Three revolutions: a comparative study of democratization and youth movements in the post-Soviet sphere.

Christy Lynn Rhodes
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THREE REVOLUTIONS:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIZATION
AND YOUTH MOVEMENTS IN THE POST-SOViet SPHERE

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A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of the
College of Arts and Sciences of the University of Louisville
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Political Science
University of Louisville
Louisville, Kentucky

May 2011
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my parents,

who have always been supportive of my hopes and goals,

even when they take me far away from home.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It is an honor to express my gratitude to my thesis director, Dr. Laurie Rhodebeck, for her patience, invaluable advice and dedicated support throughout this endeavor, as well as many others during my time at this University. I am additionally thankful to the other members of my committee – to Dr. Jason Abbott for his inspiring seminar lectures, recommendations, and for challenging his students to question the very nature of our discipline. And secondly, to Dr. Alexei Izyumov for his willingness to offer outside expertise.

Finally, I am forever indebted to my family and friends for their patience and understanding over the course of the past two years. From overwhelming life changes to mundane evenings of procrastination, your support was (and is) everything.
ABSTRACT

THREE REVOLUTIONS:
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AND YOUTH MOVEMENTS IN THE POST-SOVIET SPHERE

Christy Lynn Rhodes

April 07, 2011

In 1991, as democratic ideals spread through the former Soviet sphere, newly independent nations and satellite countries began engaging in the truly challenging, albeit hopeful task of dual state- and democracy-building endeavors. After twenty years of growth and change, democracy in the Commonwealth of Independent states remains tenuous. My research examines the levels of democracy in the region while assessing the electoral revolutions experienced there in the early 2000s. I employed a two-part approach, using aggregate-level data for a regional overview of democratic scores and a qualitative comparative case study evaluating the Rose, Orange and Tulip Revolutions as well as their influential youth movements. The findings reveal inconsistencies in the “success or failure” paradigm that has dominated scholarly research assessing electoral revolutions as well as democratization literature more broadly.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIZATION AND
TRANSITIONS IN THE POST-SOViet SPHERE

The question of how, when, and why states democratize has long been a central
pillar of comparative politics and scholarly work within political science more generally.
Early work focused on Southern Europe before moving westward to Latin America;
however, democratization scholars have carved a lasting niche in political studies that has
been unbounded by generation or region. In 1991, the next and seemingly most definitive
stage of democratization came to fruition as the Soviet Union fell. As democratic ideals
spread through the post-Soviet sphere, newly formed nations and satellite countries began
engaging in the truly challenging, albeit hopeful task of dual state- and democracy-
building endeavors.

While these changes were heralded as the “third wave of democratization”
(Huntington, 1993), many policymakers and scholars further embraced the paradigm
within democratization literature that enumerated a simple, teleological transition to
democracy. As the post-Soviet nations enter their second decade of “transitioning,”
however, this paradigm is up for debate and closer scrutiny. What was then pinpointed as
a moment signifying “the end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992), has since encountered
challenges, wide variations of success, and significant reversals while democratic ideals
languish throughout this post-Soviet space.

This has certainly been the case in the more immediate events of the past ten
years, which seem to mark a second definitive stage of this so-called "wave." Electoral protests, deemed the "Color Revolutions," spread through the region as attempts by citizens and oppositional parties to change the authoritarian or corrupt natures of these relatively new governments. Though heralded as major advancements in democratic change by regional proponents, media outlets and Western academics, the effectiveness and long-term changes are questionable throughout the changing regimes.

The literature review that follows is structured in such a way to reflect upon the development and present-state of democratization scholarship, including the so-called "transition" paradigm. Since the movements in question concentrated on the ballot to improve democracy, I have also included a section discussing the ways in which elections are often wrongly conflated to mean democracy, without taking into account other, relevant characteristics. The last section will briefly discuss the literature surrounding the Color Revolutions themselves, before beginning the detailed comparative study of the three specific cases: the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the Tulip/Pink Revolution in Kyrgyzstan.

LITERATURE REVIEW: DEMOCRATIZATION AND TRANSITIONS

An analysis of democratization literature and the transition paradigm would be quite incomplete without an introduction to Samuel Huntington and his now somewhat infamous "wave" terminology to describe the phenomenon. Though I have already mentioned critiques to this view of democracy, it is nonetheless important for a background understanding and absolutely essential within the wider democratization literature.

It is clear why democratization and democracy-building literature has flourished
within contemporary comparative politics. One simple reason is the sheer growth in “cases” to study. Between 1974 and 1990, more than 30 democracies emerged, thus doubling the number of democratic governments in the world (Huntington, 1993: 12). Though other democratic “waves” and reversals have occurred throughout history, Huntington's “third wave” work is notable, as it comes at the end of the Cold War, when the United States and democracy emerged as the victor. This was a critical juncture in history, and he argues that this “victory” led to a rapid spread of democracy and the accompanying need to address these new countries and how they democratize (Huntington, 1993: 13).

Although he accounts for varying stages of success, Huntington describes democratic transitions as linear and teleological paths with a certain end: a full-fledged democratic system. The transitions to or away from democracy are the only options in his wave analogy. Some may stall and result in “democracy with adjectives” (Collier and Levitsky, 1997), but the prevailing views paint a polarized picture of democracy or non-democracy. Presently, however, many of the post-Soviet states Huntington writes about in the Third Wave are still in “transition” or experiencing failed democratic revolutions. Similarly, others have benefitted from economic growth but have not necessarily experienced the concomitant democratic change he initially prescribed.

His methods of analysis, or the insular “waves” of democratization, present an even narrower, consolidated view. It results in generalizations, which are broadly applied to the countries undergoing change at one time. It does not fully take into account histories or experiences that may influence democratic gains or losses in a particular location. This top-down approach views the waves as monolithic global change and
ignores complexities happening within countries. When addressing internal dynamics, he proposes broad factors leading to change, which may not be applicable to the country in question.

Overall, Huntington sacrifices detail for generalizability and presents a too-thin and problematic account of the “third wave” in democratic growth. By viewing many of these changes as simply transitional phases on the path to democracy, he misses a chance for deeper analysis. This problem raises critical questions about views of democratization studies and the existing literature's transition paradigm.

I have faulted Huntington for an inaccurate view of democratization and its path of development, but he by no means stands alone in this view. Instead, his work and much of that which dominates scholarly work on democratization is built upon this faulty paradigm of “waves” and a certain “end of history” path to democracy.

Thomas Carothers (2002) in the Journal of Democracy arguably presents the most compelling criticism of the transition paradigm and a call for its reassessment among comparative political scientists. The concept of the third wave was embraced by many scholars and dually loved by policymakers alike, yet its basic premises have proven inaccurate or incomplete in describing democratic change. Moreover, while it was perhaps useful during a “time of momentous and often surprising political upheaval,” it can no longer describe the day-to-day or decade-to-decade realities for the countries it aims to assess (Carothers, 2002: 6). Succinctly summed up by Carothers, then, “it is increasingly clear that reality is no longer conforming to the model” (2002: 6). Though this is applicable to many nations undergoing democracy-building efforts, it is perhaps most clearly seen in the post-Soviet sphere.
When nations do not proceed along a smooth path to transition or worse, return to authoritative policies and procedures, the current standard in democratization literature is to label them as a democratic subtype. For the majority of these nations, which exist in a gray zone between fully functioning democracy and authoritative regime, they are simply regarded as still in “transition.” The question rarely arises that the transition might not result in a democracy. Once again, Carothers is enlightening in his assessment of the troubled paradigm: “By describing countries in the gray zone as types of democracies, analysts are in effect trying to apply the transition paradigm to the very countries whose political evolution is calling that paradigm into question” (2002: 10). Rather than sharpening the definition of democracy, there exists a theme in the literature to create “diminished” subtypes (Sartori, 1970, 1984; Collier & Levitsky, 1997).

Though the phenomenon of subtypes is not necessarily new in democratization literature, Collier and Levitsky (1997) put forth an empirical study that challenged its usefulness and proliferation throughout the studies. They argue that the “hundreds” of democracy subtypes or “democracy with adjectives” presents a dangerous challenge to the literature. This tendency creates messy and blurred distinctions, often with little overlap or considerations of those that already exist. In other words, if a case does not fit the model, it has been more likely that a scholar will create a new subtype, rather than concentrating on the distinct and compelling history of this example and how it challenges the definitional paradigms.

The continuation of the transition paradigm and the additional adoption of diminished democracy subtypes have led to a false simplicity and a real inaccuracy in democratization studies. This habit among scholars has, furthermore “impose[d] a
simplistic and often incorrect conceptual order on an empirical tableau of considerable complexity" (Carothers, 2002: 15). It is no longer accurate to assume the stages and rules, which have characterized this paradigm and indeed, its subsequent plethora of scholarly studies since before Huntington's "third wave" after the Cold War.

ASSUMPTIONS OF THE TRANSITION PARADIGM

Thomas Carothers (2002) argues for a clean and decisive break from the transition paradigm, and in doing so, he is very clear about which exact stages and prescriptive elements of the democratization literature should be thrown out. Though they may be applicable at times, it is dangerous for the following considerations to be automatically "assumed" anytime a state undergoes democratic change.

Away from Authoritarianism: First, it should no longer be assumed that either the countries in the "third wave" or future democratizing nations are actually in transition to democracy. An assumption that pervades the democratization literature is that if a country is moving away from authoritarianism, then it is on an almost automatic path toward democracy. Before critiques from the likes of Carothers, Levitsky and Collier, this step was often the first and most concrete pillar of democratization studies. Nonetheless, empirical analyses and observations reveal that this is not necessarily true. A state may become less authoritarian in some ways but never have any intention of becoming a full-fledged democracy as prescribed by many scholars and policymakers within the democracy-promotion communities.

Defined Stages: Next, it should no longer be assumed that states will follow the straightforward and teleological stages as follows: democratic opening, breakthrough and consolidation. Most often, states have not fallen in line with these stages. Instead, they
have languished in the aforementioned gray area, or a “precarious middle ground” between functioning democracies and outright dictatorships, despite efforts that would be simply characterized as “openings” or “breakthroughs” (Carothers, 2002: 18). Though this subject will be addressed in much greater detail, the example of Georgia in its early stages of independence after the Soviet Union and the democratic promise it held in 1991 stands out as an exemplary illustration of this problem. In 1991, Georgians and democratic promoters – both scholarly and policy-oriented – had high hopes for the newly independent state. In 2002, Carothers cited this as an example where the transition paradigm fails. At the time of his article, Georgia was on the brink of state failure, unable to balance the dual challenges of state-building and democracy-building. Even more interestingly, for the purposes of this work, is that now Georgia has fully undergone a “democratic revolution” in which its old regime was ousted yet, it remains mired in conflicts and a resurgence of authoritative ruling powers, as will be described in detail in the next section.

*Concentration on Elections*: One of the reasons offered for why the transition paradigm has not been able to account for democratic change and furthermore, has not been able to fulfill its “consolidation” stage is that the concentration on elections is too extreme and narrow-minded (Carothers, 2002; Moller and Skaaning, 2010). Though political rights, such as speech and assembly, have been considered in the literature (Dahl, 1989), the so-called “electoral core” of democratization remains firmly intact.

This Schumpeterian understanding of democracy places undue emphasis on the presence and functioning of elections, to the detriment of other important factors (Schumpeter, 1974; Moller and Skaaning, 2010). A third demand for democracy, other
than elections and political rights, emerged later in scholarly work and may be characterized as the rule of law (O'Donnell, 2001, 2004). This is accomplished and achieved by a legal system that embraces and then ensures the rights and obligations of a democratic system. Still, despite these other two areas, a concentration on elections is more pervasive and commonly used in democratization analyses. More importantly, perhaps, is the notion that even though elections are spreading and in use in many nations, states do not necessarily embrace the other two attributes of democracy (Moller and Skaaning, 2010: 276). Again, for the purposes of analyzing the Color Revolutions, this notion is important to keep in mind as the citizens rallied around in support of electoral changes, or in circumstances relating to corruption in the voting system. As the elected terms turn over or come to an end, it is arguable that the fervor of democratic ideals has not been rooted within the system overall. This supports the notions embraced by Carothers, Moller and Skaaning (2010) who argue that elections alone reveal a very "thin" description of democracy. Many countries can operate with elections, even those that are seemingly free and fair, but without further embracing democratic rights for their citizens. In short, elections are an easy path to a democracy "victory," but as scholars critically evaluate the transition paradigm, it is apparent that the sole and simple presence of elections does not a democracy make.

*Political Elites and Secondary State-Building:* Finally, there is a tendency within democratization literature to assess only the roles of political elites in the democracy-building process. Within this area, it is also argued that state-building comes secondary to democracy-building. The challenges of these prescriptions from the transition paradigm are once again echoed by the experiences in Georgia from 1991 to present.
Considering these challenges and the need to work outside a traditional, transition paradigm, Carothers is once again insightful in suggesting a new approach for democratization studies and empirical work. For states that are languishing in that precarious middle ground, he suggests that democratization studies “proceed from a penetrating analysis of the particular core syndrome that defines the political life in the country in question, and how aid interventions can change that syndrome” (2002: 19). Two decades after their seemingly defining moment, the post-Soviet space of Eastern Europe and Central Asia present an ideal place to approach democratization in this more nuanced, penetrating analysis.

**COLOR REVOLUTIONS**

The period after the fall of the Soviet Union has been characterized by democratic changes, reversals and complexity for the former USSR territories or satellite states. These nations faced the unique and unenviable task of simultaneously building a state, an economy and institutions. As scholars and policymakers in the West and within this region were hopeful for a swift and dramatic democratic transition, the reality has been much more complex. After the dust settled following the dramatic changes of the early 1990s, these relatively new democracies have more recently had to struggle with the consolidation of democratic ideals and the fair turnover of powers, many of which were accustomed to the Soviet-style rule of power. One of the more recent manifestations of these challenges have come in the form of electoral uprisings, or “revolutions” in the region.

Starting in 2000, the Yugoslav Revolution, or the “Bulldozer Revolution,” marked the first in the next generation of eastern European democratic changes following the
immediate post-Cold War era (Spirova, 2008). This event spurred a series of similar, non-violent protests in neighboring post-Soviet states, beginning with the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, Ukraine's Orange Revolution in 2004, and the Tulip or Pink Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. Though the extent and effects of regional diffusion are debated (Way, 2008), these revolutions, commonly grouped together as the “Color Revolutions” share a great deal of characteristics.

Despite these shared elements, however, much of the literature on the Color Revolutions tends to be single case-studies or large-N comparisons of global, democratic revolutions. My choice to adopt a qualitative case-centered comparison was taken to learn more about these shared characteristics, as well as how the cases are nuanced. It is notable, too, that much of the discussion has been highly-electorally driven analyses, with less focus on historical factors that may explain variation. Given the emphasis on elections within democratization literature and the transition paradigm, this theme is not at all surprising, but it does stand to be expanded upon.

In particular, the literature that attempts to provide a smaller-N and detailed comparative analysis of the Color Revolutions, such as Wolchik and Bunce (2006) and Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009), has centered largely on elite politics and national-level events while indirectly but effectively downplaying the roles of less obvious actors: opposition party influences, coercive elements by both the state and protestors, and the extent of involvement among civic and nongovernmental interest groups, including the size, support and demographics of actively protesting segments in the given societies.

In these decisions to concentrate on elites and national level politics, the original impetus behind the revolutions may be ignored and contribute to the unsustainability of
democratic reform. The comparative case study that follows, on the other hand, is informed by the actors and events that have been obfuscated during previous analyses.
CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES

Since democratization efforts within this region are an area of study that deals with rapid change in the form of frequent elections and new developments in civic culture and policies, it is one that requires constant study. In order to evaluate democratization in the post-Soviet sphere, with an emphasis on the Color Revolutions, I will employ a comparative study that will be conducted in two parts. The first stage will evaluate all former Soviet republic states at an aggregate level using BTI (Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index) scores. The second will be a more qualitative, case-centered comparison of the three aforementioned and similar Color Revolutions: Georgia's Rose Revolution, Ukraine's Orange Revolution, and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. All three were largely non-violent protests calling for free, fair elections and an end to post-Soviet authoritarianism following the state’s normal and prescribed election cycle.

