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UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE

THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 1906

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty

Of the Graduate School of the University of Louisville

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree

Of Master of Arts

Department of History

by

Marjorie Lucille Rogers

1933

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THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS, 1906

-* PREFACE *-

PREFACE.

The Algeciras Conference can not be thought of as a single isolated event or as the product of a moment. It is linked to the facts that both precede and follow it. There was never a fact in history that did not have other facts responsible for it or was not itself responsible for many coming after it, and if the writer shall seem to set a rather arbitrary beginning and ending for this account of the Conference, let the reader remember she does so for convenience only, and that the present can no more be cut from the past of which it is a product than the future can escape being shaped by the present. The Conference of Algeciras, then, is merely an incident, at once a cause and a result, in the long story of Franco-German friction, of which the origin is obscure and the end yet invisible.

-* M A P *-

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Chapter I

INTERNATIONAL FRICTION IN MOROCCO

THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS

Chapter I

International Friction in Morocco

In the opening years of the twentieth century there came under the control of a European state the last of the backward nations, Morocco. For centuries during which more or less regular diplomatic and commercial relations were carried on with European powers, Morocco resisted western civilization. That she had been able to hold out longer than countries of the same sort as herself, especially against control by a western nation, was due partly to the period of relatively strong rule which prevailed in the state between 1813 and 1900, a period which began before the era of imperialism was thoroughly started. The country had been ably governed by the Sultan, Mulai-el-Hassan, until his death in 1894 when the power fell into the hands of the grand vizier, Ba-Ahmed. The latter's equally effective rule came to an end when he died in 1900.

The new Sultan was a mere youth, and though intelligent and attractive, was ill-equipped to wield his authority. Unlike the great mass of his people, Abdel-Aziz was inordinately fond of many of the products of European civilization, such as bicycles, motor-cars, photography and fireworks. At length, the young man's

extravagance emptied the Moroccan treasury. In an attempt to save the situation, the government increased the taxes. The new taxes not only were extremely heavy but also were in violation of the Koran. Under these circumstances, the natives, who thoroughly resented their Sultan's conduct, revolted. The political and religious ties of the people began to give way. By 1903 the Moroccan capital, Fez, was threatened by the rebels, and the Sultan's authority extended to only a few towns. He had no money, therefore no army. One writer has compared Morocco to a feudal state of a type to be found in Europe about the year 1000.¹ Indeed, it was little else; the Sultan was Sultan in name only. Even the geography of the country militated against national unity. Thus, Morocco was a lovely morsel ready to be devoured by a hungry Mediterranean nation seeking sources of food supplies, raw materials, markets and strategically located land. Furthermore, an excellent excuse for intervention in Moroccan affairs existed. The disorder in the country, which naturally endangered the lives and property of foreigners, made protection of them an urgent international question.

Aside from the fact of a relatively strong internal government under Mulai-El-Hassan, it is to be wondered why Morocco was not already taken in tow by one of the great Western powers. The reason is simple enough. The nations which chiefly coveted Morocco were those having

¹. B. E. Schmitt, England and Germany 1740-1914, 228f

Western Mediterranean interests, i.e., Great Britain, Germany, France, Spain and Italy. Morocco was contiguous to the French and Spanish possessions in Northern Africa and was situated near to Spain on the Straits of Gibraltar. She was also on the route to South Africa. Out of the fact of her location, then, grew a conflict of strategic interests between the powers. Though each of the western nations concerned longed to gain the upper hand in Morocco, each suspected that the others would take advantage of their position if similarly situated. Hence, the powers desired to maintain a state of affairs which should keep every foreign nation in Morocco within well defined limits. To achieve this end had been the actual purpose of a Conference held at Madrid in 1880. The Conference, in settling a number of commercial problems, had concluded that every nation represented at Madrid should have most-favored-nation treatment in Morocco. The Sultan's independence and sovereignty were, of course, guaranteed. It might be added that up to 1903, at least, foreign trade with Morocco was not large. But, as it has been aptly put, "Increasing insecurity of foreigners and the Sultan's need for loans foreshadowed the end of Moroccan independence."¹

There was, however, one nation that had been intensely alert to conditions in Morocco, and was turn-

¹E.N.Anderson, The First Moroccan Crisis, 1904-1906, 4. Hereafter this work will be cited as Anderson, Moroccan Crisis.

ing them to advantage at every opportunity. Like her sister states, France had declared herself in favor of the status quo in Morocco, but, like them also, not through any special respect which she entertained toward the North African country, for she had no desire to see Morocco reform herself. France's main idea was to prevent any other Power from gaining too much influence. The foregoing policy was pursued through the 1890's, after which came a visible change. A combination of factors might be said to have been responsible.

The international situation was especially favorable to a change of policy. Three of the Powers interested in Mediterranean affairs were laden with troubles of their own: Great Britain occupied with the Boer War; Italy defeated by Abyssinia in 1896, and Spain by the United States in 1898. The internal disintegration of Morocco has already been referred to above. But even a favorable international situation might not have been sufficient to induce an unwilling nation to embark upon an imperialistic program likely to prove a rough sea. There were other forces at work.

The French people had been carefully prepared for the day when France should be able to extend her African possessions to include Morocco. Development of an attitude favorable to colonial acquisition, particularly in Africa, was largely the work of an organization having a small but distinguished membership -- the Comité de

l'Afrique française. Because of the high position held by many of the members in state affairs, the Comité was in a position to exercise considerable influence upon the French government as well as on the nation. The Comité went so far as to formulate a policy which it desired to see the government pursue, and which the latter did come to follow to a large extent. This policy may be summed up, in general, as follows:

- (1) The French government was to make agreements with interested states respecting Morocco;
- (2) The sovereignty of the Sultan and the integrity of his land to be assured;
- (3) The freedom of the Straits to be adequately guaranteed;
- (4) Satisfaction for the legitimate interests of the powers, considered chiefly economic, through full commercial liberty;
- (5) Recognition of Spain's territorial claims;
- (6) "Pacific penetration" to be the method used in winning Morocco by means of control over the Sultan, who was the sole source of religious and political authority.¹ Pacific penetration would gain the good will of the French people and would prevent other powers from taking offense.

The Comité's arguments in behalf of its policy ranged from the reasonable to the ridiculous, but its campaign was highly successful and nearly the whole nation was

¹. Ibid., 7.

converted to the Morocco policy.

All that was then lacking to make a change in the government's policy both positive and effective was a leader fired with the ideas of the Comité and intelligent enough to make them a reality. Such a one was M. Theophile Delcassé, who became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1898. Delcassé was a strange man, to say the least, a highly uncommunicative person who immediately assumed complete independence in performing the functions of his office. Taking advantage of Parliament's preoccupation with internal affairs, he carried out his policy of maintaining and developing French interests. He aimed at increasing French prestige and rounding out her possessions in Africa. Control of Morocco would be a source of defense to France, because of its proximity to France's other African possessions, as seen by a glance at the map. To sum up the situation, we see that all the conditions were favorable to an aggressive policy on the part of France in Morocco. The powers most likely to be interested were busy with their own affairs; the Moroccan government was on the verge of collapse; the French people were in the right frame of mind; and France had a foreign minister capable of leading the way.

The French had had occasion for close contact with the Moroccan government for many years. As far back, in fact, as 1845 a treaty had been signed between the two countries which roughly fixed the boundary line

between Algeria and Morocco. The unrest in the latter country had given rise to innumerable raids in Algeria by savage tribes. The French complained loudly and demanded protection, which the Sultans were in no position to give. Accordingly, the local Algerian authorities often took it upon themselves to pursue the tribes across the indefinite boundary into their own country in order to subdue them. Then it would be the Moroccan Government's turn to complain. Friction was almost continuous and sharp words were often visited by the French upon the Sultan. Such was the case in 1901, owing to the fact that attacks by Moroccans on Algeria had increased. This time the Sultan appealed to Great Britain and Germany for aid. The Mission he sent to London was merely warned by Lord Landsdowne that if the Sultan could not keep order, France would have to defend her interests.¹ Germany was indifferent, though she was not to remain so for long. In the end, a new treaty was arranged between France and Morocco, when the latter sent a special mission to France to settle the boundary trouble. But the treaty of 1901 left the boundary as uncertain as it had been, for Delcasse had no intention of creating a carefully isolated Morocco.² Having an indefinite

¹G.P.Gooch, History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919, 341. Hereafter this work will be cited as Gooch, Modern Europe.

²Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 14.

border line between the two countries was for France like having a foot in the door.

There were several interesting provisions in this treaty, interesting in the light of French policy. One created a zone between the two countries within two lines drawn through what was definitely known to be Moroccan and Algerian territory. The tribes living inside the zone were themselves to choose whether they wished to reside under French or Moroccan authority. Moroccans and Algerians were to be free to enter the zone for commercial and other purposes. Moreover, tribes of either country owning pasture lands in the other might still use them. Each country was to appoint two commissioners to settle border disputes. Each was privileged to set a line of posts for defense purposes in territory definitely its own.¹ In 1902 two other treaties were negotiated by France with Morocco. They laid down a complete program of military, political, and economic cooperation between them.²

It was quite apparent that the Sultan could not hope to maintain order in and along the frontier of Morocco without help; so he requested the aid of a few

¹ Ibid., 18 from Ministere des Étrangeres, Document diplomatique, affaires du Maroc, 1901-1905. (Hereafter this Livre jaune will be cited as L.j. 1901-1905) 15ff., No. 20 and annexe.

² Ibid., 17, from L.j., 1901-1905, 26ff., No. 24; 33ff., No. 27f.

French military instructors, who were supplied him. A French bank also advanced him a small loan. At the same time, however, the Sultan sent another mission under one of his advisers, Kaid Maclean, and ex-British soldier, to Great Britain and Germany to secure help in stopping French interference. The Mission met with the same failure as the earlier ones.¹ When 1903 rolled around bringing with it the revolt in Morocco already mentioned, the Sultan found himself in such dire straits that he was glad enough to accept the loan of 22,000,000 francs guaranteed on the customs which France advanced to him for the purpose of carrying out reforms.² Thus unwillingly he began to fall in with Delcassé's policy of "Pacific penetration", which it was hoped should some day bring Morocco completely under French control. Although the French Foreign Minister's instructions to the French representative at Tangier carefully required that the Sultan be assured of French respect for the sovereignty and integrity of his land, and of France's desire to give him neighborly assistance, they also required the representative to support all enterprises, philanthropic, commercial and industrial, tending to augment French influence in Morocco.³

¹G.T.Gooch & Harold Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War, II, 272ff., No.328. Hereafter this work will be cited as B.D.

²Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 18, fr. L.j., 53ff, No.39

³Ibid., 16, from L.j., 1901-5, 18ff., No. 21.

In the meantime, what of the other nations that might have reason to be intensely interested in France's relations with Morocco? Delcassé by no means overlooked the possibility of competitors suddenly confronting him, however preoccupied they might be at present with their own affairs. Securing the goodwill of these nations became, therefore, a very important part of his policy. He won the neutrality of Italy, Spain and Great Britain by establishing ententes with them. The negotiations bringing about these understandings proceeded for the most part simultaneously, but they will be discussed separately for purposes of clarity.

