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STRUCTURE, SPENDING, AND DEMOCRACY:
A STUDY OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS

By

Neal McIntyre Turpin
B.A., Transylvania University, 2009
M.P.A., University of Louisville, 2011

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty of the
College of Arts and Sciences of the University of Louisville
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
In Urban and Public Affairs

Department of Urban and Public Affairs
University of Louisville
Louisville, KY

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A Dissertation Approved on

May 10, 2016

by the following Dissertation Committee:

Dr. Steven Koven

Dr. Janet Kelly

Dr. David Imbroscio

Dr. Jason Gainous

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ABSTRACT

STRUCTURE, SPENDING, AND DEMOCRACY: A STUDY OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS

Neal Turpin

May 10, 2016

The debate over the effect of government structure is one of the most examined aspects of administration. At the municipal level, much of this work has focused on the structural reforms of the Progressive era. Three of these reforms –city managers, at-large elections, and non-partisan elections –were meant to make cities more professional and efficient. Three more –initiatives, referenda, and recalls –were meant to make cities more democratic.

A large segment of this literature has studied what effects these structures have on local government spending, and results have been mixed. This dissertation seeks to examine what effects structural reform elements currently have on municipal spending. The main proposition is that differences in local government spending are no longer due to professional structures as they were in the past, and that future differences will have more to do with democratic elements. The results presented here support this thesis.

Using information from the Lincoln Institute and the ICMA, this dissertation updates previous research on spending data for 111 cities to see what changes may have occurred since structures were last examined. In addition, a new national level dataset was created showing how often direct democracy measures were used in each city in order to examine the effect of their use, not simply their presence.

Results from this study show that professional structures are no longer associated with lower levels of spending. The use of direct democracy measures was associated with different levels of spending. Cities with higher rates of initiative use were found to have higher per capita spending levels, and were more likely to focus spending on social services rather than police. Race was the most significant demographic factor, with spending levels going down as cities became less diverse.

As democratic structures seem to have more of an effect on spending than professional structures, the last chapter suggests new avenues for study. In particular, newer democratic structures such as participatory budgeting are spreading, creating new opportunities for involvement and research.

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CHAPTER I

STRUCTURE, SPENDING, AND, DEMOCRACY:
AN INTRODUCTION

Government structure is one of the most frequently examined aspects of politics and administration. Scholars and practitioners alike have tried to determine the effect of structuring and restructuring organizations in different ways. Is one type better? Do certain structures make an organization more efficient? More competitive? More responsive? What effect do the people who make up the organization have on how it works? If a government is inefficient, is it the environment, the people, or structures which are to blame?

Scholars have looked at nearly every level of government organization, from the federal government to the local parks department. One of the most diverse forms of government organizations, however, are cities. Cities of all sizes, populations, geographies, economies, and cultures exist in the US, and they are made up of a startling number of structural combinations.

This work will examine municipal government structures and their effect on political outcomes, specifically on spending. In addition, the structures themselves will be reviewed, exploring their various histories, strengths, and weaknesses. While there are many types of local governments (school districts, water districts, etc.), the exclusive focus of this work will be general purpose municipalities. Municipal governments will be examined using the ideas of structure, spending, and democracy.

The main proposition and central thesis of this dissertation is that differences in spending between local governments are no longer due to professional structures as they were in the past, and that future differences will have more to do with democratic elements. In past studies, the focus has largely been on economic inefficiency and in some cases social inefficiency, which is the belief that people do not (or cannot) consider the full cost of their political actions to the general public. However, future work should take into consideration democratic inefficiency, which is the idea that a government's level of citizen input and participation does not facilitate an optimal decision making process.

Municipal Reform

At the local level, the debate over municipal structure has focused primarily on the elements and results of the Progressive reform movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Growing cities had produced growing problems, and the goals that drove most reformers were to make government better, more honest, and more efficient.

In the late 1800s, immigration and industrialization had brought millions of people into American cities. This produced a climate favorable to political machines (Banfield & Wilson, 1963; Harrigan & Vogel, 2000; Hofstadter, 1955). Machines sought to gain power, control votes, and win elections. Their system of patronage, favoritism, and little accountability led to high levels of corruption in city governments across the United States.