DESIGN AND SOURCES OF DATA – REGIONAL FOCUS

A defining feature of this research is the two levels of analysis. This two-part approach was chosen to increase sample size and provide for greater generalizability and thus, more reliable findings about levels of democracy within this region. In both comparative stages, the main unit of analysis is nation-states. The major difference between the stages relies upon the sources of data: aggregate index scores for the first and detailed, specific findings for the specific Color Revolution states in the second.

For the first phase of research, I will consult aggregate data for the post-Soviet
republics, also known as CIS, or the Commonwealth of Independent States, based on variables related to democracy and leadership management. Since it is impossible to go into adequate detail for every CIS-based country for the purposes of this project, I hope that this aggregate view will help cast a wider net in answering the questions driving my research. While several databases and sources are available and attempt to enumerate the levels of democracy in a given location, I have chosen the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (henceforth, BTI) for my research. After careful consideration and evaluations of similar projects, such as Freedom House scores and variables within the World Values Survey (Inglehart-Welzel, 2010), BTI has proven to be the most reliable and applicable resource.

Unlike the aforementioned research, BTI’s focus falls directly in line with the purpose of my own research interests. Rather than empirically evaluating a large set of variables, this index and the researchers responsible for it are inspired by and aim to “represent the world in transformation” (BTI, 2010). As such, the work is clearly inspired by scholarly work and theories found within democratization literature as it attempts an empirical understanding of the democratization process. Furthermore, the index aims to understand countries in transformation and as such, narrows its focus by limiting the dataset to include countries that have yet to achieve a fully consolidated democracy or market economy, and additionally, have populations of more than two million (BTI, 2010). This narrower focus, along with the index’s regional search capabilities, allow for a more detailed understanding, even within the aggregate view. As such, this index and its useful Transformation Atlas is the most applicable and informative measure of democracy for the first stage of my research.
Thus far, I have shown how the research focus of BTI complements my own; however, it is additionally important to note that the data can be extrapolated to shed light on the particular regional focus of this work. The flexibility of BTI is important so that it will allow for an aggregate understanding of the region in question, thereby giving a baseline understanding of recent democratic changes, challenges and obstacles in the post-Soviet sphere. This greater understanding is possible because of how BTI structures its data. First, it provides individual rankings on a country. These rankings are based on dimensions of democracy, its market economy, and “political management” (BTI, 2010). Based on 17 criteria, the democratically-transforming countries are then scored and ranked among their worldwide peers.

Secondly, BTI’s data are structured so that a researcher can narrow down specific rankings in the form of country reports. These reports evaluate a given country’s political and economic performance, as well as the political leadership or management (BTI, 2010). Therefore, even though we are working within the large-N, aggregate view of democratic changes in this stage of my research, the source of data allows for greater nuance in country-by-country comparisons. This additional function will yield a smoother transition between aggregate comparisons and the case-specific descriptions in the second level of analysis. Most importantly, however, is that the BTI biennial rankings will allow one to compare and contrast changes between countries or over a given time period and look for similarities, variability and other factors to explain the democratic changes among the Commonwealth of Independent States.

It should be noted, however, that a possible perceived shortcoming of the BTI is that it only covers a somewhat recent span of time. Although its relative infancy may be
The method of evaluation for the second and more extensive section of my research will draw upon case comparisons of three Color Revolutions and their aftermaths in the post-Soviet sphere. Additionally, path-dependent historical strategies will be employed to allow for more nuance in analyzing the three events. In asserting that “history matters,” this analytical approach will evaluate the instances of change and continuity as they relate to the Georgian, Ukrainian and Kyrgyzstani cases. It is also important to note that the purpose in this wider approach is to evaluate and stress the roles of otherwise obfuscated actors, such civic movements and less elite-controlled activities, that seem to be highly influential and active in all three cases.

DESIGN AND SOURCES OF DATA – CASE STUDY FOCUS

The method of evaluation for the second and more extensive section of my research will draw upon case comparisons of three Color Revolutions and their aftermaths in the post-Soviet sphere. Additionally, path-dependent historical strategies will be employed to allow for more nuance in analyzing the three events. In asserting that “history matters,” this analytical approach will evaluate the instances of change and continuity as they relate to the Georgian, Ukrainian and Kyrgyzstani cases. It is also important to note that the purpose in this wider approach is to evaluate and stress the roles of otherwise obfuscated actors, such civic movements and less elite-controlled activities, that seem to be highly influential and active in all three cases.
The choice in adopting a qualitative case-centered comparison that is also informed by a historical analysis is to move the discussion from the highly electorally-driven analyses or aggregated, large-N variables. The following research is informed by social movement theory, including discussions on the most effective definitions of "revolution" itself, academic journal articles on the events, and for more recent changes and to develop an understanding of how the revolutions have been portrayed, I will consider media coverage of the Georgian, Ukrainian and Kyrgyzstani changes.

The selection of three seemingly similar cases also stems from the need for an overall, qualitative assessment of these events. In other words, though they are quantitatively labeled as the same and noted as successes in recent scholarly work, they are likely to possess important and qualifying differences that are in need of recognition (Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009). Furthermore, in attempting to challenge the quick and arguably inaccurate assessments by scholars who rush to label an event as a "success" or "failure," the tendency is to pull in as many democratic transitions or "revolutions" as possible in order to compare them side by side. The three cases chosen cover the continuum of perceived "success" and "failure" and account for geographic variation within this area of focus. Spanning from the westernmost edge to Central Asia, the countries that will be discussed reflect the diverse nature of the transforming former Soviet region.

In particular, the recent 2009 article by Kalandadze and Orenstein adopts this approach to the detriment of a detailed, robust analysis for the countries included. They, instead, rely upon aggregated data already gathered and coded to assess the democratic levels of given states before and after the onset of a democratic or electoral revolution.
They cite Freedom House's *Freedom in the World* series for “general assessments of regime dynamics” and supplement those findings with Freedom House's *Nation's in Transit* publications to assist with a closer look at the complex political regimes (Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009: 1406). The authors cull 12 states that have undergone recent democratic change and to their benefit, they do attempt to account for various regions in looking to reach greater generalizability. It is their end-goal that is problematic, since their findings are summarized into a table with three possible outcomes, which upon reading, seems to erase altogether the unique details for a state. Factors that may be important to the overall understanding of a given country's authoritative past and present-day foundations of democratic progress are sacrificed in place of a neatly summarized label. That is why, in this research, I have employed a two-pronged analysis. It is essential to have a broader, empirical understanding of democratizing countries while also addressing specifics that are not easily measured in a quantitative analysis.

Kalandadze and Orenstein’s work is, in of itself, interesting and supplies information about a wide variety of relatively new democratizing changes. However, their findings are summarized into a table with only three possible outcomes, thus losing a great deal of nuance in the process. Their classifications include the following for a “democratization score”: (1) Failed/Repressed cases, (2) Successful cases without democratization, and (3) Successful cases with democratization (or some democratization). Putting aside the fact that they never fully define what they mean by democratization, one already may be suspicious that democratic electoral revolutions may not have a clear end that can be so easily defined as a success or failure.

Furthermore, in looking only to national elections and failing to account for the changes
in attitudes by citizens themselves, the scholars ignore a great deal of important endogenous and exogenous influences on democratization as a whole.

Reconsidered Revolution and “Measuring” Success

The assessments of the democracy in the post-Soviet spaces of Eastern Europe and parts of Central Asia have revealed notable inconsistencies in how “revolution” is treated in present-day politics. As in the enterprise of the Color Revolutions, it appears that the Western media label these actions as revolutions shortly before bracketing the actions as full or partial successes or failures. Additionally, some scholars have even gone as far to label them as less than “real revolutions” or ones that simply did not “effect long-term change” (Stewart, 2009, p. 645, 647). These same scholars seem to only be looking to elite-driven or national electoral processes to drive their assessments.

Specialists in the region, such as McFaul (2007), Bunce and Wolchik (2006), have limited their language in regard to the Color Revolutions and propose a definitional change in the resulting new paradigm of “electoral revolution.” In one article, the author even went through the great painstaking detail of putting every occurrence of the word revolution in quotation marks, as to suggest the failures every single time the events were even mentioned (Stewart, 2009). While it is true that post-Soviet nations, including Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan may have experienced changes following their Color Revolutions to indicate that democracy did not fully “arrive,” this aforementioned scholarship on the work downplays even the most basic, albeit meaningful, result of these events: that citizens and oppositional parties organized within authoritative environments for democratic ideals.

In an effort to look beyond these stringent notions of revolution and fully assess
the capabilities as well as limitations of the three movements, the sections below will attempt detailed, comparative case analyses. The purpose here is to look away from national elections, approval ratings, and presidential outcomes in order to reassess the changing developments and characteristics that made the events possible, while also assessing any long-term influences in the broader civil society. I will begin with an overview for each country to describe the basic facts of each case, before comparing all three on the following characteristics: opposition party influences, coercive elements by the state apparatus – through military or police involvement, and the extent of involvement of youth movements, an important and understudied component of the post-Soviet electoral revolutions.

Though the case selection discussion dealt generally with the events and similarities, the purpose of this section is to expand upon the similarities to look for intrinsic characteristics that may challenge the dichotomous success versus failure paradigm employed by Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009). Furthermore, it would appear that the definitional and limiting changes to the word revolution may be too rash and employ only a narrow understanding of these events. In drawing upon scholarly work by Charles Fairbanks (2007) in Revolution Reconsidered, the following section attempts to illustrate a more nuanced approach before scholars, politicians and the media wholeheartedly brush off these events as failures in a democratic “wave.” The countries will be analyzed below, via the earlier proposed qualitative case-centered comparison.

**RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES**

This research aims to test two hypotheses about democratization and democratic revolution within the post-Soviet sphere. The first addresses electoral revolutions in the
regional more broadly, while the second theorizes on the employment of the “success or failure” paradigm within the larger transition literature.

Initially, the first hypothesis assesses electoral revolutions with a comparison of democratic transition indicators in the CIS region and is found in my first and aggregate level of research. **Hypothesis #1: when a CIS country has experienced an electoral revolution, it is more likely it will have higher levels democracy.** Electoral revolutions in the post-Soviet sphere have been carried out as attempts to move closer to ideal democracies. This aggregated research will allow for a baseline understanding of the region and assess the following indicators of democracy: stateness, political participation, rule of law, stability of democratic institutions, and political and social integration.

The second level of analysis focuses on a singular factor that may influence the longevity of the democratic changes. **Hypothesis #2: When a country has a higher level of civic involvement, it is more likely it will have lasting reform following an electoral revolution.** While this is not a new assertion within democratization literature by any means, I hope that this will be a more effective way to evaluate the way non-elite forces influence politics within a transitional democracy. The role of these otherwise outsider groups, in this case, the level of youth movement involvement, will be utilized to assess the longevity of reforms and impacts on the wider societies.

The driving forces behind these hypotheses are inextricable and critical to both democracy and studies of the Color Revolutions in the CIS region. As such, they were chosen so that they can provide powerful and parsimonious analyses for the region in question as well as its present-day democratization efforts. Additionally, both hypotheses
address the faulty theoretical paradigm that has been previously discussed in the literature review. These findings assess how views change when we remove democratic revolutions (and indeed, transitions overall) from a two-pronged scrutiny of success or failure. Based on preliminary research, it seems that when the changes are characterized as “success” or “failures,” it creates a false dichotomy that inevitably erases important distinctions or results in irreducible and inaccurate claims. This is evaluated in Chapter 4, with variables related to oppositional leadership and state influences (such as the military or police involvement in the electoral revolutions) and in Chapter 5, which evaluates the youth movements. This broader challenge proposed here questions the early outcomes, as well as the continued changes occurring in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan’s democracies.
CHAPTER III
ELECTORAL REVOLUTIONS IN THE GREATER CIS REGION

The purpose of this chapter is to use a broader, regional approach to assess electoral revolutions in the CIS. Using the BTI rankings, it is possible to empirically account for recent democratic change in the CIS region and begin analyzing the impact the Color Revolutions may have had in the area. Using democratic indicators from BTI and by coding the CIS countries according to their experiences with electoral revolutions, my research will benefit from a baseline understanding of these movements in the region and their impact on democratization efforts overall. The hypothesis driving this stage of research is: when a CIS country has experienced an electoral revolution, it is more likely it will have higher levels of democracy.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The dependent variable here is the presence of electoral revolution within the CIS nation-states since the fall of the Soviet Union. This variable has been coded based on a commonly accepted definition of “electoral revolution” present within Color Revolution literature (McFaul, 2006; Kalandadze & Orenstein, 2009). The twelve countries were dichotomously coded as a 0 to reflect no presence or 1 to indicate the presence of an electoral revolution. At this stage of analysis, the 0 or 1 does not suggest the longevity or

1 Characteristics are according to the BTI rankings. These are detailed in the Independent Variable section below.
2 The countries included are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. It should be noted that, as of August 2009, Georgia withdrew its membership from CIS. For the purposes of this research, it is still included in the regional analysis.
impact of these uprisings, but simply follows McFaul and others’ precise definitions to signify a presence. The countries are coded according to the following criteria:

1. A fraudulent election acts as the driving force for electoral protests;
2. The opposition resorts to extra-constitutional means to defend democracy (i.e. mass protests);
3. Both the incumbents and the oppositional candidates declare their authority, due to the disputed electoral results (McFaul, 2006).

McFaul also suggests a fourth criterion: that both sides avoid significant use of violence. More recently, however, scholars have questioned this last claim, arguing that reports of violence may stem from incumbent party controls and, as such, are not a clear indicator or measurement for electoral revolutions. Additionally, “failed” revolutions are often squashed by violent means, but these actions should not draw attention away from the fact that citizens acted in mass protests to support free and fair elections in a struggling democracy (Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2010).

Table 3.1 Electoral Revolutions in the CIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Revolutions Present (1)</th>
<th>No Occurrences (0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Georgia (2003)</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan (2005)</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova (2009)</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The independent variables for this aggregate level of analysis stem from data collection in the BTI democratic rankings. These five criteria are based on a total of 18
questions used in assessing the state of political transformation and include: *stateness*, *political participation*, *rule of law*, *stability of democratic institutions*, and *political and social integration*. In contrast to other, more narrow definitions of democracy that focus primarily on basic civil rights and free elections, the BTI’s concept of democracy casts a wider net to include the above-mentioned details that are essential, but often sacrificed in other statistical analyses.

The BTI thus asks to what extent the democratic system is consolidated in terms of its acceptance, its structures of representation and its political culture. In so doing, the BTI shows whether, and to what extent, the ground rules for democracy are anchored in a society. For the purposes of this section, I will isolate the five overarching criteria. The overall scores for each of the five characteristics are scored 1.0 to 10.0 on BTI. For the purposes of this research, they have been recoded into the following four categories: Very Strong, Strong, Weak and Very Weak. These categories are based on the relative scores of the CIS region’s rankings to allow for a more accurate assessment between countries. Additionally, these narrower and descriptive categories should provide for an easier understanding of the five, following variables.

**Stateness**

The aggregated score given to a country’s “stateness” is based on four more defined elements in the effort to improve content validity for this important characteristic of democracy. The BTI Program and coding manual defines “stateness” as having obtained this clear objective: “there is clarity about the nation’s existence as a state, with adequately established and differentiated power structures” (2010, 17). Though this

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3 For a full description of the categories and how they have been recoded for the crosstabulations, please see Appendix A.
research utilizes the aggregated scores, it is nonetheless important to enumerate the four questions that go into determining this overall score. It is clear that this Index and scholars working on the project approached this carefully, as to adequately reflect the characteristics which may determine a region’s stateness and ability to rule.

1. To what extent does the state’s monopoly on the use of force cover the territory?
2. To what extent do all relevant groups in society agree about citizenship and accept the nation-state as legitimate?
3. To what extent are the state’s legitimacy and its legal order defined without interference by religious dogmas?

Table 3.2 BTI Stateness Rankings for CIS Countries (2006-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stateness by Country</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BTI Transformation Index 2006-2010

The table above reflects the range in variability for the CIS and its stateness scores. Belarus, with its strong state apparatus and monopoly on force, is the region’s highest scorer at 9.0, with Georgia having the regional low in 2006. Additionally, all of the CIS have experienced an increase in their stateness scores, with the lone exception of Georgia. This is unsurprising given the nation’s recent skirmishes with Russia and inter-
ethnic and territorial afflictions. As such, the nation has not been able to hold onto the monopoly of force or accepted legitimacy, as the indices suggest.

