondents served on a committee.

Respondents listed 14 different committees on which they served. Nine (23%) served on the badge/patch/vehicle markings committee, 4 (10%) on communications, 2 (5%) on community outreach, 3 (8%) on the facilities committee, 2 (5%) on in-car cameras, and 1 (3%) on information technology. The mission statement/values committee and the values committee each had 2 (5%). One respondent (3%) served on the recruiting/hiring committee, while 4 (10%) served on the committee regarding training. Five respondents (13%) served on the specialty teams committee and 2 (5%)

served on the uniform committee, 1 (3%) on weapons issues, and 1 (3%) on workload analysis. Of those serving on the committees, 17 (44%) respondents served on at least 2 committees, 5 (13%) served on at least 3 committees, and 4 (10%) served on 3 committees.

If they did not serve on a committee, respondents were asked if they talked to anyone who did serve. Of those respondents, 104 (30%) indicated that they did talk to someone who served on a committee while 226 (65%) did not. Twenty (6%) didn't know or preferred not to answer. Of those responding, 52 (24%) from LDP talked to someone who served on a committee about the merger while 158 (72%) did not. Eleven (5%) of those serving with LDP didn't know or preferred not to answer. Of the former JCPD respondents, 51 (44%) did talk to a committee member about the merger while 58 (50%) did not. Seven (6%) of the former JCPD officers didn't know or preferred not to answer.

The 16 organizational change components (culture, mission, values, decentralization, policy and procedures, administrative reporting, weapons, contracts, pay, benefits, boundaries, equalization of workload, size of divisions, communications, 10-codes, and car numbers) are variables that are contained in the satisfaction and complexity sections. In the satisfaction section, the variables are preceded by the letter "s" (satisfaction) and by the letter "c" (complexity) in the complexity section.

The OCC satisfaction variables were measured using the following 7-point Likert scale: 1=very satisfied, 2=satisfied, 3=somewhat satisfied, 4=somewhat unsatisfied, 5=unsatisfied, 6=very unsatisfied, and 7=don't recall/prefer not to answer. In the satisfaction section, respondents are asked to indicate their satisfaction with the OCCs that were created as a result of merging LDP and JCPD.

Table 11 displays the results in aggregate form, in regards to the satisfaction OCCs. Tables 12 and 13 (Appendix C) depict the responses for the members from each former agency (LDP and JCPD respectively).

In reference to the respondents' satisfaction with the culture (sculture), almost 70% of the respondents were somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied, or very unsatisfied with the culture. Sixty-five percent of the LDP respondents were somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied, or very unsatisfied. JCPD personnel were even more so with 78% being somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied, or very unsatisfied.

However, in relation to the mission and values of the newly formed LMPD, most were satisfied. The majority of LDP (79%) personnel were satisfied with the mission statement that was merged while only 49.4% of former JCPD personnel were satisfied.

For both the mission (smission) and values (svalues) of LMPD for both LDP and JCPD, over 60% of the respondents were very satisfied, satisfied, or somewhat satisfied. However, the decentralization (sdecent) policy of LMPD left over 75% of the respondents somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied and very unsatisfied. Over 82% of LDP personnel were unsatisfied with the decentralization policy. The same held true for former JCPD officers of which 72.9% were somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied, or very unsatisfied with decentralization.

Over 67% of the respondents were somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with the merged policies and procedures (spp) of LMPD. In reference to the policies and procedures, 59.6% of the LDP officers were somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied, or very unsatisfied. In comparison, even more of the former JCPD officers (83.2%) were to some degree unsatisfied.

Additionally, the majority of respondents were somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with the administrative reporting practices (sreport) of the newly formed LMPD. Most of the respondents with both LDP and JCPD were somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied or very unsatisfied (57.8 and 69.2% respectively).

However, in regards to weapon selection (sweapon), the majority of respondents were very satisfied or satisfied with the choice of weapon for the merged department. Former LDP personnel (88%) and JCPD personnel (54%) were both either very satisfied or satisfied with the weapon choice made for LMPD.

Although the majority of respondents (54%) were satisfied with the contract (scontract), it was not an overwhelming majority. However, former department affiliation showed vast differences. While 74% of the LDP respondents were somewhat satisfied, satisfied, or very satisfied, 81% of JCPD personnel were somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied or very unsatisfied.

The same held true for the officers' satisfaction with pay (spay). Related to pay, 75.2% of LDP respondents were somewhat satisfied, satisfied or very satisfied. JCPD respondents saw this issue differently as 84.2% of them were somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with the pay issue. This may have been due to JCPD officer salaries being greater than LDP officers. LDP officers were seeking parity in the merger process and, as a result, received raises in salaries while the salaries of JCPD personnel were held at a constant level until LDP achieved equal pay with them.

Of the contractual issues, officers seemed most satisfied with benefits (sbenefit) with over 60% of the officers being very satisfied, satisfied, or somewhat satisfied. As with the contract and pay OCCs, the majority of LDP personnel (81%) were somewhat

Table 11 – Combined OCC Satisfaction Responses

Variables	VS	S	SS	SU	U	VU	DR
Sculture	.8% (3)	11.4% (44)	16.9% (65)	14.8% (57)	25.5% (98)	29.1% (112)	1.6% (6)
Smission	4.9% (19)	32.0% (124)	25.8% (100)	9.3% (36)	12.4% (48)	8.5% (33)	7.0% (27)
Svalues	5.4% (21)	33.4% (129)	24.1% (93)	9.8% (38)	8.8% (34)	11.1% (43)	7.3% (28)
Sdecent	.5% (2)	7.6% (29)	11.2% (43)	15.4% (59)	24.2% (93)	37.8% (145)	3.4% (13)
Spp	1.3% (5)	13.8% (53)	15.9% (61)	17.0% (65)	18.3% (70)	31.9% (122)	1.8% (7)
Srept	1.3% (5)	12.0% (46)	21.2% (81)	16.2% (62)	18.6% (71)	26.7% (102)	3.9% (15)
Sweapon	32.4% (123)	43.4% (165)	8.7% (33)	5.0% (19)	3.7% (14)	5.0% (19)	1.8% (7)
Scontract	8.9% (34)	26.8% (102)	18.2% (69)	8.2% (31)	15.0% (57)	21.8% (83)	1.1% (4)
Spay	13.3% (51)	24.0% (92)	16.4% (63)	6.8% (26)	15.1% (58)	23.4% (90)	1.0% (4)
Sbenefit	13.2% (50)	26.9% (102)	20.6% (78)	8.4% (32)	10.0% (38)	20.1% (76)	.8% (3)
Sboundary	1.3% (5)	21.9% (84)	21.7% (83)	12.5% (48)	16.4% (63)	25.1% (96)	1.0% (4)
Sequal	.5% (2)	19.5% (75)	21.3% (82)	13.2% (51)	18.4% (71)	22.6% (87)	4.4% (17)
Ssize	.5% (2)	20.2% (77)	19.6% (75)	15.2% (58)	20.9% (80)	21.7% (83)	1.8% (7)
Scomm	2.1% (8)	17.3% (66)	18.3% (70)	12.3% (47)	19.9% (76)	28.8% (110)	1.3% (5)
S10	8.4% (32)	28.2% (108)	17.0% (65)	12.8% (49)	12.8% (49)	18.8% (72)	2.1% (8)
Scar	7.3% (28)	49.6% (189)	17.6% (67)	7.1% (27)	7.6% (29)	8.9% (34)	1.8% (7)

*VS=Very Satisfied, S=Satisfied, SS=Somewhat Satisfied, SU=Somewhat unsatisfied,
U=Unsatisfied, VU=Very unsatisfied, DR=Don't recall/prefer not to answer

satisfied, satisfied or very satisfied with the benefits of the merged departments.

However, JCPD personnel (75%) were mostly somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied, or very unsatisfied.

In regards to restructuring the patrol divisions, in aggregate, most of the respondents were unsatisfied with the results. However, while the majority of JCPD respondents were somewhat satisfied, satisfied or very satisfied, the majority of LDP personnel were somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with the change.

As with the boundaries (sboundary), the same held true, in totality, with the size of the patrol divisions (ssize), and the equalization of workload (sequal) in the newly merged/formed patrol divisions. The same was true when size and equalization of workload was stratified by former department affiliation. Most (56%) of the former JCPD personnel were satisfied with the equalization of workload while the majority (63%) of LDP personnel were not.

Regarding the size of the division boundaries, most (68%) of the former LDP officers were unsatisfied. To the contrary, the majority (57%) of JCPD personnel were satisfied with the sizes of the divisions. This may have been because former LDP personnel were accustomed to smaller areas due to the higher volume of calls for service. The sizes of former JCPD districts were much larger due to fewer calls for service.

Collectively, the majority (61%) of officers were discontented with the communications section merger (scomm) being somewhat unsatisfied, unsatisfied or very unsatisfied. Combined, approximately 54% of the respondents were very satisfied, satisfied, or somewhat satisfied with the 10-code system (s10) that was implemented. The majority (51%) of LDP personnel did not like the adoption of the 10-code system

while the majority (55%) of former JCPD personnel did. This was probably due to the fact that LDP personnel, prior to merger, used very few of the 10-codes while JCPD personnel used them in their entirety. This was a drastic change for LDP personnel.

Additionally, the majority (75%) of officers were satisfied with the car numbers (Scar) merged as a result of the consolidation. The majority of officers with both LDP (75%) and JCPD (73%) were somewhat satisfied, satisfied or very satisfied with this merger.

The OCC complexity variables are measured using the following 7-point Likert scale: 1=very easy, 2=easy, 3=somewhat easy, 4=somewhat difficult, 5=difficult, 6=very difficult and 7= no opinion. In the complexity section, respondents were asked to indicate their perception of difficulty in merging the OCCs that were a result of merging LDP and JCPD. Table 14 shows the summative OCC complexity responses. Tables 15 (LDP) and 16 (JCPD) (Appendix C) contain the OCC complexity responses for each former agency.

In regards to respondents' perceived complexity in merging the culture (cculture), over 65% perceived that it was difficult or very difficult to merge. The majority of respondents from both JCPD and LDP (87% and 82% respectively) perceived merging the culture as somewhat difficult, difficult, or very difficult. In fact, 44.4% of JCPD personnel and 39.4% of LDP personnel perceived it as very difficult. Culture was perceived as difficult to merge in that each former department's culture was distinct, had endured the test of time, and consisted of mutual interpretations that were exclusive to each particular agency.

Collectively, the majority (67%) of the respondents didn't perceive the merging of the mission statements (cmisson) as difficult. The same held true for the values (cvalues) of the newly merged LMPD. The majority of officers from both the former LDP and JCPD (70.3% and 61.4% respectively) perceived merging the mission statements as being somewhat easy, easy, or very easy. Officers from both the former LDP and JCPD also perceived merging the values as somewhat easy, easy, or very easy (68.6% and 61.7% respectively).

The decentralization (cdecent) policy of LMPD was not perceived as easy to merge. Cumulatively, almost 80% of the respondents perceived it as somewhat difficult, difficult, or very difficult to merge/implement. The greater part of officers from each of the former agencies believed this process to be somewhat difficult, difficult, or very difficult.

Merging the policies and procedures (cpp) and administrative reporting practices (creport) of LMPD were both perceived by the majority of respondents as very difficult, difficult or somewhat difficult to merge. The preponderance of officers from both the former LDP and JCPD (60.6% and 79.7% respectively) were in agreement and viewed merging the policies and procedures as somewhat difficult, difficult, or very difficult. The respondents from the former LDP and JCPD (56.3% and 68.2% respectively) also considered consolidating the administrative reporting practices as somewhat difficult, difficult, or very difficult.

However, in regards to weapon selection and the difficulty in merging the weapon systems (cweapon), the overwhelming majority (77%) of respondents perceived it as

being somewhat easy, easy, or very easy. In mass, the officers of each of the former agencies believe this merger process to be somewhat easy, easy, or very easy.

Officers perceived the issues related to the contract as difficult or complex. The majority of respondents perceived the contract (ccontract) as being difficult to merge. However, for LDP personnel, almost as many perceived it to be somewhat easy, easy or very easy (49%). The majority of JCPD personnel (80%) perceived merging the contracts as difficult.

Amassed, officers believed merging pay (cpay) and benefits (cbenefit) as difficult to merge. Again, in relation to pay, the majority of officers of the former LDP (51%) believed merging pay to be a somewhat easy, easy, or very easy process. To the contrary, 75.2% of the former JCPD officer perceived the merger of pay to be somewhat difficult, difficult, or very difficult. In reference to merging benefits, the majority of LDP officer (52%) perceived the process to be somewhat easy, easy, or very easy. As with pay, the majority of JCPD officers (72%) perceived the process as somewhat difficult, difficult, or very difficult.

In regards to restructuring the patrol divisions, most of the respondents perceived the process as complex. The majority of the respondents perceived merging the boundaries of the patrol divisions (cboundary) and determining their size (csize) as difficult or complex. Equalization of workload (cequal) was also perceived by the majority of officers as difficult to merge. When assessing the responses for each former agency, the majority of both LDP and JCPD officers perceived all of these merger processes as somewhat difficult, difficult, or very difficult.

Table 14 – Combined OCC Complexity Responses

Variables	VE	E	SE	SD	D	VD	NO
Cculture	1.3% (5)	5.8% (22)	8.2% (31)	17.5% (66)	24.6% (93)	40.7% (154)	1.9% (7)
Cmission	5.1% (19)	27.7% (104)	34.1% (128)	14.4% (54)	6.1% (23)	4.5% (17)	8.0% (30)
Cvalues	5.8% (22)	26.9% (102)	33.0% (125)	13.5% (51)	7.1% (27)	5.5% (21)	8.2% (31)
Cdecent	.8% (3)	5.8% (22)	10.6% (40)	26.5% (100)	29.6% (112)	23.8% (90)	2.9% (11)
Cpp	.8% (3)	10.3% (39)	18.3% (69)	24.1% (91)	23.6% (89)	19.4% (73)	3.4% (13)
Crept	1.1% (4)	11.0% (41)	21.2% (79)	26.8% (100)	19.0% (71)	14.2% (53)	6.7% (25)
Cweapon	17.1% (64)	36.3% (136)	24.0% (90)	8.5% (32)	5.9% (22)	4.5% (17)	3.7% (14)
Ccontract	2.1% (8)	13.8% (52)	22.0% (83)	22.8% (86)	17.5% (66)	18.3% (69)	3.4% (13)
Cpay	2.9% (11)	17.6% (66)	19.8% (74)	21.9% (82)	15.2% (57)	18.7% (70)	3.7% (14)
Cbenefit	2.7% (10)	17.5% (66)	22.3% (84)	22.5% (85)	13.5% (51)	17.8% (67)	3.7% (14)
Cboundary	1.9% (7)	13.3% (50)	17.8% (67)	29.0% (109)	18.4% (69)	17.3% (65)	2.4% (9)
Cequal	2.1% (8)	10.9% (41)	15.7% (59)	26.4% (99)	22.9% (86)	18.1% (68)	3.7% (14)
Csize	2.4% (9)	12.0% (45)	18.1% (68)	23.9% (90)	20.2% (76)	20.2% (76)	3.2% (12)
Ccomm	1.6% (6)	9.6% (36)	14.7% (55)	23.0% (86)	20.9% (78)	27.0% (101)	3.2% (12)
C10	9.9% (37)	23.5% (88)	26.7% (100)	16.0% (60)	9.1% (34)	11.5% (43)	3.5% (13)
Ccar	13.3% (50)	36.3% (136)	23.2% (87)	12.3% (46)	5.3% (20)	5.9% (22)	3.7% (14)

*VE=Very Easy, E=Easy, SE=Somewhat Easy, SD=Somewhat difficult, D=Difficult, VD=Very difficult, NO=No Opinion

The majority (27%) of respondents perceived the merger of communication procedures (ccomm) as very difficult while over 40% perceived it as either difficult or somewhat difficult. Respondents from both JCPD (75.8) and LDP (69%) had similar perceptions in that the majority of officers perceived this process as somewhat difficult, difficult, or very difficult. To the contrary, collectively, the greater part of the respondents perceived the merger/implementation of the 10-code system (C10) and the car numbers (ccar) as easy, as was the case for respondents of both LDP and JCPD.

Data Transformation

Certain data transformations were necessary for complete and accurate statistical analysis of the relationships among individual and groups of variables, and specifically for confirmatory examinations of the internal consistency of the relationships among the variable measures reported.

One such transformation included how to address certain responses to the survey questions, i.e., no opinion and don't know/prefer not to answer. The "don't know/prefer not to answer" response was an option in the section related to merger experience and participation (Questions 3, 4, and 6) and the section referencing satisfaction with the OCCs (Questions 7 – 22). The "no opinion" response was available in the section regarding the perceived complexity of the OCCs (Question 23). Including these responses would distort the means; therefore, these responses were recoded as missing.

In assessing the race of the respondents, over 85% were white (Non-Hispanic). As a result, a new variable, wvnon, was created with the following values: 1=white and 0=all others.

The variables serve, talk, committee, commettee1, committee2, and committee3 were combined to form the variable “serviceoncommittee” (service on committee). This variable was created due to the fact that there were few cases for Committee, commettee1 and committee2 in addition to there being no variance (0.00) for the variable serve due to the small number of cases.

In reference to satisfaction with the OCCs, a variable “satisfaction” was created and combines all of the satisfaction OCCs (i.e., sculture+smission+svalues+sdecent+spp+sreport+sweapon+scontract+spay+sbenefit+sboundary+sequal+ssize+scomm+s10+scar). This was created as a result of a principle components analysis where 4 variables (sculture, smission, svalues, and sdecent) all had eigenvalues over 1.0 and accounted for 65.25% of the variance.

In regards to perceived complexity of the OCCs, the variable “complexity” was created. Complexity included the following OCCs: cculture+cmission+cvalues+cdecent+cpp+creport+cweapon+ccontract+cpay+cbenefit+cboundary+cequal+cssize+ccomm+c10+ccar. This was created as a result of a principle components analysis where 5 variables (cculture, cmission, cvalues, cdecent, and cpp) all had eigenvalues over 1.0 and accounted for 75.70% of the variance.