Although many simply felt this was just politics as usual, the mix of corruption, unresponsiveness, and demographic changes due to immigration led to calls for reform among Progressives. Good Government Clubs began to spring up, primarily in the Midwest and Northeast. In January of 1894, the National Municipal League was formed, with its first meeting being held in Philadelphia. Representatives from cities across the country came and spoke, promoting municipal reform. This meeting was filled with calls for "good" government, in terms of both honesty and effectiveness. Speaking at the first meeting, Theodore Roosevelt promoted the two gospels of morality and efficiency for reformers at all levels (National Municipal League, 1894).

By 1915, the League had proposed its first Model City Charter. In it, the ideals for how a city should be run were laid out, and soon these reforms were adopted in cities across the country. Some of these reforms were designed to make city governments more professional, while others focused on making them more democratic.

The first major set of reforms dealt with administration and the election of city officials, and included at-large elections, non-partisan elections, and establishing a city manager as the chief executive of a city. These reforms were meant to focus municipal government on the whole city, with government becoming professional and business-like instead of simply a set of spoils for whatever party or ward won an election. They were particularly popular among reformers fighting against corruption. Cities that adopted one of these reforms usually adopted all three, although this was not always the case.

Because of their focus on representation, their use against corruption, and their close relation to each other, these three are typically grouped together. Although they are often called simply "reform elements" (Morgan & Pelissero, 1980), with cities adopting them being called “reform cities,” this ignores many other reforms that were adopted around the same time. For this reason, this work will refer to these structures as professional reforms.

The other major set of Progressive reforms dealt with the ability of citizens to directly influence leaders and their decisions. Corruption had not only made governments worse in terms of efficiency, but less democratic, and Progressives didn’t miss the opportunity to advocate for change. Corruption is inherently undemocratic, as it often put the will of the machine over the will of the people. Ideally in a democracy, all citizens are treated equally. When favoritism is standard operating procedure, however, this can’t happen. And while corruption has a negative effect on democracy, democracy may have an equally negative effect on corruption. Meier and Holbrook (1992), for example, find an inverse relationship between levels of voter turnout and levels of corruption, and Drury et al. (2006) found that democracy can mitigate the negative effects of corruption. The two ideas simply do not mix.

The initiative, the referendum, and the recall all gained popularity in the late 19th century, and were promoted as a way to deal with an unresponsive legislature. They mirrored professional reforms both in justification and their rate of adoption. The initiative allows citizens at the state or local level to draft a bill by petition and submit it directly to voters for approval (Elliot & Ali, 1988; Harrigan & Vogel, 2000; Zimmerman, 1999). The referendum allows laws or ordinances considered by legislators to be approved or overturned, serving essentially as a citizen veto. Finally, the recall allows voters to remove from office officials whose job performance is unsatisfactory. While traditional elections may serve this last purpose for the most part, recalls allowed officials to be removed mid-term. These reforms can affect policy directly, using it to implement policy, or indirectly, forcing legislators to be more responsive (Matsusaka, 2004).

At the local level, San Francisco became the first city to adopt these elements in 1898 in a voter approved city charter (Zimmerman, 1999). The ideas quickly spread around the country, and by 1915, they were part of the National Municipal League's Model City Charter. These structures are generally called direct democracy elements, as they allow citizens to bypass legislatures and directly affect policy choices. This term is apt, and this work will refer to these structures as direct democracy reforms.

But what have been the results of these structural changes? Following a thorough history of the structures and the movements that created them, this dissertation will examine what effect they have had on the cities which use them, specifically in terms of spending. This study will have two primary research questions. First, it will address the question of whether or not the choice of professional government structure is related to spending levels. The second research question that will be addressed is whether or not the use of direct democracy mechanisms is related to spending levels.

A Structural Fix

While many Progressives and reformers tried to educate citizens and government officials about how to improve municipal operations, they did so along with a strong push for structural changes (National Municipal League, 1894). These changes were meant to ensure professionalism among administrators and prevent the kinds of corruption and inefficiency that had plagued cities in the past from reoccurring.

This is not surprising, as political reformers generally propose structural remedies for inefficiencies in governing capabilities (March & Olsen, 1983). These structural changes occur constantly, and even when issues arise, a new change is put forth as the solution. Changes in institutional arrangements can make a difference, but not always, as administrative problems will exist regardless of an organization's structure. Still, for most reformers, there is a belief that "the institutional grass is greener somewhere else" (Weaver & Rockman, 1993, p. 3).

