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UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE

ENGLAND, GERMANY AND THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES
1898-1914

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty

Of the Graduate School of the University of Louisville

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree

Of Master of Arts

Department of History

by

Paul R. Kneisel

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 1898-1914

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ENGLAND, GERMANY AND THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES
1898-1914

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Paul R. Kneisel
July 30, 1942

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FOREWORD

FOREWORD

Of the vast mosaic of alliances, secret treaties and economic rivalry that preceded the World War, historical research has widely neglected that section involving the negotiations of Germany and England on the possibility of the ultimate partition of the Portuguese colonies between themselves. These negotiations cover much of that period before the first World War during which the alliance systems were consummated. Examination of these negotiations gives some insight into the labyrinthine tunnels of secret treaties, alliances, and counter-alliances. Such an examination not only shows how such stupid diplomacy works but also serves as an excellent reflector by which one can see how imperialism and balance of power became motivations for the various alignments that did so much to make modern history what it is. Hence, it can be said that the Portuguese negotiations offer an interesting study not only for their inherent historical value but also for the illumination they obliquely cast on the genesis of the disastrous alliance system and its natural result--the World War.

The negotiations themselves that occurred

between Germany and England because of the colonies of England's age-old ally, Portugal, fall into two main divisions. The first division embraces an intricate series of diplomatic maneuvers just prior to the Boer War, a series of maneuvers that had considerable importance in determining the complexion of that war. The second series involving the Portuguese colonies occurred approximately two years prior to the World War. The second development was in reality an outgrowth of the first, which had become dormant after England refused to make an immediate division of Portuguese colonies possible. The second period of negotiation was begun more as a means of finding some grounds on which to establish the beginning of a better understanding between mutually hostile Germany and England than simply as a means of increasing the colonial domains of the respective negotiators.

The episode has a rather sordid character because Portugal, a sovereign state, was not officially consulted during the negotiations, nor was Portugal informed of the complete contents of the treaties that resulted from these negotiations. Although more or less forced by the pressure of events and German diplomacy to work with Germany at

this ante-mortem dissection of the Portuguese Empire, England's participation was particularly embarrassing to her. It was embarrassing because England and Portugal had been constant allies for over half a millenium. The manner in which England resolved the dilemma of keeping an old friend (Portugal) at the same time she was supposedly paying tribute with her friend's possessions to a possible enemy (Germany) fully cognizant of his potentiality provides an interesting problem of research.

In order to show the salient features of the problem, this paper will endeavor to accomplish the following: (1) give a comprehensive background of Anglo-Portuguese relations from the inception of the old friendship between those two countries to the end of the Nineteenth Century, (2) give a background of the international situation that dictated England's diplomatic negotiating with Germany for the possible disposal of Portuguese possessions, (3) give an account of the negotiations, (4) analyze the motivations, (5) analyze the outcome, and (6) attempt to show the impossibility of secret alliances based on selfish fears.

Although a conscientious effort was made for

accuracy and objectivity in this research, some hypothecation was necessary to explain why England agreed to discuss the possibility of dividing her friend's empire and to explain why the agreements relative to the division of the empire never materialized. If the writer appears to tend somewhat toward partiality and conjecture, he begs that the color of events in the international scene at the time of this writing be accepted as a partial excuse.

After the first reference to the British Documents on the Origin of the War and Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette in this thesis they will be respectively referred to as B. D. and G. P.

No specific maps illustrating the territorial distribution set forth by the treaties were available for the writing of this thesis. The data on the maps appearing in this thesis were assimilated from the text of the treaties themselves. The information was verified as well as possible by comparison with general maps of Africa. Good copies of such maps appear in the following atlases:

Hammond's New World Atlas, Doubleday Doran,
Inc., Garden City, New York, 1939

The Matthews-Northrup New International
Atlas, Blue Ribbon Books, Inc., New York

Any general atlas could be used, however, for verification.

CHAPTER I

THE "ANCIENT" PORTUGUESE-ENGLISH ALLIANCE

CHAPTER I

THE "ANCIENT" PORTUGUESE-ENGLISH ALLIANCE¹

"England does not make alliances--
she grants them."

--Lord Cranborne, son of Lord Salisbury

Near the close of the Middle Ages--1373 to be precise--a treaty was concluded between England's House of Lancaster and Portugal's House of Avis.² This treaty was to be the predecessor of a vast and uninterrupted series of treaties binding these two kingdoms into an alliance that became by far the oldest existing alliance of the world.³ In fact, if one were to be exact, the seeds of this understanding that is so deeply rooted in modern history were already sown during the Crusades, when the English and Portuguese established the friendship that was to grow into this most permanent of all alliances.⁴ With but few

1. The word "Ancient" is used here despite the fact that the treaties were concluded in medieval rather than ancient times because the diplomatic documents refer to them as the ancient treaties, c.f. British Documents on the Origins of the World War, Vol. I, Nos. 92, 93.

2. British Parliamentary Accounts and Papers 1899, CIX (C9088), pp. 68ff.

3. Jones, Guernsey, "Beginnings of the Oldest European Alliance: England and Portugal," American Historical Association Report for 1916, I, 407.

4. Ibid., p. 407.

alterations the relations between England and Portugal have been essentially the same for almost three centuries, unshaken by wars and revolutions involving either or both states. Truly this is a phenomenon of extraordinary rarity in international relations. At first consideration it might even seem queer, because of the lack of common interests and similarity of race, but alliances are not built upon community or race, religion, or ideals, to say nothing of sentiment or affection, but upon community of fears.¹ England and Portugal have never lacked common enemies.

An examination of the content of this ancient treaty and its successors provides ample proof of commitments that England made to Portugal and vice versa. These created a unique and rather embarrassing diplomatic situation for England when Germany undertook to negotiate with her for Portugal's colonies during the years 1898-1914.

The Treaty of 1373, concluded just four years before the death of Edward II, came as a result of the Hundred Years War, which involved by this time, not only France and England, but also Castile. Hence, it

1. Jones, loc. cit., p. 407.

was decidedly beneficial for England to enlist the aid of the Portuguese. The treaty gave immediate aid to England, but put restraints on her in subsequent dealings relative to Portugal. The following articles from the treaty themselves explain these restraints:

TREATY SIGNED AT LONDON, JUNE 16, 1373

Article I

In the first place, we settle and covenant that there shall be from this day forward between our above said Lord Edward, King of England and France, and Lord Ferdinand, King of Portugal and Algarve, and the Lady Eleanor, Queen and his consort, their successors in the aforesaid Kingdoms . . . and their realms, lands, dominions, provinces . . . true, faithful, constant, mutual and perpetual [friendship] They shall henceforth reciprocally be friends to friends and enemies to enemies and shall assist, maintain, and uphold each other mutually by sea and by land against all men that may live or die, of whatever dignity, station, rank or condition that may be and against their realms and dominions.¹

They shall strive for peace, as much as in them lies, and personal safety, security, interest and honor, and the harmlessness, conservation¹ and restitution of their rights, property, effects and friends, wheresoever they be.

They shall everywhere faithfully prevent the hurts and injuries, disgrace, or baseness which they know or which one party knows to be at any future time intended or contemplated against the other party, and shall provide remedies for them; . . . without reserve, and fully inform, forewarn and successfully counsel the other party against whom such things are meditating. . . .

1. Underscoring mine.

Article II

Also, neither party shall form friendships with the enemies, rivals or persecutors of the other party or knowingly himself or through others advise, aid or favour the enemies, rivals, or persecutors of the other party, to his detriment, hurt, or prejudice; or gratify them in any way, receive them into his kingdom or lands, or knowingly suffer them to be gratified, received, counterbalanced, or harboured, either publicly or privately under any specious excuses, contrivances or pretexts . . .

Also, if the kingdoms, lands, dominions, or places of the other party should happen to be infested, oppressed or invaded by sea or by land, by enemies, [etc.], or if any of these . . . prepare in any manner or appear . . . anxious to infest or oppress . . . [aid shall be given] ¹

Over five centuries before 1898 England had already bound herself to preserve Portugal's dominions, strive for the conservation of Portuguese rights and property, prevent everywhere injuries and disgrace which she knew were even contemplated against her ally, maintain straightforth communication to Portugal of any information that involved the safety of Portugal and refuse to give comfort to the rivals of Portugal. Of course, at the time of the signing of the treaty England received much in return for such self-denying limitations. Portugal acted as a bulwark against her continental rivals.

Thirteen years later in 1386 the clauses of the

1. British Parliamentary Accounts and Papers,
loc. cit., pp. 67-69.

1373 Treaty were re-emphasized in a new treaty executed at Windsor. Evidence of this can be especially noted in Clause VII.

TREATY SIGNED AT WINDSOR, MAY 9, 1386

Article VII

Further it is agreed that if either of the aforesaid parties can learn, discover, or anticipate any injury, contumely or disadvantage to have been planned or meditated against the other party, on sea or land, manifestly or privately, he shall prevent it as much as in him lies, as though he were desirous of preventing the injury and contumely intended to his own interest and shall endeavor by all means in his power, that such design, with all the particulars connected with it may be brought to the notice of the other party against which it is so intended, and every artifice, deceit, and invention shall be abstained from.¹

Between 1386 and 1642 there was an intermission of treaty making; nevertheless good relations were maintained because the two powers never seemed to be without common enemies. Then, too, the growing influence of the commercial classes in an increasingly powerful English government made inevitable the continuance of the advantages that could be had from judiciously manipulating this willing pawn.²

In 1642 a treaty was concluded between the English House of Stuart and Portuguese House of

1. British Parliamentary Accounts and Papers, loc. cit., pp. 69-70.

2. Jones, loc. cit., pp. 407-8.

Braganza which gave to the English merchants in Portugal a reasonable amount of religious toleration, protection from financial losses resultant from the Inquisition plus extra-territoriality and immunity from Portuguese laws.¹ In addition to these valuable concessions the contracting powers reiterated their previous declaration of mutual trust and assistance when they guaranteed to each other in Article I of the Treaty signed at London, January 29, 1642 that,

. . . Neither of the said most renowned Kings, their heirs and successor by himself or any other, shall do or attempt against each other or their Kingdoms by land or by sea nor shall they consent or adhere unto any war counsel, or Treaty in prejudice of the other.²

For a time it seemed that the Puritan Revolution would destroy the understanding between Catholic and Pro-Stuart Portugal and the now more or less Protestant England. In fact Portugal was the only power to espouse overtly the Stuart cause.³ Portugal had always been friendly to the Stuarts. She afforded Charles I access to the rest of Europe by allowing her ambassadors and diplomatic offices to be used for

1. British Parliamentary Accounts and Papers, loc. cit., pp. 69-70.

2. Ibid., p. 71.

3. Jones, loc. cit., p. 411.

communication and even for the transportation of money and ammunition.¹ Such action naturally brought down on Portugal's head the wrath of the avenging Republic and postponed considerably (26 years) the inevitable final form of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. In fact, for just a short time there was a state of war between Portugal and the Protectorate when the Royal "Pirates" Maurice and Rupert took refuge in the Tagus River. Cromwell blockaded Portugal. King John IV retaliated by declaring war. However, he was powerless to do more than imprison English merchants and sequester property. So when the Republican victory of Dunbar indicated the real strength of England, John sued for peace, which Cromwell agreed to by executing another treaty in 1654. This treaty granted England a considerable indemnity and added to the mercantilistic concessions she had already secured.² After this treaty was signed Englishmen shared equal privileges with the Portuguese in the Portuguese colonies. It also reemphasized and repeated what had been guaranteed before:

1. Jones, loc. cit., pp. 409-410.

2. Ibid., p. 411.

It is also agreed and concluded that no other league or confederacy whatsoever made or to be made by the most Serene Lords, the Protector of England and the King of Portugal, with any other princes or republics whatsoever shall derogate from the present treaty of peace and alliance, but that the peace and confederacy shall be kept entire and always in full force.¹

Even more than the Treaty of 1642 the agreement of 1654 was regarded as a charter of liberties for English in Portugal.² It is interesting to observe that although Portugal was the only nation to oppose the Republic openly it was also the first to send a credited ambassador to the "Parliament and Commonwealth of England."³ So, despite sentiment, Portugal was more interested in England and not English governments.

Although the relations between the two countries during the Puritan interlude were fraught with tension, the relations again became reciprocally helpful and friendly. As early as 1660, Portugal was obliged to call upon the despised republic for aid against her enemies. A treaty with the usual Anglo-Portuguese assurances was concluded. It was about to go into effect when the Restoration dissolved the Commonwealth.

1. British Parliamentary Accounts and Papers, loc. cit., p. 71.

2. Jones, loc. cit., p. 413.

3. Ibid., p. 412.

When Charles II returned to England he had intended to reverse the entire foreign policy of Cromwell. However, his connections with France and negotiations for the marriage with Catherine of Braganza by his chief minister, Clarendon, soon postulated a reversal of his original intentions.¹

The marriage of the two dynasties gave the penultimate touch to the alliance. It was not a sudden decision, for a proposal for marriage was made in 1644.² It had long been a cherished wish of Portugal's John IV.³ The matter was again discussed just after the execution of Charles I. Charles II was found to be sympathetic. Throughout the Puritan crisis the Royal House of Braganza had extended aid and sympathy to the dispossessed occupants of the House of Stuart. When Charles returned to England wifeless, he provided in himself the keystone of English foreign policy which was in truth merely a corollary of that of Louis XIV.⁴ During his exile

1. Jones, loc. cit., p. 413.

2. Ibid., pp. 409-410.

3. Ward, A. W. and Gooch, G. P., The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, I, 16.

4. Green, John Richard, History of the English People, III, 236ff.

Charles was obliged to depend upon the varying hospitality of Louis' Kingdom. So to him a certain amount of gratitude was due. However, Charles did not fall in line with Louis so much out of gratitude as he did because he knew that only by the aid of Louis would he be able to realize his aims. He knew that Louis was designing to reduce Spain to as near a state of vassalage as possible and that Louis needed English support to make his hegemony complete. By marrying himself to Portugal, an ally of France and foe of Spain, as he had his sister, Henrietta, to the Duke of Orleans, Charles aligned himself, though not formally but nevertheless, definitely, with France. Of course, Charles received something in return for the marriage conveniently arranged by his loyal Clarendon. He received the subsidies of Louis which made possible his independence from Parliament and luxurious and profligate life. However, England as a nation, too, received considerable material returns, not from Louis, but from Portugal, which helped more than a little in laying the foundations for the domination of the Mediterranean and India.¹ The English received a dowry of half a

1. Jones, loc. cit., p. 419.

million pounds--fabulous in those days--the fortress of Tangier in the Mediterranean, the trading center of Bombay, India, and political pledges of religious toleration for all Englishmen throughout the Portuguese Empire.¹ At first this arrangement was distasteful to the English people as a whole, for it came at the same time that Charles arranged for the disposal of Dunkirk to Louis XIV.² The people did not relish trading hard-won Dunkirk for distant Tangier, nor did they like the growing power of the Sun King whose Bourbon Dynasty was beginning to be as much of a specter to them as the now waning House of Hapsburg had once been.³

Nevertheless, by sealing this bargain, since aid to Portugal was a steady French policy, England ranged herself on the side of France as a foe of Spain and as such contributed much to the downfall of her former rival and persecutor.⁴ With English and French support Portugal was able to insure for all time her independence from Spain for which she had

1. Green, op. cit., p. 237.

2. Macaulay, Thomas Babington, The History of England from the Accession of James II., I, 179.

3. Ibid., p. 179.

4. Green, op. cit., p. 237.

been struggling for sixty years.¹ So just as Spain reached her pinnacle of greatness in Portugal, she started there, too, her downfall.² As events subsequently proved, this downfall was continually aided and abetted thenceforth by the maintenance of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliances.

There was still another factor in the conclusion of this alliance. That is, the mercantilistic Clarendon was extremely eager and energetic in inserting commercial clauses in the wedding treaty, in an attempt to make the marriage to the Catholic Infanta more palatable for mercantilistic and Protestant England.³

This union then, of Charles and the Infanta of Portugal not only aligned Charles with Louis but was open admission that Cromwell's successful foreign policy was to be resumed. So despite the Puritan restoration interlude and comic opera Anglo-Portuguese war of 1642, there was no real alteration in the relations of Portugal and England.⁴

The marriage was formally sealed by treaty on June 23, 1661 at Whitehall. The first article and secret article of this treaty are interesting because

1. Jones, loc. cit., pp. 408-9.

2. Green, op. cit., p. 237.

3. Jones, loc. cit., p. 415.

4. Ward and Gooch, op. cit., p. 29.

they specifically bind the signers to abide by all previous treaties and to protect all conquests of both from all enemies, both present and future.

Article I

That all Treaties made between Great Britain and Portugal since 1641 until this very time shall be ratified and confirmed in all points and to all intents, and shall receive as full force and ratification by this treaty as if they were herein particularly mentioned and inserted word by word.

Secret Articles

His Majesty of Great Britain in regard of the great advantages and increase of dominion he hath purchased by the above mentioned treaty of marriage shall promise and oblige himself as by this present article he doth to defend and protect all conquests or colonies belonging to the Crown of Portugal against all his enemies as well future as present.¹

From this time on the arrangements between Portugal and England remained extraordinarily constant and were never subject to change--merely re-emphasis of the original theme--that is, with the exception in the years 1898-1914 which is the *raison d'être* of this discussion.

If some authorities neglect or refuse to consider the earlier foundation of the "Oldest Alliance," none deny that 1661 marks the beginning of this relationship. Even this date gives it ample claim

1. British Parliamentary Accounts and Papers, loc. cit., p. 72.

for the most durable of all understandings--over two hundred and fifty years.

The remaining treaties that were concluded in subsequent years comprise a mere catalogue of reassurances--England's rise to world leadership bears witness of this point throughout.

During the War of Spanish Secession, Portugal, true to her obligations, adhered to England and became a member of the Grand Alliance.¹ To bolster and clarify their relations the allies reaffirmed their intentions toward each other by another treaty, which reads in part as follows:

TREATY SIGNED AT LISBON, MAY 16, 1703

Article I

All former treaties between the above said powers (England and Portugal) are hereby approved and confirmed and ratified and ordered to be exactly and faithfully observed except insofar as by the present treaty is otherwise provided and established.²

At the Peace of Utrecht after this war England was instrumental in securing concessions for Lisbon.³

1. Ploetz' Manual of Universal History (H. E. Barnes, Editor), p. 391.

2. British Parliamentary Accounts and Papers, loc. cit., p. 76.

3. Ward and Gooch, op. cit., p. 54.

During the Seven Years War Portugal was invaded by Spain because she refused to end all correspondence and commerce with England.¹ However, by supplementing the national resources of Portugal, England soon offset the effects of the invasion.² During our American Revolution, Portugal was briefly at war with Spain, America's ally.³

The Portuguese government remained steadfast to England during the Napoleonic struggles even when the homeland was taken over by the Empire of France. In 1807 Portugal was the only country whose ports were excluded from the restrictions of the Orders in Council. Later in the same year when France moved in on Portugal, the British persuaded the Portuguese government to flee from the homeland to Brazil rather than capitulate to Napoleon's demands by even so much as a token war on England.⁴ The British received permission to use the Ports of Madeira and the Portuguese Fleet.⁵

1. Ward and Gooch, op. cit., p. 121.

2. Ibid., p. 123.

3. Ibid., p. 166.

4. Ibid., p. 365.

5. Ibid., p. 365.

There was a treaty of Rio de Janeiro, signed between England and the Portuguese government in exile, February 19, 1810 to fit the peculiarities of the Napoleonic situation.¹ This treaty was abrogated in 1810 when a new one was instituted which again put the Anglo-Portuguese relations in their customary place. Article III explains this entire situation:

The Treaty of Alliance concluded at Rio de Janeiro on the 19th of February, 1810, being founded on circumstances of a temporary nature, which have happily ceased to exist, the said treaty is said to be void in all parts and of no effect, without prejudice to the Ancient Treaties of Alliance, Friendship and Guarantee which hereby renewed by the High Contracting Powers and acknowledged to be in full force and effect.²

After the Napoleonic furor, England sank into comfortable and "splendid isolation." In fact, for a period of more than fifty years she had no permanent ally, except little Portugal.

