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UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE

**DIPLOMACY
AT THE OUTBREAK
OF THE WORLD WAR.**

**A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty
Of the Graduate School of the University of Louisville
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
Of Master of Arts**

Department of History

By

Earl Robertson Martin

Year

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CONTENTS

	Page
Chapter I	
A Political Murder.....	1
Chapter II	
Jugo-Slav Nationalism.....	7
Chapter III	
The Dual Monarchy Endangered.....	15
Chapter IV	
Serbia Must Be Destroyed.....	24
Chapter V	
The Austrian Ultimatum To Serbia.....	30
Chapter VI	
The Ultimatum Works.....	42
Chapter VII	
The Russian Mobilization.....	53
Chapter VIII	
France Stands By Her Ally, Russia.....	65
Chapter IX	
Diplomacy Fails.....	73
Chapter X	
The Appeal To Arms.....	83
Chapter XI	
England and Belgium Enter The World War.....	92
Chapter XII	
Japan Supports England.....	119
Chapter XIII	
Self Interest Leads Italy To Join Entente.....	127
Chapter XIV	
After The Study Is Made.....	141

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chapter I
A Political Murder

DIPLOMACY
AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD WAR

Chapter I
A Political Murder

The early summer of 1914 did not disclose any ominous signs of war on the political horizons of the Great Powers. Aside from internal conditions in the newly created kingdom of Albania and a discussion between Turkey and Greece over the final disposition of some islands in the Aegean, there were no storm clouds that suggested the tornado-like approach of war.

However, in the midst of comparative peace, two shots were fired that "were heard around the world". One killed Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir apparent to the throne of Austria-Hungary; the other fatally injured his wife, Sophie Chotek. "Sophie, Sophie, do not die", said the Archduke. "Live for our children". Almost instantly, however, both died. The assassin, Princip, was taken away to jail.¹

The city of Serajevo, Bosnia, was the location of the murder. Since 1908 Austria-Hungary had been in complete control of the province of Bosnia. It was Sunday morning, June 28, 1914. Archduke Francis Ferdinand had come in an official capacity on an inspection tour to

1. Fay, Sidney Bradshaw, The Origins of the World War, II, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1930, p.126, quoting Conrad, IV, pp.19-22.
Schmitt, Bernadotte E., The Coming of the War, I, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1930, p.257, quoting Pharos, pp.155-159.
(Hereafter these works will be cited as Fay I or Schmitt I.)

attend certain military manoeuvres. A nineteen year old Bosnian citizen of Yugoslav extraction killed him.

The student of history in 1914 could correctly diagnose the world's ills and say war was imminent, but he knew not when nor where it would begin. But the two shots were the torches that set most of Europe ablaze; for within four weeks a declaration of war had been sent, followed up shortly by other declarations, until the largest part of the world had joined the fray.

Princip had never met Francis Ferdinand, but the latter was a scion of the Hapsburgs. The fact that Francis Ferdinand was a Hapsburg was sufficient; therefore, Princip slew him.

Washington and Cornwallis were not personal enemies, but they fought each other to a finish in the Revolutionary War. The one desired freedom from England; the other wanted closer relations with the Empire. In a way the colonists and the Serbians had similar motives. Revolutionary sentiment in Bosnia favored separation of their province from Austria; the Archduke represented a government that wanted to keep Bosnia at all hazards.

Inasmuch as Francis Ferdinand represented unity of the Empire, Princip decided to kill him, believing that by so doing the independence of his country would be fostered. The assassin, too, had been influenced by those whom he considered martyrs to the cause of Yugoslav freedom. One of these was Zherajitch, a Herzegovinian. In 1910 the latter shot five times at the Governor and then speedily committed suicide. The Governor went untouched,

but he stirred the Yugoslavs to the depths when he kicked the corpse of the would be assassin as it lay in the mud sprinkled with blood. This event occurred in the same town where the two shots of ill fated memory were later fired. The youth were especially inflamed by the governor's action. Zherajitch then became a hero and his tomb a shrine. Many made pilgrimages to his tomb, keeping the grave decorated with flowers. Princip often visited this tomb for reflection and inspiration. It is said that even the day before he fired the fatal shots that he decorated the grave and swore by it that his hand should shoot true the next day.² It was not strange, perhaps, that a mixture of "anarchism, socialism, and nationalism" should influence minds of some young men. Such a martyr as Zherajitch would have a tremendous influence, psychologically.³

No doubt the authorities in Bosnia were nervous. Between 1909 and 1914, 166 persons were tried for high crimes against the state. Of these, the majority were found guilty. Many Bosnians thought, it seemed, that Francis Ferdinand was strongly opposed to Yugoslav nationalism.⁴ Moreover, some of the youths wished to be heroes. Consequently, they were on the lookout for possibilities of killing any of the higher government officials of Vienna.

The assassins were also desirous of revenge.

2. Fay, *op.cit.*, II, pp.96-97, quoting Jevtitch, p.20.

3. *Ibid.*, p.97, quoting Jevtitch, p.6.

4. Schmitt, *op.cit.*, I, pp.150-151, quoting Csernin, *Im Weltkrieg*, pp.43-66.

The belief of many Bosnian citizens was that by killing the Heir to the Throne they would get vengeance and also precipitate a revolution. Chabrinovitch, one of the conspirators who worked with Princip, commenting on the tragedy said, "I regarded revenge as a holy duty of a moral civilized man and I, therefore, planned to take vengeance....". Princip reinforced what his companion had said; "Every day", protested the murderer, "a high treason trial. Every day it went worse with our people. I killed him and I am not sorry". He declared that Francis Ferdinand was interested in union and to prevent it many lives must be sacrificed.⁵

For Princip was afraid that the Heir to the Throne would attempt to establish a tripartite union among the Magyars of Hungary and the Jugoslavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. When asked if he favored this tripartite union, he declared, "God forbid". He declared further, "I am a nationalist". "As far as Serbia is concerned, it is her duty to free us as Italy freed her Italians".⁶

Thus the assassins hoped to remove the individual whom they believed to be the key man to their idea of progress. With him out of the way, they decided they could strike more often, insult professors who urged loyalty to the Empire, stir up disturbances at the playing of the National Anthem, and hurl invectives at those who had shop signs written in German.

As the Heir Presumptive and his wife went through

5. Fay, op.cit., II, p.132, quoting Phares, p.30

6. Ibid, p.133, quoting Phares, p.23.

the streets of Serajevo on that Sunday morning in June, 1914, seven conspirators awaited him with bombs or pistols.⁷ It does not seem strange that the visitors did not escape. As the car bearing the party passed by the point where Chabrinovich was stationed, he tossed a bomb at the hated pair. The chauffeur saw the instrument of death coming and put on speed. The bomb either hit on the rear of the car and bounced off or was thrown back of the car by its would be victim. At any rate the bomb exploded, wounded a Lieutenant-Colonel in the second car, and injured several onlookers. When the Archduke was sure the wounded were all cared for, he exclaimed, "Come on. The fellow is insane.⁸ Gentlemen, let us proceed with our program".

The procession moved on to the City Hall. Here the mayor received them with a speech of welcome. The speaker emphasized the undying loyalty with which the Bosnians greeted him. Whereupon, the Heir declared, "Enough of that".⁹ "What! I make you a visit and you receive me with bombs". Having concluded all the ceremonies at the City Hall, the procession moved on. It was reported to Francis Ferdinand that the bomb thrower had been apprehended. At this, the Heir said, "Hang him as soon as you can or Vienna will send him a decoration".¹⁰ A misunderstanding about the route to be taken caused the Archduke's car to slow up at the fatal corner. It was 11:30 A.M. when

7. Schmitt, p.255, quoting Conrad, IV, pp.19-22.

8. Fay, op.cit., II, p.124, quoting Recoily, p.183.

9. Ibid, p.125, quoting Recoily, p.184.

10. Schmitt, op.cit., I, p.256.

the plot was executed. Princip fired two shots as the chauffeur, momentarily confused about his directions,¹¹ brought his car to a stop.

A message that same day from Serajevo to a nationalist in Croatia expressed the sentiment undoubtedly¹² of many Southslavs: "Both horses well disposed of".

Long after these events had occurred, the passers-by at the corner of King Peter Street and the Quay noticed workmen riveting a bronze tablet to the wall of a store. "At this place", they read, "Gavril Princip pro-¹³claimed liberty June 28, 1914".

"Proclaimed liberty!" Well could events similar to the assassination inspire the terse expression, "Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name!".

11. Fay, op.cit., II, p.125, quoting Conrad, IV, pp.19-22

12. Fay, op.cit., II, p.80, quoting Conrad, IV, p.73

13. H. R. Knickerbocker, Will War Come? The Herald Post, March 12, 1934

Chapter II
Jugo-Slav Nationalism

Chapter II

Jugo-Slav Nationalism

The wave of nationalism that had swept over Europe engulfed the South-slavs too. Bosnia and Herzegovina whose inhabitants were largely Slavic wanted to be a part of a Jugo-slav nation. Serbia, too, was interested in combining all the people of the same racial characteristics into one nation. Serbia, moreover, did not have an outlet to the sea. In order to get commerce on a larger basis, and be able adequately to protect herself from attacks from the sea, Serbia was most desirous of getting access to the Adriatic. Not only did Serbia want the territory of the Bosnians and Herzegovinians because of the geographical value of these territories, but also because the people themselves were kinsmen and friendly.

However, Austria-Hungary had designs on the same land and the same peoples, and naturally wanted the Adriatic Sea as her own special property. Obviously she was interested in checking the ambitions of her Slavic neighbor to the south of her.

The shadow of Austria-Hungary, therefore, lay right across the path of the ambitious Slavs. The first blow to Serbian nationalism came in 1878 when Austria-Hungary was invited by the Powers of Europe "to occupy" the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order that the peace of Europe might be maintained. The Congress of Berlin at this same

time set Serbia free from all control by the Porte.¹ In another thirty years (1908), the second blow fell to the advantage of Austria-Hungary which, at that time, actually annexed the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The shadow had become a reality and Serbia's dream was shattered. Serbia however did not despair. She turned to Russia, her protector at other times, but this power was wholly unprepared for a European war in 1908, having just previously completed the disastrous Russo-Japanese war. So Guchov, one of the leaders of the Russian Duma, advised Serbia that when Russia had completely reorganized her army then she would have her check up with Austria-Hungary. "Do not begin any war now", said the Duma member, "for this would be your suicide; conceal your purposes, and make ready; the day of your joy will come".²

The Czar a few days later reiterated the sentiment of the Duma member when he said, "the Serbian sky was overhung with black clouds". He declared that the defeat of Russia would ruin "Slavdom".³

The discussion with Russia, however, was not the only card in Serbia's hand. For immediately after the annexation by the Dual Monarchy of the Slavic provinces an organization was effected in Belgrade which meant much to Serbia, Austria-Hungary, and the peace of the world. This

1. Hazen, Charles Downer, Europe Since 1815, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1910, p. 626.
2. Fay, op.cit., I, pp. 384-385, quoting report of Kasutitch in Deutschland Schuldig, p. 112.
3. Ibid., pp. 385, quoting Bogitchevitch, pp. 150-151.

was the organization of Narodna Odbrana or National Defense. Naturally, branches were established in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the discontented Slav territories of Austria-Hungary. Other branches were established throughout Serbia. Provided the city or district was sufficiently large, a committee was appointed to serve as connective links with the Belgrade headquarters. If the population was small, a confidential man was appointed to keep in contact with the headquarters of the organization. More than 400 committees existed.⁴

The Narodna Odbrana was opposed to the annexation of the Slav provinces by Austria-Hungary. It did not hesitate to say that Austria-Hungary was the greatest enemy of Serbia. It preached Serbian idealism, fostered education, and favored improved conditions of hygiene and temperance. Since war with the Hapsburg monarchy seemed inevitable, the organization trained the young men to be able to throw bombs effectively in order that bridges and railways could be quickly and effectively demolished. Naturally it was easy for propaganda of any nature to be broadcast through the medium of spies that could easily be sent through countries inhabited by Slavic peoples.⁵

The "Underground Railroad" system, utilized somewhat effectively in the United States before the Civil War, was perhaps not more effective in assisting slaves to the

4. Schmitt, op.cit., I, p. 181, quoting Union or Death Organization, Nova Europa, XV, June 11, 1927.

5. Schmitt, op.cit., I, pp. 182-183, quoting Surkotich, Der Hochverrats-Prozess Von Banjulaka in K.S.F., IX, pp. 34-41.

North than was the system of "tunnels" used by the Narodna Odbrana in sending books, newspaper clippings, and other propaganda into Bosnia.⁶ "For the sake of bread and room, for the sake of the fundamental essentials of culture and trade, the freeing of the conquered Serbian territories and their union with Serbia are necessary to gentlemen, tradesmen, and peasants alike".⁷

Professor Schmitt declares that a member of the organization told him that the Narodna Odbrana existed largely on paper and that little was done.⁸

In spite of the declaration that little was done, Princip, the murderer of Francis Ferdinand, declared at his trial that he had been a member of the National Defense society and as such had been given money.⁹

Just three years after the forming of the Narodna Odbrana another even more radical society Ujedinenje ili Smrt Union or Death was organized. It was usually referred to as the Black Hand. Composed originally of ten members this society had its headquarters in Belgrade. Its aim was to unite all Serbs (Art. 1) preferring terrorist methods "to intellectual propaganda". (Art. 2) It planned to organize revolutionary movements in all territories where Serbs lived. It "will use every means available to combat the adversaries of the national idea". (Art. 4)

6. Schmitt, op.cit., I, p. 184, quoting Phares, pp. 100, 108.

7. Schmitt, op.cit., I, p. 82.

8. Ibid., p. 181, footnote, p. 193.

9. Fay, op.cit., II, p. 82, quoting Phares, pp. 22-25.

Only a courageous individual would join the Union or Death. He really surrendered his "personality" (Art. 30); was "bound to absolute obedience" to the central committee (Art. 27); agreed to communicate anything of interest to headquarters (Art. 28); and pledged his own life for the proper conduct of any member he might recommend (Art. 24). To add to the mysticism the members had numbers and were unknown to each other personally (Art. 25).¹⁰ It is no wonder that the declaration was made that "a society which could combine the self-effacing loyalty of the Jesuits, the ruthless spirit of the Russian Nihilists, and the symbolism of the Ku Klux Klan was indeed a noteworthy organization".¹¹

Several cross-currents existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, not the least of which was that of religion. About 825,000 Greek Orthodox, largely Serbs; 612,000 Mohammedans divided among Serbs and Turks; and 442,000 Roman Catholics, largely Croats, were in the provinces. With a sprinkling of Jews, Protestants, and gypsies, the total number approximated 1,900,000 in population. In a large measure the Greek Orthodox population liked the Serbians; the Roman Catholic loyalties were divided between their relations with cultural Austria on the one hand and their desire for Serbian Nationalism on the other. The Mohammedans were for the most part favorable to Francis

10. Schmitt, op.cit., I, p. 191, quoting Popovich, (The Black Hand) in Nova Europa, XV, June 11, 1927, pp. 398-400.

11. Schmitt, op.cit., p. 193.

12
Joseph.

Other currents running against the barrier of Austro-Hungarian force were; those of the youth of Bosnia who were opposed to Hapsburg treatment; the hope for unity among the Jugo-slavs; the writings of anarchists, and the propaganda introduced from Serbia.¹³

Naturally the young Bosnians looked to Serbia as a source of supply for their energies and activities. Many of them frequently went to Belgrade where they breathed the free air so different from the atmosphere of the Hapsburgs. Three of the youths who were in the plot to kill the heir apparent to the Hapsburg throne had visited in the Serbian capital.

Another leader "speaks, wakes people up, and again disappears like a shadow as if he were swallowed up by the earth feeling himself followed by the footfalls of Austrian agents among whom were some Serbians also".¹⁴ When the Zagreb Srbohran published the news in March 1914 that Francis Ferdinand would visit Serajevo on June 28, it stirred the passions of the Slavs. For this was a day of national mourning due to the fact that at the battle of Kossovo in 1389 the Serbian state had been overthrown. It appeared to some of the revolutionary group as if the Archduke's visit were designed as an insult. Without knowing that Princip and others had already decided to

12. Fay, op.cit., II, p. 93, quoting Austro-Hungarian Census of 1910.

13. Fay, op.cit., II, p. 100, quoting Pharos, pp. 22-24.

14. Fay, op.cit., II, p. 97, quoting Jevtitch, p. 6.

kill the heir-apparent they sent the newspaper clipping to Chabrinovich, one of the revolutionists in Belgrade, without comment save the word "greeting".

Immediately Chabrinovich began the discussion of the murder with Princip. Grabesh, another revolutionist, read the clipping. Meeting his two friends, he expressed his indignation at the proposed visit of the Archduke. The three decided to do the deed. They were not long in getting aid. All practiced shooting for some time. Equipped with "six bombs, four Browning pistols, 130 dinars, a road map of Bosnia", some poison, and a note to the officials at the frontier, they set out in May to Serajevo.

The "tunnel" worked perfectly.¹⁵ Princip sent a telegram to one of the "Black Hand" leaders, "The marriage¹⁶ will take place Sunday. Send funds".

The plans did not fail. The "Black Hand", through its international operation, added another crime to its list. These members felt that the Powers had not given them a square deal at the Congress of Berlin. Russia had told Serbia to wait till a more convenient season. But the revolutionists were unwilling to wait. Nationalism had swept through their ranks as wind sweeps a prairie fire. To the revolutionists, "necessity knew no law". It was a question of "unite or die", they thought. As in 1878 Turkey surrendered territory for the organization of Serbia,

15. Schmitt, op.cit., I, pp. 226-228, quoting Pharos, pp. 7-10, 23-25, 32-34, 45-48.

16. Edith Durham, The Serajevo Murder Plot, Current History, XXV, p. 659 ff.

so must Austria-Hungary surrender Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nationalism was served but at a cost unquestionably unforeseen by the Black Hand, Serbia, and Austria-Hungary.

Chapter III
The Dual Monarchy Endangered

Chapter III

The Dual Monarchy Endangered

When the news of the death of Francis Ferdinand was delivered to Francis Joseph, he uttered these words, "Was I not to be spared even this?"¹ Blow upon blow had descended upon the aged monarch. Many tragedies had beset the reigns of the Hapsburgs. Francis Joseph's brother, Maximilian, had, against the advice of some, gone to Mexico to be Emperor in the land of the Montezumas. He had been shot by the Mexicans, and his wife became insane. His son Rudolph, so rumor has it, died from suicide. His nephew became insane and killed his guardian. An anarchist near the end of the nineteenth century killed the Empress Elizabeth. Otto, another brother, added to the sorrow of the Emperor when he began to lead an immoral life.²

When Francis Ferdinand in the early nineties used to visit at the home of the Archduke Frederick and the Archduchess Isabella at Pressburg, the Archducal pair had visions of their daughter as the Empress. An accident revealed that they were deluded. One summer day after a tennis match, Francis Ferdinand had forgotten to take his watch when he changed clothes. The watch was brought to the Archduchess by a servant. She could not resist opening the locket, expecting to see the picture of her daughter.

1. Fay, op.cit., II, p. 29, quoting Margutti, p. 139.
2. Ibid., I, p. 29, quoting Margutti, p. 139.

Instead she saw the likeness of Sophie Chotek one of her ladies-in-waiting. It mattered not that Sophie Chotek was a countess in her own right, belonging to a Czech family of long tradition. Isabella's dreams crashed immediately, and almost as quickly the countess was ordered from the house. Francis Ferdinand declared he would marry Sophie, and the Emperor declared he would not. A compromise was effected, however, by Francis Joseph granting his nephew the right to contract a morganatic marriage.³

With this as a background, it was small wonder that there was not much emotion in evidence when the bodies of the Serajevo assassination arrived at Vienna. It is even the more easily understood why the head of the Dual Monarchy wondered why he "was not spared" that indignity. The honors to the dead were few, and the last rites were not those befitting a position which Francis Ferdinand had occupied. For the Emperor did not like the heir presumptive, and the court would not tolerate the Duchess of Hohenberg whom they liked to call Sophie Chotek. The body of the nephew was in a plain casket with the full insignia, however, of his rank about him. On the casket that held the body of his wife, a pair of gloves and a black fan were placed indicating the past rank of the Duchess. The Emperor sent no flowers, and invited very few people to the funeral. He even excluded the children of the Archduke

3. Fay, op.cit., II, pp. 28-30, quoting Nikitsch-Bouilles, p. 26 ff.

from attending the funeral of their parents. Only 150⁴ great nobles attended.