While a simple structural change may not solve an organization's every problem, this does not mean that structural elements have no effect. Institutions matter, and different institutions produce different results (Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004; Park, McCabe, & Feiock, 2010). These differences in behavior and policy outcomes are due to structure, regardless of socio-economic and environmental factors (Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Pelissero & Krebs, 1997). "Political institutions define the framework within which politics takes place" (March & Olsen, 1983, p. 18), and "constitute the 'rules of the game' for any political society" (Clingermayer & Feiock, 2001, p. vii). Booms (1966) further argues that most people would have a similar demand for services, so any difference would have to come from the supply side (government) rather than the demand side (citizens).

For most authors, these rules and frameworks matter. Institutions are not simply a cosmetic feature, but affect the behavior and decision-making of policy makers (Clingermayer & Feiock, 2001). Different governments "filter" political inputs and outputs (Lineberry & Fowler, 1967), affecting what issues, groups, and policies receive focus. As Lineberry and Sharkansky state, "formal structures advantage some interests and disadvantage others," and the choice is not "ideologically neutral" (1978, p. 161).

Whatever the effect these authors feel structure has on outcomes, perhaps none have stated possible outcomes as dramatically as Banfield and Wilson, who write that “conceivably, for example, changes in the style of city politics, by affecting the national party system and thus the Presidency, may affect the peace of the world and the future of mankind” (1963, p. 346). Issues of world peace will not be addressed here. However, due to the importance of local politics, this work will operate under the premise that municipal structure matters.

A Renewed Institutionalism

For much of the 20th century, political institutions were the focus of a great deal of academic work. This “old institutionalism” focused on influence, coalitions, and informal power structures among institutions, and was epitomized in the work of Phillip Selznick (1949, 1957). This view was largely overshadowed in the middle of the century by behavioralists, who argued that political and economic behavior was the sum of individual choice.

While not all authors fell under the behavioralist banner, mountains of literature were produced concluding that government structures matter very little. Many argued that economic concerns were the primary driver of political and organizational action. Political leaders sought economic growth at all costs (Logan & Molotch, 1987) and worked constantly to attract and retain mobile capital (P. E. Peterson, 1981). For them, inter-local competition affects the action of leaders more than any institutional structure could for keeping spending and taxes low (Craw, 2008; Minkoff, 2009).

Others took a more political view of action. These authors generally argue that how organizations are structured is not as important as what people want. In an influential work, Robert Dahl (1961) wrote that decisions about policies are made through political means, tied to the view of the people, while structure and institutions don’t matter much. In another influential work, Banfield and Wilson (1963) argue that results were brought about by the “political ethos” of a city, not any sort of structural reform. Cities that want to improve will get better simply because they are the type of cities that want to improve. For this group, public opinion is the primary driver of policy, and bureaucratic structures are not able to negate political forces (Meier, Stewart, & England, 1991; Palus, 2010).

Beginning in the late 1970s, however, a “new institutionalism” began to emerge. Contrary to the arguments of behavioralists, these scholars felt very strongly that “the organization of political life makes a difference” (March & Olsen, 1984, p. 747). New institutionalism blends some societal behavior elements into the previous ideas of institutionalism, arguing that institutions are more than just the arena where political behavior plays out. Institutions have become larger, and organizations are now major political and economic actors.

The new institutionalism emphasizes the ways in which individual action is structured by rules and constrained through institutional context, which limits some actors while privileging others (Immergut, 1998; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Far from being based on behavior alone, institutions limit choices and predispose certain outcomes (Clingermayer & Feiock, 2001). Embedded with new institutionalism is the idea of autonomy, and the notion of the institution as a decision maker and a political actor. The idea recognizes that institutions operate in an institutional environment, and that institutions influence human behavior through societal rules and norms. The environment affects institutions which in turn affect the environment. Institutions can cause people to act in specific ways, not by force, but because they are led to that action through institutional structures.

In this environment, institutions exist and survive by being economically viable, but also through their search for legitimacy. Once certain structures have become institutionalized (and therefore legitimate), other governments and organizations will adopt them in a process called isomorphism. Isomorphism increases an organization's likelihood of survival, even if the elements being adopted are not efficient (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). At a certain point, the adoption of innovations provides legitimacy rather than improving performance (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In that case, the need for legitimacy outweighs concerns of efficiency. When a structure gets labeled as a "good government" reform, other cities and organizations will adopt them, wanting to be seen as good governments. This creates a very real form of institutional peer pressure. While early adoption of professional and direct democracy reforms may have been meant to solve specific issues, later adoption may simply be based on the growing legitimacy of those structures (P. S. Tolbert & Zucker, 1983).