The final variable that was created for analysis was “overallsupport” (overall support). This included the variables of psupport (prior support) + csupport (current support).

Descriptive Statistics Post Data Transformations

After the aforementioned data transformations, means and standard deviations were calculated for the variables. These calculations are displayed in Table 17 (Appendix C) in aggregate and also by former department affiliation.

In reference to support, collectively, officers expressed less support for consolidation before merger than they currently do (3.089 vs. 2.718). When comparing means for LDP and JCPD regarding prior support for merger, LDP officers were more likely to support merger than did JCPD officers (2.364 vs. 4.365). This finding is consistent with the 1998 study on merger conducted by the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission where 82.1% of LDP sworn personnel were in favor of the consolidation while 89.9% of JCPD sworn personnel were opposed to it. Even though former JCPD personnel are more supportive currently than they were prior to merger (29.5% vs. 12.0%), LDP personnel currently support merger more than their JCPD counterparts (71.5% vs. 29.5% respectively).

Few respondents had any experience with the merger process, nor did many of them serve on any of the merger committees. When comparing experience levels by agency, the majority from LDP and JCPD had little or no experience with a merger, nor did they serve on a committee. Additionally, the mean (1.684) indicates that not many of the respondents talked to officers who served on a committee. While few for both agencies, more JCPD officers talked to committee members than did personnel from LDP (44.0% vs. 23.5%).

Of the OCCs variables addressing satisfaction, the respondents were most unsatisfied with the decentralization (sdecent) policy of LMPD with a mean score of

4.743. Following decentralization, officers were most unsatisfied (in ranking order) with culture, policies and procedures, administrative reporting practices, and the communications section merger with mean scores of 4.422, 4.351, 4.237, and 4.185 respectively.

Respondents were most satisfied with the weapon choice having a mean score of 2.176. Additionally, the means show that respondents were also satisfied, in ranking order, with car numbers, values, and mission statement (2.844, 3.178, and 3.191 respectively). It is interesting to note that while respondents were satisfied with the mission and values of LMPD, they were the least satisfied with the culture which is, at least partially, molded by values and mission of the organization (3.178 and 3.191 vs. 4.422).

When comparing departments, the means indicate that former LDP personnel were most unsatisfied with the decentralization, followed by boundary size, culture, equalization of workload and division boundaries. The means also show that former LDP personnel were most satisfied with weapon choice (1.767), followed by benefits, pay, and the contract. Former JCPD personnel were most unsatisfied with pay and then the contract, policies and procedures, the culture, and benefits. They were most satisfied with the car numbers (2.860), weapon choice, 10-codes, and values.

In reference to difficulty or complexity in merging the OCCs, culture had a mean score of 4.838 and was perceived as the most difficult OCC to merge. Decentralization was perceived as the next most difficult OCC to merge and was seen as more difficult to consolidate than the communication's section or the policies and procedures. Officers

also perceived equalization of workload, size of the divisions, and merging administrative reporting practices as more difficult than ratifying the contract, pay, and benefits.

The means show that former LDP personnel also perceived the culture as being the most difficult to merge (4.757). They also identified, in ranking order, decentralization, equalization of workload, merging sizes of the divisions, merging boundaries, and consolidating the policies and procedures as difficult to unify. Former JCPD personnel also saw the culture as being the most complex to merge (5.007), followed by decentralization. Merging the contract and policies and procedures were seen as next most difficult with both having a mean score of 4.584. They also distinguished, in ranking order, merging communications and benefits as the next most difficult OCCs to reconcile.

Relating to the complexity in merging the OCCs, combined, respondents perceived it easiest to merge the choice of weapon and the car numbers with means of 2.620 and 2.767 respectively. The means also showed that respondents perceived merging the mission and values easier than merging the 10-codes (3.063 and 3.063 vs. 3.262).

Former LDP personnel perceived the easiest OCCs to merge to be the choice of weapon, followed by car numbers, mission statement, and values. The means denote that former JCPD personnel perceive the car numbers, choice of weapon, mission statement and values to be the easiest OCCs to merge.

In regards to the newly created variables, amassed, overall support had a mean score of 5.805 showing, collectively, there was little support for merger. In fact, the means show that overall support for merger was much less than with prior support or

current support. The means denote that former LDP personnel had more overall support than former JCPD personnel (4.486 vs. 8.172).

The variable addressing serving on a committee had a range of 35.00 to 52.00 and a mean of 46.000. However, due to the small number of cases, it was not used for analysis purposes.

In regards to the variable satisfaction, the range was 21.00 to 96.00 with a mean score of 59.312 indicating that most of the respondents were unsatisfied with the results of merging of the OCCs. While the majority of respondents were unsatisfied with the results of merging the OCCs, the means indicate that former LDP officers were more satisfied than JCPD officers.

The variable complexity had a range of 30.00 to 96.00 and a mean score of 60.630, suggesting that most of the respondents perceived the merging of the OCCs as difficult. In assessing the means for each department, members of each of the former agencies perceived merging the OCCs as complex. However, officers of the former JCPD perceived merger as more complex than did the officers from LDP (63.744 vs. 58.944 respectively).

In comparing both complexity and satisfaction, respondents' perceived level of complexity/difficulty was greater than their level of satisfaction for the OCCs.

After a review of the means, it seems that support for merger has increased over time. Additionally, the OCCs of culture and decentralization relating to complexity and satisfaction had the highest mean scores, suggesting that 1) officers perceived culture and decentralization as the most complex OCCs to merge and 2) officers were least satisfied with the merged culture and decentralization policy of LMPD. The lowest mean score

for both the satisfaction and complexity OCCs was the choice of weapon meaning choosing the weapon was the easiest aspect of merger and resulted in the greatest satisfaction. Finally, the means indicate prior experience with merger, service on a committee, or talking to someone who was on a committee was of little consequence in the support of consolidation.

Data Analysis and Model Development

In order to determine 1) if officers' perceptions of the difficulty of merging organizational change components is related to attitudes toward police consolidation and 2) if the degree of their support for consolidation diminishes as their perception of complexity increases, a Pearson r correlation analysis was first conducted to examine the relationships among the explanatory variables and the dependent variables of current support and overall support. The results of the correlation analysis are displayed in Table 18 (Appendix C).

In relation to support, and specifically current support (csupport), a highly significant moderate correlation exists with prior support ($r(306) = .581, p < .001$). In relation to the satisfaction OCCs, all were highly significant at the $p < .001$ level. The strongest correlations, although moderate, were positive and with the variables sculture, smission, svalues, spp, sreport, scontract, spay, and sbenefits. Although highly significant, weak positive correlations exist between current support and the satisfaction OCCs of sdecent, sweapon, sboundary, sequal, ssize, sl0, and scar. The weakest positive correlation, which was significant with the satisfaction OCCs, was with the l0 codes ($r(337) = .006$).

When comparing the complexity OCCs with current support, cmission, cvalues, cpp, creport, cweapon, ccontract, cpay, and cbenefit, all had weak positive correlations, but were highly significant at the $p < .001$ level. Of these variables, ccontract had the strongest correlation ($r(326) = .260, p < .001$). Still significant at the $p < 0.01$ level were the variables cculture, ccomm, and ccar. All of these variables also had weak positive correlations. The variables cdecent, cboundary, cequal, csize, and c10, were not statistically significant.

Of the demographic/officer characteristics, the PD had a positive moderate correlation and was significant at the $p < .001$ level. Rank had a weak inverse correlation that was also highly significant at $p < .001$. This negative correlation suggests that those with higher rank have more current support for consolidation than those of lower rank.

The newly created variable of satisfaction had a positive moderate correlation with csupport and was highly significant. The variable complexity also was highly significant with a moderate positive correlation. Overall support had a strong positive correlation which was highly significant ($r(306) = .883, p < .001$). This is because overall support combines both current support and prior support.

None of the service on committee variables was statistically significant. In relation to demographic/officer characteristics, years of experience, former department years of experience, rank at the time of merger, age gender, ethnicity, nor education were statistically significant.

In assessing support, and in particular overall support, a highly significant strong positive correlation exists with prior support ($r(306) = .895, p < .001$). Again, as with

current support, prior support was contained, along with current support, in the overall support variable.

In relation to the satisfaction OCCs, *sculture*, *smission*, *svalues*, *spp*, *sreport*, *sweapon*, *scontract*, *spay* and *sbenefits* all were highly significant at the $p < .001$ level. In ranking order, the strongest of these correlations, although moderate, were positive and with the variables *sbenefit*, *scontract*, *spay*, *sculture*, *spp*, *sreport*, *smission*, *svalues*, and *sweapon*. Weak positive correlations exist between overall support and *scar*, *sdecent*, and *scomm*, but all were highly significant. The variables *ssize* and *sequal* had weak positive correlations, but were significant at the $p < 0.01$ and $p < 0.05$ respectively. The satisfaction OCCs of 10-codes and patrol division boundaries were not statistically significant.

When comparing the complexity OCCs with overall support, although moderate, *cbenefit* had the strongest positive correlation ($r(274) = .381, p < .001$). Other variables that were highly significant, with moderately positive correlations, were *cpay*, *ccontract*, and *cpp*. *Cculture*, *cmission*, *cvalues*, *creport*, and *cweapon*, all had weak positive correlations, but were highly significant at the $p < .001$ level. *Cdecent*, *ccomm*, and *ccar* had weak positive correlations to overall support, but were still significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. The variables *cboundary*, *cequal*, *csize*, and *c10*, were not statistically significant.

Of the demographic/officer characteristics, the variable PD had a positive moderate correlation and was highly significant ($r(299) = .633, p < .001$). Age and rank had weak inverse correlations that were also highly significant at $p < .001$. This negative correlation indicated that respondents of higher rank or those who were older had more overall support for merger. Rank at the time of merger also had a weak inverse correlation with overall support at the $p < 0.01$ level. This is consistent with the current

rank variable in that as rank increased, the more overall support they had for consolidation.

The newly created variables of satisfaction and complexity had positive moderate correlations with overall support and were highly significant with r values of .563 and .361 respectively.

As with current support, none of the service on committee variables was statistically significant. Also, in relation to demographic/officer characteristics, neither years of experience, former department years of experience, gender, ethnicity, nor education were statistically significant.

It was hypothesized that 1) police officers' perceived complexity of organizational change components is related to attitudes toward police consolidation and 2) the greater officers' perceived complexity of organizational change components, the less support for police consolidation. To test these hypotheses, a stepwise multiple linear regression analysis was carried out using the aforementioned significant correlations. Because many variables were initially used, stepwise regression analysis was utilized to determine which variable(s) had the most impact or was the best predictor of the dependent variable.

This technique allowed the researcher to add one variable at each step of the analysis to determine if that new variable had a significant impact on the dependent variable(s). The criterion for including variables in the regression equation was a significance level of $p < 0.05$.

All models realized by the stepwise regression analyses were assessed for multicollinearity. Multicollinearity occurs when two or more independent variables are

highly correlated. This association makes it difficult, if not impossible, to determine their effects on the dependent variable, in this case, current support. For each of the developed models, the tolerance or the proportion of variability in one independent variable not explained by the other independent variables was above 0.30 (Belsley et al. 1980). The specific tolerance statistic for the variables in each of the models is depicted in the regression tables.

The stepwise regression tested several models for each dependent variable (i.e., current support and overall support). For the DV current support, the hypotheses for this study were supported in whole, or at least partially, depending upon the model. With overall support as the DV, the results were mixed depending upon which independent variables were used in the regression equation.

Six models were constructed using current support as the dependent variable, and five models were constructed utilizing overall support as the dependent variable. The newly formed variable of complexity was selected rather than using each complexity OCC due to a little over 75% of the variance being accounted for by five of the complexity OCC variables (i.e., Cculture, Cmission, Cvalues, Cdecent, and CPP). The variable satisfaction was also used for both dependent variables for the same reason: three of the variables explained a little over 60% of the variance (i.e., Sculture, Smission, and Svalues). Both the complexity and the satisfaction variables had statistical power while taking into consideration all of the OCCs.

For assessing the effects on current support for merger, in addition to the complexity and satisfaction variables, the variables of prior support, former department affiliation, and rank were selected because of their correlational statistical significance.

Additionally, prior support and PD were chosen because of the passionate perceptions and attitudes from members of LDP and JCPD before the merger occurred in 2003 as identified in the 1998 police consolidation study conducted by the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission.

Table 19 summarizes the results when each independent variable was added, step by step, to the regression equation with the dependent variable current support. All models were assessed for multicollinearity and the tolerance was above 0.30, illustrating no problems. Additionally, Table 20 (Appendix C) contains summary information (i.e., n , R , r^2 , F and P statistics).

Using the dependent variable current support, a forward stepwise regression was conducted using complexity as the independent variable for Model 1. Complexity significantly predicted current support in this model. Complexity also explained 7.3% of the variance in current support scores.

The results of Model 1, as hypothesized, indicate support for H_1 in that police officers' perceptions of the complexity of merging the organizational change components are related to attitudes toward police consolidation. This model also supports H_2 , which hypothesized that the more complex officers perceived merging the OCCs, the less likely they were to agree that they support merger.

Model 2 included both the complexity and satisfaction variables. In this model, satisfaction was a statistically significant predictor of current support. However, complexity was not. This model accounted for a little over 36% of the variance in current support. For this model, both H_1 and H_2 were rejected indicating that officers' perceptions of complexity did not affect their support for merger. This model also

implies that when respondents were asked to indicate their satisfaction with the OCCs that were created as a result of merging LDP and JCPD, the more unsatisfied, the less likely they were to agree that they support merger.

Model 3 consisted of the variables of complexity and prior support. Satisfaction was removed from this model. Prior support was determined to be a significant predictor of current support in this model. However, as with Model 2, complexity was not. Just over 40% of the variance of current support was accounted for in this model. Therefore, both H_1 and H_2 were rejected.

Table 19 - Current Support*

<u>Model</u>		<u>Unstandardized Coefficients</u>		<u>Standardized Coefficients</u>		<u>Collinearity Statistics</u>	
		<u>B</u>	<u>Std. Error</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>t</u>	<u>Sig.</u>	<u>Tolerance</u>
1	Complexity	.030	.007	.277	4.547	.000	
2	Complexity	-.014	.008	-.126	-1.740	.083	.584
	Satisfaction	.071	.008	.681	9.388	.000	.584
3	Complexity	.008	.006	.073	1.311	.191	.871
	Psupport	.572	.052	.604	10.895	.000	.871
4	Complexity	-.025	.007	-.225	-3.840	.000	.575
	Satisfaction	.059	.006	.548	9.140	.000	.548
	Psupport	.514	.047	.537	10.945	.000	.817
5	Complexity	-.025	.007	-.223	-3.775	.000	.568
	Satisfaction	.058	.007	.545	8.986	.000	.537
	Psupport	.505	.059	.528	8.598	.000	.525
	PD	.050	.188	.016	.266	.791	.573
6	Complexity	-.024	.007	-.212	-3.542	.001	.557
	Satisfaction	.056	.007	.522	8.357	.000	.510
	Psupport	.498	.059	.522	8.464	.000	.523
	PD	.025	.189	.008	.134	.894	.571
	Rank	-.098	.062	-.074	-1.569	.118	.890

*Dependent Variable = Csupport

Model 4 included the variables complexity, satisfaction, and psupport. In Model 4, complexity, satisfaction, and prior support were all significant predictors of current support. These variables accounted for 64% of the variance in current support scores. support, the variable complexity had an inverse relationship. Model 4 supports H_1 in that police officers' perceived complexity of organizational change components is related to attitudes toward police consolidation. However, H_2 was rejected. In this model, the greater officers' perceived complexity of organizational change components, the more support they have for police consolidation.

Model 5 also consisted of the variables complexity, satisfaction, prior support, but in this model, PD was added. As with Model 4, complexity, satisfaction, and psupport were all significant predictors of current support. As with Model 4, satisfaction and prior support had a positive relationship with current support while complexity had an inverse relationship. However, PD or former police department affiliation was not a predictor of current support. Sixty-four percent of the variance in current support was accounted for in this Model 5. As with Model 4, Model 5 supports H_1 . As the complexity in merging the OCCs was perceived as easier, there was less support for merger. Therefore, H_2 was rejected for this model.

The last model, Model 6, as with Model 5, consisted of the variables complexity, satisfaction, psupport, and PD, but also added rank as a predictor. As with Models 3, 4, and 5, complexity was a significant predictor of csupport while satisfaction and prior support were also significant predictors with positive relationships to the current support score. However, neither prior department affiliation nor rank had an effect on current

support. This model accounted for 64% of the variance in the current support score. As with Models 4 and 5, this model supported H_1 . However, H_2 was rejected for this model.

It is important to note that the positive relationship in Model 1 becomes negative, but weak, in Models 4-6. The fact that complexity loses significance in Model 2 suggests complexity is an unstable predictor when other variables, especially satisfaction, are added.

For the dependent variable current support, Models 1, 4, 5, and 6 supported the hypothesis which states that police officers' perceived complexity of organizational change components is related to attitudes toward police consolidation. However, only Model 1 supported the second hypothesis affirming the greater officers' perceived complexity of organizational change components, the less support they have for police consolidation.

In assessing all of these models, it was determined that Model 1 supported both hypotheses when the only variable in the model was complexity. In Model 4, prior support, followed by satisfaction, were stronger predictors of current support than complexity. Nonetheless, complexity is statistically significant in predicting current support. As such, the most parsimonious model, indicated by the significance of all variables in the model and the variance within the model, is Model 4

Table 21 summarizes the results when each independent variable was added, step by step, to the regression equation with the dependent variable overall support. Table 21 also depicts the collinearity diagnostics that were evaluated. All independent variables had a tolerance level of above 0.3, indicating no issues with multicollinearity.

Additionally, Table 22 (Appendix C) contains summary information (i.e., n , R , r^2 , F and P statistics).