Even the German Kaiser did not come, for he had been advised by the German consul at Serajevo that assassins might be present in Vienna.⁵ The Kaiser sent a personal note to the Emperor saying that he was giving up his journey "with a heavy heart and deep grief."⁶ For the benefit of the public, information was given out that the Kaiser was ill from lumbago.⁷ The British Ambassador thought the brevity of the services for the dead, which lasted only fifteen minutes, was out of consideration for the age of the Emperor.⁸ Much discussion about the apparent slight to the departed evidently occurred, for the government deemed it necessary to explain that a precedent had already been established in the cases of the arrival at night of the bodies of the Empress Elizabeth and Archduke Rudolph, and that as much military display had been given to the late Archduke as to the former cases.⁹

4. Schmitt, op.cit., I, pp. 280-281, quoting Steed, I, pp. 401-403.

5. Outbreak of The World War, (Kautsky Documents), German Documents collected by Karl Kautsky, Oxford University Press, New York, 1924, telegram, July 1, 1914, No. 6A, p. 59. Hereafter referred to as Kautsky Documents or K. D.

6. Ibid., p. 60, telegram 107, July 2, 1914.

7. Gooch and Temperley, British Documents On The Origins of the War, Vol. XI, The Outbreak of War, King's Stationery Office, London, 1926, No. 26, p. 18. Hereafter referred to as British Documents or B. D.

8. Ibid., No. 34, p. 26.

9. Ibid., No. 37, p. 29.

Francis Joseph was among the last of his age. How changed conditions were in 1830 when he was born! In that year a wave of revolutions swept over Europe menacing the absolute governments of the world. In 1914 the aged monarch was among the last of the near absolute rulers. Naturally, he was determined to maintain his Empire for his successors. It was a difficult task. Numerous peoples lived within the confines of his Empire and the nationalities spread out on a map of Austria-Hungary resembled the patches of a crazy quilt. The tendency for peoples of the same race, habits, and customs to live under the same flag and govern themselves had been growing. Both Italy and Germany had each united their peoples under their respective flags. But Francis Joseph could not accept that sort of political philosophy. He was opposed to nationalism because, once he accepted that policy, his Empire would fall apart into a number of pieces. Had he accepted a nationalistic policy, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Croatia would most likely have indicated their desires to join Serbia. Serbian irredentism, as has been shown, called for the union with Serbia of the southern provinces of Austria-Hungary. The Emperor had been watching this nationalistic movement for some time.

At the time of the eventful tragedy of Sarajevo, Francis Joseph sent an autographed letter to the Kaiser, his ally. He expressed regret that Wilhelm II

was unable to attend the funeral at Vienna.¹⁰ He also, under the stress of the moment, expressed a few political sentiments. The researches made concerning the "bloody deed of Serajevo"... "indicate", he said, "that it is the result of a well organized plot". The aim of these Pan slavists is to "weaken the Triple Alliance and shatter¹¹ my Empire", he wrote.

Then the aged monarch put out a feeler. He suggested that a new Balkan League should be created under the control of the Triple Alliance in order to encourage Bulgaria and attract Roumania back into stronger ties of friendship with the members of the Triple Alliance. Concluding, he expressed the conviction "that a conciliation between Serbia and us is out of the question... while this center of criminal agitation continues unpunished¹² in Belgrade".

Very interesting, too, was a "memoir" accompanying the letter which had been completed a day or two before the assassination. In it some observations had been made by the Austria-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold, regarding the conditions in the Balkan peninsula in the years 1912-1913. On the whole, the count thought conditions were somewhat favorable to the Empire and the Triple Alliance. Albania had been created and

10. Austrian Red Book, Official Files Pertaining To Pre War History, Part I, Geo. Allen and Unwin, London, No. I, p. I, Kautsky Documents, p. 68.
11. Austrian Red Book, op.cit., No. I, p. I.
12. Ibid, p. 3.

it would, according to Berchtold, be in a position within a few years to be of some effective military assistance. This state, too, would offset the growth of Serbia. It seemed evident that Bulgaria had at last awakened from "her hypnotic dream" and would not in the future be dominated by Russia.

Along with these advantages, the Count, speaking for the government, suggested some disadvantages. First of all, it was distressing that Turkey had almost been driven out of Europe. Should Serbia and Montenegro unite, which was possible, it would be detrimental to Austria-Hungary's interests. Russia and France had taken measures, he said, to consolidate their advantages and minimize or modify the measures they did not like", ". . . The alliance between Russia and France . . . must, in its last consequences", Berchtold said, "be of an offensive nature." On the other hand ". . . the character of the Triple alliance is purely defensive," said the Austrian Foreign minister. It was evident, he said, that the diplomacy of Russia and France would urge the Alliance of Bulgaria and Serbia. Roumania, according to the Count, was not as friendly as formerly¹³ and would bear watching.

At the close of the "memoir" a few statements were made after the assassination had occurred. "Austria-

13. Austrian Red Book, op.cit., I, pp. 3-13; K. D., pp. 70-77. The table of contents of the Austrian Red Book indicates that the copy of the "Memoir" was a rough draft. The Kautsky Documents, No. 14, p. 70 indicate slight modifications in the phrasing over the document in the A. R. B. Hereafter referred to as A. R. B.

Hungary", says the report, "has always shown good will and friendliness to bring about tolerable relations with Serbia". Since these efforts have been in vain, the government must "in the future look to the tenacious, irreconcilable, and aggressive enmity of Serbia". The report concluded with an announcement of policy. "The government must seize the threads, which its enemies are weaving into a net over its head, with a strong hand and¹⁴ tear them once for all".

The two groups of Powers known as the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente faced each other in 1914. Events in the forty-five year period preceding the outbreak of the World War were ominous for the peace of Europe. Among these events were the formation of the Triple Alliance, the Anglo-Russian reconciliation and the Triple Entente. The two crises in Morocco in 1905 and 1911 respectively, had aroused the Germans and French. The Balkan crises of 1908-1909 and 1912-1913¹⁵ stirred the Russians and Austrians. The treaty of Bucharest signed August 19, 1913 was not very favorable to Austria. Serbia was at last given territory on the Adriatic and her increase in land was relatively large. Roumania was given territory, Bulgaria lost territory

14. Austrian Red Book, op.cit., I, p. 13. Kautsky p. 77 gives substantially the same material but phrased differently.

15. Renouvin, Pierre, The Immediate Origins Of The War, June 28-August 4, 1914, Translated by Theodore Carswell Hume, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1928, pp. 10-11.

and naturally was indignant.¹⁶ Austria did not like the treaty of Bucharest. This was indicated by Berchtold when he said:

"... Serbia, whose policy has for many years been hostile towards Austria-Hungary and stands entirely under Russian influence, has gained both in population and territory much more than it expected. Its territorial neighborhood to Montenegro and the visible growth of the idea of a Greater Serbia makes an aggrandisement achieved by the union with Montenegro seem a not unlikely event." 17

At last Austria seemed to partially understand the activities of the Narodna Odbrana and the Black Hand. She saw that these organizations would cause her much trouble unless a way could be found to stop them.

Serbia, as has been mentioned in a previous chapter, had set out to unite all South Slavs under her control. Many Serbs, Serbo-Croats, and Slovenes lived in Austria-Hungary. Serbia was anxious to annex the territory where they lived. The revolutionists would achieve unification by fair means or foul.

Austria-Hungary was equally determined that Serbia should not unite all the South Slavs. The issue was joined. It seemed plausible to say that to prevent this unity the Empire must apply the same principle as Scipio used long ago when he said, "Carthago delenda

16. Cooke, W. Henry and Stickney, Edith P., Reading In European International Law Since 1879. "Peace of Bucharest", August 10, 1913, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1931, pp. 243-247.
17. Austrian Red Book, I, p. 3.

est." It appeared at this juncture to be a life and death struggle. Would Austria-Hungary use the murder of the Archduke as an occasion to check the ambitious Slavs? The next chapter will disclose the answer.

Chapter IV

Serbia Must Be Destroyed

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Serbia Must Be Destroyed

The Austrians received the news of the assassination with anger. It was necessary in Vienna to protect the Serbian Legation from a mob. Military people and the upper classes felt, generally, that the time had come to have a reckoning with Serbia. The sentiment of public opinion began to move toward war.

Before Serajevo, many officials at Vienna believed that something ought to be done to strengthen the old Empire. After the assassination they were sure they were right. It was necessary, they believed, to construct additional buttresses for the Empire.¹ Francis Joseph, desiring to end his days in peace, was afraid conditions in Serbia were becoming intolerable. The Emperor and King had not been successful in his wars, and, quite naturally, in his declining years he was reluctant to start a new war. Nevertheless, he said to the German Ambassador, "I see a very dark future". He believed that nothing could be gained by being kind to the Serbians. The Ambassador declared, "My Emperor will stand behind every firm determination arrived at by Austria-Hungary". Near the close of the interview the

1. Fay, op.cit., II, p. 186, quoting Conrad, IV, pp. 31 ff.

aged monarch in speaking of the death of a famous Italian general said, "Everybody is dying around me; it is too sad".²

General Conrad, Austrian Chief of Staff, favored war. He believed that it was necessary "to draw the sword against Serbia".³ He had foreseen the necessity of war for some time and had frequently urged the Government to fight. Conrad now urged Berchtold to strike. In the last analysis, Berchtold seemed to be the key man. He had declared July 2, in no uncertain terms that the "gulf between Austria and Serbia is beyond bridging over".⁴ The Austrian Foreign Minister, therefore, decided that he would use the crime of Serajevo as the casus belli. He would check the threatened fusion of Serbia and Montenegro, and save Albania. When the Jugoslavs were taken care of, the dangers in the south would disappear. Berchtold, therefore, adopted the suggestion of Conrad, and decided that Serbia must be destroyed.

Count Berchtold, however, had to move with caution. He must be sure of public opinion, Tisza of Hungary, the Emperor, and Wilhelm II. A year before,

2. Tschirschky to Bethmann, telegram, July 2, K. D., op.cit., No. II, pp. 64-66.

3. Fay, op.cit., II, p. 185, quoting Conrad, IV, p. 31.

4. Austrian Red Book, op.cit., I, p. 13.

Bethmann had warned Austria against attempting to gobble up Serbia.⁵ However, considerable water had gone over the dam within the year, and Berchtold hoped to be able to gain Germany's approval and assistance in his proposed Serbian venture. For the Kaiser had been extremely friendly to Francis Joseph and the Archduke.

Wilhelm was enjoying a short vacation at Kiel, and while aboard his yacht, June 28, he noticed a small launch approaching. He waved it away, but the admiral aboard signalled that he had a communication. Folding a paper in a cigarette case he pitched it aboard the Kaiser's yacht. It was the news of the fatal report from Serajevo. The Kaiser turned pale as he read the note and ordered his yacht to the shore.⁶

The Kaiser was shocked at the news. He had been very friendly with Francis Ferdinand. When the Archduke and his wife visited Potsdam, they were received with marked attention. The Duchess of Hohenberg was received as an Archduchess. This mark of respect touched the Archduke and caused him to appreciate the Kaiser's friendship greatly. Just a few days before the fatal shots were fired, the Archduke entertained the Kaiser at his beautiful villa of

5. Bethmann to Szogyeny and Zimmerman to Tschirschky, July 6, 1913, *Grosse Politik*, XXXV, p. 129 ff.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 204-205, quoting Recouly, p. 19 ff.

7

Konopischt in Bohemia.

Berchtold was aware of this friendship and utilized the information to try to gain the Kaiser's assistance. He was not disappointed. The Austrian Ambassador at Vienna reported to Berchtold that Germany had decided ". . . that we must judge what is best to be done . . . ; whatever we decide we may always be certain that we will find Germany at our side, a faithful ally and friend of our monarchy".⁸ Bethmann telegraphed the German Ambassador at Vienna that, "His Majesty will faithfully stand by Austria Hungary, as is required by the obligations of his alliance and of his ancient friendship".⁹ Thus Germany handed her Austrian ally "a blank check".

The Kaiser's decision was in harmony with his attitude expressed upon the receipt of Tschirschky's note June 30, wherein the latter had cautioned Austria against hasty action. The Kaiser wrote on the margin of the telegram, "Now or never. It is solely the affair of Austria what she plans to do in this case. The Serbs must be disposed of and that right soon".¹⁰

7. Fay, op.cit., II, pp. 31-33, quoting Nikitsch-Boullès, p. 115 ff.
8. Szegyeny to Berchtold, telegram, July 6, A.R.B., I, No. 7, p. 20.
9. Bethmann to Tschirschky, telegram, July 6, K.D., No. 15, pp. 78-79.
10. Kautsky Documents, op.cit., No. 7, p. 61.

The German government had moved rapidly. On July 5 and 6 it had: (1) agreed to Austrian military action against Serbia; (2) recognized that Russia might come into the war; (3) and urged action at once.^{II}

The Kaiser then met representatives of the army and navy. He asked to see the Prussian Minister of War, but told him that military preparations need not be made.¹² Thereafter the Kaiser sailed away for his vacation.

Tisza did not know that an appeal had been made to Germany. He counselled moderation and objected to the appeal, pending additional information from the tragedy. But Berchtold had his way.

Berchtold now turned his attention to Tisza. The Austrian Foreign Minister and Count Hoyos agreed that it would be necessary to bring pressure to bear upon Tisza. Berchtold then sent a letter to Tisza in which he said that "Germany would consider further negotiating with Serbia a confession of weakness on our part". He hoped to thus influence Tisza to consent to the war.¹³

Tisza held out against war until July 14, when he finally conceded that the ultimatum be sent as

- II. Austrian Red Book, op.cit., I, No. 7, pp. 20-21.
- I2. Kautsky Documents, op.cit., pp. 14-16.
- I3. Austrian Red Book, op.cit., No. 10, p. 34.

Berchtold suggested. However, he was opposed to any annexations as a result of the war.¹⁴ Immediately afterward the conference with Berchtold, Tisza went to call upon Tschirschky. "It was very hard for me to come to the decision", said the Hungarian, "to give my advice for war, but I am now firmly convinced of its necessity and I shall stand up for the greatness of the monarchy to the utmost of my ability". Concluding the interview, Tisza grasped the hand of the Ambassador and declared, "Together we shall now look the future calmly and firmly in the face". When the Kaiser heard of Tisza's change of heart he exclaimed, "Well a real man at last".¹⁵

Berchtold, "who more than anyone else was responsible for the World War",¹⁶ could now calmly prepare for war. All the chief officials had capitulated. He was now ready for the ultimatum.

14. Austrian Red Book, op.cit., I, No. 19, p. 47.

15. Tschirschky to Bethmann, K. D., op.cit., No. 49, pp. 112-113.

16. Fay, op.cit., I, p. 18.

Chapter V

The Austrian Ultimatum To Serbia

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Shall Austria-Hungary be a door mat to be stepped on by nations, some of whom she had looked upon with contempt in the very recent past? Shall the crumbling Empire of the Hapsburgs fall to pieces from its own weight as the "wonderful One Hoss Shay"? Shall she accept the scorn heaped upon her by the Serbians who said the Old Empire was "worm eaten"? Or shall she be torn to pieces by her enemies outside her borders? Either alternative was hard for her to face. If so, the kingdom of Francis Joseph, which to the Austrians' way of thinking had a glorious history, must crumble into the dust of forgotten nations, and be relegated to the scrapheap of rusted out crowns.

The world waited; would the pistol shots at Serajevo be followed by violent explosions? War did not immediately follow. So Europe began to breathe more easily; the tension was receding. After all, people said, "We are not going to have war". But their optimism was of short duration. It was a peaceful Sunday morning - July 19 - to be exact. If the Viennese had observed closely as they returned from church service, they would have noticed a number of private automobiles stopping at Count Berchtold's residence. It was 10:00 A.M. when the last man arrived. Even Count Tisza, Minister-President of Hungary, came all the way from

Budapest to this summer morning meeting where the fate of millions was at stake. Even the Austrian Chief of Staff returned suddenly from his vacation, ostensibly to be at the bedside of his sick son.¹

It was the Joint Ministerial Council in session. They met under the utmost secrecy to make the note to send Serbia, and to fix the date when it might be most advantageous for them to send it. After much discussion it was decided to deliver the note to Serbia at 5 o'clock P.M. Thursday, July 23. Forty-eight hours were given for the Serbians to answer. If at the end of that time a satisfactory answer had not been received, it was likely war would follow the delivery of the note. The delivery of the note was so timed in order that the Austrians might gain a little time on the Slavs by ordering their mobilization by early Sunday.² So the note was concluded, and was sent by messenger on the nineteenth to the Austrian Minister at Belgrade for delivery July 23. Count Berchtold, July 20, instructed Baron Giesl to tell Serbia that, "We cannot enter into any negotiations . . .".³

The scene shifts to the capital of Serbia. It is early Thursday. A secretary from the Austrian ministry

1. Fay, op.cit., II, p. 49, quoting Conrad, IV, pp., 78, 87, 94.
2. Council of Ministers for Common Affairs, A. R. B., I, No. 26, p. 54.
3. Austrian Red Book, op.cit., I, No. 28, p. 63.

called at the Serbian Foreign Office to ask if he might see Pashitch at 4 o'clock that day to bring an "important communication".⁴ It so happened that this event was almost on the eve of an election. Pashitch was out mending his political fences in a distant part of the country when the caller arrived and it was exceedingly difficult to reach him. Needless to say in that kind of a national emergency he was located but could not come in time. So at the appointed time the Serbian Ministers who were in the city met to receive the Austrian diplomat.

It was unusual for a representative of a foreign power in making an appointment for a conference to fix the time.⁵ Now, however, to add insult to injury the Austrian Secretary arrived at the appointed hour saying that Giesl would not arrive until 6 o'clock.⁶ Nor was this all the evidence to indicate that Austria chose the time to give her the greatest advantage.

For, since January, 1914, it had seemed advisable and had been planned that Poincare, the President of France, visit St. Petersburg to call upon the Czar. Fear makes strange bedfellows. The Republic of France and the absolute monarchy of Russia in close alliance seemed just as opposite as the poles. So,

4. Berchtold to Giesl, July 21, A. R. B., I, No. 36.

5. Schmitt, op.cit., I, p. 472.

6. Berchtold to Giesl, telegram, July 23, I, No. 62.

even in the light of rumblings from the Sarajevo incident, Poincare felt it might cause more discussion if he did not go just at that time than if he remained. So on July 20, 1914 he and his Prime Minister were received at the Russian capital.⁷

Imagine the reception with the Russian band playing the Marseillaise and the French President drinking a toast to the health of the Czar! It was a joyful occasion. For, said the Czar in his welcome, it was his hope that France and Russia "will continue to enjoy the benefits of peace which the fullness of their strength ensures by constantly tying more tightly the bands that unite them".⁸ Needless to say, Poincare responded in like manner. "Your Majesty", said the Frenchman, "can be assured that France in the future, as always in the past will, in sincere and daily co-operation with her ally, pursue the work of peace and civilization for which both governments and both peoples have never ceased to labor".⁹

So, during the three days presence of the

7. Fay, op.cit., II, p. 277, quoting Poincare, IV, p. 211.
8. How The War Began In 1914, being the Diary of the Russian Foreign Office from the 3rd to the 20th (old style) of July, 1914; published by the Red Archives, Department of the Russian Soviet Government in their Historical Journal, Vol. IV, 1923. Translated from the original Russian by Major W. Cyprian Bridge, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1925, Appendix, p. 113 ff. Hereafter referred to as Schilling's Diary.
9. Schilling's Diary, Appendix, p. 114 ff.

French, the heads of the two governments talked over, as did Herbert Hoover and Ramsay MacDonald on the banks of the Rapidan, the common problems of their countries. It seems likely that the high point of the Frenchmen's visit to the Russians was expressed in the utterance of Poincare to the Russian Ambassador concerning possibilities in Austria when he said, "Sazonov must be firm and we must support him".¹⁰

So, after the toasts were said, the healths drunk, the salutes fired, and the anthems played, Poincare and Viviani sailed away to their native land in complete ignorance of what was about to happen in the city of Belgrade that same evening. For the stage was set in Belgrade. Two members of the Serbian cabinet were present at 6 o'clock when Giesl appeared at the Serbian Foreign Office to deliver the ultimatum. A third member was not present, since he did not understand French, the diplomatic language, anyway. Baron Giesl delivered the note to Serbia July 23, "and added that the time for the answer had been fixed for Saturday at 6 P.M., and that if by that time I had received no answer or an unsatisfactory one, I should leave Belgrade with the entire legation".¹¹ With that, Giesl began reading the note but was interrupted by the Serbian who said he could not take the responsibility of hearing the

10. Fay, op.cit., II, p. 282.

11. Austrian Red Book, I, No. 67, p. 114.

note in the absence of his chief. However, the Austrian said in view of the fact that Serbia was not very large, and that railroads were available, he thought Pashitch, the Serbian Foreign Minister, could return quickly. Anyway, that was not Austria's concern. With that he turned on his heel and departed, leaving a copy of the note.

