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UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE

PAN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY, 1932-1940

A Dissertation

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In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree

Of Master of Arts

Department of Political Science

By

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Chapter I. Inter-American Background	1
Chapter II. Montevideo, 1933.	14
Chapter III. Buenos Aires, 1936.	29
Chapter IV. Lima, 1938.	46
Chapter V. Panama, 1939 - Havana, 1940 . . .	60
Chapter VI. The Economic Problem.	78
Chapter VII. Factors For and Against Solidarity	97
Chapter VIII. In the Final Analysis	112
Bibliography	123

CHAPTER I

INTER-AMERICAN BACKGROUND

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On the first day of his first administration, President Franklin Roosevelt announced:

In the field of world policy, I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the Good Neighbor -- the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others -- the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.¹

Although Roosevelt's verbal touch was needed to give this foreign policy a name, definite changes in the Latin American policy of the United States had already appeared during the preceding Hoover administration. Indeed, Calvin Coolidge was probably defining his own peculiar version of the Good Neighbor policy when he asserted at the Sixth International Conference of the American States at Havana, in 1928, that "it is better for the people to make their own mistakes than to have someone else make their mistakes for them."²

Coolidge's ideas on the Good Neighbor were more honored in the breach than in the fulfillment. His military intervention in Nicaragua in 1926 could not be reconciled with the concepts of national sovereignty and independence

¹Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address, Washington, D. C., March 4, 1933 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933).

²Quoted in Ricardo J. Alfaro, Commentary on Pan American Problems (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), p. 31.

held by Central and South American States. The Havana Conference, itself, was marked by bitter debate, the United States taking an extremely strong stand against the principle of non-intervention. It is clear that the true basis of Coolidge's policies lay in his declaration that

The person and property of a citizen are a part of the general domain of the nation. Even when abroad . . . there is a distinct and binding obligation on the part of self-respecting governments to afford protection to the persons and property of their citizens, wherever they may be.¹

This was in the best interventionist tradition, closely following the interpretation given the Monroe Doctrine by Theodore Roosevelt and his successors.

Although taking an active interest in the Latin American revolutionary movement and among the first to recognize the independence of the new republics in the first two decades of the nineteenth century, the United States failed almost entirely to participate in the first sixty years of inter-American cooperation.² First attempts at collaboration were most inauspicious. This country was

¹Calvin Coolidge, "Address to the United Press," April 25, 1927 (New York Times, April 26, 1927).

²Brief outlines of the origins of Pan Americanism may be found in many places. One of the best is in Howard Trueblood, "Progress of Pan American Cooperation," Foreign Policy Reports, XV (May 15, 1940). In the Bulletin of the Pan American Union, LXXIV (April, 1940), there is an able discussion of the early conferences in which the United States did not take part.

invited to send delegates to the first Congress of Panama in 1826, called by Simon Bolivar, President of Peru; the Senate debated at great length before accepting the invitation, and, when delegates were finally appointed, one missed the boat and the other died en route.¹ Indeed, except for President Monroe's famous message of December 2, 1823, the United States displayed little political interest in the nations south of the Rio Grande until well after the Civil War. From 1826 to 1889, this country was not represented at any of the numerous political conferences of the Pan American States.

When the United States finally sought Latin American cooperation, economic motives lay behind the country's stated desire to foster peace in the Western Hemisphere. It was this pecuniary motivation that "led to the Pan American movement . . . conceived by James G. Blaine (Secretary of State) as a diplomatic trade mark for the expansion of the commerce of the United States."² This was in 1881, but, due to political dissension within the United States, the First International Conference of American States did not meet until 1889.

¹Cf. Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Crofts, 1940), p. 195.

²Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: Holt, 1936), p. 736.

The thirty-nine years from 1889 to 1928 marked the period of active imperialism by the United States in Latin America. Primary motivating factors behind this country's belligerency in the southern nations -- in the Caribbean area, specifically -- were economic aggrandizement and a determination to eliminate any threat to the self-interest or to the security of the United States. On one hand, this aggressiveness was expressed in direct efforts to foster business and financial interests; on the other hand, the policy involved intervention to restore order in revolution-ridden or debt-swamped nations, and to prevent European interference in Latin American affairs. It is one of the ironies of history that the Monroe Doctrine, promulgated to prevent European intervention in the New World, became an instrument sanctioning such intervention by its promulgator during this period.

Nothing better illustrates perversion of the Doctrine than statements of this country's diplomatic leaders:

Secretary of State Richard Olney, on the British-Venezuelan boundary controversy of 1895: "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."¹

¹Quoted from Foreign Relations, 1895, Olney to Bayard, July 20, 1895, in Bailey, op. cit., p. 483.

And Theodore Roosevelt, in his message to the Congress of December, 1904:

Chronic wrong-doing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and, in the Western Hemisphere, the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.¹

Events that marked this imperialistic phase of the Caribbean policy included the direct challenge to Great Britain during the Venezuelan controversy of 1895; assumption of a virtual protectorate over Cuba in March, 1901; taking Panama from Colombia in 1903; extension of near-protectorate status to Nicaragua after overthrowing the dictator, Zelaya, in 1914; bombardment of Vera Cruz in 1914; the punitive expedition against Pancho Villa in 1916; military occupation of Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1915-1916; dispatch of a battleship to Panama in 1921; sending of marines and sailors to Nicaragua in 1926.

During this period of four decades, six verbose but largely meaningless inter-American conferences were held.²

¹James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Washington: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1908), X, 831, quoted in Trueblood, op. cit., p. 292.

²In the Special Handbook for Use of the Delegates, for the Seventh International Conference (Baltimore: Pan American Union, 1933), pp. 1-21, there is a brief but complete history of the proceedings and results of the first six conferences.

The fact that acute Latin American distrust of the United States was never absent indicates the actual unimportance of these meetings. Nor could the southern nations be censured for their attitude. From time to time, however, there were some small rifts in the clouds of justifiable suspicion. Thus the United States gave Latin America profound satisfaction in 1914, when it accepted the mediation of the ABC Powers in its dispute with Mexico. This act, together with the Conference summoned in 1915 by President Wilson to discuss the Mexican situation, aroused high hopes in Latin America of a new era in Pan American relations.¹

But, with the close of the World War, there was, if anything, a pronounced growth of "Yankophobia" on the part of Latin American nations. With the United States' occupation of Santo Domingo, financial intervention in Haiti, and the dispatch of marines to Nicaragua, ill will was almost at a new high before the Sixth Conference of American States at Havana in 1928. Nor did the able defense of American intervention presented by Charles Evans Hughes do more than gloss over matters at this meeting. The net effects of the Conference were as much for the bad as for the good. The fact that a prominent Argentine delegate left the meeting after a verbal tiff with Hughes constituted an unpleasant aftermath.

¹Cf. "Pan Americanism and the Pan American Conferences" (Foreign Policy Association, Information Service, Nov. 27, 1927) p. 280.

Definite change in Latin American policy appeared under the Hoover administration. Growing criticism at home and abroad and the difficulty of maintaining property rights during economic depression undoubtedly contributed to this change. The general shift in policy had been foreshadowed to some extent by the publication in 1930 of a memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine written by J. Reuben Clark, Undersecretary of State.¹ Although never officially endorsed by the administration, this work attracted wide attention because of its strict construction of the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, repudiating the Roosevelt corollaries as unjustified by the words of the original statement. That the Clark memorandum was an index to future action soon became apparent.

The usual military intervention did not follow revolution in Panama in 1931. No efforts were made to take over the Dominican Republic or El Salvador when their governments defaulted on debt payments to American nationals. The last United States marines in Nicaragua were withdrawn on January 2, 1933. Steps were taken to end armed intervention in Haiti. Moreover, this country reverted to its traditional policy of recognition of new governments. On February 6, 1931, Secretary of State Stimson repudiated the Wilsonian policy

¹J. Reuben Clark, Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1930).

of non-recognition of governments of revolutionary origin, and the United States promptly recognized revolutionary governments in South America, Panama, and the Caribbean area. This was an important step; the influence of the United States has often been so great that the mere granting or withholding of recognition has determined the existence of governments.¹

Armed intervention by the United States was the bitterest of all pills for the southern nations to swallow; no policy could do more for the sake of inter-American good will than one of non-intervention. At an early date, President Roosevelt stated his determination not to interfere with the internal affairs of Latin American governments; on May 16, 1933, he indicated this country's willingness to forego the practice of armed intervention, except in accordance with existing treaties.² At the Seventh Conference of American States held at Montevideo in 1933, Secretary of State Hull affirmed the desire of the United States to end such treaty arrangements with all possible speed, but he added that "some patience" might be necessary before

¹Cf. David H. Popper, "Latin American Policy of the Roosevelt Administration," Foreign Policy Reports, X, No. 21 (Dec. 19, 1934), 271.

²Treaty relations of the United States with some Caribbean nations, such as the Permanent Treaty of May, 1903, with Cuba, and the Canal Agreement of November, 1903, with Panama, gave Washington the right to intervene under certain circumstances.

"disentanglements from obligations" could be effected.¹

During a conference discussion in regard to the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States a few days later, Secretary Hull elaborated upon his previous statement. He said:

Under the Roosevelt administration, the United States government is as much opposed as any other government to interference with the freedom, the sovereignty, or other internal affairs or processes of the governments of other nations no government need fear any intervention on the part of the United States under the Roosevelt administration.²

The last word on intervention was given by President Roosevelt two days after the adjournment of the Montevideo conference. Roosevelt asserted:

. . . . the definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention. The maintenance of constitutional government in other nations is not, after all, a sacred obligation devolving upon the United States alone. The maintenance of law and the orderly processes of government in this hemisphere is the concern of each individual nation within its borders first of all. It is only if and when the failure of orderly processes affects the other nations of the continent that it becomes their concern; and the point to stress is that in such an event it becomes the joint concern of³ the whole continent in which we are all neighbors.

These statements, at their face value, represented probably the most abrupt change in foreign policy in the

¹Minutes and Antecedents, Seventh International Conference of American States, Montevideo, 1933, First Committee, p. 24.

²Ibid., Second Committee, p. 121.

³Franklin Roosevelt, "Address at the Woodrow Wilson Foundation," December 28, 1933 (New York Times, December 29, 1933), p. 1.

entire history of American foreign relations. A policy which had been strongly upheld as late as 1928 by Charles Evans Hughes was dropped in 1933 by Franklin D. Roosevelt. Intervention had for years been the cause of the greatest enmity harbored by Latin American nations against the United States. The conference at Montevideo marked the end of that interventionist policy, at least in theory; 1933 saw a greater cordiality toward the United States on the part of its southern neighbors than ever before existed.

That non-intervention, in fact, was doubted with good cause by the Central American republics will be seen later. Nevertheless, to some extent, actions backed up words. In the spring of 1934, grave disorders in Cuba sorely tried the new policy. Although warships were sent to Cuban waters, and although the diplomats of this country indulged in much unbecoming activity, troops were not landed. The signing of a treaty with Cuba on May 29, 1934, by which the Island was released from the interventionist stipulations of the Platt Amendment, was of significance. Three months later, the last marines were withdrawn from Haiti. Almost simultaneously, a pact was signed with Panama removing some of the apron strings that had been tied to that country by the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903.¹

¹The new treaty was not ratified by the Senate until July 25, 1939; the delay was caused mostly by opposition by the army and navy.

Difficulties with Mexico gave the Good Neighbor policy a severe test in 1938 with the Mexican government's expropriation of foreign oil holdings. The problem is still unsettled, but the non-intervention pledge has not been broken. Reciprocal trade agreements have been further indices of Pan American cooperation, and the decision to give the Philippines their eventual independence has been still another straw in the wind of diminishing Yanqui Imperialism.

The first phase of the policy of the United States toward Central and South America was one of isolation. Still in the colonial stage of its economic development, the United States was content to rest almost exclusively on the stipulations of Monroe's doctrine from 1826 to 1889. As the tempo of economic development in the United States was accelerated, the demand for Latin American raw materials and foodstuffs advanced rapidly while, on the other hand, the Latin American market for products of this country tended to decrease.¹ Largely as a consequence of this economic fact, the second and imperialistic phase of Latin American policy was instituted. Marked chiefly by the flagrant use of interventionist doctrine, this era is

¹Trueblood, op. cit., p. 287.

characterized by an ever increasing hostility toward the United States on the part of the Central and South American nations.

Franklin Roosevelt has received a disproportionate amount of credit for the Good Neighbor, or third, phase of this country's Latin American policy, which was really inaugurated by Herbert Hoover. The Good Neighbor policy has specifically meant the following things:¹

1. Abandonment of intervention by the United States, including the complete withdrawal of all this country's forces from the Caribbean countries. Non-intervention, however, means different things to different people, and the United States' interpretation has been strongly challenged.²

2. Refusal of the government to act as a collection agency for private debts.

3. Abandonment of the policy of not recognizing revolutionary governments.

4. Abrogation of the Platt Amendment in the case of Cuba, ratification of a new treaty with Panama, withdrawal of financial control from Haiti.

5. Attempts to improve trade relations on a reciprocal basis.

¹Adapted largely from Ibid., p. 288 ff.

²Cf. infra, p. 23.

6. Fostering of inter-American cultural relations.

7. Strengthening of the machinery to insure inter-American peace and inter-American solidarity against unfriendly political forces.

The Good Neighbor policy was not instituted for altruistic reasons; it came into being because American profits in Central and South America were drying up during a period of world-wide depression and because ill will engendered by imperialism was becoming more vocal, more powerful, and more difficult to keep down. On the one hand, the Good Neighbor policy is an attempt to make profit with honey where vinegar has failed; on the other hand, it is an attempt to foster good will and continental solidarity in a period of dynamic and inimical political change.

CHAPTER II

MONTEVIDEO, 1933

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The atmosphere of the Seventh International Conference of American States, meeting in Montevideo, Uruguay, from December 3 to December 26, 1933, was most unpropitious for discussion of means to insure peace. Uppermost in the minds of all the delegates was the fact that the devastating Chaco War was still being fought between Bolivia and Paraguay. Other purely American considerations making for pessimism were the current Leticia dispute between Colombia and Peru; the uncertainties related to the Cuban revolution and especially the attitude of the United States to that leftist movement; the growing list of debt defaults; and the imposition of new high tariffs, exchange controls, and quotas¹ that were further decreasing inter-American trade. Abroad, the failure of the World Economic Conference, as well as of the disarmament negotiations at Geneva, gave further cause for gloom.

In mitigation of the gloom, the Good Neighbor policy was already off to a running start as a result of Hoover's administration and Roosevelt's inaugural statement. At Montevideo, Hull's approving stand on non-intervention was

¹Cf. Charles A. Thomson, "The Seventh Pan American Conference, Montevideo," Foreign Policy Reports, X, No. 7 (June 6, 1934), 90.

not the only fundamental shift in United States policy. At previous conferences, the United States had refused to discuss such controversial questions as private debts and tariff policies; here, however, the reverse was true. Indeed, Hull's leadership was most marked in the discussion of economic measures; his program resulted in a resolution to promote trade, reduce tariffs, liberalize commercial policies, foster the most-favored-nation principle, and favor the establishment of a permanent agency to aid in the reduction of trade barriers.¹

Hull also put the United States on record as being willing to sign, ratify, and keep all the peace pacts that had been promulgated previously by the American states.² These included:

1. The Gondra Treaty for Avoiding and Preventing Conflicts, signed at the Fifth Conference at Santiago in 1923. The characteristic feature of this convention was the establishment of a procedure of investigation in the case of a conflict, the idea being borrowed from the Bryan

¹Final Act, Resolution V, p. 6. All Final Acts cited are printed in The International Conferences of American States, First Supplement, 1933-1940 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1940). At Montevideo, Resolutions LXXX and LXXXI also dealt with the desirability of fostering better inter-American trade relations. Cf. also Hull's address introducing Resolution V, Dec. 12, 1933, in Report of the Delegates of the United States to the Seventh International Conference (Washington, 1934), pp. 113 ff. On p. 5 of this report, Hull's complete plan for economic cooperation introduced at Montevideo is outlined.

²Minutes and Antecedents, Committee I, pp. 23-25. A good review of the peace machinery of the American nations is found in Alfaro, op. cit., pp. 44 ff.

"cooling off" treaties of 1913 and 1914. The Gondra Convention excepted some controversies, gave limited powers to the permanent commissions, and provided no conciliation until commissions of inquiry were formed. At the time of Montevideo, this treaty had not been ratified by Argentina and Bolivia.

