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FREEDOM IN HEIDEGGER

by

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A.B., St. Mary's College, 1959

S.T.B., Gregorian University, 1961

A Thesis

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ABSTRACT

This thesis represents an investigation into the meaning and development of freedom in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Part I deals primarily with Sein und Zeit. Dasein, human reality, is defined both as a finite, thrown being-in-the-world and as a free entity, projecting its possibilities. Dasein achieves authenticity in the renunciation of the crowd and by embracing its ultimate possibility--death. The conclusion to Part I argues for the identity, in Heidegger's thought, of finite freedom and temporality.

Part II deals with Gelassenheit, a work of Heidegger's latter period. Freedom is expressed in a new vocabulary. Man must release himself but the initiative in the freedom process is no longer with Dasein but with Being. The Critique, which concludes the paper, sees the latter Heidegger as an attempt to transcend the temporal horizon imposed by Kant.

INTRODUCTION

Martin Heidegger¹ was originally motivated in philosophy with the reading of Franz Brentano's On the Mannifold Sense of Being in Aristotle.² This work pointed out the ambiguities in the Aristotelian use of the word "being". Heidegger meditated this book and became convinced that the problem of being must be rethought. This conviction inspired the writing of his chef d'oeuvre, Sein und Zeit.³ It was to be a reposing of the question about the meaning of being. The answer to the being-question was to be sought in an analysis of human reality (Dasein) carried out in the phenomenological tradition of Husserl, the friend and teacher of Heidegger.

Heidegger's projected work was to consist of two major divisions. The First Half was to contain (1) a foundational analysis of Dasein, with (2) a defense of the thesis that Dasein's meaning was Care, and that (3) any question about the meaning of being must take into account Temporality. The Second Half was to contain an analysis of the

¹Martin Heidegger was born in 1898 in Messkirch, Germany. After a brief encounter with theological studies, he began to pursue philosophy, eventually coming under the influence of Edmund Husserl at Freiburg.

²Von der Mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles; Freiburg, 1862.

³Sein und Zeit, Tuebingen: Niemeyer, 1963. (abbreviated:SZ)

philosophers Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle and an exposition of their alleged misconceptions of the being-question. Only the first two sections of the First Half were published.

Heidegger's method was the phenomenology of Husserl. It professed to be an intuition of essences which penetrated the layers of philosophical prejudice to arrive at reality, the phenomenon itself. Truth for the phenomenologist was the appearance. No metaphysical theory could substitute for the careful analysis of what appeared. The task of the philosopher was accurately to intuit and describe the phenomenon as it presented itself in consciousness. Sein und Zeit abounds with phenomenological terminology. Being is said to disclose itself, to come to light, to appear in the light of its presence, etc.

The difficulty of reading Heidegger is legendary. Even native German readers have been known to despair.⁴ Heidegger, a gifted linguist, creates a novel vocabulary for the expression of his ideas. Neologisms abound as do revivals of obsolete words and phrases. This is not pedantry; Heidegger believes that phenomena are likely to stand out in better relief when described in an unconventional vocabulary.

All commentators agree that after 1930 Heidegger's

⁴Cf. Translators Preface to Macquarrie and Robinson version of Being and Time.

writings begin to show a new direction. There is a marked change, for instance, between Sein und Zeit and the essays on Truth and Metaphysics which follow after only a few years. This change effects both style and content. I intend to explore the depth of this evolution in Heidegger's thought especially in regard to freedom.

Freedom is my central theme. I propose the following two questions for solution in this paper.

- (1) What is the meaning of freedom in Sein und Zeit?
- (2) How does the presentation of freedom in Gelassenheit⁵ differ from the above?

I have chosen Gelassenheit for two reasons. First, the book is primarily concerned with freedom. Secondly, the work is an excellent example of Heidegger's latter writing.

The scope of this paper is, then, an investigation into the meaning and development of freedom within the philosophy of Heidegger. A broader study of the place of Heidegger in the history of the problem of freedom would be of much value but beyond my present concern.

The body of the paper will be primarily expositive. In Part One my task will be to isolate the principle ideas of Sein und Zeit (Dasein and its World, the Existentials, Care, Death, Resolve, and Temporality) and to explore their relevance for the development of Heidegger's understanding

⁵Gelassenheit, Pfullingen: Neska, 1954. (abbreviated: G)

of Freedom. In Part Two, I will present an exposition of the development of Gelassenheit's doctrine of freedom over that of the early period. The conclusions to Parts One and Two will seek to answer the questions proposed earlier in this Introduction by the defense of two theses. The first thesis regards the identification of freedom and time in Sein und Zeit. The second has reference to the source of freedom in Gelassenheit.

The final section of the paper will be a Critique of Heidegger's thought on freedom. This critical appraisal will be carried out (1) by a clarification of one way in which Heidegger has advanced over the traditional concept of freedom, and (2) by some remarks on Heidegger's overcoming of the temporal horizon imposed by Kant.

PART ONE

SEIN UND ZEIT

CHAPTER I

DASEIN THE FREE

The concept of Dasein¹ provides us with a profitable starting place for our study of freedom in Heidegger. Literally Dasein means "to be there". It is not, as often thought, a neologism of Heidegger but appears in philosophical German with the meaning of presence or existence. Heidegger's use is, however, unique. Dasein is for him the human phenomenon.

Dasein is the "there" of Being. It is the place where Being appears or, to use more Heideggerian language, it is the occasion for the presence of Being. Heidegger sees Dasein as a kind of rupture or break in present-to-hand reality.² "Auf dem Grunde des Seinsverstaendnisses ist der Mensch das Da, mit dessen Sein der eroeffnende Einbruch in das Seiende geschieht,. . ." (SZ p. 206)

This is our first indication of the freedom of Dasein.

¹Several excellent translations of Dasein have been offered. Perhaps the most literary is that of de Waelens: "l'existence humaine". (La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger. p. 27) Richardson prefers the literal "there-being". (Heidegger, p. 44) In this paper I have chosen to retain the German. Moreover, since the term is becoming common in philosophical discussions in English, I will omit the underline.

²This term refers to that reality which is not Dasein. Heidegger derives his term present-to-hand in his discussion of equipment. When a tool fails to function it discloses itself as merely present-to-hand, i.e. outside any meaningful context.

It is not circumscribed by the determinism which characterizes present-to-hand reality. Indeed, it is a rupture in the world of the present-to-hand which is an opening for the appearance of Being.

By naming man the "there" of Being Heidegger wishes to convey his identification of Being (Sein) and Da-sein. There is in Heidegger no ontological distinction between the two. The fundamental ontological difference is between Sein and Dasein on the one hand and present-to-hand reality on the other. One of the reasons for Heidegger's desire to avoid the ontological distinction between Sein and Dasein is his intention to overcome the subject-object dichotomy which has plagued philosophy. In the philosophy of Heidegger one does not find a knowing subject standing vis a vis an object and the consequent problems of uniting them. He has gone beyond this distinction and avoided the problems it entails.

Heidegger understands Dasein as that entity whose essence is its existence. It is that Being whose whatness (Sosein) is its act of existing (Existenz).³ The ramifications of this for freedom are far reaching. Dasein's essence is to exist, to become, to complete itself. It is its own possibility of self-achievement. It is incorrect, therefore, to think of Dasein as a static being, devoid

³In classical medieval philosophy existence (esse) was attributed to only one essence, God.

of the freedom to develop. It is on these grounds that Heidegger criticizes Aristotle's definition of man as anthropos logon echon. Man is, according to Aristotle, this thing or substance to which rationality is added. For Heidegger, however, man is not a substance but the freedom to become.

Daher drueckt der Titel "Dasein", mit dem wir dieses Seiende bezeichnen, nicht sein Was aus, wie Tisch, Haus, Baum, sondern das Sein. (SZ, p.42)

If Dasein accepts the responsibility of its freedom it lives authentically.⁴ But it can also abdicate this responsibility, deny its freedom and exist inauthentically. Indeed, every Dasein lives much of its life in inauthenticity. This is because of its "everydayness". (alltaegliche Indifferenz, SZ, p. 43) Dasein is, as it were, suspended between the call to freedom and the temptation to surrender itself to the tranquilization of "everydayness".