With great fear the two Serbians read the ultimatum demanding that the Serbian government accept the terms within forty-eight hours, or suffer the consequences. At the conclusion, Yovanovich turned to the other saying, "Well, there is nothing to do but die fighting!"¹² Small wonder the expression for, in substance, they had just read that Serbia must:

1. Suspend every publication in her country which might cause hatred toward Austria-Hungary.
2. Check the establishment of societies such as "Narodna Odbrana", and seize all its means of propaganda.
3. Remove from the public schools everything that might serve to be antagonistic to Austria-Hungary.
4. Arrest Major Voja Tankositch and Milan Ciganovitch who as a result of the inquiry seemed to be involved.
5. Remove any officers from her army whom Austria-Hungary might nominate.
6. Accept Austria-Hungarian representatives to assist in suppressing the attempt against her territorial integrity.
7. Allow Austrian delegates to assist Serbia in ascertaining the guilt of the parties in the conspiracy of Sarajevo.

12. H. F. Armstrong, Three Days in Belgrade, July 1914, Foreign Affairs, January 1927, p. 275.

8. Prevent unlawful traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier.
9. Explain the utterances of high Serbian officials who had, since the murder, spoken in hostile terms of the Empire.
10. Notify Austria-Hungary of the compliance with the demands. 13

When Sir Edward Grey read the note in England he commented, ". . . The note seemed to me the most formidable document I had ever seen addressed by one State to another that was independent".¹⁴ Even the German foreign minister was moved to say, "As a diplomatic document, note left much to be desired".¹⁵

Pashitch returned home early July 24. Immediately, the Cabinet and the Prince Regent set to work to see what kind of an answer could be made. Telegraph wires were kept hot by requests for assistance of one kind or another, such as asking Britain to request Austria to make the terms of the note less drastic, for they "are impossible of acceptance".¹⁶ Very little news that even encouraged Serbia was received from foreign powers.

And so, into Friday night and all day Saturday they worked with the note, changing a word here, a word there, "erasures" and "corrections", and "riders". In

13. Austrian Red Book, op.cit., I, pp. 61-62.

14. Grey to Bunsen, telegram, July 24, B.D., No. 91, p. 73.

15. Rumbold to Grey, telegram, July 25, B.D., No. 122, p. 91.

16. Crackanthorpe to Grey, telegram, July 24, B.D., No. 92, p. 74.

nervous haste they gave the answer to the typist, and to add to the difficulties, as time rapidly ticked away, the only typewriter refused to work and the copies had to be made by hand. Just ten minutes before the time limit had expired, namely at 5:50 P.M., Pashitch grasped his hat and the document, and walked to the Austrian legation where promptly at 6:00 P.M. Baron Giesl received him.¹⁷ "We have accepted part of your demands", said the Serbian. "For the rest, we rely on the loyalty and chivalry of the Austrian General. We have always been quite satisfied with you."¹⁸

The Serbian government in its reply to the Austrian ultimatum agreed to:

1. Publish in the "Journal Official", July 26, a condemnation of all propaganda directed at Austria-Hungary and warn all persons that it will proceed to punish those who may spread anti-Austrian propaganda.
 2. Provide for the punishment of the press who may incite hatred against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.
 3. Dissolve the Narodna Odbrana and similar societies.
 4. Remove from the curriculum of the schools anything the Dual Monarchy deemed propaganda.
 5. Remove all civil and military officials that have been proved "guilty of acts directed against the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy".
 6. Accept the collaboration of Austrian officials in
17. H. F. Armstrong, Three Days in Belgrade, July 1914, pp. 273-274, Foreign Affairs, No. V, January 1927.
 18. Schmitt, op.cit., I, p. 533, quoting Giesl, pp. 268-269.

so far as the rulings of international law would sanction.

7. Undertake an investigation of those accused of being implicated in the plot of June 28, 1914. "As regards the participation in this inquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would constitute a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents."
8. Attempt to arrest commandant Voja Tankositch and Milan Ciganovitch.
9. Check illicit "traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier".
10. Furnish explanation of derogatory remarks against Austria made by Serbian officials after the assassination.
11. Notify the Austro-Hungarian Government of the execution of the measures provided in the note as rapidly as possible. Serbia agreed to submit any phase of the question to either the International Tribunal at The Hague or to the Great Powers. 19

But Giesl could not accept the terms, for "any acceptance which contains conditions or reservations you are to consider in the light of a refusal".²⁰ Naturally it required only a hasty perusal by Giesl to see there was not an unqualified acceptance. Count Berchtold had overlooked no detail. Baron Giesl had been

19. Scott, Diplomatic Documents, op.cit., I, (Austrian Red Book, I, No. 34), pp. 88-98.
20. Austrian Red Book, II, No. I, p. I.

given explicit directions.

"I assume", the Count wired the Baron, "that according to the instructions you have received you have completed your preparations so you can leave Belgrade immediately . . . should the terms of forty-eight hours have expired without effect. The result is to be sent in a few words from Semlin in claris and immediately to the military cabinet of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty at Ischl; also in claris from Semlin and in cipher from Belgrade to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Count Tisza in Budapest. . . . It will be best for you to eventually leave Belgrade by the 6:30 train which arrives at Semlin at 6:40. When you arrive in Semlin you will use the official railway telephone at the station and get a telephone connection with the Budapest railway directors who must connect you with Count Tisza whom you are to inform of departure from Belgrade. . . . We might receive the news of ²¹ your departure as early as 7 o'clock on Saturday."

So the remarkable exhibition of speed which was in evidence since Berchtold decided to move against Serbia was shown again, for the Baron had even prepared a note to the Serbian Foreign Minister before he received the Serbian reply in which he stated, "I have the honor to inform you that I am leaving Belgrade this evening ²² with the staff of the Imperial and Royal Legation".

Within fifteen minutes the minister and his retinue were at the station; the train left at 6:30 P.M. As soon as he crossed the river, which was the frontier, ~~into~~ Semlin he was called on the telephone by Tisza at

21. Berchtold to Giesl, telegram, July 24, A.R.B., II, No. 1, p. 1.
22. H. F. Armstrong, Fateful Documents of The World War, Current History, XXV, October, 1927, pp. 92-93. Scott, James Brown, Diplomatic Documents Pertaining To The Outbreak of The European War (Serbian Blue Book) No. 40, p. 1476. Hereafter referred to as Scott, Diplomatic Documents.

Budapest. Tisza said, "Must it really be?" An affirmative answer, of course, was the reply. Count Tisza relayed the information to Berchtold at Vienna, commenting especially upon the fact that at mid-afternoon that day the Serbians had ordered mobilization and had moved their government away from Belgrade.²³ Giesl, also, sent a message in cipher to Berchtold.

With that, the Baron went aboard again and the train rolled on through the night, and stopped early the next morning at Budapest where Tisza and Giesl talked more specifically about the events of the past few hours. Late that same afternoon Vienna was reached, and Giesl's journey home was ended. Shortly after he was engaged in conversation with Count Berchtold.

In the meantime the Serbian reply had been flashed round the world. That the reply was conciliatory seemed to be the consensus of the opinion of most of the statesmen. Even William II was moved to say, "A brilliant performance for a time limit of forty eight hours.

. . . A great moral success for Vienna. But with it every reason for war drops away and Giesl ought to have remained quietly at Belgrade. On the strength of this I should never have ordered mobilization".²⁴

Some of the demands were met completely; some, partially; only one refused, and a request was made to

23. Telephone message from Giesl, via Budapest, July 25, A. R. B., II, No. 26, p. 23.

24. Kautsky Documents, No. 271.

refer that requirement to The Hague. That point was the demand that Serbia allow Austrian officials to help search out Princip's accomplices in the assassination.

So in the face of nine-tenths of the demands conceded, Austria decided for war; for had not Berchtold said that if Serbia swallowed the terms it would be "very disagreeable" to him.²⁵

The fact is Austria had decided for war. The last word of the diplomat had been spoken. He vanished from the scene. The soldier took his place.

One day long after these events, there appeared at the former Austro-Hungarian Legation in Belgrade a man visibly aged. He wanted certain legal papers to qualify for a government pension. This man was Baron Giesl. How different was Europe! How different was the Baron! How changed was his demeanor from that hot summer day in 1914 when "he strapped up his brief case and rolled away to the station".²⁶

25. Kautsky Documents, No. 29.

26. H. F. Armstrong, Three Days In Belgrade, Foreign Affairs, Volume V, p. 275.

Chapter VI
The Ultimatum Works

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The Ultimatum Works

"It is very bad. It will mean war,"¹ declared M. Pashitch, Prime Minister of Serbia, when he heard the news of the fateful events at Serajevo. Pashitch was right; Berchtold had indicated at the conclusion of the "Memoirs" (a copy of which was sent to Wilhelm II July 2,) that it was necessary for Austria to grasp the net woven by "its enemies and tear them once for all".² Francis Joseph, writing to the Kaiser, declared that a "conciliation between Serbia and us is out of the question"³ Count Tisza, writing to his Emperor and King from Budapest July 1, indicated the further attitude of Vienna when he wrote that he had just learned Count Berchtold's intention of making "the horrible deed of Serajevo the occasion for reckoning with Serbia".⁴

When the Russian minister at Belgrade heard the tragic news from Serajevo, he declared: "Esperons que ce ne sera pas un Serbe".⁵ (Let us hope it was not a Serbian.) The Two shots at Serajevo caused Russia to be quite disturbed for she had been for centuries concerned about events in Southeastern Europe. Of course the Poin-

1. H. F. Armstrong, Three Days In Belgrade in Foreign Affairs, V, January 1927, pp. 267-275.
2. Austrian Red Book, op.cit., I, p. 13.
3. Ibid., No. I, p. 3.
4. Austrian Red Book, op.cit., I, No. 2, p. 14.
5. Kautsky Documents, op.cit., No. 10, p. 64.

care visit to the Russian capital had excited attention among, at least, the higher classes of Russian society. At the banquet, which the Grand Duke Nicholas gave to Poincare July 22, two princesses, wives of two Grand Dukes, were talking vigorously:

"Do you know that we are passing through historic days, blessed days! Tomorrow, at the review, the bands will play nothing but the Marche Lorraine and Sambre et Meuse. Today, I had a telegram from my father in the proper style; he tells me we shall have war before the month is out. What a hero, my father! He is worthy of the Iliad. Here, look at this little box - it never leaves me; it has Lorraine soil in it, yes, Lorraine soil, which I collected beyond the frontier when I was in France two years ago with my husband. And now look at that table of honor! It is decorated entirely with thistles; I would not have any other flowers put on it. Now then! They are thistles from Lorraine! I picked a few stalks on the territory annexed (by Germany); I brought them here and had the seeds sown in my garden. Melitza, talk to the Ambassador some more; tell him all this day means to us, while I go to receive the Tsar."

The Ambassador was seated next to the Grand Duchess Anastasia. She made many remarks, mixed with prophecies:

"War is going to break out. Nothing will be left of Austria. You will get Alsace-Lorraine back. Our armies will meet in Berlin. Germany will be annihilated." Then suddenly, "I must control myself, the Tsar is looking at me." 6

As Paleologue introduced his colleagues to the President of France, the latter took the opportunity to say a word here and there, to each of them. When the Austro-Hungarian approached, Poincare offered his condolence over the Serajevo affair. A scene in diplomatic

6. Fay, op.cit., II, p. 283, quoting Paleologue, I, p. 14 ff.

fencing took place. "Have you any news from Serbia?" said the Frenchman. To which the Austrian frigidly replied: "The investigation is advancing." One word brought on another; finally, the Austrian said, "We cannot tolerate, Mr. President, that a foreign government shall allow murderous attacks to be prepared on its soil against our sovereignty." Poincare made a thrust under the Austrian's guard, however, when he said, "With a little good will, this Servian affair is easy to settle. But it is easy for it to become envenomed. Serbia has very warm friends in the Russian people. And Russia has an ally, France. What complications are to be feared here?"⁷

When Count Szapary reported his conversation to Count Berchtold, he did not fail to say that Poincare's influence would not be very favorable toward exercising calmness.⁸

It was easily seen that Russia would very probably make Serbia's fight her own. Racial and religious ties, not to speak of events in the Balkan peninsula, held the attention of Russia. She had been interested in Constantinople for centuries, for it guarded the outlet to the Black Sea. It followed, therefore, that any quarrel between Austria and Serbia could very easily involve Russia. If it involved

7. Fay, op.cit., II, p. 281, quoting Paleologue, I, p. 9 ff.

8. Austrian Red Book, op.cit., I, No. 45, pp. 98-99.

Russia, her ally France would likely become interested and, before the Powers realized it, all Europe might be aflame.

Even Sir Edward Grey was interested in checking the war. He expressed the hope, July 20, that effort might be made "to prevent any breach of the peace". Austria and Russia should discuss matters together if they should become difficult.⁹ Grey advised the new British minister to Serbia that it was not Britain's "business to take violent sides in this matter".^D Grey drew "a sharp line of distinction . . . between an Austro-Serbian and an Austro-Russian quarrel. In the first, he did not wish to mix as it did not concern him. But an Austro-Russian strife meant, in the circumstances a world war".¹¹

Berchtold did not hesitate to say that he thought the tragedy of Serajevo was a matter between Serbia and Austria alone. In other words the Count was interested in localizing the war. Von Schoen agreed thoroughly with the Austrian Foreign Minister's point of view, for he said: "It is a matter of common interest for all monarchical governments that the Belgrade nest of anarchists be once and for all rooted out and it (Germany) will make use of its influence to get

9. British Documents, op.cit., No. 67, pp. 53-54.

10. Ibid., No. 79, p. 64.

11. Lichnowsky to Jagow, K. D., telegram, July 25, No. 180, p. 200.

all the Powers to take the view that the settlements between Austria and Serbia is a matter between those two nations alone".¹²

A British diplomat expressed a strong opinion on "localization" when he said, "I can quite understand Russia not being able to permit Austria to crush Serbia. I think the talk about localizing the war merely means that all the Powers are to hold the ring while Austria quietly strangles Serbia. This, to my mind, is quite preposterous, not to say iniquitous".¹³

Sazonov had expressed Russia's views very succinctly, for he had said "in the most determined manner that it would be quite impossible for Russia to admit that the Austro-Serbian quarrel could be settled by the two parties concerned".¹⁴

The Russian Foreign Minister is quoted as saying, "Hatred is no part of my character; therefore, I feel no hatred toward Austria, nothing but contempt". Anyway it was his opinion, he said, that Austria was on the lookout to "avaler" (devour) Serbia. "In that event, however," declared the minister, "Russia will go to war with Austria." When it was suggested that Austria intended no annexation of Serbian territory, Sazonov suggested a prophetic policy for Austria. "For

12. Kautsky Documents, op.cit., Supplement IV., No. 2, pp. 617-618.

13. British Documents, op.cit., No. 239.

14. Pourtales to The Foreign Office, K.D., July 25, No. 160.

Serbia was to be eaten up, then it was Bulgaria's turn,¹⁵ and then we shall have them on the Black sea". Even the Italian Ambassador as early as July 16, urged Russia to call to the attention of Vienna that "Russia would not endure any infringement by Austria of the integrity¹⁶ and independence of Serbia".

Poincare, while at St. Petersburg, declared to the Austrian Ambassador that the Serbians have friends and it was impossible for a situation to rise which might be inimical to peace.¹⁷ Evidently Poincare was attempting to bluff Austria and at the same time encourage Russia.

Bethmann-Hollweg indicated Germany's attitude on July 23, when he said that the attitude of Germany then would be that the difficulty is one which "affects¹⁸ Austria and Serbia only".

When Sir Edward Grey heard the contents of the ultimatum, July 24, he expressed the belief that it might lead to trouble between Austria and Russia. If Austria moved her troops against Serbia, Russia would mobilize. This would cause the peace of Europe to be endangered. Grey considered, "it required two to keep

15. Pourtales to Bethmann, K.D., July 25, No. 20, pp. 213-214. Cf. Szapary to Berchtold, July 25, A.R.B., II, Nos. 17, 19 and Schilling's Diary, op.cit., pp. 31 ff.
16. Schilling's Diary, p. 25.
17. Austrian Red Book, op.cit., I, No. 45, p. 98.
18. Bethmann to the Minister in the Imperial Suite, K. D., No. 125, p. 165.

peace" now, even as it ordinarily took "two to make a¹⁹ quarrel".

Grey proposed that the four Powers, Germany, France, Italy, and England, work together at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favor of peace in the event that²⁰ Austria and Russia threatened one another. The Teutonic nation approved; France delayed acceptance for she favored mediation between Austria and Serbia; Russia also found objections to it.

The storm clouds of war were getting very dark by July 26. Sazonov was now ready to allow England, France, Germany, and Italy to handle the thorny problem²¹ of diplomatic negotiations in the Balkan area.

On the strength of Sazonov's request, although Grey was out in the country, Nicholson sent the message asking if Paris, Berlin, and Rome would be willing for the ambassador of each to meet with Grey at London in conference at once in order that an attempt might be²² made to avoid hostilities. Italy accepted the same²³ day. France the day following, Russia was at the moment favoring "direct conversations" with Austria, but

19. Grey to Bunsen, B. D., No. 86, p. 70.

20. Grey to Humboldt, telegram, July 24; Scott, Diplomatic Documents, op.cit., (British Blue Book, I, No. 11), p. 885.

21. Buchanan to Grey, telegram, July 25, B. D., No. 125, p. 93.

22. Nicholson to Grey, telegram, July 26, B. D., No. 139, p. 100.

23. Rodd to Grey, telegram, July 26, B. D., No. 154, p. 107.

if hopeful results were not realized, she would accept the British proposal.²⁴ Three of the Powers thus accepted the suggestion; Berlin, however, declared she was unwilling to call Austria into a European court of justice on the Serbian case. The Germans at that hour²⁵ were still clinging to "localization". Failure, therefore, was the end of the latest proposal for stopping the war.

Germany now backed up the proposal of Sazonov for "direct conversations" between Austria and Russia. The latter together with the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg discussed the ultimatum. Finally Sazonov, turned to his companion, and remarked, "Take back your ultimatum, modify its form and I will guarantee the result".²⁶ At this juncture just one barrier to peace was in the way. Berchtold wanted war. To prevent mediation Berchtold succeeded in getting Francis Joseph²⁷ to agree to war. The German Ambassador at Vienna sent in his report to Berlin as follows: "They have decided here", he said, "to send out the declaration of war tomorrow at the latest chiefly to frustrate any attempt at intervention".²⁸

24. Bertie to Grey, telegram, July 27, B.D., No. 183, B.D., No. 194.

25. Bethmann-Hollweg to Lichnowsky, telegram, July 27, K. D., op.cit., No. 248, p. 237.

26. Scott, Diplomatic Documents, I, (French Yellow Book, No. 54), p. 606.

27. Ibid., p. 400.

28. Tschirschky to The Foreign Office, telegram, No. 257, German War Documents, International Conciliation, p. 232.

Berchtold was now in position to meet all mediation proposals that came his way. When the Russian Ambassador approached Berchtold with the idea of "direct conversations" the latter was able to say that he could not consider the proposal for "war on Serbia had been declared today".²⁹ To Germany and England he said, that the latter's proposal for a conference was "too late". In view of the state of war already existing", he said, it "has been outstripped by events".³⁰ "Prestige of the Dual Monarchy was now engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict".³¹

Berchtold was so anxious to get the Emperor to approve the stand for war that he laid before the Emperor the draft of a telegram to Serbia. In the report he said that he had spoken to the "Commander of the Balkan forces" and "to the chief of the General Staff", as to the advisability of declaring war the following day. No objection was offered.³² It is highly interesting to note here, however, that Conrad had recently told Berchtold he could not possibly have the army ready for an attack before August 12. This answer was in response to a question of Berchtold, July 26, who had asked Conrad when he preferred the outbreak

29. Austrian Red Book, op.cit., II, No. 95, p. 158.

30. Ibid., No. 81, p. 145.

31. Bunsen to Grey, telegram, July 28, B.D., No. 227, p. 151.

32. Austrian Red Book, op.cit., II, No. 78, pp. 138-139.

of war. To which Berchtold replied, "But the diplomatic situation will not last as long as that".³³

Berchtold was careful in this report to Francis Joseph, who was at Ischl for his health, to say:

"According to the report of the 4th Corps-Command, Serbian troops on Danube steamers near Temes-Kubin fired at our troops who also gave fire, so that the encounter lasted some time. Hostilities have therefore begun, and it is advisable that we should give our army that freedom of motion to which it has right when the state of war has been proclaimed." ³⁴

The Emperor and King wrote on the communication received from his Foreign Minister the following: "I approve of the enclosed draft of a telegram to the Serbian Foreign Office, containing the declaration of war to Serbia and authorize you to do as your propose."³⁵

The telegram which the aged monarch signed was the declaration of war. It contained the following cryptic statements:

"The Royal government of Serbia not having answered in a satisfactory manner to the note which had been presented to it on the 23rd July 1914, the Imperial and Royal Government finds itself in the necessity, to insure for itself its rights and interests, and for this purpose to have recourse to the force of arms, all the more because the Serbian troops have already attacked a detachment of the Imperial and Royal army near Temes Kubin. Austria-Hungary, therefore, from this moment considers itself on a footing of war with Serbia.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Austria-Hungary

Signed, Francis Joseph.