In 1873 when there were republican agitations in Spain for an annexation of Portugal to Spain, England stood up for Portugal by informing the Spanish Minister that she would brook no external interference

1. British Parliamentary Accounts and Papers, loc. cit., p. 79.

2. Ibid., p. 79.

in the affairs of her ally.¹

In 1875 Portugal's colonial possessions in the vicinity of Delagoa Bay in Mozambique, one of the colonies involved in the German negotiations, offered specific grounds for negotiation between England and her old ally.² The Bay itself had been the object of numerous counter conquest claims by Holland, England, Portugal and even Austria; although Portugal claimed it first by right of discovery. As late as 1861 the British ship *Narcissus* raised the British flag over the territory. Portugal protested but hostilities did not develop between these two contenders and friends of convenience. Instead it was finally decided to allow Marshal MacMahon, President of France, to act as arbitrator.³ Evidently, England was not too certain of her claims because the British minister to Lisbon requested in a note to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs that although a decision had not yet been reached by Marshal

1. British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914, I, 51-2, No. 69, encls. No. 1 and No. 3.

2. Bixler, Raymond, Anglo-German Imperialism in South Africa 1880-1900, pp. 104-5.

3. British and Foreign State Papers, 1872-73, LXIII, 1045ff. (Cited by Bixler, op. cit., pp. 104-5.)

MacMahon, Great Britain and Portugal should enter into mutual agreement to the effect that the power in whose favor the award was made not "entertain any proposal for the acquisition of this territory until the defeated claimant had an opportunity of making the successful claimant a reasonable offer for the acquisition of that territory either by purchase or some other consideration."¹ The British minister implied that such an acquisition by a third party would damage the confidence and security of relations.² In reply to this, Portugal gave her fullest assurances. Marshal MacMahon decided in favor of Portugal, who still has sovereignty over the area.

The episode has more than passing interest for this thesis, because of the relation of the Delagoa Bay area to the negotiations of 1898 with Germany and Portugal. Closely related to this question was a treaty signed between the two allies, June 11, 1891. This treaty defined the spheres of influence of each in Africa and safeguarded British interests in Delagoa Bay. Article VII of the treaty points this out:

1. Bixler, op. cit., p. 105.

2. British Foreign and State Papers, LXX, 1878-9, No. 70, pp. 338ff (cited by Bixler, op. cit., pp. 104-105).

. . . The two powers agree that in the event of one of them proposing to part with any of the territories to the south of the Zambezi assigned by these articles to their respective spheres of influence the other shall be recognized as possessing a preferential right to the territories in question or any portion of them upon terms similar to those proposed.¹

In 1894 Great Britain, fearing that Germany might acquire Delagoa Bay, informed the Portuguese government that she would not part with any rights which would diminish the value of preferential claims granted to her in that area.²

Relations between Portugal and her protector remained the same until 1898 when Germany began to negotiate with England for possible acquisition of Portuguese colonies. These negotiations, of course, cast some doubt on the possible status of England and Portugal's alliance. However, within a year after 1898, England had concluded another treaty with Portugal which reaffirmed the old relation. This was the so-called "Treaty of Windsor" and was signed on the 14th of October 1899 to give England reassurance of Portugal's attitude in the use of the Port of Lorenzo Marques in Portuguese East Africa

1. British Foreign and State Papers, 1890-91, LXXXII, 32 (cited by Bixler, op. cit., pp. 104-5).

2. Bixler, op. cit., pp. 107-8.

by England in the event of a war with Transvaal.¹

This treaty, of course, showed that England still had advantages to gain from her Portuguese friendship and intended to keep them--her negotiations with Germany notwithstanding. The truth of this intention is evinced yet again when England signed a treaty for arbitration of mutual disputes at Windsor, November 16, 1904. The preamble to this is very similar to the numerous venerable treaties of the past:

WINDSOR TREATY

Being moreover desirous of confirming, by a further solemn Agreement, the friendship and alliance which have happily subsisted for so long a period between them, and the two nations which they represent, and of eliminating as far as possible, from their mutual relations, everything which might tend to impair or weaken that friendship and alliance [a treaty of arbitration is concluded.]²

This treaty was renewed in 1909 by Sir Edward Grey for a period of five years.

The treaties of 1898, 1904, and 1909 have more than passing significance in that they were a series of treaties steadfast to the age-old friendship

1. See Appendix D for the text of this declaration.

2. British Foreign and State Papers, 97, pp. 68-9. This treaty is the real Treaty of Windsor--rather than the Declaration of 1899.

and yet renewed at a time that they were counter to the more recent German treaty of 1898. The resolution of this enigmatic situation requires an investigation of European conditions between 1898-1914.

The diplomatic evidence of the treaties leaves no doubt that England consistently wanted the friendship of her small ally, Portugal. Both countries received much benefit from this mutual understanding. Portugal had constant protection from her two large neighbors, France and Spain, and a collaborator in certain colonial negotiations in Africa. She also had a ready market for her principal product, port wine, whose entire export trade centered in the English market, because of special privileges dating back to Methuen's treaty of 1703.¹ England in return had a constant springboard for continental wars and a wedge between Spain and France, as well as valuable commercial rights. The treaty series indeed had its advantages, but also its liabilities. England sometimes found that this friendship went contrary to the opportunistic policy of "muddling through." It also obligated her sometimes when she

1. Ward and Gooch, op. cit., p. 166.

would not have been. Then too, the English national disease of gout might be attributed by some as a direct outgrowth of the treaty of Methuen, since practically the entire output of port wine was sent to England as a result of this treaty.

CHAPTER II

ENGLAND, GERMANY AND THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE IN 1898

CHAPTER II

ENGLAND, GERMANY AND THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE in 1898

With the approach of the Twentieth Century there was a tremendous change in the values of international relations. The German and Italian wars of national unification ushered in a whole series of new problems and rivalries. The European continent was being divided into armed camps whose relative power was evenly enough balanced to give each one reason to pause before antagonizing the other.¹

Although international relations were still being carried out according to the archaic practices inherited from the old dynastic subject-state system,² the technological changes that the Twentieth Century had fostered and the expansion of rival imperialisms presaged an imminent change. International problems no longer were of a strictly European character. Signs were rapidly appearing which indicated that the next conflict of interests would be worldwide. The world was undergoing a "diplomatic revolution"

1. Ward and Gooch, op. cit., III, 266.

2. Hale, Oron James, Publicity and Diplomacy, p. 3.

which required international problems to be settled on increasingly broader general lines.¹

This revolution had been given impetus by the resignation of Bismarck from the international scene. The absence of his diplomatic sagacity was soon noticed in the Weltpolitik policy of Germany. However, the revolution was in the making even before this. It started with the beginning of Germany's Pan-German and colonial aspirations, sweeping, in spite of his well-founded convictions to the contrary, even the solid Bismarck into the current which was to lead his Germany into the maelstrom of Weltpolitik.

When Germany became a colonial power she did much to upset the balance of Europe. German colonial dreams and schemes very soon created rivalries and hostilities, principally with England.² This rivalry, coupled with Germany's new navy program, whose purpose by 1898 left no illusion to the "two-power standard" theorists of England, eventually forced England into one of the hostile camps. Therefore, Bismarck's earlier acquiescence to a colonial empire

1. Seton-Watson, R. W., Britain in Europe, p. 596.

2. Larson, L. M., A Short History of England, p. 771.

later provided a logical excuse for a large navy. Thus he unwittingly laid the groundwork for England's final decision to participate in the Triple Entente and the inability of Germany to arrive at an alliance agreement. Friendship with England was a cardinal policy with the Iron Chancellor.¹ He was even opposed to a German navy powerful enough to agitate England.² What he did not see was that his supposedly innocuous colonial policy, when administered by hands other than his own, was to become the stimulant that upset the equilibrium of his plan for Germany's security and presaged a fatal navy rivalry as well.

But in the early 1890's no one could yet foretell what the situation eventually would be and that Germany would be more hostile to England than any other power. All that was evident was a change in world politics which was definitely unfavorable to England's favored position. At the time German agitation was only one of a large number of perplexing problems that could not be clearly understood because

1. Count Wilhelm von Bismarck to Chancellor Bismarck, August 19, 1885, Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, IV, 134.

2. Hamman, op. cit., p. 70.

diplomats and statesmen were still grasping at principles whose usefulness had already slipped away with the approach of rapid communication and the machine age.

In fact, in 1887, England had made a friendly entente with Italy, one of Germany's partners in the Triple Alliance.¹ Family relations between Windsor and Potsdam were very cordial.² These relations were cordial enough to give the final impetus to Russia to enter into an entente with France. Thus England, for a time at least, was not in such an unfavorable position with reference to Germany. In fact, she was in a position to cast a deciding vote between the two sides that were now forming.³ Germany did not realize this. As yet, most of the British diplomats could not grasp the situation because of their encumbrance by the policy of the past. Both powers were at an important historical crossroad and did not know that they were.

In the 1890's in England foreign relations were still influenced by the timeworn principle of isolation,

1. Fay, Sidney B., Origins of the World War, p. 125.

2. Ibid., p. 125.

3. Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 570.

so often called, "splendid," but at best, precarious. England, since Trafalgar, was the undisputed mistress of the seas. She, therefore, enjoyed an independence of action rarely obtained by other powers of that day. Her geographic insularity further amplified her aloofness from nearby European problems, which for her were never so much causes of a set system of policy as individual motivations for particular opportunities. After Napoleon, England's cabinet trimmed her sails more and more to a line of action epitomized by Canning's famous phrase "with every British Minister the interests of England ought to be the shibboleth of his policy."¹ The only set policy was that of opportunism or what is more commonly known as the policy of "muddling through." For over fifty years England steered away from permanent alliances with any continental nation. The sole exception was Portugal. The "devilish" Palmerston epitomized this policy well by stating:

I say it is a narrow policy to suppose that this country or that is to be marked out as the eternal ally or the perpetual enemy of England. We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual and those interests it is our duty to follow.²

1. Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 459.

2. Ibid., p. 459.

Such a viewpoint was inherited by the conservative ministry of Lord Salisbury. His work at the end of the century attempted to follow the old policy. In many respects, however, he began to realize some need to cooperate in continental matters. But even though he frequently inclined to cooperation, he was particularly adverse to pledging England in advance to act on circumstances which had not yet arisen.¹ He was constantly adverse to formal alliances.²

In fact, it was only when the danger of war with South Africa appeared that English diplomacy began to understand clearly its position in relation to the other aspiring empires stimulated by the opening of new areas of the world, scientific achievements, the development of large scale industry and commerce and the increase of population. These sought an outlet for their energies which might preserve the precarious balance in Europe.³ In going overseas, however, these powers actually caused the upset which

1. Temperley, Harold and Penson, Lillian, Foundations of British Foreign Policy, p. 521.

2. Ward and Gooch, op. cit., II, 261.

3. Ibid., p. 267.

they sought to avoid.¹ England, the earliest of the expansionists, had contiguous conflicting interests in almost every section of the earth where the others tried to stake a claim.

England was faced with the perpetual Russian effort to expand her Empire in directions that were dangerous to her colonial possessions. The Russian danger was particularly perplexing because the large Russian land mass made it possible for that country to spread farther afield without encountering the dangers of the British fleet on the high seas where alone she was supreme.

British claims and interests encountered Russia's at points widely separated over the world. Russia's expansion into Manchuria was seriously menacing England's commercial and naval superiority in the orient.² The colossal weight of the Tsarist Empire was being felt more and more on the borders of England's Indian Empire.³ Russia was continually nipping at the heels of Turkey, whose maintenance until late in Salisbury's ministry England regarded

1. Ward and Gooch, op. cit., III, 267.

2. Fay, op. cit., pp. 128-9.

3. Ward and Gooch, op. cit., III, 267.

as an essential to her imperial safety.¹ Likewise England had incurred the hostility of France in several instances. Lord Edward Grey, Foreign Minister of England during the World War gave the following picture of the situation:

. . . There was constant friction, rising on the slightest provocation to quarrel and hostility, between Great Britain and France or Russia. The ground swell of ill-will never ceased. British interests touched those of France and Russia in many parts of the World and where interests touch, an atmosphere of ill-will is always dangerous. The blackest suspicion thrives on it, like noxious growth under dark skies in murky air.²

Even previous to 1898, England had had considerable disagreement with France about the collection of debts and the gradual establishment of suzerainty in Egypt. In this situation Germany gave some moral support to England.³ Perhaps this was a carry-over from Bismarck's policy of keeping France and England disturbed so as to turn French eyes from Germany. However, Bismarck also encouraged France's colonial policy at the same time so that there would

1. Fay, op. cit., p. 127.

2. Grey, Edward, Twenty Five Years, II, 11.

3. Nicholson, Harold, Portrait of a Diplomatist (Sir Arthur Nicholson), p. 94.

be bad blood between England and France.¹ England also had to be careful of French expansion in the Indo-Chinese area.² In 1898 there was considerable hostility about the Nigerian boundary in Africa.³ Major Marchand of France and General Kitchener of England met under warlike conditions in the disputed African area. This was but the final of a series of unfriendly events between the two ancient enemies. An early war appeared to be inevitable.

While England was faced with all of this rivalry Germany was making her own late bid. Most of the unclaimed territory of the world at that time was situated in one of the most disputed areas, namely, Africa. Germany became a neighbor of England on both the east and west coast of Africa. She attained these separated areas just in time to compete at cross purposes with the remainder of the African colonial powers in attempting to join their various scattered possessions. Cecil Rhodes was beginning to conjure up his visions of the Cape-to-

1. Schmitt, Bernadotte, England and Germany 1740-1914, p. 134.

2. Ward and Gooch, op. cit., VIII, 288.

3. Fay, op. cit., p. 128.

Cairo empire. On top of all of this, Italy was making a bid for Abyssinia. Of all of England's danger spots, Africa provided the greatest number of possibilities of an open conflict. In spite of the Anglo-German treaty of 1890 by which England was given all German claims to African Zanzibar for European Helgoland, relations gradually, almost imperceptibly, became strained by a continuous succession of these events.

Potentially the Krueger Telegram episode was just such an occasion. It further indicated that Germany already was not anxious to build up diplomatic cordiality between herself and England, the declarations of the Kaiser and the lineup of Europe to the contrary notwithstanding. This evidence becomes more pointed when one observes that the date of the raid was 1896, two years before 1898 when Chamberlain's bid for a German alliance was refused by Germany. Yet the effects of the event were distinctly felt years after its occurrence. It was a crisis that could have led to an eclipse of British supremacy in South Africa. As it finally resolved itself, the resulting suspicions of German reactions became a permanent feature in Anglo-German

relations.¹ Retrospective examination indicates that the gradual deterioration of English and German relations had definitely begun with the Jameson Raid and its direct result, the Kaiser's telegram to President Krueger of Transvaal.² Germany's conduct in this situation was the initiating cause of the final breakdown of Bismarck's policy of friendship with England.

For some years prior to 1896, because of her South African colonial interests, Germany had been extremely friendly with the Boer Republic, England's big problem in lower Africa for over a generation.³ In fact, this friendliness with the Boers grew in proportion to the animosity that developed between the Germans and the English. Economic and political relationships became so intimate between the German and Boer by the middle of the "nineties" that Germany controlled over a fifth of the foreign investments in the Boer Republics.⁴ Big commercial houses from

1. Carroll, E. M., Germany and the Great Powers, 1866-1914, p. 362.

2. Lovell, R. I., The Struggle for South Africa, p. 368.

3. Brandenburg, Erich, From Bismarck to the World War, p. 80.

4. Carroll, op. cit., pp. 362-3.

Germany maintained thriving branches in Pretoria and Johannesburg.

The Germans had a sentimental sympathy for the Boers as well as a materialistic one. They regarded these Dutch farmers as a "small people of Germanic blood struggling to maintain their independence" despite the pressure of a colossal England.¹ For these reasons the colonial enthusiasts of Germany had long earmarked the area as a desirable and likely possession--of, if not a position, at least a means of challenging and blocking British superiority in South Africa. This viewpoint was exemplified when President Krueger to a large group of Germans assembled at Pretoria on the Kaiser's birthday expressed his gratitude for past German aid and confidence for future help. England protested that according to the Treaty of Pretoria (1884) and the Convention of London (approved by Bismarck, 1881), the Republic could not independently make any arrangement with a foreign power. Germany showed her stand by promptly informing England that her interests required an economically independent Transvaal with open communication from Pretoria to Delagea

1. Carroll, op. cit., pp. 362-3.

Bay in Portuguese Mozambique.¹

These comments coincided with German actions in the construction of the railroad from the Portuguese Mozambique port of Lorenzo Marques to Pretoria. This was the Transvaal's only non-English outlet to the sea. The project received considerable financial support from Germany. Such action, threatening the English position not only in the Transvaal but in Portuguese East Africa was emphasized particularly by the appearance of two warships at the port and the dispatch of a congratulatory telegram to President Krueger by the Kaiser.² England had attempted to forestall the damage this railroad would do to her African Empire by securing a lease to Delagoa Bay, the Mozambique terminus of the road.³ This effort was thwarted in 1893 by Germany and the United States, who interfered ostensibly because they feared that such a lease would damage their holdings in the Portuguese railroad.⁴ Brandenburg even states that the Anglo-German animosity had its inception at this

1. Carroll, op. cit., p. 363.

2. Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 80.

3. Lovell, op. cit., p. 342.

4. Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 45.

time.¹

The railroad episode of July, 1895, was still sore in the minds of England and Germany when Sir Edward Malet, the British Ambassador, made his final leave of the German Emperor before replacement. In his conversations he went beyond what a circumspect farewell would require by reminding William that Germany's attitude in reference to the African situation and Boer problem could cause trouble.² The Kaiser said that Malet even mentioned "war for the sake of a few square miles of niggers and palm trees; war with Queen Victoria's grandson and England's only friend."³ Salisbury, the Prime Minister of England, expressed his surprise to the German Ambassador when he learned of this remark and stated that Malet had had no official instructions to make such a statement.⁴ Lovell implies that Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, might have inspired Malet to utter the remark.⁵ However,

1. Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 45.

2. Carroll, op. cit., p. 364.

3. Kaiser's October 29, 1895 Report of a Conversation with Colonel Swaine, G.P., VI, No. 2529.

4. Lovell, op. cit., p. 354.

5. Ibid., p. 354.

J. T. Garvin, Chamberlain's apologist, supports Malet's denial of the remark.¹

Regardless of the exact wording of Malet's remarks, the Kaiser's subsequent comments to the British Military Attache, Colonel Swaine, show that he might have even welcomed the excuse they or similar remarks gave Germany to state her position. In his comments to Swaine, William

. . . ended with a threat that if England continued to 'insult and fool' the Dreibund as she had for the past seven years, he would be 'simply forced to make common cause with France and Russia.' Britain, he concluded, could only escape from her isolation by 'coming out unreservedly and openly on the side of the Triple Alliance or against it.'²

Here the Kaiser exposed himself and the current German policy--to browbeat England and at the same time "make great capital out of this story, also for possible naval demands to protect our growing trade."³ Brandenburg substantiates this viewpoint somewhat, even though he does place the Kaiser's remarks in a more excusable setting.⁴ The Kaiser had made up his

1. Garvin, J. L., Life of Joseph Chamberlain, III, 65.

2. Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 576.

3. William II to Marschall October 25, 1895 (Note), G.P., XI, No. 2580.

4. Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 81.

mind that he was not going to treat England with "kid gloves" any longer; if friendly persuasion wouldn't do the trick, intimidation would. He was resolved to show definitely to England the dangers of isolation and how much she needed Germany¹--at Germany's price, however.

At the time that Malet made this purported statement, Marschall, the German Foreign Secretary, stated that the German government's interests in the Boer Republic had of necessity to oppose any possible incorporation of these states into British Rhodesia. Public opinion in Germany demanded that the government make such a stand.² He countered Malet's remarks by saying England could not afford to antagonize Germany because she had too many enemies.³ Germany's stand was based on insistent reports that Rhodes' South African Company was plotting a revolt of the Uitlanders in the Transvaal.⁴

Such was the situation when news flashed over the world that Dr. Jameson, Cecil Rhodes' administrator

1. Lovell, op. cit., p. 363.

2. Marschall's Report October 15, 1895, G.P., XI, 5.

3. Ibid., pp. 5-7.

4. Carroll, op. cit., p. 364.

of the South African Company's territories and head of private company police, had crossed the border with six hundred men into the Transvaal. The avowed purpose of this raid was to come to the aid of an uprising of persecuted English Uitlanders (aliens), supported by money and arms from Rhodes.¹

The conspiracy was a complete fiasco. However, it might have had some chance for success had it been confined to an internal revolt of Uitlanders desiring a "new republic." But, when the Jameson party, coming from South African Company territory, was superimposed upon the "internal revolt," the plot failed. Jameson disregarded a postponement of the uprising and impatiently "jumped his gun" on December 29, 1895. As a result, the Uitlanders were forced hastily to summon their men together at an extreme disadvantage. They were easily overcome by President Krueger's troops at Krugersdorp. This "putsch" was definitely Rhodes' responsibility. The British Cabinet had no part in the raid although Chamberlain probably knew² of it and consequently, was guilty of the sin of "omission if not commission."³

1. Bryce, James, Briton and Boer, pp. 35 ff.

2. Garvin, op. cit., III, 74 ff.

3. Carroll, op. cit., p. 365.

When news that the raid was started reached Europe, Berlin instructed Count Hatzfeldt, the German Ambassador at London, to inquire if the British Government sanctioned the raid.¹ Marschall laid down a flat principle that Germany would not tolerate the annexation of Transvaal.² He informed the new British Ambassador, Lascelles, that in spite of repeated warnings of the danger of incurring German illwill in South Africa, England did not pay the least bit of attention.³ Salisbury and Hatzfeldt informed Berlin via Lascelles that there was no official endorsement of the raid. Salisbury did this even before its outcome was known.⁴ Nevertheless, a formal note of protest was sent from Berlin. The German Ambassador was instructed to ask for his passport if he received an impression that the raid was authorized in London. At the same time Germany sounded out France to see if she would cooperate (temporarily) with Germany in stopping England. The purpose of this gesture was to make England again

1. Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 83.