In the Vom Wesen der Wahrheit this ambivalence will be expressed in terms of Dasein's dwelling in truth and un-truth. "Das Dasein ist, weil wesentlich verfallend, seiner Seinsverfassung nach in der Unwahrheit..."⁵

⁴Heidegger's word for authenticity is Eigenlichkeit. Rather than genuineness and similar concepts this word carries the thrust of the original Greek for authenticity: one's own. I am uniquely myself when I live authentically.

⁵Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Frankfurt: Klosterman, 1943. page 22.

This paper will occasionally use the term un-freedom. Although to my knowledge this term does not appear in Heidegger it is a convenient phrase for expressing the renunciation of freedom in inauthenticity. For although Dasein is called to authenticity, it cannot live continually in this state. It is of the essence of Dasein to fall into un-freedom.

One further observation will help to clarify Heidegger's understanding of Dasein. We must be careful to avoid any identification of Dasein with the knowing egos of Kant and Husserl. Heidegger has attempted to move the realist-idealist controversy to another battle ground by positing a relationship which is prior to any knower and known object. Since there is no ontological distinction between Sein and Dasein, there is no need of the type of synthesis Kant describes in his Transcendental Apperception.

Moreover Dasein does not relate to its world by forming concepts of it. Dasein is basically pre-ontological. The relationship of Sein and Dasein takes place before conceptualization. Man is aware of Being before there is any structural formulation of this awareness. This is strongly reminiscent of the Augustinian-Scotistic tradition of intuitionism.⁶

⁶ Heidegger's dissertation for Habilitation at Freiburg was on Duns Scotus. (Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus, 1915).

Heidegger expresses this pre-ontological grasp of Being in the phenomenological term "being-in". It is because of being-in that we can speak of such a thing as a lumen naturale.

Die ontisch bildliche Rede vom lumen naturale im Menschen meint nichts anderes als die existenzialontologische Struktur dieses Seienden, dass es ist in der Weise, sein Da zu sein. Es ist "erleuchtet", besagt: an ihm selbst als In-der-Welt-sein gelichtet, . . . (SZ, p. 133)

Being-in will take on more clarity in the next chapter as the problem of the world and its relationship to freedom is dealt with.

CHAPTER II

FREEDOM-THE CONDITION FOR A WORLD

This chapter will investigate the role of freedom in providing Dasein with a world. Dasein is in its world. But this is not the "in" of a temporal-spatial insertion. Nor is it the "in" of a conceptual knowledge of the world. Dasein knows its world through the intellectual power which the Greeks named eidos after an analogy with visual perception. But this, for Heidegger, is not the primal relationship. Dasein's fundamental relationship to the world is a pre-conceptual awareness which Heidegger calls being-in. "Erkennen ist ein Seinsmodus des Daseins als In-der-Welt-sein, es hat seine ontische Fundierung in dieser Seinsverfassung. (SZ, p. 61)

The difference between knowing the world, in the sense of having a concept about it, and the more basic experience of being-in can be described in terms of taking up a position relative to the known object. A seeing (idein) involves a subject-object relationship and a confrontation of a thing perceived vis a vis the perceptual faculty. Dasein can more properly be said to take part, from the inside, as it were, in the entity that is understood. This type of relationship is possible only in a free being. Dasein is not constrained to a mere "looking at" the world but is allowed to participate in it.

Heidegger distinguishes four usages of the word "world".¹

(1) It can designate that totality of things present-to-hand. (2) The world can be used metaphysically as the being of number one. (3) World can be used as the wherein (worin) Dasein dwells. (4) It can designate the metaphysical concept which corresponds to number three. Heidegger will limit his use of the term to the third sense. Dasein has its environment (umwelt). But unlike the environment of the animal, Dasein's world consists in a totality of innumerable and interdependent meaningful relationships. Dasein is aware of these relationships before they are structured in concepts. Each object in the world bears a relationship to many other objects that pinpoint it in a meaningful context. "Zeug ist seiner Zeughaftigkeit entsprechend immer aus der Zugehoerigkeit zu anderem Zeug...." (SZ, p. 68)

This complex system of identification is indicative of the presence of freedom. Dasein combines old meanings to form new ones, thereby producing progress in human knowledge. Creativity is the mark of that entity whose meaningful world is not static and determined but free

¹Heidegger's concept of world, although quite original, is nevertheless the outgrowth of his association with Husserl. The influence of the latter Husserl, especially the Lebenswelt sections of the unpublished manuscripts, is felt here, as it is in the writings of Merleau-Ponty. (cf. Spiegelberg, p. 159, Vol. I)

and dynamic.

This totality of meaningful relationships which is my world only appears when something happens to interrupt its smooth function. If a hammer were to break down during use it would stand out as this thing that no longer fits into my world.

In solchem Entdecken der Unverwendbarkeit faellt das Zeug auf. (SZ, p. 73)

...es zeigt sich als Zeugding, das so und so aussieht und in seiner Zuhandenheit als so aussehendes staendig auch vorhanden war. (SZ, p. 73)

Die Umsicht stoesset ins Leere und sient erst jetzt, wofuer und womit das Fehlende zuhanden war. (SZ, p. 75)

The upshot of the entire discussion of signs and references which comprises several sections of Chapter III of Sein und Zeit is that besides the objects of our awareness, there is an area in which they are encountered. Husserl referred to this as horizon. The horizon is not itself a thing of our consciousness but without it the known object would be impossible. The horizon is eminently free in the sense that it lets the objects of the world stand out in their truth, that is to say, it allows them to be themselves.

Dieses, woraufhin umweltlich Zuhandenes freigegeben ist, so zwar, dass dieses allererst als innerweltliches Seiendes zugaenglich wird, kann selbst nicht als Seiendes dieser entdeckten Seinart begriffen werden. (SZ, p. 85)

The horizon of understanding has for Heidegger both an active and passive aspect. The active aspect will be discussed when the existential Projection is treated. (cf. Chapter III) The passive aspect is the freedom by which Dasein lets the world appear in its truth. This is reminiscent of the phenomenological method of Husserl who constantly encourages us to return to the things themselves. We must avoid prejudices and unjustified expectations as we investigate phenomena. They must be allowed to be what they are, to appear in their original and primal truth. It is in this sense that we can speak of an openness or freedom by which Dasein releases the object.

Bewendenlassen bedeutet ontisch: innerhalb eines faktischen Besorgens ein Zuhandenes so und so sein lassen, wie es nunmehr ist und damit es so ist. (SZ, p. 84)

CHAPTER III

DASEIN AS FREE AND FINITE

In discovering its world through being-in, Dasein discovers itself. These discoveries are not ideas which Dasein forms about itself and its environment but rather unstructured, preontological revelations of existential situations. In this chapter I will examine the three basic ways in which Dasein is in its world. Heidegger calls this Dasein's existential constitution. These modes of being-in will reveal Dasein as a finitely free entity.

Dasein's modes of being-in are not properties which Dasein has but rather fundamental modes of existence. Dasein's existence then is not simple but complex. It involves a threefold manner of being. But these modes are equiprimordial- they are all on the same level of reality and it is the most basic one possible. "...die Charaktere sind nicht Eigenschaften eines Vorhandenen, sondern wesentlich existenziale Weisen zu Sein." (SZ, p. 133)

The first of the three existential constituents of Dasein is Disposition (Befindlichkeit).¹ Disposition is Dasein's discovery of itself as already present to a

¹Disposition is the translation of Richardson: Macquarie and Robinson translate as "state of mind". Etymologically befinden means to consider or to find, and reflexively it can mean to feel or even to exist.

particular situation. Dasein is never unattached but always discloses itself in an attunement with its world. It is thrown into its environment in the sense that it always is as that which has been. Nor is it possible to alter or even improve this "has been" character. Dasein is variously determined and discovers itself already cast upon its world.

In der Gestimmtheit ist immer schon stimmungsmaessig das Dasein als das Seiende erschlossen, dem das Dasein in seinem Sein ueberantwortet wurde als dem Sein, das es existierend zu sein hat. (SZ, p. 134)

Heidegger is describing that experience of "just being there", the brute fact of existence. Sartre uses the word facticity to express a similar idea. Befindlichkeit could well have been the inspiration for Sartre's novel La Nausee.