Delcassé's first triumph of diplomacy was the entente established with Italy in 1902. In 1881 Italy's attitude toward France had been considerably embittered by the latter's seizure of Tunis which Italy coveted greatly. The hard feelings thus engendered resulted in a ten year tariff war between the two countries, and in Italy's entry into alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Italy soon discovered that the Alliance which she had entered mostly as a protest directed toward France was of little use to her, that she even suffered because of it.¹ Wherefore, she undertook in 1896 to bring about a rapprochement with her neighbor on the north. The trouble over Tunis was settled that same

¹. B.D., I, 285, No. 355; 286, No. 356.

year. Two years later the tariff war between Italy and France was ended by a commercial treaty.¹

In 1898 Delcassé, quick to foster the new situation, visited Rome. Italy having given up all hope in regard to Tunis had accordingly turned her eyes on Tripoli as a substitute. Delcassé proceeded to use the object of Italy's new desires as a means whereby he might win Italian recognition of France's preferential position in Morocco. He was entirely successful. On December 14, 1900, a secret agreement was reached between France and Italy. According to the treaty Italy recognized that action taken by France to exercise and safeguard the rights resulting for her from the proximity of her territory to Morocco, would not be considered prejudicial to the interest of Italy as a Mediterranean power. Furthermore, in case a modification of the political and territorial status of Morocco should result, Italy would "reserve for herself, as a reciprocal measure, the right of eventually developing her influence in Cyrenaic Tripolitaine."² As one may readily see, the above statement was somewhat vague and gave to Italy a negative sort of assurance.

¹. Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 20, from Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914, XVIII, 716, No 5833. Hereafter this work will be cited as G.P.

². Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 22, quoting L.j., 1900-2, 3f., No. 1, Annexes I and II.

Italy was patently anxious for better terms in regard to Tripoli. There was, however, from the French standpoint, at least, one obstacle which had to be leaped or got around in some way. This was Italy's obligation as a party to the Triple Alliance. France wanted to make sure that the Alliance, renewable in 1902, should contain no clause aggressive toward her. In June, 1901, the Italian Foreign Minister verbally promised the French Ambassador to Italy that the renewal treaty between the Central Powers and Italy would contain nothing hostile to France, in return for which declaration of Italy's rights in Tripoli were put on the same basis as those of France in Morocco. The burden of his conversation was embodied in notes exchanged between France and Italy on November 1, 1902, which constituted a formal, but secret agreement containing the following clause insisted on by Delcassé:

"In case France (Italy) shall be the object of a direct or indirect aggression on the part of one or several Powers, Italy (France) will preserve a strict neutrality. The same will hold in case France (Italy) as a result of direct provocation is forced to take, for the defense of her honor or security, the initiative of a declaration of war." ¹

¹. Ibid., 31, quoting L.j., 1900-2, 4f., No.3;6, No.5.

Thus ended the twenty year quarrel between the two Latin nations, publicly announced by the visit of President Loubet of France to Victor Emmanuel in 1904. Though Italy had obtained what she wanted, a recognition of her claims to Tripoli, yet she found herself with a foot in each international camp, a position which was to prove a rather uncomfortable one, as we shall see. Delcassé gained more than the direct end he had in view, that of settlement of the Morocco question as far as Italy was concerned. The Triple Alliance, already weakening, had received a severe blow despite the German Chancellor's famous remark to the effect that in a happy marriage a husband does not mind his wife's indulging in an innocent extra dance.¹ What is more, the drawing of Italy away from Germany marked, if not the end of French isolation, (a thing of the past by 1898,) at least the beginning of German isolation.

The establishment of the entente with Spain was accomplished at the end of a rather rocky diplomatic road. Delcassé realized that Spain was entitled to a special position in Morocco as was France. Spain's proximity to Morocco, her history of past attempts at conquest of the country, her economic interests there and the number of Spanish in Morocco, which was greater than that of any other foreign nation, had all testified to the fact that Spain could not be ignored in any disposition of Morocco among the Powers. Spain had, however,

¹. Gooch, Modern Europe, 347.

been satisfied with the status quo and had not reciprocated warmly the advances made to her by France in 1898-1900.¹ Nevertheless, when she saw the progress France was making in the region back of Morocco, she awoke to the danger to Spanish interests there,² and decided that if the territory was to be divided, Spain would claim the northern part. It was Spain, then, who opened direct negotiations with France over Morocco, but it was France who gained the most through Delcassé', who was unwilling that Spain should have as much territory as she desired. The negotiation dragged along for some time. Finally, in 1902 an agreement was reached upon three main bases:

- (1) The two countries adhered to the principle of the pacific penetration of Morocco;
- (2) France promised Spain diplomatic support in the execution of the treaty;
- (3) Spain was to receive as her sphere of influence almost all of the old kingdom of Fez, including the Capitol and Tangier in the north; France was to get the rest.³

Unfortunately for Spain, as it proved later, the agreement fell through because the conservative government which had just come into power in Spain feared the attitude of Great Britain who did express her desire to be

¹. B.D., II, 258, No.311.

². Ibid., 259, No.314; 260, No.315.

³. Ibid., II, 279, No.336; 306ff., No.364; III, 33, No.34; 35, No.37, No.41; 31f., No.32.

considered in the discussions over Morocco.

Negotiations lapsed for a time while Delcassé began to treat with Great Britain. Throughout the Anglo-French negotiations Spain revealed her anxiety lest Spanish interests should not receive due consideration. She thought that she should have been included in the discussions over Morocco.¹ In 1904, negotiations were reopened between France and Spain, and a new agreement was reached, although Spain considered the terms given her much inferior to those proffered her in 1902. Spain particularly objected to a clause which Delcassé at the last moment wanted included. By it she would be precluded from taking any action in her sphere of influence until the status quo in Morocco should come to an end. Spain felt that this prohibition upon Spanish action would give France an excellent chance to establish herself in Morocco in such a manner that Spain could never claim that the political status of Morocco had been altered, and thus be able to assert her rights to a sphere of influence.² Nevertheless, Spain had to accept pretty much what France and Great Britain between them were willing to concede to her.

The Convention between France and Spain, which was secret, was signed at Paris, October 3, 1904.

¹. Ibid., III, 39, No. 44.

². Ibid., 39, No. 44.

According to it Spain adhered to the Anglo-French agreement of the previous April. There is no need to discuss here the various articles of the treaty. Suffice it to say that such subjects as the boundary line between the two spheres, joint economic enterprises, military action, and contraband in Morocco were dealt with. The clause Delcassé had desired was also incorporated and Spain promised not to alienate the territory she would receive.¹ By this treaty the rapprochement between France and Spain became a reality. Delcassé had gained another nation's recognition of France's preferential claims in Morocco.

During the long drawn out Spanish negotiations, conversations with Great Britain were begun in 1903 anent the establishment of cordial relations between England and France. Delcassé was keenly aware of the necessity of gaining British approval of the aims he wished to achieve in regard to Abd-el-Aziz's helpless country. He had made advances to Great Britain earlier than 1903 but they had met with slight success.² There were a number of factors in the business not calculated to make Delcassé's task an easy one. France was still smarting from the injury to her pride suffered at the hands of the British in the Fashada incident of 1898. Furthermore, both countries were the respective allies of two nations at swords points in the Far East,

¹. For the terms of this treaty see Ibid., 49, No. 59.

². B.D., I, 163, No. 188; 171, No. 198.

namely, Russia and Japan, Besides, British influence in Morocco was growing apace. Delcassé was anxious to prevent an Anglo-German alliance.¹ Hence he cultivated assiduously German friendship and twice in 1901 made advances to Germany to establish an accord.² Both attempts were fruitless but were offset by the failure of the Anglo-German agreement to materialize. As it turned out, the business and political groups in Great Britain and France eased the French Foreign Minister's path by agitating for improved relations between their respective nations.

In May 1903 King Edward paid what turned out to be a very successful visit to Paris, which was returned by President Loubet and Delcassé two months later. The negotiations begun then and continuing until April 1904 amounted to little more than mere bargaining. France was dominated by the desire to gain British recognition of her peculiar interest in Morocco; Great Britain, on the other hand, saw in this situation a splendid opportunity for the settlement of the Egyptian problems. Although the Russo-Japanese war breaking out in February, 1904, complicated matters, an agreement was eventually attained as a result of compromise. Three documents comprised the Accord of April 8, 1904. We are interested in the third agreement which concerned

¹. Ibid., 162, No. 187.

². Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 45, from G.P., XVIII, 28ff, Nos. 5393-95.

Egypt and Morocco. As in the case of the Spanish agreement there is no need to go into the details of this treaty.¹ The significant fact is, that each of the two countries agreed to surrender its rights and interests in the backward nation coveted by the other; that is to say, France would keep her hands off Egypt; Great Britain would do the same in regard to Morocco. Supplementary to the public agreement there were five secret articles which boldly laid down a program of action to be taken in case the Sultan should cease to exercise authority. Great Britain promised to France full diplomatic support in carrying out the program. As Mr. Anderson has strikingly said, "The doctors were agreeing upon a division of the patient's property before they began to operate."² France's secret agreement with Spain and Great Britain were quite obviously in violation of the open door principle.

When we come to a consideration of M. Delcassé's policy in regard to Germany, those who are of a literary turn of mind may possibly be reminded of the great characters in Shakespearean tragedy whose unhappy ends were often the result of a tragic flaw in their personalities. M. Delcassé seemed almost to be the victim of such a flaw, although luckily for the immediate peace of

¹. B.D., II, 373ff., No. 417.

². Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 106.

the world no fatal event occurred as a result of it. To be sure, Delcassé had made an honest effort to win the friendship of Germany. He had even attempted to bring about an accord. Nevertheless, he seems to have completely under-estimated the interest which Germany might manifest in the future of Morocco, though he might have suspected it. Be that as it may, he very casually informed Germany of the Anglo-French agreement through the German Ambassador to France. Fearing that formal announcement would provoke discussion, he no doubt hoped that his comparative silence would gain a tacit acceptance by Germany of his policy.

Whatever Delcassé thought, he continued pacific penetration throughout 1904. The loan made to the Sultan had brought the Moroccan customs almost entirely under French control. Further acts of banditry emphasized the pressing need for reforms in Morocco and gave France additional opportunities to take the lead in introducing them. The French government proceeded to outline a complete plan of reform. M. Saint-René Taillandier was dispatched in 1905 to Fez to persuade the Sultan to adopt the plan. Of course, the French envoy was carefully instructed to impress upon the Sultan that France was acting merely in a friendly spirit in offering to help him establish a strong government, a thing he was to understand was possible only

through close cooperation between the Moroccan and French governments.¹ According to the plan French officers were to help train the Moroccan police so that order might be restored. The scheme of reform also included the building of roads and telegraphs, as well as the establishment of a State bank.² The envoy did not find the Sultan in a very receptive mood, although the latter conceded the practicability of some of the reforms. It was necessary, the Sultan said, for them to be discussed with the Maghzen. While these discussions were going on and René-Taillandier was toiling to wring acceptance from the Moroccans, Germany suddenly awoke to what was going on and uttered a clarion protest.