While some institutional processes can be beneficial for society (or perhaps simply neutral), some other forms can be outright negative. Corruption was institutionalized in many cities, and therefore became a legitimate government practice (Rosenbloom, Karvchuck, & Clerkin, 2009). On a more individual level, societal structures and institutions can cause personal morality and ethics to "be swallowed and effectively erased" (G. B. Adams & Balfour, 2004, p. 29). For these reasons, it is important not just to understand institutionalization, but to ensure that the right processes become institutionalized.

It is not the case, however, that institutionalists are blind to other factors that may affect political outcomes. New institutionalists argue that governing structures can shape incentives for political actors, but that there are internal and external pressures on organizations (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Hajnal & Trounstine, 2010). Policy decisions are affected by structure, economic issues, political concerns, and needs. Institutions matter, and while they may not guarantee success or failure, they do provide opportunities for success or failure (Meier & O'Toole, 2006; Weaver & Rockman, 1993). Most authors agree that what voters want matters, but “the rules of politics matter as well” (Bridges & Kronick, 1999, p. 704).

On a higher level, cities may also be limited in their actions by their state governments (Benton, 2003; Chapman & Gorina, 2012). This doesn’t mean that local structures don’t matter –only that there are other structures that matter as well. But while state action may affect municipal governments, the effect is typically uniform (Booms, 1966), and it is local institutions that affect how policies are made and which constituencies are served (McCabe & Feiock, 2005).

While it is almost certainly true that environmental factors play a role in policy decisions, this study will address structure. Structure will be defined as the formal elements of government which determine who is put in a position to affect policy decisions. Examining municipal government, this work will argue that formal institutions play a major role in understanding how and why city governments act the way they do. This will focus on the formal structures mentioned earlier: at-large/district elections, manager/mayor, partisan/non-partisan, initiatives, referenda, and recalls. This study will not attempt to look at more informal structures such as special interest influence. While relevant, informal structures are more fluid, hard to define, and difficult to measure. Formal structures provide a real basis for study and potentially change.

Spending and Efficiency

The idea of an inefficient government has been the source of countless reforms and restructurings, and with each structural change, reformers hope to hit the "efficiency bull's-eye" (Schachter, 2007, p. 801). These constant cries about bureaucracy and waste have led to changes in budgeting, program planning, and performance measures (Behn, 2003). Entire administrative movements have developed from the need to make things work better. Bureaucracies were meant to help make administration efficient, rational, and honest, separating administration and politics (Wilson, 1887). New Public Management was, in turn, meant to make bureaucracies more efficient and rational (National Performance Review, 2008; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Even labeling something as inefficient can be a powerful tool for change. And this focus does matter. Local governments spent $1.66 trillion in 2012 (Barnett, Sheckells, Peterson, & Tydings, 2014). How and where that money is spent makes a significant difference in people's lives.

Much of this is rooted in the Progressive era, particularly the works of Fredrick Taylor and the scientific management literature. Taylor (1914) proposed using successful aspects of engineering and business to improve the success and efficiency of governments. He did not feel that business was perfect, simply that the government could learn something from the private sector. Having a scientific way of performing a task was better than “rule-of-thumb” methods, which were non-transferable and unreliable. Writing even earlier, Woodrow Wilson argued that administrative study should find out what governments should do and how to do it with the “utmost possible efficiency and at the least possible cost” (1887, p. 197). Luther Gulick (1937) and Frank Goodnow (1914) also argued for improvements to administrative efficiency using division and coordination of labor.

Efficiency is not, however, a singular concept, and the idea takes many forms. In physics, efficiency is generally a measure of energy output over energy input, typically expressed as a percentage. In economics it occurs when resources are optimally allocated, to the point where it is impossible to produce any additional output without increasing the level of input, and where production takes place at the lowest possible cost. Similar to the physics definition, business efficiency measures a firm’s expenses and revenues. In the Progressive era, even social reformers spoke in these terms, considering corruption to be a form of moral inefficiency (Judd, 1988).

Governmental efficiency is harder to define. In the popular sense, efficiency relates to the better use of funds. Frederickson writes that it is “to achieve as much public good as possible for the available dollars” (1997, p. 97; 2010, p. 60), and states that efficiency values are about “achieving the most, the best, or the most preferable public services for available resources” (2010, p. xv). Others who are more business minded simply apply the definition of business efficiency to a government’s budget. People in this camp may often call for government to do more with less, thereby maximizing efficiency from both ends of the ratio.