Count Berchtold"³⁶

33. Fay, op.cit., II, p. 417, quoting Conrad, IV, p. 131.

34. Austrian Red Book, op.cit., II, No. 78, p. 138.

35. Ibid., p. 139.

36. Ibid., Berchtold to Serbian Foreign Minister, telegram, July 28, A.R.B., II, No. 78, pp. 138-141.

From the time, however, that the Emperor signed the declaration to the time the telegram to Serbia was sent, the message was changed materially. The document received by the Serbian Foreign Minister did not contain the phrase, "all the more because the Serbian troops have already attacked a detachment of the Imperial and Royal army near Temes-Kubin".³⁷

We are justified in believing that Berchtold was afraid Francis Joseph would not approve the declaration without some very specific attack by the Serbs. So having procured the highly prized signature he had no further use for the phrase and thus omitted it from the draft of the uncoded telegram sent to Nish at 11:10 A.M. July 28, 1914. On the day following the sending of the telegram he sent a report to Francis Joseph. In it he said that he had removed "from the declaration of war directed against Serbia, the sentence concerning the attack of Serbian troops near Temes-Kubin". He asked for the "gracious sanction" of the Emperor and King to the elimination of the phrase.³⁸ But the work was done for either with or without the phrase it was war.

37. Scott, Diplomatic Documents, op.cit., (Serbian Blue Book E, No. 45), p. 1479.

38. Berchtold to Francis Joseph, July 29, A.R.B., III, No. 26, p. 27. Cf. A.R.B., II, Nos. 78 and 97.

Chapter VII
The Russian Mobilization

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The Russian Mobilization

In St. Petersburg the official visit of Poincare was over. The France steamed away from the Russian capital for home. The French President was well satisfied with his reception in Russia. It was unusually late when the Russian diplomats retired for the night.

The Russians were awakened the next morning to the news of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. When Sazonov digested the substance of the Austrian note, he hastened to be ready to keep the diplomatic channels open between the Russian capital and the other capitals of Europe. The Foreign Minister must have done much speculating about the possibilities of war before the ultimatum, for he unhesitatingly said to Baron Shilling as he met him upon his return to the Capital, "It is the European War". The Czar did not make such an outspoken remark when he heard the news for he merely said, "This is disturbing", and ordered that he be kept advised of additional news.¹

Almost immediately the diplomatic jockeying began, for Count Szapary of Austria came to see Sazonov in order that he might defend the very momentous announcement of his government. Had there been a political barometer

1. Schilling's Diary, op.cit., p. 28 ff.

functioning at that time in the Empire of the Bear, undoubtedly the barometric pressure would have dropped to a low almost comparable to that of the period just preceding the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905. The two tactful masters of the art of diplomacy matched steel against steel in their discussion. Szapary started to read the ultimatum and explain its contents with frequent interruptions from the Russian. "The fact is, you want war and have burned your bridges", said Sazonov. The Austrian said in response to this rejoinder, "We are the most peace-loving Power in the world, but what we want is security for our territory from foreign revolutionary intrigues and the protection of our dynasty from bombs". "One sees how pacific you are, now that you are setting Europe on fire", said Sazonov, and he continued further, "I know what it is. You want to make war on Serbia! I see what is happening, the German newspapers are egging you on. You are setting fire to Europe. It is a great responsibility you are assuming; you will see the impression that this will make here and in London and Paris and perhaps elsewhere. It will be considered as an unjustified aggression".²

Sazonov, having, as he believed, correctly read the political barometer, gazed upon the horizon to the westward. As has been indicated before, it appeared to

2. Szapary to Berchtold, telegram, July 24, A.R.B., op.cit., II, No. 16, p. 13. Cf. A.R.B., II, No. 17, 18, and K. D., No. 148.

him that Austria intended attacking Serbia, and that right soon. Of course, he knew the diplomatic game well enough to believe that, very likely, Szapary might have made wrong impressions.

In spite of these impressions, however, there was enough to be seen to indicate that Russia should make some moves in the direction of protection. So, he began to call his subordinates around him and to give directions of the moves to be made on the international chess board of Europe. If the Austrians were bluffing, he decided that a partial mobilization of the Russian army might stop any attack upon Serbia. Sazonov wasted no time in issuing orders for the Council of Ministers for 3 o'clock the same day. All high officials who were on vacations were ordered back to their posts. Withdrawal of state deposits in Germany was recommended. A conference was held with the Chief of the General Staff³ on the advisability of partially mobilizing the army.

Did Sazonov realize just what mobilization, or even partial mobilization, meant? Once an army is organized for war, even though behind its frontiers, there is a strong probability that some private or privates may bring on the overt act which may mean war. Too, if it so happens that a potential enemy is mobilized behind its frontier, perhaps within shouting distance of the first group, war is almost certain to follow.

3. Schilling's Diary, op.cit., pp. 28-29.

Of course Russia justified her movement on the basis that she felt that Austria intended to blot Serbia off the face of Europe; divide the territory among her friends; keep some herself, naturally; and use the territory she gave away to gain new friends. Moreover, the Serbs were Russia's kinsmen. They looked to her for advice and for assistance in case a larger nation should attack them. Too, Russia had been interested in the Balkan region. She had indicated her interest in the Crimean War of 1854-1856 and in the war in 1877-1878. She felt that she had been deprived of her just dues in the way of territory, largely by the Teutonic Powers. Although Bismarck of Prussia had declared, "that the whole Balkan peninsula was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier", yet he later, perhaps reluctantly, changed his mind. During several centuries Russia had desired Constantinople for the straits hard by are the natural outlet of the Black Sea region. Here was the outlet to the granary of Europe. Anything, therefore, disturbing to the balance of power in the peninsula would naturally disturb Russia.

The Russian Foreign Minister hastened to the French Embassy. Here he had lunch with Ambassadors from Paris, London, and Bucharest. He did not hesitate to say to the diplomats that "the steps taken by Serbia meant war". He asked that there be agreement between Russia, France, and England. The French Ambassador did not hesitate to say, "France would not only give Russia strong diplomatic support but would, if necessary, fulfill all

the obligations imposed on her by the alliance". The Englishman was not so reassuring for he was not at all certain that England would come in since his country was not interested in Serbia. In his report to London, Buchanan declared that "it almost looked as if France and Russia were determined to make a strong stand even if we declined to join them".⁴

Sazonov next met with the Council of Ministers at the appointed time. The points decided were: (1) to request Austria to extend the time limit in order that the Powers might satisfy themselves of the inquiry; (2) to ask Serbia not to fight, but to rest her case with the Great Powers; (3) to mobilize four military districts, depending, of course, upon developments; (4) to take such other military measures as seemed expedient.⁵

Sazonov had decided that the Powers must sit in judgment upon the Austro-Serbian situation. He was not even interested in hearing the German Ambassador suggest "localization" for the conflict. Sazonov replied that Austria wanted to take Serbia, and if she does more in that direction, "Russia will go to war with Austria". Pourtales was unwilling to bring the difficulty of the Austro-Serbian trouble before a court of Europe. It seemed to him "to be absolutely impracti-

4. Buchanan to Grey, telegram, July 24, B.D., op. cit., No. 101, p. 80.

5. Schilling's Diary, p. 30.

6
cable", he said.

At a dinner in St. Petersburg, the Czar's Equerry declared to Von Chelius of Germany, "the situation is very serious". Highly significant was an expression of a Russian general who declared, "The guns along the Danube have probably already commenced their fire, for one only sends a note like that one after the cannon have been loaded".⁷

Sazonov was a very busy man. Another council meeting was held the twenty-fifth. The Czar was present. It was decided that partial mobilization should follow. They hoped by this means to bluff Austria into a settlement with Serbia and Russia. It would, also, give Russia time to prepare for war. Decision was made to call the troops to their standing quarters, for their complete equipment was there. The order which went out at 4:10 P.M. July 25, caused the movement of a million or more men throughout Russia. In addition, 3,000 cadets were made officers immediately. At the St. Petersburg Military Academy, the Czar addressed the cadets saying, "Believe in God as well as the greatness and glory of our country. Seek to serve Him and Me with all your strength". A state of war in towns containing fortresses and along the German and Austrian frontiers was proclaimed at

6. Pourtales to Bethmann, K.D., op.cit., No. 204, p. 213.

7. Chelius to the Kaiser, July 26, K.D., op.cit., No. 291, p. 269.

8

1:00 A.M. July 26.

It seemed evident, said an army man, that "war was already a settled matter".⁹ "Russia cannot allow Austria to crush Serbia", said Sazonov, "and become the predominant power in the Balkans and secure of support of France; she will face all the risks of war".¹⁰

Sazonov apparently believed that Austria and her ally did not think that Russia would back up Serbia. If Russia would call into play a portion of her potential army, the Central Powers might hesitate before they plunged the world into the abyss of war.

In addition to this belief, the Russian high command thought war imminent and that they should make the most of preparation before the other nations started their preparation. So the minister of war was directed, "to proceed immediately to gather stores of war material",¹¹ even before the order for partial mobilization.

As time passed and Austria did not immediately declare war, Sazonov became more at ease. For three days before the Austrian declaration of war upon Serbia, the Minister became optimistic. In the meantime Sazonov suggested to Berchtold that Russia and Austria talk over their difficulties. Sunday and Monday passed and Berch-

8. Fay, op.cit., II, pp. 307 ff., quoting telegram, 1566, General Staff, Hoeniger, p. 80.

9. Ibid., I, p. 319.

10. Buchanan to Grey, July 25, B.D., op.cit., No. 125.

11. Barnes, H. E., The Genesis of the World War, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1926, p. 336.

told did not reply to the proposal for mediation.

However, while Sazonov was waiting he received the news of the Austrian declaration of war upon Serbia. He sent a message to the Russian Ambassador in Berlin in which he announced that because of the declaration of war, Russia would mobilize four military districts the following¹² day.

Sazonov went to the Czar to get him to accept mobilization. No record was kept of his visit. But shortly afterward the Czar sent the Kaiser a message. ". . . An ignoble war has been declared to (sic) a weak country. I foresee that very soon I shall be overwhelmed by the pressure brought upon me and be forced by extreme¹³ measures which will lead to war".

The Chief of the Russian General Staff went to the Czar the next morning. He carried with him the order for partial mobilization; also an order for general mobilization. He was able to get the Czar's signature for¹⁴ partial mobilization without serious difficulty. (Very likely the Czar signed the order for general mobilization, too.) It was necessary to get the signatures of the Ministers of War, Marine, and Interior. These were pro-¹⁵cured without difficulty. The fact that Sazonov had

12. Dickinson, G. Lowes, International Anarchy, The Century Company, New York, 1926, p. 429, quoting Romberg, p. 35.

13. The Czar to the Kaiser, Schilling's Diary, p. 46.

14. Fay, op.cit., II, p. 452, quoting telegram, No. 1785, Iamushkevich to Zhilinski, July 29, 1914.

15. Fay, op.cit., II, p. 454, quoting Dobrorolski, p. 105.

announced partial mobilization before seeing the Czar indicated how sure he was that they could get the signature of that dignitary. For Nicholas II was likely to agree with the last man who talked with him.

In the meantime the office of the Central Telegraph Office in St. Petersburg was busy. The mobilization order was to be sent to all parts of the great Empire. About a dozen instruments were made ready to send the dispatch. It was 9:30 P.M.; the Czar had changed his mind. He ordered partial mobilization instead of general mobilization.¹⁶

The Kaiser had sent the Czar a telegram. In it he said that Russia by remaining neutral in the Austro-Serbian war could prevent "involving Europe in the most horrible war she ever witnessed. I think a direct understanding between Your Government and Vienna possible and desirable", said Wilhelm, "and as I already telegraphed you, my Government is continuing its exertions to promote it".¹⁷

Sazonov and the military leaders were determined to secure an order for general mobilization. They knew Russia was a very vast country. Her population was largely rural and, of necessity, widely scattered. She was the most backward, perhaps, of any of the European

16. Fay, op.cit., II, pp. 455-456, quoting Dobrorolski, p. 107.

17. The Kaiser to the Czar, July 29, Schilling's Diary, p. 55.

countries. Many of her roads were mere paths and especially in the winter time they were practically impassable. Her railroads were few, and consequently there were vast distances between railroads. The movement of troops and war materials would, therefore, of necessity, be very much slower than in highly industrialized countries such as, Germany and Austria. Vast distances would need to be covered to transport troops from one part of the Empire to the other. Russia must, therefore, begin military movements before her enemies. Sazonov told the Czar that France would be displeased unless Russia lived up to her obligations as an ally; that Germany might convince France that she should remain neutral and if she did, Russia would fall a victim to the German army.¹⁸

The Russian Chief of Staff awaited Sazonov's visit to the Czar. He wanted a message as soon as the Czar had signed the order for mobilization. "After this", the Chief of Staff said, "I will retire from sight, smash my telephone and generally adopt measures which will prevent anyone from finding me for the purpose of giving contrary orders which would again stop our general mobilization".¹⁹

Sazonov's arguments were convincing to the Czar, but not before a struggle. "Think of the responsibility which you are asking me to take!", said the Czar. "Think

18. Fay, op.cit., II, p. 469, quoting Dobrorolski, p. 108.

19. Schilling's Diary, op.cit., p. 64.

of the thousands of men who will be sent to their death".²⁰
Diplomacy had concluded its work. The Czar thought of the safety of his Empire. It would not do at all to allow Germany to surprise Russia.

Sazonov telephoned the Chief of Staff, "Now²¹ you can smash your telephone". For at 4 P.M. the Czar directed that the troops be called to the colors. By 5 P.M. the three necessary signatures had been obtained; and at 6 P.M. a momentous message went out to the Empire as follows: "His Majesty orders: the army and navy to be placed on a war footing and to this end reservists and horses to be called up, according to the mobilization plan of the year 1910. July thirty-first is to be counted the first day of mobilization."²²

"Mobilization means war". This was accepted as a truism by military men of Europe.

Russia, of course, justified her general mobilization by Austria's declaration of war against Serbia, because the latter involved possible re-organization of the Balkan peninsula. Austria had not agreed to any of the requests that Russia proposed, namely, the lengthening of the time of the ultimatum, the desirability of using the Serbian answer to the note as a basis for additional discussion, or the offer of "direct

20. Schilling's Diary, p. 60.

21. Schilling's Diary, op.cit., p. 66.

22. Schmitt, op.cit., II, p. 245, quoting Frantz, p. 265.

conversations". Even the authorization of partial mobilization brought no concession from Austria.

Austria all along seemed to feel that Russia would not fight, but Austria was wrong, and because of her bad guess the world was brought into the titanic struggle.

Chapter VIII

France Stands By Her Ally, Russia

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Certainly France felt keenly the sting of Bismarck's work which made possible Germany's supremacy in the life and death struggle of 1870-1871. Paris had kept wreaths at the foot of the statue of the lost city of Strassbourg for years. France could not forget the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. Sentimentally, they were of great value to her; politically, they were quite significant, since Germany was thus permitted to increase her territory on the west side of the Rhine river; economically, because the iron mines of Lorraine and the coal mines of the Saar valley were of tremendous importance. Undoubtedly, jealousy existed in France because of Germany's rapid development, industrially and politically. The German population exceeded that of France by a wide margin and the latter very probably was afraid of a repetition of the attack of 1870.

France began to look for friends after her terrible defeat by Prussia. She was rewarded in 1891 by making an alliance with Russia. For France had money and Russia had soldiers. Investments could, therefore, be made in Russia which would help turn the wheels of industry, and the French could breathe easier because of the surety of the Russian army. The French then faced¹ the future with confidence.

1. Hazen, Europe Since 1815, p. 357.

When in 1913 Poincare was elected President of France, the French nation was assured of a more vigorous policy on the part of the President than was usual. He indicated this within two days after his election by sending a message to Parliament. This prerogative had not been exercised by previous presidents. In this message, he said that he favored adequately safeguarding and increasing the nation's strength, and closed with these words, "It is in the service of this policy and maintenance of this unity in the future that I shall unfalteringly employ all my energies".² The President was a Lorrainian and, very naturally, he looked back to the land of his birth with the desirability of returning the lost provinces to France. In the same year of his election to the Presidency he said, "France is not afraid of war".³ The French President was not alone in his attitude toward Alsace-Lorraine. Many of the people hoped that France might regain the territory they believed had been so wrongfully wrung from her. The ties of blood are very strong. Just as the French wanted the provinces so Russia was determined to support the Jugo-Slavs in the Balkans.

In 1913 when France ordered three years training for French soldiers, a member of the German Reichstag

2. Poincare, Raymond, The Memoirs of Raymond Poincare, 1913-1914, Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1928, p. 16.
3. Gooch, George Peabody, Franco-German Relations, Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1923, p. 63.

voiced his sentiment against it. "It is a provocation;
we will not allow it", said the German.⁴

Poincare's government was sparing no pains in preparing for any eventuality. The Frenchman had told Izvolski shortly after the former's election in 1913 that he would still guide the foreign policy of his country. Up to the outbreak of the war Poincare succeeded very well. The Russians were gratified, for they believed they had found a man that would back up Russia should there be a Russo-German war.⁵

Poincare had visited Russia in 1912. He decided to make a visit in 1914 in his capacity as head of the nation. July 20, the France steamed into Cronstadt. In a few minutes the Czar and President were engaged in conversation.⁶ At the banquet that same evening the Czar in his speech of welcome was hopeful that the combined strength of their two countries might continue in peace and even tie . . . more tightly the bands which unite them".⁷ Later while aboard the France, Poincare, in thanking the Czar for the gracious reception, declared that both countries were "animated by the same ideal of peace combined with strength, honour, and dignity".⁸ The Czar responded in a closing message, "Our concerted diplomatic action and the brotherliness subsisting between our

4. Scott, Diplomatic Documents, op.cit., Part I (The French Yellow Book), p. 533.

5. Fay, op.cit., p. 316, quoting Livre Noir, I, pp. 203, 216, 266, 281.

6. Poincare, Memoirs, 1913-1914, op.cit., p. 165.

7. Schilling's Diary, op.cit., appendix, p. 113.

8. Ibid, p. 115.

armed forces . . . will lighten the tasks of our respective governments".

Having left suitable gifts for the members of the family of the Czar, including the decoration of the Cordon of the Grand Cross for the heir to the throne, the President of the French Republic left the hospitality of the Romanoffs and the France steamed away from its moorings for the home port.

The English Ambassador at St. Petersburg was informed by Sazonov the next day after the France started home that France and Russia were agreed upon the question of the balance of power, particularly in the East; that they would interfere if Austria attempted to attack the sovereignty of Serbia, and on a reaffirmation of the alliance. ". . . It almost looked as if France and Russia were determined to make a strong stand", said Buchanan to Grey.⁹

As the France approached Stockholm a wireless message was received aboard, sent to Poincare by the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, announcing the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. Poincare advised an extension of the time limit; also an investigation by the Powers.¹⁰ The suggestions were not accepted. Sazonov in Russia suggested to Belgrade on July 24, that, "the situation of the Serbians being hopeless, it would be

9. Buchanan to Grey, July 24, B.D., op.cit., No. 101, pp. 80-81.

10. Poincare, Memoirs, 1913-1914, pp. 182-183.

better for them to offer no resistance and to appeal to
 the Great Powers".¹¹ Meanwhile, the France came to
 anchor at Stockholm. A message from the Quai d'Orsay
 awaited the chief. In it Bienvenu-Martin said that
 Germany supported Austria on the Serbian ultimatum.¹²
 Poincare did not prolong his visit to Sweden, for on
 the twenty-sixth he was en route for Copenhagen.¹³ He
 probably was encouraged to get away from the Swedish
 capital as early as hospitality would allow. For he
 heard alarming news from the Russian Minister who said,
 "It means war". The Frenchman replied, "It is terrible,
 terrible; for if it means war for you, it most certainly
 means war for us". Poincare was unable to get additional
 news as he entered the last lap of his journey because
 of interference from the German wireless stations.¹⁴

Sazonov now believed he was standing on firm
 ground or he never would have said, "On the day that
 Austria crossed the Serbian frontier, the order for
 mobilization against Austria would be issued".¹⁵ He was
 further assured by a message from the French government
 that France was ready ". . . to fulfill her obligations
 as an ally in case of necessity".¹⁶ Sazonov was so well
 pleased at the tenor of the note from France that he

11. Schilling's Diary, op.cit., telegram, No. 1487, p.33

12. Poincare, Memoirs, 1913-1914, p. 187.

13. Ibid., p. 193.

14. Schuman, Frederick Lewis, War and Diplomacy In The French Republic, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1931, pp. 214-215.