Table 3.3 Electoral Revolution * Level of Stateness Crosstabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Stateness</th>
<th>Very Weak</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Very Strong</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Revolution?</td>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BTI Transformation Index 2010

To additionally evaluate stateness of the CIS, table 3.3 is a cross-tabulation of the presence of electoral revolutions and the levels of stateness. I tested the claim that when a CIS country has experienced an electoral reform, it is more likely it will have higher levels of democracy by way of the stateness cross-tabulation. The table above shows a positive, but weak relationship between presence of electoral revolution and stateness. When evaluating correlation, the Pearson Correlation Coefficient also shows a weak relationship (r=.155, 2-tailed sig. =.630)⁴. These findings support my overall claim but the weak relationship requires further evaluation. As such, detailed variables related to stateness, such as the coercive apparatus of the state will be evaluated in a comparative case study in the next chapter.

**Political Participation**

The second independent variable that serves as a proxy in understanding democratization for the CIS countries is political participation. Clearly, since this research aims to assess the impact of electoral revolutions, the continuance or change of a

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⁴ The correlations were calculated using the unranked (0-10) dataset from the 2010 Transformation Indices.
citizenry's political participation is a strong indicator of satisfaction and overall
democratic development following changes in voting or the electoral system. The
description of political participation from BTI echoes these sentiments. The project
defines this variable as: “the populace determines who rules, and it has other political
freedoms” (2010, 17).

Like stateness, this research uses the aggregated scores for political participation,
but it is still important to note the underlying questions that make up these values.

1. To what extent are rulers determined by general, free and fair elections?
2. To what extent do democratically elected leaders have the effective power to
govern, or to what extent are there veto powers and political enclaves?
3. To what extent can independent political and/or civic groups assemble freely?
4. To what extent can citizens, organizations and media express opinions freely?
(BTI 2010, 17).

Table 3.4 BTI Political Participation Rankings for CIS Countries (2006-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: BTI Transformation Index 2006-2010*

Since BTI’s questions for political participation ties directly into the ability for
citizens to engage in free and fair elections, it is logical that this region would express a
wide variety of scores, given that fraudulent or corrupt electoral practices have long been considered a norm and an impetus for change in the Color Revolutions.

At a steady 7.8 out of 10.0 for each year evaluated, the political participation levels for Ukraine set this nation as the regional leader for pro-democratic reform. As mentioned earlier, however, the other 11 nation-states reveal a great amount of variability, and even unpredictability. Overall, seven countries encountered decreasing levels over the years consulted, while five expressed an upward or stable pattern in their scores.

Next, Table 3.5 compares the 2010 levels of political participation, with instances of electoral revolutions as earlier defined. As with stateness, the purpose for this cross-tabulation is to reflect upon the earlier hypothesis: *When a country has experienced an electoral revolution, it is more likely it will have higher levels of democracy.* However, the results of the below cross-tabulation do not indicate a strong pattern. The only "very weak" country was one that did not experience an electoral revolution, while the three "very strong" ones had all experienced one. When evaluating correlation, the Pearson Correlation Coefficient also shows a somewhat stronger relationship (r=.507, 2-tailed sig. =.092). Most countries, however, are clustered in the ambiguous middle-ground between weak and strong. This finding does not strongly support the claim that a country that has experienced an electoral revolution is more likely to have higher levels of democracy, in the form of its political participation scores.
Table 3.5 Electoral Revolution * Level of Political Participation Crosstabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Revolution?</th>
<th>Very Weak</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Very Strong</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BTI Transformation Index 2010

Rule of Law

The third independent variable is a less studied, albeit extremely important indicator, of democratic health within a nation. As previously argued in the literature review, traditional democratization literature and the transition paradigm often focus too heavily on the functioning of elections, while ignoring the utmost importance of the rule of law that makes elections, democracy, civil liberties and other desirable attributes a possibility. This is especially true when discussing electoral revolutions, which derive their focus and power from activities related to elections. As such, rule of law should be an important and unique indicator for this research. As it is often obfuscated when discussing electoral revolutions, it is likely that the results here will be enlightening when evaluating democratic changes for the region.

The aggregated scores below are based on the following, four questions:

1. To what extent is there a working separation of powers (checks and balances)?
2. To what extent does an independent judiciary exist?
3. To what extent are there legal or political penalties for officeholders who abuse their positions?
4. To what extent are civil liberties guaranteed and protected, and to what extent can citizens seek redress for violations of these liberties? (BTI 2010, 17).
### Table 3.6 BTI Rule of Law Rankings for CIS Countries (2006-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: BTI Transformation Index 2006-2010*

The objective for this third democratic variable, according to BTI, is that "state powers check and balance one another and ensure civil rights" (2010, 17). Insofar as the scores indicate, the CIS countries have been performing at relatively low levels when it comes to the Rule of Law. For example, according to Table 3.6, an alarming ten of the twelve countries experienced overall declines in their scores. Even the overall leader in the region, Ukraine, faltered on this variable, falling from 7.0 to 6.8 and finally, to 6.3 in 2010. As the cross-tabulation below shows more clearly, 75 percent of the countries are clustered at the lower end of the spectrum, at "very weak" or "weak." Even with countries that have experienced an electoral revolution, a majority fall into the lower half (four in the "weak" categories versus three in the "strong").

Although the earlier aspects of stateness and political participation revealed wide variation in CIS scoring, this third variable more strongly signifies a disturbing and declining trend in pro-democratic reform. This finding may be related to the nature of
Rule of Law and the four questions the BTI uses in its assessment. They evaluate less tangible, enforceable and discernible tenets of democracy than when compared to observing fraudulent elections, for example. In Table 3.7, I have tested the claim that countries that have undergone electoral revolution are more likely to have higher levels of democracy, in the form of rule of law scores. This cross-tabulation shows that the worst performing states have not experienced electoral revolution, but only weakly supports the claim that states that have undergone an electoral revolution are more likely to have higher levels. When evaluating correlation, the Pearson Correlation Coefficient indicates a stronger relationship (r=.645, 2-tailed sig. =.024). Nonetheless, with Rule of Law being weak throughout the region, other factors may be more enlightening.

Table 3.7 Electoral Revolution * Level of “Rule of Law” Crosstabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule of Law Level</th>
<th>Very Weak</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Very Strong</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Revolution?</td>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BTI Transformation Index 2010

Stability of Democratic Institutions

The fourth independent variable measures the stability of democratic institutions within the nation-state. BTI coders ask two simple questions and assign a score between 1.0 and 10.0 to assess the institutions’ overall performance. They ask the following:

1. Are democratic institutions, including the administrative and judicial systems, capable of performing?
2. To what extent are institutions of the democratic state accepted or supported by the relevant actors?

(BTI 2010, 17).
This variable is included due to its importance in evaluating the differences between states that have undergone electoral revolutions versus those that have yet to have civilian involvement in this way. One would expect that democratic institutions became stronger or more democratic, following massive protests; however, this may not always be the case due to systemic, underlying corruption by even the opposition parties or poor check on powers to the executive. These factors will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

Table 3.8 BTI Stability of Democratic Institution Rankings for CIS Countries (2006-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BTI Transformation Index 2006-2010

The main objective of this variable is to assess whether “state powers check one another and ensure civil rights” (BTI 2010, 17). Within the overall region, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova have garnered the highest scores. However, Georgia and Ukraine also experienced declines in their scores between the 2008 and the 2010 indices (-1.5 for Georgia and -1.0 for Ukraine). Despite this decline, they still stand well above most of
their regional counterparts, given that over half of the countries have been scored at or below the 2.0 mark. In 2010 alone, eight of the twelve countries were in the recoded in the “very weak” range. Interestingly, nearly all of the worst performing countries, with the lone exception of Belarus, are geographically located in Central Asia. This division leaves the best performing countries closer to Europe, a pattern that has previously existed in the other variables but is exceptionally cogent when assessing the stability of democratic institutions.

Table 3.9 Electoral Revolution * Stability of Dem. Institutions
Crosstabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Level of Stability (Dem. Institutions)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Very Strong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral No (0)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolution? Yes (1)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BTI Transformation Index 2010

Table 3.9 shows the cross-tabulation between the presence of an electoral revolution and the stability of the democratic institutions in the CIS. This table shows a scattered and weak relationship between the presence of electoral revolutions and higher levels of stability. When evaluating correlation, the Pearson Correlation Coefficient also indicates a somewhat weak relationship ($r=.405$, 2-tailed sig. $=.192$). Moreover, there exists an extreme volatility for the CIS stability of democratic institutions – with most states clustered at the margins.

Political and Social Integration

This fifth and final independent variable reflects a dominant theme in the democratization literature: that a large and involved civil society will contribute to a well-
functioning democracy. Keeping this argument in mind, this final assessment will test whether the political and social integration within the CIS countries have experienced any changes, growth, or impacts on democracy following an electoral revolution.

Once again, although I am utilizing an aggregate score for comparison, the questions and objectives the coders used for the BTI ranking are enlightening. They have defined political and social integration as regimes in which “stable patterns of representation exist for mediating between society and state; there is a consolidated civic culture” (BTI 2010, 17). The four questions for coding are useful to consider.

1. To what extent is there a stable and socially rooted party system to articulate and aggregate societal interests?
2. To what extent is there a network of cooperative associations or interest groups to mediate between society and the political system?
3. How strong is citizen consent to democratic norms and procedures?
4. To what extent have social self-organization and the construction of social capital advanced?

Table 3.10 BTI Political and Social Integration Rankings for CIS Countries (2006-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BTI Transformation Index 2006-2010
In evaluating the consolidated civil culture, Table 3.9 shows a wide variation of scores for the CIS countries in the 2000s. Most countries (Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) experienced an overall decline; while the five others remained stable or saw an increase in their scores (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, and Turkmenistan). Similar to the other variables studied thus far, Ukraine projected the most impressive scores, at its regional high of 6.3 in 2006. Turkmenistan, the only absolutely static country, scored a regional low of 1.7 in the indices.

Table 3.11 Electoral Revolution * Political & Social Integration Levels Crosstabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Level of Political &amp; Social Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Revolution?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BTI Transformation Index 2010

Given the regional variation and complex patterns in Table 3.10, I have restricted the analysis in 3.11. In this cross-tabulation, I tested the claim that CIS countries with electoral revolutions are more likely to have higher levels of political and social integration, a strong indicator for democratic growth. Thus far, this appears to be one of the strongest indicators and support the aforementioned claim. Shown above, the cross-tabulation indicates that “very weak” and “weak” levels are mostly comprised of countries without an electoral revolution. The “strong” and “very strong” categories, on the other hand are almost wholly comprised of CIS that have experienced an electoral
revolution. When evaluating correlation, the Pearson Correlation Coefficient suggests a very strong relationship ($r=.722$, 2-tailed sig. $=.008$). This finding suggests that, unlike the previous variables, the connection between electoral revolution and the civil culture as expressed through the political and social integration levels is stronger and more stable.

Although this cross-tabulation helps to define this relationship, it is not entirely conclusive nor does it eliminate other possibilities. Nonetheless, this finding illustrates the positive connection and supports the next section of my work, which will qualitatively expand on the role and consolidation of civil society during the Color Revolutions.

**PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS**

The purpose of this chapter was to find the relationships between electoral revolutions and five important indicators of democratization. The 2010 BTI's overall assessment of the CIS region is that the "upward trend...has reversed. The potency of the color revolutions has dissipated and the region's autocratic regimes are increasingly consolidating their grip on power" (BTI 2010). Ukraine was the only country in the region that did not falter on overall previous scores, making it a weak leader for democracy in the region. Although this conclusion is accurate, it was important first to consider the relationships between these nations, their electoral revolutions and the impact on stateness, political participation, rule of law, stability of democratic institutions, and political and social integration. Considering that many of the cross-tabulations only presented a weak relationship between the presence of electoral revolution and higher levels of democracy, these findings raise further critiques of the
simple and dichotomous success-versus-failure paradigm used when assessing the Color
Revolutions and democratization literature more broadly.

 Nonetheless, with these relationships now determined, the next level of my
research can more effectively move beyond the aggregate level and attempt to understand
the nuance within the three case studies: Georgia’s Rose Revolution, Ukraine’s Orange
Revolution and Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution.
CHAPTER IV

COLOR REVOLUTIONS INTRODUCTION:
OPPOSITIONAL PARTIES AND STATE APPARATUS

This chapter begins with an introduction to the three case studies of Color Revolutions and examines specific variables related higher level politics and stateness. In particular, oppositional party influences and the military or police involvement during protests are evaluated while assessing the challenges these detailed comparisons raise to the success-versus-failure paradigm. My choice of electoral revolutions for the case studies stemmed from the fact that all three were labeled as generally “successful” by Kalandadze and Orenstein (2010); yet, upon closer scrutiny in the last chapter, they reveal wide variability in terms of actual outcomes, state influences and overall democratization scores.

I will begin with an overview for each country to describe the basic facts of each case before comparing all three on the following characteristics: opposition party influences and coercive elements by the state apparatus – through military or police involvement. The analysis below will also set the stage for the final section of my research, which will address the specific youth movements in the three case studies and their wider influences on civil society and democratic reform.

Georgia’s Rose Revolution (2003)

The abridged version of Georgia’s Rose Revolution tells the story of a country, which had only recently dealt with a civil war and territorial disputes, coming together to
protest the authoritarian environment under incumbent President Eduard Shevardnadze. Again, to put it perhaps too simply, the revolution was a “success” in that it obtained its short-term goal of overturning the election and inaugurating the opposition leader, Mikheil Saakashvili (Way, 2008: 63).

Having already covered the ebb and flow of democratization and hybrid regimes, or semi-democracies, one should reasonably assume that the story does not end here. Since these events occurred over seven years ago at the time of this writing, the present-day politics of Georgia reflect a tumultuous and ill-devised power sharing arrangement for its democratically-heralded and seemingly idealistic opposition leadership. Although it has not been officially legislated or passed at the time of writing, however, the Georgian parliament is currently debating changing its constitution to allow President Mikheil Saakashvili the ability to retain power after his term ends in 2013 (Kuzio, 2010: 286). At this point a success vs. failure paradigm would label the event as a failure, or if generous, as a “successful case without democratization,” which is exactly what Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009) did. The following introduction to the Rose Revolution does not suggest, or even attempt to claim, that the Georgian uprisings led to full and progressive democratic change; instead, it argues that the people—the citizens themselves—have been largely left out of the picture and may reflect a more nuanced view on the subject at hand. The capital city of Tbilisi may not be the beacon of hope for the region that it was in 2003, but while the highest powers may still engage in consolidatory, authoritarian struggles, the evidence suggests that the citizens themselves do not wish for, nor would they tolerate a full reversal back to authoritarian kleptocracy.

In the post-Soviet state of Georgia, former President Shevardnadze's dominant
party was relatively strong and successful, especially when compared with other countries — as illustrated later in Ukraine, for example. His success came in that he was able to establish a powerful, single party in the mid-1990s following the breakup of the Soviet Union and Georgia's subsequent independence. In the establishment of his party, the Citizens' Union of Georgia (CUG), he developed a strong foothold in the electoral politics that were represented in his executive office holding, as well as in the majority of parliamentary holding (Way, 2008: 63). In a path-dependent historical understanding of Georgian events and the present-day political power struggle the nation currently faces, an understanding of the party politics in pre-Rose Revolution Georgia will be illuminating.