That "I am here" is given in the experience of Disposition but the whence and whither is not disclosed. It is this factor that prompts the use of the word Thrownness (Geworfenheit). This carries connotations of the cast of the die of fate, of being thrown on the sea of life, etc. With such expressions Heidegger portrays the fait accompli character of Dasein. Disposition is the existential source of Dasein's un-freedom. It reveals an entity handed over to its fate, thrown onto a situation not of its own choosing.

The second of Dasein's modes of

being-in-the-world is Understanding (Verstehen).² Dasein understands its world. This understanding is, however, neither an idea nor judgement about the world. Rather, it is an imposition of meaningful structures onto reality. This is termed by Heidegger, Projection (Entwurf). Seeing its possibilities Dasein chooses among them and imposes on the existing world its particular way of being itself.

Das Verstehen ist, als Entwerfen, die Seinsart des Daseins, in der es seine Moeglichkeiten als Moeglichkeiten ist. (SZ, p. 145)

Verstehen ist das existenziale Sein des eigenen Seinkoennens des Daseins selbst, so zwar, dass dieses Sein an ihm selbst das Woran des mit ihm selbst Seins erschliesst. (SZ, p. 144)

The important word here is potentiality-for-being (Seinskoennen). To grasp what Heidegger is saying it must be remembered that the definition of world is that totality of meaningful relationships in which Dasein finds itself involved. The particular historical moment in which Dasein finds itself is not its choice. It is determined for Dasein. Yet in becoming what it can, Dasein exercises its freedom by the choices it makes from these innumerable relationships. These choices are not the free acts of a faculty, as in the classical philosophical definition of the will. But rather these choices are Dasein. Dasein does not possess a faculty which makes it free. Dasein is freedom, it is its possibilities.

²Richardson prefers the translation: Comprehension.

There is more than just a passing similarity here between the Heideggerian use of the word Projection and the Kantian doctrine of the a priori. In Kant the pure a priori intuitions of space and time can be said to be projected onto the manifold of intuition. Moreover, the understanding thinks the known object by projecting onto it the categories which are ultimately time-determinations (Zeitbestimmungen). Heidegger's study of Kant (Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik) which appeared shortly after Sein und Zeit, leaves little doubt as to the influence of Kant on Heidegger.

However, in spite of the remarkable similarities between the doctrines of Projection and the Kantian a priori, there are notable differences. Heidegger is not giving us an epistemology in his doctrine of Projection. There is no question here of an a priori intuition of reality. Rather, what Dasein projects is itself, that is, its own unique way of ordering and combining the myriad relationships it encounters in the world.

The openness to what can become is then a distinctive mark of Dasein. This is why we are able to speak of the freedom of Dasein. Understanding accounts for the undetermined aspect of Dasein's existence. It is always on the move, always toward the future. This eventually leads Heidegger to speak of the Being disclosed by the projections

of Dasein as Event.³ Being is the happening or occurrence of truth and Dasein is the occasion for this event. Being comes to presence when Dasein projects itself onto the world. This is no contradiction but rather a reciprocal process.

The freedom which Dasein exercises in the projection of its possibilities and the freedom with which Being becomes present is one and the same freedom viewed from different aspects of the dialectical process. The difference is one of emphasis. As a matter of fact we will find that this placement of emphasis is the foundation for any division between an early and a latter Heidegger.⁴ The earlier period stresses the freedom of Dasein in the Event of Being; the latter period concerns itself more with the origin of this Event from beyond Dasein.

Because Dasein is a projecting entity, it is ahead of itself. It lives in such a way that it is always more than it actually is. Its projects keep it, in a sense, unfulfilled.

Auf dem Grunde des Seinsart, die durch das Existenzial des Entwurfs konstituiert wird, ist das Dasein staendig "mehr" als es tatsaechlich ist, wollte man es und koennte man es als Vorhandenes in seinem Seinsbestand registrieren. (SZ, p. 145)

³ Ereignis can mean event or occurrence, that which comes to pass. Cf. Vortraege und Aufsaeetze, Pfullingen: Neska, 1954, p. 99.

⁴ Richardson uses the convenient Heidegger I and Heidegger II.

Dasein is doomed to live beyond itself. It is the "not yet achieved". This is the stigma of freedom. Freedom is at once the glory and curse of Dasein.

A possible source of misunderstanding exists here. Dasein's freedom to explore the possible and become itself is by no means an absolute one. Understanding is only one of the three modes by which Dasein is in its world. We have seen that the Thrownness of Dasein has limited it to a particular environment, place in time, such and such facticity, etc. As a result Dasein's projections will be limited by these situations. In other words, Dasein enjoys only a finite freedom. This is in marked contrast to Sartre's pour soi whose freedom knows no bounds.⁵ Authenticity for Dasein involves not only an exercise of freedom but also an acceptance of finitude which is most clearly felt in the Resolve for death. (cf. Chapter VI)

Befindlichkeit und Verstehen charakterisieren als Existenzialien die urspruengliche Erschlossenheit des In-der-Welt-Seins.

Der Entwurf des eigensten Seinkoennens ist dem Factum der Geworfenheit in das Da ueberantwortet. (SZ, p. 148)

The final existential mode of being-in is Discourse (Rede). Richardson translates this as Logos and de Waelens as Discursivite. Both of these versions have the advantage

⁵Cf. article: Transcendence in the Philosophy of Heidegger. Langan, Thomas. The New Scholasticism, XXXII, 1.

that they divorce in our minds the specifically Heideggerian meaning of Rede from what is ordinarily connoted by language and talk. Discourse is more generic than either of these. It may express itself in language but it includes any articulation of Dasein. And because Discourse is an existential, it is the ontological foundation for all forms of expression, including language.

Das existenzial-ontologische Fundament der Sprache ist die Rede. (SZ, p. 160)

Rede ist die Artikulation der Verstaendlichkeit.

Die Hinausgesprochenheit der Rede ist die Sprache (SZ, p. 161)

In the Sein und Zeit period of his philosophical development, language does not seem to play the important part in Heidegger's thinking that it will later. So much of the latter Heidegger deals with language that it takes on an almost exclusive occupation with it. Heidegger's treatment is not a mere analysis (as is prevalent in the British Isles and America) but a quasi-poetical and at times mystical obsession. One gets the impression from some of the latter titles that Heidegger is a poet rather than a professional philosopher. At the same period Heidegger evinces a keen interest in poets, Rilke and Hoelderlin for instance. Language is raised to a dignity where it seems to enjoy a certain identification with Being itself. "Die Sprache ist die Haus des Seins."⁶

In Sein und Zeit however, Heidegger's awareness of

⁶ Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit mit einem brief ueber den Humanismus, Bern: Francke, 1947, p. 53.

the prerogatives of language is only beginning to take form. Discourse is seen as the articulation of intelligibility. It is the world (total intelligible relationships) in words. Discourse can be thought of and dealt with as merely present-to-hand as in scientific studies of language and in linguistic analysis. Philosophically, however, language is the expression of the dialectic of freedom and unfreedom. It is the cry of a being torn between the tension created by its summons to freedom on the one hand, and on the other, its fall into the unfreedom of its everydayness. Words can come only from the finitely free.

Die befindliche Verstaendlichkeit des In-der-Welt-seins spricht sich als der Rede aus.
(SZ, p. 161)

Das Bedeutungs ganze der Verstaendlichkeit kommt zu Wort. (SZ, p. 161)

We have seen the three existentials by which Dasein is in its world, Disposition, Understanding, and Discourse. These three are authentic ways of being-in. To each there corresponds an inauthentic manner. The inauthentic modes which Heidegger names are: Ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit), Curiosity (Neugier), and Idle Talk (Gerede). Heidegger is fond of the term Fallenness (Verfallenheit) to describe Dasein's inauthentic state.

Fallenness, as used in Sein und Zeit, does not carry with it any theological implications. Authenticity is not understood as a state of beatitude from which Dasein has been excluded. On the contrary, Fallenness is as much a

part of Dasein as authenticity. Dasein fluctuates between the two and would be meaningless without either. The ultimate reason for this state of affairs will eventually be seen to be the temporal character of Dasein.

The inauthenticity of Fallenness is best seen in the rule of the "they".⁷ Through the surrender of its freedom Dasein is assimilated into the anonymity of the crowd, sharing only the values the crowd dictates. The crowd is no one; it is everyone. As fallen into inauthenticity, Dasein is in an eminently unfree situation. One can recognize the considerable influence here of Kierkegaard on Heidegger.