The German policy throughout the period of the Moroccan crisis and the Conference of Algenciras was most uncertain and therefore difficult to fathom.³ The direction of German foreign policy seemed to be a case of too many cooks spoiling the broth. The Kaiser insisted upon taking a hand in the conduct of foreign relations with the result that Count Bülow, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and later Chancellor, spent a good deal of his time correcting the mistakes of the Emperor. Furthermore, though Bülow had ideas of his own, he was constantly open to the

¹. Gooch, Modern Europe, 348 from L.j., 1901-5, 179ff, No.299.

². Ibid.

³. BD.III, "General Report on Germany for 1906, May 24, 1907." 433.

persuasive influence of Baron Von Holstein in the Foreign office, whom many considered as almost a psychopath. There was no continuity, no real direction to German policy. Consequently, other nations could not be expected to know Germany's intentions, if Germany herself apparently did not know what she wanted.^{1.}

Although at first German government was friendly to the Anglo-French agreement of April, 1904,^{2.} later in the year the German Ambassador to Great Britain in conversation with Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary, stated that Germany wanted the status quo and the open door to prevail in Morocco, and that she meant "to uphold any rights which she was entitled to claim in Morocco under existing treaties".^{3.} At the time the Anglo-French agreement was concluded Bulow saw no cause for alarm, while the Kaiser told King Edward that Morocco had never interested him.⁴ This attitude on the part of official Germany may account in part at least for Delcassé's fundamental error in not reaching some defi-

1. Ibid., 429.

2. Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 141f., quoting Bernard von Bulow, Reden, (Leipzig, 1903), II, 74, 84, 90f.

3. B.D., III, 53, No. 62.

4. Ibid., IV., 1, No. 1; Ibid., 2, No. 2; Sidney Lee, King Edward, VII, II, 292ff., also G.P., XIX, 186ff., Nos. 6038 and 6040.

nite understanding with Germany concerning the future of Morocco. However that may be, the Pan-Germans soon raised a hue and cry throughout Germany to the effect that German economic interests were being sadly neglected and that Germany should uphold her rights.

The sending of the French envoy to Fex was the occasion for a sudden change of German foreign policy. The German Chargé at Tangier, Kuhlmann, remarked that France had made a "bad mistake" in thinking that the agreement with Spain and Great Britain settled the international side of the question.¹ Germany hurried to bolster up the Sultan in his opposition to France. She demanded the status quo.

Holstein, at this moment, conceived the idea of the Kaiser's paying a visit to the Sultan by way of making a political demonstration which should bring the Moroccan affair into prominence, be of benefit to Germany's economic interests in Morocco, and embarrass Delcassé. Bulow, who by this time was German Chancellor, accepted the idea at once. The Kaiser, however, was not in sympathy with the plan, and had to be persuaded to take part in the affair. Even at the last moment when about to leave his yacht at Tangier, March 3, 1905, he tried to use the roughness of the sea and the sort of horse he should have to ride as excuses for not pro-

¹ E.T.S. Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914, III, 220F, No. 261.
Hereafter this work will be cited as G.D.D. III.

ceeding with the demonstration. As for the Moroccans, they apparently looked forward to the Emperor's visit as a possible check upon French designs.¹ Bulow in a four page telegram had taken pains to instruct William II as to what he should say in the speeches the latter would make at Tangier. The Kaiser was to encourage the Moroccans in their resistance to France and arouse uneasiness in the French, but he was not to commit Germany to anything definite. As reported, the Kaiser's speech to the Sultan's representative ran, as follows: He declared that "he had great interest in the welfare and prosperity of the Moroccan Empire, that he visited the Sultan as an independent ruler, and that he hoped under the authority of the Sultan a free Morocco would be opened to the peaceful competition of all nations without monopoly or exclusion."²

The Tangier demonstration proved to be a blunder, a diplomatic failure of the first order. This was for two main reasons. In the first place the Emperor, whom King Edward called Europe's "enfant terrible", talked too freely and thus bound Germany more tightly in respect to her Moroccan policy than Bulow had wanted;³ in the

¹. B.D., III, 58, No. 68.

². Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 193f., quoting the version of the speech published in Allgemeine Zeitung (Munich) April 4, 1905.

³. See Bulow's instructions to the Kaiser, Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 190f., quoting from G.P., XX, 272ff., No. 6574ff.

second place the visit cemented the entente between Great Britain and France, the least desirable happening for Germany. But the fat was in the fire and it was to fry for a long time. Delcassé and the French policy in Morocco had been openly challenged.

Before going further, let us see if we can draw at least a few tentative conclusions with regard to the motives which may have lain behind Germany's foreign policy. It is evident enough, I think that Germany when she became clearly aware of France's intentions in respect to Morocco, was truly concerned about the future of her economic interests in that country. Consequently, she demanded the maintenance of the status quo and the open door. But it was also evident that the status quo was impossible. Germany revealed her recognition of this fact when she complained about France's failure to consult her in regard to Morocco. What, then, did she want? Protection of her economic interests was certainly not the sum total of her desires. Various possible explanations of her policy have included Germany's desire to maintain her prestige, to gain compensation somewhere,¹ to acquire naval bases and coaling stations, to establish a German Morocco which should neutralize French Algeria in case of war, to become a Mediterranean power,² and to destroy the Entente

¹ E. Brandenburg, From Bismarck to the World War; a History of German Foreign Policy, 1870-1914, 229f.; G.D.D., III, 220f., No. 207.

² B.E. Schmitt, England and Germany, 1740-1914, 233. Schmitt says Germany never admitted these things.

Cordiale. We shall keep these possibilities in mind as we proceed with our study.

By April, 11, the French envoy at Fez reported that the Sultan had consented to have his troops at Tangier, Rabat, Casablanca and Ujda organized on French models. The progress he had thus made was completely undone, however, upon arrival of a German envoy, Count Tattenbach, on May 13. In about two weeks the Count had so influenced the Sultan that the latter rejected the French scheme of reforms.¹ A British mission which arrived a couple of days after was unable to reverse the decision. The Sultan gave as an explanation of his conduct the excuse that he could only accept the French plans if ratified by the Powers.² What did that mean? The international friction in Morocco had reached the point where a way out of the difficulty had to be found. Was the Sultan suggesting one, and if so, was it his own idea and would it work?

¹•Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 225, from G.P. XX, 392, No. 6672.

²•A.W.Ward and G.P.Gooch, The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, III, 341.

Chapter II

THE WAY OUT: AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

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The Way Out: An International Conference.

The Sultan's way out proved to be an international Conference of the powers signatory to the Madrid Convention of 1880. The conference should pass upon the French proposals. The Sultan's move was patently of German origin.¹ The German press had for some time been advocating a conference and early in April before the German envoy reached Fez, the German government sent out circulars to the powers to sound their attitude toward such a meeting.²

The story of the period prior to the actual holding of the Algeciras Conference is as necessary to the story of the Conference proper, as a key is necessary to open a locked door. To omit a discussion of the diplomacy of this period would be like arriving at a play at the beginning of the last act and expecting to understand what the characters were about without knowledge of what had transpired earlier. In considering, then, the diplomatic relations leading up to the Conference of Algeciras, we see that they fall rather naturally into two major phases: first, the period of Germany's struggle to bring the Conference about; second, the period of the struggle by the powers (chiefly French and German) to agree on the program. These divisions

¹. B.D., III, 88, No. 106.

². Ibid., 66, No. 78

made in something so fundamentally continuous as history may be excused perhaps on the ground that they make for clarity, always at a premium in any consideration of European politics.

The action taken by Germany in the shape of the Tangier demonstration required to be followed up, hence the circular note sent to the powers. The reaction which the German government received for its trouble was not very satisfactory. Austria-Hungary and Russia disapproved of Germany's action.¹ The other nations tried to evade the issue and hung back to let France take the lead. Spain declared she could not adhere to the German proposal unless France and Great Britain agreed to do so. The sudden looming of the German Michael on the French horizon frightened the country into a criticism of the policy of its Foreign Minister, Delcassé, who heartily opposed a Conference and sought to reach a direct settlement of the misunderstanding between Germany and France. Italy also urged direct settlement but Germany responded to Delcassé's overtures by insisting on the Conference.

The motives behind German actions are well set forth in instructions given by Bulow to Count Tattenbach on April 30, 1905. In explaining Germany's desire for a Conference, he says:

¹ Anderson, *Moroccan Crisis*, 206 from G.P., XX, 317, No. 6612; 277f., No. 6577.

"Even if, therefore, France were inclined to permit us to conquer a part of Morocco, we would for the present perhaps not be in a position to take advantage of this overture. In reality, we are confronted with the alternative either of relinquishing Morocco now to France without adequate compensation to Germany, or of working for the extension of the life of the Sherifian Empire in the expectation of a turn of events favorable to us. Thus, I perceive your important task to be in holding the future free for the profit of German interests. I sum it up in stating that you should bring the Sultan to declare that he could consider the French demands only if they were advised by a conference of all the signatory Powers. The reference to the conference I consider for the Sultan the easiest and for us the most favorable form of refusal. That the Sultan refuse the French demands is naturally the main thing."¹

In speaking of maintaining the state of Morocco until a favorable turn of events, and of keeping the future free, Bulow probably had in mind the time when German public opinion should be solidly behind a policy of colonial acquisition and the time when the German navy should be capable of winning and preserving a colonial Empire. It is evident also, I think, from the instructions, that

¹ Ibid., 216f.

Bulow was confident that no Conference of the powers would accept the French plan of reforms.

Unfortunately, at this time there developed in France much opposition to Delcassé and his policies. The opposition resulted from a number of factors, such as Delcassé's long tenure of office, his independent methods, and the enmity between him and the French Premier, M. Rouvier, who believed that France should treat Germany and Great Britain alike in regard to Morocco. Rouvier suggested that an exchange of notes between France and the powers might be all that was necessary to settle the trouble, but his proposal met the same fate as Delcassé's proposal for direct settlement between the two nations. The Kaiser's excuse for German refusal to settle directly with France was that Germany was championing the cause of the world.¹ As for Great Britain, she could not understand why there should be so much international difficulty over what the Marquess of Lansdowne pleased to call a "diplomatic oversight" on the part of Delcassé.² In the meantime, Germany suggested that France herself call a Conference. She naturally refused to do so. Then the Sultan on May 30, 1905 issued his own invitation to a conference to consider the French plans of reform.

¹J.B.Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Times, I, 469. Hereafter this work will be cited as Bishop, Roosevelt, I.

²B.D., III, 68, No. 83.

A little earlier, Germany had approached the United States, urging her to persuade Great Britain to accept a conference. President Roosevelt replied that the United States had not enough interests at stake to warrant entangling herself in the matter, but that she was not averse to trying to help the establishment of a friendly feeling between Germany and Great Britain, provided it was clearly understood that the United States was not taking sides.¹ Great Britain, however, remained hostile to a conference.