In other words, rather than looking only to national elections, one can evaluate the situation to find problems that are structural and inherent to the Georgian political system, and manifested in the party relations. For while Shevardnadze was able to consolidate his power into a relatively strong party, the Citizens' Union of Georgia had a number of problems, which still play a role today. Most notably, according to Lucan Way (2008), a regional scholar who has also written extensively on what he deems "competitive authoritarianism," the CUG had inherent problems that led to President Shevardnadze's downfall. He writes that although it was successful and strong, "The CUG, however, lacked any obvious ideology and was in large measure a patronage machine for Shevardnadze loyalists" (Lucan, 2009: 63). While this characteristic is problematic for democratic legitimacy, it is not necessarily problematic for an authoritarian leader, such as Shevardnadze, who was only inheriting and arguably continuing the Soviet nomenklatura authoritarianism.
Ironically and interestingly, in this case, the lack of ideology did become problematic when Shevardnadze's popularity among Georgian citizens and even among his former loyalist supporters declined immensely. Lucan continues describing the party struggles and notes that,


In this account of party politics, one finds that the future opposition leader and current President Saakashvili was actually a former staunch supporter of the authoritarian regime led by Shevardnadze. As the protestors stormed the parliamentary building in Tbilisi in 2003, it was Saakashvili who greeted the current president, rose in hand, and forced him to flee (Lucan, 2008: 64). The same opposition leader who not only led the revolution, but contributed to one of its most lasting and impressionable images of reform, is the same person who is currently trying to hold onto power via parliamentary reforms.

Unsurprisingly, this complicated narrative is seldom told in scholarly or journalistic accounts of the Rose Revolution. In conducting research, Way's (2008) article was the only scholar I found to fully address the convolutions of party influence. Though Saakashvili is now considered to be power hungry and less than democratic, initial reports did not mention his close affiliation with the authoritarian regime. Additionally, those like Stewart (2009) or Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009) have painted him as the democratic reformer. The fact that he, too, fell prey to an extra-constitutional power struggle exemplifies the overarching failures and challenges to democratization in the country. The full reality, as illustrated above, is a mixed bag: multifarious and full of intricacies that are often left untold. Moreover, these complexities reflect the need for
additional, often imperceptible details while also suggesting that entrenched authoritarianism may continue to be a problem within this post-Soviet space. To suggest that the failures were on part of a “failed” protest takes a rash all-or-nothing stance, which ignores deep-seated, structural afflictions.

The structural problems may also be manifested through the coercive abilities of the state and, relatedly, the tactics which are chosen by the protestors. Once again, Lucan Way, is insightful on this topic in asserting that “regimes with little coercive capacity—owing to small or underequipped security forces, substantial wage arrears, or loss in a major war—have had far more difficulty coping with even modest protest” (2009: 62). Looking to this factor will allow for a detailed view of the state’s abilities and revolution’s effectiveness.

In the case of Georgia, the strength of the coercive state was decidedly weak. In the early 1990s, Georgia not only lost territories to secessionist groups, but it additionally entered into a civil war in the early 1990s that shattered its coercive abilities. Because of these events, Georgian forces had to deal with the constant threat (and realities) of regional rebellion and war, which levied monetary burdens that the regime simply could not handle. These threats and the economic unpreparedness were pushed to a breaking point with the relatively “sporadic” protests that broke out in 2003 in response to President Shevardnadze’s attempted rigging of parliamentary elections (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006: 6).

On November 22, 2003, tens of thousands of protesters demonstrated while future President Saakashvili and allies faced very little resistance from the police as they entered parliament. In a quick change, Shevardnadze fled and resigned the next day (Bunce and
Wolchik, 2006). In an interview following the affair, the interior minister acknowledged that the police had not been paid in three months and asked, “So why should they have obeyed Shevardnadze?” (Way, 2009: 62). This additional detail once again illustrates the need to look beyond labels of success or failure and review underlying facts related to the revolutions. Georgia’s Rose Revolution, it could be argued, may owe its initial triumphs partly to the fact that the coercive forces of the state simply failed or did not begrudgingly follow the leader’s orders. Whereas other countries, such as Belarus, have also seen protests, the state has been more efficient in responding and quelling resistance movements (Manning, 2007: 173). That case is outside the scope of this research; however, it is an important point to bear in mind that the contingency of “success” and “failure” may rely on seemingly insignificant, yet structurally unique aspects of a country.

**Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (2004)**

In less than two decades since independence, Ukraine has experienced considerable growth in its civil society and verbalized commitments to democratic ideals that have further removed the country from its Soviet past (Kuzio, 2010). Without a doubt, the 2004 revolution in Ukraine was the most significant action the citizenry and oppositional parties have taken to assert their desires for pro-democratic change. The sheer size of these protests put the Orange Revolution at the center of the world stage. Interestingly, too, of the three countries discussed, Ukraine is the only one considered a “full” success by Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009). They see it as a successful case with clear democratization, thusly reinforcing the notion from the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index that Ukraine is leading the charge for democratization within CIS.
countries. As the section below will illustrate, once again, the country actually embodies a more multifaceted view—neither fully successful, nor failing. Instead, my analysis finds that this apparently democratic leader is still plagued and characterized by existing structural problems, which should be looked at for a meaningful and nuanced understanding of both Ukraine's continued democratic success, as well as for the region as a whole.

Differing from Georgia, the leaders of Ukraine had less party organization and relied heavily upon a smattering of competing parties. Taras Kuzio (2010), a Ukrainian who has written extensively on the country's politics, noted that the alliances were bound together by short-term patronage and coalitions that rarely lasted, even within Ukraine's short history (30). Ukraine's president, Leonid Kuchma, relied heavily on a loose coalition of parties, and these precarious affiliations kept him from fully consolidating political control. After various scandals, including arms sales and "Kuchmagate" in which the president was supposedly aware of and tangentially supported the murder of an opposition journalist, Kuchma's approval ratings plummeted into single digits (Way, 2008). It was surprising, then, that his hand-picked candidate won the presidential election against the hugely popular Viktor Yushchenko. Upon this alleged win, which was fraught with voting irregularities and clearly rigged, citizens took to the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv in late November 2004 to protest the results and demand a re-vote. Way (2008) evaluates Ukrainian party formation and writes of Kuchma:

Quarrels between allies prevented Kuchma from instituting stronger presidential rule. And after the release of tapes pointing to corruption and ties to illegal arms sales, the president's popularity declined, and previous allies, including Yuliya Tymoshenko, Yushchenko and numerous other officials, moved into the opposition. Virtually the entire leadership of the Orange Revolution had in fact been closely allied with the president just a
few years prior to the 2004 presidential election that brought the collapse of the Kuchma regime (62-63).

Though Yushchenko did not have to storm parliament or deliver a rose to Viktor Yanukovych, he did go on to beat the dominant party-backed opponent in the re-vote, thus reaching the Orange Revolution's short-term goal.

As seen in Georgia just one year earlier, there exists a pattern of former dominant party elites falling out of line and forming an oppositional coalition. Yushchenko, by most measures, was much more democratically progressive than his Georgian counterpart, but this did not necessarily translate into political efficacy, as he was not altogether successful as a politician. To the dismay and upset of many in the West, as well as his few remaining supporters, Yushchenko received only approximately 5% of the presidential vote in 2010 (BBC News, 18 Jan. 2010). To add insult to injury for this incumbent, he also suffered a humiliating defeat to his former alliance partner Yuliya Tymoshenko and ultimately, lost the position to Yanukovych, the former criminal and pro-Russian opponent the country rallied to defeat in the Orange Revolution. Given these challenges to long-term democratic change, the labeling of this revolution as "successful with democratization," suggests that Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009) repeat their earlier mistake in not fully accounting for nuance within their stringent and arbitrarily discrete classifications.

Ukraine's strong and unyielding coercive apparatus is, perhaps, less instructive than in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan's revolutions. Only persistent protesting in the capital city center and satellite cities led to change for the Orange protestors. Unlike Georgia, which had not paid its police for months, Ukraine had an intensive, well-paid and encompassing security enforcement system with police officers and military officials.
These authoritative figures did not curtail the protests; however, they strongly defended government buildings so that the opposition’s only hope was the three-week-long massive demonstrations (Kuzio, 2010). Way supports this claim in writing that “the relative strength of the Ukrainian state made regime overthrow impossible without large-scale protest” (2008: 64). Whereas other countries, like Georgia, maintained only sporadic protest, this extensive security apparatus forced the continued and higher-risk involvement of long demonstrations by the opposition leaders and, more importantly, extremely dedicated citizens demanding change.

Nonetheless, it seems that full democratization has not reached Ukraine, despite being labeled as the region’s most successful revolution. Though impressive changes were reached in the short-term election of Yushchenko, coalition in-fighting and the more recent election of Yanukovych suggest a multifaceted view of the country and its positionality within the movement toward a full democracy.

The election of Yanukovych was closely watched and he was fairly elected; however, he seems to represent a repositioning back to pro-Russian rhetoric. For example, he has appointed an administration made up of former Kuchma officials, selected a cabinet of which half the members come from his home region of Donetsk, and has now infamously partaken in a “crossing of red lines” including the extension of the Black Sea Fleet (Kuzio, 2010a). David Kramer, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, wrote in the Kyiv Post, that “Yanukovych’s denial of the 1933 famine as a ‘genocide’ during his PACE speech on the same day as the Black Sea Fleet ratification was ‘like pouring oil on an already simmering fire in Ukraine’s polarized politics’” (quoted in Kuzio, 2010a). These events put Ukrainian
politics on the world stage once again; this time, in an infamous news story characterized by violent antics including egg-throwing and smoke bombs within a parliamentary session. Therefore, without completely reversing Kalandadze or Orenstein's decision and simply regarding it as a failure, these details serve as a reminder that one should qualitatively and robustly understand the environment and the changes that may be in store for the divided Ukrainian nation.

*Kyrgyzstan's Tulip/Pink Revolution (2005)*

The last of the Color Revolutions considered in this research is Kyrgyzstan's Tulip or Pink Revolution, which was the most recent of those covered, occurring in 2005. Though obviously still within the post-Soviet space, Kyrgyzstan's Central Asian location provides some regional variance to this three-way comparison. Additionally, as a small country roughly the size of South Dakota, and as a relatively more rural country, Kyrgyzstan faced unique challenges in its oppositional organizing and protest tactics (Khamidov, 2006: 85). Before assessing its particular experience, it is first important to understand the basic thrust of the Tulip Revolution and its resulting changes.

Like the other two revolutions already discussed, Kyrgyzstan's democratic revolution was the result of the attempted holdover of power by the incumbent party. Most notably, President Askar Akayev was removed from power, which was the major anticipated goal of the protests. Similar to the 2003 Georgian revolution, in Kyrgyzstan an initially small number of protesters led to impressive and considerably large transformations. A couple hundred Kyrgyzstanis challenged the incumbent authoritarian regime by staging takeovers of regional government buildings and outposts. President Akayev, then, gave up power during an antigovernment rally in the capital city of
Bishkek (Sharkov, 2008). The numbers of that rally are approximated at a much-larger ten thousand and ultimately aided in the swift ousting of Akayev and his fairly-elected replacement, Kurmanbek Bakiyev.

Following in line with the other cases, it is likely unsurprising that the election of Bakiyev did not result in a teleological progression with an absolute end goal, or the massive spread of democratic ideals throughout Kyrgyzstan. Instead, the country has faced its vast share of hardships ranging from riots, to ethnic violence, all the while concurrently dealing with a recent coup of the once-idealized, new leader.

President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was reelected in early 2009, but the election itself was laden with protests and accusations of ballot stuffing, events that were reminiscent of pre-Tulip Revolution politics (Sharkov, 2008). The years following the Tulip Revolution have also seen a marked return to the abuse of presidential power. The resulting coup in April 2010 came after Bakiyev's speculative involvement with the murders of prominent opposition politicians (Freedman, 2009: 843-45). The escalating ethnic violence and riots of April 2010 led to the coup and an exile of President Bakiyev, who relinquished his presidential position only to assert that it was rightfully his a few months later in July 2010 (Lally, 12 Oct. 2010). Interestingly as well, although beyond the scope of this paper, Bakiyev sought exile in Belarus, a country that had weathered an attempted electoral revolution without the anticipated change of authoritarian rule. Currently, an interim government is in place as Bakiyev still attempts to assert his position as president after tendering his resignation (Lally, 12 Oct. 2010).

As in Ukraine and Georgia, the opposition leadership emerged from the previous regime's fallout in Kyrgyzstan. So, too, in Kyrgyzstan, did the incumbent party suffer
from a lack of ideology and loosely connected coalitions that fell apart to support the opposition leader, Bakiyev, in 2005. And in Kyrgyzstan, the opposition was able to meet its short-term goals due to the lack of coercive capacity in the state. Just as in Georgia, the military and security services via the police forces did not stand up to the serious, albeit somewhat small, protests in the capital city of Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (Freedman, 2009: 843).

One dissimilar feature was that Kyrgyzstan had not recently been threatened by recent military defeats or a civil war within its territory, unlike Georgia's worn-thin and inadequately funded security apparatus. Nonetheless, Kyrgyzstani police fared similarly that they were asked to defend a state that had not provided for them; the police force was "severely underpaid and often to buy their own fuel and uniforms" (Way, 2008: 68). According to a political scientist, Scott Radnitz (2006), who was present in Kyrgyzstan at the time of the Tulip Revolution, the police struck deals with protestors to ignore or stand aside as the opposition took over local government buildings. Their demonstration did not reach the impressive numbers or excruciating length of the Orange Revolution; however, the inadequacy of the security apparatus in Kyrgyzstan led to very similar, sweeping reforms in the election process. In other words, they were more limited in number but still achieved the same end-result: strong electoral reform and the election of a new leader.

Unlike Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan also had considerably less support from Western actors hoping to permanently instill democratic values. This support was not entirely absent, given that Kyrgyzstan, until very recently, played a role in providing an important military base to the U.S. for the war in Afghanistan and, therefore, was an ally in the
continuing War on Terror (Harding, 4 Feb. 2009). However, the geographic reality of being situated within Central Asia did not bestow upon Kyrgyzstan the same amount of democratic frenzy that existed in the European crossroads of Ukraine, for example. Relatedly, the added enticement of EU membership was not a compelling factor, as it arguably has been (or was) in Ukraine. The protest style in Kyrgyzstan also seemed to reflect a change and relative inefficacy of democratic NGOs and ill-advised protestors:

The attempts and relationships between local NGOs and Western actors could not prevent the revolution from developing into mass looting. Very few died in these cases, not because the opposition relied on nonviolent strategies but because the military and police quickly dispersed in the face of mass protest (Way, 2008: 58).

The geographic location, lack of strong party politics and an unstable security apparatus were factors leading to the initial achievements of the Tulip Revolution. The past year, however, has illustrated a number of difficulties for the fledgling democracy.

As the elected president remains in exile and the interim government attempts to pick up the pieces of a coup, ethnic violence, and recent pressures from neighboring Russia (who pressured the small republic to close the aforementioned US military base), it may be too soon for scholars to assert that this event was a “success.” Instead, a view that accounts for the existing structural challenges and entrenched authoritarian nature of the regime should be accounted for in a meaningful and qualitative manner. To call this event a success (even one “without democratization” ala Kalandadze and Orenstein [2009]) undermines other events in the area and avoids the question of whether or not the new political leaders have democratic ideals at heart.

Summary

Through broader understanding of revolution and, additionally, of what classifies
one as a "success" or "failure," this research hoped to illustrate that the events between 2003 and 2005 in Eastern and Central Europe are in need of more detailed, qualitative study. While it is true that the Rose, Orange and Tulip/Pink Revolutions mainly found their achievements via judicial invalidations of fraudulent elections, the fact remains that these decisions simply would not have been possible without the "outpouring" of citizens into the streets of capital cities and, at times, into the halls of parliaments (Fairbanks, 2007: 45).

While the subsequent changes may reflect challenges to the system, it should not be forgotten that a change in people's recognition of the political system was necessary to make the revolutions possible in the first place. It is, therefore, rash to label these events as successes or failures as soon as five years after they took place. The overwhelming feeling among citizens that they can "never go back" to pre-Color Revolution practices suggests that change is ongoing in the post-Soviet landscape (Fairbanks, 2007: 56).