Still others may see efficiency in a purely political way, looking at which action can produce the most votes, take the least time, or spend the least political capital. Rational or economic decision making may be irrational in a democratic society (Wildavsky, 1984). In this argument, political rationality or efficiency may bring about much more satisfactory results than economic rationality. The “logic of efficiency loses force” as you get higher into leadership, as there are more concerns, needs, and goals to deal with (Selznick, 1957, p. 3). The efficiency ideal also assumes that goals are settled in the first place and that necessary resources are available, which is not always the case.

But there is some trouble with the term “efficiency” as it is typically used in a governmental context. In most cases, “efficiency” is used when what is really meant is “spending.”

Although other measures of efficiency take output into consideration, this is a much more nebulous concept in politics. It is generally argued that “public service output levels are not directly measurable” (Bradford, Malt, & Oates, 1969; Hayes & Chang, 1990, p. 171; Jung, 2006). Even if outputs were easily measurable, placing a cost on them to determine efficiency can be difficult. Economists, for example, typically argue that preventing all crime would be inefficient, as the societal cost of preventing all crimes would be greater than the societal benefit (Brueckner, 2011; O'Sullivan, 2009). But just how many robberies are an efficient number of robberies? Or murders, for that matter? From a public health perspective, what is an efficient number of measles cases?

Since outputs are so hard to directly measure, when previous authors look at efficiency, the only thing they can really measure is spending. These authors have operated using the premise that service quality is equal across municipalities. If service quality is equal, then cities that provide those services for less are seen as more efficient.

This is clearly not true, as quality of services vary greatly across the nation. Lower per capita spending may relate to better use of funds, but we can’t quite know the effects. Lower spending may just relate to less or poorer services. Higher expenditures may show the need for spending or may relate to significantly better outcomes. Because of the lack of reliable or measurable output measures, this study will examine spending levels and priorities, not efficiency as it is typically defined in the literature.

Democracy

The third major theme of this dissertation will be democracy. Democracy itself is hard to define for the simple reason that there are so many variations of it. A very basic definition is that, in a democracy, citizens have the ability to have some say in how they are governed. More formally, it is a system where power lies with the people, and is exercised either by the people directly or indirectly through elected officials and representatives.

All democracies are not alike, however, and a government’s level of democracy can be heavily scaled. In one government, citizens may have the ability to directly determine all aspects of what their government does. In another, a citizen may only be able to affect a small percentage of government action. Some governments may allow for direct participation. Others may remove citizens from direct action through representatives, or even twice remove them, as is the case with the Electoral College or the previous process of choosing Senators through state legislatures.

Then there are questions about the benefit of democracy itself. Some argue that majority rule can easily devolve into mob rule. The possibility of removing large amounts of representatives every election cycle can also lead to huge levels of political instability. And while democracy can be defined as “rule by the people,” an obvious question becomes: “Which people?” Though criticisms persist, this piece will operate under the idea that democracy is beneficial.

Public administration has long sought to make government action more professional, often borrowing private sector market mechanisms. However, professionals and market mechanisms are not enough to make good laws without the input of citizens (Fung, 2004). In this study, what we are interested in is not whether or not democracies spend more or less, as every city in the United States can be considered a democracy to some degree. Rather, the question lies in whether the extension of democratic structures is related to spending. Is there a tradeoff between democratic structure and spending as measured by per capita expenditures? If so, what are the sizes of these tradeoffs? Because of these questions, it is beneficial to examine just what sort of relationship democratic structures have on municipal spending.

Outline of Chapters

This dissertation will re-examine many of the ideas surrounding reform structures. Current data will be analyzed to determine if older ideas surrounding these structures still hold true. These structures are over a century old at this point, yet they still play a major role in the lives of millions of Americans. New ideas and structures will also be examined to discover what areas may provide fertile ground for future reformers.

Chapter 2 will provide a history of the professional reform movement in the US and the structural changes that followed. It will look at where the reforms came from, what cities adopted them, and who advocated for them. Issues surrounding these reforms will also be examined. Chapter 3 will turn to the other set of Progressive reforms, direct democracy structures. The use and results of these structures will also be presented, as well as some of the issues and concerns surrounding them.

Chapter 4 will present a review of previous research into the effects of these sets of reforms, and show a mixed and evolving consensus concerning their results. It will then show the purpose of further research. Chapter 5 will then use new data to study professional and direct democracy reforms, comparing the relationship of these structural elements to municipal spending. In addition to overall spending, it will examine police and social service spending. Unlike other works on direct democracy reforms, this dissertation will consider not just the presence of these structures, but their use.