Delcasse, supported by Great Britain, clung to his policy of opposition also, but his colleagues were frightened as to the outcome if he continued thus. Germany threatened war and demanded the elimination of the Foreign Minister. Delcasse was convinced that Germany was bluffing, but Premier Rouvier thought differently when Prince Henckel von Donnersmark in visiting Paris remarked that "If you (the French) think that your Foreign Minister has engaged your country in a too adventurous path, show it by separating yourselves from him, and above all by giving your foreign policy a new orientation. The Emperor does not wish for war, but if you are beaten you will be bled white."² The British Government apparently did not fear war, since she believed Germany far too weak on the sea to attempt such a thing.³

¹. Bishop, Roosevelt, I, 471f.

². Gooch, Modern Europe, 356.

³. B.D., III, 68, No. 82.

Be that as it may, the French Cabinet was sufficiently alarmed to present a hostile front to Delcassé at the decisive Cabinet meeting of June 6, 1905, when supported only by President Loubet, Delcassé was forced to resign. In commenting upon his fall to the British Ambassador to France, Delcassé said that he had been ready to make commercial concessions to Germany if she had been willing to talk, and though he would not have yielded anything politically or territorially, he would not have done anything in Morocco which would have jeopardized Germany's treaty rights there. Further, if England, France and Spain stood together, he said he did not believe that Germany would attack France. Moreover, Italy had bound herself to remain neutral as regards Morocco and not oppose France.¹ It appeared to be evident that Germany was aiming at more than protection of her treaty rights.

Now, as to the effect which Delcassé's fall had upon the international situation and the nearness of the powers to a conference: It seemed to be a triumph for German diplomacy to be thus able to eliminate the chief obstacle to its scheme. At least it must have seemed so to the German Emperor, for he immediately raised Chancellor von Bulow to the rank of Prince; it looked as if he meant to celebrate the initial success of Germany's Moroccan policy. However, an interesting thing happened,

¹. Ibid., 78, No. 96.

and no doubt, a startling one for Germany, the fact that only a slight change in French foreign policy was noticeable upon Rouvier's assumption of the office of Foreign Minister.¹ Rouvier continued to demand a direct understanding with Germany, but he approached his opponent in a more subtle way than his predecessor. He informed the German Ambassador that he had no liking for a conference, but that if he did accept the Sultan's invitation, there would have to be a preliminary understanding with Germany. He said, "We think a conference dangerous without previous agreement, and useless with it" (Italics mine).² The French, however, did not definitely refuse acceptance.

William II was inclined to favor Rouvier's suggestion of an exchange of notes between the powers rather than a conference, but not so Bulow, who once more appealed to President Roosevelt to take a hand in the matter and persuade France and Great Britain to agree to a conference. He represented the conference to Roosevelt in the light of an alternative to war. The latter, never very well informed on European affairs, seems to have accepted the Chancellor's interpretation of the situation, for he reluctantly promised to do what he could. Roosevelt decided it would be useless to speak to England for, to quote him,

¹. Ibid., 97, No. 126.

². Gooch, Modern Europe, 357f.

"I felt that if a war were to break out, whatever might happen to France, England would profit immensely, while Germany would lose her colonies and perhaps her fleet. Such being the case, I did not feel that anything I might say would carry any weight with England, and instead I made a very earnest request of France that she do as the Emperor desired (Bulow, of course, spoke through the Emperor) and agree to hold the conference".¹

While expressing to France the "real sentiment" which he had for her, he impressed upon her the danger of war to the French, pointing out that in such a contingency Great Britain could help France but little on land and that she had no reason to believe that a conference would allow Germany unjustly to attack French interests. In addition, he not only promised not to accept an invitation to a conference, except on condition of France doing likewise, but also promised that if he went he would be absolutely impartial, standing firm against any German attitude smacking of unfairness.² On June 23 France gave in.

At once Roosevelt suggested to Germany the danger of war to them also, that Germany could not be sure she would win, since France was bound to be supported. He proposed that a program of the conference be arranged between Germany and France, and hinted that inasmuch as France had accepted the conference it would be advisable on Germany's part to make a few concessions to her, else the Kaiser's "high and honorable fame might be clouded" should war result.

¹. Bishop, Roosevelt, I, 483f.

². Ibid., 478.

When Roosevelt's mediation is closely examined, it will be seen that as a result of it Germany, by accepting Roosevelt's suggestion that a program be agreed upon before the Conference, was really the nation which backed down. France had already accepted the Conference in principle when Rouvier stated on June 21 that if France accepted the Sultan's invitation there would have to be a preliminary understanding. Germany, who had at first demanded France's acceptance of the Conference without any sort of discussion prior to its meeting, now found agreement on the program acceptable, but insisted it should follow France's assent. France, on the other hand, demanded an agreement on the program before giving her formal consent to attend a conference.¹ France wanted to keep her hands free; she wanted to be able to back out of the Conference if a program to her liking could not be decided upon. At this juncture, Roosevelt once more came to the rescue. He proposed that France and Germany accept the following: "The two governments consent to go to the Conference with no program, and to discuss all questions in regard to Morocco, save, of course, where either is in honor bound by a previous agreement with another power."² Germany accepted readily; France only after Rouvier despaired of being able to avoid a conference. An accord was signed by the two

¹. Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 252 from G.P., XX, 485f., No 6746.

². Bishop, Roosevelt, I, 485.

Powers July 8, 1905, by the terms of which France accepted the Conference on the understanding with Germany that her rights be respected and that her arrangements with England and Spain not be questioned nor the open-door policy altered.¹ Four days later Great Britain agreed to the Conference, although, she had backed France in opposition to it up to the very last.

One nation in particular felt great relief over the accord. That nation was Italy. Though she cared little enough about a conference, she cared less about a war which would have revealed her anomalous position in a glaring light. It should be mentioned that the Emperor, in thanking Roosevelt for his good offices, instructed the German Ambassador to the United States to say that "In case during the coming Conference differences of opinion should arise between France and Germany, he in every case will be ready to back up the decision which you (Theodore Roosevelt) should consider to be the most fair and the most practical."²

The accord of July 8th won for Germany French acceptance of the Conference without a preliminary agreement on a program, but France was protected by the guarantee that her arrangements with Spain and Great Britain

¹. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905,
59 Cong., 1 sess., House of Repr.; Dec. 1., serial
No. 4941, P 668.

². Bishop, Roosevelt, I, 487.

were not to be questioned. Thus, her special position in Morocco was recognized.

Negotiations regarding a program were begun at once, lasting about three months. The discussions soon came to revolve around several controverted points. Police and financial reforms were the main issues at stake. In regard to the first, France was determined that the regulation of police on the Algerian border be settled directly between her and Morocco, whereas Germany considered that the question of border police should be an international one.¹ Bulow was willing that the military and police mandate in Morocco be divided among the Powers in such a way that France receive the exclusive mandate for the frontier region, provided that Germany receive a mandate for some Western Moroccan coastal towns from Rabat south.² This was naturally unacceptable to France; hence, Germany clung to entire internationalization of police. Germany also demanded that the Conference meet at Tangier; twice France rejected the proposal. Relations between the two nations were further strained (1) when the Moroccan government granted to a German firm on July 30th a contract for building a breakwater in the harbor of Tangier and (2) when a group of German banks loaned the Sultan 10,000,000 marks. It was

¹ B.D., III, 131ff., No. 174.

² Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 262, from G.P., XX, 525n.; 450, No. 6718; 525f7, No. 6774.

rumored that Tattenbach, the German envoy, helped to persuade the Moroccan government in these matters. Though he upheld the transactions against French complaints, Bulow reprimanded Tattenbach because his actions had complicated the negotiations. In the meantime, Spain's offer of a town in southwest Spain as a meeting place received no reply from Germany.

At about this point, however, Chancellor von Bulow recognized that Germany must alter her policy or lose face in the family of nations. Therefore, he sent to Paris one Dr. Rosen who had advised the German government to make a concession on the meeting place and to withdraw her demands in regard to regulations of police on the frontier. But at the same time Germany should try to obtain an exact definition of the limits of the frontier region. France should then give way on the question of the mole and the loan. When he got to Paris, Rosen decided to make a concession by Germany on the frontier question contingent upon France's disclaiming any intention to control the financial or police reforms in the whole of Morocco. The French government refused, but offered to include in the discussion at the Conference, matters which, though not pertaining directly to Morocco, Germany was interested in -- such as the Bagdad and Camerun railway. Germany, however, rejected the offer.

At this juncture, came the intervention of Count Witte, who was returning to Russia from Portsmouth, Maine, where he had represented Russia in the peace negotiations between that country and Japan. Russia was anxious to negotiate a loan with her ally, France, an impossibility until the business concerning the Conference was cleared up. He stopped off in Germany and urged the German government to give way. The German Ambassador to France, Radolin, was willing, as was Emperor William who was sick of the Moroccan affair. The German government decided to heed Count Witte's advice, for, after all, it was not in a position to fight France. The understanding was reached September 28. The program of the Conference was to include:

- (1) Police reform and suppression of contraband traffic in arms by way of an international accord, except in the frontier region which should be the exclusive concern of France and Morocco.
- (2) Creation of a Moroccan State bank; stabilization of Moroccan monetary system; advancement of funds to pay police and carry out urgent public works.
- (3) Improvement of methods of collecting the customs and raising revenues.
- (4) No alienation by the Sultan of any public service to the profit of particular interests.

(5) Principle of adjudication without regard to nationality to be followed in giving contracts for construction of public works.

(6) Meeting of the Conference at Algerias in Spain.¹.

There was a supplementary understanding which settled the differences which arose over the German contract for the mole and the German loan. Rouvier took pains to declare that aside from the above agreement, he was not bound on any point.² The Sultan had little liking for the program presented to him but finally gave his consent on October 22. December 1 he sent out a circular letter of invitation to the Conference. The invitation was accepted by all the powers, including the United States, signatory to the Madrid Convention.

During the time which elapsed between the agreement on the program and the opening of the Conference, the powers chiefly interested took stock of their positions and the outlook for them at the Conference. The German government, in particular Prince Bulow, considered there was every reason to be hopeful about the Conference from the German standpoint. Germany looked for the support of America, knowing that Roosevelt upheld the open-door policy. She expected no interference from Russia and had secured a promise of support from her ally, Austria-Hungary, Further-

¹ B.D., III, 142ff., No.184; 146f., No.188.

² Andre Tardieu, LaConference D'Algerciras, 44f.; also Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 273 from L.j., 1901-5, 305f., Nos. 349f.

more, Germany had played upon Spain's jealousy of France in Morocco to the extent of preventing the appointment by Spain of the anti-German Senor Villa-Urrutia as a delegate to the Conference. Sir A. Nicholson-, British Ambassador to Spain, in reporting to his government a conversation between himself and Villa-Urrutia stated that the German Charge d Affaires had informed the Spanish government that Villa-Urrutia's appointment "would not be regarded in a friendly light by his Government."¹ As for Italy, Germany believed that in order to prevent a war she would urge France to accept Germany's terms. What is more, British public opinion was a little more friendly toward Germany with the coming into power in Great Britain in December, 1905 of a Liberal government. The Germans meant to work for the maintenance of the open door and economic equality for all, as well as, the complete internationalization of Morocco (this would apply to any bank established also), but if there was a division of mandated territory for police reforms, Germany was going to see to it that she received her share and one which would contain a port favorably located for later expansion in the interior.. The Germans had one major concern and that was that they should not be isolated at the Conference; Bulow especially urged an avoidance of this danger. Germany was practically isolated in Europe as it was, but if she won at the Conference, the Entente

¹. B.D., III, 150, No. 192.