15. British Documents, op.cit., No. 247, p. 162.

16. Schilling's Diary, op.cit., p. 43.

telegraphed London and Paris, "It only remains for us to hasten our armed preparation and to reckon with the inevitability of war".¹⁷

President Poincare and Viviani landed at Dunkirk early the morning of July 29. They wasted no time in getting to Paris. Here approval of measures made in their absence was made; troops in training were ordered to their standing quarters; troops were ordered to return from Morocco; and officers on leave were told to return. The cabinet seemed to be united for purposes of defense.¹⁸

The President, however, moved cautiously. He recalled conditions in 1870 when France declared war first. He favored waiting for Germany to move in order that Russia and France might not be accused of starting the war.¹⁹

The question now arose of the best means of frontier defense. The Minister of War saw the strategic necessity of adequate defence; Viviani saw the diplomatic necessity of allowing no overt act to be committed by France. The latter was especially interested in courting the good will of England who had not openly expressed herself about entering the war.

A compromise between the War Minister and Viviani resulted. Viviani advised Cambon, French

17. Ibid., p. 54.

18. Fay, II, pp. 482-483, quoting Recouly, pp. 61 ff.

19. Ibid., pp. 483-486.

Ambassador at London that, ". . . we have kept our troops ten kilometres from the frontier and forbidden them to approach nearer".²⁰ So France approached the state of war.

Will no one raise a voice against the impending avalanche that is shortly to crush northern France? At least one man of considerable ability does not hesitate. It is Juarez from Beautiful Languedoc. He was a very intellectual man, becoming a professor of philosophy at twenty-five. He now espoused the cause of the people. Socialists of Europe were in session at Brussels. Juarez in his speech at one of the sessions declared the German Socialists had been mentioned as the models for France. "I thank our German comrades in the name of the French, and I swear: We will continue to support them like brothers against the war-mongers' Attila campaign, true till death".²¹ Very shortly thereafter he protested to his own government as a member of the Chamber of Deputies against its failure to check Russia in its movements for war.²² Before another day had passed, he had been killed by Russian agents, it is claimed. He had lived as he suggested in his speech in Brussels, "true till death".

20. Scott, Diplomatic Documents, op.cit., I (French Yellow Book), No. 106, p. 663.

21. Cited by Ludwig, op.cit., pp. 189-191.

22. Michon Georges, Franco-Russian Alliance, The Macmillan Company, 1929, p. 285.

At that hour there was every evidence of the fulfillment of Poincare's advice to the Russian Foreign Minister while the former was visiting there; "Sazonov²³ must be firm and we must support him".

23. Fay, *op.cit.*, II, p. 282.

Chapter IX
Diplomacy Fails

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Diplomacy Fails

The suggestion was made by Grey, even before the ultimatum, that Austria and Russia talk over the trouble arising between Austria and Serbia. France, however, was unwilling, for it was "very dangerous". Efforts of France and Russia to extend the time limit were unacceptable to Berchtold. Attempts to have four Powers mediate between Austria and Serbia were vetoed. Grey's suggestion that a conference of Ambassadors attempt to find a solution were rejected. The desire of Austria and Germany to "localize" the conflict came to nothing.

Grey could not understand why Austria was unwilling to make use of the Serbian reply as a basis for negotiations. For should diplomacy fail in this instance, Russia would be provoked and Europe would have a terrible war. Grey, therefore, asked Germany to use her good offices to encourage Austria to accept the Serbian reply or at least use it as a starting point¹ for conferences.

Bethmann decided that the time had come to act. He, therefore, sent a message to Tschirschky.

1. Lichnowsky to Bethmann, telegram, July 27, K.D., No. 258, p. 243.

"I request Count Berchtold's opinion on the English suggestion, as likewise his views on Sazonov's desire to negotiate directly with Vienna", Bethmann said in his message.²

However, Berchtold had a reply ready. ". . . Since the opening of hostilities on the part of Serbia", telegraphed Berchtold, "and the ensuing declaration of war, England's move was made too late".³ It was evident that Berchtold was in no mood to enter negotiations. For he had decided that war must be declared in order "to cut the ground from every attempt at intervention".⁴

Evidently, Germany had a very lukewarm attitude toward the transmissal of Grey's request for restraint upon her ally. The Austrian Ambassador bears out this statement, for he telegraphed Berchtold that Germany "assures us in the most decided way that it does not identify itself with these propositions; that on the contrary it advises to disregard them, but that it must pass them on to satisfy the English government".⁵

Just at this time the Kaiser hurried back to Potsdam from his cruise. Bethmann, hearing that the Kaiser was ordering the fleet home, ventured on the

2. Bethmann to Tschirschky, telegram, July 27, K.D., No. 277, p. 411.
3. Tschirschky to Bethmann, telegram, July 28, K.D., No. 313, p. 283.
4. Tschirschky to Bethmann, telegram, July 27, K.D., op.cit., No. 257.
5. Szogveny to Berchtold, telegram, July 27, A.R.B., op.cit., II, No. 68, p. 126.

twenty-fifth "most humbly to advise . . . no premature return of the fleet". The Kaiser upon receiving this message wrote on the telegram, "Unbelievable assumption! Unheard of! It never entered my mind!"⁶ In the meantime, however, upon the Kaiser's return, decision was made by him to suggest the "Halt in Belgrad" proposal.

". . . Every cause for war falls to the ground", said the Kaiser as he read the Serbian note. However, he continued, "The Serbians are Orientals; therefore, liars, tricksters, and masters of evasion". Wilhelm then proposed that "a guarantee that the promises will be carried out" be required. In addition, the Austrian army could occupy a part of Serbia for a "temporary" period.⁷

Bethmann sent the message as directed, but he did not make it very strong for he did not want to give offense to Austria and under no circumstances did he want to make it appear that he was attempting to check Austria. For sixty hours he waited for an answer to his message. When it finally came it was a rejection. The Kaiser, too, had sent a message to the Emperor of Austria. "I should be honestly obliged to you if you would favor me with your decision as soon as possible", said the Kaiser.⁸ But the hope for a

6. Bethmann to the Kaiser, telegram, July 25, K.D., op.cit., No. 182, p. 201.
7. Wilhelm to Jagow, telegram, July 28, K.D., op.cit., No. 182, p. 201.
8. Wilhelm to Francis Joseph, telegram, July 30, K.D., op.cit. No. 437, p. 371.

favorable answer to the "Halt in Belgrad" proposal was all in vain.

In the meantime, Grey is busy in London. Lichnowsky reported that the Minister was pleased by Germany's attempt to mediate between Austria and Russia. Grey was ready to enter into any discussions that might be hopeful of success. The German Ambassador at London reported that Grey had said, "half in jest, that we could never tell whose house might remain unscorched in the midst of such a conflagration as a World War".⁹ On the thirtieth, Grey telegraphed Buchanan at St. Petersburg that he favored the plan of conferences to settle the Austro-Serbian difficulty, provided the Austrians would evacuate any Serbian territory occupied when satisfaction was provided.¹⁰

Grey next passed on the Russian formula. He believed it involved too much concession from Austria. For Austria was called upon to eliminate from the ultimatum "anything infringing on Serbia's sovereign rights". Austria, too, was expected to admit that her relations with Serbia were of European interest.¹¹ He asked Sazonov to modify the proposal. "If Austria", he said, "having occupied Belgrade and other Serbian territory, declares herself ready in the interest of

9. Lichnowsky to Foreign Office, telegram, July 29, K.D., op.cit. No. 313, pp. 357-358.
10. Grey to Buchanan, telegram, July 30, Scott, Diplomatic Documents, op.cit., (British Blue Book, I), No. 103, p. 965 of K.D., No. 439.
11. Kautsky Documents, No. 421, p. 360.

European peace to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military preparatives provided that other Powers did the same".¹² But these proposals went the way of all the others; they ended in failure for the Powers evidently did not trust one another.

At this time, it seems proper to notice events in another quarter. The royal cousins who presided over the affairs of Germany and Russia at times sent secret telegrams to each other which they signed very affectionately, "Willy" or "Nicky". The series of sixty-five messages were written from 1904 to 1907. In these dispatches, which came to light as a result of the opening of the Russian archives, these monarchs considered various international topics. The Kaiser gave the Czar advice on methods to be used to defeat Japan; arranged an alliance with the Czar that, had it remained in force, would have nullified Russia's alliance with France and considered the crossing of Denmark in case of war. Both seemed to be especially anxious to preserve the peace of the world; yet, both conspired to thwart¹³ the continuance of peaceful world relations.

12. Grey to Buchanan, telegram, July 30, B.D., op. cit., No. 309, pp. 196, 197 - also K.D., No. 460.
13. Bernheim, Herman, Willy-Nicky Correspondence, Alfred Knopf and Company, New York, 1918, pp. 15-18.

With the strengthening of the bonds of the Entente nations on the one hand, and the cultivated friendship of the Triple Alliance nations on the other, the Kaiser saw that he would be unable to swing the Czar's country over into his armed camp, and so the correspondence so affectionately nurtured for four years seemed to die, except that now and then a message of the old type may be found.

Then came the two shots at Scrajevo and the crisis. The Kaiser's government stood back of the "blank check" granted to Austria. The month quickly passed, and with it came the ultimatum. Said the Kaiser when he heard of the Serbian mobilization, "This may result in mobilization by Russia; will result in mobilization by Austria".¹⁴ Additional proof of how serious William considered conditions is to be found in the fact that he cut short his cruise in the North, and he returned quickly and quietly to Potsdam, July 27. But the Kaiser had arrived back on the soil of the Fatherland to forecast possible events; to receive the latest reports from his ally; and to keep both eyes and ears open on his eastern and western frontiers.

He did not have long to wait before things began to happen. He, by this time, had read and digested the Austrian ultimatum and the Serbian reply. Recalling

14. Bethmann to Wilhelm, telegram, July 25, K.D., op.cit., No. 132, p. 201.

his previous experience in writing his part of the Willy-Nicky correspondence, the Kaiser resumed this correspondence the next day after the Austrian declaration of war upon Serbia. "It is with the gravest concern", said the Kaiser, "that I hear of the impression which the action of Austria against Serbia is creating in your country. The spirit that led Serbians to murder their own King and his wife still dominates the country. I fully understand how difficult it is for you and your government to face the drift of your public opinion. Therefore, with regard to the hearty and tender friendship which binds us from long ago with firm ties, I am exerting my utmost influence to induce the Austrians to deal straightly to arrive at a satisfactory understanding with you. I confidently hope you will help me in my efforts to smooth over difficulties that may still arise. SIGNED: Your very sincere and devoted friend¹⁵ and cousin, Willy".

Nicholas at the same time remembered the very informal correspondence with his royal cousin at Berlin, and sent a telegram to his kinsman in which he said, "An ignoble war has been declared to (sic) a weak country. . . . To try to avoid such a calamity as a European war, I beg of you in the name of our old friendship to do what you can to stop your allies from

15. The Emperor to the Czar, telegram, July 28, K.D., op.cit., No. 335, p. 296. Also Schilling's Diary, p. 45.

going too far."¹⁶ The messages of the two cousins crossed on the wires.

William immediately responded to the Czar's message, affirming his desire for peace and advising against any military movements on the part of Russia; for, said he, that "would precipitate a calamity we both wish to avoid and jeopardize my position as mediator which I readily accepted on your appeal to my friendship and my help".¹⁷

The Czar was so heartened by this message that he cancelled the order for general mobilization which was just in the act of being sent to borders of the far flung Empire. This move, of course, caused the hearts of the Russian General Staff to skip a few beats, and led them as has been stated previously to agree tacitly among themselves that when they were able to get the next order for general mobilization that, "they would smash the telephone and disappear" for the time being. The Czar suggested next that, "It would be right to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Conference". The Kaiser noted on the message,¹⁸ "Well!, Well! Thanks just the same". Bethmann merely said in reply, "consideration in this case would naturally be excluded".¹⁹

16. Kautsky Documents, op.cit., No. 332, p. 320.

17. Kaiser to Czar, telegram, July 29, K.D., op.cit., No. 359; Schilling's Diary, p. 56.

18. Kautsky Documents, op.cit. No. 366; Schilling's Diary, p. 54.

19. Bethmann to Pourtales, telegram, July 30, K.D., op.cit., No. 391, p. 343.

The Kaiser now was enraged at a telegram he received from the Czar wherein the latter admitted that because of "preparations" by Austria they had decided partially to mobilize "five days ago". Wilhelm at this point noted, "I cannot agree to any more mediation, since the Czar who requested it has secretly mobilized²⁰ behind my back. My work is at an end".

Thus did the Willy-Nicky correspondence fail. Only a miracle could save the world from the mighty avalanche of war.

Meanwhile, the Kaiser had a report from another quarter. Grey had expressed himself with vigor to the German Ambassador in London on July 29. England could "stand aside as long as the conflict remained confined to Austria and Russia. But if we (Germany) and France should be involved" . . . Great Britain would²¹ be forced to make up its mind quickly". This information proved conclusively that Great Britain might fight. Consequently, Bethmann in informing the German Ambassador of changed conditions said, ". . . We must urgently and impressively suggest to the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet the acceptance of mediation²²".

The telegram was read by Tschirschky to

- 20. Nicholas to Wilhelm, telegram, July 30, K.D., op.cit., No. 390, p. 342.
- 21. Kautsky Documents, op.cit., No. 368, pp. 321-322.
- 22. Kautsky Documents, op.cit., No. 395, p. 344.

Berchtold. The latter was "pale and silent". Later he²³ said he would take the matter to the Emperor.

Finally, the answer came. It was decided to "carry through the war against Serbia and to order mobilization one day earlier than had previously been decided upon. At 12:23 P.M. July 31, the order for mobilization with Francis Joseph's signature attached was sent on its way. August 4 was declared as the first day of²⁴ mobilization.

Conrad received heartening news from Moltke July 30. It undoubtedly cheered Berchtold, too, for it declared that, "The standing firm in a European War is the last chance of saving Austria-Hungary. Germany²⁵ will go with her unconditionally".

23. Tschirschky to Bethmann, telegram, July 31, K.D., op.cit., No. 465, pp. 386-387.

24. Fay, op.cit., II, p. 517, quoting Schaefer, p. 536.

25. Ibid, pp. 507-508, quoting Conrad, IV, p. 152.

Chapter X

The Appeal To Arms

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The Appeal To Arms

Berchtold had won his point. It was now or never. Unless the Serbians were checked in their dream for power their nationalistic aspirations would spread and cause untold damage to Austria. Should Austria-Hungary lose her access to the sea she would become a third rate power. That was a thought that was now seriously contemplated by Berchtold. On a number of occasions in the past few years, there had been causes for war. The Austrian Foreign Minister would not be denied now. He had successfully piloted an ultimatum; broken off diplomatic relations; and co-operated with Conrad to mobilize the army. Year by year Russia was getting stronger, and if it was necessary to fight her Austria was ready to go all the way.

Francis Joseph was not entirely without hope even when Giesl left Belgrade. When he received the news of the break in diplomatic relations he said in a choking voice, "Also doch". (So it has come after all) However, he still believed that war need not necessarily¹ ensue. By July 31, however, he decided that there was no escape from war and so signed the order for mobilization, effective August 4.

1. Fay, op.cit., II, p. 350, quoting Margatti, p. 404.

In a telegram to the Kaiser, the Emperor of Austria declared that he relied upon God, "combined with the certainty that the strength of your defense will with unflinching fidelity, furnish security for my Empire and for the Triple Alliance".² The issue between Austria and Serbia was to be settled by the appeal to arms.

Russia did not hesitate long. She recalled that she had to bring in her troops from the far-flung districts of the Empire. She would avenge her diplomatic defeats in 1878 and 1908. She could not take chances on some other great Powers getting possession of the Straits. She could not sit still and watch her Slavic kinsmen in the Balkans be taken by Austria. For the nation who could control Constantinople and the Straits would control the economic conditions of South-eastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean.³ Even that nation would probably become the master of the Balkans. Because of economic reasons, political policies, and, not least, because of ties of blood, Russia must not allow Austria to get a firmer hold on the Balkans. The Russians considered the war, for the possession of the coveted Straits might be just ahead. They must not hesitate.

Sazonov had looked over the field carefully.

2. Francis Joseph to Wilhelm, July 31, K.D., No. 482, p. 400.
3. Stieve, Friedrich, Isvolsky and The World War, Alfred Knopf and Company, 1926, pp. 187-193.

He saw the evidence of a possible crash of the Dual Monarchy. He did not fail to notice that the expansion of Serbia must be largely to the Northward where so many of her kinsmen lived against their will under the domination of Austria Hungary.⁴ When Sazonov heard about the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, he said, "Austria could not be both accuser and judge in her own cause".⁵ A few days later Russia mobilized her army. Russia was ready for the struggle.

Meanwhile, Berchtold continued to look to Germany for assistance. Bethmann said that "a very unimportant clash between the interests of Russia and Austria-Hungary may start a war".⁶ The Kaiser expressed himself very effectively on the Serbian question. He declared they were liars, tricksters, and could not generally be relied upon. The Kaiser was moved to note in a telegram from the Ambassador at Belgrade sent July 24, "How hollow the whole so-called Serbian Great Power appears. That is the way all Slav states are! Only tread firmly on the feet of the rabble!"⁷ The Kaiser had been called upon to stand behind his "blank check".

Wilhelm was not unmindful of the possibilities in the "Near East". He had previously made friends with

4. Ibid, p. 180.

5. Kautsky Documents, op.cit., No. 160.

6. International Conciliation, German Secret War Documents June 15 to August 5, 1914, No. 150, p. 204.

7. Ibid, No. 150, May, 1920, p. 227

the Sultan. For political and economic reasons he favored a closer friendship with the Turks. Both Austria and Germany had interests in that part of the world. Turkey was the traditional enemy of Russia. If then, Germany and Austria should fight Russia, opportunities for trade would undoubtedly open before them.⁸ When the Kaiser heard that the Czar had taken military measures five days before or July 24, he was infuriated. He was even aroused to say that the Czar ". . . mobilized behind my back".⁹

Since Germany "had the speed and Russia the numbers", it was imperative to Germany that the latter country should not be allowed to mobilize her forces from afar. "It appeared that England, France, and Russia have agreed among themselves . . . to carry on a war of annihilation against us, taking the Austro-Serbian conflict as a pretext", noted the Kaiser. "The stupidity and clumsiness of our ally is thereby turned into a noose for us". "The encircling of Germany has now at last become an accomplished fact". "Edward VII is, after his death, stronger than I who am alive".¹⁰

At this moment the Kaiser who was at Potsdam was interrupted by a telephone call from the Chancellor.

8. Ibid., p. 219.

9. Ibid., p. 239.

10. International Conciliation, German Secret War Documents, No. 150, May 1920, pp. 240-241.

Russia had issued the call for general mobilization, said Bethmann. The red placards calling the troops to the colors had been posted the night of the thirtieth. The Kaiser's government immediately proclaimed,¹¹ "threatening danger of war". Germany now tried to divert Austria's attention to Russia principally, for¹² Germany expected to mobilize within forty eight hours. "The declaration of Threatening Danger of War meant¹³ mobilization, . . . and this meant war".

Wilhelm then wired George V saying he had just heard that "Nicky has ordered the mobilization of his whole army and fleet. . .".¹⁴ On the same day he sent a message to the Czar saying that peace was still possible provided the Czar would stop mobilization "which must¹⁵ threaten Germany and Austria-Hungary". A telegram from the Czar to Wilhelm came to the German Foreign Office at 2:52 P.M., July 31. The messages of the Kaiser and Czar were crossing on the wires. The Emperor of all the Russians admitted that the mobilization was the result of the movement of Austria, but he declared, "My troops shall take no provocative action"

11. Ibid., p. 243.

12. Bethmann to Tschirschky, telegram, July 31, K.D., No. 479.

13. Protocol of the Session of the Royal Prussian Ministry of State, July 30, K.D., No. 456.

14. Wilhelm to George V, telegram, July 31, K.D., No. 477.

15. Wilhelm to Nicholas II, telegram, July 31, K.D., No. 480.

while negotiations with Austria are pending.¹⁶ Bethmann on the last day of the stormy diplomatic month of July gave Russia twelve hours to call off mobilization and declare it to Germany.¹⁷ Russia refused. The scene was very dramatic. Pourtales asked Sazonov three times to suspend military operations. Three times he replied in the negative. The German then gave Sazonov the declaration of war, and walking to the window declared, "I could never have believed that I should leave St. Petersburg under these conditions". The next morning the German Embassy was closed and Pourtales and his staff left for Berlin by special train by the way of Finland.¹⁸

At the same hour that Pourtales was leaving St. Petersburg, the Czar was addressing his officers in church, "I salute in you my whole army. I solemnly swear not to make peace so long as there is a single enemy on Russia's soil".¹⁹ Russia and Germany had entered the lists. They confidently looked for others to follow.