Following this, Chapter 6 will provide a summary of the dissertation. Conclusions from the work will be presented here, as well as a discussion of where these findings fit into the existing literature and what has been added to the debate. This chapter will also explore reforms which are likely to be used in future research. As reformers of the last century looked for new solutions to urban issues, reformers of this century will do the same. In their search, reformers are looking through a lens of democracy, not just professionalism, and debates over government structure and efficiency seem to be expanding to study the effect of democratic structures.

CHAPTER II

PROFESSIONAL REFORMS

In the late 1800s, problems with city government were growing as rapidly as urban populations. City machines stepped in to deal with many of these problems, albeit in their own imperfect way. These issues prompted reformers of all types to propose radical changes to how city governments were run. These professional reforms spread rapidly across the country, and while largely effective for their intended purpose, may have created as many issues as they solved. This chapter will explore why and how these “good government” reforms came about, and examine in detail many of the issues surrounding them today.

City Machines

It is impossible to understand the urban reform movement without addressing city machines. In the middle of the 19th century, industrialization and immigration brought millions of people into American urban life. Many of these groups clustered in certain districts within cities. These conditions led to an environment conducive to the formation of political machines, which are “organizations built to obtain political power” (Koven, 2008, p. 65).

Often a source of ethnic acceptance or assimilation, machines changed the traditional WASP power structure of the city, integrating marginal ethnic groups into political life, registering them to vote, and valuing their vote (Oliver, 2001). Many machines were even organized in or operated out of saloons and pubs, which were important community centers for many of these groups (Judd, 1988).

As cities grew, urban political machines and bosses sprang up across the country. Boston had James Curley. Memphis had Ed Crump. The Bronx had Ed Flynn. Cincinnati was run by George Cox and Chicago by Richard Daley. James Pendergast ran the machine in Kansas City, and after his death, his brother Thomas took control. These bosses all came from different walks of life. Abe Reuf in San Francisco was a lawyer who spoke seven languages. Frank Hague in Jersey City had almost no formal education and was elected to office before he was old enough to vote. The most infamous city boss, New York's William Tweed, started out as a firefighter. Elected to Congress at age 29, he became bored with Washington after one term, moving back to New York to expand his power.

Political machines are businesses designed to get votes and win elections (Banfield & Wilson, 1963). They are non-ideological, existing only for the accumulation of power. Machines offer incentives to people in exchange for votes. Votes were traded for jobs, favors, money, licenses, and public works contracts (Rosenbloom et al., 2009). Typically, though, these incentives were forms of friendship. While the popular image of bosses handing out stacks of money and jobs for votes was certainly well founded, there weren't always enough jobs or enough dollars for everyone. However, when you needed to get out of jail or get your lights turned back on, friendship proved very valuable.

While friendship and favors were traded liberally, there was very little attempt by machines to alter the conditions that led to the need for patronage in the first place (Lineberry & Sharkansky, 1978). Machines depended on maintaining a lower class clientele for support –a group of citizens that always needed something badly enough to trade a vote for.

The machine system's most notable issues were corruption, patronage, favoritism, and little public accountability (Harrigan & Vogel, 2000). However, not everyone saw the level of corruption as a negative. Many involved simply saw it as politics as usual –to the point where it was practically institutionalized (Rosenbloom et al., 2009). The Tammany politician George Washington Plunkitt believed this was all nothing more than "honest graft" (Riordon, 1948, p. 3).

However, corruption is "the betrayal of the public trust for reasons of private interest" (Rosenbloom et al., 2009, p. 513), and machines most certainly did not act in the public interest. Public employees were often expected to contribute to the party in charge and engage in electioneering. Banfield and Wilson (1963) saw the machine system as one of organized bribery, and considered the act of exchanging your vote for private benefit to be a violation of duty as a public citizen.

Vote buying and voter fraud were rampant. Stories abound of precinct bosses walking the streets with pockets full of silver dollars. Often candidates would receive more votes that there were people in the city. Other times, not a single opposition vote would be tallied in a precinct. Even the deceased were known to exercise their right to vote, with ballots being cast in the names of dead citizens, and in some cases even pets. Men with beards were often shaved so as to not be recognized when they voted again. One story recalls a voter pretending to be a prominent clergyman. When an election official told him that he was not, in fact, a bishop, the "repeater" responded, saying, "The hell I ain't, you bastard!" (Callow, 1976, p. 159).