Cordiale, at least, would be definitely weakened. If she lost, her isolation would be publicly demonstrated.

No one was more aware of the bad effect on the Angle-French entente of French failure at the Conference than Premier Rouvier who did his best to find out exactly how far England would go in support of France. He relied on Russian support because of the alliance with her and her dependence on France for a loan. He did not expect opposition from either Austria-Hungary or Belgium. But Rouvier was not absolutely sure of Britain, for which reason M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador to Great Britain, was instructed to sound that government's attitude. Sir Edward Grey, the new foreign secretary, avoided the issue until some answer to the French Ambassador's point blank question had to be made. Grey reports his conversation with M. Cambon in a despatch to the British Ambassador to France, January 31, 1906, by which time the Conference had already begun. He says:

"The French Ambassador asked me again today whether France would be able to count on the assistance of England in the event of an attack upon her by Germany.

I said that I had spoken on the subject to the Prime Minister (Campbell-Bannerman) and discussed it with him, and that I had three observations to submit.

In the first place, since the Ambassador had spoken to me a good deal of progress had been made.

Our military and naval authorities had been in communication with the French, and I assumed that all preparations were ready, so that, if a crisis arose, no time would have been lost for want of a formal engagement.

In the second place,....., I had taken an opportunity of expressing to Count Metterrick (German Ambassador to Great Britain) my personal opinion,....., that, in event of an attack upon France by Germany, arising out of our Moroccan agreement, public feeling in England would be so strong that no British government could remain neutral.

* * * * *

In the third place, I pointed out to M. Cambon that at present France's policy in Morocco,....., was absolutely free, that we did not question it, that we suggested no concessions or alterations in it, that we left France a free hand and gave unreservedly our diplomatic support on which she could count, but that, should our promise extend beyond diplomatic support and should we take an engagement which might involve us in war, I was sure my colleagues would say that we must from that time be consulted with regard to France's policy in Morocco, and, if need be, be free to press upon the French government concessions or alterations of their policy which might seem to us desirable to avoid.¹

¹. Ibid., 180, No. 219.

The British government, as indicated in the above despatch, had already conceded the advisability of secret military and naval conversation between the two Powers, but through Sir Grey's adroit handling of the question of support of France in case of war, England managed to keep her hands free, Although Grey and Campbell-Bannerman emphatically expressed their allegiance to the Entente Cordiale, Grey knew that if France lost at the Conference the prestige of the Entente would suffer, hence he declared that "our main object therefore must be to help France carry her point at the Conference."¹ Thus, he determined that Germany should formally recognize France's preponderant position in Morocco.

Both the British and French urged Spain to remain loyal during the Conference. There was good reason for doing so, for, as the Spanish Prime Minister admitted, Germany had been making persistent attempts to detach Spain from France and England.² When the Italian government was approached by Great Britain to press the former for her support, she replied that because of her position in regard to the Triple Alliance she could make no promises.

In attacking the problem of police at the Conference, Great Britain and France agreed to a suggestion made by the Russian Minister at Tangier, that the police question be

¹. Ibid., 182, No. 209.

². Ibid., 167, No. 208.

discussed solely from a practical point of view, without reference to its political aspect. When it became simply a question of the protection and safety of foreigners in Morocco, it would appear quite logical to those acquainted with Morocco that the work could be best done by the French and the Spanish who were used to handling the natives there.¹ Germany would be held responsible for breaking up the Conference if she rejected this plan. In the instructions given to the French delegates, French demands called for the commission to France and Spain alone of the suppression of contraband trade and of policing, and the establishment of a bank in which France should have a superior position, and which should not only be under the French legal system but have a French president. Internationalization of the police was to be absolutely refused as should be also any proposal placing a minor power in control of the police. It might be mentioned with interest that the demands which France intended to make at the Conference were practically identical with the fallen Delcasse's aim in regard to Morocco.

On January 16, 1906 the Conference of Algeciras was formally opened with the Spanish Duke of Almodovar presiding. The town of Algeciras marked the landing place of the Moors in Spain on three successful invasions, now, the scene of a meeting which promised to decide the

¹. Ibid., 205f., No. 224.

fate of their Empire. Modern Algeciras, dating from 1760, is a quaint town with narrow cobblestone streets, plaster buildings with shutters, grill incased windows, and grilled iron balconies. In preparation of the Conference, the whole town had been whitewashed, the paving repaired, and the grass removed from the streets. Sessions were held in the Town Hall which boasted red carpet on its interior staircases and rows of flower pots down the steps descending to the patio. The delegates met in the largest apartment in the Town Hall and sat around a long T shaped council table covered with green baize. From the ceiling of the room were suspended many electric light bulbs the brilliant glare of which was hardly softened by the shallow fluted shades above them.¹.

Algeciras was really a very poor choice as a conference town. There were only two hotels. The newspaper men were quartered at one and most of the delegates at the other, the Reina Cristina, a low-storied, bow-windowed structure under Scotch management. It was situated on the promontory which divides the Gulf from the Straits of Gibraltar, so that it faced the Rock of Gibraltar. Some of the delegates rented separate villas, as did the British delegation, but at exorbitant prices. Nicholson, head of

¹For description of Algeciras and the Town Hall see Sydney Brooks, "The United States at Algeciras", Harpers Weekly, 50:402; Henry C. Lodge, "The Monroe Doctrine and Morocco," ibid., 332-3; Fortnightly Review, "The Algeciras Conference", 85; 940-7; Harold Nicolson, Portrait of a Diplomatist, 126.

the English delegation, and his three assistants paid a rental of L10 per day for 84 days.¹

The number in each delegation ranged from fourteen in the French to two for those powers who attended the Conference simply because they were signators to the Madrid Convention. The Moroccan party, however, including eight regular delegates, numbered upwards of sixty persons, all of whom added a decidedly picturesque note to the assemblage of people in the town. They came in Moorish attire wearing white robes and red and white turbans.² Furthermore, the Moroccan delegates always rode to the meetings on muleback. Their head was Sid Mohammed Torres, an octogenarian, and a descendant of Spanish Arabs who once had occupied southern Spain. In fact, the old man possessed the key of the houseⁱⁿ which his ancestors had lived at Cordova. He had a long white, spotless beard. He walked bent over an ivory-topped stick, wrapped from head to toe in a white wool mantle.³ A slight, smiling man with a waxed mustache, M. Révoil, headed the French delegation.⁴ He was a subtle reasoner, but overcautious,

¹. Fortnightly Review, "The Algeciras Conference", 85:940.

². Outlook, "Conference of Algeciras," 82:103.

³. Salvatore Cortesi, "From Portsmouth to Algeciras", Independent, 60: 1152.

⁴. For a description of the other delegates see Nicolson, Portrait of a Diplomatist, 126ff., Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 349.

obstinate, and mistrustful of Germany. Sir Arthur Nicholson, as mentioned above, was the leader of the British and probably the most able person at the Conference. Although the blue-eyed little man had nothing in his personal appearance to command regard, since his frail person was twisted with rheumatism and arthritis, yet he had a sense of control and his quiet work really brought the Conference to a definite conclusion. Germany sent as her leading representatives Herr von Radowicz, who was so old and feeble as to count for practically nothing, and Count Tattenbach, whose unpleasant personality harmed his country's cause. Nicholson described him as a rasping, disagreeable man, neither straight-forward nor truthful, whose blunt aggressiveness created a bad impression.¹ Our representatives were Mr. White, Ambassador to Italy, and Mr. Gummeré, Minister to Morocco. The former was charming and conciliatory, but not very well informed. Italy sent the seventy-six year old Visconti Venosta, white-haired and bewhiskered, one-time Foreign Minister under Cavour. Count Cassini, who was sociable but not very dependable, represented Russia. Count Welsersheimb was Austria-Hungary's chief delegate, as was the Duke of Almodovar for Spain. Besides the regular delegates there were about fifty journalists.

¹. B.D., III, 243, No. 268.

Formal sessions were held from ten to twelve o'clock in the morning, and were reserved for ratification of matters agreed upon unanimously in the committee of the whole, composed of all delegates sitting unofficially and engaging in free debates.¹ Conference committee meetings were held from three to five o'clock in the afternoon. The drafting and translating committees, the latter made up of the delegation interpreters, met whenever convenient. The members of the translating committees had the hardest work of all to do, for they had the thankless task of translating Arabic into French and vice versa. The formal meetings were held at irregular intervals, about three times a week, or whenever the President of the Conference was advised that instructions had been received sufficient to issue a summons or when the drafting committee had some document ready to present for consideration. In all, there were about thirty sittings of the Conference. They were, however, interspersed with agonizing periods of delay because the Moroccan delegates were forever referring to their government, a procedure which required about two week's time, since the Moroccans would make the trip across the Mediterranean to their country and

¹. For organization of the Conference see Fortnightly Review, "The Algecirras Conference," 85; 941; Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 350.

and back again. More important than the regular meetings of the Conference were the direct negotiations between the French and German delegates, negotiations which became almost constant after January 25, 1966.

Chapter III

THE PROBLEM OF THE STATE BANK

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The Problem of the State Bank

The Duke of Almodovar, President of the Conference, in the opening speech expressed the principles which were to govern the work of the nations there assembled. He declared that everyone desired "reforms based on the triple principle of the sovereignty of the Sultan, integrity of his empire, and equality of treatment in matters commercial, that is the open door." He said it was not the intention of the Conference to devise a complete plan of reform for Morocco, but rather to "study together the means of applying measures which at present appear to be the most urgent and easiest to introduce."¹ The Conference got busy at once on the problems which it could settle with the most facility. These included the surveillance and repression of contraband arms; improvements in the collection of taxes and ways and means of creating new revenues; regulations concerning customs duties and the repression of fraud and of contraband; and a declaration relating to public services and public works.

When the above matters had been taken care of, the Conference was ready to turn to the two major problems, the establishment of a state bank and the organization of police in Morocco. The settlement of these two was

¹ B.D., III, 229, No. 248.

very important, for it would not only determine the future of the Moroccan state but also greatly affect international politics on the European stage. Discussions on the bank and police proceeded, for the most part, simultaneously or alternately, one being taken up when the work on the other had struck a snag. The story of each of these problems, however, shall be discussed here separately. Although this method will not show so well the manner in which the chief delegates juggled the discussions to suit their own ends, it will have the greater advantage of giving a clearer, more connected account of the handling of each problem. In the consideration of both questions, the relationship between France and Great Britain must be constantly borne in mind. It is well expressed in King Edward's words to M. Cambon just before the Conference: "Tell us what you wish on each point, and we will support you without restriction or reserves."¹

The problem of the state bank will be taken up first. The French, assuming the initiative, presented to Count Tattenbach on January 29 their plan for a bank. There were six major articles concerning the establishment, management, and control of such an institution. They provided for

- (1) A bank subject to French law and the French judicial system;

¹ Sidney Lee, King Edward VII, V.II, 361.