2. The General Treaty of Inter-American Conciliation, signed at Washington in 1929. This treaty aimed at remedying defects of the Gondra Convention by extending conciliation to "all controversies of any kind which have arisen or may arise." Here, too the Commission of Inquiry, itself, was allowed to render conciliation. The treaty had not been ratified by Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, or Venezuela.

3. The General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration and the Additional Protocol of Progressive Arbitration, also signed at Washington in 1929. Arbitration by these pacts was extended to disputes of a legal character only, which could not have been settled through diplomatic channels. These measures had not been ratified by Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, the United States, or Uruguay.

4. The Saavedra Lamas Anti-War Pact of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, signed at Rio de Janeiro on October 10, 1933. This treaty provided that the parties "condemn wars

of aggression"; agree that disputes of all kinds be settled "only by pacific means"; and obligate themselves "to submit disputes to the conciliation procedure," with certain exceptions. The conciliation procedure established in this treaty differs in some respects from that in the Convention of 1929. In both cases, however, the parties to a dispute are not bound by the findings of the Commission. This new treaty, entirely unratified at the time of Montevideo, had only been signed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay.¹

Complicated by overlapping and sometimes conflicting clauses, these pacts were made ineffective by the lack of signatures and ratifications. One of the first acts of the Montevideo Conference, initiated by Argentina and Chile and supported by the United States, was to pass unanimously a resolution urging the ratification of these instruments.² In the resolution, the Kellogg-Briand Treaty was also named.³ As a result of the resolution, a proces-verbal was signed before the end of the Conference; all the American governments signified their intention to ratify the conventions

¹Lists of signatures and ratifications from Report of the Delegates, p. 8.

²Final Act, Resolution IV, p. 6.

³Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, and Uruguay had not ratified the Briand-Kellogg pact at the time of the Montevideo meeting.

and pacts in the manner prescribed by each.¹

Such a pious promise is a good example of Pan American peace machinery at its worst. In January, 1941, despite this resolution and one similar to it passed at Buenos Aires three years later, virtually none of these treaties had been ratified by the requisite number of signatory states.² Argentina is perhaps the worst offender. To date (June, 1941), she has ratified only her own Saavedra Lamas Pact!

After passing resolutions to hurry the ratification of a multiplicity of peace treaties, the Conference delegates proceeded to add more conventions to the already long list. Main result of their efforts was the Additional Protocol to the General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation. This protocol was the outcome of an effort by a committee of the American Institute of International Law to create a permanent International Commission of Conciliation of fifteen members to take the place of the two commissions previously established under the Gondra Treaty of 1923 and the Conciliation Convention of 1929. "The Conference doubted the practicability of this project and decided in favor of improving and simplifying existing machinery."³ "Simplification" took the form of

¹Proces-verbal of the intention to subscribe to the pacts for the settlement of international conflicts by pacific means, text from the certified copy in the archives of the Pan American Union, in the International Conference of American States, first supplement (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1940), p. 124.

²See chart, folded, p. 102.

³Report of the Delegates, p. 10. For the discussion on the Protocol, cf. Minutes and Antecedents, Committee I, pp. 56-61, 71, 87.

providing that the two commissions set up by the earlier pacts would be formulated as permanent bodies so as to be ready to act immediately when controversies arose; formerly, the commissions would be formed only after disputes had¹ taken place.

The Conference made other attempts at oiling up the creaking peace machine. A resolution on Good Offices and Mediation, introduced by the American delegate, J. Reuben Clark, was unanimously adopted. It provided that "it shall never be deemed an unfriendly act for any State to offer good offices or mediation to other States engaged in a controversy," and was intended to supply a means for good offices only in those cases in which there was no other² machinery to function.

It has been noted that "the question of the Chaco and the reestablishment of the peace of the continent was³ uppermost in the minds of all the delegates." Despite the fact that the agenda carried no item on the Chaco, a good part of the time of the First Committee on the Organization of Peace was spent in discussing the Bolivia-Paraguay

¹Text of protocol from certified copy in the archives of the Pan American Union is printed in The Conferences of American States, p. 20.

²Final Act, Resolution XXXVI, p. 22.

³W. Mayer, "Seventh International Conference of American States; Review of the Tangible Results," Bulletin of the Pan American Union, LXVIII (April, 1934), 272.

war and ways and means to end it.¹ In the discussions, Secretary of State Hull emphasized the fact that every effort should be made to bring pressure to bear upon the two countries to end their difficulties, especially in view of the fact that the Conference was placing such great stress on peace machinery. Eloquent remarks on the desirability of peace were made by delegates of almost every country.

The United States, whose opposition to such things had been prominent at former conventions, again broke precedent at Montevideo when Hull urged the utmost cooperation for the solution of the Chaco problem with the League of Nations Commission which was on the scene. A sub-committee, formed to discuss peace in the Chaco, devoted its labors almost exclusively to assisting the Commission. On December 15, at the same session of Committee I in which the resolution on the ratification of peace treaties was approved, telegrams were read from the presidents of eight countries, including the United States, urging the Conference to do everything possible to promote an amicable solution of the Chaco dispute.²

The efforts of the League Commission and the sub-committee resulted in the signing of an armistice by Bolivia and Paraguay on December 19, 1933. Announcement of the truce at the Conference called forth the most enthusiastic tribute.

¹The question reappears frequently through the Minutes and Antecedents, especially of Committee I, pp. 7-65.

²Ibid., pp. 27-28.

The Conference adopted a resolution on December 24, in which it extended greetings to the League of Nations Commission and reaffirmed its faith in pacific means for the settlement of international disputes.¹ At the same session, the Conference unanimously adopted a resolution, proposed by Secretary Hull, calling the attention of Bolivia and Paraguay to their obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations for the submission of their dispute to a pacific settlement and requesting the disputants to "accept juridical methods for the solution of the dispute, as consistently recommended"²

Settlement of the Chaco dispute was regarded by Conference delegates as one of the high points of their achievements. Many self-congratulatory words were wasted, however. Before the ink was even dry on the resolution, the disputing nations were accusing each other of breaking the terms of the truce; and before the first of the year,³ the war was under way in full force again.

¹Final Act, Resolution LXIX, p. 28. This resolution also extended a vote of applause to Dr. Gabriel Terra, President of Uruguay, for his previous intervention in the Chaco.

²Final Act, Resolution XCV, p. 34.

³Many commentators put blame on Argentina for instigating the Chaco War, for prolonging it, and for the combatants' failure to keep the truce. Cf. Carleton Beals, The Coming Struggle for Latin America (New York: Halcyon House, 1940), pp. 339-342. Argentina's insincerity seems well proved; yet Argentina led in paying lip service to Chaco peace at Montevideo. For comment on situation at Montevideo, cf. Charles A. Thompson, op. cit., p. 92.

The most important single act of the Conference in the actual cementing of inter-American solidarity was the Convention passed on the Rights and Duties of States.¹ Article VIII of this treaty declares that "no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another." During the discussion of this article, Secretary Hull made the statement previously noted in regard to the approval of the doctrine of non-intervention by the United States.² His stand was heartily praised in the extravagant terms that only Central American diplomats still seem to command in the days of declining Fourth-of-July oratory.

Other significant pledges made in the Convention include the following: (1)"The primary interest of states is the conservation of peace. Differences of any nature should be settled by recognized pacific methods";³ (2)"The contracting states definitely establish as a rule of their conduct the precise obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages which have been attained by force the territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object of military occupation nor of other measures of force by another state, directly or indirectly,

¹Text from certified copy in the archives of the Pan American Union in The International Conferences of American States, pp. 120-124.

²Supra, p. 9.

³Article 10.

or for any motive whatever, even temporarily."¹ It is significant that the cautious Mr. Hull signed this treaty with a reservation, because within the period of the Conference there was "apparently not time to prepare interpretations and definitions of fundamental terms that are embraced in the report."²

Although the entire tenor of the Montevideo Conference was one of amicability and cordially-expressed relationships, standing very strongly in contrast to the rancor of the Havana meeting five years before, the United States did not escape without one challenge to its stated good intentions. A statement by a Colombian delegate praising the United States for not intervening in the recent Cuban revolution was challenged strongly by Angel Alberto Giraudy, President of Cuba's delegation. Senor Giraudy stated:

It is not possible to remain silent when it is affirmed that the United States does not wish to intervene in Cuba, because this is not true. If intervention means the actual occupation of a country, the subjugation of peoples, then the statement is correct. But if it is not intervention when in a defenseless nation a representative of the United States incites

¹Article 11.

²Brazil and Peru also signed with reservations, stating that they accepted the principle stated in Article 11 but "do not consider it codifiable because there are some countries that have not yet signed the Anti-War Pact of Rio de Janeiro of which this doctrine is a part "

part of the people against the government ;¹
 if it is not intervention to surround a defenseless
 island by a threatening fleet in an attempt to im-
 pose upon it a government it does not desire; then,²
 there has never been any intervention in America."

This statement was greeted by no applause, as far as the record shows, but there is no doubt that the Cuban delegate was expressing a thought held in common by many present.³

Throughout the Conference, the Mexican delegates, who represented one of the few actual working democracies in the hemisphere, found themselves leading in the introduction of measures on which no action was taken. An elaborate peace code, designed to coordinate in one document all the features of the various peace treaties, was presented. The only objections expressed to it were on the grounds of its all-inclusiveness. It was too big a single step forward. The Conference, "bearing in mind the advantages which could be offered by the concentration" resolved that the project should be submitted to the consideration of the governments belonging to the Pan American Union.⁴

¹A reference to the activities of Undersecretary Sumner Welles who actively opposed the liberal government of Grau San Martin in favor of more conservative regimes. Cf. Beals, op. cit., pp. 226-230.

²Minutes and Antecedents, p. 34.

³The efforts of the United States were, in great measure, responsible for the defection of the Grau San Martin government and the final stability of the military dictatorship of General Fulgencio Batista. Cf. infra, p. 105.

⁴Final Act, Resolution XXXV, p. 16.

A good example of how such excellently conceived projects can be lost in the labyrinth of Pan American relations is afforded by the Mexican Peace Code. It was submitted in amended form to the Buenos Aires Conference for the Maintenance of Peace in 1936, which, in turn, submitted it to the Committee of Experts for the Codification of International Law, to be reported upon at the Eighth Conference at Lima in 1938.¹ The Eighth Conference again passed the buck back to the Committee of Experts and asked that it be broached at the Ninth Conference in 1942!² Though many diplomats have paid verbal homage to this code, its chances of passage seem just as slim for 1942 as they were in 1933.

The Mexican delegate, Puig Casauranc, also expressed an eloquent desire to have the problem of debts, bimetallism, a continental central bank, and other important economic problems discussed at the Conference.³ The United States and Argentina opposed discussing these problems on the ground that the Conference was not prepared to deal with such subjects. The project was lost in the maze of the organization and was finally referred to a Pan American financial conference.⁴

¹Final Act, Buenos Aires Conference, Resolution XXVIII, p. 16.

²Final Act, Eighth Conference, Resolution XV, p. 38.

³Reports of the Delegates, p. 26.

⁴Final Act, Resolution I, p. 5. Cf. infra, p. 94.

In evaluating the influence of any of the Conferences of American States, one is impressed, first, with the amazing amount of verbiage and the plethora of relatively unimportant resolutions that, at Montevideo, ranged from the campaign against the locusts to the problem of lending dignity to labor. These matters clutter up the record and the delegates' time; at the Seventh Conference, for example, the United States found itself in a minority of one arguing against a convention on the nationality of women and spending considerable effort in upholding its position. The problem is to extract the important factors from the limbo of well-meaning platitudes.

There is no doubt that at Montevideo the conditional acceptance by the United States of the principle of non-intervention was the foremost achievement of the Conference. Without such a stand, there could have been no hope of ever achieving unity among the Americas. With the stand, a degree of unity became possible; but it cannot be said that the Seventh Conference capitalized on the opportunity.

The political agreements arrived at, such as the process-verbal of the intention to subscribe to the pacts for the pacific settlement of international conflicts, were of the first degree of unimportance. If a nation has the intention of ratifying peace pacts, this adherence will follow in the normal course of that nation's foreign policy. If, however,

a nation's foreign policy does not include the adherence to such pacts, no additional agreements promising to adhere will have any effect whatsoever. There is no better case¹ in point than the policy of Argentina.

The high-sounding resolutions and conventions, given so much attention by the Conference prove, on critical examination, little more than words, words, words; proposals with teeth in them, such as the Mexican Peace Code, were passed over entirely by the Conference.

The economic achievements of the Seventh Conference lay also in the realm of potentialities rather than actualities, as far as the promotion of inter-American solidarity was concerned. Secretary Hull's program for reciprocal trade agreements and for the scaling down of tariff barriers received widespread approval. The agreements reached, however, were in the form of non-obligatory resolutions. And the important proposals of Mexico were passed over completely. In a like fashion, the codification of international law received marked impetus at Montevideo, but could achieve significance only through the willingness of the states concerned to adhere to the legal system being finely fashioned.²

From another aspect, the very fact that the twenty-one

¹
Supra, p. 18.

²Final Act, Resolution LXX, p. 28 proposed improved methods for the codification of international law.

American states were willing to send delegates to discuss openly important political, economic, and juridical questions was a significant phenomenon in a world which, even then, was turning away from the conference table to the battlefield. And it is in the intangible area of fostering favorable public opinion that perhaps the greatest achievements of Montevideo rest. Intangible, but marked, too, was the general feeling of cordiality among the delegates; yet the same sense of well-being might have been gained adequately and less hypocritically at a banquet table rather than at a conference table. After-dinner speeches are not taken so seriously as peace pledges.

The Seventh Conference was jarred from its own self-esteem by (1) accusations in the back rooms that Argentina was actively aiding Paraguay carry on hostilities against Bolivia, while, at the same time, professing to be in strong-¹est sympathy with the peace movement; and (2) outspoken criticism from Cuba of the current interpretation of non-intervention by the United States.

Secretary Hull, in usual diplomatic fashion, confused the expressed intent with the actuality when he stated the results of the Conference in the following fashion:

A great new epoch in our relations has been born. A mighty new era of permanent friendliness, understanding, economic peace and cultural cooperation, and all-American solidarity has been inaugurated. We have outlawed war and conquest and embarked upon our peaceful destiny²

¹Cf. supra, note 3, p. 21.

²Cordell Hull, Speech at Lima, Peru, January 11, 1934, quoted in the Report of the Delegates, p. 59.

CHAPTER III

BUENOS AIRES, 1936

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BUENOS AIRES, 1936

The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace met at the suggestion of President Roosevelt at Buenos Aires, Argentina, from December 1 to December 23, 1936. In identical notes, addressed to the heads of the American republics, Roosevelt called attention to the fact that the peace protocol recently negotiated between Bolivia and Paraguay offered "an altogether favorable opportunity" for the American states "to consider their joint responsibility and their common need of rendering less likely in the future the outbreak or the continuation of hostilities and by so doing, serve in an eminently practical manner the cause of permanent peace on this Western Continent."¹

Although the European situation found no place in the official story of Buenos Aires, the effect of the European backdrop on the American stage cannot be gainsaid. The League of Nations had further demonstrated its inefficacy by failing to do anything about either the Italian conquest

¹Circular letter from the President of the United States to the Presidents of the other American Republics proposing the convocation of the Conference, Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace Special Handbook for the Use of Delegates (Washington: The Pan American Union, 1936), pp. 1-3.

of Ethiopia, consummated in the previous summer; or the civil war in Spain, still raging after more than a year and a half; or the German remilitarization of the Rhineland, accomplished in the previous March. These were further indications that the decline of the Versailles Peace and the League of Nations was continuing at full pace. Europe's peace had already been broken and there seemed no possibility of mending it. America's war had just ended and the time seemed ripe to take steps insuring continuation of the peace.

The purpose of the Conference, as outlined in the President's invitation, was to determine how the maintenance of peace might best be safeguarded -- "whether, perhaps, through the prompt ratification of all the American peace instruments, already negotiated; whether through the amendment of existing peace instruments . . . ; or perhaps through the creation by common accord of new instruments of peace additional to those already formulated."

The twenty-one American states unanimously approved President Roosevelt's suggestions; the Conference met on schedule, and, although the original intention was to confine it to problems of peace, the program was ultimately extended to cover almost the scope of the preceding Montevideo meeting. Of the sixty-four resolutions and twelve conventions, the four most important to inter-American solidarity were:

1. The Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation, and Reestablishment of Peace. (Known as the Consultative Pact.)

2. The Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention.

3. The Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation.

4. The Convention to Coordinate, Extend, and Assure the Fulfillment of the Existing Peace Treaties between American States.