Das Wer ist nicht dieser und nicht jener,
nicht man selbst und nicht einige und nicht
die Summe Aller. Das "Wer" ist das Neutrum,
das Man. (SZ, p. 126)

Contemporary technology contributes more surely to this leveling off of the individual to the status of the crowd. But the success of the "they" in maintaining their point of view is due to the disburdening effect of submission to the "they". After all, individual responsibility has no place in an act that can be blamed on the group. Dasein, by losing itself in this anonymity, is really attempting to abdicate its personal responsibility. It is fleeing from its burden of freedom.

Und weil das Man mit der Seinsentlastung
dem jeweiligen Dasein staendig entgegenkommt,
behaelt es und verfestigt es seine hartnaeckige
Herrschaft. (SZ, p. 128)

⁷ Das Man: the crowd, (cf. SZ, p. 126 et seq.)

CHAPTER IV

FINITE FREEDOM AS CARE

Our phenomenological analysis of Dasein has revealed a finitely free existence which discloses itself as constituted by Disposition, Understanding, and Discourse. This chapter will ask whether Dasein can be thought of as unified and if so, how so. In other words, is there a unity to be found in the manifestation of Dasein as finite freedom? "...wie existenzial-ontologisch die Ganzheit des aufgezeigten Strukturganzen zu bestimmen?" (SZ, p. 181) We are inquiring, therefore, into Dasein as a totality.

Heidegger begins his answer to this question by composing a descriptive definition of Dasein, drawn from the elements we have already seen. In it are contained all the important existentials. Dasein is ahead of itself (Understanding), thrown in the world (Disposition), and alongside the beings of the world (Discourse).¹ Can the meaning of Dasein be expressed more succinctly? What is the summation of the above description? Heidegger replies that Dasein is Care (Sorge) and Care is revealed in Anxiety (Angst).

A phenomenology of anxiety is necessary, therefore, if we are to be able to grasp Dasein as a totality.

¹Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in als sein bei. (SZ, p. 192)

Anxiety is the ontological equivalent to the emotion of fear. In fear, the cause is seen for what it is, the fearsome. In the state of anxiety, however, there is an experience of being threatened but the source of the danger remains veiled. The origin of anxiety is Dasein as finite freedom. My finitude is the vague yet powerful force that overcomes me with apprehension. As a reaction to anxiety Dasein flees. The flight is both from itself and its obligation to freedom, Dasein flees to the "they" because the crowd takes to itself Dasein's burden of choice and makes Dasein's decisions for it. The crowd offers a measure of specious security with which Dasein tranquilizes itself.

Bei Abkehr des Verfallens gruendet vielmehr in der Angst, die ihrerseits Furcht erst moeglich macht. (SZ, p. 186)

Das Wovor der Angst ist das In-der-Welt-sein als solches. (SZ, p. 186)

Anxiety challenges Dasein to inquire into its world. It breaks the spell of the "they" and replaces it with authentic decision making. Dasein is brought face to face with its possibilities. The freedom involved in being open to possibles implies a negation. For if I can elect this possible, I am free to negate that one. The experience of freedom, inasmuch as it involves the negation of unchosen possibilities, is the source of Dasein's experience of Nothingness (Nichts) in Anxiety.

Die Angst offenbart im Dasein das Sein zum eigensten Seinkönnen, das heisst das Freisein fuer die Freiheit des Sich-selbst-wählens und -ergreifens. Die Angst bringt das Dasein vor sein Freisein fuer... Die Eigenlichkeit seines Seins als Möglichkeit, die es immer schon ist. (SZ, p. 188)

Existential anxiety thrusts Dasein into an immediate encounter with the negation at its heart. In Was ist Metaphysik² Heidegger again returns to this theme. Nothing (Nichts) will then be identified with Being. Heidegger recalls Hegel's statement: "Pure Being and pure Nothing are thus one and the same."³ Pure is the decisive word for an understanding of this difficult statement. Neither Being nor Nothing have content. They are the only two perfectly pure concepts.

With this interpretation of Being, Heidegger sets himself against the classical philosophical view of Being as substance. Being (Sein) is not a being (Seiendes). Being is not an object in our consciousness, rather it is the non-substantial source of this consciousness. And it is the revelation of non-being in anxiety that is the veil of Being. "Das Nichts als das Andere zum Seienden ist der Schleier des Seins." (WM, p. 35)

Anxiety, as the existential experience of non-being, discloses a Dasein whose meaning is Care. Care is not

² Was ist Metaphysik, Bonn: Cohen, 1930. Hereafter: WM.

³ The Science of Logic, Hegel, I, WW, III, p. 74.

understood in the ontic sense of worry over problems but as involvement in the world. As an entity thrown into its world, but at the same time free to comprehend and articulate its world, Dasein reveals itself as concerned with its world. We are justified, therefore, in speaking of the meaning of Dasein as Care.

This definition of Dasein is more primal than any of the definitions inspired by a present-to-hand analysis, e.g., man as a rational animal. A definition of this sort is not incorrect, but it misleads in the sense that it poses as exhaustive. On the contrary, it is true as far as it goes but it does not reach the depths where Dasein dwells. Fundamentally, Dasein's meaning is Care. It is meaningfully absorbed in and tied to its world.

Die Sorge liegt als urspruengliche Struktur-ganzheit existenzial-apriorisch "vor" jeder, das heisst immer schon in jeder faktischen "Verhaltung" und "Lage" des Daseins. (SZ, p. 193)

The presence of an authentic Care indicates freedom. The Dasein that is most free is that which is fully aware of its involvement in the world into which it is thrown and which lives in an on-going dialogue with the possibilities that lie before it. The opposite situation is a mere addiction to the world which reduces the value of Care to a milder version of wishing about what could be and which in reality is un-freedom.

Wenn das Dasein in einem Hang gleichsam versinkt, dann ist nicht lediglich noch ein

Hang vorhanden, sondern die volle Struktur der Sorge ist modifiziert. Blind geworden, macht es alle Moeglichkeiten dem Hang dienstbar. (SZ, p. 195)

CHAPTER V

DEATH AS FREELY CHOSEN

Death is a possible. The fact that we have no evidence of anyone escaping death does not alter its category as a possible. But death is not an ordinary possible. It is final. Heidegger defines death as the possibility of not having any more possibilities. (SZ, p. 262) This chapter will ask how Dasein exercises its freedom in face of the possibility of death.

As long as Dasein is, there remains something outstanding, something that remains to be settled. Without this settlement, Dasein is not complete, not achieved. But death is not a mere end for Dasein but a way of being. An animal has an end, so does a nebula, but Dasein lives in such a way that it is always toward its end. It is a being-toward-death. (Sein-zum-Tode, SZ, p. 234)

Heidegger spends several pages of Sein und Zeit explicating the unique manner in which death is an end for Dasein. Some of his greatest contributions to phenomenology are made in the chapter on death. Dasein does not come to an end like fruit ripens or the moon reaches its complement of light. The end of death constantly hangs over Dasein. It is an ending being. Dasein lives with its end; it exists in an ending manner. To bring into relief this most important distinction between the different

ends, Heidegger prefers to use the word ableben for the cessation of the human organism. The Dasein which thus lives out its time can be said to perish; only the Dasein which approaches death authentically can be said to die.

Death affords Dasein with the ultimate possibility for expressing its freedom as an individual. My death is the most unique thing that I possess. No one can share it and certainly it is non-transferable. Heidegger makes the observation that death justifies his earlier identification of existence and mineness. Death brings to the fore most clearly Dasein's individuality and freedom because it makes Dasein unique by separating it from the un-freedom of the "they".

Keiner kann dem Anderen sein Sterben
abnehmen. (SZ, p. 240)

Am Sterben zeigt sich, dass der Tod
ontologisch durch Jemeinigkeit und
Existenz konstituiert wird. (SZ, p. 240)

The temptation to abdicate my freedom and give my death away is strong. The crowd will accept my death. Indeed the anonymity of the "they" is the only way to escape the terror of death. By putting on the personality of the "they" I attain immortality. After all, the crowd continues; only individuals die.