2. Tilley's Memorandum, B.D., I, 326.

3. William II to Marschall, January 1, 1896, G.P., XI, No. 2514.

4. Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 576.

realize the danger of isolation and the need of joining the Triple Alliance.¹ A request had been made of Portugal for permission to send a detachment of German troops to march through Portuguese African territory to Pretoria, Transvaal for the protection of German subjects. This request was denied by the Portuguese minister, Marquis de Soveral. According to Eckardstein, Hatzfeldt's assistant at London, this one gesture did more than anything else to prevent an outbreak of war between England and Germany.² A passage of troops before England could have retrieved the situation, might have started a juggernaut, which could not be stopped even after the primary cause, the raid, had been proven to be independent of governmental sanction.

News soon came through that the raiders had been captured and that the danger to Transvaal was over for the time being. Immediately the German government scurried about to retrieve a situation that could have been dangerous in spite of the failure of the raid. A telegram was flashed to Hatzfeldt to request the return of the note of protest.

1. Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 83.

2. Eckardstein, Baron von, Ten Years at the Court of Saint James 1895-1905, pp. 84-5.

Luckily this was possible because Salisbury was away and had not yet been able to open the note.¹ It was returned to the somewhat embarrassed Germans. However, the salvaging of this message was almost wasted effort, for in the next few days Germany performed one of the greatest diplomatic blunders of the century when she sent the famous congratulatory telegram to President Krueger.

The failure of the raid was in a sense a disappointment for the Kaiser and his government. If the raid had been successful and could have been attributed to England, Germany would have had some cause for the establishment of a protectorate over the Transvaal. This might have been one of the reasons why Germany at this time approached her erstwhile enemy, France, and also Russia, for possible support. She could make temporary use of her European rivals because of their indignation at the raid. However, the French saw through this easily enough.² Germany went so far as to offer Krueger a protectorate on January 2, 1896.³ Dr.

1. Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 84.

2. Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 578.

3. Lovell, op. cit., p. 369. Lovell bases his statement on Konrad Lehman's account of a Memorandum by Lieutenant Mesmer-Selden, one time German Military

Fredrich Thimme, one of the editors of the Grosse Politik in an article, "Die Krugerdepsche," has stated that Transvaal had feared the establishment of a German Protectorate before the Jameson episode made such an action possible or more desirable to the Boers.¹ Wilhelm even offered Dr. Leyds, Boer Representative-at-Large in Europe, military help and added "if Lorenzo Marques (Portuguese Mozambique's port of entry and chief source of Boer supplies) ever changed owners, it could only come into German or Boer hands."²

However, Salisbury's "correct attitude" had cheated Germany of any reasonable pretext for further intervention at this time.³ Nevertheless, the Kaiser, at least, felt that something must be done. So on January 3, 1896, a meeting was called in Berlin which was attended by the Kaiser; Hohenlohe, the Imperial Chancellor; Marschall, the Foreign Minister; and Dr.

Attache at Constantinople. This Memorandum is quoted in Chancellor Hohenlohe's Memoirs. Lehman's article "Die Vorgeschichte der Krugerdepsche" appeared in Archiv fur Politik und Geschichte, 1925.

1. Lovell, op. cit., p. 364.
2. Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 577.
3. Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 84.

Kaiser, the Colonial Secretary.¹ Likewise, Secretary of State for the Navy Hollman, Commanding Admiral Knorr, and Chief of Naval Cabinet Senden were present.² The Kaiser made some very interesting, if not fantastic, suggestions which Marschall explained in his diary.

January 3rd. At 10 o'clock conference with H.M. . . . H.M. unfolded somewhat astonishing projects. A protectorate over the Transvaal, but I talked him out of that at once. Mobilization of the Marine Infantry. The dispatch of troops to the Transvaal. And upon the Chancellor's objection: 'That would mean war with England,' H.M. replied, 'Yes, but only on land.' Then it was resolved to send Scheele (Colonel Baron von Scheele, Governor of German East Africa until February 1895) to the Transvaal to reconnoitre. Also an unfortunate idea. Finally H.M. at my suggestion sent a congratulatory dispatch to President Krueger.³

The telegram was finally sent then as the cabinet's way out of a dilemma. It was in Brandenburg's words "a sort of lightning conductor for the Kaiser's energy."⁴ The final message itself was drafted by Marschall, but it was far from being his own wish and idea as the Kaiser later accused. Marschall⁵

1. Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 84.

2. Hammann, op. cit., p. 68.

3. Ibid., pp. 68-9.

4. Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 84.

5. Hammann, op. cit., p. 67.

was merely following a line of action which would be the least of several evils. He was even obligated to alter several words in the original message written by Herr Kaiser, the Colonial Secretary, to suit the Kaiser.¹ The words congratulating Krueger for "preserving the respect for your government" were changed to "preserving the independence of the country against attack from outside."² The full message reads as follows:

I express to you my sincere congratulations that you and your people, without appealing to the aid of friendly powers, have succeeded, by your own energetic action against the armed bands which invaded your country as disturbers of the peace, in restoring peace and in maintaining the independence of the country against attacks from without.³

This was an improvement over such original fantastic suggestions as having Germany declare war on English South Africa and remain at peace with England at the same time or to get France to cooperate with Germany in frightening England in a war overseas. Nevertheless, the message still contained enough dynamite to change the opinion of the English public toward

1. Carroll, op. cit., p. 369.

2. Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 85.

3. Langer, W. L., Diplomacy of Imperialism, I, 237.

Germany to one of definite hostility. The last phrase of the message was a plain endorsement of the Transvaal's claim to complete independence. This was contrary to the London convention of 1881¹ which recognized England's sovereignty over the external affairs of the Dutch African Republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The telegram, a greater blunder than the raid ever was, threw a shadow over Anglo-German relations which subsequently grew darker.² Salisbury frankly told Eckardstein that it was silly from the point-of-view of German interests.³ The insanity of the situation was realized all too well by Hatzfeldt who contemplated resigning as a result of the blunder and the irreparable damage it had done to British-German relations.⁴ His only reason for staying on was to "make good as far as possible the harm done."⁵

The Jameson Raid and the African situation in general were indications to some Englishmen that

1. Carroll, op. cit., p. 362.

2. Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 578.

3. Eckardstein, op. cit., p. 85.

4. Ibid., p. 87.

5. Ibid., p. 87.

England was in need of an ally. Among these was Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary in Salisbury's second cabinet. Chamberlain was convinced that "Splendid Isolation" was a bankrupt policy.¹ England had hardly a single friend. Something had to be done quickly. She desperately needed allies who would work for peace. Chamberlain and Arthur Balfour, acting as Prime Minister in his uncle, Lord Salisbury's, absence, considered that, despite the numerous Anglo-German differences, Germany would be the most logical candidate for possible partnership in a defensive alliance² since most of the differences between the two countries were still in the stage of annoyances. Chamberlain was convinced that an ally was absolutely necessary. He did not believe that an alliance with even Russia and France was impossible.³ However, he was more convinced that England's differences with Germany, particularly colonial, were not nearly as divergent as with other powers. Consequently, Chamberlain began to make inquiries as to the possibility of some kind of alliance

1. Garvin, op. cit., III, 254.

2. Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 106.

3. Garvin, op. cit., III, 255.

with England. But, his negotiations were not officially those of the cabinet. Hence, they were regarded as a private matter.¹ Through the intermediary of Baron Eckardstein, the German Ambassador's Assistant in London and an old acquaintance of Chamberlain's, a meeting with Hatzfeldt, the Ambassador, was arranged.² The meeting occurred March 29, 1898. At this time it was unofficially proposed that England might not only reach an understanding but even conclude a defensive alliance with Germany.³ This is substantiated by Hatzfeldt.⁴

Here Germany at last had in her hands what Bismarck had desired and what he had striven for so hard in the last years of his ministry--an alliance with England.⁵ On the surface at least this was what Germany wanted or thought she wanted in 1896.⁶

1. British Documents, Vol. I, Foreword. Also Chamberlain's Memorandum, March 29, 1898, Garvin, op. cit., III, 259-60.

2. Garvin, op. cit., pp. 255-256.

3. Ibid., p. 260. Chamberlain's Memorandum of March 29, 1898.

4. Hatzfeldt to Bulow, G.P., XIV, pt. I, 196-199.

5. Hamman, op. cit., pp. 24 ff.

6. Supra, pp. 37-38.

However, now that she had the possibility of securing what she wanted, she let it go because she thought she could get even better terms in view of England's predicament. She was skeptical, with some justification, for just a few months before a similar proposal had been made to the Tsar.¹ Then, too, the favored Navy program of the Kaiser was now beginning to displace many of the older ideas and policies. Another distracting factor was the unofficial nature of the proposals from a responsible cabinet. Bulow, the German Minister of State, said that he could not trust the uncertainty and unreliability of England's parliamentary government.² Likewise, Bulow objected to such an arrangement on the grounds if such a treaty were made by Germany "we must come to the assistance of England whenever she was attacked in India or Canada or in some other of her numerous colonies and overseas possessions, while England remained with grounded arms if Russians marched against Austria or the French against Italy."³ Strangely enough, the

1. G.P., XIV, 243.

2. Bulow, Prince Bernhard, Memoirs, I, 380.

3. Ibid., p. 379.

Kaiser, too, was instrumental in creating the deadlock. The British overtures were, he told the Tsar "by my commands coolly and dilatorily answered in a colourless manner."¹

Salisbury, the Prime Minister, upon his return from France, where he had been resting because of his health, was probably happy that Chamberlain's suggestions had not been more productive. He later told Hatzfeldt that while he agreed with Chamberlain in abstract in desiring a rapprochement with Germany, he did not favor a formal alliance or treaty necessary until a specific case of necessity arose.² Salisbury had not yet been convinced that "splendid isolation" should be given up. He was in truth the "residuary legatee of the system of Castlereagh."³ However, the "ice had been broken." Both powers seemed to agree

. . . that the most important task of both governments was gradually to dispel the ill-humour still prevailing between the two countries, by showing a spirit of accommodation in minor questions, and thus to prepare public opinion on both sides for a definite political agreement.⁴

1. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 94.

2. Hamman, op. cit., p. 79.

3. Cecil, Algernon, British Foreign Secretaries, "Salisbury," p. 309.

4. Hamman, op. cit., p. 79.

Chamberlain as late as June 2, was still reported by Hatzfeldt as desiring "to work by leisurely but friendly efforts for an alliance with Germany and so to act that the way was left open for any understanding later on."¹ Salisbury's unrelenting reluctance to entertain seriously talk of a complete alliance with Germany was based on his suspicion that Germany dangled the prospect of such an alliance before England just enough to keep her interested in times of difficulty. Germany did this merely to wrangle colonial concessions from England and not to realize the purported purpose--a permanent understanding resulting from an alliance.²

The German Ambassador continued to discuss the question academically with Salisbury with the hope that something could be gained for Germany in the future.³ It so happened that the "future" was just a little over a month away and the "something that could be gained" was the Portuguese colonies.

Thus by June 1898 the English Government had come to a partial realization of its adverse situation

1. Hatzfeldt Report of June 2 and 3, G.P. XIV, 240.

2. Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 145.

3. Ibid., p. 114.

of "splendid isolation." England was in danger of being without friends at a time when her own colonial problems were becoming acute in South Africa. To forestall any embarrassment in the growing difficulties, England indicated that she would possibly bow to circumstances and seek aid among her rivals and potential enemies; at the time Germany was the most logical one from whom to secure such aid.

CHAPTER III

STEPS TOWARD AN ANGLO-GERMAN COLONIAL AGREEMENT

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Chamberlain's initial efforts to establish a regular alliance between Germany and England proved unsuccessful because of German distrust of England, German indecision as to whether she should turn more to Russia or England for added support¹ and the unenthusiastic attitude of the Salisbury element in the British Cabinet. Nevertheless, both powers left the back door open.² Germany indicated that while a large scale understanding was impossible, there was still a possibility for a settlement of specific minor matters.³ This apparently conformed to Salisbury's views as expressed to Baron Staal, Russian ambassador, when he was inquiring as to the rumored possibility of an Anglo-German alliance. At this time the British Prime Minister replied, "Alliance (with Germany) non; rapprochement oui."⁴ Consequently,

1. Brandenburg, op. cit., pp. 113 ff.

2. Supra, Ch. II, pp. 51-52.

3. Bulow to Hatzfeldt, June 8, 1898, G.P. XIV, No. 251.

4. Hammanp, op. cit., p. 80.

the stage was well set in 1898 for specific negotiations for the eventual disposal of Portuguese colonial possessions, particularly in Africa where there was such a duplication of German and English interests. According to Hamman, Germany realized that the proximity of Portuguese possessions in Africa to Transvaal, German East Africa, German South West Africa and the British South African possessions provided ample opportunity for embarrassing complications. The Reich soon conceived the idea of avoiding hostile complications by means of an Anglo-German agreement concerning Africa.¹ This, however, placed Germany on the horns of a dilemma--how was she to come to an agreement with England in Africa and yet not give up rights and possessions of her own? Evidently, a catalyst, lightning conductor, or scape-goat was needed.

The embarrassing condition of Portuguese finances by May, 1898, plus the growing strategic importance of the location of her colonies were coincidentally opportune for the diplomatic sparring of England and Germany. By May of 1898 Portugal was in

1. Hamman, op. cit., p. 80.

desperate need for money to meet not only the forthcoming award of arbitration against her as a result of her confiscation¹ of British railroad interests in Mozambique (East Africa), but even her ordinary debt engagements, on which the payment of interest had been suspended.²

So desperate was this need that the Portuguese government sent its Governor-General of Mozambique, Major Moushino de Albuquerque to Paris, London and Berlin to make soundings as to the disposition of these various governments. Portugal, at this time, was even offering her colonies in Africa for sale or as a collateral for a loan.³ This visit by Moushino proved a revelation to him of the militarism that pervaded Germany. He, as governor of Mozambique, the nearest non-British neighbor of the German favorite, Transvaal, saw danger to his country from Germany. So "he determined that his country should maintain the best possible relations with Germany and the Transvaal compatible with a

1. Mr. Bertie's Memorandum on England and Portugal in Africa, May 1, 1898, B.D. I, No. 65.

2. Hamann, op. cit., p. 82.

3. Ibid., p. 82.

close understanding with England."¹ Consequently, concurring with the Marquis de Soveral, longtime Portuguese statesman and Ambassador to London in 1898, he thought that his government should adopt a suggestion from England. That is, that a loan should be raised in England on the guarantee of revenues of the Portuguese colonies, including Lorenzo Marques, "coupled with a thorough understanding with Her Majesty's government."²

This gesture, more favorable to England than the other powers, was in keeping with Portugal's ancient friendship with England³ and the Treaty of preemption that she had signed with Portugal in 1875, granting her prior rights to purchase Mozambique if Portugal were disposed to sell it.⁴ However, it could pique Germany, who because of the proximity of Mozambique to German East Africa and the Boer Republic, believed it to be in her sphere of influence by the right of justice if not by law. In fact, already during the Jameson crisis, the

1. Bertie's Memorandum on England and Portugal in Africa, B.D., I, 45.

2. Ibid., p. 45.

3. Supra, Ch. I.

4. Supra, Ch. I, pp. 17-18.

Kaiser himself admitted that Germany was out to get Lorenzo Marques, Mozambique's chief port.¹ Chamberlain strongly suspected Germany of having designs on this locality as late as 1898.²

Thus even before 1898, Germany's newly aroused colonial ambitions prompted her to take advantage of Portugal's precarious pecuniary situation. She showed herself extremely interested to furnish credit guaranteed by the customs of Angola, Mozambique, and Timor.³ The Portuguese colonies were not only tempting prizes, but were also exasperating inconveniences to German African policy; the role Portugal played by refusing transmit to German troops during the Jameson crisis was proof.

The German government lost no time in bringing pressure to bear on England. Although the German Empire had shown an interest in the Portuguese colonies as early as the Jameson situation, it was particularly anxious to secure concessions in Portuguese Africa after the Moushine mission gave glaring

1. Hamman, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

2. Count Hatzfeldt to the German Foreign Office, June 14, 1898, Dugdale, E.T.S., German Diplomatic Documents 1870-1914, p. 29; Also G.P., XIV, 261.

3. Guedes, Armando Marques, Alianca Inglesa, p. 325.

indication of Portuguese finances. On June 3, 1898, the Kaiser indicated, on marginal notes on the report of Hatzfeldt (the German Ambassador to London) to the Foreign Office, that German colonial interests demanded consideration of the acquisition of some of Portugal's African possessions.¹

Therefore, on June 6, 1898 when Count Tattenbach, German Minister to Lisbon, learned that the Marquis Luis de Soveral had been sent to England with specific instructions to obtain money by mortgaging the revenues (not the sovereignty) of Mozambique, Angola and other Portuguese colonies, he telegraphed Berlin at once.² This information soon produced action, for on June 14, 1898, Hatzfeldt called on Salisbury and made some roundabout inquiries as to what Soveral was proposing.³ Salisbury was evasive. However, he indicated that the problem had been referred by him to the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain. He promised Hatzfeldt that he would

1. Dugdale, E.T.S., op. cit., Bernhard von Bulew in Berlin to Count Hatzfeldt, June 8, 1898, III, 27-28. Also G.P. XIV, 261.

2. Ibid., p. 27, editorial note.

3. Salisbury to Viscount Gough, June 14, 1898, B.D., I, 48.

inform Germany in due time if steps were undertaken in reference to the Portuguese colonies which would concern the legitimate rights and interests of Germany. Salisbury was completely aware of German sensitiveness in African matters.¹ He had learned that too well during the Jameson Raid crisis. He was eager to keep Germany placated.

According to his own report of the conversation, Hatzfeldt said he

. . . explained in friendly, but emphatic terms that one-sided action in the matter here involving actual or contemplated passing of Portugal's sovereign rights in those colonies into British hands would make a very bad impression with us and also would not tend to improve our relations which we both desired and that the question was a political one, which he, Salisbury, and not Chamberlain would have to decide.²

The gauntlet was definitely down. However, Bulow must have believed that there was a strong possibility of being able to persuade or force England to enter into a joint negotiation, because when the French ambassador asked if he (Bulow) had any information on a possible Anglo-Portuguese negotiation, he replied in a depreciating tone.³ Nevertheless, he was careful to include

1. Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 114.

2. Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, June 14, 1898. Dugdale, E.T.S., op. cit., III, 29; also G.P. XIV, No. 261.

3. Bulow to Hatzfeldt, June 17, 1898, Dugdale, E.T.S., op. cit., III, 30; Also G.P. XIV, 266.

in information telegraphed to Hatzfeldt, the suggestion that if England knew that France was interested, she (England) would negotiate much more readily with Germany. The next meeting between Salisbury and Hatzfeldt brought out more specific comments. Hatzfeldt asked if England would join with Germany in a common action on the financial negotiations Portugal was requesting. Salisbury said the Government

. . . considered any financial dealing between us and Portugal a matter which exclusively concerned the two powers in question . . . I did not think . . . that they negotiations could form the subject of diplomatic communication between Her Majesty's Government and the German government.¹

Such an attitude, if allowed to continue, would soon make it possible for England to present a fait accompli before Germany could even get a chance to present her case. Consequently, von Bulow immediately telegraphed Hatzfeldt an outline of Germany's position in the affair. The sum and substance of this message was that willy-nilly Germany was going to get something out of the Portuguese situation. Bulow veiled his materialistic outlook very thinly when he wrote,

1. Marquess of Salisbury to Viscount Gough, June 21, 1898, B.D., I, no. 67.

For us as well as for England in this matter as in all colonial matters in general, it is an affair not so much of provable rights, but of interests and the power available for establishing these interests, if need be.¹

His arguments went on to prove that although Germany lacked the assurance of naval strength that England had to assure her of independent action, she controlled the European balance in such a way that should make things extremely embarrassing for England if that country refused to allow Germany to push her way into the negotiations. Then, too, he indicated that Germany should be given some reciprocity for the support she had given to England's Egyptian policy. In fact, if Germany did not get much reciprocity, she might be made to appear the fool and the Government would lose prestige both at home and abroad. In this event Germany would be forced to act with energy. So it would be cheaper for England to come along quietly and agree from the first.² Bulow was anxious to commit England as quickly as possible, for although Portugal had refused England's conditions for the loan on June 20th, he felt that the financial condition of

1. Bulow in Gerlin to Hatzfeldt, June 22, 1898, Dugdale, E.T.S., op. cit., III, 32; also G.P., XIV, 272.

2. Bulow to Hatzfeldt, June 22, 1898, G.P., XIV, 272.

the Portuguese government would soon force it to capitulate.¹ He did not want this to happen before Germany could get an opportunity to participate in the negotiations. Then too, he was anxious because he felt that France was eager to gain something at this time from the Portuguese situation. In fact Bulow's anxiety over possible French interference extended until August, the last month of negotiations.²

In spite of the German attitude--if not intimidation--and in spite of a desire to consider German sensitiveness, Salisbury was fundamentally concerned that the Portuguese Empire should not break up if anything could be done to save it.³ In fact, this was

1. Bulow to Hatzfeldt, June 22, 1898, G.P. XIV, 34.

2. Baron von Richthofen to Count Hatzfeldt, August 12, 1898, Dugdale, E.T.S., op. cit., III, 37.

3. Dugdale, Blanche, Arthur James Balfour, I, 266-7. This fear of France is somewhat amusing; Von Bulow himself created the situation. At the same time that Germany was sounding out England in early June for the possibility of joint action on the Portuguese colonial question, Von Bulow was sounding out France to see if she would act jointly with Germany on the same question. Von Bulow to Count Minister in Paris, June 18th, 1898, Dugdale, E.T.S., op. cit., III, 30-31. This was to be a type of hedging in case England would not cooperate. Hanotaux, Foreign Minister in the Meline Ministry appeared to be interested. However, before anything concrete was accomplished the Meline Ministry resigned. It was succeeded by the Brisson Cabinet in which Delcasse was Foreign Minister. Delcasse definitely did not approve of anything resembling Franco-German collaboration. The "danger" of French "interference" ceased.