Terms of the Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Reestablishment of Peace were an adaptation of a project submitted by Brazil which, using the language of the original message of President Monroe in 1823, stated that the contracting powers "would consider as an unfriendly act the interference of any extra-continental power with an American country, whenever such interference should threaten the security of that country or else directly or indirectly endanger its territorial integrity or determine the exercise, in any form, of a preponderant influence in its destiny."¹ Thus, the Brazilian proposal sought to make the Monroe Doctrine the common doctrine of all the American states.

This direct challenge to Europe, however, encountered opposition from Argentina, especially. Consequently, the

¹Diario de la Conferencia, p. 500, quoted in Ricardo J. Alfaro, op. cit., p. 95.

project was revised; as finally accepted, it referred in vague terms to the situation arising "in the event that the peace of the American republics was menaced," and it called in such event for mutual consultation by the American states, "for the purpose of finding and adopting methods of peaceful cooperation."

Article II of the Convention goes beyond the scope of the Monroe Doctrine. It deals with two distinct situations; one arising in the event of a war between American states, the other in the event of "an international war outside America." Provision is made for consultation among the American governments in both cases. In the former, consultation has as its object, "a method of peaceful collaboration." In the more important case of a war outside America, language of the treaty reached its high point of saying nothing; consultation is to take place "to determine the proper time and manner in which the signatory states, if they so desire, may eventually cooperate in some action tending to preserve the peace of the American continent."¹

It is somewhat ironical that Argentina, and not the United States, retarded the scrapping of the unilateral Monroe Doctrine; this country was willing to go the entire distance in setting up mutual guarantees of collective security in

¹Text from certified copy in the Archives of the Department of State; printed in The International Conferences of American States, p. 188. Ecuador and Honduras signed with minor reservations.

in the hemisphere. Argentina was loath to slap at her good customer, Germany. The southern republic desired, of course, to retain the relinquishment of the United States' right of solo action; at the same time, she did not want to clasp hands too tightly with the United States and thus prevent her from reaching out to Europe.

To call the result a convention of "very guarded language" is to pay it too high a compliment.¹ It is a convention whose language allows the signatories almost precisely the freedom of action they had before it existed. The innocuous brand of consultation provided, in the case of an extra-continental threat, is softened further by "if they so desire"; lack of any machinery of consultation is further evidence of lack of real intent to take effective unified action. For the sake of unanimity, the convention had all its teeth drawn.

The most important effect of this treaty was probably a psychological one. Though "continentalizing" the Monroe Doctrine was not accomplished in fact, the support of the United States was bound to cement more friendly relations with the southern republics in this new manifestation of the Good Neighbor policy. Yet from the viewpoint of the United States, the result was no cause for self-congratulation; the country gave up a policy of long standing in exchange for a mess of words signifying nothing.

¹Cf. Charles G. Fenwick, "The Buenos Aires Conference: 1936," Foreign Policy Reports, XIII, No. 8 (July 1, 1937), p. 92. Professor Fenwick's review is able, albeit over-optimistic.

The association of the Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention with the Consultative Pact was by no means accidental. If the latter ever worked, its machinery of consultation would make domination on the part of the leading state of the continent easily possible. The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States had laid down the principle that "no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another."¹ The Additional Protocol, for no discernible reason except to allay fears of the South and Central American states, reaffirmed this principle, declaring "inadmissible" the intervention of any one of the contracting parties "directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any of the other parties." It also provided that "the violation of the provisions . . . shall give rise to mutual consultation, with the object of exchanging views and seeking methods of peaceful adjustment."²

Like the Additional Protocol, the Declaration of Inter-American Solidarity, presented by the combined Central American delegations, contained little or nothing new in the field of inter-American peace machinery. A preamble recited the existence of common ideals of peace and justice and the

¹Cf. supra, p. 22.

²Text from certified copy in the Department of State; printed in International Conferences of American States, pp. 191-192.

necessity of making a declaration of "principles of American international law, by which is understood a moral union of all the American republics" and "the principle of American solidarity in all non-continental American conflicts."¹ The declaration then asserted the "absolute juridical liberty" of the American nations and "their unrestricted respect for their respective sovereignties" and the "existence of a common democracy throughout America"; it enumerates as principles accepted by the American community of nations:

(a) proscription of territorial conquests and that, in consequence, no acquisition made through violence shall be recognized; (b) intervention by one state in the internal or external affairs of another state is condemned; (c) forcible collection of pecuniary debts is illegal; and (d) any difference or dispute between the American nations . . . shall be settled by the methods of conciliation, or unrestricted arbitration, or through operations of international justice.

Again one is left overwhelmed with the words but unimpressed with the effect. Again, too, the only teeth of the original document were extracted by the Argentine delegates. This was a statement to the effect that "all the American nations will consider as an attack upon themselves individually an attack which may be made by any nation upon the rights of another"²

¹Final Act, Resolution XXVII, p. 16.

²Diario de la Conferencia, p. 493, quoted in Fenwick, op. cit., p. 94.

Argentine conservatism also won at the expense of the program of the United States in the drafting of the Convention¹ on Treaty Coordination and Neutrality. In the original draft prepared by the delegation of the United States, provision had been made for the creation of a "permanent inter-American consultative committee." Determined opposition from the Argentine delegation to the creation of this committee was partly on the ground that it suggested a political organization of the continent contrary to the policy consistently followed with regard to the Pan American Union, and partly on the ground that it appeared to be an attempt to set up a sort of League of American Nations in opposition to the League at Geneva.² Although neither objection seemed particularly germane, the United States dropped the proposal purely for the sake of harmony. In the place of the permanent committee was substituted the bare obligation to consult, without reference to any machinery of consultation. The Convention, as finally passed, repeated the Montevideo attempt to coordinate and make more effective the five previously signed peace conventions³ for the continent; set forth, in case peace failed, the

¹The Montevideo Resolution had been largely ignored. At the time of the Conference only seven countries (The United States, Chile, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Salvador) had ratified all the important American peace treaties.

²Cf. Fenwick, op. cit., p. 95.

³Articles I and II, Text of the convention from certified copy in the Department of State; printed in International Conferences of American States, pp. 192-197. Argentina, Paraguay, El Salvador, Colombia signed the convention with reservations. A resolution, No. III, was also passed relative to ratification of peace treaties.

desirability on the part of the contracting states, of adopting, "in their character as neutrals a common and solid attitude, in order to discourage or prevent the spread or prolongation of hostilities";¹ and described criteria for determining when hostilities became war and when neutrality proposals would come into effect.²

The treaty again demonstrated praiseworthy, verbal intentions of the American states; aside from this, however, it was moribund from birth as the result of innumerable exceptions possible under its terms, intentionally vague language, and complicated, ill-defined overlapping with previous treaties.

That these four measures, with all their weaknesses, were the outstanding steps taken towards Pan American solidarity at the Buenos Aires Conference demonstrates the mediocre accomplishments of that meeting. Yet an analysis of the final act reveals very little else of any consequence whatever. The resolution on the limitation of armaments was a case in point.³ In all the annals of all international conferences, there is probably no more pious, more contradictory, and more

¹Article VII. No obligation existed where the neutrality measures came into conflict with previously signed pacts; thus, for the sixteen of the twenty-one states who were members of the League of Nations, the neutrality terms of the treaty were largely nullified.

²Article V. The original proposal of the United States provided for an arms embargo, the prohibition of loans and the restriction of trade to all belligerent states; this was in accordance with the existing neutrality legislation of the United States. The proposal met with unqualified disapproval of all the other states and was therefore dropped.

³Final Act, Resolution XXXIII, p. 18.

meaningless act. With any possibility of a system of collective security ruled out by the convention conservatives, the best that could be done was to recommend that all governments "which consider themselves in a position to do so" conclude agreements for limiting "their armaments to the greatest possible extent, within the requirements of internal order, and the justified defense of their sovereignty!"

Attacking the evils of militarism from another angle, the Conference went on record formally repudiating war as a means of settling differences between states and recommending the "humanization of war" where and when it occurred.¹ A project on the definition of an aggressor, presented by Bolivia and Brazil, was altogether too controversial to handle; it was referred to the Committee of Experts in charge of the codification of law.² Additional treaties signed on (1) the Prevention of Controversies and (2) Good Offices and Mediation were of little or no consequence.³ As a matter of fact, they probably weakened the structure of Pan American peace machinery by establishing overlapping means of settlement, less binding than others previously provided.

¹Final Act, Resolution XXXIV.

²Ibid., Resolution XXX, p. 17.

³The former established permanent bi-lateral commissions to study, with the object of eliminating, causes for future controversies and to propose additional lawful measures; the latter provided that when controversies arise that cannot be settled by diplomatic means, the disputant nations have recourse to the mediation of "an eminent citizen" of any of the other American countries. Texts from certified copies in the Department of State, in The International Conferences of American States, pp. 197-201.

It cannot be said that the economic steps taken were any more impressive. The Montevideo Conference had adopted a resolution which was both a declaration of principles and a program of "economic disarmament." There was little left to do, unless the Conference was willing to take specific and definite steps. The Conference wasn't willing; it therefore merely repeated recommendations for the principle of abolishing or reducing trade restrictions in general,¹ and for the somewhat contradictory principle of equality of treatment in respect to whatever restrictions might be maintained.² Both resolutions carried the inevitable qualification that the policies were to be put into effect to the extent to which "the different national economies" permitted.

The most definite results of the Peace Conference, strangely enough, were in the field of cultural and intellectual cooperation and "moral disarmament." Twenty-three of the sixty-two resolutions adopted dealt with these topics; one of the most significant measures was the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations, which provided for an annual exchange of students and professors between each of the Pan American states.³ The Conference referred to the

¹Final Act, Resolution XLVI, p. 23.

²Final Act, Resolution XLIV, p. 22.

³Text from certified copy in the Department of State, printed in The International Conferences of American States, pp. 203-205.

next meeting the proposal for a permanent Inter-American Court, which had been backed by Costa Rica, Salvador, Guatemala, and ¹Nicaragua.

Throughout the Conference, more so than at any previous one, the nations of the two Americas were clearly divided in their viewpoints. Argentina, supported by Chile and Uruguay, represented the conservative European opinion. These countries stood in favor of universalism, leaguism; stood opposed to any strong regional understandings, to expressions of continental solidarity, to an American League of Nations, to the "continentalizing" of the Monroe Doctrine, and to a permanent Inter-American Court. The Dominican Republic and Colombia represented the opposite extreme, with recommendations for ²full-fledged American Leagues of Nations; Mexico and Venezuela, urging a unified peace code, stood close to the left with the five Central American nations in a bloc of partial support; the latter were successful in their advocacy of the resolution of continental solidarity. The United States, Brazil, and Cuba were the centrists of the Conference, being pulled too far toward the right extreme for the fulfillment of their re-

¹Ibid., Resolution IV, p. 7.

²Ibid., Resolution X, p. 9 took cognizance of the two projects, declaring that complicating factors made the topic "not sufficiently ripe," and recommending that the two states reconcile the differences in their respective drafts; it resolved to include the project on the agenda of the Eighth Conference at Lima. Bolivia, Cuba, and Ecuador, in addition to the Dominican Republic and Bolivia, urged that the union be discussed.

spective programs but suffering the compromise for the sake
of Conference unanimity.¹

On one point the United States did not compromise. This was the resolution on the coordination of the pacific instruments with the Covenant of the League of Nations; this measure recommended that the American states which were members of the League and signatories of the Pact of Paris, the Saavedra Laamas Treaty and "any such agreements signed in the future" should request of states that were not members of the League but were parties to the other treaties that they cooperate with the League. This cooperation would take the form of studying projects for the coordination of these instruments with the Covenant and with measures that Geneva might adopt to prevent war or to settle disputes by pacific means. Despite broad qualifications allowed in the resolution, the delegates of the United States abstained from voting for the measure which would have pledged their country to cooperate with the League. It is worth noting that the Argentine delegates, who urged this resolution, were not willing to drop it as the representatives of the United States had dropped projects when unanimity was not possible. Passage of the resolution was a clear victory for Argentina over the United States, for the adherents of universal action over the supporters of hemispheric action. Another resolution solidified the victory; it provided that

¹Paul Vanorden Shaw, "Buenos Aires," reprinted from North American Review (March, 1937), pp. 24-41, in The Reference Shelf, XII, No. 6 (1938), p. 153.

"treaties and conventions adopted at Inter-American Conferences shall be open to accession or adherence of the American states which may not have signed them (the same) shall be open¹ to all states whenever it is so provided in such instruments." To this the United States acceded.

Virtually every step taken forward at Buenos Aires was accompanied by a qualification somewhat negating the total gains. Thus, the Monroe Doctrine was tacitly amplified into a multi-lateral agreement by the Consultative Pact; but any genuine advance in inter-American unity that might have been achieved through such an agreement was effectively emasculated by the substitution of the vague Argentinian wording for the clearcut statement presented by Brazil. Thus, the principle of consultation was established in any contingency; but the permanent consultative committee had to be dropped; and only a pious resolve was substituted for it.

Nevertheless, it must be said that insofar as legal obligations and expressions of idealistic objectives are concerned, the Conference was unqualifiedly successful. Principles of equality of states and of non-intervention received new confirmation; repudiation of war and territorial conquest, although along familiar lines, can scarcely be criticized for repetition; the economic resolutions can only be lauded for

¹Final Act, Resolution V, p. 2.

the lip service they paid to the principle of free trade. Furthermore, mobilization of public opinion on behalf of pacific settlement caused by the Convention itself and provided for, indirectly, through the Consultative Convention¹ was a genuine and valuable factor.

Yet what might have been done impresses one more strongly than what actually was accomplished. The treaties of Buenos Aires, with those preceding them, created no definite system or procedure of consultation. In case of a conflict, there were many overlapping jurisdictions, providing possibilities of delay and duplication of efforts. Procedures were ill defined, and there were so many different courses to follow that chances for successful peaceful settlement were slim indeed. The need for careful coordination of the agreements and unification of the procedures could have been met by the adoption of a single document, such as the Mexican Peace Code, or the adoption of separate, but harmonious Conventions, which together could form one structure.² Instead, Buenos Aires added willy-nilly to the numerous conventions existing and postponed consideration of the Mexican proposal.

¹Cf. Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 7.

²Samuel Guy Inman, Building an Inter-American Neighborhood, "World Affairs Books," No. 20 (New York: National Peace Conference, 1937), p. 50.

A fundamental reason for the lack of success at all the conferences of the glibly labeled "American democracies" was well demonstrated at Buenos Aires. The countries meeting there, in the first place, were not democracies; they were engaged in heated economic rivalries; they were split fundamentally on the problem of Americanism versus universalism; they were, in large part, closer to Europe than to each other, culturally and ethnically.

Of the states represented at Buenos Aires, only the United States, Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia were not at least benevolent dictatorships. President Roosevelt, who addressed the Conference, asserted that "Democracy is still the hope of the world."¹ Yet, in seventeen or eighteen of the nations represented, constitutional representative government was honored habitually in the breach, executives normally overrode the legislative and judicial arms of the government, and electoral machinery was rendered more or less meaningless by coercion or fraud. In the newly formed dictatorship in Cuba, the army head of state was bulldozing his congress and imprisoning political dissenters; in the Dominican Republic, President Trujillo was killing or confining his political opponents; in Brazil, President Vargas was keeping his critics in jail; in Uruguay, President Terra had flatly banned all political debates; in Peru, President

¹Franklin D. Roosevelt, text of address in "The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace," International Conciliation (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March, 1937), No. 328, pp. 209-214.

Benavides had recently cancelled an election when it was apparent that he was losing; in Bolivia, in Paraguay, and in Argentina, military dictatorship and feudal aristocracy¹ held absolute control.

There could be no stranger setting imaginable for a speech by an American president to state that "we stand shoulder to shoulder in our final determination that others . . . will find a hemisphere wholly prepared to consult together for our mutual safety and our mutual good." The wonder is that the Buenos Aires Conference accomplished what little it did.

¹Cf. Norbert Herring, "Exit the Monroe Doctrine; Buenos Aires Conference," Harpers, April, 1937, pp. 449-458.

CHAPTER IV

LIMA, 1938

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The Eighth International Conference of American States convened at Lima, Peru, under the handicap of great expectations, on December 9, 1938. The program for the Conference carried most significant and far reaching items:

- (1) Perfection and coordination of inter-American peace instruments (including topics on investigation, conciliation and arbitration, and the Code of Peace; definition of the aggressor, sanctions, and the strengthening of means for the prevention of war);
- (2) Creation of an Inter-American Court of International Justice; (3) Creation of a League or Association of American Nations; (4) Declaration with respect to the American doctrine of the non-recognition of territory acquired by force

All this was included under the section on the organization of peace; economic problems to be discussed¹ were no less promising of large forward steps.