On the topic of future research and changes within Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, it would seem that scholars and other interested parties should look to people's perceptions as well as the structural challenges, other than solely viewing national elections as ways to challenge the authoritarian status quo. Furthermore, the false dichotomy between "success" and "failure" or, relatedly "democratized" and "non-democratized," inevitably erases important distinctions and results in irreducible or inaccurate claims about the regimes in question. The reality is much more nuanced and requires both detailed case studies and robust comparisons for a fuller understanding of these recent changes. The next section continues in this vein, assessing an important but often misunderstood factor in the Color Revolutions: the youth movements.
CHAPTER V

YOUTH MOVEMENTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY

"Give your children too much freedom and lose your own." - Russian proverb

In assessing his home country’s Tulip Revolution, Alisher Khamidov, a Kyrgyz journalist, writes that “post-Soviet political elites share two common features in their attitudes toward youth: one, they fear youth involvement in politics, and two, they want to control it” (2006: 85). Considering that the children of Soviet independence played a crucial role in the electoral revolutions of the early 2000s, the strength and resilience of youth movements is a powerful indicator of democratic change in this region. Furthermore, since youth movements were hugely present and predominant in the Color Revolutions, beginning in Serbia’s 2000 Bulldozer Revolution, they have often been cited by scholars and policymakers. Despite this attention, the analyses of these groups have been somewhat superficial and at worst, mistakenly portray them as rabble rousers. This misinterpretation is due in part to propaganda and chicanery put forth by the post-Soviet elites in their attempt to hold onto ruling powers (Nikolayenko, 2007). A more in-depth discussion, however, reveals a strong regional diffusion of youth movements, the growth of a political generation, and important roles as decisive, as well as divisive, civil society leaders in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.

It is important to bear in mind that the members of this generation, which came-to-age under newly independent and nationalist states, largely embraced a pro-Western and idealistic viewpoint in comparison to their earlier counterparts. With few, if any,
memories of living under the rule of the Soviet Union, these youth grew up in a culture that allowed them to balance popular culture and political interests specific to their states. Despite attempts by post-Soviet leaders to mimic the Soviet Komsomol and create pro-governmental youth associations, many of the new nations saw an emergence of a more grassroots-oriented and pro-democratic youth culture (Khamidov, 2006: 85).

Ultimately, this carte blanche background, accompanied by a growth in education levels, allowed progressive youth to reclaim a national identity and embrace a pro-democratic fervor that would ultimately aid in ousting the holdovers of Soviet regimes. As such, the youth movements worked to encourage a growth of civil society in the post-Soviet sphere while being at the forefront of protest lines to usher in democratic ideals. The Kmare (translated as Enough), civic organization in Georgia, Pora! (It's Time!) in Ukraine and finally, KelKel (Renaissance) in Kyrgyzstan all played roles in the development and carrying out of their respective color revolutions (Sharkov, 2008; Bunce and Wolchik, 2006). While it is important also to recognize that these groups did receive funding from pro-democracy NGOs and the U.S. government, one should be careful not to entirely dismiss their effectiveness and grass roots organizing, a slight that has happened all too often in reporting on the Color Revolutions of these countries.

The section that follows will include a comparative analysis of the movements in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. Following with the arguments laid out earlier in the research, the attempt is not to persuade the reader to label one movement as a success or failure, but rather to allow for a deeper understanding of these movements within the context of an electoral revolution and subsequently, the civil society framework of their nation-states. Additionally, as stated in literature review, a problematic penchant of the
democratic transition paradigm is to concentrate on political elites. The comparison of youth movements and their roles in the larger context of political and societal change is my attempt to challenge this myopic view of democracy, democracy-building, and transitional change. While my account only reviews the post-Soviet sphere, recent events in the Middle East and North Africa, for example, illustrate the power held by younger generations to fiercely and effectively challenge the ingrained status quo of generations’ past.

**YOUTH MOVEMENTS AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS**

It has been highly problematic for these youth movements to be seriously and rigorously studied for several reasons. First, as already mentioned, is the issue of post-Soviet rulers obfuscating their roles and aiding in the creation of other youth groups to mask actual grassroots organizing (Khamidov, 2006). Secondly, as with most studies on democratization, the role of political elites has been central to analyses, while leaving less powerful individuals and organizations at the margins. Finally, as Olena Nikolayenko (2007) points out, there has been a dearth of theoretical underpinnings in the post-communist area and a failure to connect social movement theory to that of political generations (175). Before continuing with a systematic analysis of the youth movements and civil society organizing, this section will outline movement and political generation theories, which are important and illuminating for the purposes of my research.

The political opportunity framework and modular political action, in association with generational theory, offer deep theoretical grounding for the Color Revolutions and, in particular, the role played by the youth movements. The political opportunity framework and Sidney Tarrow’s (1998) detailed accounts of social movements help us to
understand the formation and very existence of these groups. On the other hand, modular political action and the concept of a “political generation” allow for insights related to diffusion and the shared experiences of youth within this bounded region and time period. Taken together, these assessments will yield a better understanding of the youth movements and ultimately support my hypothesis that a better developed civil society leads to a longer-lasting and more effective electoral revolution, while challenging dominant transitional success-versus-failure paradigm described in Chapter I.

**Political Opportunity Theory**

First, the political opportunity framework attempts to outline a clear understanding of social movements and most importantly, their beginnings (Nikolayenko, 2007: 174). Using this theory, Tarrow (1998) laid out a powerful account of social movements and contentious politics in *Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics*. Drawing upon his work and its adoption by comparative political scientists, like Nikolayenko, one can see that an account of political opportunity “provides a fruitful starting point to assess the likelihood of protest activity from a comparative perspective” (2007: 175). Tarrow, moreover, is very careful in defining a social movement. He makes the cautious distinction between movements and political parties or advocacy groups, which find a better fit within a political elite power structure. Instead, according to Tarrow, a social movement is one that collectively presents challenges to elites, authorities, other power-holding groups or social norms and is acted on “by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents, and authorities” (1998: 3-4). Tarrow’s definition does specifically mention interaction with elite power-structures; it is, nonetheless, clear that the main thrust of his interest and the
central topic of the theory focuses on the actions of the masses.

The most important information gleaned from a political opportunity approach in general and Tarrow’s theory in particular, is in examining the emergence of a movement. Nikolayenko (2007) rightfully notes that “the core argument of this approach is that changes in the political environment influence the chances for mass mobilization” (174). Among these so-called changes in a political environment, Tarrow specifically points out the following as most influential and most common in mobilization: increasing access to participation, elite divisions, shifting alignments, influential allies, and lastly, repression (1998: 3-4). By contextualizing the youth movements of the Color Revolutions within a political opportunity framework, the causes of their emergence will become even clearer and more important. This approach will, furthermore, aid in depicting a path-dependent historical analysis that will illuminate their respective similarities and differences in realizing the goals of democratic change. This type of grassroots-aided theory will become important in moving beyond a top-tiered approach to post-Soviet politics while grading the success vs. failure paradigm that has so often plagued democratic transition literature.

This theory is important in deducing causes or triggering factors of contentious politics; however, the initial mobilizing causes tell very little about the lasting effects of the politically-motivated revolutions. To that end, the remaining analysis must be supplemented with related theory to account for other changes within the post-Soviet sphere during the tumultuous and monumental early-to-mid 2000s. For this account, I turn to modular political action and political generational theory to attempt an explanation in the variability, diffusion and shared experiences across thousands of miles.
and nearly half a decade in the CIS countries evaluated here.

**Modular Political Action**

Modular political action, despite its cryptic naming, is mostly an attempt to understand the diffusion of actions across time or regions. Drawing upon work by Mark R. Beissinger (2007), a CIS-region scholar, it is utilized here to account for the diffusion of Color Revolutions throughout the former Soviet Union. Beissinger's account is insightful; however, unlike my research, his account relied strongly on the patterns of the movement from one electoral revolution to the next, without paying close attention to the mobilizing attributes that we are able to glean from the addition of Tarrow's theoretical perspective. Nonetheless, his account and modular political action do provide a second piece to the puzzle in understanding the formation, growth and ultimate conclusions of the youth movements in question. Simply put, Beissinger's account of modular political action, in general, refers to political acts or movements that are largely based on the emulation or iteration of prior successful examples (2007: 259). Using modularity and its emulative phenomena as a theoretical guide, a study of collective action can then concentrate and account for the shared patterns of mobilizing frames, repertoires of political action, and "modes of contention" across cases (Sharp, 1993; Beissinger, 2007: 261). Writing of the Color Revolutions, in particular, Beissinger continues:

The revolutions that have materialized among the post-communist states since 2000 are examples of a modular phenomenon in this sense, with prior successful examples affecting the materialization of subsequent cases. Each successful democratic revolution has produced an experience that has been consciously borrowed by others, spread by NGOs, and emulated by local social movements, forming the contours of a model (2007: 261).

An in-depth discussion of the models and their particularities follow, but for the time
being, it is useful to note that the iterations of electoral revolutions studied clearly follow certain protesting and theatrical techniques, embraced similar logos, sloganeering, and modes of communication. A closer analysis, supported by the works of those like Beissinger, shows that this type of movement did not appear out of thin air but instead, emerged under carefully calculated guidance and leadership in the wake of unique local events. In particular, a playbook by political scientist Gene Sharp of the Albert Einstein Institute ushered in a standard for protesting techniques in the region and thusly characterized the formats of the Color Revolutions in question. Sharp’s 1973 book, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, as well as his more recent work under the umbrella of the Institute has been instrumental, if not infamous, for would-be democratic supporters throughout hybrid or failing regimes, particularly those within the post-Soviet sphere. And although Tarrow’s account of contentious politics and movement formation will tell us that the mobilizing causes are different, a supplemental approach from modular political action can illustrate this type of diffusion across nation-state lines.

**Political Generations**

Finally, in connection with the phenomena of this emulative political action, one must also consider the shared history and backgrounds of the individuals who led and formed these groups. Although Beissinger’s account of diffusion through modular political action considers shared cultural characteristics of the various youth movements, he does not go far enough to speak of a political generation, which seems to have played a momentous role in characterizing the surge in youth involvement of the electoral revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan (Beissinger, 2007: 263). Specifically, this third theoretical piece is essential in developing a more robust and complete picture
of the types of individuals who became involved, as well as the unique, generational
timing of the Color Revolutions. While a political generation is, admittedly, closely
connected to the cultural characteristics Beissinger developed in modular political action
theory, I argue that the growth and remarkable generational changes characteristic of the
post-Soviet landscape require a more in-depth analysis.

Before describing the uniqueness of the Color Revolutions’ youthful protest
movements, it is first necessary to define what exactly is meant by a “political
generation” within comparative political theory. For the purposes of this research,
political generation is defined as “a group of individuals who have undergone the same
basic historical experiences during their formative years” (Rintala, 1968: 93). In addition
to sharing formative experiences, Braungart and Braungart (1989, 1991), who studied the
American 1960s protest movements, point out that whenever a particular age group acts
together to create political change, a political generation is formed (297). They continue
that,

According to generational theory, an age group is transformed into a
political generation when a bond is created among its members based on
their unique growing-up experiences in society and a shared feeling that
they have a mission to perform by changing the political status quo
(Braungart and Braungart, 1991: 299).

In other words, where a sense of community did not exist before, a more cohesive and
bounded generational group comes into being through mutual and concerted political
efforts. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the formation of new, sovereign nations and the
related move away from communism all are likely to impact the generations coming to
age during such an epoch of tumult and monumental change.

Research supports this claim, finding that these shared political experiences exist
throughout political movements more broadly, but is most often acted upon by younger generations. Recent history and social changes indicate that the vast majority of age groups who are mobilized to resist political change consist of young people, especially students (Braungart and Braungart 1991, Esler 1982, Nikolayenko 2007). This finding is not entirely surprising but is central to understanding the Color Revolutions as sites for political change. Scholars discussing generational theory continually debate whether or not political generations actually result in long-lasting change, or whether they simply youthful, “deviant” political aspirations (Rothman and Lichter, 1982). However, the crux of the matter in this case is that the youth movements were a strong mobilizing force in high-level electoral reforms and democratic transformations. Whether or not this particular generation will stay committed to democratic reforms as they age remains to be seen, but a comparative study of their tactics and commitments during the Color Revolutions is enlightening when evaluating the short-term successes and dynamism of CIS civil society.

It is this theoretical grounding in political generation theory, the diffusive explanations of modular political action and lastly, Tarrow’s political opportunity framework that will allow for a more complete and three-pronged explanation of the youth movements and connected civil society in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. In addition of the theories chosen, my choice to hone in on a large, albeit complex and oft-misunderstood, force within the Color Revolutions was made in order to move away from elite-level electoral politics. While many may narrowly concentrate on success or failure in terms of opposition party seats and share of the vote in Prime Minister or Presidential elections, the lasting changes of the Color Revolutions are arguably less obvious and still
foment under the surface of high-level politics. Keeping this underlying purpose in mind and having established a theoretical underpinning for my analysis, it is possible to fully assess this key component of civil society in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan during their respective Color Revolutions.

**YOUTH MOVEMENTS IN COMPARISON: KMARA, PORA! AND KELKEL**

The opening of this comparative study differs from most in that, by way of an introduction, I shall begin my discussion by mentioning an organization that is outside the scope of my chosen cases. Erstwhile, I have made a focused effort to comprehend the multifaceted and complex electoral changes in the Rose, Orange and Tulip Revolutions. However, when I began this section, I found that an analysis of youth movements in the post-Soviet sphere would be incomplete, inaccurate and profane without a brief introduction to Otpor, the Serbian youth group, which partially led and mobilized the foundational Bulldozer Revolution.

In 2000, Otpor (translated: "resistance") laid the groundwork and set forth an example of what youth movements could accomplish in a hybrid regime, characterized by entrenched Soviet-style leadership, corruption and electoral authoritarianism (Schedler, 2006). Moreover, the three youth movements central to my analysis drew inspiration and received training from this group after the successful toppling of President Slobodan Milosevic in September 2000. Otpor came to fruition under distinctive Serbian challenges, including an atmosphere characterized by genocide, extreme interethnic hatred and dismal mistrust of politicians (Nikolayenko 2007: 178). For the sake of brevity and because it does not directly factor into my research, these topics will not be discussed at great length. Suffice it to say that Otpor was beset by many direct challenges to its
political atmosphere; nonetheless, through the nonviolent guidebook and leadership of Gene Sharp, funding and training by Western actors, and allies within the broader civil society, the group mobilized for political transformation and came to symbolize a movement of pro-democratic, post-Soviet youth that could be emulated and expanded across the region.

Additionally, Otpor’s logo choice was a bold variation on a historically-significant theme: a clenched black fist, which drew its inspiration from the red fist symbol of Bolshevik resistance against the czar. This reclamation of history, as well as other courageous and outsider tactics such as graffiti, rock concerts and street theatrics would give frustrated youth an outlet and toolbox for revolution that was then reiterated across state lines according to their own unique political opportunities (Steinberg, 2008).

**The Color Revolution’s “Political Generation”**

The aforementioned mobilizing events and shared characteristics help explain the variance in the youth movements during these Color Revolutions. However, returning to Nikolayenko (2007), the very title of her article, “The Revolt of the Post-Soviet Generation,” indicates that there was something quite exemplary about this generation, those who came to age during this period, including their unique relationship to politics and a perhaps increasingly foreign-seeming, Soviet-inherited ruling class.

Without a doubt, obvious differences do exist, and I do not intend to paint a picture that all Georgian, Ukrainian and Kyrgyzstani youth are the same. Clear differences may be seen by just looking at basic statistical indicators. The poverty rate, or those subsisting on less than $2 a day, is one illuminating example. In 2005, Georgia’s

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5 Please see Appendix B for a graphical listing of logos from the post-Soviet youth movements discussed.
poverty rate approached an overwhelming 30%, while Kyrgyzstan did not fare much better at 27%. These higher levels stand in stark contrast to that of Ukraine, which stood at only 2%, according to figures from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Similarly, the aforementioned rural to urban population percentages account for a much different lived experience. And while all three are technically situated within the CIS region, the actual distance among them is immense. Not only do these countries consist of vastly different landscapes and cultures, simply to get from the capital city of Kyiv, Ukraine to Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, one would need to travel over 2,100 miles. To further contextualize this distance, a flight between the two cities takes approximately 4 hours and 30 minutes, making the diffusion of similar protest tactics and electoral revolutions all that more remarkable.

Here, I have only scratched the surface of the differences between the lived experiences of the individuals who comprised the Georgian, Ukrainian or Kyrgyzstani youth movements. My purpose in pointing out these factors is not to attempt a definition or touchstone of their lived experiences but rather, to illustrate the extent to which they have clearly varying opportunities or lifestyles. This factor should not be forgotten, but much more important to my research, however, is a comparison of the ways in which they are similar and encompass a political generation. Aside from the obvious experiences of rallying around an electoral failure, the section below will concentrate on factors that contributed to unrest, knowledge and ease of involvement within the youth movements in the first place. These include the growth in higher education as well as a post-Soviet search for national identity or recognition.