- (2) A division of capital as follows: France, 27%; Spain, 23%; Great Britain, 20%; Germany, 20%; Italy, 10%;
- (3) An administrative council of ten to be chosen according to nationality by the shareholders;
- (4) A directory named by the council;
- (5) A committee of discount in Tangier selected from resident shareholders and a committee of examination to be chosen by future subscribers;
- (6) The preferential right to make loans held by France to continue, but possible relinquishment in return for an increase in the percentage of capital to be given France.¹.

The French based their demands on their preponderant economic interests in Morocco, which they felt had to be recognized. From the French view point, it was a question of maintaining the open door without losing interests already acquired. To them "the open door (did) not signify that those who are in the house must leave."².

The Germans, not yet ready to make any concessions, objected to France's claim to preference for making loans. They also proposed the use of the Egyptian mixed codes and what was particularly repugnant to the French -- the equal division of the capital among the Powers, a proposal which,

¹. Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 352, from G.P., XXI, 128ff., No. 6974.

². Andre Tardieu, La Conference, D'Algeciras, 141ff.

if accepted, would simply amount to the internationalization of the bank. Both governments became very busy trying to win the other Powers to their support. Germany was anxious for Italy, Austria, and the United States to declare themselves in favor of her plan; she did not desire British mediation, for it might result in active English support of France.

For the time-being, however, the question of the bank was allowed to ride while attention was turned to the problem of the police. In the latter part of February negotiations on the police reached a standstill. To prevent the disruption of the Conference, the Germans returned to the bank question and on February 20th both France and Germany submitted their bank plans, revised somewhat, to the committee of the whole. Since it would only be confusing to describe each plan separately, article by article, we shall confine our attention to the major differences between the two proposals, the differences and the diplomacy connected with their adjustment constituting, after all, our chief interest in Franco-German relations at the Conference of Algeciras.

In the first place the two countries differed over the location of the central office of the bank, which Germany thought should be at Tangier, while France insisted on Paris, possibly because French bankers would have a

superior interest in the bank according to the French plan. In the second place, Germany desired that the statutes governing the bank should be drawn up by a Conseil d'Administration composed of two delegates from each national group and ratified by a Conseil de Surveillance composed of the diplomatic representatives at Tangier. Also, she wished the bank to be subject to the Egyptian mixed codes. According to the French plan, the statutes were to be drawn up by a committee chosen from the various subscribing groups and ratified by the stockholders, the bank to be subject to the French law and the French judicial system. A third major difference was in the supervision of the bank. The German plan called for supervision by the Conseil de Surveillance, mentioned above, and management by the Conseil d'Administration, also mentioned above, under the guidance of a director chosen by the last mentioned body. The French, on the other hand, desired the bank to be directed by a Conseil d'Administration composed of fifteen (15) members selected by the shareholders, each chosen from the nationality of the subscribing group. This body was to select the bank officers and determine their power. In addition, there was to be a high commissioner chosen by the Moroccan government to watch over the bank for the Sultan. The fourth, and really the most important difference

between the two plans, concerned the division of capital. Germany flatly demanded an equal division of the capital among the powers, as she had done from the first. The French plan would divide the capital into fifteen parts, eleven of which should be subscribed by financial groups in Germany, Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, Spain, the United States, Italy, Holland, Portugal, Russia, and Sweden with no power having more than one part; the remaining four parts would be given the French group of banks which had made the Moroccan loan in 1904. France was demanding for her banks the right of subscribing a greater share of the capital than her first plan called for; but she did so to gain compensation for her present willingness to relinquish the right of preference for making loans to Morocco, a privilege to which Germany had objected strenuously.

Germany opposed the French plan on the ground that it would make the bank a French institution and not an international one. France returned with the argument that the German proposals completely ignored France's rights and superior interests in Morocco, that they created not an economical institution but a political one, aimed at France. Furthermore, France held that Germany's plan was impracticable because diplomatic representatives were not qualified to assume the responsibility in regard to the bank which Germany chose to give them.¹ Because the plans

¹. B.D., III, 265f., No. 298.

were so conflicting, discussion of them was deferred until France and Germany should negotiate further. By March 3 it appeared as if the Conference was on the verge of failure, for an impasse had been reached on the question of the police as well as that of the bank. The major opponents busied themselves, as before, in trying to win the lesser powers to their support. Their activities will be taken up in greater detail in connection with the more important problem of police.

The English, particularly Foreign Secretary Grey, were very pessimistic over the outlook of the Conference and were concerned lest France be held responsible for its disruption. Sir Arthur Nicolson, therefore, and M. Révoil sought a means to prevent a break up of the Conference over the bank question. They decided to bring up the police question and push it through to some kind of conclusion, favorable to France it was hoped. Rupture of the Conference over the bank would create a very bad impression on public opinion; for the bank question was not as readily understandable as the police question, and people would not comprehend why the financial difficulties could not be settled favorably by both parties. The police question was accordingly taken up, but was once more dropped temporarily when no agreement could be reached.

Finally, on March 11th the Conference turned again to the bank upon the proposal by Nicolson, with the approval of Révoil, that there should be chosen three censors

(later, four) who should oversee the bank and submit their reports to a council of administration of the bank. The German representatives accepted the proposal on condition that the censors be chosen by the respective governments from the personnel of the banks interested in the Moroccan state bank and on condition that the Signatory Powers receive copies of the censor's reports, "as being the only way of assuring the international State character of the right of control, a point of view, in our (the German) opinion, to be observed under all circumstances".¹

By this time, however, Germany had given up her demand for equal division of the capital but was willing to concede only three (3) shares as against the four (4) demanded by France. The various Powers urged Germany to compromise. In the meanwhile, the Austrians had brought forth their compromise proposal concerning the police. On March 23 Count Welsersheimb informed M. Révoil in private conversation that if France would make some concessions, Germany might give up her demand for neutral police at the port of Casablanca.² The Count's suggestion was a happy one, for Révoil indicated France's willingness to accept only three (3) shares in the bank.

¹. G.D.D., III, 245, XXI, No. 272.

². B.D., III, 319f., No. 379.

The question of the degree of international control which should exist over the bank was not solved at this point; Germany, in expected contrast to France, thought that the various governments and the diplomatic corps at Tangier ought to have some authority over the censors. However, mediation triumphed again in the face of French refusal to give way, and on March 26, both Germany and France made concessions on the control of the bank.

At the last moment, France met with complications in the shape of Spain. According to the Franco-Spanish agreement, Spain would receive her share from France later on. She now demanded it at once, but France refused, and Spain had to content herself as best she could.

At last, the problem of the bank was settled, the decisions pertaining thereto being briefly summarized, as follows:

- (1) There were to be four (4) censors selected with the approval of their governments by the Banks of England, Germany, France and Spain, and charged with the duty of supervising the administration of the bank. They were to make an annual report.
- (2) There were to be a council of administration and a High Commissioner appointed by the Moroccan Government.

- (3) The State Bank of Morocco was to have the exclusive privilege of issuing bank notes. It was to act as the State treasurer, receiving, for instance, the customs duties, and was to furnish the funds for the organization of the police and for public works as well as to make loans to the Government up to a million francs.
- (4) The total capital was to be fifteen (15) to twenty (20) million francs divided into fifteen (15) shares, three (3) going to France, and the remainder to be divided among the signatory powers.

Chapter IV

THE PROBLEM OF THE POLICE

Chapter IV

The Problem of the Police.

The question of the Moroccan police was by far the more important of the two major problems facing the Conference. France at the very beginning was prepared to accept some degree of internationalization in regard to the state bank, but she entertained no such ideas about the police. In fact, Révoil informed the American and Italian delegates that France would prefer the status quo to any police arrangement which might be inimical to her influence in Morocco.¹ Confusion characterized German policy at the Conference as it had throughout the whole Moroccan affair. For that matter, confusion had been the keynote of German foreign policy in general since the Iron Chancellor had taken a back seat. An example of this instability was to be found in the many reports of various German police proposals which were current and which were well calculated to bewilder the French.

In this situation, Nicolson urged Révoil to be frank and open and lay his proposals before the German delegates. Such a procedure was not in harmony with Révoil's nature, but he finally agreed to accept Nicolson's advice. The plan which the French presented on February 3 provided that the French and Spanish together be given a mandate for the police. As a guarantee of commercial equality,

¹•Nicolson, Portrait of a Diplomatist, 132.

there should be international agreement upon the form, extension, and control of the mandate.

In the meantime, the Germans had drawn up three possible plans, outlines of which were dispatched to Washington, January 20. The first provided for the organization of the police by the various powers in separate districts, each power to assume a mandate for a port on the Atlantic coast. Unity of policy was to be achieved by general agreement on such questions as those of arming and training. The second plan would entrust the entire police organization to a small power, preferably Switzerland. According to the third plan the Sultan should organize his own police with the aid of volunteer officers chosen by the Sultan himself or by three of the small powers.¹ On the twenty-third Baron Sternburg explained the plans to Secretary of State Root who, saying that he personally approved Number 3, promised to consult President Roosevelt about the matter. The American representative at Algeciras informed his government that the plans were not practicable. Both the French and English delegates rejected them on the same grounds.

On January 24 there appeared in Siècle a solution suggested by a French writer, M. De Lanessan, which it will be seen followed closely the lines of Germany's third plan. Said M. De Lanessan: "There remains only one admissable

¹. Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 353; B.D.III, 235, No. 256.

solution; to charge the Sultan with the policing of his empire while determining the means by which he should have control and while instituting an international control over the organization and employment of those means."¹ Bulow seized upon this plan at once and urged President Roosevelt to sponsor it. The United States Government was informed by Germany that Austria, Italy, and Russia approved this scheme. This was on the thirtieth. Nicolson reported to his government, however, that Germany had intimated to the Spanish Foreign Minister on the twenty-sixth the possibility of a combination for police, made up of France, Spain, Italy and Germany.² Harold Nicolson points out that Germany was also suggesting both at Madrid and in Italy that the police be entrusted to Spain alone.³ This he calls Germany's "smoke-cloud" policy.

Though sympathetic to the De Lanessan plan, the Italian, American, and Russian delegates expressed their approval of the French plan of February 3 as the most moderate and practicable. Tattenbach's efforts in private conversation with Nicolson on February 3 to get the latter to urge concessions on the part of France were a failure. Radowitz advised the German government to compromise, but Bulow was unwilling. It looked as if the Conference was

1. Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 354, from G.F., XX, 123ff., No. 6968.