To the United States, especially, the promises held forth by the Lima program were twice welcome. Two dangers had arisen which seemed to threaten the increasing cordiality among American nations resulting from the continuation of the Good Neighbor policy and the final settlement of peace in the Chaco. On the one hand, the Cardenas policy of expropriation had caused friction between Mexico and the United States and

¹Program of the Eighth International Conference of American States in Special Handbook for the Use of Delegates (Washington: The Pan American Union, 1938), p. 3.

had awakened fears regarding the position of foreign capital in other Latin America countries. On the other hand, the drive of the Fascist powers to extend their influence in the Americas had increased since the Munich agreement and during the losing fight of the Loyalists in Spain.¹

Significantly enough, the American "democracies" deliberated at Lima in the hall of the Chamber of Deputies which had not been used since the Chamber had met and been dismissed two years before.² Aside from the Declaration of Lima, which, despite many qualifications, went beyond all previous statements of inter-American solidarity, the achievements of the Eighth Conference were disappointing.

The focal point of interest at Lima, from first to last, was the question of inter-American solidarity. With Secretary Hull as the spokesman, the American delegation offered a program that strongly stressed the determination of the American nations to oppose either a military or an ideological invasion of the Western Hemisphere. In his opening address, Hull asserted that "an ominous shadow falls athwart our own continent." He further declared: "There must not be a shadow of a doubt anywhere as to the determination

¹Cf. Charles A. Thomson, "Results of the Lima Conference," Foreign Policy Reports, XV, no. 1, (March 15, 1939), 1.

²New York Times, December 10, 1938, p. 8. Another note, somewhat off pitch, was an early speech by Peru's Dr. Carlos Conda in which he warned against implanting "artificial methods of commerce on this continent"; at the time, Peru was carrying on a thriving barter trade with Germany.

of the American nations not to permit the invasion of this hemisphere by the armed forces of any power or any possible combination of powers." With no less zest, Hull criticized doctrines and activities "utilized for the purpose of undermining and destroying in other nations established institutions of government and basic social order."¹

The concern of the United States to develop more effective inter-American cooperation against political and cultural penetration and possible armed aggression was substantially supported at Lima by a Caribbean bloc of some twelve nations, made up of Mexico, the Central American countries, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, and the three West Indian republics. As at Buenos Aires, Argentina, supported by the neighboring state of Uruguay and, to a lesser degree, by Paraguay and Bolivia, expressed a different point of view. Determined by reasons of their own national self-interest, the policy of these countries indicated no alarm at any immediate Nazi-Fascist menace.² The task of the Conference was to reconcile the conflicting points of view and at the same time evolve a meaningful policy.

When the United States delegation was still en route to Lima, an Argentine draft on inter-American solidarity was

¹Text of speech is in ibid., December 11, 1938, p. 14.

²Cf. Thomson, "Results of the Lima Conference," Foreign Policy Reports, XV, No. 1 (March 15, 1939), 3. The New York Times of December 13, p. 2, carried a story to the effect that Brazil, Chile, and Argentina were afraid that any statement of solidarity would bring economic reprisals from Germany.

forwarded from Buenos Aires; it contained suggestions for extending consultation to cover more than simply the threats to peace specified in the Consultative Pact of the 1936 meeting. The draft contained reference to common action against aggression, simply providing for general or regional meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, "when they deem it advisable."¹ This was patently not strong enough for the American delegation.

Immediately upon his arrival at Lima, Secretary Hull discussed the solidarity question with Foreign Minister Cantilo of Argentina and other delegates.² It was agreed that the proposed measure should be reduced in technical rank from a treaty to a declaration, and that the two questions of solidarity and consultation be temporarily separated, while attempts were made to fashion a formula for each. Meanwhile, on shipboard, the United States delegates had revised the Argentine draft and had included a provision expressing common concern in opposing subversive movements. In his address to the Conference on December 10, Dr. Cantilo coupled a pledge

¹Discussion of the solidarity agreement closely follows that of Charles Thomson's report and of the New York Times. Text of the Argentine draft is in Diario de la VIII Conferencia Internacional Americana, Lima, No. 74 (December 14, 1938), p. 434.

²Cantilo was not at Lima as a delegate, although he addressed the conference. His visit was for six days, and for a time there was feverish haste to evolve an acceptable solidarity agreement before he left for Buenos Aires. Cf. New York Times, week of December 9.

of general willingness to oppose aggression with refusal to bind Argentina to specific commitments.¹

Two days later the Argentine Foreign Minister left Lima with no agreement having been reached and with the morale of the Conference at its low point. On his way home, Cantilo dispatched a second Argentine draft. Brazil, Cuba, and Mexico, however, urged a stronger statement. As a consequence, a third formula was worked out by delegates from Peru, Brazil, and Argentina, which was hastily dispatched to Buenos Aires. Cantilo, however, flatly rejected this draft. There was nothing to do but to return to Argentina's second formula; this was done, and the problem seemed to have been solved. The Brazilian delegation threw a scare into the Conference, however, when it suspended action on the draft on orders from the home government; it was only on December 24 that unanimous agreement became possible. Consideration of the Declaration had consumed almost the entire time, effort, and patience of the Conference. What did the all-important document say?

The Declaration first made note of the doubtful fact that "the people of America have achieved spiritual unity through the similarity of their republican institutions, their unshakable will for peace, their profound sentiment of humanity and tolerance, and through their absolute adherence to the principles of international law." It then reaffirmed "the

¹Diario, No. 5, December 11, 1938, p. 281.

continental solidarity" of the American republics and "their purpose to collaborate in the maintenance of the principles upon which the said solidarity is based their decision to maintain them (the above mentioned principles) and to defend them against all foreign intervention or activity that may threaten them." It further proclaimed for the American states that "in case the peace, security or territorial integrity is thus threatened by acts of any nature that may impair them, they proclaim their common concern and their determination to make effective their solidarity, coordinating their respective sovereign wills by means of the procedure of consultation using the measures which in each case the circumstances may make advisable." The Declaration added that "it is understood that the Governments of the American Republics will act independently in their individual capacity, recognizing fully their juridical equality as sovereign states," and provided "that in order to facilitate the consultation the Ministers for Foreign Affairs when deemed advisable and at the initiative of any one of them, will meet in their several capitals by rotation and without protocolary character."¹

The Lima Declaration hardly did more than reiterate, amplify, and make somewhat more explicit the declaration made at Buenos Aires in 1936, in which the American states had affirmed that "every act susceptible to disturbing the peace of

¹Final Act, Text of Declaration, p. 131.

America affects each and every one of them, and justifies the initiation of the procedure of consultation." Whether the Lima measure greatly strengthened the "continentalization" of the Monroe Doctrine is hard to say. Lima did hint at a common action against subversive activities as well as open armed attack; and, most important of all, it prescribed a method for implementation through the clause providing for consultation to be carried out through meetings of the Foreign Ministers.¹ But beyond this there was nothing.

Nevertheless, the Declaration of Solidarity must be entered on the credit side of the ledger;² what were the debits, the disappointments of the Conference?

Disappointment I: Projects for the creation of an Association of American Nations, presented by Colombia and the Dominican Republic, which had been referred to Lima by

¹A resolution, No. CVII, on Improvement in the Procedure of Consultation provided that consultation might be invoked for economic, cultural, and other questions. Final Act, p. 131.

²There were, of course, other manifestations of co-operation at Lima important enough to merit attention. They included, in the field of economics, resolutions on the reduction of barriers to international trade, No. II, ibid., p. 20, and on the liberalization of inter-American commerce and economic non-aggression, No. LXIII, ibid., p. 91; a sweeping reiteration of American principles, No. CX, ibid., p. 133, and a specific re-statement of non-recognition of acquisition of territory by force, No. XXVI, ibid., p. 54. More important were resolutions directed against racial or religious persecution, No. XXXVI, ibid., p. 62, and ideological penetration, No. XXVII, ibid., p. 55, and No. XXVIII, ibid., p. 56. In addition, there were the usual slow steps made toward a codification of international law, mainly in Resolution XVII, ibid., p. 42.

Buenos Aires, were again evaded. These important measures were referred to a conference of jurists with the suggestion¹ that they be submitted to the Ninth Conference.

Disappointment II: The Mexican project of the Peace Code, modified by the Committee of Experts to which it had been referred, and a proposal from the United States for the consolidation of American peace agreements were both referred to the Pan American Union and International Conference of American Jurists for consideration at the Ninth Conference.²

Disappointment III: Consideration of the project to establish an Inter-American Court of Justice, which had been referred from Convention to Convention from almost the very first, was again postponed, with the declaration "that it is the firm purpose of the states of the American continent to establish an Inter-American Court of International Justice, whenever these states may recognize the possibility of doing so with complete assurance of success"³

Disappointment IV: The entire problem of the definition of an aggressor and the application of sanctions was referred to a later date.⁴

¹Ibid., Resolution XIV, p. 37.

²Ibid., Resolution XV, p. 38.

³Ibid., Resolution XXV, p. 52.

⁴Ibid., Resolution XXIV, p. 51.

Disappointment V: A draft project pledging the American states not to employ armed force for the collection of public or contractual debts and not to intervene diplomatically in support of pecuniary claims (unless there was a denial of justice or an infraction of international law) was debated inconclusively. In addition to this draft, Mexico and Argentina presented other projects touching on the question of pecuniary claims. Rather than press the projects which had already started a heated debate, the Conference recommended the problem for future study and consideration at the next Conference.¹

Disappointment VI: In the economic field, the best the Conference could produce were the usual recommendations for reduction of trade barriers and liberalization of inter-² American commerce.

Disappointment VII: Probably the biggest failure of all at Lima, according to John W. White of the New York Times who seems to have been the only journalist exercising critical judgment there, was the failure of the United States to assume an aggressive leadership of the bloc standing for strong cooperation. Not only did the United States sidestep this leadership, but, in insisting upon unanimity at all costs,

¹Cf. Charles A. Thomson, "Results of the Lima Conference," Foreign Policy Reports, XV, no. 1 (March 15, 1939), 7-8.

²Final Act, Resolution II, p. 20; Final Act, Resolution LXIII, p. 91.

it did not allow another country to take the requisite¹ measures. The criticism seems to be justified in the results of the Conference; nor did the Caribbean bloc accept the results with equanimity.

Correspondent White stated that the Cubans were bitter because the delegation of the United States had backtracked on its promise to support Cuba's strong resolution calling for the repudiation of all collective persecution "for racial and religious motives." This clearcut opportunity to align the American states against the new rise of anti-Semitism in German-controlled regions was opposed by Argentina and the other countries economically bound to Germany. The softening of the Declaration to a statement that persecution "is contrary to the political and juridical systems of America" was acceded to readily by the United States and was regarded as an act of betrayal by Cuba and the other Caribbean states.

Other criticisms of the leadership at the Conference were fundamental. Mexican and Cuban delegates openly mourned a muzzling of free debate; the steering committee was censured for refusing to let the Conference receive Cuba's proposal that the American nations offer mediation in the Spanish Civil War;² "one prominent Central American delegate," on reading the

¹New York Times, December 21, 1938, p. 12.

²Many observers were pointing out that a Rebel victory in Spain would provide an opportunity for greater Fascist penetration in South America. Spain's close cultural ties with South America were particularly feared.

final draft of the solidarity declaration, was quoted as saying:

We are going home to restudy our whole position with regard to future Pan American Conferences. If this is an example of what they are to be, they are a waste of time and not worth the expense of sending delegates to them.¹

The constantly compromising position of the United States was made more marked by the open Nazi efforts to sabotage the Conference. As early as December 6, a correspondent wrote, "It would be foolish to pretend that the Rome-Berlin Axis is not exerting strong influence in the forthcoming conference." John White recorded that the "Agents of the Rome-Berlin Axis have begun a determined fight to prevent formation at Lima of a Pan American Axis that might strengthen the United States at Germany and Italy's expense in South America." White gave as an example of German methodology an advertised lecture on archeological research in Peru by Professor A. Ubbelohde-Doering of Munich; instead of a discussion of the recent digging in Peru, "his audience heard a scathing attack on Pan Americanism and President Roosevelt's 'bugbear' of a German invasion of South America."² At the Conference, itself, a disproportionate number of both German and Italian "observers" were on hand.

¹John W. White in the New York Times, December 21, 1938, p. 12.

²Ibid., December 6, 1938, p. 1.

Placed in a defensive position, the United States achieved neither the more desirable result nor the more respected position that might have been gained through an aggressive attack on the attacker. On the other hand, it cannot be doubted that the tactics pursued by the United States were in great part responsible for whatever the Conference finally did achieve. In contrast to Munich, Lima stood not for coercion but for voluntary agreement.

In this field, Lima conserved the gains made at Montevideo and Buenos Aires. It took no backward steps. At a time when general retreat characterized the forces of peaceful cooperation, and international understanding, it held ground previously won and kept the road open for further advance in the future.¹

The achievements at Lima -- specifically: (1) the amplification of the continental Monroe Doctrine through the Solidarity Agreements; (2) the measures advocating the principle of free trade; and (3) the gentle criticism of German racial persecutions -- these steps, such as they were, represented defeat for the attempts of the Fascist nations to scuttle the Lima Conference.

But German propaganda did not prevent more significant achievements. More fundamental reasons for the failure were suggested by the following conversation between Professor Samuel Guy Inman of the United States and Foreign Affairs Minister Cantilo of Argentina:

¹Cf. Charles A. Thomson, "Results of the Lima Conference," Foreign Policy Reports, XV, no. 1-(March 15, 1939) 8.

Inman: But you and Mr. Hull did differ, then? In what way?

Cantilo: We differ in this: Mr. Hull seems to get his key from what is outside this continent. He expressed his fear of what Europe or Asia, with their new ideologies might do to America, so he wants us to arm. I get my key from America itself. I say our business is to go forward in building our American life in the American spirit. When a nation from the outside really threatens us, then is the time we are to take decisive and united action to defend ourselves.

Inman: Doesn't it seem to you, Dr. Cantilo, that Chancellor Hitler might be starting off on a second Napoleonic era?

Cantilo: No, I do not at present see that. What I do think is that America ought to stand solidly together for its own development. Our program ought to be drawn not because we fear an outside enemy, but because we want to make a strong America. The position of the United States is different from that of Latin American countries. You must face certain world problems which are not ours. The United States worked out its problem with China, its strong position in the Philippines and Hawaii, not from an inter-America standpoint, but based on your own national interests. So today you naturally work out your world relations according to your own ideas. But then the United States brings that position here to us in Latin America and says, "Let us adopt this as a Pan American policy." We do not like this.

Inman: Mister Minister, why is it that Argentina always seems to be so near to Europe?

Cantilo: Well, in the first place, in Argentina our population contains an enormous number of Italians, Spanish, French, Germans, and other European people. Equally important is that Europe is our market and we sell it most of our products. The United States buys practically nothing from us. Did you know that in the first eight

months of 1938 Argentina bought more from the United States than we did from England, our best customers? And what did the United States buy from us? How can we expect to forget all about the people who give lifeblood to our nation and buy our products?

¹Samuel Guy Inman, "Lima Conference and the Totalitarian Issue," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCIV (July, 1939), 10. This issue of The Annals contains a supplement on "The Lima Conference and the Future of Pan Americanism."

CHAPTER V

PANAMA, 1939 - HAVANA, 1940

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September, 1939, marked the beginning of the war in Europe and the beginning of a new phase in Pan American relations. The speed with which the first Consultative Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics was convened at Panama demonstrated the concern of the American states over the European war.¹ The primary concern of the meeting, which started on September 23, was in maintaining the collective neutrality of the states of the two Americas and in minimizing the economic effects of the war on the hemisphere.² Prior to the gathering, there were the usual German attempts to create dissension, John White reporting from Buenos Aires that "German propaganda agencies are flooding Latin America with warnings that the neutrality conference at Panama is merely a guise for trapping the

¹The Conference was jointly initiated by the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Panama, Peru, and the United States. These countries agreed on Panama as a meeting place, and invitations were issued by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of that nation. Text of invitation is in The Conferences of American States, pp. 315-316. Cf. also Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 3.

²Just three days before the meeting convened, President Roosevelt declared that his policy for the United States was motivated by "one single, hard-headed thought -- keeping America out of war." New York Times, September 21, 1939, p. 1.