Using the dependent variable overall support, a forward stepwise regression was conducted to test five models. Model 1 used complexity as the IV. Model 2 included the variables complexity and satisfaction. In Model 3, the IV PD was added to the complexity and satisfaction variables. Model 4 included the variables complexity, satisfaction, and rank. Model 5 contained the IVs complexity, satisfaction, PD, and rank. Prior support was not used for determining its effect on overall support due to the fact that it was part of the overall support variable (i.e., overall support = psupport + csupport).

Using the dependent variable overall support, a forward stepwise regression was conducted using complexity as the independent variable for Model 1. Complexity significantly predicted current support in this model. However, complexity also explained a significant portion of the variance in current support scores.

The results of Model 1 are in support of H_1 , in that police officers' perceptions of the complexity of merging the organizational change components are related to attitudes toward police consolidation. Model 1 also supports H_2 . The more officers perceive the complexity of merging the OCCs as difficult, the less overall support they have for merger.

Model 2 included both the complexity and satisfaction variables. In this model, satisfaction was a statistically significant predictor of current support with a positive relationship. However, complexity was not. This model accounted for a little over 31% of the variance in current support. For this model, both H_1 and H_2 were rejected.

Model 3 comprised the variables of complexity, satisfaction, and former police department affiliation. While satisfaction and PD had a positive relationship with overall support and were determined to be significant predictors of it, complexity was not. Almost 50% of the variance of overall support was accounted for in this model. Because complexity was not statically significant in this model, both H₁ and H₂ were rejected.

For Model 4, PD was removed from the regression equation. Model 4 contained the IVs complexity, satisfaction, and rank. Satisfaction and rank were significant predictors of overall support, but complexity was not. Satisfaction had a positive relationship with overall support while rank had an inverse relationship. This model

Table 21 - Overall Support*

Model		<u>Unstandardized Coefficients</u>		<u>Standardized Coefficients</u>		<u>Collinearity Statistics</u>	
		<u>B</u>	<u>Std. Error</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>t</u>	<u>Sig.</u>	<u>Tolerance</u>
1	Complexity	.075	.013	.361	5.789	.000	
2	Complexity	.003	.017	.015	.186	.852	.586
	Satisfaction	.111	.016	.552	6.956	.000	.586
3	Complexity	.005	.014	.022	.332	.740	.585
	Satisfaction	.078	.014	.386	5.636	.000	.544
	PD	2.934	.322	.488	9.106	.000	.891
4	Complexity	.008	.017	.039	.489	.626	.576
	Satisfaction	.099	.016	.490	5.992	.000	.539
	Rank	-.400	.155	-.162	-2.587	.010	.918
5	Complexity	.007	.014	.034	.516	.607	.576
	Satisfaction	.072	.014	.358	5.075	.000	.514
	PD	2.849	.326	.474	8.747	.000	.871
	Rank	-.218	.132	-.089	-1.665	.100	.895

* Dependent Variable=Overallsupport

accounts for over 32% of the variance in overall support scores. Again, as with the other models in Table 21, this model did not support either H_1 or H_2 .

Model 5 included the variables complexity, satisfaction, PD, and rank. Both satisfaction and former police department affiliation, having positive relationships, were significant predictors of overall support at $p < .001$ level. It should be noted that while rank was not significant at the $p < .05$ level, it was at $p = .100$, having a negative relationship with overall support. As rank increased, overall support of merger also increased. Again, as with Model 3, complexity was not significant. Variables in Model 5 accounted for over 53% of the variance in overall support scores. However, both H_1 and H_2 were rejected.

When assessing complexity on its own merit as a predictor of overall support (Model 1), it supported H_1 . However, when combined with other variables such as satisfaction, former police department affiliation, and/or rank, complexity was not a significant predictor of overall support. In fact, the variables PD followed by rank were better predictors of overall support. In relation to complexity, Model 1 was selected as the best model as it supported H_1 . Overall, Model 5 is the best explanatory model for predicting overall support even though it omits complexity.

When considering both measures of support for merger (i.e., current support and overall support), current support was selected as the best variable for gauging support for merger. Current support was selected since this variable was the most sterile measure of support as it was unadulterated with prior support. Additionally, prior support was a significant predictor of current support. Model 4 in Table 19 utilizing the variables complexity, satisfaction, and prior support, was the best overall explanatory model for

predicting current support. All variables were significant and the greatest variance was explained by Model 4. As such, this model supported both hypotheses.

In this analysis, complexity predicted both current support and overall support when there were no other variables in the models, and in both cases the relationship is positive. However, with current support as the dependent variable, the relationship, while remaining statistically significant in Models 2, 4, 5, and 6 in Table 19, turns negative.

When current support is regressed with complexity alone, complexity has a positive relationship. However, when satisfaction is included in the regression model, the relationship between complexity and current support is negative, but weak. Specifically, in Model 4, prior support and satisfaction were determined to be stronger predictors of current support than complexity. Therefore, it appears that prior support of the merger and satisfaction with merging the OCCs is far more important and overrides complexity in the model(s). As long as officers had previously supported consolidation and were satisfied with the results of merging the OCCs, it seems to make little difference how difficult it was to merge the organizational change components.

Additional Analysis

While not the primary focus of this particular research, three additional analyses were conducted. Two analyses were conducted utilizing satisfaction as the dependent variable and one using prior support as the dependent variable. These analyses were conducted in an effort to gain more insight to the findings reported above.

The first analysis utilized satisfaction for the dependent variable and complexity, prior support, PD, and rank for the independent variables. These variables were selected

based upon their correlational statistical significance with the variable satisfaction, in addition to their utilization in other models used for analysis in this study.

As with the aforementioned analyses, a Pearson r correlation analysis was first conducted to examine the relationships among the explanatory variables and the dependent variable satisfaction. The results of the correlation analysis are displayed in Table 18 (Appendix C).

Complexity had a positive moderate correlation with satisfaction and was highly significant at the $p < .000$ level. Prior support had weak correlation with satisfaction which was positive, but highly significant at the $p < .000$ level.

Of the demographic/officer characteristics, the variable PD had a positive weak correlation with satisfaction and was significant at the $p < .001$ level. Rank had a weak inverse correlation that was also highly significant at $p < .001$. This negative correlation suggests that those with higher rank have less satisfaction with consolidation.

Table 23 summarizes the results when each independent variable was added, step by step, to the regression equation with the dependent variable satisfaction. All models were assessed for multicollinearity and for each model, the tolerance was above 0.3, illustrating no problems. Additionally, Table 24 (Appendix C) contains summary information for the analysis (i.e., n , R , r^2 , F and P statistics).

Using the dependent variable satisfaction, a forward stepwise regression was conducted which tested three models. Model 1 used complexity as the independent variable. Complexity significantly predicted satisfaction in this model. Complexity also explained 40.3% of the variance in satisfaction scores. This model suggests that the more

complex officers perceive the merging of the OCCs, the less satisfied they are with the results of merging them.

Table 23 - Satisfaction*

		<u>Unstandardized Coefficients</u>		<u>Standardized Coefficients</u>		<u>Collinearity Statistics</u>	
<u>Model</u>		<u>B</u>	<u>Std. Error</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>t</u>	<u>Sig.</u>	<u>Tolerance</u>
1	Complexity	.660	.056	.635	11.774	.000	
2	Complexity	.638	.054	.614	11.808	.000	.991
	Rank	-.2670	.620	-.224	-4.306	.000	.991
3	Complexity	.613	.054	.590	11.390	.000	.965
	Rank	-2.328	.620	-.195	-3.755	.000	.956
	PD	4.431	1.523	.153	2.909	.004	.934

* Dependent Variable=Satisfaction

Model 2 included both the complexity and rank variables. In this model, both complexity and rank were statistically significant predictors of satisfaction. This model accounted for a little over 45% of the variance in satisfaction. Model 2 implies that rank is a stronger predictor of satisfaction than was complexity. As with Model 1, this model indicates that as the perception of complexity increases in merging the OCCs, officers are less satisfied with the results of merging them. It further indicates that as an officer's rank increases, the more satisfied they are with the merged OCCs.

Model 3 included the complexity, rank, and PD variables. In this model, complexity and rank were statistically significant predictors of satisfaction at the $p<.000$ level. PD was significant at the $p<.004$ level. This model accounted for 47.5% of the variance in satisfaction. This model implies PD was the strongest predictor of satisfaction, followed by rank and complexity. As with Models 1 and 2, this model

indicated that as the perception of complexity of merging the OCCs diminishes, officers are more satisfied with the results of merging the OCCs. It further indicated that as officers' rank increases, the more satisfied they were with the merged OCCs. Additionally, former JCPD officers were less satisfied with the results of merging the OCCs.

The second analysis utilized satisfaction for the dependent variable and demographic information as the independent variables, i.e., rank and age. These variables were selected based upon their correlational statistical significance with the variable satisfaction. It should be noted that the demographic variables gender and wvnon were omitted from the analysis due to 1) their significance level and 2) there was little variance in the distribution of values for these variables.

As with the aforementioned analyses, a Pearson r correlation analysis was first conducted to examine the relationships among the explanatory variables and the dependent variable satisfaction. The results of the correlation analysis are displayed in Table 18 (Appendix C).

Rank had a negative weak correlation with satisfaction and was highly significant at the $p < .000$ level. As rank increases, so does satisfaction with the merged OCCs.

Age had weak correlation with satisfaction which was negative and significant at the $p < .05$ level. As age increased, so did satisfaction with the merged OCCs.

Table 25 summarizes the results when the aforementioned independent variables were added, step by step, to the regression equation with the dependent variable satisfaction. All models were assessed for multicollinearity and for each model, the

tolerance was above 0.3, illustrating no problems. Additionally, Table 26 (Appendix C) contains summary information for the analysis (i.e., n , R , r^2 , F and P statistics).

Table 25 - Satisfaction* with Demographics

		<u>Unstandardized Coefficients</u>		<u>Standardized Coefficients</u>		<u>Collinearity Statistics</u>	
<u>Model</u>		<u>B</u>	<u>Std. Error</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>t</u>	<u>Sig.</u>	<u>Tolerance</u>
1	Rank	-2.371	.753	-.188	-3.147	.002	
2	Rank	-2.377	.745	-.189	-3.191	.000	1.000
	Age	-.381	.144	-.157	-2.651	.008	1.000

* Dependent Variable=Satisfaction

Using the dependent variable satisfaction, a forward stepwise regression was conducted which tested two models. Model 1 used rank as the independent variable. Rank, while having an inverse relationship, significantly predicted satisfaction in this model. Rank only explained 3.6% of the variance in satisfaction scores. This model suggests that as rank increases, satisfaction with merging of the OCCs increases.

Model 2 included both the rank and age variables. In this model, both rank and age statistically significant predictors of satisfaction. This model accounted for 6.0% of the variance in satisfaction. Model 2 implies that rank is a stronger predictor of satisfaction than was age. As with Model 1, this model indicates that as ranks increased, so did satisfaction with the merged OCCs. It further indicates that as an officer's age increases, the more satisfied they were with the merged OCCs.

The third additional analysis utilized prior support as the dependent variable and PD and rankmerge (rank at the time of merger) for the independent variables. These variables were selected based upon their correlational statistical significance with the

variable prior support. Additionally, the variable PD was utilized due to its inclusion in other models analyzed for this study. Complexity and satisfaction were not used for this analysis due to the fact that future or unknown events occurring after the consolidation could not influence prior support for merger, nor be used to predict it. Following the same logic, the variable rank (current rank) was omitted as current rank could not be used to predict the past (i.e., prior support).

As with the previous analyses, a Pearson r correlation analysis was first conducted to examine the relationships among the explanatory variables and the dependent variable satisfaction. The results of the correlation analysis are displayed in Table 18 (Appendix C).

Of the demographic/officer characteristics, the variable rankmerge had a negative, weak correlation with prior support, but was highly significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. This negative correlation suggests that those with higher rank had more prior support for consolidation. PD had a positive, moderate correlation with prior support that was highly significant at the $p < .000$ level.

Table 27 summarizes the results when each independent variable was added, step by step, to the regression equation with the dependent variable prior support. Table 28

Table 27 – Prior Support*

		<u>Unstandardized Coefficients</u>		<u>Standardized Coefficients</u>		<u>Collinearity Statistics</u>	
<u>Model</u>		<u>B</u>	<u>Std. Error</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>t</u>	<u>Sig.</u>	<u>Tolerance</u>
1	PD	2.000	.142	.609	14.043	.000	1.000

* Dependent Variable=PriorSupport

(Appendix C) contains summary information for the analysis (i.e., n , R , r^2 , F and P statistics).

Using the dependent variable prior support, a forward stepwise regression was conducted which resulted in one model. For this model, the variable rankmerge was removed from the stepwise regression analysis. Model 1 used PD as the independent variable. PD significantly predicted prior support in this model. PD also explained 37.1% of the variance in prior support scores. This model suggests that the former JCPD officers supported merger less than former LDP personnel prior to the consolidation occurring. This finding is consistent with the results of the 1998 study conducted by the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission in which former LDP officers supported merger more than former JCPD officers.

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION

Throughout the country, government consolidation has been the topic of many discussions among advocates of both monocentric and polycentric views of government. Typically, proponents of government consolidation promoted effectiveness and efficiency as the cornerstone to their argument. Those opposing argue to the contrary citing the negative aspects of effectiveness and efficiency associated with larger governmental structures. The Louisville merger was no different.

While many governmental entities conduct research on effectiveness and efficiency, little comparative research exists after a consolidation takes place (Durning, 1992). Since city-county mergers occur infrequently, there is much work to be done in the study of governmental consolidation, in addition to the sub-units of government that also join together as a result of the overall merger. The Louisville police consolidation provided such an opportunity to learn more about such mergers.

Change exists in all organizations, especially during a consolidation. Many changes can lead to complex issues. As a result, government consolidations are complicated because of the many ways an organization can change (i.e., structurally, operationally, administratively, and procedurally).

With or without a merger, satisfactory law enforcement service and protection are in large part contingent upon the attitudes of employees. During a consolidation, it is inevitable that rules will change, agencies will be restructured, and there will be different

interpretations of culture. These changes are complex and affect the attitudes and perceptions of employees including employees' satisfaction and perceptions of complexity with the processes and resulting structures. These changes in employee attitudes and perceptions can have both positive and negative consequences.

Additionally, the attitudes and perceptions of personnel, specifically police officers, can change over time resulting from experience, education, social interaction or influence, communication, environment, and persuasion. A police officer's perception of the complexity of merging organizational change components (OCCs) relating to police department consolidation affects attitudes and perceptions regarding support for consolidation.

Many factors or organizational change components were considered in forming the LMPD. All of these components or factors were an integral part of the LMPD merger. For this study, a list of the most important or dynamic changes, organizational change components, was developed in order to determine officers' perceptions of complexity related to consolidating these OCCs. All of these organizational change components were important to the successful police department consolidation of LMPD and not only affected the organization, but also the employees and their attitudes and perceptions.

Because consolidation was an innovation or new to members of the LMPD, many did not perceive the complexities involved in consolidating sub-units of government or of implementing these OCCs. Therefore, this research was conducted in an effort to understand the complexity of the organizational change components, officers'

perceptions of that complexity, and how the perception of complexity in merging the OCCs affects the support for the consolidation.

In terms of complexity and complexity theory and its application to organizations, only recently has a sufficient body of academic work been collected to study organizations. However, research regarding officers' perceptions of complexity in merging organizational change components during the consolidation of a police agency is non-existent.

In response, this study 1) examined the level of police officer support for consolidation and how it has changed since 1998, before the LMPD consolidation, 2) compared police officers' perceptions of the complexity of merging organizational change components in the consolidation process and how their perceptions of the complexity affected their attitudes toward the consolidation, and 3) determined how the police officers' perceptions of the complexity of merging the OCCs affected support for or against police consolidation.

The hypotheses for this study were as follows:

- 1) Police officers' perceived complexity of organizational change components is related to attitudes toward police consolidation.
- 2) The greater officers' perceived complexity of organizational change components, the less support for police consolidation.

To test these hypotheses, a survey instrument (Appendix B) was utilized to gather information regarding support for merger, merger experience and participation, satisfaction with merged OCCs, perceived complexity of merging OCCs, and

demographic information/officer characteristics. Of the population of 669 officers, a total of 390 respondents (56%) completed the survey.

While the analysis of the data shows somewhat mixed results for the specific effect of identified organizational change components on support for merger, there are trends toward some significant relationships. These relationships exist between complexity of merging the OCCs, satisfaction with the merged OCCs, and prior support for merger with current support and overall support for merger.

The data encompass a somewhat contradictory picture of the nature and strength of the relationships among some of the independent and dependent variables. The first 6 models utilized current support as the dependent variable (DV).

When using the DV current support, Models 1, 4, 5, and 6 supported the hypothesis (H_1) which states that police officers' perceived complexity of organizational change components is related to attitudes toward police consolidation. Additionally, Model 1 supported the second hypothesis affirming the greater officers' perceived complexity of organizational change components, the less support they have for police consolidation.

In assessing all of these models, it was determined that prior support, followed by satisfaction were positively related and stronger predictors of current support than complexity. Nonetheless, complexity was statistically significant in predicting current support with a weak inverse relationship. As such, the best model, indicated by significance and variance explained, was Model 4.

When utilizing overall support as the DV and assessing complexity on its own merit, Model 1 supported H_1 and H_2 . However, when combined with satisfaction, former

police department affiliation, PD, and/or rank, complexity was not a significant predictor of overall support. For purposes of this study, Model 1 was selected as the best model supporting H₁ and H₂. However, overall, Model 5 was selected as the best explanatory model for predicting overall support even though it omits complexity.

After considering all models and both dependent variables, current support was selected as the best dependent variable for measuring support for merger as it was autonomous and not linked with any other variables such as the case with overall support. The variable overall support contained both current support and prior support which might have altered findings, especially since prior support was a strong predictor of current support. Therefore, support was used in its purest form, current support, to measure support for consolidation.

Some of the OCCs were quickly merged, while the consolidation of others has been an evolving process. In aggregate, officer support for merger has nominally increased since 2003. However, today as in 1998, there are still differences between former LDP and JCPD personnel. In 1998, 82% of LDP officers supported merger while 90% of JCPD officers opposed merger. Currently, 71.4 % of former LDP officers support merger while 58.3% of former JCPD officers oppose it.