63
Education: Site of Growth and Reformation

Education is an important starting place in two ways: as a site for networking, but also as a source of discontent or area for reform. Furthermore, not only has education been connected to the emergence of new elites through revolution, but it has long been linked to democratization more broadly (Goldstone, 2001: 39). For example, while free and fair elections were the main driving force behind youth movement organizing in the three countries, educational reform was a secondary source of mobilization, as will be discussed in the next section. Discontent with university corruption was not a critical tipping point resulting in any of the major protests, but this general disaffected attitude did reflect a source of discontent specific to the youth movements (Bakhtadze, 2002). The university as a site of contestation is especially salient, given the growth of students in all three countries leading up to their respective electoral revolution.

Just in Ukraine, for example, the “share of students between the ages of fifteen to twenty-four increased from 21 to 32 percent in the last decade” (Nikolayenko, 2007: 171). Similar growth existed in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, as illustrated below. For these countries, the rise in attendance amounted to an incomparable growth of higher learning, and also reflected a physical location where young people could gather, network, and engage in political action when needed.

Table 5.1 Georgia Tertiary Education Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GER % (Gross Enrollment Ratios)</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2002*</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Students</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2 Ukraine Tertiary Education Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GER % (Gross Enrollment Ratios)</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Students</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.3 Kyrgyzstan Tertiary Education Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GER % (Gross Enrollment Ratios)</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Students</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the tables above illustrate, all three countries experienced a growth in education at the same time their youth movements were strongly mobilizing. The data for Georgia, however, are interesting and unique. Of the three countries assessed, only Georgia experienced a decline in gross enrollment ratios (GER %) of its tertiary education levels. It is beyond the scope of my research to suggest causes in this decline, but for this project, it is still telling that the growth that Georgian universities did experience was between the years of 1999 and 2002, when its Kmare youth organization was on the rise, expanding and organizing. As the last two tables show, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan experienced similar growth patterns as Georgia, but did not encounter a decline after the electoral revolutions. The larger enrollment figures for these two countries also coincide with the youth movement growth and electoral revolution involvement of Pora and KelKel. In summary, the post-Soviet generation in these three
countries entered into higher education at regionally-impressive numbers around the
times of their great political upheaval in the early-to-mid 2000s. This comparison does
not suggest that the growth in education actually resulted in the youth movements but
rather, that higher education acted both as an important physical networking site as well
as a site for contestation and reform, given the larger enrollment numbers and their self-
interest in educational politics. These two features aided in bonding the young
populations together as well as contributing to the formation of a political generation with
common tactics, goals, and physical networking sites.

Nationalism and Ethnic Makeup

In addition to greater enrollment ratios of higher education, the post-Soviet youth
can be characterized by another aspect that differs markedly from the older generations in
their nation-states. This characteristic deals directly with their relationship to the Soviet
Union, nationalism and their coming-to-age in a newly independent state. I have
previously suggested that the carte blanche background for the youths in the recently
formed, once-satellite nations was formative of a political generation. This section
examines that assertion in greater depth.

In particular, scholars have addressed the long-term effects of “Russification,” in
both language and custom requirements for non-ethnically Russian individuals during
Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union (Way, 2008; Nikolayenko, 2007). Nikolayenko
continues on to assess its importance in regard to a formation of a new political
generation and writes that “decades of Russification, an official Soviet policy aimed at
imposing the domination of Russian culture throughout the multiethnic Soviet Union, left
deep scars in the social fabric of former Soviet republic” (2007: 177). This policy had
many implications for nationalism and CIS-studies, but for the purpose of this section, it is important to note that it resulted in yet another difference between their parents' generation and the youth of today.

For example, once being liberated from a policy of foreign origins, the search for a national identity for Georgians, Ukrainians and Kyrgyzstanis was once again at the surface and of import during this critical juncture. Now blessed with statehood, young people were then simultaneously tasked and privileged to revive their own languages, folk heroes, and national culture more broadly. Whereas the previously mandated policy of Russification imposed language and cultural standards on a diverse ethnic culture in all three countries covered, this new development allowed young people the freedom to find or remake their nation and national-identity according to their own interests.

In the 1920s and 1930s, or the earlier years of the USSR’s nationalities reforms, the focus was on a policy of *korenizatsiya* or “indigenization.” These reforms were more multiethnic or multinational in nature and accepting of differing groups. By the later 1930s and entering into difficult wartime efforts, Russification was more fully in effect, with Russian language classes as a requirement (Way, 2008). These policies waxed and waned during the duration of the Soviet Union, but a notion of hierarchy, with the Russian-language and ethnically-Russian individuals at the top, was as reoccurring theme throughout (Brubacker, 1994).

This history is important given the actual ethnic diversity of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. These influences, taken together, have undoubtedly impacted the post-Soviet generation’s attempts to differentiate themselves from a foreign past and forge a new, national culture of which they can take ownership. Additionally, growing up in an
environment with the freedom of language-choice and national identity fostered a strong
identification with the nation-state. Although not all is peaceful and even the countries in
question have experienced painful and ongoing ethnic tensions, the Kmara, Pora and
KelKel youth movements emerged with an interest to set themselves apart from the
historical and overarching Soviet identity. In doing so, too, these movements and the
youth more generally were decidedly more Western-leaning, both in terms of movement
allies but also in terms of democratic or market goals.

In order to better understand this point, it is useful to look toward the actual ethnic
makeup of Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. The tables and qualitative assessments
below indicate the ethnic make-up, challenges to civil society and further implications for
long-term effects of the Rose, Orange and Tulip Revolutions.

**Table 5.4 Ethnic Make-up of Georgia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Groups</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Georgians</td>
<td>84.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijanis</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ossetians</td>
<td>&lt;1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yezids</td>
<td>&lt;1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>&lt;1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kists</td>
<td>&lt;1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>&lt;1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abkhazians</td>
<td>&lt;1.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The table above reflects the ethnic makeup and divisions within Georgia. Although
Georgians are the clear majority in terms of percentage, accompanying qualitative
research on the history of Georgia suggests that there exists a view that "Georgians
themselves are not homogenous and can be further divided into groups” (Hunter, 1994). Therefore, aside from the obvious variations in ethnic dimensions, such as the Abkhazians, the Ossets, Armenians or Azerbaijanis, there are divisions in the dominant ethnic group as well. This fact suggests, not only a sheer multiplicity of ethnic minorities, but that they are often obscured, even in dominant discourse. It goes on to imply that Georgians themselves “cannot be regarded as ethnically cohesive and are subject to internal divisions” (Hunte, 1994). With the aforementioned poverty level, we find that these ethnic cleavages are further aggravated by the harshness of the economic conditions, ultimately, contributing to vulnerability in statehood in terms of both domestic and outsider threats.

The removal of an overarching Soviet policy on ethnic identity led to changes of Georgia’s approach to ethnic minorities in two major ways. First, in asserting sovereignty, the newly formed state of Georgia was able to proudly display the majority ethnic group Georgian, despite its otherwise multifaceted composition. Secondly, however, the disappearance of supranational governance in the form of the Soviet Union left a power vacuum in which ethnic divisions and once-silenced or less powerful groups could assert their standing, even if that erupted in the atmosphere of ethnically-motivated violence and hostilities. As such, it has been these divisions that have plagued the civil society of Georgia and as discussed later on, hindered youth movement success following the opening up after the Rose Revolution.
Table 5.5 Ethnic Make-up of Ukraine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Groups</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusians</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldovans</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimean Tatars</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Background Note – Ukraine. Retrieved from [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3211.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3211.htm)

Ukraine’s ethnic reality is relatively diverse but statistically less complicated than that of Georgia and is characterized by a dichotomy between Ukrainians and Russians, both ethnically and linguistically. As one might expect, given Ukraine’s defining characteristic as a *borderlands* between East and West, or Europe and Russia, the ethnic makeup of Ukraine is strongly Ukrainian but with a sizable Russian minority. Unlike Georgia, Ukraine’s prominent internal divisions generally do not stem from ethnic groups or ethnic violence. Rather, the dividing line in Ukraine straddles Eastern and Western Ukraine. Nationalism and, likewise, the Orange electorate hold a more prominent position in Western Ukraine. Meanwhile, Yanukovych, the bulk of his supporters and the decidedly more pro-Russian electorate finds its home in the Eastern region of the country.

These divisions are not a new symptom after Ukraine’s 1991 independence. They have fomented under the surface, sometimes boiling over into nationalist violence, during many times prior to 1991 and even prior to the existence of the Soviet Union itself. In a NATO document describing the country, NATO fellow Khrychikov writes:
For the sake of convenience, it will be expedient only to make a point that regional polarisation of Ukraine and pro-Russian sentiments in the Eastern parts may be considered as historically rooted and been developed throughout centuries of being exposed to influxes coming from neighbours. Eastern Ukraine has had a long period of being part of first Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union, whereas most of Western Ukraine joined the USSR only after the Second World War (2000: 7)

Clearly, given this distinction, the challenges to civil society and the long-term democratic growth instilled by the Orange Revolution will be played out between pro-Russian or nationalist proponents. This was articulated in Chapter 4, as illustrated through the actions of Yanukovych in choosing his administrative and cabinet members, and it is also echoed in political sentiments of the youth movements during the electoral revolution. The youth in Pora! set out to distance themselves from its Soviet past and in doing so, embraced the Orange and nationalist rhetoric of Western, or more urbanized Ukraine. As has been characteristic of Ukrainian history, the long-term influences of this political generation seem to be played out again and again in the dichotomous choice of East or West. Although this has proven much more manageable and less violent than ethnic divisions in Georgia, for example, this either/or distinction still acts as a barrier to liberalizing change for the weakening democratic leader in the region.

Table 5.6 Ethnic Make-up of Kyrgyzstan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyz</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dungan</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uyghur</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


71
The population of Kyrgyzstan differs from the other two case studies in that it is comprised of three main ethnic groups: Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Russians. Similar to others in Central Asia, this rich mix of ethnic groups can be traced back to the somewhat haphazard drawing of borders by Stalin the 1920s. However, after the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, the balance of ethnic groups changed somewhat dramatically. The ethnic Russian population has sharply declined, particularly in the southern part of the country. As indicated by the title of the news article, “Kyrgyzstan: Delicate Ethnic Balance” (2010, June 17), this removal of the ethnic Russian minority, accompanied by internal migration, has greatly altered the fragile balance between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. The dual challenge of state and democracy-building in this strongly multi-ethnic society has proven difficult, even after the initial attempts of the Tulip Revolution.

Having laid the groundwork for the generation from which these movements emerged and the particularities of their nation-states, it is now possible to more adequately and accurately assess their full involvement in the Color Revolutions.

Comparison of Political Opportunities and Modular Political Action

Apropos to this section, it is interesting to consult yet another Russian proverb which asserts povtoreniye - mat' ucheniya or “repetition is the mother of learning.” This somewhat familiar - practice makes perfect - adage is useful in assessing the dispersive and iterated actions employed by youth movements in the region. Specifically, when looking to the mobilizing events, training and protest tactics, there exists a great amount of overlap and shared characteristics between the three case studies. All three were inspired by the Serbian factor, Otpor, in one way or another and, of course, all three were responding to fraudulent electoral results on behalf of an incumbent government. As the
following section will illustrate, the cases chosen exhibit extensive shared characteristics; however, there also exists a great deal of uniqueness, given the specificities of their nation-state and inimitable circumstances.

**Kmara in Georgia’s Rose Revolution**

Whereas Serbia benefited from the organized and unconventional protests of Otpor in the Bulldozer Revolution, Georgia’s Rose Revolution was aided by the work of the strong youth movement branded as *Kmara* or “Enough.” Prior to the major protests in the wake of the 2003 elections, Georgian students began to organize as early as 2000 to raise awareness of what they perceived as unmitigated corruption at state universities. These initial efforts were relatively small, comprised of approximately 2,500 students, and began at Tbilisi State University before branching out to other universities and smaller locales across the country.

Before the mobilizing events in 2003, these smaller organizations concentrated on state corruption within the national universities, such as the hiring or promotion practices among the state-ruled administrations. This early activism paled in comparison to the national-level electoral reform sparked by the Rose Revolution, but the smaller groups did achieve relative successes. For example, beginning at Tbilisi State University, students created the first student government at a state university, a new criterion that was then emulated at other schools in Georgia as efforts to implement educational reform and reduce state-sanctioned corruption (Bakhtadze, 2002). What is more notable for the purposes of this analysis, however, is that these nascent student groups would later evolve into the much larger and more effective Kmara youth movement.

Clearly, the Georgian youth movement was at its height during the Rose
Revolution of November 2003, but Kmara itself seems to have formed as early as February 2003 (van der Schriek, 2003). It was at this point that the existing loose network of student organizations coalesced to form the highly connected organization, operating under the single banner of Kmara. Here, Tarrow’s work on political opportunity frameworks as well as Beissinger’s account of modular political action come together nicely to support an explanation of Kmara’s calculated formation.

This change from informal to formal was the result of not only mobilizing events related to the upcoming parliamentary elections and dissatisfaction with then-president Shevardadnze, but it was also accompanied by the diffusive training efforts on behalf of Otpor and funding from pro-democratic sources with deep pockets. By partnering with the Georgian Human Rights NGO, Liberty Institute, and increasing contact with activists from Otpor, the student movements greatly increased their networking and organization-building capacities (McFaul, 2005). Before November 2003, some of these newly-minted Kmara activists also received training at Belgrade’s Center for Nonviolent Resistance, which had been instrumental in the earlier Serbian youth movement. Taking a page out of the Otpor and a Gene Sharp-inspired playbook regarding nonviolent resistance, the young activists modeled their organization to form a decentralized network of leadership.6 Kmara’s numbers grew during this brief build-up in 2003; meanwhile, organizers consciously maintained a leadership style that was loose, unaffiliated with a “head office” and made up of regional cells. This geographic and managerial diversity hearkened to the grassroots-style activism the group desired, but it also provided much-needed autonomy and self-sufficiency.

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6 See Appendix C for an excerpt from Gene Sharp and the Albert Einstein Institute’s work on nonviolent resistance tactics for comparison.
In other words, without a head office or strict hierarchical leadership, the dismantling of the organization would prove difficult, if not impossible, for the political elites in power. Instead, Kmara members were considered to be sovereign leaders within their regional bases. Their initial training included political marketing, media relations, recruitment and debating skills and moreover, lessons on how to stage a “bloodless revolution” ala Gene Sharp and his nonviolent tactics (van der Schreik, 2003). Western NGOs, particularly Soros’ Open Society Institute, aided in providing the much-needed funds for trainings and trips between Serbia and Georgia. This early stage, initially led by members of Otpor and receiving aid from Western pro-democratic groups—such as the aforementioned Soros’ Open Society Institute, the National Endowment for Democracy, and Council of Europe among others—provided Kmara youth advocates with a toolkit for democratic activism that could then be supplanted and shared with their respective cities and broader regional networks (Herd, 2005). Given this diffusion and transferability, Kmara followed a similar path as Otpor: it quickly went from a Western-aided organization with cross-national ties to a movement that was shared with the Georgian people themselves and would further help them realize democratic efforts on a national scale.

This type of youth movement, distinctive with millennial political and marketing savvy, was unprecedented in Georgia. By the way of its structure, Kmara began by focusing singularly on regional issues, but in the short lead-up to the November elections, they started to concentrate largely on electoral reform. Here, they utilized nonviolent protest tactics such as graffiti (of their clenched fist logo—the same as Otpor’s except for the Kmara wording at the bottom of the image), and noisy protest marches, also similar to
Otpor’s stylistic protest tactics (Herd, 2005; Nikolayenko, 2006). These were cheap but effective measures in that they greatly improved the visibility of the youth movement and its increasingly national motives. Soon thereafter, Kmara was a “broadly recognizable name” in Georgia, with members making appearances on news channels and in major newspapers, such as the Tbilisi-based national news source, *Georgian Times* (van der Schriek, 2003). As the November elections grew closer, the group acted in tandem with the aforementioned Liberty Institute to organize and train election observers that would ensure free and fair procedures on the voting day. Kmara, unlike the opposition parties or the more traditional civil society organizations, was of acute importance at this juncture. It was here that they were able to tap into their informal, albeit extremely powerful, student networks for recruitment.