Salisbury's attitude throughout the Portuguese conversations and negotiations; while Germany was interested in securing spoil, he was chiefly interested in not antagonizing Germany and yet not offending Portuguese susceptibilities.¹ Brandenburg, expressing somewhat the German viewpoint, concedes that England had no desire to hasten the dissolution of the Portuguese Empire.² Hamman is of a similar view.³ Von Eckardstein, Hatzfeldt's assistant in London at the time of the negotiations, believes that the whole situation was hypothetical.⁴ Bulow on the other hand gives indication throughout his account of the negotiations that he was strictly interested in what he could get out of the situation in a material way.⁵ Portugal's susceptibilities and the possibility of concluding a lasting understanding with England were not considered. He probably considered buccaneering the colonies from the very first.⁶ Ironically

1. Dugdale, Blanche, Arthur James Balfour, I, 267.

2. Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 117.

3. Hamman, op. cit., p. 83.

4. Eckardstein, op. cit., p. 182.

5. Bulow, op. cit., I, 320 ff.

6. Garvin, op. cit., III, 321.

enough the German Government through Bulow maintained a policy that was most succinctly expressed by Salisbury in a speech in Albert Hall, May 4, 1898. He said then,

You may roughly divide the nations of the world as the living and dying . . . the weak states are becoming weaker, the strong states are becoming stronger . . . the living will gradually encroach on the territory of the dying . . .¹

Germany, with her colonial appetite brought into full spate by the Weltpolitik philosophy, was evidently resolved to have her share of the world even if she had to take it from the dying and give them a little help in the process of dying.

Portugal was made all too cognizant of her predicament, not only by the austere paternalism of England, but also by the blunt diplomacy of Germany. On June 22, 1898 the British Government was informed by Soveral that the Kaiser had sent the King of Portugal such an urgent message that the King had to rush back to Lisbon and grant an audience to the German Minister (Tattenbach).² Tattenbach said that the Kaiser could not continue on amicable terms with Portugal if the negotiations for a loan from England

1. Garvin, op. cit., III, 281.

2. Salisbury to Sir H. MacDonell, June 22, 1898, B.D., I, No. 68.

were continued without due regard to the legitimate interests of Germany. At this time the Portuguese Government was still anxiously trying to get the best deal it could from England without unduly offending Germany and France.¹

The Portuguese government asked England what to do in reference to the German pressure. England informed Portugal that it depended on how badly she wanted the money. However, insofar as the intimidation was concerned, Salisbury said that Germany had no right to interfere with the negotiations that were being discussed between Portugal and England. In reply to the Portuguese inquiry at this time as to what was England's attitude toward the "Ancient treaties," England replied that it was the same as that expressed in Lord Granville's note to the British Ambassador in reference to a similar request in 1873.² It should be observed, however, that the 1873 note made no mention of colonial territory. On the whole, the English attitude in the reply to Soveral's inquiries seemed slightly cool.

The next day Salisbury seemed to be a little

1. Salisbury to Sir. H. MacDonell, June 29, 1898, B.D., I, No. 71.

2. Supra, Ch. I, p. 16.

more receptive toward German suggestions for a joint loan based on colonial revenues and on ultimate possibility of assuring sovereignty of allotted colonies if the Portuguese should default on these loans.¹ Several approached Salisbury again on the twenty-ninth with a suggestion that 8,000,000 pounds be lent to Portugal, 2,000,000 of which would be secured by revenues from Mozambique; 6,000,000 of which would be secured by customs from Portugal itself. Salisbury intimated "that the advantages to us did not appear to be very great."² There was a definite attitude of reservation here.

By June 30th, Mr. Bertie, Assistant Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs, had prepared an official memorandum based "on the assumption that Her Majesty's Government are disposed to admit the participation of Germany, but to exclude that of France in the arrangements for the relief of Portugal from her present embarrassments" He concluded his comments with the ominous promise, stating:

If for political reasons it is necessary to come to terms with Germany we might have with her

1. Salisbury to Viscount Gough, B.D., I, No. 70.

2. Salisbury to Sir H. MacDonell, B.D., I, No. 71.

an exchange of secret notes undertaking that whenever, if ever, the break-up of Portugal from internal causes should come about Germany shall receive certain specified portions of the spoil.¹

This was the essence of the entire agreement concluded in August.

On July 6, according to Hatzfeldt, Salisbury himself began discussion on the Portuguese question and assured him "that he was by no means refusing to come to an understanding with us on it."² There is no record of this conversation in the British Documents. In fact, there is no record in any of the Foreign Office Archives.³ By July 9, Salisbury was discussing specifics with Hatzfeldt. With no violent objections he listened to Hatzfeldt's suggestions of probable lines of division and distribution of shares of the Portuguese African Empire. He said, "I told Count Hatzfeldt I would place the negotiations before my colleagues on Tuesday."⁴ However, he still

1. Memorandum by Mr. Bertie, June 30, 1898, B.D., I, No. 72.

2. Hatzfeldt to German Foreign Office, July 6, 1898 (cipher telegram), G.P., XIV, 281.

3. Editor's Note, B.D., I, 55.

4. Salisbury to Viscount Gough, July 9, 1898, B.D., I, No. 74.

impressed upon Hatzfeldt that he could not, for fear of French mischief-making, consent to an agreement which would have the effect of wounding the feelings of the Portuguese, and giving them the impression that the English were watching for the downfall of Portugal. In the same statement in which he said that he would present the matter officially to his cabinet he still voiced his reluctance to sell an old friend into bondage. He said, "The difficulty will be a form of note which would not look like cutting up Portugal while still alive."¹ However, he was now speaking of a note as a foregone conclusion.

The die was cast. An agreement was ultimately to be made by two external parties--Germany and Britain--for the possible ultimate division between them of a third party's insecure colonial possessions, the Portuguese colonies. Based on surface indications such an arrangement could best be described by Sir Arthur Nicholson, First Lord Carnock's statement. He described it as "the most cynical business in my whole experience of diplomacy."² Already by July 6, 1898

1. Salisbury to Viscount Gough, July 9, 1898, B.D., I, No. 74.

2. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 285.

England had, according to surface indications, left considerations of Portugal aside. No reply was made to Portugal's final capitulation to Salisbury's terms for a loan.¹ These terms would have given England--independent of German collaboration--a voice in the administration of Delagoa Bay.

By July 1898, then, Great Britain despite her ancient friendship for Portugal and despite qualms of conscience was ready to make a deal to share in the eventual spoils of her decadent friend's Empire. England, to be sure, was not entirely to blame, because Portugal made the first overture earlier in the year to raise a loan, secured, if there was no other recourse, by the colonial revenues or possible sale. Nevertheless, Portugal did not intend to sacrifice sovereignty over the colonies as the contemplated Anglo-German deal contemplated at this time.² Neither did England initiate the joint German-English negotiation. Why then, notwithstanding Salisbury's qualms, did England finally agree to negotiate? This question can not be fully answered at this state of discussion,

1. Sir H. MacDonell to the Marquess of Salisbury, July 6, 1898, B.D., I, No. 73.

2. Salisbury to Sir H. MacDonell, June 28, 1898, B.D., I, No. 68.

but the fundamental difference between the German and English viewpoint must be noted. Germany was considering an immediate dissolution of Portugal. England was hoping for her to continue as long as possible as she was. As long as Portugal stood--weak or strong--what Germany planned could not occur. England probably was using an uncertain possibility of an eventuality as a basis of negotiation with Germany to hold Germany in check. Germany considered that such a possibility could be made quite kinetic by a willful Germany acting in conjunction with England. England maintained an attitude of reluctance and hesitancy. Germany maintained an attitude of opportunism and action. Then, too, it should be noted that as late as July 13, Salisbury seemed to think that Portugal would be a member of the negotiations.¹ As the negotiations developed he saw that Portugal was to be excluded. This fact probably contributed to his dislike of the whole arrangement, which he more or less tried to side-step.

From the evidence already displayed it can

1. Salisbury to Viscount Gough, July 13, 1898, B.D., I, No. 75.

be said then that England finally agreed to such a paradoxical arrangement for political reasons, but she was always anxious that such an arrangement should not appear to be "cutting up Portugal while still alive."

CHAPTER IV

THE ANGLO-GERMAN TREATY OF 1898

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The colonial understanding only tentatively discussed before July 1898, now (July 1898) began to be more definite. Active negotiations took the place of suggestions and hints. Once England agreed to consider a settlement, the negotiations became merely protracted bargaining over who should eventually get what share of the Portuguese colonies. The outcome of this bargaining had two distinctly different aspects. On paper it would seem that Germany secured the "lion's share." Actually England won a brilliant diplomatic victory at a time when such a victory was politically and militarily priceless.

Germany first demanded all of Angola (Portuguese West Africa) and all of Mozambique north of the Zambezi River and east of the Shire River. This included part of what was already English territory, Blantyre. In addition to this Germany desired the Portuguese island of Timor in the Orient.

Salisbury was sure that the Kaiser was "bent on an agreement of some kind"; but that, nevertheless, he was taking the opportunity to make larger demands

than he was prepared to press."¹ As long as Salisbury took part in the negotiations he maintained, in addition to his concern about "cutting up Portugal alive," an unrelenting campaign to deflate the German demands to as low a point as possible. In fact, the Kaiser became so exasperated at Salisbury's attitude that he had his mother write her mother, Queen Victoria, informing her that her Prime Minister was an obstacle to the understanding between England and Germany.²

When Hatzfeldt returned to the Foreign Office on July 13 to see how his proposals of the ninth had been accepted by Salisbury's colleagues, he found that a definite decision to consider negotiations had been made.³ However, the terms that Salisbury placed before Hatzfeldt left him ill-satisfied. At this stage of the negotiations Salisbury still assumed that Portugal would have a voice in the decisions. To all appearances he was going on the assumption that Portugal still wanted money badly

1. Salisbury to Viscount Gough, July 9, 1898, B.D., II, No. 74.

2. Langer, op. cit., II, 527.

3. Salisbury to Viscount Gough, July 13, 1898, B.D., I, No. 75.

enough to be agreeable to a joint loan instead of one to England alone. England's counter proposals gave Germany substantially what she wanted in Mozambique, but only that portion of Angola south of the town of Egito.¹ England also wanted as a sine qua non that Germany agree to Portugal's abandoning to England the railroad from Lorenzo Marques as well as the Port itself. Salisbury still insisted that Portugal and her colonies should be maintained as long as possible and that no surrender of sovereignty be involved in the loans. He suggested that preemptive rights be granted over those sections used as collateral respectively for Germany and England. These preemptive rights were to go into effect only if mischance overtook Portugal to such an extent that she would be forced of her own accord to surrender her colonies. Late on the same afternoon that Salisbury informed Hatzfeldt that England was agreeable to a joint loan along the lines just described, the Portuguese Minister Marquis de Soveral called on Salisbury and delivered the following message: ". . . in view of all the difficulties with which the question of

1. See map, Appendix F.

a loan was surrounded, his Government had decided in favour of leaving matters in statu quo.¹ According to Salisbury, Soveral explained that this decision involved the abandonment of all idea of a loan from the British or any other Government and also of any notion of altering the attitude of Great Britain or of Portugal towards any portion of the Portuguese possessions in Africa.

This point-blank statement put a decidedly different interpretation on any further negotiation that might be carried on, for now the negotiations would not include participation of the subject of the negotiations, Portugal. Portugal's refusal "to come along" was extremely embarrassing because her precarious finances might even have initiated an international commission of debt administration, which, of course, would have precluded any diplomatic or colonial schemes that either England or Germany might have. Nevertheless, the negotiations continued without the blessing of Portugal's presence or acquiescence. On July 19, 1898 Hatzfeldt again called on Salisbury and expressed terms for an agreement

1. Salisbury to Sir H. MacDonell, July 13, 1898, B.D., I, No. 76.

which were very similar to those of July 9; he presented these in French in the tentative form of a treaty.¹ The next day Salisbury informed Hatzfeldt that the cabinet had fully considered the proposals and found that they were not entirely acceptable.² Above all things the British would not give up certain territory of their own as well as the Portuguese territory. The Germans had proposed to allow England to have the unrestricted right to control Delagoa Bay and the Transvaal Bay in return for Blantyre (British territory), most of Mozambique, Angola and Walfisch Bay (British territory). Salisbury explained that England already had preemptive rights over Delagoa Bay,³ hence Germany had no legal right to object before international law if England were to acquire this area independent of German cooperation. The British Prime Minister countered the German bid for British territory by a demand by England for Togoland, if Walfisch Bay were to be given up. This upset the German Ambassador

1. Salisbury to Viscount Gough, July 19, 1898, B.D., I, No. 77.

2. Salisbury to Viscount Gough, July 20, 1898, B.D., I, No. 78.

3. Supra, Ch. I, pp. 17-18.

immensely. He even threatened that Germany would have to turn to Russia if England would not give more concrete indications of a desire to become a friend of Germany. Apparently Salisbury as a "master of public affairs" was trying to elude Hatzfeldt as long as possible by various evasions.¹ On the other hand it was apparent that Germany considered herself in an excellent position to drive a good bargain. The negotiations continued for almost a month longer with Germany and England remaining at these two extremes. The tenor of the German negotiations in this affair as described in the subsequent memoirs of the principle negotiations, is exceedingly mild in comparison to that expressed in the documents. Von Bulow's very general account of the episode would make it seem to be merely a trial of British fidelity which the treaty found to be lacking.² This viewpoint, however, is very easy to arrive at years after all of the events in the situation had taken the course destiny had designed. Eckardstein states that the negotiations were very hypothetical.³ However, at the

1. Guedes, op. cit., p. 327.

2. Bulow, op. cit., III, 320-321.

3. Eckardstein, op. cit., p. 182.

time of negotiation it was evident that Germany was thinking in terms of definite objectives which could be obtained because of the financial embarrassment of Portugal and diplomatic embarrassment of England.

Between the twentieth of July and the twenty-seventh, no official British records were made on the negotiations. On the twenty-seventh, the indomitable Hatzfeldt again appeared at the Foreign Office to see if England was still willing to conclude a treaty with Germany in reference to the Portuguese colonies.¹ Evidently when Berlin learned that the threat to appeal to England's old enemy, Russia, did not make Britain jump into Germany's arms, the Reich was willing to make a few concessions. Germany no longer brought in the extraneous matter of cession of British territory contiguous to certain Portuguese colonial areas allotted by Germany to Germany. The demands for Blantyre and Walfisch Bay were dropped as were (temporarily) the demands for Timor. However, in return for this concession Germany wanted more territory in Angola and Mozambique which formed an enclave into British territory. Salisbury immediately stated

1. Salisbury to Sir F. Lascelles, B.D., I, No. 79.

that this was not agreeable. These views were reiterated a week later when Hatzfeldt again reviewed the conversations.¹ Salisbury repeated his objections of July 27; whereupon Hatzfeldt suggested that in return for giving up demands for the enclaved territory between the Zambezi and Shire Rivers, Germany should receive more land in Angola. Salisbury again countered with objections. First, he objected to the term "compensation" used by Hatzfeldt in reference to concessions Germany wanted in Portuguese Africa from England in return to concessions given to her. Then he indicated that the added territory Germany wanted in Angola would require that England at least be granted extra-territorial rights there in case of an eventual Portuguese cession.

Salisbury still was anxious to consider the susceptibilities of Portugal. He still gave the impression that Portugal should be consulted and informed. He stated that if the arrangement were made between England and Germany "a great deal of drafting would be necessary in order to prevent such stipulations from wounding the feelings or infringing

1. Salisbury to Sir F. Lascelles, B.D., I, No. 80.

upon the rights of Portugal."¹ He did not yet seem to think a secret arrangement was necessary.

Hatzfeldt himself gave the best description of the Prime Minister's reactions when he said "I realized that the Prime Minister wishes at all costs not to appear at Lisbon in the light of an expectant heir, dividing in advance the Portuguese heritage with another."² Perhaps it was more than a coincidence that at this particular point in the negotiations Salisbury decided to take a rest at his French villa at Dieppe. After August 10 he had turned all of the negotiations over to his nephew, Arthur Balfour, whom he left in charge of the Foreign Office.³ Balfour spent the next ten days in cutting down the extraordinary German demands so that an agreement could be reached.⁴ It is quite possible that between July 20, 1898 when Salisbury was so cold to Hatzfeldt's suggestion and August 3 when he appeared reconciled to an agreement of some sort, part of his mixed

1. Salisbury to Sir F. Lascelles, July 27, 1898, B.D., I, No. 80.

2. Hatzfeldt to German Foreign Office, August 8, 1898, Dugdale, E.T.S., op. cit., III, 36.

3. Dugdale, Blanche, op. cit., III, 267.

4. Ibid., p. 267.

cabinet had indicated a desire to make a deal involving possible infringement of Portuguese sovereignty. This he agreed to because of political reasons, although he did not approve personally. Then, too, he never relished the idea of an alliance or agreement with Germany. The Chamberlain element was particularly desirous of an arrangement of friendship with Germany. This had, of course, been attempted earlier in the year by Chamberlain without enthusiastic support from Salisbury--who oddly enough was taking a short rest in France at that time too.

The French Foreign Office is responsible for a similar interpretation, in reporting the situation from the viewpoint of the Marquis de Soveral of Portugal.¹ The Quai D'Orsay had the impression that when Salisbury realized that Portugal would have to pay the piper for the realization of an agreement of sorts with Germany he "retired to his villa at Dieppe to avoid recrimination of the Marquis de Soveral--Afin d'eviter les recriminations de M de Soveral, le Marquis de Salisbury se rendit dans sa villa de Dieppe."² This

1. M DeFleurian, Charge D'Affaires de France a Londres a M. Poincare, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, Londres, 2 Avril 1912, Documents Diplomatiques Francais 1871-1914, 3 Serie 1911-1914. Tome Second, 8 Fevrier, 10 Mai 1912, No. 291, p. 297.

2. Ibid., p. 297.

document states that Salisbury had defended himself but poorly when Soveral addressed observations of righteous indignation to him. There is no specific record of such a conversation in the British Documents. The Portuguese writer, Guedes, gives the impression that Soveral might have spoken to Salisbury about the pending Anglo-German deal.¹ However, Guedes bases some of his information on the French documents and consequently, cannot be relied upon as a completely independent source--especially since there was no official Portuguese documents published on this entire episode.² Brandenburg gives the

1. Guedes, op. cit., pp. 327 ff.

2. In a letter sent to the writer of this thesis on November 27, 1941, by Pedro don de Sousa Pernes, Attache to the Portuguese Legation in Washington, D. C. the following information on Portuguese material for this thesis was given:

"The Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of November 22nd, and to tell you that there has been no official 'White Book' published by the Portuguese Government on the subject of 'The Anglo-German Negotiations over the Portuguese Colonies 1898-1914.'

If you read Portuguese you may find something of interest in the book, "A Alianca Inglesa" by Armando Marques Guedes, published in Lisbon, 1938, pages 324-27

Other references of interest can be found in Mr. Harold Nicholson's biography of his father, Lord Carnock. In this book you will find quotations which show the attitude of the British Foreign Office in regard to this whole question."

impression that Salisbury wanted to wash his hands of the whole matter;¹ hence, the delegation of the task to his nephew. Then, too, Salisbury had evaded Germany as much as possible. When he finally saw that Germany could not be put off any longer he may have let someone else take the onus of responsibility and have given assurances in the meantime to the protesting Soveral. Later in 1911 the Ambassador to France, Sir Francis Bertie, wrote Sir Edward Grey the following interpretation of Salisbury's absence: (Bertie was Assistant Under Secretary of State in 1898.)