Some officers seem to be “set in their ways” in reference to their attitudes regarding consolidation. Some officers were satisfied with the merged OCCs and have shifted their opinion of consolidation. However, many officers, even after going through the consolidation process, have not changed their attitudes.

From the beginning, officers from both departments had strong opinions about the consolidation. These opinions prevailed even though officers from both departments

knew little, if anything, about merger. Many of these opinions were polarized by members of each of the individual departments and grounded in perception and attitudes. The data from the additional regression analysis supports this in that PD (IV) was a strong predictor of prior support (DV). Additionally, these perceptions and attitudes were, in part, nurtured and supported by the individual departments' Fraternal Order of Police lodges. Rogers (2003) notes that most people do not assess an innovation on the outcomes of scientific studies, but rather on subjective information about the innovation conveyed to them by others. During the LMPD merger, information was distributed from several different sources. However, over 65% of the respondents in this study never talked to any committee members directly involved in the consolidation process.

Officers with the former LDP, in majority, supported the merger because of what it could provide to them. Just prior to merger, officers from LDP had lower salaries than their counterparts at JCPD. In comparison, there were also more restrictions on benefits at LDP than at JCPD such as the take-home car policy, court pay, and the like. LDP officers hoped to gain equal benefits and pay as a result of merger.

Conversely, JCPD officers were against merger because of the personal losses they thought they would encounter. They believed that if merger occurred, their pay would remain stagnant until all officers, former LDP and JCPD alike, had parity. In other words, their pay would stay the same while their LDP counterparts would have salary increases until all officers were considered equal in terms of pay and benefits. They also believed that they would have a reduction in benefits such as the take-home car policy. JCPD personnel believed that their take-home car privileges would become more restrictive, similar to LDPs. In Grant's (2011) study on organizational justice, one officer

notes, “They (LDP) were going to get a great big pay raise, we were probably not going to see for a long time and we’re going to get the short end of that stick” (p. 115).

Probably most concerning to JCPD personnel was the perception that they would be forcefully overtaken by the former LDP, not merged with them. As with many opponents of police department consolidation, former JCPD personnel feared loss of autonomy. They feared loss of local control and also a loss of local identity from not having their own police department.

Of major concern to officers from each former agency was the unknown of the innovation of merger. Only 5% of the 390 officers who participated in this study had any experience with a merger or the process of consolidation. Very few of the officers knew of the complexities involved in merging 2 large police departments. As such, this merger was an innovation to the officers of both LDP and JCPD. In support, the literature (Rogers, 2003) points out that an innovation refers to a concept or procedure that is viewed as new by a person that is accepting it. It need not be new as dictated by time, but rather, it just needs to be perceived as new by the individual accepting it. In the case of the Louisville merger, the perceptions of officers, in relation to the character of the merger or innovation, not only affected attitudes of officers and their perceptions of the complexity of merging the OCCs, but it also affected support and how quickly the consolidation was accepted.

Because of these strong beliefs from officers from both former agencies, prior support was a significant predictor of current support. Many of the officers surveyed, as shown in the findings, still have strong opinions for or against merger. As these opinions have been engrained in officers and their belief systems prior to innovation of merger

and, in many cases, since consolidation has occurred, they have an effect on current support of the innovation of merger.

Officers are still very passionate in their view supporting or opposing merger and many continue to have the same views they had before the merger occurred. One officer interviewed by Grant (2011) noted:

I didn't think it would benefit the people of Jefferson County and I still don't think it has. I don't see the people of Jefferson County are any better off now. They sold us a bill of goods about how there was going to be no more duplication of services and all of this silliness and it didn't come to pass (Grant, 2010, p. 124).

In regards to the innovation of consolidation, some officers did not view the merger as fair nor any better than the system used before consolidation where there were two major police agencies in Jefferson County (see Grant, 2011). This view was reflected in their prior support and current support for merger and with their satisfaction in merging the OCCs. While the majority of LDP officers (72%) supported merger, the greater part of JCPD officers did not. Of the former JCPD officers responding to the survey, the majority (63%) strongly disagree, while 19.5% disagree with the statement that they supported merger prior to the consolidations. Additionally, the majority (39%) of former JCPD officers strongly disagreed and 19.7% disagreed with the statement that they currently supported merger. Additionally, the majority of former JCPD officers were very unsatisfied with at least 50% of the merged OCCs to include culture, decentralization, policies and procedures, administrative reporting practices, contract, pay, benefits, and communications.

Compatibility was non-existent for many officers. In other words, the merger was not perceived as consistent relating to the existing values, past experiences, and the needs, wants, and satisfactions of the individuals from each of the departments. Trialability or the degree to which officers had the opportunity to try out or experiment with the innovation/consolidation before the adoption decision also did not exist (Agarwal and Prasad, 1997). Rather than merger occurring on a controlled basis utilizing an incremental approach, it occurred quickly, which caused uncertainty. Also, the attribute of observability was sometimes absent; changes in the structure and systems were not immediately visible to all. If those results had been seen by officers of both former departments, the merger would have been more likely to be accepted.

For these reasons, the passion of officers from both LDP and JCPD, either in support of or opposition to merger, has continued through the years, even prior to the consolidation occurring. While in mass there has been an increase in officer support over the past 9 years, it has been minimal. This passion has affected attitudes in prior support and, as shown in Model 4, its relation to current support for merger. In Model 4, prior support was the most significant predictor of current support. When prior support for merger increased, current support increased. Additionally, as displayed in Model 1 of the additional analysis when prior support was regressed on PD, PD was a significant predictor of prior support.

In Model 4, satisfaction was also a strong predictor of current support. As satisfaction with the merged OCCs increased, so did current support. As with any innovation, how officers perceive and view the change will affect their willingness to adopt the new ideas or innovation. Satisfaction with merging the OCCs is an integral part

of this perception as evidenced by Models 2, 4, 5, and 6 related to current support. The more satisfied officers were with the merged OCCs, the more support they had for merger. Additionally, as determined by the follow-up analysis where satisfaction was the DV, as the perception of complexity increased in merging certain OCCs, the less satisfied officers were with the results of merging the OCC(s).

In regards to satisfaction, collectively, respondents were most satisfied with weapon choice, car numbers, values and mission. These OCCs were also perceived by respondents as the easiest to merge, which is supported by the literature. Pursuant to the literature, OCCs simpler to understand and merge are adopted more rapidly and easier to implement. These OCCs were also a very visual aspect of the merger. They were easily observed and personnel could see merger taking place.

Benefits, pay, and contract were most satisfying for former LDP personnel. This is because they gained from all of the contractual issues, especially pay. Increases in former LDP officer salaries raised satisfaction levels among LDP personnel.

JCPD personnel were most satisfied with the car numbers, weapon choice, 10-codes, and values. During the initial stages of merger, the consolidation committee, with approval of the Chief of Police, agreed to let officers carry the weapons they currently had and go to one weapon system through attrition of personnel. This was because of the extreme costs associated with purchasing new weapons. This decision led to not only more satisfaction with the weapon choice, but less complexity due to no changes in weapon choice. Consequently, officers from both of the former departments were satisfied with the weapon choice. Additionally, the 10-code system chosen by the merger committee was unchanged from the version that was utilized by the former JCPD. Again,

there was little complexity involved from the perspective of JCPD officers. Additionally, their satisfaction levels were high when considering these OCCs.

The respondents from the former LDP were most unsatisfied with the decentralization, boundary size, culture, equalization of workload and division boundaries. These changes were the most complex to merge and were supported by the findings in the follow-up analysis. As officers perceived merging the OCCs as complex, the less satisfaction they had for the merged OCCs. Again, consequently, in Model 4, the less satisfaction for merging the OCCs, the less support.

Former JCPD personnel were most unsatisfied with pay and then the contract, policies and procedures, the culture, and benefits. This, in part, resulted from the parity issue. Since former JCPD officers were paid more than LDP officers, they did not receive pay increases until parity was achieved by former LDP officers. Many of the policies implemented were former LDP policies, and JCPD officers were not satisfied with changing from what they had previously known.

In the 1998 study that was conducted by the Louisville-Jefferson County Crime Commission, officers were asked to assess the personal effect on them from possible changes in pay, uniforms and equipment, promotion opportunity, benefits, take-home vehicles, pension, safety, and access to specialized assignments. Departmental differences emerged in that LDP personnel believed that most items would remain about the same and no items would be worse. However, JCPD personnel believed that most items would worsen and no items would be better. This was shown to affect support for merger prior to it occurring.

As such, satisfaction with the OCCs is integral to support for merger. When assessing satisfaction on current support for merger in Models 2-6, satisfaction was a significant predictor of current support in each of these models. As satisfaction increased, so did current support for merger. Satisfaction is also a significant predictor of overall support, as shown in Models 2-5, when overall support is the dependent variable. However, complexity is a significant predictor of satisfaction as determined by the follow-up analysis.

The consolidation of the Louisville Division of Police and the Jefferson County Police lends itself to what Krantz (1985) termed as a transitional event where internal or external events call for a rethinking of organizational structure, functions, or role. This consolidation resulted in many changes in the way each of the departments conducted business prior to merger to include everything from geographical boundary restructuring to their mission and values. As such, many of the changes were complex and involved different OCCs where rethinking of structures, functions and roles took place.

Complexity related to organizations is a relatively new science. Complexity science is based on the premise that all organizations are “complex” and that this results from an accumulation of behavior on the part many members taking action on information. In addition, these behaviors were polarized in two distinct groups, officers with JCPD and officers with LDP. The newly formed LMPD organization was unique and, like other organizations, had different levels of complexity that were contingent upon the varied organizational components, factors, structures, individuals, and the like.

Many complexities resulted during the LMPD merger with over 1300 personnel, civilian and sworn officers alike, attempting to merge different OCCs. in addition to other

factors or components. As the findings show, some officers perceived merging certain OCCs as easy, while other OCCs were perceived as very difficult to merge. Even though varied opinions existed regarding the complexity of merging the OCCs, they were eventually merged.

In Model 1 where current support was used as the DV and complexity was the only independent variable in the model, it was a highly significant predictor of current support. As officers' perceptions of the difficulty in merging the OCCs increased, their support for current support of merger diminished. The literature is in support of this model. Rogers (2003) notes that complex innovations are difficult to implement and are adopted more slowly than ones that are viewed as simple. In support, Pankratz et al. (2002) assert that they are also less likely to be adopted.

In Model 4, prior support was the strongest predictor of current support followed by satisfaction and complexity. Complexity also had a weak inverse relationship with current support. In other words, the more prior support they had for merger, the more current support they had for consolidation. Also, the more satisfied officers were with the merged OCCs, the more current support they had for merger. Finally, the weak inverse relationship between complexity and current support indicated that the more complex officers perceived merging the OCCs, the more support they had for merger.

The literature offers some explanation for this inverse relationship. Organizations are dynamic, non-linear systems governed by a set of simple "order-generating" rules (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Lewis, 1994; MacIntosh and MacLean, 2001). Stacey et al. (2002) notes that the key to survival is for all organizations to develop a set of rules which keep the organization operating "on the edge of chaos." If too much stability

exists, it will result in the absence of change. Too much chaos creates an overwhelming atmosphere where change cannot occur.

During the consolidation of LMPD, the organization was operating in a chaotic mode. Many changes were being made quickly and the organization was constantly in a state of flux. To merge LDP and JCPD, OCCs were identified to merge. To merge them, a strategic plan or “order-generating” rules were devised to maintain order and to effectively and efficiently merge the OCCs. The chaotic nature of the organization, in addition to merging many of the OCCs, added to the complexity of the consolidation. This complexity caused more chaos and instability within the organization. Even though some of the OCCs were perceived as difficult to merge, the instability caused by merging them converted an existing pattern of behavior into a new more suitable one, i.e., a merged OCC and ultimately a merged police agency. Since satisfaction was a strong predictor of current support, as long as officers were satisfied with the results of merging the OCCs, they had current support for merger. Even if merging the OCCs was perceived as complex, the complexity led to a suitable result with which officers were satisfied, and ultimately, they expressed current support for merger.

In response to the aforementioned findings, further analysis was conducted using satisfaction as the dependent variable. In Model 3 of the analysis using satisfaction as the DV, complexity, rank and PD were all significant predictors of satisfaction. In this model, as the perceived complexity of merging the OCCs increased, officers were more unsatisfied with the results of the merged OCC. The model also indicates that LDP officers were more likely to be satisfied with the results of merging the OCCs. Finally, as an officer’s rank increased, they were more satisfied with the merger.

As previously mentioned in the literature, the more complex the innovation, the less likely it is to be adopted or supported. If officers are not satisfied with the results of merging the OCCs, they won't have current support the merger. Consequently, if officers believe the OCC to be complex to merge, they will be less likely to be satisfied and in turn, less likely to have current support for merger. As an example, decentralization and culture were perceived as the two most complex OCCs to merge. Officers were also most unsatisfied with the results of merging these OCCs.

In this model using satisfaction as the dependent variable, the more rank increased, the more satisfaction an officer had for merger. During the merger, persons of higher rank were charged with consolidating the LDP and JCPD. They were responsible and accountable for the results of the merged LMPD and the OCCs perceived by officers to be the most difficult to merge, i.e., culture, decentralization, redefining patrol division boundaries, etc. Officers of higher rank were the ones orchestrating the consolidation of these OCCs and making the ultimate decisions regarding their merger. Because of this decision-making ability, higher ranking officers were more likely to be satisfied with the merged OCCs because ultimately, they planned them.

Also, officers of higher rank in the organization were expected to follow the company line. In other words, they were expected to support the merger without taking into account their personal feelings. This may have also affected their satisfaction in relation to the merged OCCs.

The final additional analysis in the study was conducted using prior support as the dependent variable. In Model 1 of this analysis, PD was a significant predictor of prior

support. The results indicated that former LDP officers were more likely to be supportive of the consolidation than former JCPD officers.

Based upon the analysis of current support, complexity, prior support and satisfaction were all significant predictors of current support. However, the strongest predictor of current support for the selected model, Model 4, was prior support, followed by satisfaction and then complexity. Even though prior support was the strong predictor of current support, when officers were satisfied with the outcome of merging particular OCCs, or the OCCs in their totality, the complex nature of this consolidation was of less concern to them than satisfaction with the results. Officers showed support for merger when they were satisfied with the results of the merged OCCs.

They also showed current support for merger if they had prior support for it. Support for merger, prior to the consolidation occurring, was partially based on how officers would personally benefit from the merger itself. If they thought they would benefit, they might have had more prior support for merger. Regarding current support, however, if they benefited, they were satisfied with the results. As shown in Models 3, 4, 5, and 6, prior support for merger was a stronger predictor of current support than complexity.

Of greater interest is the more officers perceived merging the OCCs as complex, the greater support they had for consolidation. Subsequent analysis using satisfaction as the dependent variable indicated that the more complex officers perceived merging the OCCs, in totality, the less satisfied they were with the merged OCC(s).

Consequently, utilizing all of the analyses, the more prior support an officer had for consolidation, the more current support they had for merging the police departments.

Additionally, the less difficult merging the OCCs was perceived by officers, the more satisfied they were with the results. In turn, the more satisfied officers were with the results of merging the OCCs, the more they had current support for merger.

Policy Implications

From this research, several implications for policy concerning the innovation of consolidation are evident. Among the most challenging implications are: 1) the importance of effectively communicating an innovation and the process for achieving it, 2) the importance of understanding and communicating the complexity of an innovation, and 3) the important role satisfaction plays in merging complex OCCs during an innovation.

In this study, officers' perceptions of complexity were assessed to determine their effects on support for merger. The responses provided by the police officers who were part of the study allowed for a determination that complexity, satisfaction, and prior support all had an effect on support for consolidation, with prior support having the strongest effect. All organizational mergers involve complex, dynamic, and/or chaotic attributes. According to one of the models developed for this analysis, the more complex merging OCCs is perceived, the less support officer have for it. For three of the models, the more complex a merger is perceived, the more support officers have for it. Also, as prior support for merger increased, so did current support for consolidation. Additionally, as officer satisfaction with the merged OCCs increases, the more support for merger increases, and satisfaction, along with prior support, overrides complexity.

Additionally, complexity has an impact on satisfaction. Three of the models where the variable satisfaction was used as the DV indicated that complexity is a statistically

significant predictor of satisfaction. As such, when the perception of complexity in merging the OCCs increases, satisfaction for the merged OCCs decreases.

Finally, a police department consolidation polarizes officers. Their attitudes are dependent upon the culture of the departments from which they come. Usually, during a merger, these attitudes cause strong opinions and perceptions to be formed either supporting merger or opposing it prior to its occurrence. Additionally, some of these attitudes and opinions seem to withstand the test of time.

As such, police administrators should remain cognizant that officers engage in an innovation such as consolidation with certain individual assumptions, grounded in personal and professional beliefs which include perceptions, needs, satisfactions, and wants. These attributes can also be altered and/or enhanced due to the officers' vulnerability resulting from the dynamic, chaotic, and complex nature of the innovation of consolidation.

Police executives contemplating an innovation such as merger should comprehensively consider the needs, satisfactions, and wants of officers. Additionally, executives should consider the process by which the innovation or merger is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of the department. This diffusion should be directed to officers involved in the innovation or merger, which is virtually everyone in the organization. By conveying information about the merger, not only prior to merger and at the initial stages, but throughout the evolving process, officers are more likely to understand the complexities involved in the merger and the reasons for consolidating many of the OCCs that are selected for the merger.

Additionally, this diffusion will diminish apprehension on the part of officers about the chaotic process and add to support of the process.

Officers should also be involved in the process at every possible opportunity. This involvement can lead to better understanding of the process, the innovation itself, and the complexities involved related to the innovation. As a result, employees will understand each exact stage in the process of merging departments. Additionally, if officers have a say in the process, they may be more satisfied with the outcome of merging the OCCs and the merger itself.