Kmara, with the aid of Otpor, further mobilized this sector by working with Rustavi-2, a private broadcast network, to air a documentary on the Bulldozer Revolution and the toppling of Milosevic twice before the November elections. The general secretary of Georgia’s National Movement opposition party, Ivane Merabishvili, told reporters immediately following the Rose Revolution that,

> Most important was the film. All the demonstrators knew the tactics of the revolution in Belgrade by heart because [Rustavi-2] showed ... the film on their revolution. Everyone knew what to do. This was a copy of that revolution (quoted in van der Schreik, 2003).

Once irregularities were reported on voting day, November 2, 2003, Kmara youth activists led the protests in Tbilisi and other major Georgian cities. They staged protests for twenty days until Saakashvili and his allies famously entered the legislative hall to present the fraudulent leader with roses and signify the end of the Shevardnadze reign.
At this point, Kmara was a comparatively recent addition—less than a year old—in the landscape of Georgian politics. Nonetheless, they managed to guide the opposition protests with careful and quick leadership. McFaul writes, “Kmara was new, and so had not paved the way for protest as Otpor had, but once the vote was stolen, Kmara played a more central role than had its Serbian counterpart in mobilizing street protests” (2005: 12). Therefore, as the Rose Revolution was played out with a combination of political parties and civic organizations, Kmara was the sought-after and required driving force in the actual street protests that were instrumental for the end of the Shevardnadze regime. As such, the organization gained a great deal from Otpor’s training and, of course, Western aid; yet it played an essential role in its decidedly unique circumstances.

As for Kmara currently, my findings suggest that many of the regional leaders and trainers left the organization to work for the Liberty Institute while many of its other activists just simply left. An internet search for “Kmara” reveals that, other than the references to 2003, Kmara has all but disappeared. This point is particularly salient, given that more recent democratic protests (Moldova’s “Twitter Revolution”, Iran’s Green Revolution, and current events of the so-called 2011 Arab Spring) have spurred a great amount of interest in the use of Twitter, Facebook and online communications. Kmara’s recent absence in news and social networking indicates that while they were instrumental in the actual protests, their relative short existence in the Georgian civil sphere may have hindered their long-term effectiveness. Additionally, Kmara’s shortcomings and lack of involvement after the flurry of 2003’s events suggests that outlying factors, such as Georgia’s economic, ethnic and security hardships in its present-day politics may play a much larger role, reducing the usefulness of a pro-democratic youth movement. This
differs markedly from Ukraine’s Pora! youth organization, which will be discussed next.

_Pora! in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution_

_ПОРА!_ is translated to “It’s time!” in Ukrainian. This simple, yet effective, branding characterized the irritation and urgency of the youth movement during the 2004 Orange Revolution. Like Kmara, Pora! received training and benefited from the overall iterated efforts of Serbia’s Otpor. With this training and by working in tandem with the Our Ukraine party coalition, Pora! incited and nurtured the three weeks of protest in the dead of the 2004-2005 Ukrainian winter. Though this research questions the dichotomous success or failure paradigm, and Chapter 4 has illustrated present instabilities for Ukraine’s democratic growth, when it comes to sheer size and imagery, Pora! was undoubtedly the most effective and memorable of the three youth movements assessed. Interestingly, too, the movement has grown to be a permanent fixture in Ukrainian civil society –as a political party (Yellow Pora!) and independent civil organization (Black Pora!), which will be discussed later on in this section.

Pora!’s evolution is strikingly similar to Kmara’s, given the growth in education, related student groups and cross-national training from Serbia’s Otpor. Members of Pora! even travelled to Tbilisi to witness their protests and learn from their tactics during the Rose Revolution (Wilson, 2006). So, too, was Pora! largely influenced by Otpor’s adoption of Gene Sharp’s nonviolent tactics in _From Dictatorship to Democracy_. Unlike Kmara and the upcoming Kyrgyzstani KelKel youth movement, however, Pora! was extremely effective in adopting these policies and becoming a fixture in the Ukrainian civil society. Part of the explanation for its increased visibility is simply related to their political and marketing know-how. Pora! and the Orange Revolution itself were visibly
sensational – from creative sloganeering to the sheer size of the protests. These images contributed to a media-fueled event that drew attention to the youth movement’s existence while raising awareness for their goals.

The exchange of roses in the Rose Revolution was a memorable highlight and yet, it paled in comparison to the images generated by the flood of people wearing orange in Kyiv’s Independence Square and the specific, propagandistic images generated by Pora!. The protestors in the square and around Ukraine were from the society at-large, but their efforts were mobilized and bolstered by the vibrant youth movement and persistence on behalf of Pora! leading up to the street events. Like Kmara, this group used cheap but effective means to spread the word about their causes (often simply anti-Kuchma) and to raise awareness more generally.

Utilizing graffiti and street art, such as wheat pasting and stenciling, Pora! expressed their slogans and splashed their logos across Ukrainian cityscapes. With this propensity toward the radical, they did not mince words nor censor themselves. These confrontational tactics were illustrated in one Pora! poster in which a boot is crushing a cockroach (signifying then-president Kuchma) and in graffiti reading “Kuchma = Bandit” (Wilson, 2006). Perhaps, most clearly and effectively, one Pora! poster suggested that the fraudulent takeover of Kyiv by Donetsk, where the incumbently-selected Yanukovych calls home, would be equivalent to the Nazi takeover of Kyiv during World War II (Kuzio, 2010a: 66). This quite radical approach beckoned to everyday Ukrainians and suggested, as Taras Kuzio (2010a) has put it: “as Ukrainians had then defeated that attempt, Pora stated that they would also defeat this attempt on this occasion” (66). The threat of a Donetsk “takeover” was a common theme in the protests of the Orange
Revolution and were strongly enunciated by Pora!, both in the aforementioned poster but
in their involvement with rock concerts and the promotion of protest music to the
younger generations. For a generation growing up with greater exposure to not only
Western ideas of liberalism, but also Western forms of entertainment, music tapped into
an under-utilized source of discontent and anger with the Kuchma/Yanukovych regime.

Kuzio, in his assessment of the music writes:

Songs such as *Ukraina* by the well-known band Mandry called upon
Ukrainians to look at their ancestors, who were looking down upon them
at this critical time. The option of staying passive was morally wrong
because too many Ukrainian intellectuals had already suffered and died.
The insinuation was that with the election of Yanukovych, their Ukraine,
from a nationally conscious point of view, would be irrevocably lost.
Orange Revolution music called upon Ukrainians to rush to Kyiv to defend
this sacred city from a Yanukovych victory. Everyone should travel to
Kyiv as soon as they could, by any means possible and, if no
other way was available, on foot (2010a: 66).

This careful blending between a commitment to Ukrainian history and a duty to aid in
fulfilling its promising future was amplified through song, rock music, and street theatrics
– including graffiti. It was not singularly proposed or enunciated by Pora!, but they were
effective in aligning the increasingly educated and Western-leaning Ukrainian youth with
their pro-democratic ideals and protests.

While these acts were similar and shared between the other movements studied,
secondary sources and the continued existence of Pora! suggests that the youth movement
was most effective in Ukraine. Pora! today has divided but remains important to the
Ukrainian civil society. One arm, Black Pora!, still acts as an independent youth civic
organization whereas its counterpart, Yellow Pora!, has been institutionalized as a
political party. Although it has not exactly flourished, it is still in existence and won seats
in a recent election for L'viv City Council in Western Ukraine. This indicates that the
youth movement and the vision it instilled has not completely disappeared from
Ukrainian civil society despite troubling national-level outcomes (Pravda, Nov. 8, 2010).

*KelKel in Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution*

KelKel, the youth movement involved in the Tulip Revolution, takes its name
from the Kyrgyz language meaning “renaissance” and “shining of the good.” Similar to
the organizations discussed thus far, KelKel, with its eager moniker, acted as a pro-
democratic and youthful source within the civil society while the country as a whole
underwent electoral reforms. So, too, like the other organizations discussed, did the
movement access leadership training and tactics from Otpor, Kmara, Pora and support
from Western democracy NGOs, such as Soros’ Open Society Institute. However, stark
differences do exist for KelKel and its overall effectiveness. While Pora encountered
difficulties but found an ostensibly permanent home in the fabric of Ukrainian civil
society and Kmara largely disbanded but still acted as a prominent mobilizing force,
KelKel faced unique challenges that undermined its overall efficacy both during and after
the Tulip Revolution.

One early challenge that has been touched upon but is important to reconsider is
simply the geographic nature of Kyrgyzstan. Steven Hess (2010) wrote in a recent article
that “Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan are relatively isolated from the West in terms of
economic, political, and social linkages and geography as compared to the Baltic and
East European states;” in which these latter post-Soviet states have endured greater
democratic growth and been more easily welcomed into the broader European culture and
society (29). He continues the comparison, noting that “although within this group,
Ukraine is clearly the most closely connected and Kyrgyzstan the least” (Hess, 2010: 29).
Due to these geographic realities, KelKel was befallen with an acute challenge, not experienced by Kmara or Pora in the prior years of democratic revolution. Despite attempts of diffusion and modulated political action of nonviolence resistance for yet another “bloodless [democratic] revolution,” the efforts by Western pro-democracy groups and similarly aligned movements like Otpor simply did not gain the same traction as they did in Georgia or Ukraine.

This incomplete diffusion was not for lack of trying. The Kyrgyz citizenry clearly received many of the same mechanisms for democracy promotion that have already been assessed for the other groups. Hess, too, stresses this point and writes,

Outside donors, such as the National Endowment for Democracy, Eurasia Foundation, U.S. State Department, and USAID sponsored more than 170 nonprofit organizations in Kyrgyzstan aimed at supporting democracy… They funded an independent printing press in Bishkek and Radio Azattyk, a Kyrgyz affiliate of Radio Free Europe, and even transported a group of Kyrgyz youth to Ukraine to observe and learn from the Orange Revolution (2010: 29-30, emphasis added).

Whereas similar activities contributed to the establishment of a cohesive youth movement in Georgia and Ukraine, KelKel never fully coalesced into a strong oppositional movement. Without wholly denigrating the student movement that did exist in Kyrgyzstan, it is important to consider factors that led to these troubles or inefficiencies. Clearly diffusion, economic support and modular political action are not the only factors that play a role in a movement’s strength and formation. The specificities of Kyrgyzstan and its 2005 mobilizing election are additional indicators as to why KelKel did not achieve parallel traction, in comparison to the others studied.

In addition to the geographic isolation of Kyrgyzstan, the country also differs in that the Tulip Revolution was played out as a more rural event when compared to
Ukraine and Georgia’s city-focused protest activities. Kyrgyzstan has a much higher rural population (64%), in comparison to Ukraine’s relatively more urbanized population at 32% and even to Georgia’s less urban 47% (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2005). Additionally, too, whereas the Rose and Orange Revolutions found strongholds in the capital cities of Tbilisi and Kyiv, Kyrgyzstan’s protests began in the south of the country in Jalal-Abad and Osh. Rather than accessing a well-connected student movement and acting in tandem with oppositional parties, the build-up to the Tulip Revolution found its greatest support in the form of “informal regional patronage networks and subnational cleavages” (Hess, 2010: 31). Here, regional elites from the south drew upon the strong division between the equally populous northern and southern regions of Kyrgyzstan, which are divided ethnically and politically and further isolated by a mountain range. As such, the fraudulent election was not an especially effective mobilizing event, as it had been for Kmara and Pora. Hess writes, “While the announcement by international election observers than the election had been rigged was not entirely ineffectual, its main importance in motivating popular outrage was related to its exacerbation of existing regionally based grievances” (2010: 33). This suggests that rather than being driven by a unified grassroots opposition, the Tulip Revolution was mostly led by political elites and an ad hoc, regional opposition originating in the south of the country. Their main interests, therefore, may not have been for reform and civil resistance, as was a major driving force in the other youth movements. Instead, it arguably represents a “window of opportunity presented by a flawed election to temporarily channel regional grievances into a national opposition” (Hess, 2010: 33). KelKel was both unable to establish a firm foundation before the build-up to the events, but it also
was overshadowed by reinforcing cleavages and the political elites who represented them. This should not be misconstrued to suggest that KelKel was altogether ineffectual, but when compared to the other Color Revolutions in my research, they present a more fragmented and less autonomous civil society group. This argument is further evidenced by the utter disappearance of KelKel from any recent accessible public records or internet searches. Whereas Kmara disintegrating to some extent and members found homes in more established NGOs and Pora achieved relative success through its acceptance into the greater civil society, nowhere was I able to find information on KelKel and its significance after the Tulip Revolution. Despite iterated attempts, through the additional adoption of the clenched fist logo we have grown accustomed to, a “free” voice on the airwaves, or extensive Western aid, KelKel’s future seems bleak, if not utterly non-existent.

Summary

While the generational advantage of being able to form a new identity allowed young people in the post-Soviet sphere to initiate and organize protests, the long-term changes and influences of these movements are more multifaceted and influenced by factors such as education, poverty levels, the extent of diffusion and regional or ethnic hostilities. Nonetheless, it remains true that the young people in all three cases were able to organize protest activities, which later on, galvanized larger portions of their nations’ citizenries and questioned the corrupt and fraudulent elections that had previously existed as a status quo. These groups undoubtedly impacted the political atmosphere and civil society in their newly developed home countries. Their success rates and long-term
influences may vary, but they should not be overlooked or relegated to the margins of democratization or transition literature on the post-Soviet region.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The underlying interest in pursuing this study was to challenge a success or failure paradigm, as it relates to both the post-Soviet electoral revolutions and democratization studies more broadly. In the aggregate regional level of this study, the presence of an electoral revolution was shown to have varying and, at times, insignificant relationships in respect to the chosen democratic variables. To supplement these findings, I employed a more detailed comparison of three electoral revolutions in the post-Soviet sphere. This step led to a more robust explanation of the differences and similarities for oppositional parties, state apparatus structures and, finally, protesting youth movements in the Rose, Orange and Tulip Revolutions.

METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS

One of the major difficulties in assessing the Color Revolutions is drawing boundary lines among party influence, NGOs and the smaller social movements while relying on secondary sources. As my research noted, the youth movements found considerable support from well-funded Western NGOs and organizations interested in spreading democracy for philanthropic or strategic purposes. Critics of the Color Revolutions have pointed to this factor as a delegitimizing force, indicating that the youth movements were insincere or invalid. Given these critiques and vociferous objections, there is a vast amount of disinformation that is difficult to wade through. While some of it stems from incumbent governments’ attempts to dissuade followers, a great deal comes
from critics more broadly – those who oppose Soros' Open Society Institute and similar foundational sources. For the purposes of this research, I have noted funding sources where appropriate and tried to disengage my work from the broader and, at times, specious critiques. Moreover, as I think my analyses of the youth movements indicate, external aid, even when extremely generous, does not necessarily translate into successful democratic change.

An additional shortfall related to my use of secondary sources is that, as with many social movements, they often fester under the surface before emerging into the mainstream. I argue that this is becoming less and less of a problem, due to the use of internet networking sites and blogging, but it is possible that the next KelKel or Kmara is currently forming and intensifying at local universities. Being geographically isolated from these likely budding reformers makes the research less precise and predictive. Nonetheless, I have attempted to control for this limitation through extensive internet searches and scouring easily accessible online sources that exist outside of major newspapers and scholarly journals. These findings reaffirm my conclusions on the respective youth movements, but it is important to keep this limitation in mind when making overall evaluations.

AREAS OF FUTURE STUDY

For a more robust comparison of electoral revolutions in the future, I would like to include cases from outside of the CIS. This regional focus has helped in creating a more manageable research project, but it has also reduced the scope and generalizability of my work. For example, recent changes in the Middle East and North Africa have highlighted the need for detailed, comparative work covering both democratic revolutions
and the extent of youth movement involvement. It would also be illuminating to evaluate electoral revolutions over time, outside of the CIS and ranging over a period longer than the early-to-mid 2000s. Another common critique of the Color Revolutions is that, as mentioned in Chapter 2, they are not revolutions at all but simply a changing from one elite group to a newer, younger elite group. This critique could be more easily challenged through a cross-regional and cross-time analysis.