Speaking to such issues as early as 1859, Richard Henry Dana Jr. stated that the motto of many bosses seemed to be "Vote early and vote often" (Radstock, 1859). Dana even touches on an attempt of efficiency among machines, writing that politicians try to solve "how to cast the greatest number of votes with the smallest number of voters." For Dana, the prevalence of fraud ensured that the side with the most dishonest supporters would win.

As bad as the issues of democratic corruption were, there was still a darker side. When adjusted for inflation, New York's Tweed ring stole around a billion dollars in 1870 alone (Connolly, 2010). Violent mobs would often stand guard at polling locations in an attempt to dissuade opposing sides from voting. Disloyalty to the machine was often severely punished, and there were even rumors of mysterious disappearances (Koven, 2008).

Reform Background

In light of these issues, reformers had an understandably negative view of cities. Whether they were economic, social, or political reformers, all felt that something was horribly wrong with urban life in America.

Many of the earliest reformers were ministers, and Biblical allusions found their way into reform writing. Josiah Strong, for instance, believed that cities' material and physical growth had outpaced their moral growth, and that starvation, sanitation issues, and overcrowding were causing needless deaths. For him, cities were fundamentally troubled. "The first city was built by the first murderer, and crime and vice and wretchedness have festered in it ever since" (Strong, 1898, p. 181). Strong wrote that as cities grew wealthier, more opportunity for corruption became available, meaning there was more need for officials with good moral character. However another minister, James Freeman Clarke, felt that without good citizens, even good city leaders could not do much, stating that "Jesus Christ himself could not save Jerusalem from decay and destruction" (Clarke, 1892, p. 291).

And they were not alone. Writing about Philadelphia, Richard Ely, a founder of the Christian Social Union, stated that the city was a "stench in the nostrils of decent men" (Ely, 1902, p. 34). Alexander Callow wrote that:

> "Cities appeared to have a monopoly on sin. New York was characterized as "an underground rapid transit railroad to hell." Pittsburgh was compared to the Biblical hellholes Sodom and Gomorrah. Philadelphia was called "The City of Brotherly Loot"; and Chicago was so tough and wicked "that even the canaries sang bass." (Callow, 1976, p. 141)

Reformers also looked at democratic issues of city government. Strong wrote that cities were run by those lacking "civic patriotism," and were a "government of the people by the boss and for the machine" (Clarke, 1892, p. 108). Just as Banfield and Wilson had speculated that city politics could affect world peace, Strong argued that materialistic and corrupt cities pose a threat to state and national governments. British politician James Bryce (1889)famously wrote in 1888 that "the government of cities is the one conspicuous failure of the United States." Some members at the National Municipal League's 1898 meeting even felt that the failure of city governments was proof that democracy itself was a failure (National Municipal League, 1898).

However, not all authors took such a hellfire and brimstone view of cities in America. Richard Ely was much more optimistic in his outlook. In *The Coming City* (1902), Ely argued that urban growth (in terms of population and influence) could be a great opportunity. He pointed out that even the President (Teddy Roosevelt) was from

New York City. While Strong and Clarke had used Biblical imagery to show issues with cities, Ely described how the improvement of cities should be seen as a religious effort. He uses the term “civic righteousness,” and references the fact that, in the Bible, a redeemed society existed in the form of a city –a “New Jerusalem”. He even goes so far as to quote Psalm 137, replacing Jerusalem with New York, Chicago, and St. Louis.

> “So we must learn to say, -indeed are learning to say, -‘If I forget thee, O Chicago, O New York, O St. Louis, let my right hand forget her cunning. If I do not remember thee, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth; if I prefer thee not above my chief joy’” (1902, p. 73).

Groups began to spring up across the country. Committees of One Hundred in Philadelphia and Cincinnati. The Citizen’s Association of Albany. The Reform League of Baltimore. The Society for Promoting Good Citizenship in Boston. The Civic Federation of Detroit. The National Short Ballot Association, founded in 1910. The most important of these, however, was the National Municipal League (now the National Civic League). The League grew out of the National Conference for Good City Government, which first met in Philadelphia in 1894. By 1895, there were 180 branches in the US (Patton, 1940).

These groups were made up of driven reformers, often political heavyweights. The National Short Ballot Association had future President Woodrow Wilson as its first President. The first meeting of the National Municipal League was attended by future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, and another future President (Theodore Roosevelt) delivered a speech.