The Kaiser and the Czar now look to France. Will France remain firm to the alliance with Russia? The Kaiser is hopeful she may not; the Czar devoutly hopes she will be faithful. Germany sent France an ultimatum. The time limit was later extended by two

16. Nicholas to Wilhelm, telegram, July 31, K.D., No. 487, p. 402.

17. Bethmann to Pourtales, telegram, July 31, K.D., No. 490, p. 404.

18. Schilling's Diary, op.cit., pp. 76-79.

19. Buchanan, George William, My Mission to Russia, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1923, pp. 211-212.

hours, and even then the Germans waited, hoping against hope that France would remain neutral. In the message to the German Ambassador at Paris, Bethmann instructed the former to insist that France, in the event she chose neutrality, turn over the fortresses of Toul and Verdun to Germany. These she promised to return to France at the close of the war.²⁰ If Schoen mentioned the fortresses in his conversation to the French, Viviani did not say so.²¹ France, however, had no thought of staying out of the war. Since 1912 Russia had known she could count on France in case of war. France reassured Russia during the crisis and announced very definitely²² on August 1 that she would stand by her.

The French government, however, wanted Germany to declare war against France. It would make the French come to the colors more patriotically. Sound "diplomatic philosophy" indeed! But the French President wanted the Germans to start the war for other reasons: (1) It would be necessary to get the approval of the French Parliament; (2) he did not want to answer questions about the Russian alliance; (3) English opinion must not be made unfavorable to France. Consequently, France gave no answer to the German ultimatum but she did

20. Bethmann to Schoen, telegram, July 31, K.D., No. 491, p. 405.
21. Scott, Diplomatic Documents, (French Yellow Book) No. 120, pp. 675-676.
22. Dickinson, citing Romberg, p. 58, No. 222, p. 60, No. 225. Information herein cited was not in R.O.B. as published in 1914.

23

mobilize August 1.

Meanwhile, Isvolsky asked to see Poincare near midnight August 1. "Germany has declared war on Russia", he said. "What will France do?" The Frenchman replied that he would call the Ministers together "and they will surely fulfil our alliance obligations".²⁴

Baron Schoen, speaking for Germany, threw down the gauge of battle to France August 3. French aviators had flown over German territory, he said. They had also violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over a part of that country. ". . . In the presence of these acts of aggression", Schoen said, "the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France". The long period of secret diplomacy had ended in war.²⁵

It is said that God was also mobilized. Francis Joseph feelingly said, "I am conscious of the momentous character of my decisions and have taken them trusting in God's justice". The Kaiser lifted his face heaven-ward, too, as he sent the message to the aged Emperor, "I join my prayers with yours that God may stand by us". The Czar, as had been suggested before, declared in the presence of the German Ambassador,

- 23. Poincare, Memoirs, 1913-1914, p. 272.
- 24. Poincare, Memoirs, 1913-1914, p. 272.
- 25. Scott, Diplomatic Documents, I, (French Yellow Book, No. 148), p. 694.

"Only One can help us."²⁶ And so invoking God's name, the nations go to war. Small wonder that Napoleon said so long ago, "God is on the side of the strongest battalions".

Thus did the nations enter the lists; the Czar signed the decree that later led him to violent death in Siberia; the Kaiser by his action in these hot summer days led him to exile at Doorn to saw wood in retrospect.²⁷ Francis Joseph closed his last days in the holocaust of war; while France in the next few years was bled white with her sacrifices on the Hindenburg line.

26. Ludwig, July 14, op.cit., p. 203.

27. Col. Frederick Palmer, Twelve Days That Wrecked A World, The Courier-Journal, August 2, 1934.

Chapter XI

England And Belgium Enter The War

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Many believed that England held the key that would unlock the door either to peace or to war on those summer days of 1914. For this belief there are a number of reasons. Of all the European powers who entered the war, Great Britain, perhaps, had less interest in the Balkan peninsula than any other. She would, of course, express some concern as to the ownership of Constantinople, but as long as Russia or some other Great Power did not make an attempt to take that city, she would certainly make no objection to it remaining under the control of Turkey. It is easily seen if the status quo was to be maintained, that it was far better for the strategic city of Constantinople (Istanbul) to remain under the weak Turks' control than to pass into the hands of a strong nation.

Later, Great Britain changed her mind about the ownership of Constantinople. When Great Britain attacked the Dardanelles in the War, Russia believed that England wanted to prevent her from getting Constantinople. Sazonov was believed by some Russians to be the tool of Britain. It seemed "necessary to save Sazonov's position and policy and to prevent serious mischief", said Grey that Russia have the promise of Constantinople. Grey admitted that neither Great Britain

nor France wanted to make the concession. But, according to the British Foreign Minister, the Russian losses in the common cause led England to be the first to make the concession. "The French agreed; the thing was done".¹

As the crisis approached in 1914, it seemed evident that Great Britain would be unconcerned with any Austro-Serbian war, except as the peace of Europe might be affected. The British were not tied by a strong alliance to either disputant in the Austro-Serbian crisis, although they belonged to the Triple Entente. Naturally a nation that had no particular interest would be more likely to see that there were two sides to the dispute.

The British fleet, too, was something with which to be reckoned, and if such a powerful nation had taken leadership and had made more definite suggestions to these powers who were about to fight, most likely they would respectfully listen.

So, because of these facts, France and Russia asked that Great Britain restrain the Central Powers by declaring in no uncertain terms that if the avalanche descended that she would quickly come to the aid of the Entente Powers. Germany, likewise, called upon Lord Grey, British Minister of Foreign Affairs, to prevent Russia from doing anything rash.

It will be remembered, however, that Great

1. Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916, Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925, II, pp 187-188.

Britain has the democratic form of government; that Grey could not move very fast until Parliament approved the general policies. In addition to that point, the Cabinet was not sure where it stood on this crisis in its early stages.

It seems, too, that Grey was occupied by other considerations. The Irish question was still a troublesome one to Great Britain and needed immediate attention. Anglo-German relations were better than they had been for years. Grey had been able to smooth the troubled waters of suspicion in official German minds on the question of closer Anglo-Russian naval relations, to the mutual satisfaction of both Great Britain and Germany.² The British fleet had just completed a visit to the Kiel canal, where they had been entertained in royal fashion by their German kinsmen.³

Nevertheless, Grey began to take an active part when he saw that the world's peace was menaced. All the suggestions made were unavailing. It is a difficult task to get four or five Powers to agree, especially when there are at least two broad lines of cleavage between them, and when oftentimes cross currents of one kind or another exist.

2. Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916, I, p. 293.

3. Captain Henderson's Report, July 3, B.D., No. 7.

The early suggestion of Grey on "direct conversations" was dropped, for France declared this was "very dangerous". France was evidently afraid that Austria might get the better of Russia in a diplomatic encounter. She thought that such a position might indicate to Germany a lack of solidarity among the Entente. The proposal of extending the limit placed by Austria on her Serbian ultimatum likewise came to naught, because it takes time for telegrams to be exchanged between nations, and, too, Austria did not take kindly to the idea.

The suggestion that Russia and Austria settle their difficulties by mediation, while acceptable to Germany, was turned down by France who thought that Austria and Serbia should settle their difficulties first. Moreover, Russia was "very apprehensive" that the Germans might think the Entente Powers were not standing together. When Grey suggested that the Ambassadors of the four Powers sit down in conference together, this plan was rejected because the plan of "direct conversations" between Vienna and St. Petersburg was brought forward. However, Berchtold objected to this last plan, and very quickly war between Austria and Serbia followed.⁴

Throughout these critical days both the Entente nations and the Teutonic Alliance attempted to discover what Great Britain would do. Grey was encouraged to throw

4. Fay, op.cit., II, pp. 400-401.

the weight of England's resources and influence on the balances with France and Russia with the idea of forcing Germany and Austria to refrain from war. Naturally, the Central Powers hoped Great Britain would maintain neutrality. Dickinson thinks it is questionable whether a bold pronouncement by Great Britain early in the controversy would have prevented war.

Even the President of France on July 31 declared in a letter to King George V "that if Germany were certain that the British Government would not intervene in a conflict in which France would be engaged; war would be inevitable", and ". . . if Germany were certain that the Entente Cordiale would be operative in such case, even to the battlefield there would be the greatest chance that peace would not be broken".⁵

But the British were not ready at the last of July to throw the weight of her influence and the strength of her grand fleet into the struggle. Both in 1906 and 1912, the English had reserved the right to enter or remain neutral in a possible Franco-German entanglement. They, therefore, did not enter the War on snap judgment.

As early as the Moroccan crisis of 1906, France was disturbed at the possibility of a German attack upon her. It was so serious that the Gallic nation asked Great Britain if, in the event of an unprovoked attack by Germany, Great Britain would assist her repel the

invasion. The French declared that Great Britain could not render armed support "when the time came, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts". Sir Edward Grey conceded the logic of the French suggestions and authorized the conversations. It was understood, however, that any discussions would not bind or restrict either government in its freedom to make decisions on the question of support when the time came.⁶

Viscount Haldane, British War Minister in 1906, corroborates the testimony of Sir Edward Grey on Franco-British military discussions. Grey consulted the Prime Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and War Minister in 1906 on the problem as to whether or not they could put 100,000 men in the field on the Franco-Belgian frontier in case the German army should attack France by the way of Belgium. Viscount Haldane was instructed to initiate negotiations with France.⁷

By 1910, with both Sir Douglas Haig and Sir John French assisting, the reorganization of the British Army was completed. It was possible then to place 160,000 troops in the field, and within twelve days have the troops in the proper place.⁸

6. Viscount Grey of Fallodon, op.cit., Speech by Sir Edward Grey In the House of Commons, August 3, 1914, II, Appendix D, pp. 310-311.

7. Viscount Haldane, Europe Before The War, Funk and Wagnalls Company, New York, 1920, p. 45.

8. Ibid., pp. 47-48.

Subsequent events proved that the British had made their pre-war organization effectively for August 3. They mobilized their entire Expeditionary Force, consisting of approximately eight divisions and began to move them across the channel upon the declaration of war.⁹

Perhaps no one would seriously question the fact that a navy was essential to the protection of Great Britain. It was very necessary to British plans that no great Power controlled the Low Countries. For almost a thousand years the British have watched the territory across the channel. The Hundred Year War, the attack of the Spanish Armada, the English trouble with France in 1793; all bear testimony that history as well as geography indicated the concern of Great Britain over the destiny of Belgium.¹⁰

The British War Minister declared in his historic speech to the House of Commons August 3, 1914 that the chief factor in Britain's attitude toward Belgium was the treaty of 1839. France and the German Confederation had observed Belgian neutrality in 1870. This treaty was founded not only out of "consideration for Belgium . . . but in the interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium".¹¹

9. Ibid., p. 50.

10. Seymour, Charles, The Diplomatic Background Of The War, 1870-1914. Yale University Press, New Haven, p. 277.

11. Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty Five Years, 1892-1916, Appendix D, p. 318.

But why should any great point be made about Belgium? It is such a small country, yet so geographically important as a part of the plain leading toward Paris, and a country that has a great deal to do with the mouth of the Rhine. The Germans, of course, called the river the German Rhine. Historically, it had been a bone of contention between Teuton and Latin for approximately ten centuries. England, too, had her interests, for the Netherlands were too close for her not to show genuine interest in possible changes in the low countries.

The little country was in a strategic location. To offset any attempt by a great Power to take the country, Prussia proposed in the first half of the nineteenth century that the States that had a specific interest in the Belgian section declare Belgium a neutral state in perpetuity. Great Britain, Austria, France, and Russia were willing. Belgium, therefore, according to the treaty of London, 1839, "was formed an independent and perpetually neutral state; if it shall be found to observe such neutrality toward all other states".¹² This neutrality was guaranteed by the Great Powers which, at that time, were France, Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. This meant that no Power could cross Belgium to attack Holland. Neither could Holland cross Belgium, nor could any other Power violate the territory of Belgium by troop movement. A secret arrangement between Belgium and the

Powers other than France provided that in the event any of Belgium's fortresses should be attacked that the other Powers signatory to the document would come to Belgium's aid. It seems evident, therefore, that should any one of the other Powers attack, the King of the Belgians would call on the other four Powers to see to it that the territorial status and the dignity of the nation remains
¹³
 unimpaired.

The evil of violating Belgium's neutrality was greater in 1914 than it would have been in 1870 for Germany was much more powerful. "If her neutrality were violated", said Grey, "and the violation submitted to by Belgium and acquiesced in by her guarantors, her independence was gone forever". When it became apparent to the British Cabinet that Germany was going to violate Belgian neutrality, "they began all to face the same way", said Sir Edward Grey, "for we had our backs to the same
¹⁴
 straight wall".

Germany had been told by Viscount Haldane in 1912, that "If France were attacked and an attempt made to occupy her territory, our neutrality must not be reckoned on by Germany". In addition thereto, the British representative told Bethmann that Great Britain was bound to

13. Ibid., pp. 349-350.

14. Viscount Grey of Fallodon, op.cit., II, pp. 8-9.

assist Belgium "in case of invasion".¹⁵ On July 31, events began to move rapidly. Great Britain asked France and Germany on July 31 if they would respect Belgian neutrality, provided no other Power violated it. Grey said to Belgium that he presumed the latter would "do her utmost to maintain her neutrality". Belgium did not hesitate to say in her reply to the British Foreign Minister that, . . . Great Britain and the other nations guaranteeing our independence could rest assured that we would neglect no effort to maintain our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other Powers would respect¹⁶ and maintain that neutrality".

France answered the British communication relating to Belgian neutrality by saying that she would "respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defense of her security to act other-¹⁷ wise. The French government assured Belgium, too, of¹⁸ her desire to maintain the Belgian neutrality. The German Secretary of State said to the British Ambassador that "he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor¹⁹ before he could possibly answer".

15. Viscount Haldane, Before The War, Funk Wagnalls Company, New York, 1920, p. 73.

16. Scott, op.cit., (Belgian Grey Book, I, No. 11)p.365

17. Scott, op.cit., (British Blue Book, I, No. 125)

18. Scott, op.cit., (Belgian Grey Book, I, No. 15)

19. Scott, op.cit., (British Blue Book, I, No. 122)

He said, furthermore, that an answer might disclose "to a certain extent a part of their campaign".²⁰

We now know that a note had been sent by Germany to her Ambassador in Brussels two days before, declaring that France might attack through Belgium, in which case Germany certainly would reserve the right to go to war with Belgium if the latter offered resistance to the German plans.²¹

However, Belgium's neutrality had been guaranteed by the treaty of 1839. It had been observed by the German States and France in 1870. The Hague Convention of October 18, 1907 contained clear pronouncements applying to neutral nations as follows: "The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable". (Art. I) "Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys, whether of munitions of war or of supplies, across the territory of a neutral Power". (Art. 2) The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, attempts against its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act. (Art. 10)²²

Furthermore, it is likely that Belgium was aware that General Schlieffen in 1894 abandoned the idea of an offensive against Russia should war against the Dual Alliance arise. A method of attack known as the

20. Goschen to Grey, telegram, August 1, B.D., No. 383.

21. Kautsky Documents, op.cit., July 29, Nos. 375-376.

22. German White Book Concerning The Responsibility Of The Authors Of The War, Carnegie Endowment For International Violation Of The Neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg Peace, Oxford University Press, New York, 1924, p. 22.

Schlieffen-Moltke plan provided for the invasion of France through Belgium. They thought they could defeat the French armies within six weeks and then move the German armies to the Russian frontier to check the Russian onslaught.

The German General Staff, likewise, in 1913 decided that if war came that more than Russia would be involved in it. So Moltke decided to take a chance; cross Belgium, and in six weeks defeat France and be able to move his troops to the eastern fronts to receive the onslaught of the Russians which would come at a later time.²³ It was a self-evident fact to all military men that Russia could not mobilize her troops rapidly due to poor roads, lack of sufficient railroads and the enormous extent of her country.

In addition, even a casual observer in Belgium could have seen the German railroads built up to the Belgian border. The same observer could easily have known that the topography of the land on the Franco-German frontier was not conducive to a rapid movement of German troops into France. He could easily have observed that, in short, it would be much easier for Germany to attack France through Belgium than to take a more southerly route. In view of these facts, "Belgium put her army on its reinforced strength", July 29. She

23. Schmitt, op.cit., II, p. 263, citing Der Weltkrieg, I, p. 17.

notified the Powers together with Holland and Luxemburg²⁴ of this development. She did not wish to be caught napping.

Belgium seemed not to be afraid of France. In a conversation at Brussels July 31, between the French Minister and the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Frenchman declared that ". . . no incursion of French troops into Belgium will take place, even if considerable forces are massed upon the frontiers of your country. France does not wish to incur the responsibility so far as Belgium is concerned, of taking the first hostile step". At this moment, Belgium believed the German attitude would "be the same as that of the Government of the French Republic.²⁵ To be on the safe side, however,²⁶ Belgium mobilized her army, August 1.

A warning to Germany of what might happen in England could easily have been read into Grey's message to the German Ambassador in London, when he suggested that "if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other observed it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country". Immediately, Grey said, the Ambassador asked him "if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, would we engage to remain neutral?"

24. Scott, op.cit., I, (Belgian Grey Book, I, No. 8) p. 364.

25. Ibid., (Belgian Grey Book, I, No. 9), p. 364.

26. Ibid., (Belgian Grey Book, I, No. 10) p. 365.

To this, Grey replied that "Our hands were still free and we were considering what our attitude should be". The British Foreign Minister then went on to say that it partially depended on public opinion what they would do, but that "the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here". He indicated they could not "give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone". The German then asked what conditions might keep Great Britain neutral. He even asked if the guarantee of France and her colonies would keep Britain neutral. Whereupon, Grey said he could not "promise to remain neutral on similar terms . . .", and closed the discussion by saying, "We must keep our hands free".²⁷

When it appeared to Moltke highly probable that war would follow very shortly after the Russian "partial mobilization" plan, he set to work to go over the plans for a possible campaign. It was extremely necessary according to the plans that Belgium did not attempt to block the path of the German troop movement, for that might cause serious embarrassment to the German cause. It so happened that the plan called for the movement of the German right wing to proceed through Liege, the terrain around which Professor Schmitt calls a "bottle neck".²⁸ Foreseeing possible difficulties

27. Scott, op.cit., II, (British Blue Book, I, No. 123), p. 984.

28. Schmitt, op.cit., II, p. 149.

here, Moltke and Indendorff some years before had arranged to move shock troops so rapidly into this region that the Belgians would not have time to get their defenses ready.²⁹ So, on July 26, Moltke, himself, drafted an ultimatum for Belgium, to be handed to the Belgian authorities at the right moment. The final document based on Moltke's draft was sent, sealed, to the German Minister in Brussels on the twenty-ninth, and the order given that this message must be kept under lock and key until the right time for opening it.³⁰ The ultimatum stated, "that French forces intended to . . . march against Germany through Belgian territory The measures of Germany's opponents force her, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory". Furthermore, according to the ultimatum, should Belgium offer resistance to the German invasion, "Germany would be obliged, to her regret, to regard the Kingdom as an enemy".³¹ International law does not justify the breach of a treaty by one country to forestall another State who contemplated the same act.³²

August 2, Jagow ordered Von Below at Brussels to open the ultimatum which had been delivered to him a few days before; make a few changes; and especially make

29. Kautsky Documents, op.cit., No. 375, p. 329.

30. Kautsky Documents, op.cit., No. 376, Cf., Nos. 648, 738.

31. Headlam, op.cit., p. 383.

32. Schmitt, op.cit., II, p. 150, citing Moltke, pp. 17-18.

the impression on the Belgians that all the information came to him August 2, for the first time. The German ultimatum carried a time limit of twelve hours.³³

Germany demanded passage for her troops through Belgium. She said her information indicated that there was "no doubt as to the intention of France to move through Belgian territory". The German troops must, therefore,³⁴ enter Belgium.

At 7 A.M., August 3, Belgium declared in her answer to the German ultimatum that "no strategic interest justifies such a violation of international law. The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honor of the nation and betray their duty toward Europe". They did not hesitate to declare to Germany that they were "firmly resolved to repel by all the means in their power every attack upon their rights".³⁵

King Albert next appealed to King George V of England for "diplomatic intervention . . . to safeguard the integrity of Belgium".³⁶

Germany notified Belgium that at 6 o'clock, August 4, since Belgium had rejected Germany's "well

33. Jagow to Von Below, telegram, August 2, K.D., No. 648, p. 486.

34. Scott, op.cit., I, (Belgian Grey Book, I, No. 20).

35. Scott, op.cit., I, (Belgium Grey Book, I, No. 22) pp. 373-374.

36. King Albert to King George V, telegram, August 3, Scott, op.cit., I, (Belgian Grey Book, I, No. 25), p. 376.

meant proposals" they would have to protect themselves against the French menace "even if we have to do it by force of arms".³⁷ In Albert's reply to the ultimatum, he said to Wilhelm, he did not expect Germany to "force us, in the face of all Europe, to the cruel choice between war and dishonor; between fidelity to treaties³⁸ and faithlessness to our internal obligations".

Shortly after 6 A.M., August 4, German troops entered Belgian territory. The German Minister of Foreign Affairs declared "the passage through Belgium was a question of life and death" to Germany. Speaking to the Reichstag, the Chancellor said, "Gentlemen, we are in a state of necessity and necessity knows no law. The crossing of Belgium is a breach of international law" "The wrong - I speak openly - the wrong we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained". He who is menaced, as we are, and is fighting for his all can only consider³⁹ how he is to hack his way through".