Additionally, the choice to concentrate on youth movements was made in an effort to better understand a single manageable, albeit important sector of the countries’ civil societies. In the future, my research would benefit from evaluating other parts of this important and changing factor related to democracy. For example, Ukraine has an increasingly significant NGO sector concentrating on women’s rights. These organizations encompass legal rights organizations associated with political parties on one hand, and radical organizations like FEMEN on the other. The latter groups embrace nonviolent but relatively extreme tactics to raise awareness about predominantly women’s issues, such as sexual trafficking in the CIS, through the adoption of nude and confrontational protests in Kyiv’s Independence Square. It is unclear, however, what role these groups, the more mainstream as well as the radical, have played in pro-democratic reform or how they are received in the broader civil society. And even though my analysis reflects generally upon Kmara, Pora!, and KelKel’s future, it would be interesting and beneficial to better understand their interplay with NGOs or other social movements in their respective countries.
OVERVIEW

Despite these shortfalls and areas in need of expansion, this research has examined recent electoral revolutions in the post-Soviet sphere while challenging the success or failure paradigm that dominates democratic transition literature. In order to cast a wider net while maintaining a parsimonious project, I employed a two-part analysis. First, the aggregate-level of my research looked at five variables related to democratic growth and well-being. Taken from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) from 2006-2010, the cross-tabulations between presence of electoral revolutions and the chosen democratic variables revealed variability in the region as a whole. Contrary to what I initially expected, the presence of an electoral revolution did not strongly relate to higher levels of democracy in the chosen variables.

For a better understanding beyond this aggregated approach, the next level of my research employed a qualitative comparison of Georgia’s Rose Revolution (2003), Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (2004), and Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution (2005). The first section evaluated variables, such as oppositional party strength and the state coercive apparatus. The findings in this section further supported the argument to resist a success or failure approach and indicated that, even Ukraine, which is considered the strong leader in the region and a “success” by scholars, has encountered reversals and challenges to its 2004 pro-democratic reform.

To better understand this variability, my final analysis in Chapter 5 focused on the youth movements, a commonly misunderstood or neglected part of the electoral revolutions in the CIS. These findings support the claim that a stronger civil society is more likely to experience longer-lasting reform, although additional factors such as state
security and ethnic hostilities play a large role in the cases chosen. Moreover, while the successes of the youth movements vary, they should be considered as an important and influential part of the democratization efforts in the post-Soviet sphere.
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Appendix A

Variables and Categorical Recoding for BTI Rankings

Independent Variables

Electoral Revolution * Level of Stateness Crosstabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Weak</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Very Strong</th>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Revolution? Yes (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Range in 2010 Stateness Scores for CIS region: 6.3 to 9.0

Recoded for relative, regional comparisons as:
01. Very Weak: 6.0-6.9
02. Weak: 7.0-7.9
03. Strong: 8.0-8.9
04. Very Strong: 9.0-10.0

Electoral Revolution * Level of Political Participation Crosstabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Weak</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Strong</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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</table>


Range in 2010 Political Participation Scores for CIS region: 1.3 to 7.8

Recoded for relative, regional comparisons as:
01. Very Weak: 0.0-1.9
02. Weak: 2.0-3.9
03. Strong: 4.0-5.9
04. Very Strong: 6.0-7.9

**Electoral Revolution * Level of “Rule of Law” Crosstabulation**

<table>
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<th>Very Strong</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Range in 2010 Rule of Law Scores for CIS region: 2.3 to 6.3

Recoded for relative, regional comparisons as:

01. Very Weak: 2.0-3.5
02. Weak: 3.6-4.5
03. Strong: 4.6-5.5
04. Very Strong: 5.6-6.5

**Electoral Revolution * Stability of Democratic Institutions Crosstabulation**

<table>
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<th>Level of Stability (Dem. Institutions)</th>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>


Range in 2010 Stability of Democratic Institution Scores for CIS region: 1.0 to 7.0

Recoded for relative, regional comparisons as:

01. Very Weak: 1.0-2.5
02. Weak: 2.6-4.0
03. Strong: 4.1-5.5
04. Very Strong: 5.6-7

Electoral Revolution * Political & Social Integration Levels Crosstabulation

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>Strong</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Revolution?</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Range in Political and Social Integration Scores for CIS region: 1.7 to 6.0

Recoded for relative, regional comparisons as:
01. Very Weak: 1.0-2.25
02. Weak: 2.26-3.5
03. Strong: 3.6-4.75
04. Very Strong: 4.76-6.0
Appendix B

Logo Usage across Otpor-inspired Youth Movements in the post-Soviet sphere

Otpor – Serbia
Kmara - Georgia

ПОРА!
KELKEL

Pora – Ukraine
KelKel – Kyrgyzstan

Appendix C

Nonviolent Tactics from Albert Einstein Institute

While not all of these methods are used or addressed, they have become somewhat of a handbook or activists in authoritarian or hybrid regimes. The youth movements discussed, in their training by Otpor and Soros' Open Society Institute, undoubtedly drew inspiration from the tactics compiled below. The Albert Einstein Institute offers Professor Sharp's works online and the methods below, for example, are available in over 40 different languages.

**THE METHODS OF NONVIOLENT PROTEST AND PERSUASION**

**Formal Statements**
1. Public Speeches
2. Letters of opposition or support
3. Declarations by organizations and institutions
4. Signed public statements
5. Declarations of indictment and intention
6. Group or mass petitions

**Communications with a Wider Audience**
7. Slogans, caricatures, and symbols
8. Banners, posters, and displayed communications
9. Leaflets, pamphlets, and books
10. Newspapers and journals
11. Records, radio, and television
12. Skywriting and earthwriting

**Group Representations**
13. Deputations
14. Mock awards
15. Group lobbying
16. Picketing
17. Mock elections

**Symbolic Public Acts**
18. Displays of flags and symbolic colors
19. Wearing of symbols
20. Prayer and worship
21. Delivering symbolic objects
22. Protest disrobings
23. Destruction of own property
24. Symbolic lights
25. Displays of portraits
26. Paint as protest
27. New signs and names
28. Symbolic sounds
29. Symbolic reclamations
30. Rude gestures

**Pressures on Individuals**
31. "Haunting" officials
32. Taunting officials
33. Fraternization
34. Vigils

**Drama and Music**
35. Humorous skits and pranks
36. Performances of plays and music
37. Singing

**Processions**
38. Marches
39. Parades
40. Religious processions
41. Pilgrimages
42. Motorcades

**Honoring the Dead**
43. Political mourning
44. Mock funerals
45. Demonstrative funerals
46. Homage at burial places

Public Assemblies
47. Assemblies of protest or support
48. Protest meetings
49. Camouflaged meetings of protest
50. Teach-ins

Withdrawal and Renunciation
51. Walk-outs
52. Silence
53. Renouncing honors
54. Turning one's back

THE METHODS OF SOCIAL NONCOOPERATION

Ostracism of Persons
55. Social boycott
56. Selective social boycott
57. Lysistratic nonaction
58. Excommunication
59. Interdict

Noncooperation with Social Events, Customs, and Institutions
60. Suspension of social and sports activities
61. Boycott of social affairs
62. Student strike
63. Social disobedience
64. Withdrawal from social institutions

Withdrawal from the Social System
65. Stay-at-home
66. Total personal noncooperation
67. "Flight" of workers
68. Sanctuary
69. Collective disappearance
70. Protest emigration (hijrat)

THE METHODS OF ECONOMIC NONCOOPERATION: (1)
ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS

Actions by Consumers
71. Consumers' boycott
72. Nonconsumption of boycotted goods
73. Policy of austerity
74. Rent withholding
75. Refusal to rent
76. National consumers' boycott
77. International consumers' boycott

Action by Workers and Producers
78. Workmen's boycott
79. Producers' boycott

Action by Middlemen
80. Suppliers' and handlers' boycott

Action by Owners and Management
81. Traders' boycott
82. Refusal to let or sell property
83. Lockout
84. Refusal of industrial assistance
85. Merchants' "general strike"

Action by Holders of Financial Resources
86. Withdrawal of bank deposits
87. Refusal to pay fees, dues, and assessments
88. Refusal to pay debts or interest
89. Severance of funds and credit
90. Revenue refusal
91. Refusal of a government's money

Action by Governments
92. Domestic embargo
93. Blacklisting of traders
94. International sellers' embargo
95. International buyers' embargo
96. International trade embargo

THE METHODS OF ECONOMIC NONCOOPERATION: (2) THE STRIKE

Symbolic Strikes
97. Protest strike
98. Quickie walkout (lightning strike)

Agricultural Strikes
99. Peasant strike
100. Farm Workers' strike

Strikes by Special Groups
101. Refusal of impressed labor
102. Prisoners' strike
103. Craft strike
104. Professional strike

Ordinary Industrial Strikes
105. Establishment strike
106. Industry strike
107. Sympathetic strike

Restricted Strikes
108. Detailed strike
109. Bumper strike
110. Slowdown strike
111. Working-to-rule strike
112. Reporting "sick" (sick-in)
113. Strike by resignation
114. Limited strike
115. Selective strike

Multi-Industry Strikes
116. Generalized strike
117. General strike

Combination of Strikes and Economic Closures
118. Hartal
119. Economic shutdown

THE METHODS OF POLITICAL NONCOOPERATION

Rejection of Authority
120. Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance
121. Refusal of public support
122. Literature and speeches advocating resistance

Citizens' Noncooperation with Government
123. Boycott of legislative bodies
124. Boycott of elections
125. Boycott of government employment and positions
126. Boycott of government depts., agencies, and other bodies
127. Withdrawal from government educational institutions
128. Boycott of government-supported organizations
129. Refusal of assistance to enforcement agents
130. Removal of own signs and placemarks
131. Refusal to accept appointed officials
132. Refusal to dissolve existing institutions

Citizens' Alternatives to Obedience
133. Reluctant and slow compliance
134. Nonobedience in absence of direct supervision
135. Popular nonobedience
136. Disguised disobedience
137. Refusal of an assemblage or meeting to disperse
138. Sitdown
139. Noncooperation with conscription and deportation
140. Hiding, escape, and false identities
141. Civil disobedience of "illegitimate" laws

Action by Government Personnel
142. Selective refusal of assistance by government aides
143. Blocking of lines of command and information
144. Stalling and obstruction
145. General administrative noncooperation
146. Judicial noncooperation
147. Deliberate inefficiency and selective noncooperation by enforcement
agents
148. Mutiny

**Domestic Governmental Action**
149. Quasi-legal evasions and delays
150. Noncooperation by constituent governmental units

**International Governmental Action**
151. Changes in diplomatic and other representations
152. Delay and cancellation of diplomatic events
153. Withholding of diplomatic recognition
154. Severance of diplomatic relations
155. Withdrawal from international organizations
156. Refusal of membership in international bodies
157. Expulsion from international organizations

**THE METHODS OF NONVIOLENT INTERVENTION**

**Psychological Intervention**
158. Self-exposure to the elements
159. The fast
   a) Fast of moral pressure
   b) Hunger strike
   c) Satyagrahic fast
160. Reverse trial
161. Nonviolent harassment

**Physical Intervention**
162. Sit-in
163. Stand-in
164. Ride-in
165. Wade-in
166. Mill-in
167. Pray-in
168. Nonviolent raids
169. Nonviolent air raids
170. Nonviolent invasion
171. Nonviolent interjection
172. Nonviolent obstruction
173. Nonviolent occupation

**Social Intervention**
174. Establishing new social patterns
175. Overloading of facilities
176. Stall-in
177. Speak-in
178. Guerrilla theater
179. Alternative social institutions
180. Alternative communication system

**Economic Intervention**
181. Reverse strike
182. Stay-in strike
183. Nonviolent land seizure
184. Defiance of blockades
185. Politically motivated counterfeiting
186. Preclusive purchasing
187. Seizure of assets
188. Dumping
189. Selective patronage
190. Alternative markets
191. Alternative transportation systems
192. Alternative economic institutions

**Political Intervention**
193. Overloading of administrative systems
194. Disclosing identities of secret agents
195. Seeking imprisonment
196. Civil disobedience of "neutral" laws
197. Work-on without collaboration
198. Dual sovereignty and parallel government

CURRICULUM VITAE

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(502) 287-7910

Education:

• University of Louisville, Louisville, KY
  M.A. (Expected Graduation: May 2011), Political Science
  Thesis: “Three Revolutions: A comparative study of democratization and
  youth movements in the post-Soviet sphere”
• University of North Carolina – Asheville, Asheville, NC
  B.A., 2006, Political Science, Women and Gender Studies
  Minor: International Studies
  Senior Thesis: “Developing international law and norms: Sexual violence in
  warfare”

Awards and Honors:

• J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Recipient, Ukraine, 2011.
• Akers Travel Grant for the Study of Women and Global Issues, University of
  Louisville, 2010
• Graduate Research Assistantship (2009-Present)
• FSA Group Employee Service Award (2008)
• Summa Cum Laude, UNC-Asheville, 2006
• Distinction in Political Science, UNC-Asheville, 2006
• Distinction in Women & Gender Studies, UNC-Asheville, 2006
• University Research Scholar, UNC-Asheville, 2006
• University Honors, UNC-Asheville, 2006
• Gene Rainey Service Award for Excellence in Political Science, UNC-Asheville, 2006
• Outstanding Women’s & Gender Studies Student, UNC-Asheville, 2006
• Western North Carolina Crime Victim Coalition Award for Crime Victim Volunteer, Asheville, NC 2006 (nominated by Our VOICE – Rape Crisis Center)
• Dean's List and Chancellor's List, UNC-Asheville, 2002-2006
• Western North Carolina Gretchen Gough Scholarship, Hendersonville, NC, 2002-2006
Conferences and Presentations:

- “Gender, International Relations and the Masculinization Process: Reading Global Politics Through Popular Film” (co-authored with Dr. Rodger A. Payne), International Studies Association Northeast conference, Baltimore, MD, 2010
- “Political Representation of Women in Ukraine and Poland: Akers Award Reflections,” Celebration of Research, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY, 2010
- “Political Identity and Memory: the U.S. and Ukraine,” Lviv Polytechnic - International Student Conference, L'viv, Ukraine, June 2010

Employment:
Graduate Research Assistant, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY (2009-Present)

- Assisted Dr. Okbazghi Yohannes in editing, preparation and data collection for a forthcoming book and journal articles on topics ranging from political economy, politics of water, biofuels, land usage and environmental issues in Africa.
- Assisted Dr. Charles Ziegler in research on Realism and Constructivism in Russian Foreign Policy presentation. Filled in to teach his Eurasian Polites class while away.
- Taught sections covering Constructivism, Post-Colonialism, Feminism, Post-Modernism, Human Rights and Human Security for Dr. Yohannes’ POLS 330 (International Relations) courses.

Program Manager, FSA Group, Louisville, KY (2007-2009)

- Nonprofit and association management
- Conference planning and membership management
- Marketing and PR
- Assisted with Board of Director relations

Office Assistant, UNCA (2002-2006)

- Political Science office assistant
- Library/cataloging assistant in Ramsey Library

Additional Volunteer Experience:
ESL Instructor and Tutor, Kentucky Refugee Ministries (February 2011-Present)

- Instructed ESL classes on job preparation and job skills (various levels)
- Tutored individual students
Court Advocate and Crisis Counselor, Our VOICE, Asheville, NC (2005-2007)
- Answered after-hours crisis line calls and hospital visitations
- Court advocate for Buncombe County Courthouse
- Organized Take Back the Night and Sexual Assault Awareness Month

Extracurricular Activities:
- Graduate Student Union Representative, University of Louisville, 2010-Present
- Bejeezus Arts Quarterly Magazine, Food Editor and Book Reviewer, 2007-2009
- Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) Member, UNC-Asheville, 2004-2006
- Amnesty International UNC-A Chapter Member, 2002-2006
- Active Students for a Healthy Environment (ASHE) Co-Chair and Nonprofit Organizer, UNC-Asheville, 2002-2006

Updated April 14, 2011