. . . the negotiations had been begun by Lord Salisbury, who later on told Count Hatzfeldt, so the latter informed me, that he would not have signed the Agreement, to which the Ambassador retorted, so he said to me, that he (Lord Salisbury) certainly would have signed it for the Cabinet would have made him do so.

Lord Salisbury had no affection for the Agreement, but that was, I think, partly because he had hoped to stave off the German Government and thought that his nephew had been too ready to conclude the negotiations. Besides this, in the latter days of Lord Salisbury's time as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, he and Arthur Balfour were not always at one and the uncle was rather jealous of the nephew in his management of the Foreign Office during the uncle's absence.²

1. Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 115.

2. Editorial note quoting a memorandum in Grey's Mss., Vol. 54, January 25, 1911, B.D., X, Pt. 2, No. 268.

Bulow reports that Salisbury made a similar excuse to Hatzfeldt somewhat after the agreement had been concluded.¹

Nevertheless, the fact remains that soon after Salisbury's sidestepping of the issues, a treaty was concluded between Germany and England. When Balfour assumed control, the Assistant Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs, submitted a memorandum to him to acquaint him with the salient British considerations. In this note he still implied that the British consent to negotiations was based on the hypothesis "that the Portuguese Government will be willing to accept the cooperation of Germany with England in providing money for Portugal, she giving in return reversionary rights over Portuguese territories to Germany and England." This was the Salisbury standpoint. The Memorandum continued with some observations that might explain Salisbury's previous evasiveness to Hatzfeldt:

There are no indications that the cooperation of Germany with England would be acceptable to Portugal. On the contrary, she is well aware of the territorial and financial designs of Germany, and it will only be very great pressure and dire financial necessity that will bring her to submit to the intervention of Germany in her affairs. M. de Soveral is strongly opposed to it, and urges that we should not tie our hands with Germany as

1. Bulow, op. cit., I, 484.

if we can postpone the question till the autumn--when we may be less occupied elsewhere--there is good prospect of a change of government at Lisbon and a satisfactory settlement between England and Portugal.¹

Here is at best indirect evidence of the conversation between Soveral and Salisbury referred to in the French Documents.² This also explains much of England's conduct in the Anglo-German-Portuguese matter after the proposed agreement became an actuality. It possibly explains why England hesitated and why the treaty that was finally made did not go into effect. Nevertheless, Balfour, having a specific situation before him--an anxious Germany clamoring for an agreement which some of the British cabinet had long hoped for in one form or another--proceeded with negotiations in a most direct manner. It would almost seem that he had this one particular task to do. Perhaps it had been delegated to him by his uncle specifically. However, it would be hard to furnish a satisfactory explanation of such a surmise. Subsequent events show some generalized reasons. Evidently the Bertie Memorandum and all of its cautions and doubts did not deter Balfour. The Memorandum seems to

1. Memorandum by Mr. Bertie, August 10, 1898, B.D., I, No. 81.

2. Supra, p. 81.

summarize the situation up to the point where a decision was made to agree with Germany, but does not include reference to a definite decision to sign.

Although Germany did not like to change horses in mid-stream, she felt that there might be some advantages. Hatzfeldt presents the situation as follows:

Although the delay caused by handing over further negotiations to Mr. Balfour is undesirable, yet I think we must consent to it. The last time he represented Lord Salisbury, Mr. Balfour was honest and forthcoming towards us; when we come to discuss the matter with him it will probably be soon evident whether a quicker conclusion is to be expected in this way. Lord Salisbury says that Mr. Balfour will probably start discussing the matter by next Wednesday.¹

On August 11 the German Ambassador called upon Balfour in reference to the Portuguese matter. Balfour expressed a reluctance--similar to his uncle's--about dismembering Portugal before she was dead.² He pointed out that England was willing to lend money to Portugal only to keep her alive. The colonial areas designated as collateral were only to be designated as a provision for the eventuality which the proposed treaty and loan

1. Count Hatzfeldt to the German Foreign Office, August 8, 1898, Dugdale, E.T.S., op. cit., III, 36.

2. Mr. Balfour to Sir F. Lascelles, August 11, 1898, B.D., I, No. 82.

should seek to avoid. However, provisions were made on both sides as to the probable disposition between them of the Portuguese colonies, in case of such eventualities. Hatzfeldt handed Balfour a memorandum as an unofficial communication. It was a slight amplification on the one he presented to Salisbury on the Third of July. On the eighteenth, the German Ambassador had another interview with Balfour. Balfour informed Hatzfeldt that according to his understanding with his uncle, Timor was not to be included in the proposed arrangement.¹ This displeased Hatzfeldt who intimated that if Timor were not included, the negotiations would be broken off, with resulting hard feelings in Germany.

At this same meeting the acting Prime Minister presented the German Ambassador with two memoranda which were England's counter offer to Hatzfeldt's "Unofficial Memorandum" of the eleventh.² These Memoranda summed up what had been the previous British stand. The first memorandum stated that if money were to be loaned to Portugal, it would be loaned jointly by the two powers, England possibly taking the largest loan. These

1. Balfour to Sir F. Lascelles, August 18, 1898, B.D., I, No. 83.

2. Ibid., Enclosures 1 and 2.

prospective loans were to be secured by revenue from Portuguese colonies so distributed that Germany would have the largest and England what was the most strategic. This security would not entail a sacrifice of sovereignty. These territorial distributions were about the same as those which England had demanded up to this date.

The second Memorandum (B) provided for the action Germany and England should take if the integrity of Portuguese possessions could not be maintained. The two powers would take over the areas which they had allotted to each other merely as loan security if Portugal could not maintain her integrity. England was to get two small trading areas in the area of Angola designated for Germany. Nothing in the Declaration was to detract from any understanding already in effect between Portugal and England. England wanted to retain the advantages of her alliance with Portugal until the very moment Portugal would fall. Timor was not mentioned in either Memoranda. The next day the Ambassador from Berlin informed Balfour that Timor was an absolute "must" for the negotiations.¹

By now the negotiations had proceeded to a

¹ 1. Balfour to Sir F. Lascelles, August 19, 1898, B.D., I, No. 85.

point where England was making definite commitments. The Portuguese government suspected as much. In fact, Hatzfeldt's frequent visits to the Foreign Office were a cause of extreme anxiety to de Soveral. He called on Balfour and stated that he feared these frequent conferences boded no good to Portugal.¹ Balfour told him that he was sure Portugal knew from Salisbury of the decision of England to act in unison with Germany. Soveral replied to the contrary. His understanding was that Great Britain would first come to an understanding with Portugal and then possibly invite Germany to share the loan and its collateral.

This was an embarrassing presentation of the matter to England because at that particular time Portugal had made no bona fide application for a loan. In fact, she had withdrawn her application over a month before, on July 13.² Balfour told the Portuguese representative that even though there was no current application by Portugal, it would be for the best of all concerned for England and Germany to come to an agreement at once. There were, he said, only three possible courses of action for Portugal.

1. Balfour to Mr. Thornton, August 18, 1898, B.D., I, No. 84.

2. Supra, Ch. IV, pp. 74-75.

The first was to borrow from Great Britain alone, as he had apparently desired; the second was to borrow from Great Britain and Germany together, according to the proposal which I had just sketched out to him; and the third was to endeavour to borrow from other Powers, which would probably only be done at the cost of an international control, to which we should have the strongest objection, and which would be disastrous to the independence of his country. If for any reason therefore the first of these courses seemed to us inexpedient, the second was the one most advantageous to Portugal. I told him frankly, therefore, that though I could not say whether our negotiations with Germany would be successful, I should endeavour to make them so.¹

This was putting the matter bluntly. But at least Soveral knew what was going on. Balfour did promise to "communicate with him again, if and when, anything was finally arranged with Germany."²

On the twentieth of July Balfour informed Hatzfeldt that he and Bertie agreed that Timor could be included in the German share of the collateral.³ He also suggested that the treaty could be swallowed much more easily by Portugal if the interest rate on the anticipated loan were kept very low. On the whole Hatzfeldt seemed very happy. The agreement was about

1. Mr. Balfour to Mr. Thornton, August 18, 1898, B.D., I, No. 84.

2. Ibid., No. 84.

3. Mr. Balfour to Sir F. Lascelles, August 11, 1898, B.D., I, No. 82.

to be concluded. He telegraphed the German Foreign Office the following message:

Timor is settled, and I am convinced that we owe it to Mr. Balfour alone, for he urgently desires a conclusion. I beg therefore that as few difficulties as possible be made for him regarding his draft, and that a secret note in explanation of the affair be agreed to in the manner I recommended.¹

In conceding Timor, Balfour had to "battle down" Chamberlain, who never wanted to see another power improve its colonial position more than England regardless of the circumstances.² When Balfour and Hatzfeldt next conferred all seemed smoothly settled.³ It was agreed that Germany would be given some compensation similar to Delagoa Bay if England should ever exercise her preemptive rights there. Germany deemed this necessary to placate public opinion. However, Balfour pointed out that the need for an action requiring compensation for Germany would only occur if Portugal collapsed completely--beyond the extent of help that a loan could offer.

Although it was agreed to give Germany

1. Count Hatzfeldt to the German Foreign Office, August 20, 1898, Dugdale, E.T.S., op. cit., III, 38.

2. Dugdale, Blanche, op. cit., III, 268 ff.

3. Mr. Balfour to Sir F. Lascelles, August 22, 1898, B.D., I, No. 88.

preemptive rights over Timor, England declined a German suggestion that England be given in return the surrender of German extra-territorial rights in Zanzibar. This refusal was based on Balfour's desire not to give the impression that England and Germany contemplated and desired the eventuality of the proposed agreement, that is, the sharing of the spoils of a fallen Portuguese Empire. If England had agreed to accept compensation for giving Germany eventual preemption of Timor, it would have looked as if the two powers were more bent on dividing Portugal than helping her with a loan. Here again the difference of the German and English opinion of the treaty can be observed. England wanted to postpone the eventuality; Germany wanted to hasten it.

A few more minor suggestions were made at this conference by both parties. All that remained to be done now was to write up the final draft of the treaty. This was done, and on August 28, Salisbury gave his approval of the arrangement after the drafts had been sent to him at Dieppe. He said:

I am afraid the German negotiations must have given you a great deal of trouble. If the Germans take to being punctilious they are quite intolerable. The result seems to me quite satisfactory.¹

1. Dugdale, Blanche, op. cit., III, 272.

However, he still indicated his reluctance on August 30, when he replied to Balfour's message informing him that the agreement had been signed. He said, "I only hope that it will not come into use for a long time."¹

When the agreement had been signed the Kaiser telegraphed Bulow the following message, showing the leit motif of the German viewpoint:

I am very glad of this turn which is all the more important since the peace and disarmament proposals and all the chatter about them add not a little to the prospects of war. I thank you, dear Bulow, for your devoted and successful labours, and for the ability with which you have induced Britain at last to give way to us. This is one more great triumph of your diplomatic adroitness and farsightedness.²

The agreement--officially it was not a treaty but a "note"--was signed jointly in London, August 30, 1898, by Balfour and Hatzfeldt.³ The agreement provided that whenever it was deemed expedient by both Germany and Britain to accede to a request for an advance of money, the loan was to be made simultaneously. The amount to be assumed by each would be decided at the time of lending. The territory was so

1. Dugdale, Blanche, op. cit., III, 272.

2. Bulow, op. cit., I, 321.

3. See Appendix A, B and C.

divided that Germany would be allowed to take Timor, all of Mozambique north of the Zambezi below its confluence with the Shire, and the greater part of Angola; England would be allowed to take the remainder of Mozambique and Angola.¹ If a foreclosure of the proposed loan were necessary delegates would be sent to Portugal to inspect the revenues. However, no rights of administration were to be given to these inspectors. Administration of the revenues was to be undertaken only if Portugal defaulted.

To all appearances this was a rather logical agreement even if Portugal were not allowed a voice in its arrangement. The agreement took cognizance of Portugal's sovereignty and ostensibly would not have gone into effect unless Portugal requested a loan of her own volition. England did not hesitate to give this part of the agreement wide publicity, a fact which irritated Germany tremendously.² Now the Reich could not object to English action in South Africa.

However, what England did not publish was the appended secret agreement which provided for the exclusion of third parties from intervening in Portuguese

1. See map, Appendix F.

2. Bulow to Count Hatzfeldt, September 3, 1898, Dugdale, E.T.S., op. cit., III, 39.

colonies included in the Anglo-German loan agreement, mutual abstinence from any future claim to those portions of the Portuguese empire allotted to each as security, and assumption of complete control by Germany and England of those parts of the Portuguese empire allotted to each if Portugal ever for any reason renounced her sovereign rights.¹

This section could be very dangerous to Portugal's integrity. In violation of the "ancient" treaties, Portugal was never formally told about the Anglo-German negotiation, notwithstanding Balfour's promise of August 18, 1898. He merely informed Soveral of the first part of the treaty in which there was no indication of a provision for the possible loss of sovereignty by Portugal. However, Lord Edward Grey stated in 1925: "de Soveral knew all about the secret agreement with Germany 'and made no secret to Lord Salisbury of his knowledge of it.'" On September 2, 1898, Salisbury took over again. His lack of enthusiasm for the agreement was noted immediately in his hesitation and reluctance to force a loan on Portugal.

The Anglo-German agreement of 1898 was signed

1. Newton, A. P., A Hundred Years of the British Empire, p. 367.

on August 31, 1898. On September 1, 1898 Hatzfeldt was already at the Foreign Office attempting to impress on Balfour the possibility of the Portuguese accepting a French loan. Hatzfeldt regarded this as extremely probable since Portugal was not apprised of the secret clauses in the new convention which precluded participation in a loan to Portugal by any power other than England and Germany. He recommended immediate activation of the purpose of the treaty. Balfour recites the Hatzfeldt presentation of the case as follows:

The German Ambassador called on me this afternoon in order to speak to me about a possible complication which might arise in connection with the recent Anglo-German Agreements. He pointed out the possibility of the Portuguese Government, in ignorance of its exact terms, going to France rather than to the two Powers for the purpose of obtaining a loan upon the security of the customs in her African Colonies. Such a transaction might be concluded before we knew anything about it; but inasmuch as, under the Anglo-German Agreements, the two countries would be bound to resist French intervention, by force if necessary, it was manifest that all four Powers might find themselves unawares involved in the gravest complications.

All this might be avoided if it was known beforehand--at all events by the Portuguese Government--that we could not admit the intervention in the matter of a third Power and that we were prepared to give every facility ourselves to the raising of the necessary loan.¹

1. Mr. Balfour to Sir F. Lascelles, September 1, 1898, B.D., I, No. 94.

Hatzfeldt urged action by Germany and her co-signer, England, before October, the time when he surmised that the French loan might materialize. Balfour promised to refer the matter to Salisbury who was to resume control at the Foreign Office. A minute added by Salisbury to the above communication gives striking illustration of his personal views as well as the future policy and attitude of England in connection with this treaty. Salisbury wrote:

I expected this. They are not content to wait for events to give them their share of Portuguese territory, but wish to force the pace of destiny. I do not think that it is possible to make such an intimation to Portugal till we know of the sort of financial terms Germany is disposed to give. They will be of the Shylock school.

There is no real danger to us--free right of preemption protects the East Coast: and our ownership of the hinterland protects Loanda.¹

On September 9, 1898 Salisbury wrote Lascelles that he had instructed the Assistant Under-secretary to tell Hatzfeldt "that, in my opinion, M. de Soveral being already acquainted with the general purport of the Anglo-German Agreement, it would be sufficient that I should intimate to him that any loan from France must not be secured on the customs of Angola, and that

1. Mr. Balfour to Sir F. Lascelles, September 1, 1898, B.D., I, No. 94, p. 76.

warning I would convey to him."¹ England continued to give Germany such vague assurances. Despite these assurances, however, Salisbury wrote the following letter to Sir H. MacDonell in Lisbon on November 7:

The Portuguese Minister called at this Office on the 5th Instant and made, for my information, a communication respecting the loan for which the Portuguese Government are negotiating in Paris. . .

I have expressed to M. de Soveral generally my satisfaction at the statement made by him on the part of the Portuguese Government in regard to the loan which they seek to raise in Paris, and I have stated to him that, under the limitations which he had mentioned, the financial measures taken by Portugal for dealing with her creditors are a matter entirely for her own decision.²

This was definitely not the German viewpoint. As early as October 1898, without active or stout cooperation of England, Germany was attempting to force Portugal to accept a loan based on the revenues of her colonies.³ Tattenbach, the German Minister, tried again and again to get British support in his efforts to force Portugal to accept a loan.⁴ The German Government's concept of the agreement was all too clearly indicated by their

1. Salisbury to Sir F. Lascelles, September 9, 1898, B.D., I, No. 97.

2. Salisbury to Sir H. MacDonell, November 7, 1898, B.D., I, No. 100.

3. Guedes, op. cit., p. 330.

4. Ibid., p. 330.

attitude then, just a short month after the signing of what Eckardstein called a "hypothetical agreement."¹

Sir H. MacDonell, English Minister to Portugal, reported on July 22, 1899, the following resume of the situation in October 1898.

I may here observe that, on my return to Lisbon in October last, I found Count Tattenbach had been pressing the Portuguese Ministers--perhaps unduly--to accept the good offices of our respective Governments for the purpose of raising a loan; he then unreservedly admitted to me that he understood his instructions to convey that one of the objects of the Anglo-German Agreement was to induce the Portuguese Government to contract a loan in order that, when its proceeds had been extravagantly wasted, we should remain with a claim on the control of the Portuguese Colonial Customs.

I promptly informed him that I had received no such instructions from your Lordship, and that I hoped he did not expect me to follow him in that line of action.²

Despite German machinations to the contrary, the agreement never went into effect. Nor did Portugal find it necessary to borrow from the English, German or French Governments. The Portuguese debts were refinanced from money that was obtained by small temporary loans based on home revenues at high rates of interest, and from the sale of large amounts of produce

1. Supra, Ch. IV, p. 77.

2. Sir H. MacDonell to Marquess of Salisbury, July 22, 1899, B.D., I, No. 112.

arriving from the colonies.¹ Private French banks raised much of this money.²

So it was then that by July 1899, less than a year after the completion of the agreement, Sir H. MacDonell could report that Count Tattenbach, German Minister in Lisbon, had to admit that a marked improvement had taken place in the financial situation of Portugal and that the idea of a loan under the Anglo-German Agreement was definitely out of the question in any case for the time being.³ The tedious dalliance of the British Foreign Office in making the agreement and then the studied delay in putting it into effect gives some substantiation to Bertie's statement that Salisbury wanted to put Germany off until October, when conditions would be better for England.⁴

1. Sir H. MacDonell to Marquess of Salisbury, July 22, 1899, B.D., I, No. 112.

2. Garvin, op. cit., III, 319.

3. Sir H. MacDonell to Marquess of Salisbury, July 22, 1899, B.D., I, No. 112.

4. Supra, Ch. IV, p. 83.

CHAPTER V

THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE TREATY OF 1899 OR
THE SO-CALLED "WINDSOR TREATY"

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By 1899 the apparently isolated events of the "ancient treaties" between England and Portugal, the Boer situation, England's isolation, and the dormant Anglo-German Portuguese colonial agreement began to show an interesting relation. This inter-relation becomes visible upon examination of the Anglo-Portuguese Declaration of 1899 erroneously known as "Treaty of Windsor." Investigation of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1899 shows how England resolved the dilemma of keeping an old friend despite the fact that she had made a treaty designed for the eventual disposal of the old friend's possessions. Never was the illogical metaphor of "having one's cake and eating it, too," more literally executed. Out of an apparently impossible situation England secured advantages from both Germany and Portugal. To understand how the situation of 1899 was resolved, specialized recapitulation of the background in 1898 is necessary.

Throughout the negotiations for the Anglo-German agreement of 1898 the pronounced reluctance and evident lack of enthusiasm of England could be

noticed. Yet it was politically and diplomatically necessary for England to make the agreement with Germany. No one knew the character of this necessity more clearly than the German Government. The insight of the German Government into the question is very clearly explained by Hatzfeldt's demands to participate in the Portuguese loan. These demands had much the same character as an ultimatum. Hatzfeldt's report of this conversation with Salisbury on June 14, 1898, if exact, shows a most adamant attitude.¹ He said,

I explained in friendly but emphatic terms that one-sided action in the matter here, involving actual or contemplated passing of Portugal's sovereign rights in these colonies into British hands, would make a very bad impression with us and also would not tend to improve our relations which we both desired, and that the question was a political one which he, Salisbury, and not Chamberlain, would have to decide.²

Baron Holstein reported a similar version at the interview.³ The Kaiser substantiates Hatzfeldt's account of pressure being brought to bear on England by his

1. Supra, Ch. III, p. 59.

2. Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, June 14, 1898, Dugdale, E.T.S., op. cit., III, 29; also G.P., XIV, No. 267. The underscoring is mine.