Das Man besorgt...eine staendige Beruhigung
ueber den Tod. (SZ, p. 253)

Das Man laesst den Mut zur Angst vor dem
Tode nicht aufkommen. (SZ, p. 254)

By resisting the temptation to flee its death Dasein finds itself, i.e., achieves authenticity. Prima facie death would appear to have no connection with authenticity and freedom. If anything strikes us as un-free it is death. Yet by accepting the finitude intrinsic to its death and denying itself the comfort of the crowd, Dasein frees itself for its own authenticity.

The power of the "they" in tranquilizing us against the threat of death takes on its most subtle form in the public sayings about the certainty of death. They say, for instance, that death is unavoidable. Paradoxically, what gets covered up in this lip service to death is precisely its possibility now.

Dieser wird hinausgeschoben auf ein "später einmal" und zwar unter Berufung auf das sogenannte "allgemeine Ermessen". So verdeckt das Man das Eigentümliche der Gewissheit des Todes, dass er jeden Augenblick möglich ist. (SZ, p. 258)

The chapter on death provides a more precise delineation of Heidegger's doctrine of Projection. We will recall that Dasein's understanding of its world was founded on the projection of possibilities onto that world. Freedom, as implying the negation of un-chosen possibilities, opened to our purview a nothingness. (Das Nichts). Now, as our picture comes more clearly into focus we see the relationship of death to negation. Death announces Dasein's intrinsic temporality and finitude. The non-being implied in death permeates the existence of Dasein with negation

and it is that negation which frees Dasein for its world of possibles. Negation is at the heart of every possible since each possible is an unactual and, to that extent, undetermined and free.

Das Sein zum Tode ist Vorlaufen in ein Seinkönnen des Seienden, dessen Seinsart das Vorlaufen selbst ist. Im vorlaufenden Enthüllen dieses Seinkönnens erschliesst sich das Dasein ihm selbst hinsichtlich seiner äussersten Möglichkeit. (SZ, p. 262)

The key word in the above text is a new one: Anticipation. The actualization of a possible comes about through Anticipation. Anticipation is an awaiting by which Dasein comports itself toward something possible in its possibility. "Zu einem Möglichen in seiner Möglichkeit verhält sich das Dasein jedoch im Erwarten." (SZ, p. 261)

By anticipating the possibility of its own death Dasein accepts this possibility and all of its ramifications. In this act Dasein is freed; freed from the dominance of the "they", freed from its own inauthenticity and freed from the presence of truth. The negation which is part and parcel of the revelation of death is the source of that openness which is freedom. Without the nichts there could not be freedom because it would be impossible to say "no". And he who is free, can either affirm or deny. Dasein's freedom is then a dreadful one. It is purchased with the price of finitude.

The influence of Kierkegaard on Heidegger is, of

course, quite strong here, as is the influence of Heidegger on Sartre. The doctrine of a freedom achieved through a thoroughgoing anticipatory acceptance of death can be interpreted either optimistically or pessimistically. Kierkegaard took a religious view of the matter and proclaimed it a sickness not unto death. Sartre's view was more morbid, in that it found in this situation something intrinsically absurd. It is a moot question whether or not Sartre's interpretation of Heidegger was correct. Sein und Zeit does seem to lend itself to a reading such as Sartre gave it. On the other hand Heidegger has consistently disassociated himself from the pessimistic school of existentialism as he has from the existentialist movement. He has named himself a philosopher of being and denied any place for moralizing in his philosophy.

However this question may be decided, one must admit that the early Heidegger could easily have been interpreted as providing a source for a philosophy of absurdity. And this is the reading that influenced Sartre. But as Heidegger himself evolved in his thinking, he became more hopeful. Man's freedom becomes more than a curse; it is also a source of his hope for meaningfulness.¹

¹In a book of poems written in 1947, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, Heidegger describes us as being in a period of waiting between the old gods, which have left us, and the Advent of Being, the apparent new birth.

Wir kommen fuer die Goetter zu spaet und zu frueh das Seyn. Dessen anfangenes Gedicht ist der Mensch. (ED,p.7)

Wir sollen nichts tun sondern warten. (G, p. 37)

We can appreciate the promise in this if we remember that to wait is clearly to have begun the actualization of the object of our wait. (SZ, p. 262)

Anticipation, as the full acceptance of death, acts with a shattering force on Dasein's complacency. Dasein is tempted to be satisfied with whatever existence it has achieved but the anticipation of death, by showing Dasein its final possibility is not-Dasein, destroys its sense of achievement and drives it to newer possibilities. Heidegger quotes Nietzsche to the effect that Dasein is saved from "becoming too old for its victories." (SZ, p. 264)

It is only through Anticipation that Dasein comes into possession of the totality of its own being, not that Dasein ceases to be ahead-of-itself but rather that it grasps the implications of its full being.

Das Vorlaufen erschliesst der Existenz als aeusserste Moeglichkeit die Selbstaufgabe und zerbricht so jede Versteifung auf die je erreichte Existenz. Das Dasein behuetet sich, vorlaufend, davor, hinter sich selbst und das verstandene Seinkoennen zurueckzufallen. . . . (SZ, p. 264)

CHAPTER VI

COMMITMENT TO FREEDOM

This chapter will deal with Heidegger's doctrine of Commitment or Resolve (Entschlossenheit). Resolve will be seen as Dasein's laying claim to its freedom through an acceptance of its finitude. The phenomenology of Resolve will reveal conscience as a witness to Dasein's potentiality for being free.

Dasein is summoned to authenticity by a witness. The witness offers testimony to Dasein's potentiality-for-being-a-whole. The witness is conscience. At the outset of his phenomenology of conscience Heidegger disavows any of the usual theological connotations. Conscience, both in Latin and German, is etymologically "that which is known".¹ But a more profound investigation into this phenomenon will reveal it as a call. The call is always one of guilt, and the accused is Dasein.

Die eindringlichere Analyse des Gewissens enthüllt es als Ruf. Der Gewissensruf hat den Charakter des Anrufs des Daseins auf sein eigenes Selbstseinkönnen und das in der Weise des Aufrufs zum eigensten Schuldigsein. (SZ, p. 269)

The call is addressed to the self. It therefore passes over the "they-self" as insignificant. The call can only be heeded by the self. The crowd does not have a conscience

¹ The German is Das Gewissen.

but only a vague urge to inhibit freedom by reducing everything to the same level. In answering the call Dasein frees its own self (eigen) and thereby achieves authenticity (Eigentlichkeit).

The call is silent. It gives no data or information about anything. In a sense it communicates nothing. The only awareness it delivers over is the awareness of nothingness. It is precisely the negation in Dasein that is the call; the negation of its Thrownness, of its Fallenness. Dasein is guilty of being nothing. And its guilt is incurred not by way of a fall from a state of virtue but rather by the very fact of its existence, Dasein is guilt.

Gleichwohl liegt in der Idee von "schuldig" der Charakter des Nicht. . . . die formal existenziale Idee des "schuldig" bestimmen wir daher also: Grundsein fuer ein durch ein Nicht bestimmtes Sein- das heisst Grundsein einer Nichtigkeit. (SZ, p. 283)

Not only is Dasein the addressee of the call of conscience, it is also the caller. Conscience is the summons of Dasein from itself to be itself, i.e. to be all its freedom will allow. The response to the call of conscience is given by Dasein in its Resolve to be itself through acceptance of its nothingness. Let us investigate more precisely the nothingness contained in each of Dasein's existentials.

As thrown, Dasein is without a basis (Grund). Dasein finds itself already delivered over to a world not of its choosing. Moreover, Dasein can never be said to

have a sufficient reason² for its existence, since, as a free being, it is independent of any fundament in the metaphysical sense. Its only fundamentum is nothingness.

Es ist nie existent vor seinem Grunde, sondern je nur aus ihm und als dieser. Grundsein besagt demnach des eigensten Seins vom Grund auf nie maechtig sein. Dieses Nicht gehoert zum existenzialen Sinn der Geworfenheit. (SZ, p. 284)

As projecting Dasein can only grasp one of the possibilities lying before it at any one instance and must thereby negate all others. This is basic to all freedom. The choice of one possibility invariably involves the negation of others.