Finally, rank was seen as an important factor for Models 4 and 5 in assessing overall support. While the important function of managers and supervisors in the innovation of consolidation was not the focus of this study, a cursory overview must be provided. In order for the merger process to be effective, policing executives and administrators must gain support from managers and supervisors. These individuals are fundamental to the process of obtaining and disseminating information. In particular, first-line supervisors are crucial to this process. They are a determining factor in how information is disseminated throughout the department, to include its timeliness and accuracy. In order to protect and preserve the integrity of this process, they must be supportive of the process, the vision of consolidation, and the organization.

The context in which an innovation takes place is distinctive to each particular agency undertaking it. Not only is it unique, but it is also new to most officers involved. Administrators must develop a process of diffusion by which they collect relevant information, analyze it, and disseminate it timely and accurately to all potential stakeholders, especially employees (McLean, 2006). Such efforts help to increase

ownership of initiatives and ensure validity of information interpretation (Cummings & Worley, 2005; McLean, 2006). This will help to gain support and to dispel some negative perceptions of complexity, such as believing some changes are more complex than they really are or avoiding changes that are believed to be too difficult. Additionally, it may foster satisfaction among officers regarding the process of merging the OCC's and also allow them to understand the issues and circumstances surrounding the innovation.

Consequently, some fundamental principles should be considered by administrators and police executives in order to maximize the innovation of merger and the process of merger and to gain support for it. These include communication channels, identification and selection of OCCs having the potential to cause dissatisfaction, identifying equipment and funding sources, trialability, observability, and minimal complexity.

Communication channels should be developed so that information can be disseminated to all personnel involved in the merger process. These channels include committee meetings, informational meetings, departmental publications, training, and published minutes for merger meetings. As shown from this study, very few officers had experience with merger and consequently, had little information about merger or the process. Additionally, not many officers talked to others about the merger process. Communication channels should be selected carefully so that accurate information can be distributed to personnel in a timely fashion and distributed to personnel prior to consolidation occurring and at regular intervals during the various stages of the merger.

This will help to dispel misinformation conveyed between merger participants prior to the consolidation and will ultimately garner support.

Identification and selection of OCCs that present issues related to officer satisfaction should be discussed prior to change. As shown from this study, culture, policies, administrative reporting practices, restructuring the patrol boundaries, and decentralization left officers unsatisfied with the results of merging them. Thorough discussions of all of these issues must take place between administrators and officers so that there is a mutual understanding and the innovation of merger is perceived as better than the one currently in existence. Again, these positives/benefits should be reinforced at every opportunity to personnel.

Attempts to identify equipment, in addition to funding sources, needed for merging departments should be conducted well in advance of the actual consolidation. In the case of the LMPD merger, the city was unable to purchase needed communications equipment. This equipment was integral to linking personnel in the urban and suburban patrol divisions. Had funding sources been identified prior to merger, this equipment could have been purchased and helped with communication issues.

If the consolidation of the entities can be accomplished on a trial or incremental basis, the innovation of merger could be more acceptable to personnel. During the LMPD consolidation, merging the OCCs was chaotic. Because of the holistic approach to merger, many OCCs were complex to merge. By conducting a consolidation on an incremental basis, the process would be less chaotic and consequently, less complex. Additionally, an incremental approach would allow for more time for officers to understand the process and the complexities involved.

During a consolidation, successes or results of merger must be seen. Administrators would be well advised to initiate the merger with several small, but observable, successes. Officials should attempt to expeditiously merge some of the OCCs perceived as easier to consolidate such as weapons, car numbers, and 10-codes. This would show urgency toward the process, in addition to progress. Executives should communicate these successes when talking to personnel.

Finally, complexity of the process should be minimized. New ideas that don't require development of new skills or knowledge are more readily accepted. In other words, if these ideas are accepted, officers may be more satisfied with the results resulting in more support for the consolidation. If personnel need to develop new skills or knowledge, open and frequent communications about the process will assist them and help in their support of the innovation of merger.

Limitations of Study

Due to the nature of this study, certain limitations exist. First, although efforts were made to represent LMPD's sworn officers, the findings cannot necessarily be stated as representing a broader population of police officers. Nor can it be assumed that all LPD or JCPD police officers would have the exact same responses.

Regarding demographic characteristics of respondents, due to structural pyramiding, very few Majors, Lieutenant Colonels, and Colonels participated in this study. To the contrary, patrol officers/detectives may have been overrepresented.

Other limitations include the officers' race and sex. Few minorities and women were represented in this research with the majority of respondents being Caucasian males.

Additionally, the type of unit to which officers were assigned (i.e., patrol, administrative, investigations, etc.) was not collected or assessed in this study. Depending upon the unit to which an officer might be assigned, the type of unit might influence their perception of consolidation. This is because some units were consolidated, while some were decentralized or disbanded. Again, these issues did not emerge in this study.

Respondents' memories were another limitation of this study. The study focused on the efforts of police officers to remember back to 2003, over 9 years ago. Also, merging some of the OCCs, such as communications, was an evolving process that transcended several years. The merging of these specific OCCs required officers to recall information over many previous years from 2003 to present. The ability of officers to recall information, specific to the consolidation, may be prejudiced or tainted due to the incorporation of other information or stimuli by more recent events through the years since 2003. Measures were taken to minimize these problems when constructing the survey so that information could be recalled by focusing on the key events of merger. However, it is unrealistic to believe that the perceptions reported by respondents have not been altered, over time, in some form or fashion. For example, satisfaction could grow over time as chaos subsides and doubt regarding merger diminishes.

The population, while a strength, was also a limitation. Many of the people who were not surveyed for this research were those initially involved with the merger, but retired before the study. Due to their age, rank and early experiences with the consolidation, they might have had different views regarding the complexity of merging the OCCs. The perceptions of those interviewed for this research, due to their rank and

status in the organization when merger occurred in 2003, had less initial experience with merger and therefore, may have had different perspectives of the complexity of consolidating the OCCs. This study did not seek to measure perception of complexity among those who were hired into LMPD after merger.

Also, the Organizational change components selected based on the Louisville experience. Efforts were taken to select five basic components (i.e., culture(s), policy and procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and redefining patrol boundaries) that would be key or crucial to any consolidation. However, these OCCs may change depending upon the department being studied. As a result, it may be difficult to duplicate this study in other jurisdictions.

Finally, consideration should be given to the confounding effect of Chief White, the newly appointed Chief of Police of LMPD. Some of the results of the merger may be attributable to him rather than the actual consolidation itself. For example, OCCs such as decentralization may have been a management preference of Chief White's rather than a result of the actual merger. However, it is hard to separate the two due to Chief White's integral role in the consolidation of LDP and JCPD.

Future Studies

All studies have limitations. Therefore, for future studies attempting to duplicate this research, suggestions are provided. These suggestions are based upon limitations of this study, in addition to the findings regarding the perception of complexity, the OCCs, and satisfaction.

First, future studies regarding the merger of LDP and JCPD should include officers who were hired after the merger in 2003 in order to get their perspectives. While

some of these individuals may not have been involved with merger during the infancy stages, they may have been involved for some stages of the merger regarding some of the OCCs that were constantly evolving. Additionally, these persons can be compared to former LDP and JCPD officers in regards to their perceptions of complexity and satisfaction with merging the OCCs.

Second, as previously mentioned, many of the people who were not surveyed for this research were officers who had more experience at the specific time the departments merged, but who retired prior to the inception of this study. These officers could possibly have had different perspectives regarding their perceptions of the complexity of merging the OCCs. This is in part because of their experience level or rank at the time of the police consolidation in 2003.

Third, the satisfaction and complexity OCCs could be placed in homogeneous groups for analysis. For example, both satisfaction and complexity could be stratified further by creating organizational, personal, work, and communications variables for both satisfaction and complexity. By classifying satisfaction and complexity in this manner, researchers could determine specifically what types of satisfaction and/or complexity effect support for merger.

Preliminary analysis shows that creating the aforementioned variables for satisfaction (i.e., orgsat, persat, worksat, and commsat) might be fruitful. For this preliminary analysis, orgsat was created using sculture + smission + svalues + sdecent + spp + sreport. Persat utilized sweapon + scontract + spay + sbenefit. Worksat used the variables sboundary + sequal + ssize and commsat incorporated the variables scomm + s10 + scar.

Fourth, when quantitatively analyzing the results of future research, additional tests could be utilized such as structural equation modeling for more comprehensive analyses. This type of analysis could provide the ability to construct variables which are not measured directly, but are estimated in the model from several measured variables (i.e., latent or hidden variables). These variables could provide additional information for analysis when looking at both satisfaction and complexity in relationship to current support for merger.

Finally, while some researchers have turned to survey research to gain insights into the effects of consolidation (Durning and Nobbie, 2000), future research might combine both quantitative and qualitative methods in order to explore further the perception of complexity. Although it is not outside the capability of quantitative methods to address this type of research, Berg (2004) asserts a qualitative method or case study provides an additional opportunity to explore “life-worlds” or naturally emerging languages and meanings individuals assign to this particular experience (Berg, 2004).

Conclusion

During a merger, change is inevitable. Instituting change during an innovation such as a police department consolidation is an integration of systems, geographical locations, physical facilities and also people. In fact, people may be the most difficult to merge.

During a police consolidation, the innovation of merger is dynamic and chaotic. Managing individuals’ perceptions and attending to their satisfactions, needs and wants during such an innovation may be the hardest issue to address.

This study tested two hypotheses:

1. Police officers' perceived complexity of organizational change components is related to attitudes toward police consolidation.
2. The greater officers' perceived complexity of organizational change components, the less support for police consolidation.

Overall, the findings in this study, based on several models that were developed, indicated that police officers' perceptions of complexity in merging organizational change components are related to attitudes toward police consolidation. Additionally, one of the models reveals that the greater officers' perceived complexity of merging the OCCs, the less support officers have for police consolidation.

Even though both hypotheses were supported, in some of the models, the effects of complexity on support for merger were superseded by prior support and satisfaction. The more prior support an officer has for consolidation, the more current support they will have. However, even though prior support was the strongest predictor of current support for consolidation, throughout this study, satisfaction with the organizational change components has been a constant. Satisfaction is a determining factor in support for merger. Additionally, complexity is a significant predictor of satisfaction. As such, if officers perceive the merger as complex, they will be less satisfied with the consolidation of the organizational change components. As long as they are satisfied with the results of merging the OCCs, they will likely support the consolidation.

It should be noted that regardless of how hard administrators try, not everyone will be pleased with the decisions made during the consolidation of an organization,

specifically a police department merger. Leaders will quickly learn that their efforts attempting to please everyone will inevitably fail.

Leadership consists of collectively motivating and influencing individuals to accomplish a common goal. This goal may be merger or go beyond the initial stages of an innovation such as merger. From this perspective, leaders of consolidation should attempt to develop a comprehensive plan focusing on immediate changes and the perceptions of those changes, in addition to the organization's future.

Additionally, law enforcement executives involved in an innovation such as merger should also concentrate more on diffusion of the innovation and inclusiveness as part of the innovation. This will help to dispel pre-merger misconceptions, alleviate the chaotic nature of the merger, and help to mold positive perceptions and ultimately satisfaction. Ultimately, this will lead to support of the innovation of merger.

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APPENDIX A
RECRUITMENT MATERIALS

PRE-RECRUITMENT E-MAIL

To: [Email]
From: "jcreed01@cardmail.louisville.edu via surveymonkey.com"
<member@surveymonkey.com>
Subject: Attirudes about Police Merger-John Reed Study on Survey Monkey
Body: Dear LMPD Police Officer:

My name is John Reed, a retired officer from LMPD. I am currently pursuing my doctoral degree and I am Ph.D. candidate in the Urban and Public Affairs program at the University of Louisville. My dissertation topic involves perceptions and attitudes about the Louisville/Jefferson County Police consolidation that occurred in 2003. More specifically, I am studying how a police officer's perception of the difficulty in merging these departments affects their support for the consolidation. Cynthia Negrey, Ph.D. of the Department of Sociology serves as chair of my committee and is overseeing my work.

I am surveying police officers who are currently working for the Louisville Metro Police Department and were working for either the Louisville Division of Police or the Jefferson County Police Department prior to the merger in 2003.

As such, you have been selected to receive an online survey to complete.

Please consider this note a request for you to participate by answering questions that will be sent to you via email this Thursday on August 23, 2012. The survey should take approximately 10 minutes to complete.

As you know, there is very little "scientific" research surrounding the Louisville/Jefferson County Police consolidation in 2003. While some attention has been focused on other police department consolidations, this survey is interested in your attitudes and perceptions as a police officer who has experienced merger here in Louisville. The survey is confidential. Individuals taking the survey will not be identified; identities and IP addresses will not be collected in the survey design. After data is collected and analyzed, results will be reported in aggregate form and made available upon request.

You can expect to receive a link to the online survey, hosted by Survey Monkey, as an email on August 23, 2012. If you are willing to participate but prefer a different email address, please respond to this communication before Wednesday, August 22, 2012 at noon and provide the more preferable email address.

If you have any questions about this survey, please feel free to contact me or my advisor, Dr. Cynthia Negrey. She can be reached via email at cnegr01@louisville.edu or by phone at 502-852-6836.

Again, I will send you the link to the survey this Thursday. Thank you in advance for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,

John C. Reed, Jr.
Ph.D Candidate, Urban and Public Affairs
University of Louisville
jcreed01@louisville.edu
(502) 387-6802

This electronic mail message and any files transmitted with it are the property of John Reed and are intended exclusively for the individual or entity to which it is addressed. The message, together with any attachments, may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, print, save, copy, disclosure or distribution is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, please immediately advise the sender by reply email and delete all copies.

RECRUITMENT INVITATION E-MAIL TO POPULATION

To: [Email]
From: "jcreed01@cardmail.louisville.edu via surveymonkey.com"
<member@surveymonkey.com>
Subject: Survey Link to John Reed Study on Survey Monkey - Attitudes about Police Consolidation
Body: Dear LMPD Officer:

On Tuesday, I forwarded an email to you regarding a study about the Louisville/Jefferson County Police merger. You are being invited to participate in a research study about police officers' attitudes and perceptions related to the Louisville-Jefferson County police consolidation.

Attached is a survey consisting of 32 questions. If you choose to participate in the study, it should take you approximately 10 minutes to complete the survey. On the first page of the survey are the instructions. Page two and three contain the informed consent. The actual survey questions begin on page four.

If you are willing to participate in the study, this is the link to the survey: <http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx> . The survey will remain active from 08/20/12 until 12:00pm CST 09/20/12.

The survey is confidential. There are no known risks for your participation in this research study. The information collected may not benefit you directly. However, the information you provide on the attached survey may be helpful to decision makers in understanding the impact police officers' perceptions and attitudes had on the consolidation. Also, this information could be beneficial to other police agencies considering a police consolidation. Your participation will also benefit me in my efforts to complete my doctoral degree at the University of Louisville in Urban and Public Affairs.

Individuals from the Department of Urban and Public Affairs, the Institutional Review Board (IRB), the Human Subjects Protection Program Office (HSPPO), and other regulatory agencies may inspect these records. In all other respects, however, the data will be held in confidence to the extent permitted by law. Should the data be published, your identity will not be disclosed.

Taking part in this study is voluntary. To take part in this study, please click this link: <http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx> . When you complete the survey, it will automatically be returned to John C. Reed, Jr. (retired Louisville Metro Police Department). If you agree to complete the survey, you agree to take part in this research study. You do not have to answer any questions on the questionnaire that make you uncomfortable. You may choose not to take part at

all. If you decide to be in this study you may stop taking part at any time. If you decide not to be in this study or if you stop taking part after beginning the survey, there will be no negative consequences for your decision.

If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about the research study, please contact me or the principal researcher, Dr. Cynthia L. Negrey, who is supervising my project.

If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may call the Human Subjects Protection Program Office at (502) 852-5188. You can discuss any questions about your rights as a research subject, in private, with a member of the Institutional Review Board (IRB). You may also call this number if you have other questions about the research, and you cannot reach the research staff, or want to talk to someone else. The IRB is an independent committee made up of people from the University community, staff of the institutions, as well as people from the community not connected with these institutions. The IRB has reviewed this research study.

If you have concerns or complaints about the research or research staff and you do not wish to give your name, you may call 1-877-852-1167. This is a 24 hour hot line answered by people who do not work at the University of Louisville.

Thanks in advance for your participation with this study. I really appreciate your help.

Again, the link to the survey is <http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx> .

Sincerely,

John

Researchers:
John C. Reed, Jr., M.S.
Department of Justice Administration
Brigman Hall
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Louisville, KY 40292
(502) 852-6567
JCReed01@louisville.edu

Cynthia L. Negrey, Ph.D
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Lutz Hall
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Louisville, KY 40292
(502) 852-8023
Clnegr01@louisville.edu

Please note: If you do not wish to receive further emails from us, please click the link below, and you will be automatically removed from our mailing list.
<http://www.surveymonkey.com/optout.aspx>

FOLLOW-UP E-MAIL TO POPULATION

To: [Email]
From: "jcreed01@cardmail.louisville.edu via surveymonkey.com"
<member@surveymonkey.com>
Subject: Reminder - John Reed's Survey on Attitudes Regarding Police Merger
Body: Dear LMPD Police Officer:

As I know all of you are busy, I wanted to send this reminder to request your assistance in completing the survey regarding attitudes about the police merger. There is only a couple of weeks left to complete the survey and your input is very important.

Please click on the following link to access the survey
<http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx> .

As you will recall, I am conducting this research to complete the requirements for my doctoral degree at the University of Louisville. My dissertation topic involves police officer perceptions and attitudes about the Louisville/Jefferson County Police merger. I am surveying police officers who are currently working for the Louisville Metro Police Department and were working for either the Louisville Division of Police or the Jefferson County Police Department prior to 2003.

The survey is anonymous and confidential and will take approximately 10 minutes to complete. Individuals taking the survey will not be identified; identities and IP addresses will not be collected in the survey design. After data is collected and analyzed, results will be reported in aggregate form and made available upon request.

If you have any questions about this survey, please feel free to contact me. Thank you in advance for your time and consideration. Again, click this link to access the survey <http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx> .