South American Republics into becoming protectorates of the United States."¹

One of the few open references to dictatorship in America ever made at the Pan American meetings came with the inaugural speech of President Juan Demostenes Arosemena of Panama, who attempted to dissociate the Americas from totalitarianism, explaining that the numerous South American dictatorships were "patriarchal manifestations springing from the inability of certain classes to govern themselves."²

Significant legislation to insure the collective neutrality of the American states was promulgated at the meeting. Measures included:

1. A general declaration, which "reaffirmed the status of general neutrality of the American republics." The states were left free "to regulate in their individual and sovereign capacities the manner in which they were to give it specific application"; but collectively they resolved to "have their rights and status as neutrals fully

¹Ibid., September 24, 1939, p. 42.

²Ibid., p. 1. Only three plenary sessions of the meeting were made public. Brief minutes of the other general sessions were made, but no record of the committee proceedings was kept. Cf. Report on the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, submitted to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union by the Director General, "Congress and Conference Series" (Washington: Pan American Union, 1939), No. 29, p. 3.

respected and observed." The American nations declared certain standards existent which they would uphold in their status as neutrals. To this end, they agreed, among other things, to prevent their respective territories -- land, sea, or air -- from being used as bases for belligerent operations; and to prevent in their territories the enlistment of persons to serve in the armed forces of a belligerent, the setting forth of military expeditions in the interest of a belligerent, or the fitting out and arming of vessels for belligerents. The declaration further asserted that the American nations would maintain close contact in order to bring into uniformity, so far as possible, the measures they adopted for the enforcement¹ of their neutral rights.

2. The Declaration of Panama, which set forth the highly publicized, but now forgotten, neutrality zone. This

¹"General Declaration of Neutrality of the American Republics," Resolution V, printed in International Conferences of American States, p. 326. The Declaration also set up an Inter-American Neutrality Committee of seven experts to study and to formulate neutrality measures. Further resolutions dealing with the attitude of this hemisphere toward the war were on Coordination of Police and Judicial Measures for the Maintenance of Neutrality, No. VIII, ibid., pp. 331-332, which provided for the formulation of common rules of action "of the police and judicial authorities . . . in preventing or repressing unlawful activities that individuals, whether they be nationals or aliens, may attempt in favor of a foreign belligerent state"; on Contraband of War, No. VII, ibid., p. 330, which registered opposition to the placing of foodstuffs and clothing for civilian populations on the lists of contrabands; and on the Humanization of War, No. VI, ibid., p. 329.

interesting document stated that "the nature of the present conflagration would not justify any obstructions to inter-American communications which, engendered by important interests, call for adequate protection." In view of this fact, the American republics declared, as a measure of continental self-protection, that so long as they maintained their neutrality, they "are as of inherent right entitled to have those waters adjacent to the American continent, which they regard as of primary concern and direct utility in their relations, free from the commission of any hostile act by any non-American belligerent nation, whether such hostile act be attempted or made from land, sea or air."¹ The neutrality zone set forth roughly followed the contours of both Americas at a distance of about three hundred miles from shore. The declaration excluded the territorial waters of Canada and of the colonies and possessions of European countries in the hemisphere; this was legal fiction, however, it being a physical impossibility to separate these waters from those of the American nations.

Shortly after the Panama meeting it became apparent that the United States was not interested in maintaining strict neutrality; consequently, these declarations were of but transient interest. The more permanent contributions of the Panama Conference, therefore, fell in the field of economics.

¹Ibid., pp. 334-337.

The resolution on economic cooperation repeated the time-worn shibboleth recommending that the governments do everything possible to abolish obstacles to free inter-American trade. But it went further and, for the first time, created an organization -- the American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee, consisting of twenty-one experts, one from each of the American republics. Functions of this committee were widespread; its specific duties were to consider problems of monetary relationships and foreign exchange; effective measures for mutual cooperation to mitigate dislocations of foreign trade affected by the war; and the possibility of establishing customs truces.¹

In addition to the neutrality and economic measures taken at Panama, a series of other resolutions, most of which were aimed at the maintenance of peaceful relations among the American nations, was also promulgated. They included:

- (a) a reaffirmation of the Lima Declaration of Continental Solidarity;²
- (b) an assertion of the faith of American nations

¹Ibid., Resolution III, pp. 322-326. The resolution also recommended that the governments do everything possible to abolish obstacles to the free inter-American movement of capital, and the negotiation of agreements to facilitate inter-American credit, to attempt to prevent excessive increase in the price of manufactured articles. In addition, it urged that the governments make every effort to complete their respective sections of the Pan American Highway.

²Ibid., Resolution IV, p. 326.

in the maintenance of international activities in accordance with Christian morality;¹ (c) a recommendation to the American states to eradicate the spread of subversive ideologies to protect the "common inter-American democratic ideal";² and (d) a provision to hold another meeting of Foreign Ministers,³ with an additional proviso for an immediate meeting in the case of a transfer of sovereignty of geographic regions of the Americas held by non-American states.⁴

By the time the second Meeting of Foreign Ministers was held in Havana, from July 21 to July 30, 1940, interest and emphasis had shifted away from neutrality to problems of hemispheric defense. The German victory in France, the taking of Denmark, Norway, and the Low Countries, and the threatened invasion of Great Britain had brought the war considerably closer to America; politically closer because Danish, Dutch, and French possessions in this hemisphere were no longer controlled by "friendly democracies"; economically closer, because the expansion of the war had created a crisis in Latin American exports. In addition, fear was rampant that the alarming

¹Ibid., Resolution IX, p. 332.

²Ibid., Resolution XI, p. 333.

³Ibid., Resolution XII, p. 334.

⁴Ibid., Resolution XVI, p. 338.

extension of Nazi activities indicated that Germany would seek economic or political domination on this continent, once victorious in Europe.¹

In the month preceding the meeting, the United States took several steps that were indicative of the coming course of action at Havana:²

1. On June 17, Secretary Hull instructed the foreign offices at Berlin and Rome to inform Germany and Italy that "the United States would not recognize any transfer, and would

¹Cf. A. R. Elliott, "European Colonies in the Western Hemisphere," Foreign Policy Reports (August 15, 1940), and Howard J. Trueblood, "The Havana Conference of 1940," Foreign Policy Reports (September 15, 1940). Totalitarian pressure on the American states and totalitarian activity within these states was stronger before the Havana meeting than ever before. On the eve of the Conference, Dr. Otto Reinebeck, German Minister to Panama, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, delivered notes to all these countries, except Panama, warning them that the Conference would move them away from neutrality and that Germany would retaliate, should the delegates act against that country. Time (July 22, 1940), p. 14. (Secretary Hull subsequently hit back at this "intimidation" with vigor.) A dispatch in the New York Times from Berlin on July 12 (p. 6) said that Goering's newspaper, the Essener National Zeitung, warned the South American nations against allowing the United States to impose a monopoly over their exports and thereby jeopardize their post-war trade. On July 16, dispatches in the New York Times (p. 12) told of the Nazis spending from fifty to a hundred thousand dollars a month for propaganda activities in Chile and of the putting down of a Nazi putsch in that country. At the Conference, itself, Germany had three active propagandist observers, Dr. Reinebeck, Stepman Tauchnitz, Charge d'Affaires at Havana, and George Leisewitz, secretary of the German Legation at Santiago.

²Adapted from Howard J. Trueblood, "The Havana Conference of 1940," Foreign Policy Reports (September 15, 1940), pp. 2-3.

not acquiesce in any attempt to transfer, any geographic region of the Western Hemisphere from one non-American power to another non-American power." Subsequently, the French, British, and Dutch governments were similarly notified.

2. Shortly thereafter, Congress passed resolutions containing similar "hands off" warnings and stating that the United States would consult immediately with the other American states in regard to measures necessary to protect their¹ interests.

3. The Washington administration announced it was contemplating a vastly enlarged program of Latin American economic cooperation; on June 22, President Roosevelt announced a cartel plan providing for "an effective system of joint marketing of the important staple exports of the American republics."²

4. Almost simultaneously, Edwin C. Wilson, United States Minister to Uruguay, made an authorized announcement that "it is the intention and avowed policy of my Government to cooperate fully, whenever such cooperation is desired, with all the other American governments in crushing all activities which arise from non-American sources and which imperil our political and economic freedom." The United States pointedly chose to have this announcement made in a small, far-away,

¹Cf. New York Times, June 18, 19, 1940, p. 1.

²Ibid., June 24, 1940, p. 1.

and poorly armed country which had just been shaken by the discovery of a Nazi plot to seize control of its government.

These four measures converged into the focal point of interest at the Havana Meeting; the main purpose of the United States at the meeting was to achieve backing and co-operation from the other American states for its announced policy in regard to European possessions in this hemisphere. In his address before the Conference on July 22, Hull stated that the United States was in favor of "the establishment of a collective trusteeship, to be exercised in the name of all the American republics," for European territory in America threatened by a change of ownership. The Secretary of State denied that the trusteeship would carry with it any thought of the creation of a special interest by any American republic and suggested that "as soon as conditions permit, the region should be restored to its original sovereign or be declared independent when able to establish and maintain stable self-government."¹

As usual, Argentina supplied the main, and in this case, about the only opposition to the plan of the United States. Divergence was not fundamental, the chief point at issue being the urgency of the question. Argentina, through its delegate, Dr. Leopoldo Melo, argued that there was no need for haste since the danger of the transfer of sovereignty that

¹Text of the address in U. S. Department of State, Bulletin, July 27, 1940.

the United States feared was "purely hypothetical"; that so long as the British fleet was intact and the Germans remained prisoners of the continent,¹ no danger existed. The Argentines also contended that, under the circumstances, the act of assuming administration over a given European colony might be tantamount to an act of war, which only the Argentine Congress could declare.

But Argentina, this time, stood alone against an almost solid phalanx of the other twenty countries, led by the United States. A deadlock threatened for the first four days of the nine-day meeting, but the result was inevitable; a compromise was effected, with Argentina giving most of the ground. Virtually the sole concession made to the southern recalcitrant was the use of the phrase "provisional administration" instead of "mandate" or "joint protectorate."

The Convention on the Provisional Administration of European Colonies and Possessions in the Americas and the Act of Havana, which supplemented the more formal treaty, were final steps in the "continentalization" of the Monroe Doctrine. The Act of Havana, itself, was a temporary measure to cope with the problem of the European possessions until the convention could be approved by the various governments. The act first states that "the status of regions on this continent

¹Cf. "Twenty Nations and One," Fortune, XXII, No. 3 (September, 1940), 74.

belonging to European powers is a subject of deep concern to all of the Governments of the American Republics." The American countries recognized that "as a result of the present European war there may be attempts at conquest thus placing in danger the essence and pattern of the institutions of America." The act declared "that when islands or regions in the Americas now under the possession of non-American nations are in danger of becoming the subject of barter of territory or change of sovereignty, the American nations, taking into account the imperative need of continental security and the desires of the inhabitants of the said islands or regions, may set up a regime of provisional administration " Among the conditions of the administration was the stipulation "that as soon as the reasons requiring this measure shall cease to exist," the possessions would either be made independent, "if it shall appear that they are able to constitute and maintain themselves in such condition, or be restored to their previous status, whichever of these alternatives shall appear the more practicable and just." Moreover, "this administration shall be exercised with the twofold purpose of contributing to the security and defense of the Continent, and to the economic, political and social progress of such regions "

Provided in the act was the creation of an emergency committee, subject to call at the request of any signatory,

whose duty should be the assumption of the administration of a region attacked or threatened "if it becomes necessary as an imperative emergency measure before the coming into effect of the convention approved by this Consultative Meeting " ¹ A significant proviso of the Act of Havana states that "should the need for emergency action be so urgent that action by the committee cannot be awaited, any of the American Republics, individually or jointly with others, shall have the right to act in the manner which its own defense or that of the continent requires."

The convention, signed by the delegates on July 19, was essentially an amplification of the principles laid down by the Act of Havana; the convention provided detailed legal machinery for the possible administration of European possessions. In many ways, it was even stronger than the temporary act. It stated, for example, that "no transfer or attempt to transfer or acquire any interest or right in any such region (territories of non-American countries located in this hemisphere), directly or indirectly, would be recognized or accepted by the American Republics, no matter what form was employed to attain such purposes." The convention specifically exempted from its provisions "territories or possessions which are the subject

¹Text in The International Conferences of American States, pp. 364-5.

of dispute or claims between European powers and one or more
of the republics of the Americas.¹"

In addition to the problem of the European colonies, further considerations of neutrality and foreign activities, and of economic and financial cooperation came before the Conference. The Committee on Neutrality was deluged with projects designed to protect the Western Hemisphere from Fifth Column activities. The most important of these, on the suppression of activities directed from abroad against domestic institutions, was submitted by the United States.² With Uruguay, the United States presented projects designed to prevent political activities on the part of consular and diplomatic agents,³ while Argentina advanced a plan for the coordination of police and judicial measures.⁴ Along the same line, Cuba proposed precautionary measures with reference to the issuance of passports.⁵ All these measures were approved by the Conference. Also approved

¹Chief regions of this category are British Honduras and the Falkland Islands, long in dispute between Guatemala and Argentina and Great Britain. Text of the Convention in ibid., pp. 373-377. Chile, Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela signed with reservations.

²Ibid., Resolution VI, pp. 351-352.

³Ibid., Resolution II, p. 351.

⁴Ibid., Resolution III.

⁵Ibid., Resolution V, p. 353.

were a resolution condemning hostilities within the territorial waters as defined at the Panama Meeting¹ and the usual recommendation for the promotion of continental solidarity.² A long series of recommendations from the Inter-American Neutrality Committee, with a number of projects submitted by the various countries, were referred back to the Committee, with a vote of applause and congratulations for its previous work.³

More important than these measures were the steps taken in the field of economic cooperation. There was no mention made at Havana of the cartel plan which had been prominently discussed prior to the Conference; this gigantic marketing project had run up against many difficulties as well as a lack of enthusiasm from the other American states. On the day that Secretary Hull made his economic recommendations at Havana, President Roosevelt announced his substitute for the cartel, a request that Congress "give prompt consideration to increasing the capital and lending power of the Export-Import Bank of Washington by \$500,000,000, and removing some of the restrictions on its operations to the end that the bank may be of greater existence to our neighbors south of the Rio Grande, including financing, the handling and marketing of some part

¹Ibid., Resolution XIII, p. 359.

²Ibid., Resolution XII, p. 358.

³Ibid., Resolution I, p. 349.

of their surpluses."¹

The Havana resolution on economics substantially represented Hull's recommendations. It included a declaration that the American nations should "continue to adhere to the liberal principles of international trade," be willing to conduct trade with any non-American country in accordance with these free principles, and "do everything in their power to strengthen their own economic position." The American states further pledged "to improve further the trade and other economic relations between and among themselves; and to devise and apply appropriate means of effective action to cope with the difficulties, disadvantages and dangers arising from the present disturbed and dislocated world conditions." The delegates voted to provide for the strengthening and expansion of the activities of the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee and instructed this committee to proceed with the promotion of a long list of cooperative activities. Among the most important duties given the committee was the creation of instruments to facilitate the disposition of American surplus commodities and to develop commodity arrangements with a view to assuring equitable terms for both producers and consumers of the commodities concerned.²

¹U. S. Department of State, Bulletin, July 27, 1940, p. 41.

²The International Conferences of American States, Resolution XXV, pp. 368-370.

The two meetings of foreign ministers demonstrated, first of all, the efficacy of the consultative procedures set up by the American nations at their preceding conferences. That the first meeting could be held less than a month after the outbreak of war was testimony to the fact that the previous inter-American conferences were productive of a genuinely co-operative attitude. But neither meeting accomplished what reasonably might have been expected of it.

As the result of an extremely short-sighted policy on the part of the United States, the political measures taken at Panama were soon forgotten. When it became apparent that the neutrality zone, for example, would work more hardships on Great Britain than on Germany, the United States lost all interest in enforcing it;¹ since the other American states possessed no power to enforce the zone, if they did have the inclination, the neutrality legislation soon became meaningless. This situation arose, of course, as the result of the policy of the United States, sponsoring a measure one month it had no desire to enforce the next. As a consequence, the other American nations were in an advantageous position to criticize the bad faith of the United States.

¹Very interesting are the documents of the protest of the American republics and the replies of Germany and England on the Graf Spee incident. Cf. Bulletin of the Pan American Union, 74 (May, 1940), 403-8.