2. B.D., III, 239, No. 262.

3. Nicolson, Portrait of a Diplomatist, 133.

going to break up inasmuch as France also refused to yield. Mr. White notes in a telegram to his government on February 5 his belief that "France will allow the Conference to fail rather than recede from it (her position)"¹ Austria even urged her ally to agree to the French plan with modifications. Germany was still hopeful of United States mediation but received no definite reply from Washington to her advances. Count Witte wrote to his German friends advocating the necessity of a conciliatory spirit on the part of Germany and pointing out the very apparent superior interest of France in Morocco.²

Finally, on February 13 Radowitz spoke directly to M. Révoil submitting a new plan which the French delegate very reluctantly transmitted to his government. The new plan contained these provisions:

- (1) The Sultan should organize the police force to be established in certain specified localities and to be commanded and organized by foreign officers freely selected by him.
- (2) The state bank should supply funds for the establishment of the police force. This provision caused no difficulty.
- (3) The diplomatic body at Tangier should exercise control over the execution of the police organization.

¹ A.L.P. Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy 1896-1906, 501. Hereafter this work will be cited as Dennis, American Diplomacy.

² André Tardieu, La Conférence D'Algéciras, 246.

- (4) A superior foreign officer or inspector-general should be selected from one of the minor Powers to inspect the police force and report to the diplomatic body at Tangier.
- (5) The plan should be an experimental project to last from three to five years.^{1.}

If Germany expected to gain support for the above, she was again to be disappointed, since the important powers all more or less openly expressed their disapproval. The Austrians once more pressed Germany to compromise, because the former country was suffering so with domestic troubles that she did not wish to be involved in an international conflict certain to occur if the Conference broke up without a settlement. Germany replied with a show of bluster. On the same day that she presented her plan, Germany sent the following cryptic telegram to Rome, Washington, Vienna, London, and Saint Petersburg:

"No reason for a further retreat is evident. The principle of sacrificing one's own interests merely because they block the way for another Power could lead to such serious consequences that we consider a disruption of the Conference as the lesser evil."^{2.}

^{1.} B.D., III, 257, No. 287.

^{2.} Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 359, from G.P., XXI, 159f. and note, No. 7000.

In other words, Germany was serving notice on the powers to the effect that if they did not want the Conference to break up they had better persuade France to give in, for Germany would not. Germany at this time also complained of the anti-German flavor of the French press, responsibility for which Rouvier emphatically denied.

Germany's bullying attitude served merely to alienate the one power she had most depended upon with the exception of Austria, and that was the United States. To Ambassador Jusserand's request early in February that Roosevelt intervene in favor of the French plan, the French government received a favorable reply. France could now be certain of British, American, and Russian support, a practical guarantee of success.

But France did make an attempt to reconcile the German plans with her own demands. She did so at the instance of the Italian delegate, who, naturally, was most anxious to prevent a failure of the Conference. In a memorandum Révoil informed Radowitz on February 16 that France would accept the German plan provided the Sultan chose French and Spanish officers and that the question of the Inspector-General be left to the Conference to decide.¹ The proposal was rejected. Then it was that the American Government stepped in.

¹. Nicolson, Portrait of a Diplomatist, 136.

On February 19, 1906, Secretary Root submitted to Ambassador Sternburg an American plan. It consisted of four (4) main points:

- (1) The Sultan should organize his own police force, the men and officers of which should be Moors.
- (2) The proposed state bank should supply the money to maintain the police.
- (3) French and Spanish officers should assume the duties of instruction, discipline, pay and assistance in management and control. They should be appointed by the Sultan and should report annually to the Government of Morocco and to the Government of Italy, which latter Power should have the right of inspection.
- (4) France and Spain should guarantee the open door.¹

Although the French press was hostile to the American proposals, the French government agreed to accept them.

As for Germany, Bulow at first refused completely to accept the plan, but on second thought, apparently, the German Government decided to express its objections, which were embodied in a memorandum from Sternburg to Roosevelt on February 22. Sternburg stated that the Emperor agreed on all points but the third. The Emperor considered that point three was practically the same as the French proposal which required that the Sultan choose only Spanish and French

¹. Quoted in Bishop, Roosevelt, I, 489ff.

officers. The Emperor said that he objected to an arrangement of this kind because it "would place the police forces entirely in to their (the French and Spanish) hands, and the police organization would be tantamount to a French-Spanish double mandate and mean a monopoly of these two countries, which would heavily curtail the political, and economic positions of the other nations."¹ Germany then suggested that the Sultan should (1) choose the officers from among the nations participating in the state bank, and (2) select them from at least four different nationalities, this last to allay French fear that the Sultan might choose only Germans. Furthermore, it was suggested that France might be allowed complete control of police in Tangier, or some other port, by way of recognizing her special rights in Morocco. Officers of various nations should cooperate in all other ports.² Roosevelt and Root refused to mediate on the basis thus outlined by Germany, since they knew quite well that France would not accept such offers.

The Conference had now reached a crisis. It was evident enough if the Conference broke up France would not be considered responsible, but that fact, however, would be small comfort in the face of a terrible war. The German Ambassador to Russia expressed to the Russian Foreign Minister his difficulty in understanding his government's ob-

¹. Ibid., 491f.,

². Ibid., 492.

stinate defense of a right, "which all other Powers, in view of the practical solution offered by the French, are ready to give up."¹ The English were very pessimistic, Grey suggested to Germany that if the Moroccan affair was settled he would do his best to bring about an Anglo-German rapprochement, so greatly desired by Germany because of her growing isolation on the continent. The Duke of Almodovar even submitted to the French and British representatives a police proposal to prevent the Conference from failing. The plan, which provided for foreign instructors at only two ports, France and Spain to have one each, was considered simply impossible by England and France; but they heartily thanked Spain for her loyalty. Throughout this period Russia also was active in efforts to find a way out of the dilemma. Lansdorff urged the United States to intervene at Berlin and instructed Russian Ambassador to Germany to leave no doubt in Prince Bulow's mind that if Germany broke up the Conference, Russia would regard her as the aggressor.²

The British and French delegates consulted one another in regard to their procedure in view of a possible rupture of the Conference. They agreed that a rupture should not occur over the bank question; therefore, a consideration of it at this juncture must be avoided

¹.Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 367 from G.P., XXI, 211ff., No. 7037.

².B.D., III, 279, No. 320.

for the reasons mentioned in connection with the discussion of the problem of the bank. France's conciliatory spirit and moderation showed up best on the police question. In the second place the two Powers determined that responsibility for a rupture should not fall on either of them.

On February 23 the Austrian Emperor, Francis Joseph, actually intervened to the extent of requesting the German Ambassador to Austria to urge moderation on the part of his government.¹ The Emperor feared that in case of a vote at the Conference, Germany and Austria would be isolated. He feared also that the ties between Russia and the two members of the Entente Cordiale would grow closer. His mediation, like that of the other powers, met with little apparent success.² An example of the instability of German policy is to be found in the fact that Holstein now tried to open direct negotiations with France. Premier Rouvier refused to consider such a procedure.³

At length, when some sort of action became absolutely imperative, the Russian Foreign Minister proposed that a vote of the powers be taken on the police question. The suggestion was not wholly acceptable to Révoil and Nicolson because, as they very reasonably argued, the delegates of the less interested powers, like the United States, Italy, Holland, Belgium, and Sweden would probably hesitate to vote

¹•Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 374, fr. G.P.XXI, 2135, No. 7039.

²•B.D., III, 279. No. 320.

³•André Tardie, La Conférence D'Algéciras, 241ff.

and the fact that the Conference preferred the French police proposal would not be made plain to Germany. If Germany should remain obdurate in the face of an unquestioned support of France by the Conference, she would then have to accept the blame for the Conference's failure.¹

March 3 marked the turning point in the Conference, for, on that day came the opportunity for which France and England were waiting. The Italian delegate, M. Viconti Venosta, and Radowitz proposed to suspend the Conference while the experts were conferring on the draft articles on the bank question. Here was a chance to bring the police question under discussion again, and at the same time force a vote in which all the delegates would be likely to take part. Nicolson, therefore, moved that the problem of the police be taken up while the experts were at work on the bank. A vote was taken. There were ten (10) votes in favor, three (3) opposed, the latter being cast by Morocco, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. Thus was German isolation at the Conference glaringly revealed by vote on a mere point of procedure. Even Italy had openly sided against her ally.²

After what had just transpired, Tattenbach was ready to concede that his government was too obstinate.³ But what is of more importance is Bulow's recognition that a

¹. B.D., III, 274ff., Nos. 312f.

². Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 375, fr. G.P.XXI, 204f., No. 7032, 233f., No. 7051.

³. André Tardieu, La Conférence D'Algéciras, 291

decided change of policy on the part of Germany was needed. He took away the control of the Moroccan affair from Holstein and assumed personal charge of it. From this point on, Germany slowly retreated, salvaging as best she could the remnants of her prestige.

Austria had submitted a plan to Germany on the twenty-sixth of February which Bulow now seized upon as a means of preventing the break up of the Conference. Briefly, the plan provided as follows:

- (1) The organization of police in Tangier, Saffi, Rabat, and Tetouan to be entrusted to France.
- (2) The organization of police in Mogador, Earache, and Mazagan to be entrusted to Spain.
- (3) In Casablanca, the organization of the police to be under the command of a Swiss or Dutch officer who should be inspector over all the police.
- (4) The inspector to report to the diplomatic corps at Tangier, which should have general control over the reorganization of the police.¹

Bulow accepted it on March 6 with the proviso that the commander at Casablanca choose his officers from other nationalities than French and Spanish. It will be seen that Germany was now willing that officers of nationalities

¹.Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 377, from G. P., XXI, 233f., No. 7045; 252f., No. 7077; L.j., 1906, 187f.

other than French or Spanish should be present at only one port.

On the eighth, both the Austrian project and the French plan of February 16 were presented to the Conference. On the tenth, Count Radowitz moved that both of them be referred to a drafting committee. He said:

"It seems to me that accord ought to be reached on the basis of the two projects....That of the French delegation certainly contains proposals which deserve the most serious examination. They ought to complete those of the Austro-Hungarian project."¹.

It must be admitted that Radowitz's suggestion was an intelligent one. Sir Edward Grey was very much pleased with the Austrian proposal. He wrote to Nicolson saying that since Germany had conceded the substance,...."it would be a great pity, if France sacrificed the substance to the shadow."². Nicolson was considerably disgusted when France refused to accept. However, inasmuch as the British had promised France their complete support, Nicolson continued to champion the French cause. But in conversation with Radowitz, he was told that Germany would yield no more. Still, France remained adamant.

¹. Ibid., 379, quoting from G.P., XXI, 270, No. 7085; also B.D., III, 292f., No. 337.

². B.D., III, 292, No. 335.

At this inopportune moment the French Gouvernement fell, causing painful delay until a new one should be formed giving Révoil the right to proceed with the negotiations. Before his fall, Premier Rouvier had suggested three (3) modifications in the Austrian plan:

- (1) The police instructors at Casablanca should be French or Spanish.
- (2) France and Spain should determine the distribution of the ports between them.
- (3) The Inspector-General should report to the Sultan and not to the Diplomatic body at Tangier.

The French also preferred a Dane as Inspector-General in place of a Dutchman, whom they feared might be under German influence.¹ In addition, they demanded that the Inspector-General have inspection duties only. Although Venosta, White and Nicolson asked the German delegates to give way, the latter declared that Germany positively would not surrender her demand that the Inspector-General also be an instructor at one of the ports.