Count Von Lerchenfeld supplemented the Chancellor's remarks when he stated the German General Staff thought it "necessary to cross Belgium: France can only be successfully attacked from that side. At the risk of

37. Kautsky Documents, op.cit., No. 791, p. 561.

38. Albert to Wilhelm, telegram, August 4, K.D., No. 836, p. 581.

39. German White Book, op.cit., p. 24, quoting Bethmann's Speech To The Reichstag, August 4, 1914.

bringing about the intervention of England, Germany cannot respect Belgian neutrality".⁴⁰ A little later in the day, August 4, Belgium appealed to the Entente for their co-operation. The German troops had entered Belgium.⁴¹ Belgium handed Von Below his passports at once.⁴² And so in the face of most desperate odds, Belgium, whose territory could be laid down eight times in Great Britain and whose population would not even equal that of Greater London, went to war against a nation who had spread the gospel of her invincible armies.

Belgium and Germany were at war. Would England hold aloof? Germany awaited the possible English action breathlessly. France was hoping that Britain's navy might come to her rescue. Neither had to wait long, for on August 4, Britain relieved each of them by the strength of her ultimatum sent to the Germans. To the Germans it meant grief, to the French, hope.

At 10:30 A.M. on August 4, Grey said to Belgium that Great Britain would join Russia and France if necessary to assist Belgium in resisting the use of force by Germany against them. She further guaranteed "to maintain their independence and integrity in future years".⁴³

40. German White Book. Concerning The Responsibility of The Authors Of The War, Oxford University Press, New York, 1924, p. 24, citing Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags, Dienstag, August 4, 1914.

41. Scott, op.cit., (Belgian Grey Book, I, No. 31) pp. 379-380.

42. Ibid., No. 42, p. 387.

43. Grey to Bertie, telegram, August 4, B.D., No. 378, p. 578.

At 9:30 A.M., August 4, England demanded that Germany must not cross Belgium, and at 2 P.M. the same day, she demanded an answer by 12 o'clock that night.⁴⁴ When no response came to the ultimatum, both Germany and England knew this meant war. In a conversation between Jagow and Goschen the former declared that "they (Germany) had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way It was a matter of life and death to them", since the southern route would have caused loss of time. Goschen then asked to see the Chancellor before he demanded his passports. The Ambassador says that the Chancellor harangued him for "about twenty minutes. Just for a word 'neutrality'; just for a scrap of paper", said Bethmann, "Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her".⁴⁵ Goschen said, in referring to the remark that Germany considered it "a matter of life and death" to get across Belgium quickly, "that it was . . . a matter of life and death for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement". At eleven o'clock, August 5, the English Ambassador received his passports and the day following left for London by the way of Holland.⁴⁶

44. British Documents, op.cit., Nos. 573, 594.

45. Schmitt, op.cit., II, p. 393, quoting Bethmann's Speech To The Reichstag, August 4, 1919.

46. Goschen to Grey, August 6 (Received August 19), B. D., No. 671, pp. 350-354.

Sir Edward Grey on August 5 said to Lichnowsky, "We don't want to crush Germany". But the Germans declared that this interview was given to the public, "And thus, Herr Bethmann Hollweg destroyed the last possibility of gaining peace through England".⁴⁷

At London, Lichnowsky took his leave of Sir Edward Grey, August 6, and departed leisurely for Berlin.⁴⁸ In speaking of his departure, Lichnowsky said, "A special train took us to Harwich. There a guard of honor was drawn up for me. I was treated like a departing sovereign. Such was the end of my London mission. It was wrecked, not by the wiles of the British, but by the wiles of our policy".⁴⁹ England and Germany were formally at war, for the war order was sent to the British fleet at mid-night, August 4.⁵⁰

In speaking to Walter Hines Page, American Ambassador at the Court of St. James, just after the sending of the ultimatum, Grey said, "The neutrality of Belgium is assured by treaty. Germany is a signatory power to that treaty. It is upon such solemn compacts as this that civilization rests. If we give them up or permit them to be violated, what becomes of civilization? Ordered society differs from mere force only by

47. International Conciliation Pamphlets, The Lichnowsky Memorandum, American Association For International Conciliation, New York, No. 127, June, 1918, p. 335.

48. Schmitt, op.cit., II, p. 407.

49. International Conciliation Pamphlets, The Lichnowsky Memorandum, American Association For International Conciliation, New York, No. 127, June, 1918, p. 335.

50. Viscount Grey of Fallodon, op.cit., II, p. 18.

such solemn agreements or compacts . . . It means the end of Belgium's independence. . . . Next will come Holland, and after Holland, Denmark. . . . This one great military power means to annex Belgium, Holland, and the Scandinavian States, and to subjugate France. . . . The war party (in Germany) has got the upper hand. Thus the efforts of a lifetime go for nothing.⁵¹ I feel like a man who has wasted his life. . . ."

Accusations have been brought against England that she entered the war for "self interest" and not because of the German attack upon Belgium. Professor Barnes declares that the Entente and Belgium had known of the German plan of attack since 1906, and that Great Britain had been dealing with Belgium for some years in attempting to convince her that Belgium should allow British troops to be landed on Belgian soil to throw back the invaders. Furthermore, Barnes says that Germany offered to stay out of Belgium if Great Britain would announce her neutrality. He further declared that the treaty of London did not enjoin any one of the nations to protect Belgium, but to merely see to it that they, themselves, did not violate Belgium's⁵² neutrality. He declared that the German crossing of Belgium was a "fortunate subterfuge" used by Grey to

51. Asquith, H. H., The Genesis Of The War, pp. 313, 316, 318, Cf., B.D., No. 638, p. 328.

52. Barnes, Harry Elmer, The Genesis Of The World War, New York, 1926, p. 555.

inflamm⁵³e British public opinion and thus bring her into the war.

Professor Renouvin, the French historian, says that Great Britain had decided to enter the war before the Germans began the crossing of Belgium or even before the German ultimatum to Belgium had been delivered. He agrees with the American historian, previously quoted, that Great Britain's entry was decided upon because of⁵⁴ the "general interests of England".

At this point it is interesting to examine parts of the memoranda of Dr. Muehlton, until the war, a member of the Board of Directors of the Krupp works at Essen. The Doctor declared the speech of the Chancellor wherein he used the expression, "necessity knows no law", indicated that Belgium was without fault. Furthermore, the speech showed the strategic value of Belgium to⁵⁵ Germany. This German Doctor declares further, that he had talked with many men who knew whereof they spoke and not a single one declared that Belgium was in the⁵⁶ slightest at fault.

The Doctor continued then with proof to break down the thesis that Belgium expected to attack Germany. He

53. Ibid., p. 579.

54. Renouvin, op.cit., p. 297.

55. International Conciliation Pamphlets, Memoranda and Letters of Dr. Muehlton, American Association for International Conciliation, New York, No. 130, September, 1918, p. 493.

56. Ibid., p. 495.

related the story of Belgium's purchase of four big guns for fortification purposes at Antwerp. Since the foundations were not established for the guns, Krupp, against its will, was asked to keep these guns until Belgium was ready. The latter even offered to pay storage on the guns. And so, Krupp held the artillery at the outbreak of war, and, of course, the German authorities kept the guns. If the Belgians had expected to attack Germany or be attacked by her, when war threatened, said the doctor, undoubtedly she would "have secured possession of her expensive guns". The reason that Belgium had dealings with Krupp, said the German, "was the expression of an effort to keep on a friendly footing with Germany". Since Germany is "greedy for business, keen in its pursuit, and quick to take offense", he said, "Belgium believed that it could keep that country in good humor. . . . whereas she expected France whose industry enjoyed little support from the government and was, moreover, less keen as regarded to its own development, to understand her reasons and be content with general indications of sympathy".⁵⁷

The Germans in October 1914 declared that the British Military Attache at Brussels, General Barnardiston, had notified the Chief of the Belgian General Staff of secret British plans to violate Belgium's

57. Ibid., p. 501.

neutrality if England thought it wise to attack Germany through Belgium. The story was told by the Belgian Minister at Berlin in 1911. Viscount Haldane says that as Secretary of State for War, that he (Haldane) was accused along with the British General Staff in sponsoring the plan. Viscount Haldane emphatically denies that any plan of the nature was ever suggested, although he admits that the Belgian General Staff was approached informally by the British Military Attache to ask the Belgians what form of help they would be likely to need in case of an attack by Germany. The evidence points, said the Viscount, to the fact that the nature of the conversation was largely that of what Britain ought to do in case of a request for help from Belgium if the latter should be invaded.

58

It had been common knowledge in England for some years that in the event of war between France and Germany that the latter would invade France by the way of Belgium. In the same fashion, common opinion indicated that Britain would actively move to check the German Army. Although Bethmann indicated he was astounded by the British ultimatum of August 4, according to the British this was ill founded because the Germans knew the part the British would have taken if war had come at the time of the Agadir incident. The military

situation was essentially the same in each case.

Just as France was entering the War, Viviani and Cambon asked the attitude of Grey on her attitude in the crisis. The Englishman, said Viviani, promised to defend our coasts and our flag, by means of the British fleet, against all insults. France, however, felt pretty sure by that time, August 1, that Britain would come to her rescue. Viviani declares that the "violation of Belgian neutrality made England rise up over the waters, immovable as destiny". Furthermore, he believes that even though Belgium's neutrality had not been violated that England would not have remained passive. But, remembering 1870 and observing the maritime brutality on the part of Germany, "England would have taken up the gauge of battle for her honor and her interests".⁶⁰

"The real reason for going into the war", said Grey, "was that, if we did not stand by France and stand up for Belgium against this aggression, we should be isolated, discredited, and hated; and there would be nothing before us but a miserable and ignoble future".⁶¹

If Grey were not sincere in bringing England into battle, he was certainly a good actor, for, while talking to a friend in the late afternoon of August 3, he was

59. Oxford Faculty of Modern History, Why We Are At War, Great Britain's Case, Oxford, 1914, pp. 27-28.

60. Viviani, Reni, As We See It, English translation by Thomas R. Ybarra, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1923, pp. 225-226.

61. Viscount Grey of Fallodon, op.cit., II, pp. 15-16.

moved to say as "the lamps were being lit", "The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime".⁶²

Without attempting to defend Great Britain in her policy, it seems a plausible explanation to say that every other nation entered the war because of that particular nation's "general interests". Great Britain believed, evidently, that if Belgium should be wholly crushed, Germany would seize the entire territory and thus get control of the channel ports. She seemed to feel, too, that Holland would be the next victim and the Scandinavian countries would be next in line, not to speak of what might happen to France. To this extent, certainly England entered the war in "self interest". Unquestionably, however, the movement of the German army across Belgium was a tremendous factor in the British entry in the War.

As the war came on, Belgium seemed to steer a course which would have been neutral if Germany had left her alone; but this Germany did not do. And so, the German Army passed over thousands of dead Belgians before it reached France. And the time taken to hack their way through this gallant little country was very precious to Germany, for she lost several days by the military activities of the courageous, patriotic Belgians. So

62. Ibid., II, p. 20.

much so, that she found the French army barring her way to the coveted goal, Paris; and the British army was also getting in line for the fray. While on the Eastern frontier, the ominous growls of the Russian Bear grew louder as the Russians startled the world with the rapidity of their mobilization.

Chapter XII
Japan Supports England

Chapter XII

Japan Supports England

When Matthew Galbraith Perry, acting for the United States, broke the barriers of Japan in 1854, he stirred the hearts and minds of the Island nation to such an extent that before the passing of six decades Japan was the most powerful nation of the Far East. Japan had tossed overboard many of her oriental activities, methods, and attitudes before her position became strong. She recognized that in many ways the occidental nations were far ahead of her, particularly along the lines of military and naval strength. She saw, too, that machine methods must in many industries supplant manufacture by hand. She, therefore, began to study the Western world with the idea of taking that which could be utilized to the benefit of her civilization.

In 1894-1895 she defeated China without difficulty. The outcome of this fight startled a large part of the world, and caused some of the nations to look with concern upon the growing power of "The Land of the Rising Sun".

Great Britain had on occasions prior to this war made friends in the Far East. Great Britain recognized in the closing years of the nineteenth century that possible trouble could come to her Indian Empire.

The British recognized that China was a tremendously large country and could be of considerable value to her because of the exceedingly long boundary line between China and India. Naturally, therefore, the British began to cultivate a closer friendship with China. Great Britain in 1893 suggested that China help protect Siam in the difficulty with France; however, China refused.¹ Then came the Sino-Japanese war and with it defeat for China. Thereafter, Great Britain did not seek the Chinese friendship. A very significant turn of affairs came when Russia, at the close of the war, decided to make objections to the requirements that Japan made upon China. Moreover, Russia was opposed to Japan taking Port Arthur and occupying a part of Manchuria. Russia saw that Japan might become too powerful on the Asiatic seaboard and might interfere with her proposed Trans-Siberian railroad. A Russian prince declared, too, that if Japan ever set foot upon the mainland that she would move as "a drop of oil on a sheet of blotting paper".² When both France and Germany took Russia's side of the discussion, Japan was compelled to give up territory that she wanted.³ Nevertheless, Japan accepted the decision of the Powers with Stoic philosophy. A representative speaker of Japan

1. Chang, Chung-fu, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1931, pp. 11-12.

2. Chang citing Rosen, I, p. 136.

3. Chang, op.cit., p. 264 ff., cf. Dickinson, p. 279.

indicated that peace would not last long. It was his belief that nations were like merchants in that they seek gain and if they fail once they try again.⁴

England announced she would not interfere when the other Powers checked Japan after the Sino-Japanese war. The Kaiser considered that announcement as good diplomacy for England.⁵ Japan had, in the meantime, adopted both the diplomacy and militarism of the West. Both England and Japan agreed that they might have a common enemy in the Far East. They, therefore, considered an alliance.⁶ The Japanese, however, were at the same time considering a treaty of alliance with Russia, presumably against England, granting to Japan certain rights in Korea, while Russia was given opportunities in Manchuria. The Japanese Cabinet, however, rejected the proposed Russo-Japanese Alliance and accepted the proposal for an Anglo-Japanese Alliance.⁷ The publication of the treaty was made early in 1902. The Alliance was renewed in 1905 and again in 1911. The two Powers in the first treaty recognized that the one had "special interests" in China, the other "special interests" in Korea. In the event of war, where one of them fought another Power, the ally agreed to "maintain a strict neutrality". Should any other Power or Powers "enter the fight . . . against that ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to

4. Dickinson citing Hayashi, p. 104.

5. Ibid., p. 279.

6. Ibid., p. 285.

7. Dickinson, op.cit., p. 288.

its assistance . . .⁸ This alliance was aimed directly at Russia who refused to check her ambitious policy in the Far East, and this fact, coupled with general conditions, caused Great Britain and Japan to make the Alliance.⁹

As a result of the alliance and Russia's failure to get out of Manchuria, Japan decided she was able to give battle to Russia. This ended in an overwhelming defeat of Russia and tremendously increased the prestige of Japan. Japan using western diplomacy and militarism had defeated a western nation.

In 1905 the Alliance was renewed. It was necessary that either ally come to the support of the other in case another Power should be the aggressor in an attack on either Japan or Great Britain. For Japan, it was unlikely that Russia would attack her; for Great Britain, it was unlikely the security of her territories in Asiatic waters would be questioned.¹⁰

Strangely enough, very soon after the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was made, the British came to an understanding with France (1904) and with Russia (1907). Consequently, at the outbreak of the World War, there was more than a harmonious feeling existing among the four Powers.¹¹

8. Chang, op.cit., Appendix A, pp. 282-284.

9. Ibid.; pp. 268-269.

10. Ibid., pp. 271-272.

11. Treat, Payson Jackson, America And The Great War, A League of Nations Publication, I, No. 8, Dec., 1918, p. 418.

In 1911 the two nations renewed their alliance. On this occasion they wrote into the pact that in case "either of the High Contracting Parties conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power" that the terms of the alliance would not force the "contracting party" to fight the nation "with whom such an arbitration was in force".¹² This third agreement was launched because Great Britain and the United States were in the process of making a treaty of arbitration, and it will be remembered that relations between the United States and Japan were not very amicable at that time due to the immigration policy of the United States.¹³ This alliance was, therefore, in effect in the Far East when the World War broke out.

It was quite evident to observers of the pre-war period that Japan would not be over friendly with Germany. At the close of the Sino-Japanese war, Germany joined Russia and France in preventing Japan from getting the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur by the Peace of Shimoneseki. When Germany was able to force China to cede Kiaochau to her, Japan felt that Germany was right at her front door. Germany stirred up plenty of mischief in the Boxer uprising. The Kaiser was even accused of encouraging the Czar in Manchuria which policy helped to lead to the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905.

12. Chang, op.cit., p. 290.

13. Ibid., p. 273.

The Kaiser, too, had shouted "Yellow Peril" at the Orientals during the period of increasingly tense relations. When Germany began to make "a strong naval base" at Kiaochau, Japan naturally began to reflect on the purpose of this base.¹⁴

As late as August 1, it did not seem to Sir Edward Grey in London that Japan would be called upon to fulfil the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Grey said to the British Ambassador at Tokio, ". . . If, however, we did intervene it would be on the side of France and Russia, and I, therefore, did not see that we were likely to have to apply to Japan under our alliance . . .".¹⁵

However, on the very next day some of the editors of the press of Japan were considering the possibility of the nation entering the war. The viewpoint, as expressed, was that the nation would be ready to fight for the protection of the Orient.¹⁶

August 3, the British Foreign Minister asked Greene at Tokio "to warn the Japanese Government that, if hostilities spread to the Far East, and an attack on Hong Kong or Wei-hai-wei were to take place, we should rely on their support" if Britain issued the call for Japan to stand by the terms of the alliance.¹⁷

14. Treat, op.cit., pp. 419-420.

15. Grey to Greene, telegram, August 1, B.D., No. 436, p. 256.

16. Greene to Grey, telegram, August 2, B.D., No. 499, p. 279.

17. Grey to Greene, telegram, August 3, B.D., No. 549, p. 298.

The Japanese were not long in reaching a decision. The Japanese Foreign Minister notified the British Ambassador on the same day that Japan, of course, was not interested in a European war, but if a German attack should be made on Hong Kong, then England "may count upon Japan at once coming to the assistance of her ally with all her strength, if called on to do so The reason for and nature of the assistance required" might be decided by England, he concluded.¹⁸

On August 15, Japan called upon Germany to release Kiaochau in order that it be eventually given to China. No answer was forthcoming from Germany although she was given eight days to think it over.¹⁹ At the expiration of that period, the Japanese subjects read the "Imperial Japanese Rescript Declaring War against Germany from noon of August 23, 1914". In it Japan said among other things, "We, by the grace of heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the throne occupied by the same dynasty from time immemorial do hereby make the following proclamation to our subjects: We hereby declare war against Germany and we command our army and navy to carry on hostilities against that Empire with all their strength".²⁰ Japan seems to have entered the struggle without England actually asking her to join.

18. Greene to Gray, telegram, August 2, B.D., No. 499, p. 279.

19. Treat, op.cit., p. 420.

20. Ibid., p. 444, citing Document of Imperial Japanese Rescript Declaring War Against Germany.

K. K. Kawakami gave the Japanese explanation of why Japan went to war with Germany when he said, "In these days when European nations are battling against one another, all in the name of God and of the Prince of Peace, it seems useless to say Japan is essentially a peace-loving people". For 250 years,²¹ while Europe was fighting, Japan was at peace. Japan did not enter the war wholly because of her treaty with Britain²², but because "Germany was a disturbing factor in the Far East and a menace both to China and herself". He considered the "territorial integrity" of China²³ necessary to Japan. Finally, Japan desired that commerce should continue unimpeded. The elimination of German control over Kiaochau would, he believed, "insure²⁴ enduring peace in the Far East".

Japan, in any case, adhered strictly to the terms of her alliance with Britain. Here, indeed, was her opportunity to strike at "The Mailed Fist", of the Kaiser's Government; here was her opportunity to drive Germany from her front door. That she made the most of these opportunities, time has revealed in full measure.

21. Kawakami, K. K., Japan And The European War, Atlantic Monthly, November 1914, p. 708.
22. Kawakami, K. K., Mikado's Campaign Against Kiaochau, Overland Monthly LXIV, No. 5, p. 505.
23. Kawakami, K. K., Japan and European War, Atlantic Monthly, CXIV, November 1914, p. 709.
24. Ibid., p. 712.

Chapter XIII

Self-Interest Leads Italy To Join Entente

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When Bismarck of Prussia set out upon his policy of "blood and iron" to make a "place in the sun" for his nation, he was pleased to remember that "beyond the Alps lies Italy". But Italy was relatively secure from invasions from the North because of the barrier of the Alps. Nevertheless, her enormous coast line did present difficulties, and, since her unification in 1871, she was naturally interested in the protection of this coast line. Now Bismarck was quite well aware of the fact that Italy was interested in reaching out for colonies.