3. Bulow, op. cit., II, 323.

congratulatory message to Bulow.¹

Of course, part of the English Government, led by Chamberlain, had made overtures to Germany earlier in 1898 for a possible alliance, only to meet a rebuff. Nevertheless, even the more hesitant element of the cabinet led by Salisbury indicated that a rapprochement might still be desirable. Consequently, England was on record as wanting some sort of an arrangement with Germany. In fact, the impending Boer holocaust and England's lack of allies made such an agreement imperative. Germany was well aware of England's predicament, hence her cool reception of Chamberlain's overtures. She was also well aware of her own colonial ambitions, as the reactions to the Jameson Raid so well illustrated. The necessity of Germany's backing down from her initial adamant attitude after the Jameson Raid also showed her Government, if not her people, the impossibility of sponsoring the Boers against a maritime power. This view had been all too well understood by the German Admiral von Tirpitz. Despite his hatred of England, he condemned the official policy and anti-English trend of German

1. Bulow, op. cit., II, 321. For a full quotation of the Kaiser's remarks to Hatzfeldt at this time see Supra, Ch. IV, p. 93.

public opinion at the time of the Jameson Raid. He believed that both government and public opinion had an unrealistic view of Germany's strength¹--an argument which would, of course, support his demands for a larger fleet.

Here was a dilemma for Germany: how could she secure land in South Africa and yet avoid the danger of an impossible war with England? Realizing that championing the Boers' cause might be strategically wrong, in spite of the moral justification of sympathizing with these people, Germany perceived that she should bow out as easily as possible and yet make the best bargain that she could for the good of the Reich and face-saving before German public opinion.

This appears to have been in the minds of the German politicians throughout the negotiations. It is a view expressed early in the negotiations by Bulow:

In leaving the English a free hand regarding Delagoa Bay and its Hinterland we take a step which will cause a feeling of disappointment amongst the whole German people because the Boers for years have become the object of a sentimental sympathy which as in all cases of sympathy cannot be combated on grounds of logic. Therefore, the Kaiser's Government, if it is not to suffer capitis diminutio, must be in a position to show

1. Tirpitz, A. von, My Memoirs, pp. 55 ff.

that its policy has not merely made renunciations but has gained evident advantages.¹

England, also, realized her own predicament only too well; but she was able to turn it into a diplomatic victory. She realized that she had to sign with Germany or else multiply her difficulties in South Africa and Europe at a time when the Boer question, as well as the Fashoda incident, were approaching a climax. Sir Edward Grey expressed the situation as follows:

It seemed clear from what I saw in them [papers he subsequently read on the situation] that the agreement had been made very reluctantly so far as Lord Salisbury was concerned and only in deference to German insistence--pressure would hardly be too strong a word. Crudely put, the German insistence was this, "you [Britain] are on bad terms with Russia and on bad terms with

1. Bulow to Hatzfeldt, June 22, 1898, G.P., XIV, 274. This also proves that Germany had from the very first resolved to get something concrete from the agreement. Hence to the German Government it was not as hypothetical as Eckardstein assumes in his Ten Years. (Eckardstein, op. cit., p. 182.) He, of course, was explaining retrospectively according to the letter of the agreement and not the spirit of the German Government's interpretation of the agreement. Even before this statement was made on the 22nd, Bulow wrote to Hatzfeldt on the 8th, ". . . dass die Erleichterung, welche wir der gefahrlosen Ausbreitung Englands durch unsere wohlwollende Haltung gewahren, auch wie alles in der Welt einen Preis hat." In other words, Germany's neutrality in South Africa has its price [Portuguese Colonies] like everything else in the world. (Bulow to Hatzfeldt, June 8, 1898, G.P., XIV, 253, Pt. I.)

France. You cannot afford to be on bad terms with us.¹

Evidently Chamberlain realized at the time of the actual negotiations what Grey realized much later. He said in a letter to Balfour--during the negotiations,

The only advantage to us is the assurance of Germany's abstention from further interference in Delagoa Bay and the Transvaal--in other words, we pay blackmail to Germany to induce her not to interfere where she has no right of interference. Well! it is worth while to pay blackmail sometimes.²

Here Chamberlain gave the clue to England's reasons for signing the treaty with Germany. The policy was not without success. The desertion of the Boers by the Reich and the decline of German interest in the Fashoda affair after the signing of the agreement of 1898 is not mere coincidence.³

Throughout the negotiations for the Anglo-German Agreement and afterward, England continued to maintain her relationship as usual with Portugal. Apparently there was no lessening of the old friendship. Early in the negotiations (June 12) England had assured Portugal, fearing German pressure on the

1. Grey, op. cit., I, 44.

2. Garvin, op. cit., I, 315.

3. Schmitt, op. cit., p. 144.

loan situation, that her attitude would be the same as it was in 1873 when England stated she would not be indifferent to foreign interference in Portugal's affairs.¹ There was one omission in this assurance which was immaterial in 1873 but all important in 1898, namely, reference to integrity of possessions. This omission could have been purposeful. It might have been deliberately made to cause Portugal some anxiety which she would be eager to dispel as soon as possible. In any case, Portugal did grant England certain concessions at the time of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1899.

Whenever Portugal became too apprehensive about the arrangement pending in 1898 between England and Germany, England would offer reassurances as to England's good intentions toward her old ally. However, although the reassurances were enough to show that England was still interested in Portugal's friendship, they were just vague enough to inspire the proper amount of anxiety. Salisbury's and Balfour's promises to Soveral to keep Portugal informed on the outcome of the negotiations bear witness to this.² It is perhaps

1. Salisbury to Sir H. MacDonell, June 22, 1899, B.D., I, No. 68; also Ibid., June 23, 1899, Enclosures I and 2.

2. Supra, Ch. IV, pp. 83 and 90.

even possible that Salisbury deliberately let Soveral know something about the nature of the secret agreement between England and Germany to keep up this atmosphere of anxiety. Soveral must have been told something, otherwise he could scarcely have told Grey that he knew all about the secret treaty. Soveral's account of the Anglo-Portuguese agreement (contained in the French documents) substantiates this.

On New Year's Day, 1899, the King of Portugal in a speech from the throne announced that the colonial possessions of Portugal must be maintained as a sacred heritage of the nation.¹ England's continued reluctance to force the agreement of 1898 and the obviously overt efforts to convey to the world the impression that Portugal and England were still the same friends as always indicate at least tacit support of Dom Carlos' statement. Although most of the evidence proving England's desire to stand by her old friend is indirect and based on coincidence, it shows a striking correlation to the failure of the Anglo-German Agreement to be consummated and the conclusion of the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement of 1899. This

1. Hamman, op. cit., p. 84.

correlation is so striking that it tends to support the belief that England never fully intended to throw over her old friend.

Such an interpretation of the queer events of 1898-99 could well account for England's extreme concern for the integrity of Portugal at the same time that she was making an agreement with Germany which provided for a possible impairment of that integrity. Evidence shows that England never wanted to force the realization of the Anglo-German Agreement.¹ England, to the exasperation of Germany, refused to hinder Portugal from securing loans which did not impair the letter of the Anglo-German Agreement by mortgaging the colonies in some way.²

What appears amusing now but was probably extremely provoking and puzzling to the Germans at the time was the fact that closer relations were actually observed with Portugal after the conclusion of the Anglo-German Agreement than before.³ The Portuguese Ministry openly and deliberately proclaimed the close terms of this friendship and alliance with

1. Supra, Ch. IV, pp. 96-100.

2. Fay, op. cit., p. 134.

3. Ibid., p. 134.

England.¹ A few months after the conclusion of the agreement with Germany, the British royal family, in the spring of 1899, entertained Dom Carlos, King of Portugal.² This was but an extension of the friendship Edward, Prince of Wales, felt for Portugal throughout his life.³ Bulow blames much of the failure of the realization of the agreement of 1898 on the intimate personal friendship between the Marquis of Soveral and the Prince of Wales.⁴

Superimposed on the whole picture of Anglo-Portuguese relations from 1898 to 1899 is a pattern of confused intrigue and bargaining based on mutual fear of what each could do to the other in cooperation with another power. The approaching Boer War was the basis of the bargaining. England could use this agreement with Germany as a lever to force Portugal to cooperate with her in the growing South African crisis. On the other hand Portugal could use the crisis in South Africa and an agreement that she had concluded in 1875 with the Transvaal to cause England

1. Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 156.

2. Fay, op. cit., p. 134.

3. Lee, Sir Sidney, Edward VII, I, 70.

4. Bulow, op. cit., I, 321.

to respect the ominous potentialities of her neutrality and to value her cooperation in the approaching war. According to the Transvaal-Portuguese Treaty of 1875, Transvaal was able to use the Port of Lorenzo Marques as its chief source of imports.¹ Since even before the Jameson Raid, the Boers had been using the Port of Lorenzo Marques and the railway leading from it to the Transvaal for the transportation of vast quantities of armaments.² Portugal was in a position to cause the English to neutralize the intentions of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1898. In the words of Theodore Wolff, the Portuguese were now in a position to stop the English from possibly "pulling the coat off their back at a convenient moment."³ They could now remind the English with good effect of the old alliance treaties which bound the English "the protection of territorial integrity."⁴

On the other hand, England was in a better position to bargain than she had been a scant year previous--before the Germans pushed themselves into

1. Salisbury to Sir H. MacDonell, September 13, 1899, B.D., I, No. 113.

2. Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 277-278.

3. Wolff, Theodore, The Eve of 1914, p. 263.

4. Ibid., p. 263.

the loan negotiations of Portugal and England. At that time England desired concessions at Lorenzo Marques. Portugal was not anxious to give them.¹ In fact, the Portuguese had been very chary of concessions until the intruding Germans appeared. This might have been one reason that England decided to allow Germany to intrude. Nevertheless, England knew that Portugal still was able to cause extreme embarrassment in South Africa, if not kept friendly.

Just thirteen days after the conclusion of the Anglo-Portuguese agreement, while Salisbury was discouraging German attempts to force a loan on Portugal, he reminded Portugal of the long-standing agreements between England and Portugal.² The purpose of this reminder was to give reason to Portugal to stop the shipment of arms to Transvaal. Several said that he could not see how Portugal could consent to do this. However, he did say that Portugal would not throw over England in case of a war. In fact, she would not even declare her neutrality in case of an outbreak of hostilities. A declaration of

1. Memorandum by Mr. Bertie on England and Portugal in Africa, May 1, 1898, B.D., I, No. 65.

2. Salisbury to Sir H. MacDonell, September 13, 1899, B.D., I, No. 113.

neutrality would have made tacit cooperation with England impossible. England could not use the strategic Portuguese colonial ports in Africa.

On the seventeenth of September, MacDonell, British representative in Portugal, communicated with the Foreign Office on this same matter.¹ Apparently he had been instructed to use pressure on the Portuguese Foreign Minister, who temporized and suggested that England do what Soveral had been diligently striving for, namely, arrive at a complete understanding on the matter. The Portuguese knew when they had a good hand of cards and they intended to get as much as possible out of it.

However, the British felt that they had been dealt a good hand, too. The frequent visits of Hatzfeldt to the British Foreign Office led the Portuguese to believe that Germany, in conjunction with England, was about to enforce the mysterious clauses of the Agreement of 1898. The British played this fear for all it was worth. The British line of reasoning was very similar to the following account of MacDonell to the Assistant Under-secretary,

1. Sir H. MacDonell to Marquess of Salisbury, September 17, 1899, B.D., I, No. 114.

They are convinced that they have nothing to fear from the Boers, so long as they stand by us, and, having fostered an exaggerated idea of the value of their cooperation, fancy that they can set their own price on it.

On the other hand, so long as they suspect that we are acting with Germany, they will always fear that--whatever may be the fortunes of war--Germany will eventually profit, and may prevent us from securing the integrity of their territory.

As regards Lourenco Marques, they are well aware that they cannot defend it and that they will inevitably have to appeal to us; but they are also well aware that Germany knows this and is scheming accordingly . . .

. . . In short, the situation here is a web of uncertainty, intrigue and confusion; the Ministers being moreover not of a calibre to face it.

Soveral has until lately kept out of the way partly from opposition to the present Ministry and partly to further his own schemes of upsetting the Anglo-German Agreement by a direct convention with us. He is moreover firmly convinced that all this Transvaal question has been got up by Chamberlain, at Rhodes' and the Chartered Co.'s instigation; this idea is in some measure shared by the Government.

To sum up, my impression is that the Portuguese Government do not entirely trust us, hence their idea of a convention which would secure them from all danger not only from the Transvaal but also from Germany. To maintain themselves in their African possessions under present circumstances, they required men and money. Can we provide them without the knowledge of Germany?¹

Five days later Salisbury informed the British Ambassador in Lisbon that the possible action of

1. Sir H. MacDonell to Mr. Bertie, September 18, 1899, B.D., I, No. 115.

Portugal in the event of war in South Africa had been the subject of a cabinet meeting. The British Government informed Soveral that in its judgment Portugal could not remain neutral in event of a war.¹ The cabinet was willing to make a defensive alliance with Portugal against Transvaal in the event of a war between England and Transvaal. Any specific questions of military actions resulting from such an alliance would be decided at the time of necessity. Soveral's efforts to reestablish English commitments for the integrity of Portugal were beginning to bear fruit.

Soveral soon declared his approval of such an arrangement and even volunteered to make arrangements whereby further shipments of arms to the Boers could be stopped.² The only thing that remained to be done was to arrive at specific wording of the proposed reaffirmation of the old agreements. Salisbury preferred the wording of the "ancient treaties" to Soveral's proposal which hinged upon the delicate meaning of the word, "sovereignty"--at a time when

1. Salisbury to Sir H. MacDonell, September 23, 1899, B.D., I, No. 116.

2. Salisbury to Sir H. MacDonell, October 7, 1899, B.D., I, No. 117. Also Enclosures 1 through 5 (Soveral to Salisbury, October 7, 1899).

England was having extreme difficulty with that word's context in reference to Transvaal.¹ Salisbury insisted too that a definite clause be inserted whereby Portugal would promise not to proclaim neutrality in the impending strife.² Soveral agreed to Salisbury's suggestions on October 7. This was just five days before the Krueger ultimatum of October 12, which precipitated the Boer War.³ The formal agreement was secretly signed on October 14, 1899 (two days after the Boer War broke out) and came to be called the "Windsor Treaty," through error by the Germans, who probably learned of it later by roundabout means. The error in the name probably results from the German belief that the treaty was concluded when the King of Portugal (Carlos) visited the British Royal Family at Windsor in 1899. The real Treaty of Windsor was signed in 1904 when King Manoel signed an arbitration agreement during a visit to Windsor. The Germans might have had a mistaken understanding of the contents of this treaty. Brandenburg's erroneous account of the

1. Soveral to Salisbury, October 8, 1899, B.D., I, No. 117, Enclosure No. 3.

2. Ibid., Enclosure, No. 5.

3. Ploetz' Manual of Universal History, p. 619.

"Windsor Treaty" is a good example of this misunderstanding.¹

According to Bulow Germany did not know of the exact meaning of this agreement until negotiations were re-opened in the years 1912-1914 for the readjustment of the Anglo-German agreement of 1898.² He states that he learned through a personal friend in Paris of the treaty sometime before the remainder of the German Government. His excuse for not informing the Government seems rather weak. He did not want to violate his friend's confidence.³ Bulow gives the following account of his understanding of the "Windsor Treaty":

About the turn of the century I learned, through the indiscretion of a foreign diplomat with whom I had been on terms of friendship since my youth, that Britain, a year after her agreement with Germany, had concluded a secret agreement with Portugal; this was confirmed by news which reached me from Paris banking circles. This agreement, the so-called Treaty of Windsor, expressly confirmed existing treaties, in which the powerful Britain and her client of many years past, the little Portugal, guaranteed one another's possessions, undertaking the reciprocal obligation to come in case of need to their defense. The conclusion of the Treaty of Windsor had largely been promoted by the then Prince of Wales, of whom the Marquis of Soveral, the Portuguese Minister in

1. Brandenburg, op. cit., pp. 156-7 and 176.

2. Bulow, op. cit., I, 321.

3. Ibid., p. 492.

London, was a personal and intimate friend. This Treaty of Windsor was, of course, in flagrant conflict with the spirit of the British-German agreement concerning the Portuguese colonies. It was not only a guarantee for Portugal, but actually an encouragement to that country not to mortgage her colonies. It increased the old tendency of the Portuguese to give preference to Britain in all economic questions. To say nothing of the fact that the Treaty of Windsor further substantially increased the political dependence of the Portuguese on Britain.¹

This view is hard to accept because the King of Portugal made public reference to the new Treaty in a speech in December, 1900 when the British Channel fleet visited Portugal. This fact was pointed out by Eckardstein in his Ten Years.² The British Documents substantiate him to a large extent.³ Eckardstein's account (if true) of his actions in reference to the Anglo-Portuguese agreement is very damaging to Berlin Foreign Office's claim of ignorance of the matter. Eckardstein said that he asked Lord Lansdowne in the British Foreign Office what the Portuguese King's statement meant. He was told that it was a "reassertion of the Ancient Alliance" and that the

1. Bulow, op. cit., I, 321.

2. Eckardstein, op. cit., p. 83.

3. Editor's summary of facts concerning the visit of the British Channel Fleet to Portugal December 1900, B.D., I, 97-98.

Anglo-German agreement of 1898 would be in no way affected by it. Eckardstein's account says:

I telegraphed this at once to Berlin and also sent a copy of his letter to the above effect. It is consequently incomprehensible to me how the Berlin Foreign Office came to believe that the expression "reassertion of the alliance" referred to the Anglo-Portuguese boundary agreement of 1892 that gave Great Britain a right of preemption over Delagoa Bay, and why 13 years later they were so surprised when the British Government again brought up the Windsor Treaty in the negotiations between Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky. For they had before them the text of Lord Lansdowne's letter in which the reaffirmation of the ancient alliance is expressly mentioned, and both the English and Portuguese papers explained that the King's speech at Lisbon had referred to the recent revival of the 17th century alliance.¹

On the basis of this evidence, it is hard to explain the German indignation after 1900 at being completely uninformed, unless Eckardstein misrepresented some facts, as Bulow intimates in his Memoirs,² or unless the German Government deliberately assumed an air of ignorance about the treaty of 1899 in order to increase the feeling of animosity in Germany against England. This is particularly true after the German navy program began to get under way and after the Boer war broke out.

1. Eckardstein, op. cit., p. 183.

2. Bulow, op. cit., p. 386.

Bulow has pointed out the intensity of German feeling on the matter:

. . . we should remind ourselves of the perfidious duplicity with which, by means of the insidious "Windsor Treaty," Britain had gone behind our backs to render ineffectual the treaty over the Portuguese colonies just concluded with us? Should not this suggest distrust, must it not inspire great caution? The harshness and ruthlessness with which Britain was handling all the incidents of the Boer War with regard to ourselves, the close-fisted pettiness which she displayed towards us and again particularly towards us in all colonial negotiations, were these encouragements to cooperate Britain . . .?¹

Brandenburg gives a more legalistic reaction, which is impartial, to say the least. His account is given below:

. . . as regards the Windsor Treaty of 1899 with Portugal, erroneous title used here it would have been more loyal and prudent not to have concluded it, if England was in earnest about an alliance. But it occurred, as we saw, after the failure of the first overture, at a moment of sharp and almost hostile tension, and it did not run directly counter to her engagements with Germany, though it lent to them a very narrow and unexpected interpretation.²

On technical grounds Germany had good reason to complain because the spirit of the Anglo-Portuguese agreement completely negated the spirit of the Anglo-German agreement. However, the English statesmen

1. Bulow, op. cit., p. 385.

2. Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 176.

would have been much more unscrupulous had they honored the German agreement and sold their staunchest friend down the river.

One loses sympathy for the German cries of perfidy when it is noted that the Reich, without consulting England, as the spirit of the dormant agreement of 1898 required, was attempting to secure portions of Angola as well as coaling stations in the Azores, for an anti-British Navy. Germany began to attempt to gain these concessions from Portugal before the existence of the "Windsor Treaty" was even suspected. All she knew at the time was that the 1898 agreement with England had not been immediately successful because of a lack of English enthusiasm in pushing over a weak old friend. Nevertheless, the treaty of 1898 was still a bona fide agreement by which Germany bound herself to act in conjunction with England in disposing of Portuguese colonies any time after 1898. No time limit had been specified when the treaty was signed. Hence Germany was just as perfidious in spirit as England, if not more so.¹

The treaty that was signed in 1899 was in reality merely an exchange of notes reaffirming the

1. E.D., VIII, 49 ff. Cites the documents substantiating this point.

old treaties.¹ It had this added statement, however, "The government of His Most Faithful Majesty Portugal will not proclaim neutrality in the war between Great Britain and South Africa."² Britain had gotten the concession she wanted so badly from Portugal just two days after the Boer War broke out. By having a benevolent non-belligerent Portuguese colonial empire at her back in Africa, the outcome of the Boer War was much more certain for England.