Die Freiheit aber ist nur in der Wahl der einen, das heisst in Tragen des Nichtgewaehlthabens und Nichtauchwaehlenkoennens der anderen. (SZ, p. 285)

The question of nothingness will be returned to in the essay on Metaphysics. (cf. Was ist Metaphysik, 1930) There, after Heidegger has had the time to meditate the significance of the "not", it will appear as indispensable for the revelation of Being but at the same time as the cause of the hiddenness of Being in metaphysics. Being and non-Being are reciprocal parts of the same process, the coming to presence of truth. The cardinal error of metaphysics has been to identify Being with one or more of its aspects. Being is beyond the categories or the sum of

² In classical metaphysics the Principle of Sufficient Reason (Nihil sine Fundamento) sought a substantive origin for every existing thing. Dasein is conceived by Heidegger as unsubstantial and therefore without sufficient reason.

all of them. Heidegger claims that Parmenides saw this and Plato glimpsed it, but with Aristotle a demeaning of Being began. Yet metaphysics is more than an ontological error. It is a necessary part of the history of philosophy. The revelations of Being in history are always followed by a period of untruth and error.

Nothing is that which makes the revelation of what-is as such possible for our human existence. Nothing not merely provides the conceptual opposite for what-is but it is also an original part of its essence. (WM, p. 340)

Only because Nothing is revealed in the very basis of our Dasein is it possible for the utter strangeness of what-is to dawn on us. (WM, p. 347)

Heidegger has been the cause of much consternation in the philosophical world with his almost obsessive pre-occupation with nothingness. He has been accused of making nothing into something.³ Nevertheless Heidegger has made a good case for his insistence on the importance of the Nichts. It is only through an acceptance of the nothingness revealed in the call of conscience that Dasein attains its freedom and authenticity.

This acceptance by Dasein of itself in all the implications of its non-being is named Resolution (Entschlossenheit). The hearing (hoeren) of the call of guilt brings Dasein to realize its loss in the "they" and makes Dasein

³Heidegger's inquiry into the ontological essence of nothing (...ontologischen Wesen des Nicht ueberhaupt... SZ, p. 285) was the occasion for numerous philosophical jests.

submissive (hoerig) to its full potentiality-for-being.

Seeing its finitude and the negation at its essence, Dasein projects upon this negation through a commitment to be itself. Dasein thus frees itself to become what it can.

Die Gewissheit des Entschlusses bedeutet:
Sich-freihalten fuer seine moegliche und je
factisch notwendige Zuruecknahme. Im. Gegen-
teil: dieses Fuer-wahr-halten als entschlos-
senes Sich-frei-halten fuer die Zuruecknahme
ist die eigentliche Entschlossenheit zur Wie-
derholung ihrer selbst. (SZ, p. 308)

CHAPTER VII

TEMPORALITY AS FINITE FREEDOM

Dasein has revealed itself as a thrown, projecting, fallen being-in-the-world. This finitely free existence has been summarily expressed as Care. Our next task will be to inquire into the meaning of Care. What is the justification for our use of such a term? Is there a more profound insight still to be had, which will shed fuller light on Dasein as Care? Heidegger answers affirmatively, and responds that Temporality (Zeitlichkeit) is the meaning of Care. This chapter will seek an understanding of Temporality, and an explanation of its relationship to freedom.

Temporality is not time. With the word "time" we invariably associate images of calendars and clocks, time loans, time capsules, and so forth. These indicate the durational and successional aspects of time. Heidegger, however, sees the above conceptions of time as inadequate. Indeed, he insists that the phenomenon of time has never been correctly understood in the history of Western philosophy.

For Heidegger, Temporality is the foundation for all other images of time. Anything that has or can be said about time from the venerable definition of Aristotle to the

zeit bestimmungen of Kant, derives from the primal fact of Dasein's temporality. Let us recall each of Dasein's existentials and explore their temporal content.

As free, Dasein is constantly coming toward itself and its possibilities; it is a not-yet-achieved entity, always projecting itself. It is for this reason that we can speak of a future. Dasein does not plan ahead because there is a future, there is a future because Dasein is a free, projecting being-in-the-world.

Das die ausgezeichnete Moeglichkeit aushaltende, in ihr sich auf sich Zukommen-lassen ist das urspruengliche Phaenomen der Zukunft. (SZ, p. 325)

...das Vorlaufen selbst nur moeglich ist, sofern das Dasein als seiendes ueberhaupt schon immer auf sich zukommt, das heisst in seinem Sein ueberhaupt zukuenftig ist. (SZ, p. 325)

As thrown, Dasein is determined. Only from the basis of the un-freedom of Thrownness is it possible for Dasein to resolve. It is due to the determinant of Dasein's Thrownness that we can speak of a past. As thrown, Dasein is that entity which has a past, and it is precisely the limit-situation imposed by the past that inhibits Dasein's freedom.

Die Uebernahme der Geworfenheit ist aber nur so moeglich, dass das zukuenftige Dasein sein eigenes "wie es je shon war", das heisst sein "Gwesen" sein kann. (SZ, p. 326)

The entire process by which Dasein embraces the nullity of its Thrownness and frees itself from the "they" in the projection of authentic possibilities produces what

we call the "present". Dasein is, therefore, basically temporal. And time, as Heidegger understands it, discloses itself as the ultimate meaning of Dasein. From this it follows that the Platonic attempt to see beyond the world of the temporal to a non-temporal origin is futile. In this Heidegger shows himself to be profoundly Kantian. Time is Dasein's horizon, i.e. there is for Dasein no vision of anything beyond the temporal. It is for this reason that Heidegger will be able to say that the question of Being which initially motivated his philosophical quest is ultimately a question about the mystery of time.¹ We are now in a position to understand what Heidegger intended when he entitled Part One of Sein und Zeit: "The Interpretation of Dasein as Temporality and the Demonstration of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being."²

The temporal horizon is the condition for the possibility of such an entity as Dasein. Heidegger refers to Dasein as an ecstatic being, literally, it is outside of itself. (Greek: ex stasein) The transcendental Dasein

¹Cf. Die Gegenwart der Philosophie; Rombach, H., Chapter XI: Zeit und Sein

²Transcendental in Heidegger's sense (as in Kant's) means a priori and universal. The Heidegger of Sein und Zeit denies the transcendent, i.e. that there is anything in our experience beyond time's horizon.

has crossed over the limitations of its Thrownness to the freedom of its possibilities. As such, Dasein is in ecstasy.

Die ekstatische Einheit der Zeitlichkeit, das heisst die Einheit des "ausser-sich" in den Entrueckungen von Zukunft, Gewesenheit, und Gegenwart, ist die Bedingung der Moeglichkeit dafuer, dass ein Seiendes sein kann, das als sein "Da" existiert. (SZ, p. 350)

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

My study of Sein und Zeit leads me to conclude that there is no essential difference in Heidegger's understanding of freedom and temporality. A complete understanding of freedom in Heidegger includes not only the capacity for the projection of possibilities but also the determinant of Thrownness. Un-freedom is, therefore, part of the essence of freedom just as un-truth or error is of the essence of truth. (Cf. WW, Chapter VI)

Dasein is what it can become. That is, it is defined in terms of its possibilities. As an entity ahead of itself, it directs its development by projecting the innumerable alternatives open to it. But the negation which lies in every affirmation of Dasein's possibilities (the affirmation of one possible closes off other choices) introduces a limit to freedom. As negating, Dasein is thrown and fallen. Freedom for Heidegger is, then, essentially finite. To act freely means to act in a limit-situation. No freedom is without its un-freedom.

Our thesis is that freedom so understood is identical with temporality. The two are complimentary aspects of the same process; they are different articulations of the same phenomenon. Sein und Zeit is clear that the reason we can

speak of a future, the very reason for the existence of calendar and clock time is Dasein's freedom to project its possibilities. The future is Dasein as possibility.

This is, however, not the total phenomenon. For every projection involves a limitation. The limit is the past into which Dasein is thrown; that which cannot be chosen. This static, determinant aspect of Dasein's existence is essentially involved in every thrust toward the future. Man lives suspended, as it were, between the two, and this is the meaning of temporality. Time is the name we give the experience of existing at the chiasma between what can become and what cannot.