On the ninth of March President Roosevelt reminded the Kaiser of his promise of June 28, 1905 to back up any decision which he (Roosevelt) should approve.² Roosevelt thought that Germany should accept completely the American plan of February 19. But Germany stuck to the Austrian plan and urged Roosevelt to support it. The President proved to be very much opposed to it, however, arguing

¹. Ibid., No. 336.

². Bishop, Roosevelt, I, 493.

that a division of the ports among the powers provided for a potential partition of the territory. He said: "The immediate effect can only be the creation of three separate spheres of influence,....And the nations to whom these spheres are assigned may be expected in the ordinary course of events to enter into complete control!"¹.

The situation thus far was ably summed up by Nicolson in a despatch to Grey dated March 13, 1906.² It appeared that Révoil and his government thought that Germany would yield further, although Nicolson had his doubts. Germany was determined on some form of internationalization of the police, which she hoped to achieve through her demand that a third power be in charge of the police at one port. France, on the other hand would not accept internationalism in any form. If, through the inability of France and Germany to agree, the Conference were to fail, in the opinion of the majority of the Conference, the responsibility would now fall on France. Nicolson felt that if France would only yield on the point at issue, for instance, be willing to accept Swiss control at Casablanca, she might obtain her way in regard to the disputed questions connected with the state bank.

When the new French Government came into power, the

¹. Ibid., 498.

². B.D., III, 301., No. 345.

new Foreign Minister, M. Bourgeois, amazed the powers by boldly renewing Révoil's instructions refusing compromise on the police. Some of the nations that had hitherto stood by France now expressed their disapproval. It was even feared in France that England might refuse her support. Great Britain, however unsympathetic she was with France's rather reckless behavior at this point, nevertheless remained faithful. At it turned out, French audacity was entirely successful. Austria began to seek some new way out of the deadlock which should make it possible for Germany to accept the French view in regard to Casablanca. A possible way out might be for Germany to give way on Casablanca in return for some compensation on the bank question.

However, before Austrian mediation took shape, the United States intervened again in favor of France. Roosevelt proposed that French and Spanish officers in about equal numbers should cooperate in each of the ports under the supervision of a general inspector from another nation. All along Roosevelt had disapproved of any arrangement which might tend toward the partition of Morocco. He had become convinced that this was Germany's aim. He informed Sternburg if Germany continued to reject American proposals and if the Conference failed, he would publish the entire correspondence; otherwise, in a public address, he would give Germany full credit for what was done.¹ On March 19 Germany accepted the plan and Roosevelt was delighted.

¹ Bishop, Roosevelt, I, 500f.

Dennis contributes the sudden yielding of Germany to three (3) things:

- (1) The very real desire on the part of the Kaiser and Bulow to avoid an European war.
- (2) Roosevelt's threat to publish all the correspondence pertaining to the Conference.
- (3) Germany's appreciation of the fact that public opinion in the world and especially in America was hostile to Germany.^{1.}

But the story did not end with German acceptance of the American plan. When it was presented to France, she rejected it; likewise Spain, for both nations opposed the idea of mixed police, except if necessary, in Tangier and Casablanca. Great Britain naturally supported the Franco-Spanish view. Nicolson expressed his fear that the United States' proposal was not practicable.^{2.} In the face of such opposition, the United States Government did not insist on the adoption of its plan.^{3.}

Thus was the revised Austrian project, which was pending, rendered important once again. According to it, France and Spain were to be entrusted with the policing of all eight ports; Germany's compensation for giving way on Casablanca was to take the form of a substantial lessening in France's demands in respect to the division of the bank

^{1.}Dennis, American Diplomacy, 505.

^{2.}B.D., III, 313, Nos. 360, 367.

^{3.}Ibid., 320f., No. 380.

capital.¹ As matters stood, Germany gave up her demand for a neutral police at Casablanca in return for which France agreed to limit her shares in the bank to three.

The degree of international control which should exist over the police still constituted a problem. Germany insisted that the Inspector be made responsible to the diplomatic corps at Tangier, which should also exercise general supervision over the police; while France, supported by Great Britain and Spain, believed that the diplomatic corps should be excluded from participation in the matter. France desired that the settlement of the foregoing question and of other details be left for determination later by France and Spain together with the Sultan. Germany wanted the Conference to divide the ports between France and Spain. Germany had made the great concession, yet France continued to hold out despite the fact that the delegates, who were anxious to conclude the Conference, believed in general that France should make a concession in the matter of the inspector's responsibility.

Mediation, however, began again. In the end, Germany agreed to a division of the ports by France and Spain with the approval of the Conference. Both powers made concession on the question of bank control. A formula regarding the responsibility of the inspector was worked out by the delegates of France, England, Spain, Russia, and Italy meeting

¹. Ibid., 317, No. 379.

in consultation at Révoil's suggestion. The formula was submitted by Mr. White to the German delegates who accepted it on March 27.

At the last moment, as in the case of the bank question, Spain complicated matters between her and France by asking for Tangier to which request France would not consent, offering instead the proposal that French and Spanish officers should jointly police Casablanca and Tangier. Spain had made her demand on the basis of the fact that, according to the Franco-Spanish agreement of 1904, only five ports were to be policed, but the Conference had dealt with all eight, France desiring the extra three for herself. Although Spain at first refused the French decision, she finally accepted it on March 31. In addition, it was decided that there should be spanish officers in Tetouan and Larache with French officers at the four remaining ports. Thus all eight ports were accounted for. The division agreed upon by France and Spain was approved by the Conference, which also accepted the following terms in regard to the police:

- (1) They should function for five (5) years.
- (2) They should be inspected at least once a year by a Swiss inspector stationed at Tangier who would be required to report to the Sultan.
- (3) The inspector should also make special reports to the dean of the diplomatic corps upon the request of that body.¹

¹. Ibid., 326f., No. 386.

It will be seen that Germany's final concessions were that the Inspector-General should be an inspector only, with no detachment of his own, that he only report to the diplomatic corps and not be responsible to it, and that Casablanca should not be policed by a third Power.

The last draft was hastily drawn up and included a resolution pertaining to slavery in Morocco, which Nicolson had presented and to which the Moroccans uselessly objected on the ground that the question of slavery had not been on the agenda. The delegates appended their signatures to the Act of Algeciras on April 2, the Conference formally concluding on April 7. The United States Senate ratified the Act in December 1906, but attached a protocol declaring that the United States would not assume responsibility for the enforcement of the provisions of the Act.

It is interesting to note that on April 12, 1906 Roosevelt, upon addressing a group of German war veterans, congratulated the German people and the German Empire upon the work accomplished by the Algeciras Conference.¹ He had kept his promise.

¹Bishop, Roosevelt, I., 501f.

Chapter V

C O N C L U S I O N .

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C O N C L U S I O N .

The Conference of Algeciras was a make-shift; it solved nothing permanently. Although the conclusion of the Conference relaxed the tension in Europe, the reforms agreed upon were far from adequate to the needs of the unfortunate Moroccan state. The right to police eight ports was not sufficient to quell the general disturbances in the country, and yet enough to embroil the French and Spanish in clashes with the natives. In fact, Morocco was weakened rather than strengthened by the Conference. The mass of the people were hostile to reform and turned more than ever to the rebel chieftan Rasouli and to the Pretender for leadership. Those few who, really hoping for reform, had believed in the powers' empty guarantees of Moroccan independence and integrity, and who had placed their faith in Germany, were keenly disappointed. They had expected that France would be properly trounced at the Conference. Instead, the powers had supported her. As one Moor has said "the Moors expected the Conference to study the industries of Morocco, the conditions surrounding the people, or the cause of the rebellions in the interior in order to cure them."¹ It is not necessary to point out that the Conference did nothing of the sort.

¹•A.K.Karam, "The Moroccan Question as Seen from Morocco" (North American Review, Nov 16, 1906) 1042.

The same writer has emphasized the fact that reform in Morocco should not be on Christian but on Mohammedan lines. He predicted that a police force like that called for by the Conference would be impossible in Morocco as long as the Moroccan mental attitude was such that the Moroccans felt no need of one. Furthermore, the bank to be set up would not be of much service to the natives, for not only did they not understand the principles underlying the banking system, but their religion forbade them to deposit money in banks. Of course, this particular Moor was quite well aware of the fact that the reforms instigated by the Algeciras Conference were designed mainly for the benefit of foreigners in Morocco. Opinion at the Sultan's court was divided on the question of acceptance of the decisions of the Conference. The Sultan delayed signing until June 18 when he did so with reservations.

In the final analysis, the Conference of Algeciras was primarily an European affair. As the Italian correspondent of the Independent said on May 17, 1906, the delegates really met to decide whether there should be a paramount power in Europe and which power it should be.

"Ancient hatred between France and Germany was coming to an issue, complicated by the racial and commercial antagonism between Germany and England."¹. The meeting of the

¹S.Cortesi, "From Portsmouth to Algeciras"., (Independent, May 17, 1906,) 1150.

diplomats rendered the situation actually dangerous.

Delcassé made the serious mistake of not squaring French aspirations in Morocco with German desires before he sent his Mission of Reform to Fez. Germany considered that her prestige had been impaired, and the Conference seemed to offer her a way to regain it. She attempted also, through the Conference, to obtain some material interests in Morocco and to overthrow the prevailing balance of power in Europe. She aimed at the destruction of the Entente Cordiale as well as that of the Dual Alliance, if possible, or at least, modification of the latter. But her attempt to isolate France was a complete failure. She only succeeded in strengthening the very alignments she sought to destroy, whereas the Triple Alliance was visibly weakened.

Through the Conference she had merely kept her promise to the Sultan to do what she could to preserve his sovereignty and had kept the way open for the future. On the other hand, Germany lost the confidence of Europe and what was more important to her, the confidence of the United States. She would have continued to enjoy the American Government's support, which she possessed when President Roosevelt helped her to bring about the Conference, if the United States had not finally realized that Germany was championing the cause of Morocco not for Morocco, not for the world, but for Germany. "We (Roosevelt and Root) became convinced that Germany was aiming in effect at the

partition of Morocco which was the very reverse of what she was claiming to desire."¹. If Germany's position had been a sincere one, she would have deserved the credit of the world. After the Conference, the resignation of Holstein from the foreign office was indicative of a change of policy on the part of Germany. There was nothing for Germany to do but keep quiet or work for her much desired Anglo-German Alliance, which she proceeded to do.

What was the outcome of the Conference for France? To be sure, she did not make Morocco practically a French protectorate as she had hoped, but she did emerge from the Conference with international acknowledgment of her special territorial, administrative, and financial interests there. To her, then, went the fruits of victory and to Germany the empty platter, although both Powers declared themselves to be satisfied with the results of the Conference. There was one other very important benefit which France derived from the Conference. The Entente Cordiale had weathered the storm; it came out "a lasting, dynamic combination for checking Germany."².

After all is said and done, the thing to be remembered about the Conference of Algeiras is that it was not a single painful incident, but only one of many episodes, each contributing its share of combustibles, and ending at last in the bloody conflagration which engulfed the world in 1914.

¹. Bishop, Roosevelt, I, 489.

². Anderson, Moroccan Crisis, 402.

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