There can be no doubt that the so-called "Treaty of Windsor" accomplished what Soveral wanted, namely, the emasculation of the Anglo-German agreement of 1898. Portugal had played a shrewd and successful game of diplomacy, but England was twice winner; she secured German abstinence from opposition to the English South African policy by one treaty against an old ally and used that same treaty to bludgeon support from Portugal in the South African situation--support that Portugal would have otherwise hesitated to give for fear of antagonizing the dangerous susceptibilities of Germany and her darling, the

1. See Appendix D for complete text of the 1899 Agreement.

2. Anglo-Portuguese Secret Declaration, October 14, 1899, B.D., I, No. 118.

Transvaal. Truly, "The German diplomats had been decisively outmaneuvered."¹

1. Carroll, op. cit., p. 408.

CHAPTER VI

EPILOGUE - 1912-1914

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. . . both England and Germany have one feeling in common, and that is fear of another. Neither wants to be the first to propose negotiations but both are agreed that they should be brought about though neither desires to make the necessary concessions.

--Col. House to President Wilson¹

Following the chimerical results of the Anglo-German agreement of 1898 and the growing rivalry of the two North-Sea powers, their relations grew more and more strained. Despite several attempts to establish a closer bond between the two powers, an atmosphere of extreme hostility developed. This development was given particular impetus after Victoria's reign ended, when the Edwardian Era saw the establishment of the Entente Cordiale between France and England.

The agreement of 1898 remained a more or less dormant issue between the two signers for over a decade. During this time relations between Portugal and England were cordial. During the first five days

¹ Seymour, Charles, Intimate Papers of Colonel House, I, 258.

in April 1902, Edward VII visited Portugal. In a speech before the assembled Chambers of Commerce he gave heartfelt assurances of the British intentions to preserve the integrity of her loyal ally of old.¹ On November 16, 1904 King Manoel of Portugal visited Windsor and signed a treaty of arbitration with England. This was the real "Treaty of Windsor" a name which many German authorities have erroneously given to the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement of 1899.²

Until about 1911 Portugal and England were working to thwart German efforts to secure a harbour in one of the Portuguese colonies.³ For the nonce, at least, the erstwhile collaborators for an eventual division of Portuguese colonies were working at cross purposes. Reasons for this difference are explained in the growing distrust resulting from the advanced evolution of the alliance system and the naval rivalry. Nevertheless, there were powers at work in England and in the civil government in Germany which would have liked to have closed this ever widening breach.

1. Benson, E. F., The Kaiser and His English Relations, p. 182.

2. B.D., VIII, 49, Editor's Note.

3. B.D., VIII, 49 ff.

Hence it was that the fruitless 1898 agreement was remembered. As early as June 23, 1911, Germany began to inquire as to the possibility of division of the Portuguese colonies through the intermediary of Baron Stumm, who spoke to Sir F. Bertie in Paris.¹ The inquiry was unofficial, since Stumm was not connected with the Government at this time. Metternich, the German Ambassador to London, hinted to Grey somewhat later that Germany would like a division of colonies to take place as soon as possible.² By 1912 Germany had specifically suggested that negotiations on the Portuguese question be revived.³ The urgent need for amending relations was obvious.

Circumstances seemed more opportune than they had for some time. The ancient Portuguese Monarchy had been overthrown on October 5, 1910 by the republicans. These republicans, with a somewhat narrow outlook wished to find some scapegoat on which to blame Portugal's trouble. They attributed exclusively and

1. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, Paris, December 21, 1911, B.D., X, Pt. II, No. 265.

2. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, December 29, 1911, B.D., X, Pt. II, No. 266.

3. Steed, H. W., Through Thirty Years 1892-1922, p. 387.

conveniently the evils of the Monarchy, brought on largely by carelessness and indifference and their own legislative bickering, to the House of Braganza, the Jesuits and the British Alliance.¹ The German Minister at Lisbon in 1913, in summarizing the course of the revived negotiations up to January 20, 1913, described the situation as follows:

In Germany the logical effect for some years after 1899 was necessarily that the Portuguese business was considered to have been a failure and to be over and done with. Not until the efforts of Imperial policy produced a desire for normal relations on both sides of the North Sea was the Portuguese colonial problem again brought to the fore, less perhaps at first because of the intrinsic value of the Portuguese colonies than in order to find an advantageous basis for negotiations between two countries. . . . The fall of the Monarchy in Portugal made it considerably easier for the British Government and public opinion to further draw away from their ally, the Republic, with its apparently chronically anarchical conditions, and after securing for England the most valuable portions, to be content to make not inconsiderable sacrifices in Germany's favour. . . . As then 1898 England and Germany are agreeing on a policy of partition, and Portugal again equally appears to have reached the end of financial resources.²

Rosen's summary covers the resumption of the Portuguese question very comprehensively and rather accurately; however, several points are omitted which

1. Bell, Aubrey F. G., "Chaos in Portugal," from These Eventual Years, p. 176.

2. F. Rosen, Minister at Lisbon to Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, January 20, 1913, Dugdale, E.T.S. op. cit., IV, 221-222.

give the English standpoint a somewhat different aspect.

It is hard to explain the British reasons for permitting the long moribund question to be exhumed; however, it is a well-established fact that Sir Edward Grey was extremely anxious to offer the olive branch to Germany in order to end the long period of dissension.¹ But what the German Government failed to understand was that while Sir Edward Grey felt bound to honor engagements into which Balfour and Chamberlain had unwisely entered, he was equally determined not to be disloyal toward Portugal.²

With Grey trying to satisfy these two incompatible goals, the negotiations were doomed to have a stormy course because the Germans regarded as insincerity what Steed calls "two concurrent though eventually incompatible honesties."³ Grey explains his dilemma in this manner:

1. Robertson, Malcolm, Introduction to Vol. IV, German Diplomatic Documents, January 20, 1931, Dugdale, E.T.S., op. cit., IV, xiv.

2. Steed, op. cit., p. 338.

3. Ibid., p. 338.

As to the future it is clear from what Metternich has already said to me that the Germans would like the division of the Portuguese Colonies to take place as soon as possible. So should I. These Colonies are worse than derelict so long as Portugal has them . . . the Union of South Africa will never rest till it has Delagoa Bay: on every ground material and moral and even Portuguese it would be better that Portugal should sell her Colonies. But how can we of all people put pressure on Portugal to sell: we who are bound by an Alliance to protect and preserve her Colonies for Portugal--an Alliance renewed secretly for value received during the Boer war? And Portugal won't part with her Colonies--any regime in Portugal that did so would be overturned by a revolution--for when nations have gone down hill till they are at their last gasp their pride remains undiminished, if indeed it is not increased. It clings to them as Tacitus says the love of dissimulation clung to Tiberius at his last gasp.¹

Trevelyan, Grey's apologist, states that he attempted to clarify rather than to complicate the tangle.² At any rate England did not do as Tirpitz blatantly accused--deliberately offer Germany territory that was not English in order to placate Germany.³ Lord Haldane, special representative to Berlin in 1912, explained the situation as merely being an undertaking to agree about possible zones which each nation might purchase or exploit should they be placed on the

1. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, December 29, 1911, B.D., X, Pt. II, No. 266.

2. Trevelyan, G. M., Grey of Fallodon, pp.269 ff.

3. Asquith, H. H., Genesis of the War, p. 97.

market.¹ This explanation, of course, was only the literal interpretation. Potentially the treaty was much more dangerous for Portugal. However, Germany was the initiator of the new negotiations, not England.

While the conversations for a renewal of the 1898 agreement began as early as 1911 under the guidance of the German Ambassador Metternich, it was not until 1912 that the negotiations began to take a more definite shape under the guidance of Prince Lichnowsky, the new German Ambassador, who took over in November 1912. He began energetically, almost at the moment of his arrival, to attempt to accomplish something definite on the Portuguese question. Within three days after he presented his credentials to London he was able to induce Grey to draw up a draft agreement revising that of 1898.²

Lichnowsky was very well liked in London and apparently enjoyed the confidence and cooperation of the government there to a remarkable degree. Throughout his account of the drawn out (two years) dealings on the question he showed a generous appreciation of

1. Haldane, Viscount, Richard Burdon, Before the War, p. 145.

2. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 285.

England's viewpoint. Lichnowsky was interested in the concomitant possibilities of the treaty as much as, if not more than, the possibility of immediate material gain it offered Germany. The new German Ambassador completely understood Grey's insistence on publishing both the Anglo-German agreement on Portuguese colonies as it would be revised and the Anglo-Portuguese Declaration of 1899. Grey had arrived at such a decision long before Lichnowsky took over the negotiations--in January 1912 to be exact.¹ At this time Grey was personally opposed to secret treaties which he regarded as embarrassing and inconvenient.² Despite the rather callous negotiations that occurred under Grey's supervision as to what country might get what section of Portugal's domain, it seems that Grey did not want to regard the possibility of a restatement of the 1898 agreement purely as a means of enlarging the domain of the Empire. It would seem rather that Lord Haldane was right. Grey merely wanted to use the renewed negotiations as a means of destroying the rancor in Germany

1. Grey's Minute to Sir Eyre Crowe's Memorandum on Timor and the Anglo-German Secret Conventions of 1898, January 26, 1912, B.D., X, Pt. II, No. 270.

2. Grey to Sir Francis Bertie, B.D., X, Pt. II, No. 364.

and the uncertainty in Portugal resulting from the diplomacy of 1898-1899. Guedes states that Grey promised the Portuguese President Teixeira Gomes categorically that he would not sign the modification without the expressed condition that it would be immediately published as would also be the embarrassing secret treaties of 1898 and 1899.¹ Grey's probable reasons for publishing all of these agreements simultaneously was to show to the world that England was not as perfidious as the mystery about the 1898-99 situation made England appear. He, of course, had to publish the treaties if he wanted to show their hypothetical nature and if he wanted to allay the suspicions of France that England was about to debilitate the strength of the Entente Cordiale.² Here again Grey was striving to overcome another dilemma--establish better relations with Germany while keeping Germany's enemy, France, friendly to England.

Lichnowsky's appreciation of these delicate intricacies is best shown by a note with which he prefaced his discussion of the Anglo-German Colonial Convention in his Auf dem Wege zum Abgrund--Heading

1. Guedes, op. cit., p. 336.

2. B.D., X, Pt. II, 559 ff.

for the Abyss:

From the outset the British Government, for reasons of home and foreign policy, laid it down as a sine qua non for the conclusion of a new treaty that both the new treaty and all the old ones should be published. Sir E. Grey also considered it of great importance that 'this treaty should demonstrate the unanimity between the two Governments and show the world that it was possible to reach agreement in such fields.' Despite this plain statement it was not till shortly before the outbreak of the war that the German Foreign Office could be induced to permit the publication and ratification of the new treaty, long after it was complete! One pretext after another was sought in order to find some way of rendering the treaty abortive. --The whole attitude of the British Minister, at any rate, showed his sincere desire for a rapprochement with us.¹

Even though the conditions requisite to a signing of an agreement seemed unsurmountable, the German Ambassador was able to get a revised agreement down on paper. All that remained was to iron out special changes that each side wanted to insert into the old arrangement. To accomplish this, tedious dickering continued from December 1912 to October 20, 1913, when a final draft was initialled (not officially signed) by Grey and Lichnowsky.² Most of the agreement was very similar to that of 1898. Several significant

1. Prince Lichnowsky, Heading for the Abyss, p. 270.

2. B.D., X, Pt. II, pp. 428-540. Also G.P. XXXVII, 13-86. See Appendix E for text and Appendix G for illustration of territorial disposition.

alterations were made, however. These alterations were explained by the German Minister at Lisbon's comments on the agreement to his Chancellor. He said:

In the nature of the case comparison of the two Conventions follows on two lines, partition of spheres of interest and the possibility of making the Convention effective. The loss of the Portuguese half of the island of Timor--the gaining of which by us was always more than problematical--and of the strip on the left bank of the Zambezi is, in my opinion, more than paid for by our acquiring the central part of Angola and by the British desinteressement regarding St. Thomas and Principe, which two islands form the most valuable part of all Portugal's colonial Empire. What we give up in Africa--the Zambezi territory which is entirely controlled commercially by Englishmen, and a comparatively small portion of eastern Angola, is hardly worth consideration as against the fact that now our sphere of influence in Angola will, with German Southwest Africa, form a compact colonial territory with a coast covering 20 degrees Longitude, whose good harbours and fertile highlands, suitable for settlement, promise highly prosperous future developments.

As regards partition of the country the advantages of the new Convention seem to me even greater, when I consider its possibilities. The Convention of 1898 was founded on the assumption that Portugal was faced with an inevitable financial collapse and would be glad to pledge her colonial customs for a loan granted by Germany and England. This assumption proved false. Since then Portugal has raised no loans of any size. Financially she has--although with difficulty--kept her head above water, and lately she appears to have wiped off her deficit and balanced her Budget. Your Excellency has realised this in good time and has thought well to introduce into the new Convention certain clauses taking account of our aspiration without reference to Portugal's need of a loan, so that we need not fear again

that what we have won by treaty will be lost to us in practice.¹

What Rosen significantly adumbrated in the closing lines of his dispatch was the most radical departure in the new agreement from that of 1898. The eighth clause in the Draft convention of 1913 made provision for joint interference by the German Reich and British Empire in the Portuguese Empire in event of any disturbance or irregularity in the Portuguese colonies which would endanger the lives, property, or vital interests of German and British citizens. If the treaty were activated with such a clause, the realization of its material aims would be accomplished much more easily by the designing powers.

Grey probably realized the terrific import of this clause. Hence his insistence on the publication of the treaties so as to leave no element of doubt anywhere. Everyone concerned, including Portugal, would realize the enormous potentialities of the treaty and would consequently do everything to avoid creating an excuse for its consummation. This

1. F. Rosen, at Lisbon, to the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, November 9th, 1913, Dugdale, E.T.S., op. cit., IV, 228-229.

would act as a brake on the Portuguese inefficiency and possibly lead to reformation of the very unstable political situation in Portugal that the Germans were banking on for the realization of their aspirations in the draft agreement. This was specifically expressed by Rosen in his report of January 9, 1913.

Rosen, Solf (German Colonial Secretary), and Lichnowsky were not opposed to immediate publication. However, the German government hesitated in spite of the fact that Grey stated that he would not officially sign the new agreement unless it were made public.

Lichnowsky said that his government refused to accede to Grey's requirement because there were people in the government who were personally jealous of his successful beginnings on a new Anglo-German understanding.¹ Although this might have some bearing on the case it is likely that the German government had a more fundamental reason than this. Probably Germany did not want to make Portugal wary and then, too, if the treaties were openly proclaimed, French suspicions of England would be allayed. France would see that England had not concluded a revolutionary agreement with Germany but merely a clarification

1. Lichnowsky, op. cit., p. 61.

of an agreement that originated before the establishment of the Entente Cordiale. German apologists such as Count Montgelas maintain that the Germans were more sincere about the ultimate possibilities of a broad understanding that this revival possessed than was England.¹ However, the main current of German policy at this time disproves Montgelas' contention. Germany might have reopened the treaty in the weak hope of using it as a means of purchasing British neutrality.² Grey's insistence on publication of the documents would destroy this value of the negotiations because the exhibition of the contents of the treaties would show that England had no desire to arrive at an understanding with Germany at the expense of the English allies. France would know that she was not being deserted. Publication would show that the foundation of the Anglo-German arrangement was laid years before the Entente Cordiale was consummated. Such an interpretation of the actions of Berlin in these negotiations gains credence when it is observed that Bethmann-Hollweg suddenly agreed to publication

1. Montgelas, Max, British Foreign Policy under Grey, p. 52.

2. Dugdale, E.T.S., op. cit., IV, 217
(Editor's Note).

of the documents in question on July 2, 1914.¹

Germany was willing to accede to the British conditions of publication only at the last moment before the war broke out. They did this in the vain hope that such a concession to British desires might purchase British neutrality in the forthcoming conflict. The Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife had been assassinated June 28.

The epilogue to 1898 merely substantiates what the tangle of 1898-99 began to vaguely indicate. The duel for Empire might allow for understanding on small points, but fundamental differences were too large to make possible a unity of action. Nicholson correctly sums up the situation by saying "Anglo-German friendship remained, however, superficial. Beneath the sugar-coating of these amenities the old fear and rivalry had lost none of its bitterness."²

1. Lichnowsky to the Chancellor, July 14, 1914, Dugdale, E.T.S., op. cit., IV, 233.

2. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 286.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS--WHO PAID THE PIPER

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS--WHO PAID THE PIPER

If judged in the cold light of objectivity and theory, Lord Carnock (Arthur Nicholson) was correct when he called the convention regarding the Portuguese colonies the most cynical business that he had ever run across in his whole experience of diplomacy. A friend, whose loyalty had been proven for over five hundred years, was the unwilling subject of negotiations between the world powers whose rivalry was very outspoken. Portugal was given no voice in the negotiations which took advantage of her internal weakness to use her as a means of placating, temporarily, two ravenous powers bent upon ultimately destroying one or the other. The apparently useless friend was to be the scapegoat. This interpretation is the most evident one and superficially at least--if only the theoretical aspects are considered--is quite plausible and true. However, the fact still remains that the Portuguese Empire is intact to this day with the possible exception of Timor which is jeopardized by a power not directly involved in the 1898-1914 negotiations. During World War I Portugal and England remained allies as of old and fought side

by side against Germany, with whom the letter of the Anglo-German colonial treaties had provided for a possible partition of the Portuguese colonies. The old Portuguese alliance was stronger than the possibilities contained in the Anglo-German colonial declarations.

Evidently, then, in spite of the theoretical provisions of the Anglo-German colonial agreements, Portugal had not been deserted by her time-proven ally. There are several possible explanations that made the ominous situation turn out so favorably for Portugal. A first and obvious explanation might be that England never intended to desert her old friend and remained true to her alliance commitments of old. A second explanation might be that Portugal's friendship still had a material value to England despite the chaotic condition of Portugal's government. A third explanation might be found in coincidental events, which by chance made possible the continuance of the old relationship.

Salisbury's unvarying reluctance to conclude the agreement with Germany and his shifting the responsibility of it to his nephew might be used as proof of the first explanation. Salisbury never relished the

idea of the treaty. His promises to keep Soveral informed and his probable informing Soveral of the contents of the treaty of 1898 would tend to substantiate a belief that the English Cabinet, or at least a most influential part of it, never really intended to sell Portugal "down the river."¹

Possibly Salisbury let the Chamberlain element of his Cabinet play with the idea of an alliance with Germany based on a colonial agreement. By doing this he could fuse the odd elements in his government.

There were several factions in the Cabinet. Indirect evidence to support this is abundant. Salisbury was at odds with his own nephew. Sir Francis Bertie's retrospective interpretation of Salisbury's declining influence in his own Cabinet substantiates this.²

Guedes declares that there were differences on the colonial questions between Salisbury and Chamberlain.³

This difference between the Colonial Secretary and the Prime Minister approached a rivalry.⁴ Salisbury

1. Supra, Ch. IV, pp. 81 ff. Also Supra, Ch. V, pp. 106-107.

2. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, January 12, 1912, B.D., X, Pt. II, No. 268. Also Supra, Ch. IV, p.83.

3. Guedes, op. cit., p. 330.

4. Hoyningen, Heinrich Freiherrn von, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des deutsch-englischen Bündnisproblems, 1898-1901, p. 109.

might have used this situation in his Cabinet to bait Germany into believing that there was a possibility of forcing England to reach a colonial agreement by playing one element of the Cabinet against the other. All the time he may never have intended to use the treaty unless compelled to, because of respect of the force of public opinion, which never would have fully condoned the desertion of Portugal.¹ The fact that the Portuguese Government, never extremely anxious about the negotiations, remained on the best of terms with England throughout is possibly an indication of some kind of assurance that England would never desert her. This fact is either an indication of assurance or an indication that the secret elements of the treaty were really secret. However, the negating effect of the subsequent English and Portuguese Treaty of 1899 seems to disprove the latter concept. That is, the Portuguese must have known of the secret agreement between England and Germany, otherwise they would not have entered into the agreement of 1899 with England. Soveral's profession of complete knowledge of the negotiations of 1898 also refutes this view.

1. Lichnowsky, op. cit., p. 312.

The second explanation of the ineffectiveness of the German-English Colonial Agreement has even more substantiation. Portugal's friendship still had a definite value in 1898. At this time Germany thought she had England in an embarrassing position and sought to gain what she could in return for German neutrality in the Boer situation. Consequently, England was forced, more or less, to sign the agreement. However, instead of getting what she had expected because of this treaty, Germany was actually thwarted. Now Germany could not act unless she acted in conjunction with her co-signer, England. If England refused to act, Germany had to wait. The German government could not complain to the world about the unfairness of such purposeful dalliance because it would immediately reveal its own secret involvement in a despicable agreement which the world could decry and which other powers probably would demand to be settled by an international conference of some sort. Such a conference would, of course, destroy any advantages England and Germany would jointly enjoy as a result of the secret agreement. However, it would not destroy rights of pre-emption to certain portions of the Portuguese Colonial Empire

which England had held by previous bona fide agreements between the British Empire and Portugal.