PART TWO

GELASSENHEIT

CHAPTER I

RELEASED FOR FREEDOM

Gelassenheit represents the mature Heidegger in the treatment of the problem of freedom.¹ The dialogue form is used. The latter writings of Heidegger show a preference for less formal and more literary forms of expression for philosophical ideas. Thus the treatises and dissertations of the early years are discarded for the essays, dialogues, and even poems of the latter period. Gelassenheit is set on a country walk with a teacher, scholar and scientist as participants. This chapter will deal with Gelassenheit's contributions to the freedom-question.

The dialogue begins with the observation that for Kant thinking was spontaneity and therefore a type of willing. Heidegger, who plays the role in the dialogue of the teacher, paradoxically asserts that if we are to discover the nature of this willing we must look away from it; that is, we must first grasp what un-willing is. Heidegger is attempting to disabuse us of the traditional idea of freedom (the act of the faculty of the will) in preparation for his understanding of freedom.

¹ Although the publication date of Gelassenheit is 1959, Heidegger tells us in a footnote that the dialogue was written down in 1944-45 from a conversation held at that time.

This un-willing is a preparatory step for Release-
ment.²

Sie wollen ein Nicht-Wollen im Sinne der Absage an das Wollen, damit wir uns durch dieses hindurch auf das gesuchte Wesen des Denkens, das nicht ein Wollen ist, einlassen koennen oder uns wenigstens hierzu bereitmachen. (G, p. 33)

The terminus a quo of this Releasement is willing in the traditional sense of the operation of a faculty. The terminus ad quem is the essence of willing which Heidegger is seeking and attempting to name. The entire process is begun by an act of renunciation (Absage).

It is noteworthy that Heidegger evinces some ambiguity in dealing with the relationship between Releasement and the renouncement of willing. At first he tells us that the former is produced by the latter. Then, as if in an attempt for precision, he states that un-willing only prepares us for Releasement. This indecision takes on importance when it is remembered that in the early Heidegger the emphasis in the revelation of Being is no longer given to Dasein but to Being itself. Dasein simply prepares itself for Being.

That Releasement is effected from beyond the nature

²The word Gelassenheit deserves some attention. The root lassen means to let appear, to look, to leave alone, to allow. Gelassenheit means ordinarily patience, self-possession, even resignation. The context seems to indicate that Heidegger intends the word in some sense of "detaching oneself and handing oneself over for something". I have chosen "Releasement" as a translation.

of man is explicitly stated by the scientist: "Die Gelassenheit wird also anderswoher bewirkt." (G, p. 34) We are not ourselves responsible for the awakening of this release. On the other hand, however, it is no effete passivity in the sense of letting things happen. The Releasement of which Heidegger speaks is beyond our concepts of activity and passivity. (cf. G. p. 36)

To summarize what we have seen thus far one can speak of two Releasements. First, Dasein frees itself from the traditional sense of willing (much in the same way that Dasein freed itself from the "they" in Sein und Zeit) and holds itself in preparation for a second Releasement which is effected from beyond Dasein.

Several highly poetic sentences are inserted in the dialogue to the effect that the conversation succeeds because of a calm which arrives with the approach of evening. There is also a reference to a mysterious guiding hand which is given credit for directing the dialogue.

Immer geloester vertraue ich dem unscheinbaren
Geleit, das uns in diesem Gesprach an die Hand,
oder richtiger gesagt, beim Wort nimmt. (G, p. 34)

Many interpretations of the symbolism of the approaching night and guiding hand could be offered but since I hesitate to indulge in the conjectural, let me be content with taking note of the profoundly poetical turn of the latter Heidegger.

In his efforts to explore the freedom of Release-ment Heidegger makes one of his rare acknowledgements of indebtedness to Meister Eckhart. Although this 13th century founder of German mysticism was still in the metaphysical tradition because of his attempts to think Releasement in terms of the will, nevertheless he did at least glimpse the problem and from him much is to be learned. Still, the problem is not a theological one, as Heidegger sees it. We must avoid all thoughts of Releasement as a discipline of self in favor of the divine will.

Our task is to think the mystery of freedom which we have called Releasement. Success is impossible if we expect that thought must be representational. The nature of freedom which we are pursuing and trying to name does not admit of conceptualization. Any image we might attempt will only serve to cloud the issue. The scientist and scholar find this profoundly disturbing. The teacher suggests the only solution is to wait. "Wir sollen nichts tun sondern warten." (G, 62) It should be remembered that waiting played an important part in the freedom-doctrine of Sein und Zeit. Waiting was a integral part of Projection by which Dasein opened itself to the horizon of possibilities and held itself in preparation for their actualization. (SZ, p. 262)

It will be recalled that horizon played an important part in the early Heidegger. By way of a visual analogy, the field of vision would be to the perceived object as the

horizon would be to the known object. What is central is the insight that the horizon is not another object of experience, rather it is that which permits the objects to be encountered.³ Now, in Gelassenheit, we find the doctrine of horizon expanded and given a new name: the Region (Gegnet).⁴

The first characteristic of the Region is its openness.

Wir sagen, dass wir in den Horizont hineinsehen. Der Gesichtskreis ist also ein Offenes, welche Offenheit ihm nicht dadurch zukommt, dass wir hineinsehen. (g, p. 39)

The Region is open because it does not constrain the objects of experience but allows them to be what they are. Heidegger expresses this in terms of letting things rest, sheltering them, protecting them in their manifestation. The things of experience are given the freedom to be themselves.

F ABER wo ruhen die Dinge, und worin besteht das Ruhen?

L Sie ruhen in der Rueckkehr zur Weile der Weite ihres Sichgehorens.

³ By way of tangential comment, one is reminded at this point that Heidegger develops a criticism of traditional metaphysical god-theories from his doctrine of horizon. God, according to Heidegger, could never be another Being among beings, albeit a super-being. (The Ontho-theological Nature of Metaphysics, in Identitaet und Differenz, Phllingen: Neska, 1957)

⁴ Gegnet is South German dialect for Gegend.

G Kann denn in der Rueckkehr, die doch Bewegung ist, eine Ruhe sein?

L Gar wohl, falls die Ruhe der Herd und das Walten aller Bewegung ist. (G, p. 43)

Heidegger makes no effort to minimize the paradoxes involved in some of his statements. The return, for instance, of the object would seem to suggest a motion. Yet, the object is said to be at rest and to abide in the free area which is the Expanse of Openness.

The free Region can not be thought conceptually, that would reify it and thereby destroy its freedom. The Region is free precisely because it does not have the determination of a thing in experience. Man can, however, dispose himself for the appearance of the Region by renouncing all representational endeavors. Heidegger calls for a type of self-discipline by which we put behind us all attempts to conceptualize the Region and wait attentively for what must come ultimately from beyond us. This is typical of the latter Heidegger. Dasein is no longer the source of the Openness but rather the freedom of the open Region is bestowed from a source which is veiled and beyond the power of Dasein to control.

The free Region occurs; it is a process. Besides the noun Gegnet Heidegger also uses gegenen,⁵ to oppose or to region. The Region is not static but in act. Indeed, it

⁵Again, this verb is found only in South German dialects, the area of Heidegger's birth.

enjoys great autonomy. It is said to present itself subtly to the dialogue without the knowledge of the participants. Moreover, it is answerable only to itself. Man's task is to bow to the autonomy of the Region by removing the obstructions which an objectifying thinking places in the way of the freedom of the Region.

So powerful is the domain of the Region that it lays claim to man. It assimilates him as if he were property. Heidegger uses the word "appropriates" (geeignet) to describe the possession of Dasein by the Region. The Region takes Dasein for its own and thereby makes it authentic (eigentlich). One is naturally reminded here of Hegel's theory of freedom, in which man is truly free only when submitting to the Absolute. (cf. Heidegger, Richardson, 331 et seq.)

The appropriation of Dasein by the Region is not permanent. As soon as man is claimed by the Region, he is already being lost to it. This restless back and forth between the freedom of a Releasement to the Region and the forgetfulness of freedom in inauthenticity is the fate of Dasein. Heidegger speaks of a suspension between the yes and no, between Being and non-Being. (G, p. 53) This clearly indicates, although in a more poetic manner than the early works, the finitude of man's releasement. However, Gelassenheit does give evidence of an attempt by Heidegger to transcend the dialectic of freedom and un-freedom

in which man is imprisoned and seek a source outside of the dialectical process. This source would be the origin of our experience of freedom. Heidegger suggests the name: Regioning.