The creation of the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee at Panama was an important step forward; yet the committee, itself, accomplished little between consultations; as a matter of fact, the members of the committee rarely attended their own meetings.¹ In the face of these facts, the Havana meeting did no more than tender the committee a vote of thanks and burden it with many new functions.²

The major achievements at Havana were represented by the Act of Havana and the Convention on the Provisional Administration of European Colonies. Through these measures, the Monroe Doctrine finally became a continental doctrine; with them, the American nations set up effective machinery to act rapidly in the event any change in the status of European colonies occurred or threatened to occur. Never before in the history of inter-American relations had measures for a common end been set forth more straightforwardly. Here, too, however, the real test will come if and when the American states put these measures into action.

The ultimate purpose of Pan Americanism in 1939 and 1940, considering the tenor of the times, should have been to weld the Americas into a solid military and economic bloc against totalitarianism. Against the European background, the measures of

¹Cf. Fortune, XXII, No. 3 (September, 1940), 141.

²Cf. supra, p. 74.

Panama and Havana appear inconclusive. In Mr. Bull's own words, they are a "clearing of the decks." Yet they were the fullest expressions of the Pan-American movement under emergency conditions and after more than fifty years of evolution.

CHAPTER VI

THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM

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The chief political danger to the Western Hemisphere rests in the economic threat of a Nazi-dominated Europe. This Europe would need vast supplies of food and raw materials from Latin America and could produce great quantities of finished goods for exchange. It also would probably have supplies of armaments for sale on terms attractive to South American countries with military ambitions.

The United States normally takes only one-third of Latin America's total exports, while Europe consumes from one-half to two-thirds of these products; consequently, Germany's bargaining power would be stronger than that of the United States. And the head start would be lengthened further by an expansion of Germany's potent barter system. Thus, even if Central and South America were in thorough disagreement with the theory of Nazi politics and the practice of Nazi trade policy, which is a moot point, those countries could not decline the opportunity to sell their great surpluses to Europe. Few of the Central American and none of the South American countries could, under current circumstances, reject German trade terms even though those terms were accompanied by

political infiltration.¹

German domination in the lower Americas, whether political or economic, would be a threat to the supplies of the United States both in war and peace. In strategic materials, Latin American sources are of tremendous value to this country, even though many Latin American products essential to national defense are of minor significance in the region's total export values. The Army and Navy Munitions Board lists fourteen strategic materials "for which strict conservation and distribution control measures will be necessary." They are antimony, chromium, cocoanut shell char, ferro-grade manganese, manila fiber, mercury, mica, nickel, quartz crystal, quinine, rubber, silk, tin, and tungsten. The Central and South American states produce many of these in quantity for export to the United States, while others are available in² limited amounts and are capable of further production.

Latin American sources are also needed for the peacetime economy of the United States. The southern republics have almost a monopoly on bauxite, from which aluminum is made,

¹Howard J. Trueblood, "Economic Defense of the Americas," Foreign Policy Reports, XVI, No. 10 (August 1, 1940), 127. One of the most exhaustive studies on inter-American economics is M. Ezekial's "Economic Relations between the Americas," International Conciliation, No. 367 (February, 1941).

²Howard J. Trueblood, "Economic Defense of the Americas," Foreign Policy Reports, XVI, No. 10 (August 1, 1940), 129.

and on bananas, Brazil nuts, carnauba wax, castor beans, chicle, coffee, flaxseed, and other important products. In addition, the Southern republics supply large quantities of sisal and henequen, sugar, cacao, hides and skins, manganese, and wool. Under normal circumstances, it would be difficult to shift these purchases to other parts of the world; under conditions¹ of war time, it would be virtually impossible.

If the German competition for these products of the Southern Americas were merely the old-fashioned trade rivalry of the last century, the problem would be an economic and not a political one. But totalitarian Germany has added new twists that enable the Nazis to out-trade even the trading Yankee; and Germany accompanies her trade with cultural and political infiltration. The result is cause for worry on two scores.

The secret of German trade success is simple and forthright despite the attempts of some commentators to make it seem complex and Machiavellian. Purpose of Nazi trade has been products, not profits; unencumbered by a profit and loss statement, Germany has been able to offer attractive terms of trade to Pan American states; possessing bulging surpluses, warehoused by world-wide trade restrictions, these states have carried on a thriving business with Germany. Having no place else to dispose of their goods, the South American states have traded on

¹Ibid.

German terms. These terms, usually, have been the well known barter deals under which the Pan American nations have accepted payment for their goods in ASKI marks which can be used only for the purchase of German goods. Under this system, which is backed in Germany by large, secret, and arbitrary export subsidies, the Nazis made amazing economic gains in the Southern Americas before the war. In 1936, Germany's best year, the Nazis pushed the United States out of first place as an exporter to Brazil and Chile and supplanted Great Britain in second place (after the United States) in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.¹

A good deal of the talk concerning German economic advances in Central and South America that dwells on the danger to the United States is, from the evidence that can be gathered, somewhat fallacious. While there is no doubt that Germany has made tremendous strides forward, most of her gains in later years have been at the expense of the third economic rival, Great Britain.

Thus, in 1929, the United States, Great Britain, and Germany, together with Japan, exported approximately \$1,612,000,000 worth of goods to Latin America, an amount equal to 59.5 per cent of total Latin American imports during that year. Of this total,

¹Fortune, XXII, No. 3 (September, 1940), 137.

the share of the United States was the lion's, 60.3 per cent, followed by Great Britain with 24.0 per cent, Germany with 14.8 per cent, and Japan a very poor fourth with 0.9 per cent. After 1929, the share of the United States shrank steadily until the low point of 48.0 per cent was reached in 1933, while Britain, Germany, and Japan increased their proportions to 32.2, 17.5, and 2.3 per cent, respectively.

The years from 1933 to 1936 witnessed a new increase in Latin American purchasing power and the greatest expansion in Germany's slice of the melon; during this period, too, the four competing nations increased their share of the total import trade of Latin America from 51.1 per cent to an estimated 59.3 per cent. In this period of greatest German activity, the competitive position of the United States showed a slight improvement, her percentage of the total exports within the group rising from 48 per cent to 49.6 per cent. The significant fact is that during this time Great Britain's share dropped from 32.3 per cent to 23.1 per cent of the total, while Germany's portion jumped from 14.8 per cent in 1929 and 17.4 per cent in 1933 to 23.6 per cent in 1936. (Japan's increase in the three-year period was from 2.3 per cent to 3.7 per cent.) Thus in the total Latin American trade, Britain, which before 1914 had held first place, was relegated to third place in 1936; Germany advanced at Britain's expense almost exclusively from 1933 to

1936, though, partly due to Germany's activities, the United States had not reached her preeminence of 1929.¹

In reality -- and this is a much overlooked fact -- the problem of hemispheric economic solidarity is not a Pan American problem, but a South American one. Dependence on the United States as a market for Latin American exports decreases markedly from north to south; the troubles lie in the south.²

The Caribbean countries as a whole sell such a large proportion of their exports to the United States, over 45 per cent during 1938, for example, that this group falls naturally within the economic orbit of the United States. Seven of these countries, 1938, sold 60 per cent or more of their exports to the United States: Panama sold 89.2 per cent; Honduras, 86.5 per cent; Cuba, 76 per cent; Guatemala, 69.4 per cent; Mexico, 67.4 per cent; Nicaragua, 67.3 per cent; and El Salvador, 61.8 per cent. In addition, Panama is almost completely dependent upon this country as a result of the influence of the Canal, while expenditures of American tourists are of large importance to Cuba, Guatemala, and Mexico. In these countries, the problem of economic solidarity is no problem at all.

¹Howard J. Trueblood, "Trade Rivalries in Latin America," Foreign Policy Reports, XIII, No. 13 (September 15, 1937), 156.

²Cf. Latin American Foreign Trade, A General Survey -- 1938 ("Foreign Trade Series"; Washington: The Pan American Union, 1940), No. 178.

Of the remaining Caribbean countries, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Costa Rica, and Colombia are only slightly less dependent upon the United States, since they sold approximately 44 per cent of their total exports to this country. In the entire Caribbean area, only one country, Venezuela, does not find her chief export market in the United States, only 13.2 per cent of her exports coming to this country in 1938. But Venezuela is strongly tied to the United States by a large indirect trade through the West Indies and by North American control of its oil fields, which are its main economic asset.

South American states present the headache. This bloc of eight states accounted for 58 per cent of all Latin American exports in 1938. Brazil, of this group, is closest economically to the United States, the latter country absorbing slightly more than 33 per cent of the former's exports; Uruguay is economically most distant, the United States taking only 4 per cent of that country's exports. In between these extremes, the West Coast States -- Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru -- sold to the United States about 20 per cent of their total exports, while, on the East Coast, Paraguay and Argentina sent 12.2 per cent and 8.5 per cent, respectively, of their products northward.

Complicating factors in the situation are: (1) two of the three largest exporting countries -- Argentina and Chile --

lie within the economically distant group; and (2) to a very marked extent the South American surplus commodity problem concerns these countries and Brazil, which does not actually lie within the economic orbit of the United States. In 1938, the total exports of these three states was valued at \$908,400,000, of which only \$175,300,000 went to the United States, a balance of \$751,100,000 sold elsewhere. While the last sum includes shipments to other Western Hemisphere markets, a large surplus of grains, meat, cotton, copper, and nitrates -- the outstanding products in a long list of surpluses -- remained for disposal outside the hemisphere.¹ The essential problem for economic solidarity of the hemisphere lies in the disposition of the 75 per cent of Argentina's exports, the more than 50 per cent of Chile's exports, and the 50 per cent of Brazil's exports that normally go to Europe and to Asia.²

War in Europe provided both an opportunity and a problem to the United States in her program of cementing economic solidarity. Opportunity arose as the result of sources of supply being closed to the southern countries; the problem was the disposal of South American products that normally would have gone to Europe. During the first six months of the war, the United

¹Trueblood, "Economic Defense of the Americas," Foreign Policy Reports, XVI, No. 10 (August 1, 1940), 129.

²Cf. Hispanic-American Historical Review (November, 1940), p. 664.

States' imports from Latin America were valued at \$285,280,000, as compared with \$215,273,000 in the same period of 1938-39. This increase of 32.5 per cent in six months meant an annual dollar rise of about \$140,000,000. Sugar, wool, hides, skins, and copper contributed largely to the general expansion, and some minor products recorded large gains as well. There was, however, only a slight increase in the value of imports of some of the leading products of South America, such as coffee, cacao, bananas, meats, and petroleum.

During the same six months period, exports from the United States to Latin America rose to \$359,664,000, as contrasted to \$234,201,000 in the last comparable period. This represents a gain of 53.6 per cent or, annually, an increase of about \$250,000,000 in what Latin America pays the United States for goods.¹

Thus the record of inter-American trade for the first six months of the war, albeit profitable, should be the cause of much legitimate concern. For North American traders were taking their profit, and at a pace that soon would exhaust the ability of the Latin American states to pay for United States goods. These first six months showed that the United States could readily supply Latin America's demand for products,

¹ Trueblood, "Economic Defense of the Americas," Foreign Policy Reports, XVI, No. 10 (August 1, 1940), 133.

usually obtained but not then available, from abroad. But the period also showed that the United States did not take the place of Latin America's lost customers.

The development of hemispheric economic solidarity is twofold. On the one side, the problem for the United States is to fill the largest possible amount of import requirements from Latin America; on the other side, the problem for Latin America is to find a market for surpluses which are not normally sold in this hemisphere, without entering into political dependence upon Europe. For the war period at least, Latin America is forced to trade with the United States on whatever terms she can get, but no ephemeral Pan American ideal will keep the states in the economic and strategic orbit of the United States after the war; they will stay only if it is to their own economic advantage. The Pan American states have little enthusiasm for making financial sacrifices for the Pan American unity which many think, with some justice, accrues benefit only to the northern republic; the southern countries look to the United States to make sacrifices herself.

In the past seven years, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act has been the cornerstone of economic cooperation between the United States and other American nations. Reciprocal agreements are now in force with eleven of the twenty-one republics, although, significantly, the great majority of these countries

are in the Caribbean area where dominion of the United States is assured in any case. Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile have not signed trade agreement pacts. There is little evidence to show that these agreements work to the advantage of the other countries. Exports of the United States to countries in Latin America with which reciprocal agreements are in force have expanded more rapidly than exports to the rest of the world; but imports from these countries have mounted much more slowly than the exports.¹

At the Panama Conference in 1939, under the pressure of war, the American states, for the first time, did something concrete by multi-lateral agreement about their common economic problems; they created the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee. At Havana, this Committee was given further powers of an advisory nature; simultaneously, the United States took an impressive step, President Roosevelt asking Congress for \$500,000,000 to enable the Export-Import Bank to underwrite surplus commodities and to strengthen internal economies of Latin American countries. This step, which was subsequently approved by the Congress, had nothing to do with the grandiose cartel plan announced earlier. It did give the Latin American countries some assurance of financial support; but it was a

¹Howard J. Trueblood, "Progress of Pan American Cooperation," Foreign Policy Reports, XV, No. 23 (February 15, 1940), 297.

short-term, emergency measure. Essentially, these loans are handouts, buying good will that will evaporate the moment the dole is stopped.

As yet, the United States has not settled down to the really difficult task of working out a long range program for the rehabilitation of the economic structures of the Latin American nations -- through, in great measure, increasing the normal circulation of goods within the hemisphere; through increasing the purchasing power of the Latin American nations by improving the living standard within them; through developing the Latin American industries; through revising their antiquated financial¹ structure.

There is only one feasible solution to the question of what to do about South America; that is, in the first place, to admit the lack of economic interdependence and the inefficacy of either words or good intentions to do anything about them; and, secondly, to proceed with the difficult task of making the ultimate self-interest of all the American states coincide with that of the United States. Such a task is well nigh an impossible one; even a hemisphere cannot be isolated from the rest of the world. The only hope is in pursuing a starkly realistic course.

¹Cf. Fortune, XXII, No. 3 (September, 1940), 111.

The first step should be recognition that the realistic course is not, in this case, the profitable one. Even at the risk of eliminating some marginal producers in the United States and at the cost of angering some sectional interests, an immediate downward hauling of United States tariffs would be a laudable first step. The use of quotas and preferential tariffs, like those now given Cuban sugar, would do much to relieve the pressure of South and Central American surpluses. The United States market for agricultural and pastoral products has not been exhausted by any means; the products have simply not been made available. They could be admitted without any great injury to domestic producers.

The most important of these products from the viewpoint of continental relations is Argentine beef. If the United States would take from Argentina only two per cent of our total meat consumption, it would provide a market for one-third of that country's meat exports and do much good in easing her difficulties. What especially hurts in this case is what President Roosevelt, himself, has called an "obvious inequity" -- the quarantining of Argentine beef under the Smoot-Hawley tariff clause which bars all meat from countries infected with contagious cattle diseases. Although large areas of Argentina are infected with the foot-and-mouth disease, Patagonia is not, and Argentina

has rightly and mightily resented a quarantine based on indefensible biological grounds. The Argentine rancher on the rolling pampas thinks he has good cause to continue to sneer at such sentimental abstraction as "hemisphere solidarity" in the face of the fact that the Senate has refused to ratify the Sanitary Convention, which would have rectified the error of the quarantine and allowed healthy Argentine¹ beef into the country.

In the long run, the surest defense of the hemisphere lies in expanding the inter- and intra-American trade -- in speeding up the north and south circulation of goods. To do this, it is necessary, above all things, to raise the extremely low South American standard of living. The per capita national income of Chile, for example, is \$77.00 as compared with \$537 in the United States -- and Chile is by no means the poorest of the American states. The job would require a gigantic capital inflow from the United States. In the face of defaulted debts and foreign expropriations, prospects of private capital undertaking the job are not very good. Nevertheless, the task is not insurmountable; for the consummation of the solidarity ideal, it must be accomplished. Money invested in Latin America for developing a more diversified agriculture, thereby widening the economic base; for building new manufacturing

¹Ibid., p. 113.

centers, thereby reducing dependence upon imports, for improving the deplorable transportation system, thereby increasing the circulation of goods -- would lift the purchasing power of Latin America beyond its present level and give it a tendency¹ to sustain a stability of its own.