Sincerely,

John Reed, Ret., LMPD

Researcher:
John C. Reed, Jr., M.S.
Department of Justice Administration

Brigman Hall
University of Louisville
Louisville, KY 40292 (502) 852-6567
JCReed01@louisville.edu

Please note: If you do not wish to receive further emails from me, please click the link below, and you will be automatically removed from our mailing list.
<http://www.surveymonkey.com/optout.aspx>

APPENDIX B
SURVEY DOCUMENTS

Attitudes Toward Police Department Merger

Thank you for taking time to complete this very important survey. Your feedback is important in assessing attitudes toward the merger of the Louisville Division of Police and the Jefferson County Police Department.

This survey should take approximately 10 minutes of your time to complete. Your answers will be completely anonymous and confidential.

In order to progress through this survey, please use the following navigation links.

- Click the Next >> button to continue to the next page.
- Click the Previous >> button to return to the previous page.
- Click the Submit >> button to submit your survey.

The next two pages contain the informed consent or information regarding your rights as a respondent to the survey. Following the informed consent pages, the survey will begin.

Please check the block next to the answer you select that best signifies your response or position. Thank you again for participating in this important study.

ATTITUDES TOWARD LOUISVILLE-JEFFERSON COUNTY POLICE CONSOLIDATION

Investigator(s) name & address: Principal Researcher:
Cynthia L. Negrey, Ph.D Department of Sociology Lutz Hall
University of Louisville
Louisville, KY 40292
502) 852-6836
Clnegr01@louisville.edu

Other Researcher:

John C. Reed, Jr., M. S. Urban and Public Affairs
University of Louisville
Louisville, KY 40292
(502) 387-6802
jcreed01@louisville.edu

Site(s) where study is to be conducted:

University of Louisville
Researcher's Home
Louisville, KY

Phone number for subjects to call for questions:

Cynthia L. Negrey (502) 852-6836
John C. Reed, Jr. (502) 387-6802

Introduction and Background Information

You are invited to participate in a research study. The study is being conducted by Cynthia L. Negrey, Ph.D., and John C. Reed, Jr., M.S., both of the University of Louisville.

Attitudes Toward Police Department Merger

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to understand police officers' perceptions of the Louisville Metro Police Department's consolidation process and how these perceptions affect support for merger. More specifically, how does a police officer's perception of difficulty in merging departments affect their support for merger.

Participants

You are being asked to participate in this study because of your experiences with the Louisville/Jefferson County Police consolidation. The criterion for participation is police officers currently employed by the Louisville Metro Police Department who have also served on either the Louisville Division of Police or the Jefferson County Police Department prior to the consolidation of the two departments in 2003.

Procedures

If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete a survey consisting of 32 questions. It should take approximately 10 minutes to complete the survey. If you agree to participate, you may decline to answer any questions that may make you uncomfortable. Results from the survey will be compiled and analyzed in their aggregate form.

Costs/Compensation

You will not be compensated for your time, inconvenience, or expenses for your participation in this study.

Potential Risks

There are no foreseeable risks other than possible discomfort in answering personal questions. You have the right to refuse to answer any questions; participation is entirely voluntary, and may be terminated at any time by striking the "cancel" button on the survey so that answers are not recorded.

Benefits

The information collected through your interview may not benefit you directly. However, the information you provide in your interview may be helpful to the Louisville Metro Police Department decision makers in understanding the impact police officers' perceptions and attitudes had toward the consolidation and the department. Also, this information could be beneficial to other police agencies considering a police consolidation.

Confidentiality

Total privacy cannot be guaranteed. Your privacy will be protected to the extent permitted by law. If the results from this study are published, your name will not be made public. While unlikely, the following may look at the study records:

- The University of Louisville Institutional Review Board, and Human Subjects Protection Program Office.
- Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP),

Attitudes Toward Police Department Merger

If you agree to complete the survey, the results of the survey will be stored in a secure location at the researcher's home.

Voluntary Participation

Taking part in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to take part at all. If you decide to be in this study you may stop taking part at any time. If you decide not to be in this study or if you stop taking part at any time, you will not lose any benefits for which you may qualify.

How Finding will be Used

The data collected will be analyzed and reported in generalities as doctoral dissertation public research conducted at the University of Louisville. Data will be reported in general terms or in aggregate form. Individual responses will not be reported. If for some reason you do not understand how the findings will be used, please contact one of the researchers to ask questions and have been given answers to them prior to proceeding.

Research Subject's Rights, Questions, Concerns, and Complaints

If you have any concerns or complaints about the study or the study staff, you have three options. You may contact the principal investigator at (502) 852-6836.

If you have any questions about your rights as a study subject, questions, concerns or complaints, you may call the Human Subjects Protection Program Office (HSPPO) (502) 852-5188. You may discuss any questions about your rights as a subject, in secret, with a member of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) or the HSPPO staff. The IRB is an independent committee composed of members of the University community, staff of the institutions, as well as lay members of the community not connected with these institutions. The IRB has reviewed this study.

If you want to speak to a person outside the University, you may call 1-877-852-1167. You will be given the chance to talk about any questions, concerns or complaints in secret. This is a 24 hour hot line answered by people who do not work at the University of Louisville.

This paper tells you what will happen during the study if you choose to take part. As this is an on-line computer generated survey on Survey Monkey, Inc., your action of taking the survey is in and of itself a demonstration of your consent that you have taken this survey voluntarily under the conditions as presented. This informed consent document is not a contract. You are not giving up any legal rights by continuing and participating in this study.

If you have any questions regarding this study or survey, before proceeding, please contact the primary researcher, John C. Reed, Jr. at 502.387.6802. Thank you in advance for your time.

LIST OF INVESTIGATORS PHONE NUMBERS

Cynthia L. Negrey (502) 852-6836

John C. Reed, Jr. (502) 387-6802

Click the "Next" button to participate in the survey or close out of the window to exit.

Attitudes Toward Police Department Merger

1. Prior to the police department merger and inception of LMPD in 2003, I was supportive of the consolidation of the Louisville Division of Police (LDP) and the Jefferson County Police Department (JCPD).

- 1) Strongly agree
- 2) Agree
- 3) Undecided
- 4) Disagree
- 5) Strongly disagree

2. Currently, I am supportive of the merger of the Louisville Division of Police and the Jefferson County Police Department.

- 1) Strongly agree
- 2) Agree
- 3) Undecided
- 4) Disagree
- 5) Strongly disagree

3. Prior to the police department merger and inception of LMPD in 2003, did you have any experience with a police consolidation?

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Don't recall/prefer not to answer

4. Did you serve on any of the merger committees at the inception of LMPD in 2003?

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Don't recall/prefer not to answer

Attitudes Toward Police Department Merger

5. If you did serve on any of the merger committees, please indicate on which committee or committees you served (check all that apply).

- 1) Badge/Patch/Vehicle Markings
- 2) CIS/CID Consolidation
- 3) Communications
- 4) Community Outreach
- 5) Facilities
- 6) Fleet Management
- 7) Impoundment
- 8) In-car Cameras
- 9) Information Technology
- 10) Intelligence/SIU
- 11) Mission Statement/Values
- 12) Policy
- 13) Property Room Consolidation
- 14) Records
- 15) Recruiting/Hiring
- 16) Specialty Teams
- 17) Training
- 18) Uniforms
- 19) Weapon Issues
- 20) Workload Analysis

6. If you did not serve on one of the merger committees, did you talk about merger to someone who did serve on a committee?

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Don't recall/prefer not to answer

7. How satisfied are you with the culture that was created at the time of merger?

- 1) Very Satisfied
- 2) Satisfied
- 3) Somewhat satisfied
- 4) Somewhat unsatisfied
- 5) Unsatisfied
- 6) Very Unsatisfied
- 7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer

Attitudes Toward Police Department Merger

8. How satisfied were you with the mission statement that was created and implemented as a result of merging the LDP and JCPD?

- 1) Very Satisfied
- 2) Satisfied
- 3) Somewhat satisfied
- 4) Somewhat unsatisfied
- 5) Unsatisfied
- 6) Very Unsatisfied
- 7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer

9. How satisfied were you with the new values statement that was created and implemented as a result of merging the LDP and JCPD?

- 1) Very Satisfied
- 2) Satisfied
- 3) Somewhat satisfied
- 4) Somewhat unsatisfied
- 5) Unsatisfied
- 6) Very Unsatisfied
- 7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer

10. How satisfied were you with the LMPD decentralization policy (reassigning personnel from specialty units) that was implemented as a result of merging the LDP and JCPD?

- 1) Very satisfied
- 2) Satisfied
- 3) Somewhat satisfied
- 4) Somewhat unsatisfied
- 5) Unsatisfied
- 6) Very unsatisfied
- 7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer

11. How satisfied were you with the new policy and procedure manual that was initially created and implemented as a result of merging the LDP and JCPD?

- 1) Very satisfied
- 2) Satisfied
- 3) Somewhat satisfied
- 4) Somewhat unsatisfied
- 5) Unsatisfied
- 6) Very Unsatisfied
- 7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer

Attitudes Toward Police Department Merger

12. How satisfied were you with the new administrative reporting practices that were initially created and implemented as a result of merging the LDP and JCPD?

- 1) Very satisfied
- 2) Satisfied
- 3) Somewhat satisfied
- 4) Somewhat unsatisfied
- 5) Unsatisfied
- 6) Very Unsatisfied
- 7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer

13. How satisfied were you with the choice of weapon(s) that were initially selected for carry as a result of merging the LDP and JCPD?

- 1) Very satisfied
- 2) Satisfied
- 3) Somewhat satisfied
- 4) Somewhat unsatisfied
- 5) Unsatisfied
- 6) Very Unsatisfied
- 7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer

14. How satisfied were you with the ratified collective bargaining contracts that resulted from the process of merging the LDP and JCPD?

- 1) Very satisfied
- 2) Satisfied
- 3) Somewhat satisfied
- 4) Somewhat unsatisfied
- 5) Unsatisfied
- 6) Very Unsatisfied
- 7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer

15. How satisfied were you with the pay rates of the ratified contracts (mentioned in question # 14) that resulted from the process of merging the LDP and JCPD?

- 1) Very satisfied
- 2) Satisfied
- 3) Somewhat satisfied
- 4) Somewhat unsatisfied
- 5) Unsatisfied
- 6) Very unsatisfied
- 7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer

Attitudes Toward Police Department Merger

16. How satisfied were you with the employee benefits of the ratified contracts (mentioned in question # 14) that resulted from the process of merging the LDP and JCPD?

- 1) Very satisfied
- 2) Satisfied
- 3) Somewhat satisfied
- 4) Somewhat unsatisfied
- 5) Unsatisfied
- 6) Very unsatisfied
- 7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer

17. How satisfied were you with the new patrol division boundaries that were initially created and implemented as a result of merging the LDP and JCPD?

- 1) Very satisfied
- 2) Satisfied
- 3) Somewhat satisfied
- 4) Somewhat unsatisfied
- 5) Unsatisfied
- 6) Very unsatisfied
- 7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer

18. How satisfied were you with the equalization of workload in the patrol divisions that was initially calculated and implemented as a result of merging the LDP and JCPD?

- 1) Very satisfied
- 2) Satisfied
- 3) Somewhat satisfied
- 4) Somewhat unsatisfied
- 5) Unsatisfied
- 6) Very unsatisfied
- 7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer

Attitudes Toward Police Department Merger

19. How satisfied were you with the geographical size of the patrol divisions that were created and implemented as a result of merging the LDP and JCPD?

- 1) Very satisfied
- 2) Satisfied
- 3) Somewhat satisfied
- 4) Somewhat unsatisfied
- 5) Unsatisfied
- 6) Very unsatisfied
- 7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer

20. How satisfied were you with the communications section that was created and implemented as a result of merging the LDP and JCPD?

- 1) Very satisfied
- 2) Satisfied
- 3) Somewhat satisfied
- 4) Somewhat unsatisfied
- 5) Unsatisfied
- 6) Very unsatisfied
- 7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer

21. How satisfied were you with the policy of using the 10-codes that was implemented as a result of merging the LDP and JCPD?

- 1) Very satisfied
- 2) Satisfied
- 3) Somewhat satisfied
- 4) Somewhat unsatisfied
- 5) Unsatisfied
- 6) Very Unsatisfied
- 7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer

22. How satisfied were you with the car numbers that were created and implemented as a result of merging the LDP and JCPD?

- 1) Very satisfied
- 2) Satisfied
- 3) Somewhat satisfied
- 4) Somewhat unsatisfied
- 5) Unsatisfied
- 6) Very unsatisfied
- 7) Don't recall/prefer not to answer

Attitudes Toward Police Department Merger

23. In your opinion, how difficult was it to merge the following organizational change components of LDP and JCPD?

	Very easy	Easy	Somewhat easy	Somewhat difficult	Difficult	Very difficult	No opinion
Cultures	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Mission Statements	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Values Statements	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Decentralization of Personnel from Specialty Units	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Policy and Procedure Manuals	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Administrative Reporting Practices	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Type of weapon Patrol Officers would carry	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Collective Bargaining	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Contracts	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Reconcile Pay Scales	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Reconcile Employee Benefits (As defined by contract)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Patrol Division Boundaries	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Equalize workload in merged patrol divisions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Geographical size of the patrol divisions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Communication Sections	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
10-Codes	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Car Numbers	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

24. For which police department did you work prior to the merger in 2003?

- 1) Louisville Division of Police (LDP)
- 2) Jefferson County Police Department (JCPD)

25. How many total years of experience do you have in law enforcement?

- 1) 0 years up to and including 5 years
- 2) More than 5 years up to and including 10 years
- 3) More than 10 years up to and including 15 years
- 4) More than 15 years up to and including 20 years
- 5) More than 20 years

Attitudes Toward Police Department Merger

26. How many years had you worked for either LDP or JCPD prior to the merger in 2003?

- 1) 0 years up to and including 5 years
- 2) More than 5 years up to and including 10 years
- 3) More than 10 years up to and including 15 years
- 4) More than 15 years up to and including 20 years
- 5) More than 20 years

27. What is your current rank?

- 1) Patrol Officer
- 2) Detective
- 3) Sergeant
- 4) Middle Management (Lieutenant or Captain)
- 5) Staff Officer (Major, Lieutenant Colonel, or Colonel)

28. What was your rank when LDP and JCPD merged in 2003?

- 1) Patrol Officer
- 2) Detective
- 3) First Line Supervision (Sergeant)
- 4) Middle Management (Lieutenant or Captain)
- 5) Staff Officer (Major, Lieutenant Colonel, or Colonel)

29. What is your current age?

30. What is your gender?

- 1) Male
- 2) Female

31. What is your race?

- 1) American Indian or Alaska Native
- 2) Asian or Asian American
- 3) Black or African-American
- 4) Hispanic or Latino
- 5) White (Non-Hispanic)
- 6) Other (Please specify)

Attitudes Toward Police Department Merger

32. What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If currently enrolled, mark the previous grade or highest degree received.

- 1) High school graduate - high school diploma or the equivalent (GED)
- 2) Some college credit, but less than 1 year
- 3) 1 or more years of college, no degree
- 4) Associate degree (AA, AS)
- 5) Bachelor's degree (BA, AB, BS)
- 6) Master's degree (e.g. MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA)
- 7) Professional degree (e.g. MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD)
- 8) Doctorate degree (PhD, EdD)

Survey Completed

Thank you for helping researchers better understand this important police issue.

Your time and attention is of great value, and your participation in this survey is sincerely appreciated.

If you would like to receive survey results when they are compiled and the final report is available, please contact John Reed at jc.reed@ymail.com.

Please click the "Done" button below to submit the survey.