G ...ist die Beziehung der Gegnet zur Gelassenheit weder ein kausaler Wirkungszusammenhang, noch das horizontal-transzendente Verhaeltnis. ...due Beziehung...kann weder als ontische noch als ontologische gedacht werden...

L sondern nur als Vergegnis. (G, p. 55)

It is not easy to exaggerate the importance of this step in Heidegger's thinking. In the early Heidegger Dasein was the source of the freedom which made man authentic; in the latter Heidegger this freedom comes from outside Dasein. The paradoxical result is that we must seek the nature of man outside of man, i.e., from the Region of Openness.

L Nur insofern das Wesen des Menschen nicht aus dem Menschen sein Gepraege erfahrt, sondern aus dem, was wir die Gegnet und ihre Vergegnis nennen, ereignet sich die von Ihnen geahnte Geschichte als die Geschichte der Gegnet.
(G, p. 58)

The Region is responsible for man's history. History is not so much created by man as it is directed from the Region. Directed but not dictated. The Region does not force itself upon man in the sense that man loses his freedom. But not that freedom is conceived as originating primarily with the Region, man's part becomes increasingly passive. He is to prepare himself by a receptive waiting for the directions of the Region.

Das Gesichichtliche beruht in der Gegnet und in dem, was sich als die Gegnet ereignet, die, dem Menschen sich zuschickend, ihn in sein Wesen vergegnet. (G, p. 59)

Die also verhalten ausdauernde Gelassenheit waere die Empfaengnis der Vergegnis der Gegnet. (G, p. 61)

Heidegger explicitly states the continuity of this thought with the doctrine of Resolve in Sein und Zeit. Thus the freedom whereby man commits himself to his finitude is an aspect of the freedom of the Region.

Man muesste dann z.B. das Wort "Entschlossenheit" so denken, wie es in "Sein und Zeit" gedacht ist: als das eigens uebernommene Sichoeffnen des Daseins fuer das Offene...(G, p. 61)

CHAPTER II

CONCLUSION

A reading of Heidegger will disclose an evolution in his thought. The first thing that strikes the reader is that the early works tend to be lengthy and technical, while the latter are shorter and poetical. But behind this stylistic difference there lies a more profound and momentous change. Some of Heidegger's commentators have referred to this as a reversal. Some (e.g. Richardson) would seem to suggest that there are really two Heideggers, as if one were dealing with not one but two successive philosophers. There is perhaps a danger of exaggerating the difference between the early and latter Heideggers. Nothing in the latter Heidegger refutes the early Heidegger. Actually, the more one reads the entire corpus, the more one becomes convinced of a remarkable continuity.

Nevertheless, there is solid ground for making a distinction between the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit and the Heidegger of those writings published after 1930. The difference is not so much one of doctrine but one of emphasis. Heidegger begins with the being-question as his problematic. The monument of Sein und Zeit approaches this problem from the point of view of a phenomenological analysis of Dasein. The analysis is largely successful; so successful, in fact, that one gets the impression that the being-question begins

and ends with Dasein. As the creator of freedom, Dasein is the cynosure of attention. Yet, in the midst of this preoccupation with the prerogatives of Dasein, there is still the unanswered question as to the source of time and freedom. Sein und Zeit closes with this question still unanswered. (SZ, p. 437)

With the development of his thought in Gelassenheit Heidegger increasingly shifts emphasis from the prerogatives of Dasein to a source of freedom beyond man. Heidegger thinks less about the part of Dasein in projecting a free world, and more about freedom and un-freedom as a dialectic from which the freedom of Dasein originates. The situation is analogous to that of the evolution from the theology of the Middle Ages to the anthropology of the Renaissance. In Heidegger (although I do not wish to suggest the construction of a theology, strictly speaking, by Heidegger) there is an evolution from the anthropologically oriented days of Sein und Zeit to the transcendent orientation of the latter period.

CRITIQUE

I offer now, by way of critical appraisal, some remarks on the significance of Heidegger's doctrine of freedom. First, I hope to provide a deeper insight into the revolutionary aspect of Sein und Zeit's understanding of freedom. Secondly, I will demonstrate the importance of Gelassenheit to be based on its overcoming of the Kantian temporal horizon.

(1) Traditionally, philosophy has tended to look upon freedom as the act of a faculty. An analogy was constructed between the intellect and the will. Just as the soul was thought to possess a faculty, the intellect, which produced acts of understanding and had for its object ideas, so too the will was conceived as a faculty which produced acts of freedom. The true was the object of the intellect and the good the object of the will.

Heidegger's understanding of freedom stands in marked contrast to this facultative theory. Freedom is not an act of Dasein- the act of freedom is Dasein. There is much here that is revolutionary. Heidegger is rejecting all philosophies which see Dasein as a substance to which certain powers (rationality, volition) have been added. For Heidegger, Dasein is possibility, development, process. It is what it can become. Freedom is the fundamental datum which a phenomenology of Dasein produces, and whatever else

can be said of Dasein can only be said because of its freedom. Even Dasein's understanding of its world is predicated upon its freedom.

With this doctrine Heidegger circumvents two of the most treacherous problems the history of philosophy has encountered in dealing with freedom. First, the facultative theory of freedom had to explain the contradiction between the necessity of a free act being uncaused and the problem of conceiving a faculty, albiet the will, which could produce acts which were uncaused. The by-passing of the entire question of a facultative freedom has spared Heidegger the agony of constructing a faculty which acted without effects.

Secondly, much energy in the history of philosophy has been expended in the attempt to reconcile the freedom of God with the freedom of man. The medieval controversies over predestination witness this. Moreover, this problem recurs in the philosophy of Hegel, who finally concludes that man must submit to the freedom of the Absolute to find his own freedom. With Heidegger this submission is unnecessary. Since there is no distinction between Sein and Dasein, there can never be a conflict between them. If freedom's origin is beyond man, as I have tried to demonstrate is the case in the early Heidegger, this does not allow one to conclude that Dasein is subordinated to the source of freedom. The freedom of Being is one and the

same with the freedom of Dasein.

It must never be forgotten that the freedom of Dasein is a limited one. Dasein is an on-going entity, but this does not mitigate its radical immersion in the world of everyday petty concerns and inauthentic distractions. Dasein is finite freedom. To be free means to be a part of the temporal process and this in turn means to experience the tension of one's limitations in the continuing search for realization.

(2) Although Heidegger's theory of freedom avoids the problems of a facultative theory and those of a philosophy which would see a conflict between Sein and Dasein, it must be admitted that the freedom-doctrine of Heidegger creates a serious difficulty. There is a temptation to conclude from the reading of the early Heidegger that man's existence is an absurd one. The fact that man is defined as the process of freedom, leaves man without a place of rest. All is development and movement, seemingly without any final achievement. For a finality in the process of freedom would destroy Dasein and replace it with the static existence of a present-to-hand entity.

The result of Heidegger's doctrine of freedom is a world without absolutes. For, by definition, an absolute is released from determination. It is absolved. In the early Heidegger, however, time was the horizon of all experience and nothing could be conceived that did not lie

under its pall. Man was, in the philosophy of the early Heidegger, a voyager who never saw port and whose only consolation was the satisfaction that might be gained by solving the problems of his journey as they arose. There could never be any respite to look forward to, no harbor to reach. Man's fate was that of Sisyphus.

It is in the light of this perplexity that we must seek the importance of Gelassenheit. I propose that the significance of Gelassenheit lies in its attempt to see beyond the Kantian temporal horizon.

For Kant, every perception was informed by the intuition of time before being submitted to our understanding. As a result, reason was placed under the aegis of time. Time became the supreme judge to which all human experience was subject. Although it is true that Kant sought contact with the transcendent through the imperatives of the will, still, time hung as a cloud over all man's endeavors. No thought of an absolute was possible, since, by definition, an absolute would be absolved from all determinations (in this case) of time. So much of contemporary philosophy has lived under this curse. Man is seen as a creature with infinite aspirations yet finite abilities. He can hope limitlessly yet perform only finitely.

Gelassenheit has attempted to break out of Kant's temporal prison. It seeks a source for the temporal process itself. And although this source is not named, because

the point in history has not arrived when it can be named, still Heidegger speaks of it in terms that suggest its freedom from the determinations of time. Thus, it is called the free, the open, the undetermined, and said to be at rest.

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