Only two agencies are now functioning to stimulate enterprises of this sort -- the Inter-American Bank, which grew out of the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee, and the Export-Import Bank of the United States. The former, however, is more or less defunct due to the fact that the American republics, with customary disregard of pledges, have not put up the capital they were supposed to; the American Bank remains the only institution geared to fill the gap. The bank has made loans to Brazil and Argentina, notably for internal improvements, on the principle of "helping the countries to help themselves." Yet much remains to be done in the field. Outstanding commercial possibility of them all is the iron ore deposits in Brazil. Rubber, which is indigenous to the tropics of South America, but which is now cultivated there in relatively small quantities, presents another tantalizing problem.²

In the face of the enormity of the economic task that clearly faces the United States, measures that have been taken

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 115

seem dwarfed and insignificant. Indeed, neither the Reciprocal Trade Acts nor the Export-Import Bank move even appreciably in the direction of permanent solution. Loans, in great part, are stop-gap measures; trade agreements tend to the advantage of the United States and do not appreciably increase the needed economic stability of the contracting countries. On the contrary, both these measures make the United States vulnerable to the charge that she is attempting to keep the Pan American states in a stage of economic dependence.¹ Such criticism, however, implies a deliberate sabotage of inter-American economic relations, which does not seem to exist; rather, the evidence indicates a lack of willingness to recognize and to overcome the obstacles that stand in the path of true economic solidarity.

Continued paternalism is not the answer. Neither does the answer lie in fluent fancies dwelling upon the merits of free trade, which exists no place in the world and almost least of all where the United States is concerned. Nor does it lie in stentorian derogation of Nazi trade policies. The only difference between the barter system of Germany and the tariff and loan policy of the United States is that the former is a far more efficient type of subsidy. Only an immediate definition of objectives and a sober appraisal of the means for attaining

¹Cf. Beals, op. cit., p. 266.

desired ends will solve the problem. What is appalling now is the lack of coordinated effort, the dependence on verbal solutions and temporary measures, the insistence on profits when strategic considerations should be paramount.

The problem of the debts of the Pan American states must be solved before any real economic solidarity can be achieved. "A factor ten times as important as any reciprocal trade agreement,"¹ the debts have not been considered at any of the meetings of the American states. At Montevideo, Puig Casauranc of Mexico pointed out the fundamental importance of the debts time and time again. Before the Committee of Initiatives, December 4, 1933, Puig asked: "Could it be regarded inopportune, barren or foolish that at a meeting where twenty debtor countries are represented this theme of so great importance should be looked into?" The Mexican delegate said that when bankers place loans

No care is given then to the need soon to rise forcing all kinds of restrictions on international commerce in order that the debt obligations be fulfilled, and no importance is attached to the condition devolving upon our peoples who are forced to live a miserable life, bearing with a tremendous depression the outflow of our insignificant metallic reserves in the service of these debts. And when we fail to observe our debt obligations religiously, the reasons that we have for so acting are not looked into. We are merely blamed for not living up to our sacred commitments!²

¹Ibid., p. 268.

²Quoted in ibid., p. 269.

The Mexican delegate was making no attack on the United States for, he said, those who had wrought so much evil in America had also been "victims of their own absurd monetary and credit system." Despite this reasonable stand, his proposal to consider the matter was entirely smothered; nor was it again broached at the subsequent Lima meeting.

Ignoring such fundamental considerations, the United States has shown bad planning in its attempts at constructive measures. The best example of this lack of foresight was the announcement of the cartel plan in June, 1940, the complete dropping of the plan in August of the same year. The plan was not dropped because of the criticisms of the Pan American states, who feared the control that would be exercised over their internal economies; the cartel was dropped because financing such a plan might mean a loss of from \$150,000,000 to \$300,000,000 annually to the United States. That the potent objections on either side were not anticipated is a sad commentary on the leadership of the Pan American policy of the United States. The fact that possible loss to the United States was the paramount consideration in dropping the plan again demonstrates that economic considerations still control the political ends this country is trying to achieve in the Americas.

During the imperialistic stage of this country's Pan American policy, the use of political means was most frequently directed at economic ends. By a strange quirk of history, the situation is now exactly reversed; the economic policy of the United States in Central and South America is primarily directed by political strategy and toward political ends. In the former days, the United States had not learned that it could not kill the goose and continue to collect golden eggs; today, the United States has not realized that good politics may mean bad business, that, in a word, political solidarity may have to be gained at the expense of business profits. At the beginning of the Roosevelt administration, the Good Neighbor policy was synonymous with good (meaning profitable) business; in the foreseeable future, this symbiosis might reestablish itself. It is in the current intermediary stage of political emergency that the two factors become divergent.

The attainment of political unity in the Americas is all-important; it is important during the war and will be important after the war, no matter who the victor. Achievement of this political end is worth almost any economic loss. The fallacy of the current policy of the United States lies in the fact that it is risking the same loss, through more loans to the southern nations, without attaining the permanent ends that the more fundamental economic measures could accomplish.

CHAPTER VII

FACTORS FOR AND AGAINST SOLIDARITY

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From the viewpoint of their own defense, the nations of Central and South America, individually, do not constitute either positive or potent forces; acting together, these nations have some power and a certain significance; in collaboration with the United States, they would command an invincible power. It is this truism that makes the success of the Pan American movement a challenge to the Americas. What forms have been created and what forces are effective to implement the Pan American ideal? What factors are in play to discredit, or even to destroy, this ideal?

Examination of documents adopted by the Conferences of American states reveals certain doctrines, so frequently reaffirmed that they must be recognized as fundamental to the American system. In truth, these doctrines are essential to any international cooperation dependent upon mutual good will and respect, and voluntary participation. Thus:

1. The American states have repeatedly insisted that international relations must be conducted in accordance with the rules of international law. They have recognized the necessity of fostering the development of that law, and they have embodied not a few of its recognized doctrines in treaties and conventions.

They have given much attention to evolving suitable methods for codification and have created various agencies for that purpose.

2. The American states have constantly stood, in theory, for the settlement of international disputes by the pacific methods available in the law they have created. They have adopted numerous conventions and other instruments to foster the peaceful solution of their controversies and have made available such measures as diplomatic negotiations, good offices, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, consultation, investigation by commissions, and judicial settlement. In the Treaty on the Prevention of Controversies, signed in 1936, they have set up a procedure for the prevention of international disputes through the elimination of the causes of future controversies.

3. The American states have repeatedly repudiated the so-called rights of aggression and conquest. They have declared aggression an "international crime," have renounced the use of force as an instrument of policy, and have stated that they will not recognize the legal validity of acquisitions of territory through conquest or other non-pacific means.

4. The American states have upheld the doctrine of non-intervention, declaring that no nation possesses the right to intervene in either the internal or external affairs of another states and have buttressed this declaration by further asserting that intervention, whether direct or indirect, is inadmissible on any grounds whatsoever.

5. The doctrine of the juridical equality of states has, in later years, been repeatedly asserted. In the American system, all states, large or small, possess the same rights and an equal legal capacity, irrespective of power and wealth.

6. The American states stand for the basic doctrine of the sanctity of international treaties and have insisted, at their meetings, that international engagements must be respected, and revised only by the agreement of the contracting parties.¹

In addition to these purely legal measures, the American states have taken further steps that, in the summing up, must be counted as factors making for unity.

7. On numerous occasions they have asserted their solidarity in adherence to republican governments and democratic freedoms.

8. The American states have enunciated a policy of mutual concern, affirming that a danger to one is a danger to all; that a threat to the security of one is a threat to the security of all.

9. In a time of international crisis, the American states have demonstrated the effectiveness of their consultative process by meeting promptly and acting in unanimity.

10. In an emergency that threatens their economic well-being, they have made serious attempts to solve their problems

¹First six points adapted from prefatory note of George A. Finch in The International Conferences of American States, pp. ix-xii.

by mutual action -- by the promotion of a freer exchange of goods through adherence to a liberal trade policy, and through other means of collective planning and collective action.

11. As a further emergency measure the states of the Americas have taken, after consultation, a common policy in regard to their neutrality and have adopted a common course of action in the face of a common danger; namely, the contingency of an attempted transfer of American territory held by a non-American state.

12. Furthermore, the American nations have concerned themselves in innumerable ways with the promotion of social well-being and cultural understanding.

13. Finally, there are potent ideological factors conducive to strong Pan Americanism. As inhabitants of a common continent, which is somewhat detached geographically from the rest of the world, there is a naturally strong feeling that common isolation calls for mutual cooperation, that in order to protect themselves against aggression, the nations of America must be united by strong ties, and that, having once won their political liberty, they must adopt effective methods to preserve it.

If action were suited to the word, there would be no problem of Pan American solidarity. If assumptions on which

the words are predicated were true, there would be no hesitation in pronouncing inter-American solidarity a fact rather than suspecting it a fancy. It is necessary to delve beneath the camouflage of words and to expose the fallacy of glib assumption.

1. The greatest contrast exists between what the delegates of the Pan American nations promise to do at their Conferences, and what is actually done by the governments of those nations in the interims. Consider only the most important of the treaties and conventions signed at the Conferences, those designed to maintain peace and to avert hostilities. (See chart, on page 102.)

The very first of these conventions was signed at the Fourth Congress in 1910 and concerned the settlement of pecuniary claims; as of January 1, 1941, only eleven of the American states had ratified this convention. The important Protocol of Progressive Arbitration (Washington, 1929) has been ratified by only nine states; the anti-war pact of Saavedra Lamas (Rio de Janeiro, 1933) has been ratified by nineteen states but is rather hopelessly encumbered by reservations of eight countries; the Additional Protocol to the Conciliation Convention of 1929 (Montevideo, 1933) has been ratified by only nine states; the Convention on the Prevention of Controversies (Buenos Aires, 1936) has been ratified by fourteen states. The record of ratification

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STATUS OF SOME IMPORTANT PAN AMERICAN TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Colombia	Costa Rica	Cuba	Chile	Ecuador	El Salvador	United States	Guatemala	Haiti	Honduras	Mexico	Nicaragua	Panama	Paraguay	Peru	Dom. Republic	Uruguay	Venezuela
<u>4th Conference</u> <u>Buenos Aires</u> 1910																					
Pecun. Claims	S	A	R d	S	R d	S	S	R d	S	R d	R d	S	R d	S	R d	R d	R d	S	R d	R d	S
<u>5th Conference</u> <u>Santiago, 1923</u>																					
Preven. Confl. (Gondra Tr.)	S	A	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	A R d	R d	R d	R d	A R d	R d	R d r	R d
<u>6th Conference</u> <u>Havana, 1928</u>																					
Rights & Duties of Sts. in evt. Civil Strife	S	S	R d	R d	R d	R d	S	R d	R d	R d	S	R d	S	R d	R d	R d	S	S	R d	R d	S
Est. Pan Amer. Union	S	S	R d	S	R d	R d	R d	R d	S	R d	R d	R d	S	R d	R d	R d	S	S	R d	R d	R d
<u>7th Conference</u> <u>Montevideo, '33</u>																					
Add'l. Prot. to Concil. Conven. (1929)	N S	N S	N S	N S	N S	N S	R d	R	N S	R d	A R d	R	R d	R d	R	A	A R d	N S	R d	S	A R d r
Rights & Duties of Sts. (Anti- War Tr.-Non- Aggression)	S	N S	R d r	R d	A R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d r	R d	S	R d	R d	R d	R d	S	S r	R d	S	R d
<u>Conf. Mainten.</u> <u>of Peace</u> <u>Buenos Aires, '36</u>																					
Mainten. Preser. Reest. of Peace	S	S	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d r	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	S	R d	S	R d
Prot. Rel. to Non-Interven.	S	S	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	S	S	R d	S	R d
Prevention of Controversies	S	S	S	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	S	S r	R d	S	S
Good Offices & Mediation	S	S	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	S	S	R d	S	S
Fulfill. Exist. Treaties	S r	S	R d	R d r	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d r	R d r	R d	R d	R d r	R d	R d	R d	S r	S	R d	S	S
<u>Con. Signed at</u> <u>Other Pan Amer.</u> <u>Conferences</u>																					
Inter-Amer. Conc. (Wash. 1929)	NS	S	R d	R d	S	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d
Inter-Amer. Arb. (Wash. 1929)	NS	S	R d	R d	S	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	S	S	R d	R d	R d r
Prog. Arb.-Prot. (Wash. 1929)	NS	S	S	S	S	R	R d	S	R d	S	R d	R d	R d	R d	R d	S	S	S	R d	R d	R d
Anti-War Pact (Rio de Janeiro 1933)	R	A	R d	AR dr	A	A	R d	AR dr	AR dr	AR dr	A	R d	AR dr	R d	A	A	R d	AR dr	A	R d	AR dr
Con. on Eur. Col. & Possess. (Havana, 1940)	S r	S	R d	S r	R d	S	S r	S	S	R d	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	R d	S	S r

SYMBOLS: A--Adherence subject to ratification. S--Signatory. R--Ratified.
D--Denounced. NS--Non-signatory. d--ratification deposited. r--reservations.

¹Adapted from chart in Bulletin of the Pan American Union, LXXXV, No. 2,
February, 1941.

for the other treaties is somewhat better, the Gondra Treaty (Santiago, 1923) having nineteen signatories. The Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression (Montevideo, 1933); the Convention on Good Offices and Mediation (Buenos Aires, 1936); the Treaty on Inter-American Arbitration (Washington, 1929); the Treaty on Inter-American Conciliation (Washington, 1929); and the Treaty for the Maintenance, Preservation and Reestablishment of Peace (Buenos Aires, 1936), all have fifteen or more ratifications.¹

2. The situation is complicated by the fact that the peace machinery of the important treaties is confused and overlapping and by the further fact that all efforts at simplification and integration have been entirely unsuccessful. As things stand now, should conflict arise, there is a good chance that the disputing parties may not be signatories to the same treaties or conventions, and in the resulting confusion over which peace machinery is to be used, none will operate effectively.

¹Francis Wilcox in his study, The Ratification of International Conventions (London: Unwin Brothers, 1935), suggests that "largely because the Pan American Union has not been vigorous or consistent in its action to secure ratifications from member states, its conventions have not been widely accepted." p. 219. Though this factor undoubtedly plays its part, one is inclined to believe that truer causes for non-ratification are more fundamental: that (1) the American states do not consider the conventions important enough to merit putting them through ratification procedures, and/or (2) the states do not find the conventions consistent with national policies.

3. The same confusing situation exists for the problem of the codification of international law, with no less than five permanent committees at work in addition to a committee within¹ each of the twenty-one nations.

4. Though in recent years the preoccupation with internal matters by the Pan American states has made for a lack of important political controversies among them, the Chaco dispute between Paraguay and Bolivia is an example par excellence of the disinclination of these southern states to settle their important international disputes by means of the pacific methods available in laws they have created. No two nations had greater opportunities to avail themselves of peaceful means, yet the decision was made on the battlefield and to the victor in arms went the spoils. And with Latin America arming at a pace unequalled ever before in its history, there is much cause for believing that new inter-American conflicts will arise in the future. Brazil and Argentina are the natural rivals on the South American continent and, according to at least one able commentator, are spoiling for the opportunity to get at each other's throats. " Great Argentina, with its satellite buffer states, plus Peru, on the one hand, and Brazil, with its tie-up with Colombia,

¹The progress of the law codification, though slow, is steady. As a whole, this work is one of the few unmitigated assets of Pan American relations.

Ecuador and Chile, on the other, are two powerful divisions that endanger the peace of the continent and the world." ¹ Ironically, if the war does come, it will be fought with arms now being supplied by the United States.

5. Despite the fact that there is cause for believing the sincerity of President Roosevelt in his non-intervention stand for the United States, the policy has been checkered, to say the least, even since the beginning of Roosevelt's administration. ² The prime example is Cuba, in 1933, when this country, in order to avoid one revolution, aided in overthrowing Machado and in setting up the De Caspedes puppet government which, despite Mr. Sumner Welles' attempt at constitution writing, was overthrown in less than two weeks. The new government was frankly leftist in nature, and recognition was withheld while thirty American naval vessels were rushed to the scene and every pressure was exerted to destroy the government of Grau San Martin. The United States embassy, with Mr. Welles on the scene for a while, became a center of conspiracy; General Batista, with the support of the United States, was able to overthrow the Grau San Martin government, which was slowly but surely gaining popular strength. Batista was immediately recognized by the United States. "The only conclusion must be that, despite the

¹Beals, op. cit., p. 347. Announcement of fighting between Peru and Ecuador was announced in the newspapers of July 7.

²Cf. supra, p. 23. Argentina's own peculiar conception of non-intervention in the Chaco has also been noted; infra, p. 21.

repeal of the Platt amendment, and the enunciation of the new Roosevelt policy, the old yardstick of stability by force and intervention was utilized."¹

Although strict adherence to the non-intervention policy in the case of the recent Mexican oil expropriation is more laudable than this country's action in the Cuban incident, reprisals of the United States, in the form of the cessation of silver purchases, has worked great hardships on our closest southern neighbor.²

6. Petruchio would have had less trouble in proving to the entire world that the moon was made of green cheese than the Pan American states will have in demonstrating their cultural unity. The truth of the matter is that no such unity exists; the very fact that the delegates to the Conferences must have speeches transcribed into four languages before they know whether to applaud or to disapprove is one proof of this. Aside from the major difficulty of language differences, the peoples of the two Americas are confronted with dissimilarities of disposition, ways of doing business, historic and cultural traditions, race problems, cultural heritages, religion, and living standards. The surprising fact is that the Central and South American nations differ almost as much among themselves in

¹Beals, op. cit., p. 236. Trenchant criticism of the policy of the United States in this matter is quoted by Beals from several Latin American newspapers.