APPENDIX C
TABLES

Table 12 – LDP OCC Satisfaction Responses

Variables	VS	S	SS	SU	U	VU	DR
Sculture	1.2% (3)	14.2% (34)	18.8% (45)	17.1% (41)	27.1% (65)	20.8% (50)	0.8% (2)
Smission	5.0% (12)	36.0% (87)	29.8% (72)	9.1% (22)	9.5% (23)	5.8% (14)	5.0% (12)
Svalues	5.4% (13)	36.8% (89)	25.2% (61)	10.3% (25)	8.3% (20)	8.3% (20)	5.8% (14)
Sdecent	0.8% (2)	7.9% (19)	7.9% (19)	15.4% (37)	27.9% (67)	37.9% (91)	2.1% (5)
Spp	1.7% (4)	16.9 (41)	20.7% (50)	17.4% (42)	17.8% (43)	24.4% (59)	1.2% (3)
Srept	2.1% (5)	12.5% (30)	22.9% (55)	20.4% (49)	16.2% (39)	21.2% (51)	4.6% (11)
Swapon	44.1% (105)	44.1% (105)	5.9% (14)	2.9% (7)	0.8% (2)	1.7% (4)	0.4% (1)
Scontract	14.2% (34)	38.9% (93)	20.9% (50)	7.5% (18)	12.6% (30)	5.4% (13)	0.4% (1)
Spay	20.7% (50)	35.1% (85)	19.4% (47)	5.8% (14)	11.6% (28)	7.0% (17)	0.4% (1)
Sbenefit	19.6% (47)	38.3% (92)	22.9% (55)	6.2% (15)	8.8% (21)	3.8% (9)	0.4% (1)
Sboundary	1.2% (3)	21.1% (51)	15.7% (38)	12.8% (31)	19.0% (46)	29.8% (72)	0.4% (1)
Sequal	0.4% (1)	18.1% (44)	15.6% (38)	18.1% (44)	20.6% (50)	24.7% (60)	2.5% (6)
Ssize	0.4% (1)	16.9% (41)	14.4% (35)	18.9% (46)	24.3% (59)	24.3% (59)	0.8% (2)
Scomm	2.5% (6)	16.9% (41)	19.8% (48)	13.6% (33)	19.0% (46)	27.7% (67)	0.4% (1)
S10	5.0% (12)	24.2% (58)	17.9% (43)	14.6% (35)	17.5% (42)	19.2% (46)	1.7% (4)
Scar	7.0% (17)	50.4% (122)	17.8% (43)	5.4% (13)	8.7% (21)	8.7% (21)	2.1% (5)

*VS=Very Satisfied, S=Satisfied, SS=Somewhat Satisfied, SU=Somewhat unsatisfied, U=Unsatisfied, VU=Very unsatisfied, DR=Don't recall/prefer not to answer

Table 13 – JCPD OCC Satisfaction Responses

Variables	VS	S	SS	SU	U	VU	DR
Sculture	0.0% (0)	6.8% (9)	13.5% (18)	11.3% (5)	22.6% (30)	45.1% (60)	0.8% (1)
Smission	5.3% (7)	24.8% (33)	19.5% (26)	9.0% (12)	18.8% (25)	14.3% (19)	8.3% (11)
Svalues	6.0% (8)	27.1% (36)	21.8% (29)	9.0% (12)	10.5% (14)	17.3% (23)	8.3% (11)
Sdecent	0.0% (0)	6.0% (8)	16.5% (22)	14.3% (19)	19.5% (26)	39.1% (52)	4.5% (6)
Spp	0.8% (1)	7.6% (10)	6.9% (9)	16.0% (21)	20.6% (27)	46.6% (61)	1.5% (2)
Srept	0.0% (0)	11.3% (15)	18.8% (25)	9.8% (13)	21.8% (29)	37.6% (50)	0.8% (1)
Sweapon	12.1% (16)	41.7% (55)	13.6% (18)	9.1% (12)	8.3% (11)	11.4% (15)	3.8% (5)
Scontract	0.0% (0)	4.5% (6)	13.6% (18)	9.8% (13)	18.9% (25)	52.3% (69)	0.8% (1)
Spay	0.0% (0)	3.0% (4)	11.3% (15)	9.0% (12)	21.8% (29)	53.4% (71)	1.5% (2)
Sbenefit	0.8% (1)	7.6% (10)	16.0% (21)	12.2% (16)	12.2% (16)	50.4% (66)	0.8% (1)
Sboundary	1.5% (2)	22.9% (30)	32.8% (43)	13.0% (17)	12.2% (16)	16.8% (22)	0.8% (1)
Sequal	0.8% (1)	22.8% (29)	32.3% (43)	5.3% (7)	14.3% (19)	18.8% (25)	6.8% (9)
Ssize	0.8% (1)	26.9% (35)	29.2% (38)	8.5% (11)	15.4% (20)	17.7% (23)	1.5% (2)
Scomm	1.5% (2)	17.4% (23)	15.9% (21)	9.8% (13)	21.2% (28)	32.6% (42)	1.5% (2)
S10	15.0% (20)	25.3% (47)	15.0% (20)	9.8% (13)	4.5% (6)	18.8% (25)	1.5% (2)
Scar	7.6% (10)	48.9% (64)	16.8% (22)	9.9% (13)	5.3% (7)	9.9% (13)	1.5% (2)

*VS=Very Satisfied, S=Satisfied, SS=Somewhat Satisfied, SU=Somewhat unsatisfied,
U=Unsatisfied, VU=Very unsatisfied, DR=Don't recall/prefer not to answer

Table 15 – LDP OCC Complexity Responses

Variables	VE	E	SE	SD	D	VD	NO
Cculture	1.7% (4)	6.6% (16)	9.1% (22)	18.7% (45)	23.7% (57)	39.9% (95)	0.8% (2)
Cmission	4.6% (11)	28.5% (68)	37.2% (89)	13.8% (33)	5.0% (12)	3.8% (9)	7.1% (17)
Cvalues	5.4% (13)	28.1% (68)	35.1% (85)	14.5% (35)	5.0% (12)	4.5% (11)	7.4% (18)
Cdecent	1.2% (3)	5.8% (14)	10.0% (24)	27.4% (66)	29.9% (72)	23.2% (56)	2.5% (6)
Cpp	0.8% (2)	12.9% (31)	22.4% (54)	24.9% (60)	19.9% (48)	15.8% (38)	3.3% (8)
Crept	0.8% (2)	12.6% (30)	23.1% (55)	26.9% (64)	17.6% (42)	11.8% (28)	7.1% (17)
Cweapon	21.2% (51)	40.0% (96)	23.8% (57)	6.2% (15)	3.8% (9)	2.9% (7)	2.1% (5)
Ccontract	2.1% (5)	19.5% (47)	27.4% (66)	19.5% (47)	17.4% (42)	10.8% (26)	3.3% (8)
Cpay	3.3% (8)	24.3% (58)	23.0% (55)	21.8% (52)	14.2% (34)	9.6% (23)	3.8% (9)
Cbenefit	3.3% (8)	23.1% (56)	25.6% (62)	23.6% (57)	11.6% (28)	9.5% (23)	3.3% (8)
Cboundary	1.7% (4)	13.8% (33)	15.0% (36)	29.6% (71)	20.0% (48)	18.8% (45)	1.2% (3)
Cequal	2.1% (5)	10.4% (25)	11.2% (27)	29.0% (70)	26.1% (63)	18.3% (44)	2.9% (7)
Csize	1.7% (4)	12.9% (31)	14.6% (35)	24.6% (59)	22.9% (55)	21.2% (51)	2.1% (5)
Ccomm	1.2% (3)	11.2% (27)	16.7% (40)	22.1% (53)	23.3% (56)	23.3% (56)	2.1% (5)
C10	8.8% (21)	23.4% (56)	28.0% (6)	15.5% (37)	10.9% (26)	10.9% (26)	2.5% (6)
Ccar	12.4% (30)	36.5% (88)	24.9% (60)	12.9% (31)	5.8% (14)	5.4% (13)	2.1% (5)

*VE=Very Easy, E=Easy, SE=Somewhat Easy, SD=Somewhat difficult,
D=Difficult, VD=Very difficult, NO=No Opinion

Table 16 – JCPD OCC Complexity Responses

Variables	VE	E	SE	SD	D	VD	NO
Cculture	0.8% (1)	3.8% (5)	6.8% (9)	15.8% (21)	26.3% (35)	44.4% (59)	2.3% (3)
Cmission	6.1% (8)	25.8% (34)	29.5% (39)	15.9% (21)	8.3% (11)	6.1% (8)	8.3% (11)
Cvalues	6.8% (9)	24.8% (33)	30.1% (40)	12.0% (16)	10.5% (14)	7.5% (10)	8.3% (11)
Cdecent	0.0% (0)	4.5% (6)	12.0% (16)	25.6% (34)	30.1% (40)	25.6% (34)	2.3% (3)
Cpp	0.8% (1)	6.0% (8)	11.3% (15)	23.3% (31)	30.1% (40)	26.3% (35)	2.3% (3)
Crept	1.5% (2)	7.6% (10)	18.2% (24)	27.3% (36)	22.0% (29)	18.9% (25)	4.5% (6)
Cweapon	9.8% (13)	29.5% (39)	25.0% (33)	12.9% (17)	9.8% (13)	7.6% (10)	5.3% (7)
Ccontract	2.3% (3)	3.0% (4)	12.8% (17)	29.3% (39)	18.0% (24)	32.3% (43)	2.3% (3)
Cpay	2.3% (3)	5.3% (7)	14.3% (19)	22.6% (30)	17.3% (23)	35.3% (47)	3.0% (4)
Cbenefit	1.5% (2)	6.8% (9)	16.7% (22)	21.2% (28)	17.4% (23)	33.3% (44)	3.0% (4)
Cboundary	2.3% (3)	12.8% (17)	23.3% (31)	28.6% (38)	15.0% (20)	15.0% (20)	3.0% (4)
Cequal	2.3% (3)	12.2% (16)	24.4% (32)	22.1% (29)	16.8% (22)	18.3% (24)	3.8% (5)
Csize	3.8% (5)	10.5% (14)	24.8% (33)	23.3% (31)	15.0% (20)	18.8% (25)	3.8% (5)
Ccomm	2.3% (3)	6.8% (9)	11.4% (15)	25.0% (33)	16.7% (22)	34.1% (45)	3.8% (5)
C10	12.0% (16)	24.1% (32)	24.1% (32)	17.3% (23)	6.0% (8)	12.8% (17)	3.8% (5)
Ccar	15.3% (20)	35.9% (47)	20.6% (27)	11.5% (15)	4.6% (6)	6.9% (9)	5.3% (7)

*VE=Very Easy, E=Easy, SE=Somewhat Easy, SD=Somewhat difficult, D=Difficult, VD=Very difficult, NO=No Opinion

Table 17 - Descriptive Statistics

Variable	LDP			JCPD			Combined Departments		
	<u>N</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>
Psupport	211	2.3649	1.33613	126	4.3651	1.13	345	3.0899	1.59050
Csupport	221	2.1946	1.26245	116	3.7155	1.40	348	2.7184	1.49003
Experience	242	1.9421	0.23395	132	1.9545	0.20	386	1.9482	.22194
Serve	242	1.8926	0.31031	132	1.8788	0.32	384	1.8906	.31252
Committee	23	10.2174	7.32342	12	8.8333	6.08	35	9.7429	6.86570
Committee1	10	12.3	6.60051	7	11.428	4.31	17	11.9412	5.62884
Committee2	2	13.5	3.53553	3	15.333	3.51	5	14.6000	3.20936
Committee3	2	16	1.41421	2	18.5	2.12	4	17.2500	2.06155
Talk	210	1.7524	0.43266	109	1.5321	0.50	330	1.6848	.46528
Sculture	238	4.1807	1.40107	132	4.8636	1.31	379	4.4222	1.40526
Smission	230	2.9957	1.27966	122	3.5902	1.57	360	3.1917	1.40807
Svalues	228	3.0439	1.3692	122	3.4672	1.61	358	3.1788	1.46151
Sdecent	235	4.7915	1.30217	127	4.7244	1.32	371	4.7439	1.31999
Spp	239	4.0711	1.48916	129	4.907	1.31	376	4.3511	1.48742
Sreport	229	4.048	1.42421	132	4.5606	1.44	367	4.2371	1.44893
Sweapon	237	1.7679	0.95721	127	2.937	1.56	373	2.1769	1.32219
Scontract	238	2.8151	1.41699	131	5.0153	1.26	376	3.5957	1.72089
Spay	241	2.7344	1.5097	131	5.1298	1.16	380	3.5737	1.80803
Sbenefit	239	2.5732	1.32283	130	4.8	1.43	376	3.3564	1.72993
Sboundary	241	4.1701	1.57589	130	3.6231	1.43	379	3.9710	1.55216
Sequal	237	4.173	1.46413	124	3.7177	1.50	368	4.0190	1.49374
Ssize	241	4.2365	1.42817	128	3.6484	1.49	375	4.0293	1.47409
Scomm	241	4.1328	1.54886	130	4.3154	1.57	377	4.1857	1.55485
S10	236	3.7415	1.58883	131	3.0992	1.72	375	3.5093	1.66090
Scar	237	2.8397	1.41107	129	2.8605	1.42	374	2.8449	1.40947
Cculture	239	4.7573	1.33146	130	5.0077	1.17	371	4.8383	1.28641
Cmission	222	2.973	1.11314	121	3.1405	1.29	345	3.0261	1.17973
Cvalues	224	2.9911	1.16369	122	3.1885	1.36	348	3.0632	1.24355
Cdecent	235	4.5234	1.20295	130	4.6154	1.13	367	4.5422	1.19092
Cpp	233	4.0086	1.30645	130	4.5846	1.21	364	4.2170	1.30252
Crept	221	3.8959	1.25156	126	4.2302	1.27	348	4.0115	1.27258
Cweapon	235	2.3872	1.17989	125	3.064	1.41	361	2.6205	1.30491
Ccontract	233	3.6524	1.34042	130	4.5846	1.28	364	3.9808	1.39348
Cpay	230	3.5	1.36631	129	4.5814	1.37	360	3.8833	1.46367
Cbenefit	234	3.4701	1.33022	128	4.5078	1.38	363	3.8320	1.43626
Cboundary	237	4.1013	1.34915	129	3.8915	1.32	367	4.0300	1.34151
Cequal	234	4.2521	1.30388	126	3.9762	1.38	361	4.1579	1.33749
Csize	235	4.2043	1.37778	128	3.9531	1.41	364	4.1181	1.39254
Ccomm	235	4.2766	1.36661	127	4.5512	1.38	362	4.3729	1.37715
C10	233	3.2961	1.46005	128	3.2031	1.53	362	3.2624	1.48312
Ccar	236	2.7881	1.30695	124	2.7339	1.39	361	2.7673	1.33381
PD	243	1	0	133	2	0	376	1.3537	.47876
Yearsexp	239	3.7908	0.85391	133	3.797	0.85	374	3.7941	.85261
Deptyrs	241	1.9004	0.92107	133	1.8722	0.93	376	1.8936	.92339
Rank	242	2.3802	1.17198	133	2.0526	0.97	377	2.2626	1.11207
Rankmerge	243	1.6049	0.89552	133	1.4586	0.75	378	1.5529	.84853
Age	239	43.3849	6.0121	126	40.833	5.48	367	42.5014	5.94045
Gender	241	1.166	0.37283	132	1.1212	0.32	375	1.1493	.35689
Education	243	3.8889	1.50206	132	3.803	1.29	377	3.8594	1.43062
Wvnon	241	0.8548	0.35306	128	0.8594	0.34	371	.8571	.35040
Serviceoncommittee	2	43.5	12.02082	2	48.5	4.94	4	46.0000	8.04156
Satisfaction	181	56.1492	13.18311	100	65.19	14.3	285	59.3123	14.2066
Orgsat	203	23.1724	6.36161	114	25.956	6.80	322	24.1180	6.64674
Persat	227	9.8722	4.12058	121	17.909	3.96	354	12.6469	5.56875
Worksat	233	12.6137	4.15914	119	10.916	3.94	358	12.0335	4.16050
Commsat	231	10.7013	3.2319	125	10.224	3.25	362	10.5221	3.24968
Complexity	181	58.9448	13.0753	98	63.744	13.7	279	60.6308	13.4980
Overallsupport	191	4.4869	2.21207	110	8.1727	2.12	308	5.8052	2.56253

Table 18 - Correlation Matrix

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Psupport	--	.581***	.103	.050	.039	-.082	.208	.608	-.105	.347***
2. Csupport			-.031	-.010	.025	.146	-.272	.137	-.130*	.536***
3. Experience				.105*	-.148	.230	-.766	.c	.028	-.048
4. Serve					.c	.c	.c	.c	-.044	-.005
5. Committee						.085	.664	.753	.c	.058
6. Committee1							.898*	.607	.c	-.181
7. Committee2								.034	.c	.171
8. Committee3									.c	-.700
9. Talk										-.157***
10. Sculture										
11. Smission										
12. Svalues										
13. Sdecent										
14. Spp										
15. Sreport										
16. Sweapon										
17. Scontract										
18. Spay										
19. Sbenefit										
20. Sboundary										
21. Sequal										
22. Ssize										
23. Scomm										
24. S10										
25. Scar										
26. Ccullture										
27. Cmission										
28. Cvalues										
29. Cdecent										
30. Cpp										
31. Crept										
32. Cweapon										
33. Ccontract										
34. Cpay										
35. Cbenefit										
36. Cboundary										
37. Cequal										
38. Csize										
39. Ccomm										
40. C10										
41. Ccar										
42. PD										
43. Yearsexp										
44. Deptyrs										
45. Rank										
46. Rankmerge										
47. Age										
48. Gender										
49. Education										
50. Wvnon										
51. Serviceoncommittee										
52. Satisfaction										
53. Complexity										
54. Overallsupport										

Table 18 - Correlation Matrix

	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
1. Psupport	.278***	.218***	.119*	.296***	.280***	.238***	.443***	.475***	.490***	.021
2. Csupport	.417***	.430***	.297***	.448***	.472***	.303***	.534***	.497***	.501***	.200***
3. Experience	-.028	-.065	.034	.008	-.030	-.064	-.022	.022	-.027	-.029
4. Serve	.119*	.131*	.049	.024	.053	-.004	-.017	-.018	-.031	.015
5. Committee	-.081	-.037	-.010	-.013	-.140	-.026	-.228	-.123	-.069	.268
6. Committee1	-.003	-.011	-.074	.382	.031	-.213	-.411	-.471	-.438	.163
7. Committee2	.492	.646	-.813	-.189	-.279	.614	-.338	-.338	-.338	-.244
8. Committee3	.291	.887	.081	.594	.127	.700	.528	.528	.528	-.728
9. Talk	-.087	-.052	-.151**	-.117*	-.129*	-.189***	-.161**	-.188***	-.149**	-.098
10. Sculture	.520***	.491***	.463***	.576***	.572***	.234***	.426***	.337***	.363***	.351***
11. Smission		.852***	.307***	.490***	.540***	.232***	.355***	.326***	.334***	.251***
12. Svalues			.304***	.466***	.507***	.205***	.321***	.300***	.289***	.230***
13. Sdecent				.391***	.392***	.098	.233***	.191***	.181***	.299***
14. Spp					.665***	.178**	.433***	.385***	.370***	.257***
15. Sreport						.153**	.392***	.334***	.359***	.342***
16. Sweapon							.415***	.394***	.360***	.055
17. Scontract								.814***	.765***	.030
18. Spay									.789***	.009
19. Sbenefit										.058
20. Sboundary										
21. Sequal										
22. Ssize										
23. Scomm										
24. S10										
25. Scar										
26. Cculture										
27. Cmission										
28. Cvalues										
29. Cdecent										
30. Cpp										
31. Crept										
32. Cweapon										
33. Ccontract										
34. Cpay										
35. Cbenefit										
36. Cboundary										
37. Cequal										
38. Csize										
39. Ccomm										
40. C10										
41. Ccar										
42. PD										
43. Yearsexp										
44. Deptyrs										
45. Rank										
46. Rankmerge										
47. Age										
48. Gender										
49. Education										
50. Wvnon										
51. Serviceoncommittee										
52. Satisfaction										
53. Complexity										
54. Overall support										