When Bismarck was not quite sure of the results of a proposed Austro-Prussian war, he invited Italy to join, by offering her Venetia. She did not hesitate. Both Italy and Prussia were satisfied with the outcome of the struggle.

Both modern Germany and modern Italy were born so late in the family of nations that most of the choice territories had been chosen. Nevertheless, Bismarck knew that Italy was looking across the narrow strip of water separating Sicily and the mainland of Africa to a choice morsel of land decadent in the hands of the descendants of the Moors, namely, Tunis. This could easily become the colonial star in the crown of an ambitious young nation.

Now it so happened that the German Chancellor knew that France had not completely satisfied her longing for colonies and that she, too, kept a watchful eye upon Tunis. So Bismarck reasoned that should France take Tunis, Italy would be angry to see the choice colonial plum slip through her fingers. He, therefore, encouraged France "to pluck the ripe Tunisian fruit". It has been said that Bismarck offered this encouragement in order to drive Italy into an alliance with Austria and Germany. It seems, however, that Bismarck was primarily interested in encouraging France. He wished to divert their attention from the humiliation of 1870. In a lesser measure he was interested in making possible enemies between the Italians and the French. He felt sure if France took Tunis that Italy would be angry. Bismarck was not¹ mistaken.

Bismarck must have known that Italy would see in the French occupation of Tunis a threat toward Tripoli. No doubt, he saw, too, that Italy might fear French propaganda in the Italian capital. Since French troops were withdrawn from Rome at the time of the Franco-Prussian war, Italy, no doubt, thought that the French might send their troops back again. If, however, Bismarck knew that as a result of these moves on the international chessboard, Italy would ask that she might help form the Triple Alliance, he gave no sign. As a matter

1. Hazen, Modern Europe, p. 470.

of fact he did not issue any politely phrased invitations to Italy to join Germany and Austria. On the other hand, he called Italy's diplomacy a "Jackal policy". He declared further that, ". . . Italy is instinctively drawn by the odor of corruption and calamity always ready to attack anybody from the rear and make off with a bit of plunder".²

Bismarck, therefore, advised Austria to frighten Italy. However, the more he thought about the possible Italian ramifications with France should the Central Powers spurn Italy's suit, the less he liked a possible disturbance to the balance of power from that quarter. So Germany and Austria were finally won over, and the Triple Alliance was the result. Bismarck was schooled enough in the game of diplomacy to appreciate the fact that Italy's "self-interest" seemed to warrant exchanges; that enemies and allies may change almost over night; and those nations who have formerly been fast friends will be enemies; and those who have been enemies will form a speaking acquaintance again and wonder how it was possible that they should ever have cast their lots in opposite camps.

Austria seems to have been even more willing than Germany to make bosom friends with Italy for, in the event Austria ever had to fight Russia, she did not want to have the Latins to the south of her to add to her difficulties. Austria's position was a bit different

from that of Germany for Austria was a Mediterranean Power along with Italy. The country of Francis Joseph kept her eyes toward possible danger in Russia and, therefore, was favorable, in the words of one of the Italian officials, in keeping "Italy from the Docket as long as possible". "Austria", he continued, "coveted no Italian territory and Italy is not yet ripe for participation into provincial republics".³

The Italians now suggested an alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Germans told Italy that the way to alliance with her was through Vienna.⁴ Victor Emmanuel's government wanted to check the ambitions of France and attempt to re-establish the "balance of power" which had been disturbed since France went into North Africa in 1881. Italy decided she must provide for "the preservation of peace and the curbing of France's lust for power".⁵

Italy had little to lose and much to gain by an alliance. She was successful in arranging terms with Germany and Austria in a Triple Alliance in 1882. Among the terms of the new five year friendship, a loophole was left to Italy. If the other Powers are "attacked", Italy agrees to go to their aid under certain conditions. Suppose, however, that Italy decides one or both of the

3. Dickinson, op.cit., p. 83, quoting Pribram, II, p. 4

4. Grosse Politik, III, p. 207.

5. Dickinson, op.cit., p. 82, quoting Pribram, II, p. 10.

other members of the Alliance start the war. In that case Italy could reserve judgment about joining them. Subsequent events at the time of the World War indicated that she exercised this privilege.⁶

This Alliance gave Italy powerful friends but it was very expensive, for it was necessary for her to keep pace with her sister states in making preparation for any difficulties by enlarging her army and developing her navy. By 1887, however, when the three Powers met to revise the treaty, she was able to demand more consideration.

Since France had beaten Italy to Tunis, Italy believed she ought to have a right to take Tripoli and she so stated that point to her allies. She, furthermore, very modestly discussed the flirtation of the French Minister with her, for he did not hesitate to say that, "The Mediterranean ought to belong to France and Italy".⁷ After full and frank discussion, Germany agreed to stand with Italy in her policy toward Tripoli. For Bismarck did not want to see Italy and France fast friends, and he saw that, should the two nations engage in war, Germany's entrance would be necessary.

It is highly interesting to note that Italy and France by secret treaty in 1902 agreed to let each other alone in case either wanted to develop a sphere of

6. Dickinson, p. 85 quoting from Triple Alliance of 1882, G.P., III, pp. 245-247

7. Dickinson, p. 87 quoting German Documents, IV, p. 190.

influence⁸ in the territory of North Africa. At the same time Italy, as a member of the Triple Alliance, agreed to assist Germany fight France in the event the latter should "make a move to extend her occupation or her sovereignty under any form whatsoever in the North African territories".⁹ Meanwhile, Italy assured France that there was nothing in the terms of the Alliance which either "menaces the security or tranquility of France".¹⁰ It is quite evident that alliances among states are made largely for self-interest and do not necessarily bring either confidence or admiration. It is evident that Italy knew about self-interest.

In spite of the fact that the Triple Alliance was renewed from time to time, some of the Germans were not convinced of Italian sincerity. They thought they saw that Italy's promise would have no value if it were not in her interest to keep it. Kiderlen Waechter later declared that, if there should be war, Italy would await the outcome of some of the battles before casting her lot with either belligerent.¹¹ Italy was not deceiving Izvolski for he declared that if war came, neither the Triple Entente nor the Triple Alliance could depend on Italy for Italy will then adopt "a waiting attitude and

8. Dickinson, p. 95 citing Pribram, II, App. C.

9. Dickinson, p. 96, quoting from Triple Alliance treaty, Clause 10.

10. Dickinson, p. 96, quoting Pribram, II, p. 247.

11. Dickinson, p. 98, quoting Pribram, II, pp. 165-166.

then join on the side toward which victory is inclin-
¹²
 ing".

At the great crisis in 1914, Italy found herself with treaties with one or more nations of both the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance. The Italian Ambassador at Paris discovered that Russia was favorable to the idea of granting Serbia an outlet on the Adriatic. In a conference with Poincare, the Ambassador said that Italy stood ready to guarantee the position of Albania and should war break out, Austria would receive Italy's aid. Poincare countered by saying that was out of harmony with the Franco-Italian understanding in 1902. To the astonishment of the Frenchman, the Ambassador said that the Albanian arrangement with Austria had been made before the Franco-Italian agreement and, therefore, it would be mandatory upon Italy to go to Austria's aid. France, of course, expected Italy to remain neutral in a war between Germany and France. Naturally, France, after this conversation, did not know just what to expect from
¹³
 Italy in case war broke out.

It doubtless was no great surprise to the Germans to find the Italians a little bit lukewarm as the events culminated into the outbreak of war. Germany must have known that the friendship between Italy and Austria was somewhat strained. Italy and Austria each had

12. Dickinson, p. 98, quoting *Livre Noir*, I, p. 266.

13. Dickinson, p. 321, quoting *Livre Noir*, I, p. 361.

interests in the Balkan peninsula. If Austria fought Serbia, and at the close of the war took some of her territory, it would mean the enlargement of Austrian power and consequently would be opposed to any ambition that Italy had in the Balkans. Italy, too, was certainly not interested in seeing the Adriatic become an Austrian lake. In addition, the Austrian Trentino district, a wedge shaped slice of territory composed largely of people of Italian descent, dipped deeply into the Italian Alps. While the Trieste district, too, was in the hands of Austria, Italy could never be very contented. No doubt, it seemed plausible to Italy that the way to get control of "unredeemed Italy" was not to fight Austrian battles unless strong "compensations" would be forthcoming. Germany, therefore, was not harboring any illusions that the Alliance could expect very much in a military way from Italy.¹⁴

In spite of the fact that Germany knew of the Austro-Italian difficulties before the war, she tried to hold Italy in line and to urge Austria to satisfy Italian demands. Flotow, the German Ambassador, had been told by the Italian Foreign Minister that if Austria was attempting to suppress Serbian "Nationalism by violence . . . Italy would not accompany her along this path". So the German lost no time in telling his government that "unless Austria compels herself to recognize plainly in view of the

14. Renouvin, p. 299, quoting Conrad, III, pp. 670-671.

danger, that in case she intends to take anything in the territorial line, she will have to compensate Italy, I consider the situation hopeless".¹⁵

Von Jagow had agreed with Austria, July 6, that Italy should not be told just what Austria had in mind in Serbia for he had been in Rome long enough to understand something about Italian characteristics. Therefore, he knew that there was danger to the Alliance in any Austrian movement in the Balkans. He feared, too, and rightly, that a hesitation on the part of Italy to assist Austria would encourage Russia with the hope that Italy might not even be satisfied with neutrality and might be persuaded to join the Entente. Von Jagow, therefore urged Vienna to satisfy Italy for, according to agreement, Italy could claim compensation for any territorial changes in the Balkans that is to the advantage of the Danube Monarchy.¹⁶

It seemed at first, however, that Berchtold was optimistic "seeming to think that Italy could not be so despicable an ally as to turn against the Monarchy".¹⁷ Count Hoyos even went so far as to declare that Italy was not entitled to compensation. After much pressure from Berlin, Vienna did consent to make Italy a little

15. Flowtow to Jagow, telegram, July 16, 1914, K.D., No. 75.

16. Jagow to Tschirschky, July 15, K.D., No. 46.

17. Schmitt, I, p. 407, quoting K.S.F., VI, March 1928, p. 231.

concession for even the Kaiser said, so Berlin declared, that Austria must "come to an understanding with Italy¹⁸ on the compensation question in time". Vienna was willing to say she did not expect to retain any Austrian territory, but might be forced to hold some of the land "during the course of the war". Should this happen, Austria would discuss "compensation" with Italy at a later date. When Berlin heard of this move, she felt that should war come (and it was imminent) that "the whole alliance will begin to totter".¹⁹ Berchtold finally sent a statement to Italy vaguely stating that she accepted the interpretation of the famous Article 7 in the Alliance in common with German and Italy, provided Italy fulfilled "the duties of an ally".²⁰

The contents of the Austrian note, because of its vagueness, proved unacceptable to Italy and, in addition, Italy declared that any attempt to help Austria in a war opposed to the Latin's interests might cause the throne to totter. She further added that she did not dare to have her coasts "exposed to English cannon".²¹ By this time, however, July 31, Italy was moving toward neutrality. She went on record saying that "Austria's procedure against Serbia must be considered an act of aggression". A casus foederis, according to the Triple

18. Stolberg to Jagow, letter, July 18, K.D., No. 87.

19. Rathmann to Jagow, July 29, K.D., 210.

20. Renouvin, p. 308, quoting Diplomatic Papers, III, p. 87.

21. Kautsky Documents, op.cit., No. 614, p. 472; No. 675, p. 501; No. 745, p. 538

22

Alliance did not exist.

August 3, Italy issued a proclamation of neutrality. She, however, let it be known that if suitable "compensation" was forthcoming, she might fulfil her part of the Alliance. Suitable compensation, according to Italy, would have been the cession of the Trentino district to her. Berchtold here, as in most other places, would not make any concession. Italy dropped strong hints, also, that she might be persuaded to join the Entente. Berchtold, however, could not be persuaded at this time to make definite offers, for he considered the demands blackmail.²³

It was quite a blow to the Alliance when Italy did not join them in the war; moreover they knew they had to treat Italy in a reasonably friendly fashion in order that she might not actually fight against them.

Just before the proclamation of neutrality was announced by Italy, Von Kleist, Wilhelm's aide-de-camp, visited Victor Emmanuel for an interview. The German reported to his royal master that the Italian King said personally he was opposed to neutrality. But he added,²⁴ "unfortunately he was powerless". The King agreed to attempt to influence his government but evidently unsuccessfully since the policy of "hands off" from the Italian government was almost immediately forthcoming.

22. Ibid., No. 534, p. 427.

23. Renouvin, p. 311, quoting Diplomatic Papers, III, p. 142.

24. Kautsky Documents, No. 850, p. 587.

Later he sent a message to Wilhelm in which he said that Italy could not recognize that Austria had a cause for war and that, therefore, she would make use of her "diplomatic activity to the maintenance of the legitimate interests of our allies and ourselves in the course of peace". The Italian King signed his note to the Kaiser, "Your brother and ally". The Kaiser, famous for his interpretations and expressions, underlined "ally" twice, and wrote on the telegram, "Scoundrel, Impudence!"²⁵

In the meantime, the desire to gain the territory held by Austria, inhabited by Italians, became very popular. There was a divided sentiment, however, in Italy. It seems that the press and public largely favored the Entente. Mussolini, at that time relatively young, favored the intervention of Italy on the side of the Entente nations. As the government kept its ear to the ground somewhat closely, it gradually began to get closer to the point of view of Mussolini and others.²⁶

In the meantime, Italy was making diplomatic overtures to Austria for some months with the thought of strengthening the Alliance and making arrangements for "compensations". On March 27, 1915, it seemed that the two nations were getting closer to an accord. Austria expressed herself as willing "to make a cession

25. Vittorio Emanuele to Wilhelm, K.D., 755, p. 542.

26. Luigi Villari, The Awakening of Italy, George H. Doran Company, New York, pp. 16-18.

of territory in Southern Tyrol comprising the city of Trent". The offer, however, was a bit vague and was unacceptable in the form offered to Italy.²⁷

Negotiations and discussions proceeded, with relations becoming more strained, until Italy submitted "the conditions which the Royal Italian Government considers indispensable if a normal and enduring of reciprocal cordiality and if possible future co-operation toward common aims of general policy is to be created between the two States". Then followed eleven Articles upon which Italy rested her case, asking that Austria agree.²⁸ The conditions were not wholly acceptable to Austria. Rome, then believing relations would not improve, withdrew from her Alliance with Austria, May 3, 1915.²⁹

The Austro-Hungarian Government received the pronouncement of Italy's withdrawal "with painful surprise", declaring that this "put an end in such a summary manner to a treaty which was based on a community of our most important political interests which has guaranteed security and peace to our respective states for so many years and which has been of obvious benefit to Italy".³⁰

27. Scott, Diplomatic Documents, op.cit., (Italian Green Book, No. 58), p. 1291.

28. Ibid., No. 64, pp. 1229-1230.

29. Ibid., No. 76, pp. 1317-1318.

30. Ibid., p. 1319. This note did not appear in the Green Book. Translation from A.R.B., approved by Italian Embassy, Washington.

May 23, Baron Sonnino, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent a message to all Italian Representatives abroad and Foreign Governments justifying the position she was taking and announcing that on and after May 24, she would be "in a state of war with
 31
 Austria-Hungary.

The Entente and the Central Powers had made offers to Italy. Italy wanted territory. She wanted her nationals under the Italian flag. The Entente won Italy. In the spring of 1915 it appeared that the Entente might win the war. Undoubtedly, the latter had a larger purse and could offer more "since it was not
 32
 its own goods it was giving away".

31. Ibid., Unnumbered, Baron Sonnino to Italian Representatives Abroad, pp. 1322-1328.
 32. Dickinson, op.cit., pp. 469-470.

Chapter XIV
After The Study Is Made

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Authors of war are not necessarily those who declare it, but those who make it necessary. The military provocation of 1914 was largely determined by a diplomatic provocation. The system of militarism built up in Europe after the Franco-Prussian war, together with the strengthening of alliances and secret diplomacy, undoubtedly contributed much to the outbreak.

It is possible, says Dickinson, that "armed anarchy produces war, even though all the diplomats be archangels; . . . if it (war) does not arise from the obliquity of agents, it must arise from the medium from¹ which they have to work".

Great commotions arise out of small things but not concerning small things. The spark at Serajevo that set the world ablaze was of itself a relatively small thing. A commotion of such consequences that no statesman could visualize, arose from it. Neither can prophets visualize the length of time for the world to recover from the appalling disaster. No nation that went to war in 1914, except England, declared at the outbreak why it was fighting. The military party seems to have been in the saddle in Russia, Germany, and to a lesser degree, France. When the diplomat vanished from the scene, the soldier took his place. Only in England did Parliament order the war.

1. Dickinson, op.cit., p. 37.

The people of other nations were not consulted. Many paid the debt with their lives, caused by rash hurried action. For a war delayed, it is said, is frequently a war saved. According to the thesis of Montgolas, no nation knew at the end of the war why it had fought.

If pronouncements of statesmen are believed, all wars are defensive; if facts of peace treaties are considered, almost all are offensive. For the moment, each nation has all the right on its side, and all the wrong is found with the enemy.

The American belief, announced later, that the conflict was a "war to end war"; and a war to "make the world safe for democracy", did not seem to have appeared among the Europeans in the early stages of the struggle.

The war was, in large part, the result of fear. Europe might be compared to a powder-magazine in which the dropping of a lighted match, whether by accident or plan, was practically certain to produce a tremendous conflagration.

The beginning of the struggle, moreover, is the condemnation not only of the performers who played their parts well at the outset, but also of the international anarchy which they received from the past. It appears to some as if the world's knowledge has exceeded its wisdom and people are simply children making merry with loaded pistols.

Growing out of this study, the following conclusions have been reached:

1. The nationalistic program of Serbia would have dismembered Austria-Hungary.
2. Austria-Hungary, to save herself, had to check the Serbian aspirations.
3. Austria's attempt to check Serbia was contrary to Russia's Balkan program.
4. Austria-Hungary must, therefore, count on Russian opposition.
5. In order to meet Russian opposition, Austria depended on her ally, Germany. Germany had given the Dual Monarchy "a blank check".
6. Both Germany and Austria-Hungary were interested in the penetration of the Near East.
7. Russia had an ally, France, that had pledged military support to Russia. In addition, France had a grievance against Germany, namely, the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine.
8. In this maze of conflict, Belgium was brought into the war because she was in the pathway of the German army.
9. The geographical position of Belgium was of great strategic importance to England. She, consequently, felt obliged to fight for the provisions of the treaty of 1839.
10. The problem of Anglo-Teuton naval rivalry was becoming intense. Here, perhaps, that rivalry could be settled.
11. Japan gladly fulfilled her obligations as an ally of England.
12. Finally, Italy took advantage of the occasion to satisfy the irredentist movement.

To find the causes of the war, the world must look at Agadir, then at Fez, and back through Tangier to the Balkan Wars. The Balkan peninsula proved to be the spot where the explosion came. A system brought the war and that system was secret diplomacy, associated with nationalism, militarism, commercial supremacy, naval

supremacy, and insatiable land hunger. History students knew long before Serajevo that strong ties existed among the European Powers. They could, however, discover but little of these understandings. They could not learn the extent of the agreements made. They could not fathom the mysteries of diplomatic entanglements.

Even the members of the Parliaments chosen by the voters of Europe could not get accurate information on secret diplomacy. From the foreign ministers of their respective governments, editors, citizens, and political leaders attempted to ascertain the existing ties of the nations without success. Both requests or demands were answered with silence or evasion.

The diplomats met in secret chambers and made the bargains that drove Europe to war. But few of those who went to war or remained at home, knew the methods of the diplomats.

Nations are unquestionably responsible for secret diplomacy. The people who live in lands where parliamentary governments prevail are especially responsible for the situation which may cause a great war. People must think for themselves and must not again be deluded by a score or more of diplomats.

In the light of conditions just twenty years after the titanic struggle, evidences point to the possibility that it was not a war to end war. It seems evident that as long as nations arm for war, take

positions which war alone can settle, ally themselves for defense, and continue their secret diplomacy, wars will come and go until at last civilization will falter at the brink of the abyss and will at last topple over and be lost.

If peace is to prevail, excessive nationalism must be curtailed; secret diplomacy needs to be replaced by open agreements; armaments must be limited by all nations to defensive purposes only, and colonies should be set free when evidences of self control seem probable.

"The darksome statesman, hung with weights of woe
 Like a thick midnight fog, moved there so slow,
 He did not stay nor go;
 Condemning thoughts, like sad eclipses, scowl
 Upon his soul.
 And crowds of crying witnesses without
 Pursue him with one shout.
 Yet digged the mile, and lest his ways be found,
 Worked under ground,
 Where he did snatch his prey." 2

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