Germany unwittingly forced herself by poor judgment in treaty making--while forcing England--to depend on the doubtful possibility of England's agreeing to overthrow Portugal. This was a possibility which England never could afford to make actual as long as there was a Boer danger. Portuguese benevolence in the forthcoming war was too valuable. The Declaration of 1899 between Portugal and England amply proves this point. The suspected assurances Salisbury gave Soveral would also tend to prove this as would Portugal's continued friendship and relative calm amid the overtly despicable negotiations of England with Germany.

The third explanation of the failure of realization of the declared results of the colonial negotiations depends on circumstance. If the Boer danger had not been present in 1898 and if the World War had not come at the very moment a second agreement was about to be signed in 1914, and if more adroit diplomats had framed the German course of action, Portugal might have been sacrificed as the colonial agreements of 1898-1914 seem to indicate.

Perhaps a simpler interpretation than any of the three given would be a statement saying that events show that the Anglo-German colonial agreements never realized their avowed purpose because they were at cross purposes with the course of the greater current of the history of the time--duel for empire.

Specific conclusions concerning the negotiations can be made however. They are as follows:

1. Portugal unconsciously set up the situation for the Anglo-German colonial agreements by asking for a loan based on colonial revenues at a time when her financial credit was of doubtful value.

2. Germany in each instance instigated the negotiations between the Reich and England for disposal of Portugal's colonies. England entered the agreements only after German pressure pointed the way.

3. Portugal gave no approval to the Anglo-German agreements which ignored her sovereign right to have a voice in the disposal of her own property.

4. Portugal did not lose her Empire even though England and Germany had an agreement providing for an eventual division.

5. Germany was definitely out-manuevered.

6. Portugal received more material benefit

from her secret treaty than did Germany. The Portuguese colonies were more valuable to England during the Boer War as Portuguese colonies than as German possessions.

7. The Boers lost their best hope for aid because of the Anglo-German and Anglo-Portuguese agreements.

8. Chamberlain was partially to blame that his desired alliance with Germany was never realized because it was at cross purposes with his colonial ambitions.

9. There was not complete unanimity in the British government on the desirability of concluding the Anglo-German-Portuguese deal.

10. Secret treaties become increasingly more embarrassing in proportion to the time they have been kept secret.

11. England and Germany arrived at an agreement on the Portuguese question because of the desires of some members of the Governments of the two Empires. However, the general policy and destiny of the nation, and their government never sincerely or enthusiastically pursued such a desire. Specific agreements on isolated points of difference between rival powers

are valueless unless a broad sincere general understanding has been reached and supported by the entire government of both contending powers.

12. Both England and Germany were using the colonial agreement for ulterior reasons. England's ulterior reasons for signing the agreements with Germany have been fully explained. Germany had other reasons besides colonial gain which caused her to sign. Bulow (in retrospective discussion) says that the treaty was merely a trial balloon to determine if England was still perfidious Albion: "In this

treaty of 1898 I was concerned not only for the actual subject of negotiations, the Portuguese possessions in Africa, but also for the opportunity of establishing how far we can rely on British bona fides."¹ The military elements of the German government wanted the treaties to act as a camouflage of friendliness for their increased rivalry for naval supremacy.² It is believed that the revival of the negotiations prior to the world war was made with the hope of getting England to remain neutral if a world

1. Bulow, op. cit., I, 320.

2. Dugdale, E.T.S., op. cit., IV, 217.

war were to occur.¹ According to Lichnowsky, England was anxious to turn German energies into channels less dangerous to England. The English had some hope of sublimating the energy expended in Germany on an increased navy into a less harmful (to England) policy of colonial expansion.² Colonel House was probably right then when he said that each power was afraid of the other but unwilling to make the concessions that would make for a straightforward understanding.

13. The agreement of 1913-1914 was an outgrowth of 1898.

14. The agreement of 1913-1914 was more dangerous to the integrity of Portugal.

15. Germany and England had different concepts of the treaties. England believed that the treaties would not become effective until the sovereignty of Portugal was impaired. Germany believed this too, but she wanted to contribute to the impairment of the sovereignty so that the treaties could become active.

16. The background of the Anglo-German-Portuguese colonial problem indicated that a departure from

1. Dugdale, E.T.S., op. cit., IV, xv.

2. Lichnowsky, op. cit., p. 226.

splendid isolation was imminent. However, Salisbury, one of the last champions of this theory of policy, whose archaic nature even he reluctantly realized, made perhaps the last brilliant play of this policy. While England stood alone he shrewdly played other powers against one another to extricate England from a difficult situation. He played the needs, ambitions, and fears of Germany, Transvaal, Portugal and France against one another. "Salisbury without exaggeration was one of the greatest British foreign ministers of the century. After Bismarck's fall, his primacy in world politics was unchallenged."¹

Muddling through had won another brilliant victory. Portugal did not pay the piper as the theory of the treaty would have one believe. The second-rate statesmanship of Wilhelminian Germany caused the Reich to pay the piper.

1. Ward and Gooch, op. cit., III, 262.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

Convention signed on the 30th instant between Great Britain and Germany, respecting the position of the two Powers in connection with a possible loan to Portugal on the security of the customs revenues of the Portuguese Provinces of Mozambique and Angola, and the Portuguese portion of the Island of Timor.¹

Enclosure in No. 90

Convention

In view of the possibility that Portugal may require financial assistance from some foreign Power or Powers, and in order to obviate the international complications which such a condition of things may produce, and to preserve her integrity and independence, the Undersigned, duly authorised by their respective Sovereigns, have agreed as follows:

I. Whenever either the British or the German Government is of opinion that it is expedient to accede to a request for an advance of money to Portugal on the security of the Customs revenues or other revenues of Mozambique, Angola, and the Portuguese part of the Island of Timor, it shall communicate the fact to the other Government, and the other Government shall have the right to advance a portion of the total sum required.

In the event of the other Government signifying its intention to exercise this right, the two Governments shall consult as to the terms of the two loans, and these loans shall be issued on the security of the Customs revenues of Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Timor as near as possible simultaneously. The loans shall bear as near as possible the same proportion to each other as the amounts of the Customs revenues respectively assigned as their security.

The loans shall be issued on terms as favourable to Portugal as the condition of the money market and

1. Mr. Balfour to Sir F. Lascelles, August 31, 1898, B.D., I, pp. 71-72, Enclosure No. 90.

the security of the loans permit, and shall in other respects be subject as near as possible to similar conditions.

II. Of the Customs revenues, referred to in Article I, those of the Province of Mozambique south of the Zambezi, and of the part of that province lying on the left bank of the Zambezi above its confluence with the Shire, and those of the portions of the Province of Angola, as hereinafter described, shall be assigned to the British loan. The Customs revenues of the remaining parts of the Provinces of Mozambique and Angola and the Customs revenues of Portuguese Timor shall be assigned to the German loan.

The portion of the Province of Angola, of which the Customs revenues shall be assigned to the British loan, is comprised within the following limits: the northern frontier shall run from the coast along the 8th parallel of south latitude to the 16th degree of longitude east of Greenwich, thence it shall descend that degree to the 9th parallel of latitude, and shall follow that parallel eastwards as far as the frontier of the Congo Free State. The southern frontier shall start from a point on the coast 5 English miles north of Egito, and shall run thence due east to the eastern frontier of the Province of Angola. The western frontier shall be the sea; the eastern frontier shall be the eastern limit of the Province of Angola.

III. Any Delegates sent by Great Britain or Germany to take note of the collection of the revenues which are the security for their respective loans shall have only rights of inspection, but no rights of administration, interference, or control, so long as there is no default in the payment of interest or sinking fund.

IV. In case of default in the payment of the interest or sinking fund of either loan, the administration of the various custom-houses in the two provinces and in Portuguese Timor shall be handed over by Portugal; those assigned for the German loan to Germany, those assigned for the British loan to Great Britain.

V. It is well understood that all rights, whether British or German, acquired in the provinces affected before the date of this Convention, shall be fully

safeguarded, provided they are of a purely private character, and convey neither political rights nor territorial or administrative jurisdiction.

It is also understood that no influence will be used in the future, either by the British or the German Governments, to obtain fresh Concessions, except in these portions of the provinces of which the customs revenues are assigned to their respective loans.

VI. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged as soon as possible. The Convention shall come into force immediately after the exchange of ratifications.

In witness whereof the Undersigned, duly authorised, have signed the same, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate, at London, the 30th day of August, 1898.

(L.S.) ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR
(L.S.) P. HATZFELDT

APPENDIX B

Secret Convention between Great Britain and Germany¹

Enclosure in No. 91

Secret Convention

Whereas, notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Convention of this day's date, it may unfortunately not be found possible to maintain the integrity of the African possessions of Portugal south of the Equator, as well as of those in Timor, the Undersigned, duly authorised by their respective Sovereigns, have further agreed as follows:

I. Great Britain and Germany agree jointly to oppose the intervention of any third Power in the Provinces of Mozambique, Angola, and in Portuguese Timor, either by way of loan to Portugal on the security of the revenues of these provinces, or by way of acquisition of territory, by grant, cession, purchase, lease, or otherwise.

II. It is understood that, from the conclusion of the Conventions of this day's date, Great Britain will abstain from advancing any claim of whatsoever kind to the possession, occupation, control, or exercise of political influence in or over those portions of the Portuguese provinces in which the Customs revenues have been assigned to Germany, and that Germany will in like manner abstain from advancing any claim of whatsoever kind to the possession, occupation, control, or exercise of political influence, in or over those portions of those Portuguese provinces in which Customs revenues have been assigned to Great Britain.

III. In case Portugal renounces her sovereign rights over Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Timor, or loses these territories in any other manner, it is understood that the subjects of, and natives of the Protectorates of, one Contracting Party, together with their goods and ships, and also the produce and the manufactures of its dominions, possessions, Colonies

¹ Mr. Balfour to Sir F. Lascelles, August 31, 1898, B.D., I, 73, Enclosure No. 91.

and Protectorates, shall, in such portions of the territories comprised in the present Convention as may fall to the other Contracting Party, participate in all the prerogatives, exemptions and privileges with regard to trade, commerce, taxation and navigation which are there enjoyed by the subjects of, and natives of the Protectorates of, the other Contracting Party.

IV. With regard to the Vth Article of the Convention of to-day's date, which refers to private rights of British or German subjects in the Provinces of Mozambique, Angola, and the Portuguese Timor, it is well understood between the two Governments that this Article applies, among others, to the so-called Katembe Concession, and, further, that the Government of Great Britain will adopt a friendly attitude in respect to the confirmation of this Concession by the Portuguese Government in case such a confirmation should be applied for.

V. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged as soon as possible. The Convention shall come into force immediately after the exchange of ratifications.

In witness whereof the Undersigned, duly authorised, have signed the same, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate, at London, the 30th day of August, 1898.

(L.S.) ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR
(L.S.) P. HATZFELDT

APPENDIX C

Secret Note, Signed by Count Hatzfeldt
and A.J. Balfour¹

Enclosure in No. 92

Secret Note

In order to make clear the intention of the two Conventions of this day's date, it is further understood between the two Governments as follows:

In the event of one of the two Governments obtaining from the Portuguese Government before the contingency contemplated in Article III of the Secret Convention a cession of territory, or the concession of special privileges not of an occasional character, in those portions of the Portuguese Provinces of Mozambique, Angola, or Timor, the customs revenues of which have been assigned to it, it is well understood between the two Governments that such cessions of territory, or concessions of privileges, shall not become operative until analogous grants as near as possible of equal value have been accorded to the other Government in those portions of the provinces, the customs revenues of which have been assigned to it by the present arrangement.

In case either Government applies for special privileges of an occasional character, it shall immediately inform the other Government, and if these privileges are granted, and if the other Government should desire it, shall use its influence to obtain for the other Government similar special privileges of an occasional character and of equal value.

And whereas, owing to the imperfect surveys which alone are at present available, the IInd Article of the Convention of this day's date may not

1. This note explains the position of Great Britain and Germany in certain eventualities in regard to the Portuguese possessions in Africa, south of the Equator, and the Portuguese portion of the Island of Timor. Mr. Balfour to Sir F. Lascelles, August 31, 1898, B.D., I, 74-5, Enclosure No. 92.

exactly carry out the intentions of the Contracting Parties, it is understood between them that in any case the port and town of Ambriz shall be included in the security assigned to Germany.

In case, therefore, that the port and town of Ambriz should be found to lie to the south of the 8th parallel of south latitude, the line of demarcation shall start from a point on the coast 5 English miles south of the port of Ambriz, and be continued thence due east until it reaches the 16th degree of longitude east of Greenwich.

From the intersection of the line, which may be determined as the line of demarcation, with the 16th degree of longitude aforesaid, the line shall, if necessary, be extended along that degree of longitude so far south of the 9th parallel of south latitude as will secure to Germany a strip of territory not less than a geographical degree in width between the southern extremity of the Congo Free State in the region of Lunda and the northern frontier of the portion of Angola of which the customs revenues are assigned to Great Britain.

Done in Duplicate, at London, the 30th day of August, 1898.

(L.S.) ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR
(L.S.) P. HATZFELDT

APPENDIX D

Anglo-Portuguese Secret Declaration October 14, 1899¹

Secret

The Government of Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and the Government of His Most Faithful Majesty the King of Portugal and the Algarves, considering as of full force and effect the ancient treaties of alliance, amity and guarantee which subsist between the two Crowns, specifically confirm on this occasion Article I of the Treaty of the 29th January, 1642, which runs as follows:

"It is concluded and accorded that there is, and shall be for ever, a good true and firm peace and amity between the most renowned Kings, Charles King of Great Britain and John the Fourth King of Portugal, their heirs and successors, and their Kingdoms, Countries, Dominions, Lands, People, Liegemen, Vassals and Subjects whomsoever, present and to come, of whatsoever condition, dignity or degree they may be, as well by land as by sea and fresh waters, so as the said Vassals and Subjects are each of them to favour the other and to use one another with friendly offices and true affection, and that neither of the said most renowned Kings, their heirs and successors, by himself or by any other, shall do or attempt anything against each other, or their Kingdoms, by land or by sea, nor shall consent nor adhere unto any war, counsel, or Treaty, in prejudice of the other."

They equally confirm the final Article of the Treaty of the 23rd June, 1661, of which the first part runs as follows:

"Over and above all and singular agreed and concluded in the Treaty of Marriage between the Most Serene and Most Powerful Charles, the

Second of that name, King of Great Britain and the Most Virtuous and Serene Lady Catherine, Infanta of Portugal, it is by the Secret Article concluded and accorded, that His Majesty of Great Britain, in regard of the great advantages and increase of dominion he hath purchased by the above-mentioned Treaty of Marriage shall promise and oblige himself, as by this present Article he doth, to defend and protect all conquests or colonies belonging to the Crown of Portugal against all his enemies, as well future as present."

The Government of His Most Faithful Majesty undertakes not to permit, after the declaration of war between Great Britain and the South African Republic, or during continuance of the war, the importation and passage of arms, and of munitions of war destined for the latter.

The Government of His Most Faithful Majesty will not proclaim neutrality in the war between Great Britain and the South African Republic.

Done in duplicate, at London, this 14th day of October, 1899.

(L.S.) SALISBURY
(L.S.) LUIZ DE SOVERAL

APPENDIX E

Enclosure in No. 341

Draft Convention¹
on Portuguese Colonies
Initialled by Grey and Hatzfeldt
October 20, 1913

(Confidential)

In view of the possibility that Portugal may require financial assistance from some foreign Power or Powers, and in order to obviate the international complications which such a condition of things may produce, and to preserve her integrity and independence, and in view of the special interests of Great Britain and Germany in their respective possessions and protectorates in East and West Africa contiguous to certain Portuguese dominions, the undersigned, duly authorised by their respective Sovereigns, have agreed as follows:

1. (1) Whenever either the British or the German Government is of opinion that it is expedient to accede to a request for an advance of money to Portugal on the security of the customs revenues or other revenues of Mozambique or Angola, it shall communicate the fact to the other Government, and the other Government shall have the right to advance a part of the total sum required.

(2) In the event of the other Government signifying its intention to exercise this right, the two Governments shall consult as to the terms of these two loans,² and these loans shall be issued on the security of the customs revenues of Mozambique and Angola as near³ as possible the same proportion to each other as the amounts of the customs revenues respectively assigned as their security.

1. Sir Edward Grey to Prince Lichnowsky, July 31, 1913, B.D., X, Pt. II, No. 341.

2. The final text initialled on October 20, 1913, has here "the two loans."

3. The final text initialled on October 20, 1913, has here "nearly."

(3) The loans shall be issued on terms as favourable to Portugal as the condition of the money market and the security of the loans permit, and shall in other respects be subject as near¹ as possible to similar conditions.

2. In the contingency contemplated in the preceding article the customs revenues of that portion of the province of Mozambique lying south of a line starting from the mouth of the River Lukugu, running thence along that river to its confluence with the River Lugera, thence along that river to its source, thence along the meridian of that source to the 16th parallel of south latitude, and thence along that parallel to the boundary of the British protectorate of Nyassaland, as also the customs revenues of the portions of the province of Angola lying to the east of the 20th meridian of east longitude and south of the Kassai River, shall be assigned to the British loan; whilst the customs revenues of the remaining parts of the provinces of Mozambique and Angola (which latter includes the administrative district of the Congo, which has its seat of government at Cabinda) shall be assigned to the German loan.

3. In the event of Great Britain or Germany sending delegates to take note of the collection of the revenues, which are the security for their respective loans, the Portuguese Government shall be asked to give such delegates rights of inspection only, but no rights of administration, interference, or control, so long as there is no default in the payment of interest or sinking fund.

4. In case of default in the payment of the interest or sinking fund of either loan, it shall be agreed with the Portuguese Government that they will hand over the administration of the various custom-houses in the two provinces: those assigned for the German loan to Germany; those assigned for the British loan to Great Britain.

5. (1) In the contingency contemplated in the preceding article all rights, whether British or German, acquired in the provinces affected, before the date of

1. Ibid.

this convention, shall be fully safeguarded, provided they are of a purely private character and do not convey either political rights, territorial jurisdiction, or administrative powers.

(2) It is well understood that no influence will be used in the future either by the British or the German Government to obtain fresh concessions, except in those portions of the provinces of which the customs revenues would be assigned to their respective loans under the present convention.

6. From the date of the conclusion of the present convention Great Britain will abstain from advancing any claim of whatsoever kind to the possession, occupation, or control of those portions of the Portuguese provinces in which the customs revenues would under the present convention be assigned to Germany, or of the islands of San Thome and Principe, or to the exercise of political influence in those territories or islands; and Germany will in like manner abstain from advancing any claim of whatsoever kind to the possession, occupation, or control of those portions of the Portuguese provinces in which the customs revenues would under the present convention be assigned to Great Britain, or of the Portuguese part of the island of Timor, or to the exercise of political influence in those territories or in that island.

7. (1) In the event of either Government obtaining from the Portuguese Government a cession of territory, or the concession of special privileges not of an occasional¹ character, in those portions of the provinces of Mozambique or Angola of which the customs revenues would be assigned to it, such cessions of territory or concessions of privileges shall not become operative until analogous grants as near² as possible of equal value have been accorded to the other Government in those portions of the provinces of which the customs revenues would be assigned to it by the present convention.

(2) In case either Government applies for special privileges of an occasional¹ character in those portions

1. The final text initialled on October 20, 1913, adds here "that is, minor or temporary."

2. The final text initialled on October 20, 1913, has here "nearly."

of the Portuguese provinces of which the customs revenues would be assigned to it under the present convention, it shall immediately inform the other Government and, if these privileges are granted, and if the other Government should so desire, shall use its influence to obtain for the other Government similar special privileges of an occasional character and of equal value.

8. If in any part of the provinces of Mozambique or Angola the lives or property of British or German subjects, or the vital interests of the adjoining British or German dominions or protectorates, are endangered by local disturbances or by the action of the local authorities, and the Portuguese Government are not in a position to afford the necessary protection, or otherwise fail to do so, the British and German Governments, after consulting together, and after a joint communication to the Portuguese Government, shall determine the nature, duration, and scope of such measures as it may be deemed necessary to take for the protection of the interests endangered.

9. If any of the Portuguese colonies in question, having become independent and having been recognised as such by the two high contracting parties, or if any part of such independent colony, should declare its annexation to the dominions of one of the two contracting Powers, the other contracting Power shall, for its part, be entitled, after previously informing the first Power, to annex those portions of such colony, thus become independent, of which the customs revenues would be assigned to it under the present convention.

10. Great Britain and Germany, having regard to the interests of their respective possessions in East and West Africa contiguous to the Portuguese provinces of Angola and Mozambique, which would be materially affected by the intervention of any third Power in those provinces, agree jointly to oppose such intervention whether by way of loan to Portugal on the security of the revenues of the said provinces, or by way of acquisition of territory by grant, cession, purchase, lease or otherwise.

11. In so far as Great Britain or Germany may hereafter influence or control the administration of Mozambique or Angola or any portion of those provinces, it is understood that the subjects, and natives of the

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