Table 18 - Correlation Matrix

	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
1. Psupport	.032	.061	.126*	-.071	.111*	.187***	.231***	.203***	.186***	.271***
2. Csupport	.230***	.241***	.268***	.006	.267***	.162**	.215***	.218***	.092	.288***
3. Experience	-.090	-.086	-.048	-.029	-.017	-.048	-.007	-.030	.028	-.016
4. Serve	-.006	.003	-.017	-.020	-.042	-.144**	.063	.062	-.005	-.007
5. Committee	.044	.169	-.019	-.140	.099	.013	-.224	-.196	.194	-.063
6. Committee1	.199	.092	-.194	.288	.047	-.277	-.073	-.180	-.113	-.157
7. Committee2	.195	.313	.313	.313	.171	.c	-.546	-.546	.627	-.853
8. Committee3	-.800	-.700	-.700	-.700	-.700	.c	-.355	-.355	.728	.127
9. Talk	-.127*	-.113*	-.104	.019	-.051	-.057	-.090	-.126*	-.171**	-.113*
10. Sculture	.452***	.363***	.344***	.157**	.268***	.355***	.359***	.341***	.283***	.405***
11. Smission	.297***	.247***	.268***	.154**	.316***	.143**	.516***	.507***	.140**	.343***
12. Svalues	.304***	.237***	.264***	.144**	.310***	.062	.465***	.467***	.105	.310***
13. Sdecent	.320***	.330***	.262***	.208***	.251***	.174***	.215***	.218***	.489***	.300***
14. Spp	.316***	.291***	.274***	.115*	.277***	.165**	.307***	.291***	.223***	.563***
15. Sreport	.413***	.389***	.380***	.150**	.368***	.208***	.355***	.332***	.265***	.490***
16. Sweapon	.069	.099	.193***	-.053	.173***	.049	.254***	.272***	.093	.166**
17. Scontract	.102	.040	.291***	-.030	.125*	.171***	.236***	.242***	.184***	.338***
18. Spay	.062	.003	.204***	-.021	.016	.102	.193***	.190***	.131*	.277***
19. Sbenefit	.128*	.073	.233***	-.021	.117*	.151**	.230***	.232***	.134*	.305***
20. Sboundary	.753***	.779***	.287***	.160**	.289***	.163**	.252***	.225***	.255***	.194***
21. Sequal		.782***	.325***	.227***	.311***	.207***	.354***	.342***	.328***	.295***
22. Ssize			.324***	.214***	.283***	.184***	.293***	.270***	.273***	.265***
23. Scomm				.198***	.280***	.156**	.230***	.223***	.213***	.202***
24. S10					.280***	.176***	.139*	.115*	.172***	.080
25. Scar						.149**	.265***	.237***	.161**	.160**
26. Cculture							.305***	.289***	.256***	.183***
27. Cmission								.912***	.266***	.428**
28. Cvalues									.272***	.460***
29. Cdecent										.417***
30. Cpp										
31. Crept										
32. Cweapon										
33. Ccontract										
34. Cpay										
35. Cbenefit										
36. Cboundary										
37. Cequal										
38. Csize										
39. Ccomm										
40. C10										
41. Ccar										
42. PD										
43. Yearsexp										
44. Deptyrs										
45. Rank										
46. Rankmerge										
47. Age										
48. Gender										
49. Education										
50. Wvnon										
51. Serviceoncommittee										
52. Satisfaction										
53. Complexity										
54. Overallsupport										

Table 18 - Correlation Matrix

	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
1. Psupport	.230***	.200***	.345***	.366***	.385***	.099	.068	.101	.142*	.045
2. Csupport	.258***	.193***	.260***	.239***	.245***	.053	.041	.052	.150**	.051
3. Experience	.002	.012	-.056	.023	.004	-.014	-.010	-.009	-.041	-.055
4. Serve	.004	.021	-.031	-.010	-.011	.035	.030	.075	.021	.028
5. Committee	-.086	-.050	.056	.059	.061	.205	.273	.331	.071	.157
6. Committee1	-.373	-.066	-.153	-.180	-.178	-.224	-.250	-.075	.200	-.021
7. Committee2	-.551	.070	.129	.129	.129	-.265	.441	-.019	.753	.874
8. Committee3	-.396	.464	.528	.528	.528	.918	.889	.793	.564	.140
9. Talk	-.173**	-.157**	-.125*	-.188***	-.167**	-.078	-.082	-.114*	-.153**	-.027
10. Sculture	.375***	.121*	.237***	.169***	.173***	.234***	.267***	.236***	.243***	.183***
11. Smission	.366***	.188***	.217***	.190***	.220***	.163**	.199***	.131*	.134*	.172**
12. Svalues	.333***	.133*	.146**	.135*	.144**	.097	.132*	.101	.104	.118*
13. Sdecent	.245***	.140**	.125*	.125*	.134*	.237***	.258***	.242***	.213***	.168**
14. Spp	.479***	.092	.231***	.188***	.203***	.177***	.220***	.179***	.226***	.115*
15. Sreport	.552***	.148**	.278***	.235***	.259***	.230***	.288***	.231***	.258***	.156**
16. Sweapon	.143**	.512***	.243***	.224***	.200***	.071	.051	.051	.179***	.080
17. Scontract	.320***	.253***	.471***	.434***	.412***	.011	-.012	-.030	.214***	.050
18. Spay	.275***	.255***	.450***	.482***	.452***	-.015	-.019	-.025	.110*	.004
19. Sbenefit	.268***	.209***	.414***	.432***	.496***	.053	.015	.016	.113*	.065
20. Sboundary	.278***	.140**	.099	.047	.106*	.507***	.473***	.491***	.179***	.114*
21. Sequal	.343***	.175***	.175***	.080	.140**	.539***	.569***	.550***	.244***	.198***
22. Ssize	.309***	.126*	.104*	.036	.096	.556***	.475***	.574***	.214***	.185***
23. Scomm	.265***	.122*	.221***	.170***	.206***	.180***	.213***	.167**	.422***	.159**
24. S10	.091	-.018	-.005	-.013	.016	.131*	.151**	.094	.178***	.497***
25. Scar	.175***	.193***	.116*	.080	.100	.221***	.259***	.195***	.186***	.236***
26. Cculture	.185***	.175***	.293***	.248***	.246***	.215***	.280***	.214***	.146**	.121*
27. Cmission	.472***	.363***	.319***	.290***	.316***	.357***	.360***	.348***	.183***	.296***
28. Cvalues	.476***	.350***	.300***	.270***	.299***	.342***	.332***	.329***	.176***	.280***
29. Cdecent	.456***	.268***	.337***	.328***	.348***	.417***	.473***	.394***	.361***	.308***
30. Cpp	.759***	.214***	.385***	.293***	.332***	.355***	.374***	.374***	.344***	.231***
31. Crept		.245***	.409***	.364***	.384***	.399***	.442***	.366***	.359***	.280*8*
32. Cweapon			.459***	.439***	.440***	.271***	.279***	.259***	.268***	.249***
33. Ccontract				.814***	.807***	.260***	.297***	.271***	.413*8*	.148**
34. Cpays					.921***	.226***	.261***	.236***	.382***	.152**
35. Cbenefit						.299***	.316***	.295***	.372***	.174***
36. Cboundary							.809***	.860***	.386*8*	.294***
37. Cequal								.831***	.467*8*	.316***
38. Csize									.440***	.302***
39. Ccomm										.289***
40. C10										
41. Ccar										
42. PD										
43. Yearsexp										
44. Deptyrs										
45. Rank										
46. Rankmerge										
47. Age										
48. Gender										
49. Education										
50. Wvnon										
51. Serviceoncommittee										
52. Satisfaction										
53. Complexity										
54. Overall support										

Table 18 - Correlation Matrix

	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50
1. Psupport	.116*	.609***	-.085	-.078	-.221***	-.152**	-.233***	.048	.014	.030
2. Csupport	.147**	.483***	.054	.006	-.259***	-.107*	-.087	-.036	-.045	.023
3. Experience	-.145**	.026	-.028	-.039	.036	.016	-.112*	.065	-.063	.107*
4. Serve	.042	-.021	-.155**	-.162**	-.199***	-.336***	-.118*	-.016	-.085	.027
5. Committee	.394*	-.097	.331	.230	.182	.354*	.230	-.065	-.141	.154
6. Committee1	.105	-.079	.307	.360	.361	.402	.083	-.165	.854***	.024
7. Committee2	.669	.313	.418	.037	.975**	.453	-.026	.c	.070	-.455
8. Committee3	.700	.700	-.887	-.887	-.140	-.728	-.875	.c	.464	-.700
9. Talk	-.025	-.223***	-.057	-.041	-.020	-.010	.063	.018	-.007	-.066
10. Sculture	.210***	.233***	.006	-.075	-.130*	-.061	-.146**	.013	.068	.115*
11. Smission	.264***	.200***	-.078	-.190***	-.259***	-.259***	-.143**	-.008	-.063	.053
12. Svalues	.198***	.137*	-.041	-.156**	-.263***	-.248***	-.104	-.076	-.033	.039
13. Sdecent	.159**	-.024	-.031	-.053	-.113*	-.081	-.063	-.010	.031	.066
14. Spp	.111*	.269***	-.023	-.146**	-.199***	-.182***	-.206***	-.097	-.025	.148**
15. Sreport	.235***	.170***	.005	-.127*	-.242***	-.190***	-.107*	-.010	-.030	.133*
16. Sweapon	.156**	.421***	.154**	.119*	-.030	.059	.020	-.068	-.051	-.116*
17. Scontract	.007	.612***	.033	-.032	-.263***	-.204***	-.111*	-.084	-.039	.057
18. Spay	-.037	.634***	.051	-.038	-.271***	-.200***	-.111*	-.056	-.057	.019
19. Sbenefit	.034	.616***	.006	-.068	-.273***	-.194***	-.115*	-.070	-.035	-.008
20. Sboundary	.235***	-.169***	.042	.057	.028	.034	.004	-.030	.009	.025
21. Sequal	.250***	-.145**	-.010	.021	.040	-.016	-.046	.003	.116*	.051
22. Ssize	.215***	-.190***	-.019	.020	.066	.012	-.044	-.001	.022	.005
23. Scomm	.142**	.056	.078	-.030	-.071	-.036	-.064	.000	.080	.006
24. S10	.238***	-.185***	-.044	-.024	.029	.001	-.008	-.049	.013	.035
25. Scar	.550***	.007	-.002	.007	.048	.067	-.087	-.009	-.016	-.062
26. Ccullture	.160**	.093	.080	.075	.114*	.098	-.060	.049	.139**	.103*
27. Cmission	.389***	.068	-.048	-.097	-.130*	-.155**	-.083	-.032	-.057	.032
28. Cvalues	.369***	.076	-.009	-.067	-.094	-.122*	-.078	-.036	-.019	.042
29. Cdecent	.281***	.037	-.050	-.027	.087	.061	-.183***	.052	.133*	.073
30. Cpp	.207***	.212***	-.063	-.166***	-.055	-.159**	-.164**	-.041	.065	.076
31. Crept	.287***	.127*	-.072	-.159**	-.072	-.182***	-.175***	.008	.034	.082
32. Cweapon	.346***	.247***	-.018	.034	.021	.003	-.108*	.025	.026	-.050
33. Ccontract	.234***	.322***	.016	-.064	-.036	-.072	-.155**	.044	.144**	.010
34. Cpay	.213***	.355***	.038	-.037	-.089	-.075	-.096	.070	.086	.004
35. Cbenefit	.244***	.346***	.026	-.059	-.107*	-.094	-.108*	.064	.074	-.013
36. Cboundary	.350***	-.075	-.065	.024	.117*	.062	-.113*	.056	.095	-.013
37. Cequal	.402***	-.098	-.043	-.049	.149**	.067	-.178***	.087	.089	.030
38. Csize	.350***	-.086	-.025	.030	.111*	.052	-.105*	.081	.077	-.012
39. Ccomm	.265***	.095	-.006	-.048	-.020	-.012	-.105*	.077	.110*	.067
40. C10	.576***	-.030	-.135*	-.101	.028	-.060	-.120*	.014	-.027	-.002
41. Ccar		-.019	-.102	-.081	.045	-.013	-.134*	.113*	.023	-.063
42. PD			.003	-.015	-.141**	-.082	-.204***	-.060	-.029	.006
43. Yearsexp				.690***	.070	.380***	.628***	-.070	-.069	-.066
44. Deptyrs					.166***	.492***	.628***	-.044	-.023	-.058
45. Rank						.553***	-.047	-.021	.285***	.052
46. Rankmerge							.333***	.001	.180***	.034
47. Age								-.036	-.064	-.150**
48. Gender									.119*	.057
49. Education										.038
50. Wvnon										
51. Serviceoncommittee										
52. Satisfaction										
53. Complexity										
54. Overall support										

Table 18 - Correlation Matrix

	51	52	53	54
1. Psupport	.181	.382***	.341***	.895***
2. Csupport	-.422	.605***	.277***	.883***
3. Experience	.c	-.064	-.006	.047
4. Serve	.c	.025	.022	.023
5. Committee	.858	-.028	.070	.003
6. Committee1	.766	-.145	-.164	-.024
7. Committee2	.557	.091	.115	-.038
8. Committee3	.804	-.004	.632	.463
9. Talk	.c	-.244***	-.218***	-.136*
10. Sculpture	-.862	-.714***	.401***	.508***
11. Smission	.123	.683***	.415***	.407***
12. Svalues	.476	.666***	.359***	.384***
13. Sdecent	.083	.517***	.316***	.232***
14. Spp	0.000	.680***	.378***	.421***
15. Sreport	-.476	.743***	.438***	.417***
16. Sweapon	.359	.451***	.317***	.307***
17. Scontract	.051	.632***	.360***	.563***
18. Spay	.051	.594***	.311***	.560***
19. Sbenefit	.051	.617***	.324*8*	.587***
20. Sboundary	-.912	.525***	.372***	.112
21. Sequal	-.791	.601***	.470***	.147*
22. Ssize	-.359	.573***	.426***	.171**
23. Scomm	-.359	.561***	.337***	.231***
24. S10	-.359	.335***	.248***	-.034
25. Scar	-.862	.497***	.332***	.234***
26. Cculture	.c	.297***	.404***	.207***
27. Cmission	-.801	.545***	.654***	.267***
28. Cvalues	-.801	.541***	.645***	.250***
29. Cdecent	.912	.375***	.608***	.161**
30. Cpp	-.476	.534***	.636***	.328***
31. Crept	-.863	.539***	.678***	.274***
32. Cweapon	-.043	.322***	.577***	.234***
33. Ccontract	.051	.378***	.687***	.354***
34. Cpays	.051	.352***	.679***	.359***
35. Cbenefit	.051	.385*8*	.699***	.381***
36. Cboundary	.504	.365***	.701***	.082
37. Cequal	.497	.379***	.722***	.059
38. Csize	.287	.334*8*	.707***	.085
39. Ccomm	.931	.324*8*	.620***	.152**
40. C10	.694	.295***	.528***	.071
41. Ccar	.359	.312***	.571***	.153**
42. PD	.359	.304***	.170**	.633***
43. Yearsexp	-.476	.035	-.057	-.043
44. Deptyrs	-.476	-.047	-.107	-.063
45. Rank	.359	-.205***	-.044	-.280***
46. Rankmerge	-.912	-.190***	-.095	-.152**
47. Age	-.726	-.151*	-.222***	-.207***
48. Gender	.c	-.082	.098	-.007
49. Education	-.043	-.017	.083	-.026
50. Wvnon	-.862	.095	.016	.005
51. Serviceoncommittee		-.569	.065	-.150
52. Satisfaction			.641***	.563***
53. Complexity				.361***
54. Overall support				

**Table 20 – Model Summary Statistics for
Current Support***

Model	<i>N</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>r</i>²	<i>F</i>	<i>P</i>
1	251	.277	.073	20.678	.000
2	208	.608	.369	59.990	.000
3	226	.634	.402	75.053	.000
4	189	.797	.636	107.675	.000
5	189	.797	.636	80.368	.000
6	188	.799	.638	64.256	.000

*Dependent Variable=Csupport
P<.005

**Table 22 – Model Summary Statistics for
Overall Support***

Model	<i>N</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>r</i>²	<i>F</i>	<i>P</i>
1	228	.361	.130	33.518	.000
2	189	.561	.315	42.773	.000
3	189	.726	.527	68.715	.000
4	188	.580	.325	31.039	.000
5	188	.729	.532	51.961	.000

*Dependent Variable=Overallsupport
P<.005

Table 24 – Model Summary Statistics for Satisfaction*

Model	<i>N</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>r</i>²	<i>F</i>	<i>P</i>
1	207	.635	.403	138.620	.000
2	206	.673	.453	16.555	.000
3	205	.689	.475	8.462	.004

*Dependent Variable=Satisfaction
P<.005

**Table 26 – Model Summary Statistics for
Satisfaction*
w/Demographic Independent Variables**

Model	<i>N</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>r</i>²	<i>F</i>	<i>P</i>
1	271	.188	.036	9.907	.002
2	271	.245	.060	7.029	.000

*Dependent Variable=Satisfaction
P<.005

**Table 28 – Model Summary Statistics for
Prior Support***

Model	<i>N</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>r</i>²	<i>F</i>	<i>P</i>
1	337	.609	.371	197.216	.000

*Dependent Variable=Prior Support
P<.005

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Louisville Division of Police
Louisville, Kentucky
1980 - 2003

Louisville Metro Police Department
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2003 – 2007

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2007 - Present

- AWARDS:**
- Recognition of Valuable Contributions to the Kentucky Department of Juvenile Justice
2007
 - Officer of the Month, March 2008
 - Recognition of Valuable Contributions to the Kentucky Seven County Services
1992
 - Exceptional Valor – Louisville Division of Police
1984
 - Academic Achievement Award
Department of Criminal Justice Training
1980
- PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES:**
- Fraternal Order of Police
 - International Association of Chiefs of Police
 - Kentucky Association of Chiefs of Police
 - Police Executive Research Forum
 - Law Enforcement Executive Development Association
 - National Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy Associates
 - Kentucky Chapter Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy Associates
- PUBLICATIONS:**
- Whetstone, Thomas, Reed, J., & Turner, P. (2006). Recruiting: A Comparative Study of the Recruiting Practices of State Police Agencies. *International Journal of Police Science and Management*, Vol 8, Issue 1, pp. 52-66.