²"Mexico in Revolution," Fortune, XVIII, No. 4 (October, 1938), p. 114.

these respects as they all differ from the United States. Nor can the several hundred resolutions that have been passed at the various meetings of the countries do a great deal to mitigate the situation.

7. As inhabitants of the same detached continent, the people of the Americas would seem to have a natural incentive for mutual interests and mutual cooperation. But a stronger, more intense feeling of mutuality pulling in the opposite direction is the sentiment of the groups which were at one time politically united and where to some extent this feeling for unity still flourishes. Thus there are groups in the countries of the River Plata region, the states of Central America, the constituents of old Great Colombia, and the members of the Peru-Bolivia Federation that aspire to their former unity and consequently exercise disintegrating functions in the larger¹ solidarity movement.

8. The problem of the competing economies of the American states is an ever-present and an all-important one; to date, no appreciable steps have been taken in the direction of any permanent solution.

9. The biggest paradox of all in the problem of inter-American unity is the discrepancy between the ideal of democracy

¹Alfaro, op. cit., p. 73.

and the fact of dictatorship. President Roosevelt's advocacy of democratic and constitutional government in the Western Hemisphere, if accepted at its face value and not as so much diplomatic palaver, would be dangerous doctrine seriously threatening the peace of Latin America. His words are a call for mass revolution in most of the twenty states south of the Rio Grande. Though the picture changes with the utmost rapidity (mostly for the worse) and exact information is difficult to obtain, the more one studies, the more one comes to the conclusion that the so-called democracies of the south are, in fact, decidedly undemocratic.¹

The southern republics have their own peculiar kind of dictatorship; but this does not signify that they are not corrupt, overbearing, and despotic. Brazil is a good example. Getulio Vargas, from all accounts, is a good-humored buffoon of sorts, not censoring, and even enjoying the many uncomplimentary jokes about himself. Most of these jests have to do with Getulio's stranglehold on the presidency (nearly eleven years in office to date). Typical is the one about a newly-minted small coin bearing Getulio's profile. The joke: "They'll have to invent a new and more powerful purgative, now." "Why?" "Because when baby swallows that -- well, you know how hard it

¹Mr. Beals affirms, furthermore, that the southern countries are led by "one of the world's prize collections of diplomatic cutthroats."

is to get Getulio out!"¹

This certainly would never be allowed in Germany; but this does not detract from the fact that the Brazilian constitution allows the president supreme power of the state. He has the right to initiate laws and the authority to suspend the national congress and to dictate legislation by decree; he can intervene in state governments, suspending legislatures and ruling through hand-picked federal commissioners; and he can hold office indefinitely.² He makes use of all these powers as well as the usual coercive measures to suppress political opposition. This is Roosevelt's "my friend, President Vargas."

At least as bad as the Brazilian dictatorship are, by the latest count, those of Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Santo Domingo, Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Argentina. In the mild dictatorship group fall Venezuela and Chile while Costa Rica, Colombia, Uruguay, and Mexico seem to be the only Pan American strongholds of even faint democracy.³ Hostilities abroad have halted the threat of German penetration which had gained steadily from 1934 until 1939, but the large group of dictatorships remains to water the strength of Western Hemisphere democracy.

¹Fortune, XIX, No. 1 (January, 1939), 32.

²Stephen Nast, "Fascism and Communism in South America," Foreign Policy Reports, XIII, No. 19 (December 15, 1937), 228-9.

³From a confidential report by John Gunther at a meeting of the Foreign Policy Association. Undated, mimeographed.

10. As a result of this penchant for despotism, which, by the way, is partly the result of inefficient and weak democratic forms, the Latin American states are a most fertile and receptive field for the Fascist economic, cultural, and political infiltration. The range of activities of foreign propaganda agencies is a truly amazing story; that such activities have not been thoroughly scotched is an insight into the governments, ¹ themselves.

11. Lack of sincerity on the part of the Latin American nations in supporting real continental solidarity is indicated by the fact that only fourteen countries have bothered to ratify the convention setting up the secretariat for inter-American relations, the Pan American Union. The treaty establishing the Union to promote cooperation on "moral" rather than political grounds was signed in 1928; after thirteen years, the Union still operates by resolution and not by law.

12. That the Pan American Union works under the legal fiction of fostering "moral" as opposed to "political" cooperation is another indication of the organizational defect in inter-American relations.

Casting the light of the first group of factors against the shadow of the second reveals no encouraging pattern. It is

¹David Efron, "Latin America and the Fascist Holy Alliance," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCIV (July, 1939), 17-25.

obvious that during the quest for inter-American solidarity some obstacles have been overcome; but many have been circumvented, many others ignored.

During the last decade, many impediments to harmonious relations have been removed. Intervention has been abandoned, at least as an avowed policy, by the United States, and this country's military might has been withdrawn from all Latin American countries. The United States has reversed its former policy with regard to recognition and has led the movement in the establishment of peace machinery for the hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine has been continentalized; "dollar diplomacy" and "paternalism" have given away to the "Good Neighbor." In sum, much has been done to promote mutual good will and to remove traditional causes of distrust.

Good will and mutual trust, however, are nothing but prerequisites for the attainment of a real degree of economic and political unity for the nations and peoples of the Western Hemisphere. The question is whether the springboard of accomplishments-to-date is strong enough to carry the nations of the hemisphere over the political, economic, and cultural morass that must be hurdled if Pan American solidarity is to become a permanent reality and not to remain a verbal will-o'-the-wisp.

CHAPTER VIII

IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS

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Many proposals for further strengthening inter-American solidarity have been made; most of these have been directed at creating an actual League of American States. The basic idea of real union was, in fact, germinated by the very first conference of Central American states convened by Bolivar in 1826. Woodrow Wilson was probably the modern progenitor of the idea, first disclosing it in a speech and later broaching it in a circular telegram to the Latin American nations in the winter of 1916. The war intervened, and the political union was next brought forward by Dr. Baltasar Brum, President of Uruguay, in 1920; President Brum published a draft of his plan which he hoped would be considered at the Fifth Conference of American States at Santiago in 1923. This consideration, however, did not take place.

A meeting held in Panama in 1926 to celebrate the centenary of the first Congress passed a resolution recommending the consideration of political union at the Sixth Conference; the Havana conclave, however, did not even have the topic on the agenda. Salvador was rumored to be preparing a plan for the Montevideo Conference, but again the topic was not found

on the program. Both Colombia and the Dominican Republic had drafts presented at Buenos Aires in 1936, however; these, it has been noted, were referred to the next Conference although six or seven states showed a disposition to discuss the matter favorably. Since then, consideration of the political union¹ idea has been postponed from meeting to meeting.

It is significant that most of the measures that have been considered for strengthening the solidarity of the American states place their emphasis on improving formal structure. One aspect of this is the preoccupation with peace plans; another is the emphasis placed on formal ratification of treaties. And this gives rise to a fundamental criticism of the attempt to establish inter-American solidarity.

The point is this: all the machinery for peace that can be concocted, all the ratifications of peace pacts that can be secured, all the paraphernalia of organization that can be set up will not be sufficient either to establish solidarity or to insure peace. A peace plan is only as good as the intent of its members; there can be no peace unless the will for peace is present and the national policies of states follow pacific channels. If ever an historical lesson were clear, it is the one that the disintegration of the League of Nations has taught. Causes for the breakdown of the European system of collective action are to be found neither in the disutility of League

¹A complete discussion of the idea of a League of American States is in Alfaro, op. cit., pp. 74-90.

machinery nor in the non-existence of League force; that breakdown was caused by the sabotage of the League ideal through the disinclination of its members to deal directly, simply, and forthrightly with problems of territory, armaments, economic imperialism, and nationalistic jingo.

The sad fact is that America seems to be repeating Europe's grievous error. There can be no denial of the proposition that an actual political union of American states is a desired eventuality. But no such union can hope to achieve success in establishing permanent peace until its constituent members have first achieved a mutual basis of action. The evidence indicates that this basis does not now exist in the Americas; nor will the superimposition of any new machinery on that already existing provide, ipso facto, the essential mutuality. This mutuality can only be achieved through the removal of the basic causes for dissent. Organization may aid in the removal, but, in any case, the first step is honest intent and a willingness on the part of American nations to submerge national interests to the inter-American good.

In the Americas, no less than in Europe, the problem is complicated by divergent cultures, language, and economies. In America, unlike Europe, it is fair to say that the entire success of the plan depends upon the actions of one nation, the United States. It is possible that the policy of other American

states, Argentina, for example, could make eventual inter-American solidarity a difficult accomplishment; without realistic action from the United States, however, real solidarity is entirely impossible.

Since 1932, the strengthening of Pan American solidarity has been advocated and furthered by the United States as one aspect of its foreign policy. Other countries of the hemisphere, notably those of the Caribbean region, have stood solidly behind the United States in this policy. If still others, notably the Argentine bloc, have seemed non-cooperative, and even obstructive, it is because Pan Americanism is no unmixed blessing.

One of the primary purposes of the movement is the achievement of peace on this continent; it is strikingly obvious, however, that if the Pan American nations allow themselves to be aligned in the close political cooperation that this country's State Department now advocates, they may very well find themselves embroiled in an unwanted war on another continent.

At the same time, even within the hemisphere, the South American states cannot be censured for viewing with alarm the dangerous inconsistencies of the foreign and economic policies of the United States. The lack of foresight on the part of the leaders of this country is astounding to contemplate. The strong advocacy of a cartel plan for marketing surpluses and its sudden dropping is a good example in the economic sphere;

nor have the final results of our economic planning been viewed with any universal approval. Following the Havana Conference, Dr. Leopoldo Melo, head of the Argentine delegation, was forthright in saying that the United States' proposals for the absorption of surpluses were superficial and of fleeting benefit; the Conference failed, he asserted, to bring forward any far-reaching general plan for continuous economic collaboration.¹ Though this attitude may be viewed as an expression of truculence from America's chief rival for leadership in inter-American affairs, the very fact that Argentina is in this position gives the United States greater reason to bring her into the fold.

Political see-sawing by the United States is cause for even greater justifiable alarm. Consider the fact, for example, that in 1939, at Panama, the advocacy of the United States was responsible for a General Declaration of Neutrality which provided, among other things, against "the fitting out, arming, or augmenting the forces or armament of any ship or vessel to be employed in the service of one of the belligerents." Consider the further fact that a little more than a year later, the President of the United States made use of powers given him by Congress to do precisely these things the country had pledged itself to prevent!

¹New York Times, July 31, 1940, p. 4.

If solidarity were complete, the foreign policy of the United States would be bringing the entire hemisphere instead of just this country close to outright belligerency in the European war. But the Pan American countries, like the United States, pledged themselves to neutrality; unlike the United States, many of these countries have seen no reason, consistent with their own national self-interest, to alter that pledge. This is an extraordinarily strong indication of a fundamental disunity in the policies of the states of the two Americas. This disunity was concretely demonstrated when, in April, 1941, the United States seized German, Italian, and Danish ships within her ports. The newspapers of the United States gave great space to the action of the Central American nations and of Peru in following this country's action with similar seizures. But the significant and disappointing fact was that neither Colombia nor Brazil nor Chile nor Argentina¹ backed the United States with like action.

Only one conclusion can be drawn. Towards the Americas, the United States pursues a policy of solidarity; towards Europe and its war, the United States takes definite sides and fast approaches a state of outright belligerency. The two policies are inconsistent and antagonistic, and the result is a dilemma of the most acute variety. Insofar as we pursue one policy, we inevitably weaken the other.

¹Pan-American News, Bi-weekly Information Service (Washington: Foreign Policy Association, April 10, 1941), II, No. 5, 1.

Further evidence of disunity in the Americas, caused by action of the United States in her program of defense, was revealed by the destroyer trade for naval bases with Great Britain. The southern countries viewed this action with alarm. Said a Colombia paper, spokesman of the Conservative party:

At Havana an agreement was solemnly reached to put any transferred European possession under Pan American trusteeship. We do not doubt the need of the United States for certain additional bases, but the present Roosevelt program of utilizing the dire straits of the collapsing British Empire to seize such bases without consulting the rest of the continent is neither democratic nor honest We talked at Havana of joint continental defense. Instead, Roosevelt rushed to Canada to make an alliance, with dangerous war implications, quite apart from the rest of the two continents How long is Latin America going to continue to take stock in hypocritical and false-front Pan-American conferences?"

And another Central American organ, commenting on the same matter, concluded: "Nazism is a remote and passing menace. Yankeeism is an immediate and permanent menace, now and for all time."¹ Though Secretary Hull, perhaps stung by the storm of criticism, hastened to announce that the new bases would be put at the disposition of the Latin American states, the implications of our European policy are negating the good will created by the administration before the war. This reaction of the Pan American states is altogether natural. The times very strongly hint that the United States is indulging in new imperialistic ventures and calling them, this time, "measures of defense."

¹Carleton Beals, Pan-America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1940), p. 441.

The solution does not lie in putting a stop to defensive measures for the hemisphere. Rather the southern countries must be taken into full partnership for the protection of the two continents. That there is no single agency coordinating or consolidating the military and strategic planning of the twenty-one nations demonstrates that not even the first adequate step has been taken toward this common-sense goal.

Yet even this cooperation, in the final analysis, would not materially add to the permanent achievement of Pan American solidarity. An interesting concomitant of the dilemma faced by the United States due to its conflicting foreign policies in Europe and in America is the program of combating dictatorships across the Atlantic while cooperating with them below the Rio Grande. Recent history, especially, seems clearly to point out that collaboration with personal rulers is an unhealthy marriage of convenience. Consequently, appeasement in the European phase of this country's foreign policy is viewed with scorn as an unrealistic course; yet in the Americas, United States policy is precisely one of appeasement. There is no reason to believe that the American brand of dictatorship will not run true to form, and that the American dictators will not utilize cooperation of the United States only to the extent that it furthers their own rule-by-force and their own personal ambition.

From this observation follows the first of two fundamental policies for the United States on which genuine and lasting inter-American solidarity must be based: a deeper regard must be shown for the people of Central and South America rather than for their unrepresentative, tyrannical governments. This regard might be shown, for example, by the United States demonstrating an interest in the welfare of liberal movements within the states, or by the United States engaging in a positive effort to raise the living standard of all the peoples of these regions. The problem is a ticklish one; but in the end, it will be impossible to defend Latin America against totalitarian influences unless the people of Latin America are allowed to share equally in the larger freedom that the United States seeks to preserve.

Concomitant with this stand is the second foundation stone for realistic action in the attainment of solidarity; the conception that trade is conducted solely for profit must be abandoned, and the United States must adopt a criterion of trade aimed at meeting the needs of the people of the Central and South American countries. Under the present policy, the Southern Americas have only the choice of becoming economic dependents of either Europe or the United States; there is no cause for their showing preference for the latter dependency. Measures that will round out and strengthen the internal

economies of the Pan American states, that will raise the living standard of their peoples, that will deal with the surplus commodity problem on a mutually advantageous basis, that will increase the flow of goods between the Americas -- only these measures sponsored by the United States will achieve the solidarity ideal. The results, too, might do more than anything else for the cause of political democracy. In the short view of things, such a policy will result in an economic loss to the United States; but long-term results will be a thousand times worth the investment.

Success of inter-American solidarity depends upon the extent to which the United States pursues this twofold policy. The importance of stronger, formal political ties, of continued cultural and intellectual cooperation, of peace pacts, and of juridical action cannot be doubted; these matters, however, pale to relative insignificance in a view of the total situation.

There is no cause for optimism over the eventual outcome. The current predominant interest of the leaders of the United States in the affairs of Europe has led them to relegate the affairs of America to a minor ring in the big show, and has kept them from making effective and adequate use of the opportunities created by those same European affairs. As late as May 26, 1941, President Roosevelt epitomized the verbal attitude of this country's statesmen by saying: "Now, as never

before, the unity of the American republics is of supreme importance to each and every one of us and to the cause of freedom throughout the world. Our future independence is bound up with the future independence of all of our sister republics."¹

The words are true, but words are easy; deeds are needed, but deeds are difficult.

¹The Courier-Journal, May 27, 1941, p. 8.

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