In general, reformers sought to rid cities of corruption by removing machines and party control, increase efficiency, and make local governments more democratic (Banfield & Wilson, 1963; Box, 1998; DeSantis & Renner, 2002; Svara, 1990). They believed that there should be separate expert and public spheres, which would “secure democratic home rule, without danger to efficiency, economy, and honesty" (Dana, 1909, p. 18). To counteract issues of patronage and favoritism, reformers tried to base hiring practices on merit, open bidding, and ethics laws.

Not everyone was as enthusiastic about the reform spirit, however. Machine politicians belittled the movement, pointing to one failed attempt at reform after another. George Washington Plunkitt even felt these ideas were dangerous. He argued that you couldn't interest young men in politics without offering them jobs in the process. In his view, civil service law was the root of all evil in government because it crushed civic pride and literally turned patriotic young men into anarchists (Riordon, 1948, p. 16). Perhaps trying to mimic the temperance attitude of some reformers, Plunkitt even stated that civil service examinations has ruined more men than alcohol.

Professional Reforms

As the reform movement progressed, several different elements were studied and debated, and ways to implement them were sought out everywhere. In the beginning, these actions could best be described as "experiments" rather than "reforms," as the results weren't completely known. Reformers knew their goals and felt confident that the proposed reforms would work, but until cities actually adopted these elements, there was no way to know for sure. Often coming from the business world, reformers felt that professional, efficient government structures would be much more effective than a purely political way of getting things done.

One of the earliest to be tried was the Commission Plan, where a small group of elected officials would exercise both executive and legislative functions. Commissions had the appearance of a traditional town council, except that there was no presiding chief executive. Each commissioner directly oversaw specific agencies. They were elected at-large and through non-partisan elections.

The first city to attempt this was Galveston, Texas in 1900. After a devastating flood, the mayor and alderman proved to be ineffective, so local businessmen found a way to implement a new model of government (Elliot & Ali, 1988). They chose the Commission Plan. Issues arose, however, when each commissioner was only interested in their own agencies. This was a fundamental violation of the principle of separation of powers, moving politics and administration even closer.

These issues caused reformers to not just look for ways to separate powers, but to separate spheres. Separating politics and administration had long been desired, and reformers found their answer in the city manager. The city manager, when combined with at-large and non-partisan elections, would make up the triumvirate of professional reforms.

The first two of these reforms were at-large elections and non-partisan elections, and dealt directly with how city council members (or other elected city officials) were elected. Non-partisan elections were designed to help rid cities of corruption by removing party control (Abney & Lauth, 1986). For reformers, there was not a Democratic or Republican way of delivering services (or a populist or socialist way, for that matter). Establishing non-partisan elections should increase efficiency, as city employees could be hired based more off of their qualifications than the party affiliation. In non-partisan elections, voters could no longer simply look for a candidate’s party identification on a ballot to decide who to vote for. Voters were responsible for educating themselves. Being non-partisan also limited the effect of national and state level issues, which reformers felt had little bearing for municipal government (Lineberry & Fowler, 1967). The fact that a President's foreign policy, for example, is unpopular shouldn't mean that local level politicians sharing the same party affiliation should suffer.

Non-partisan elections were advocated for at least by the 1898 meeting of the National Municipal League. By 1915, the idea had made it onto the Model City Charter, which stated that ballots were to have the names of candidates listed "without party or other designation," and also alphabetically rotating the list of candidates so that no one would have an advantage (National Municipal League, 1915, p. 11).

At-large elections were meant to avoid focusing on individual districts or parts of town, and instead focus on the city as a whole. Focusing on the entire city meant that larger issues could be addressed. To a large extent, this was done to dilute the power of minorities, ethnic groups, or immigrants, which often lived in certain districts and were seen as a large source of machine support. The first Model City Charter stated that at-large elections would "eliminate the evils of ward representation" (National Municipal League, 1915, p. 22). In the 1898 National Municipal League Meeting, it was stated that (especially in smaller cities), that "there is no valid reason for district or local representation," and they sought to "discourage its continuance whenever and wherever possible" (National Municipal League, 1898, p. 11).

The third professional reform was the city manager. The city manager serves as the chief executive officer of a city. They are not elected. Rather they are appointed by the council to serve. Managers are often professionally trained and may have few connections to the city they serve. The 1915 Model City Charter states that, "the city manager shall be the chief executive officer of the city. He shall be chosen by the council solely on the basis of his executive and administrative qualifications. The choice shall not be limited to inhabitants of the city or state" (1915, p. 23).

The city manager position seems to be modeled at least in part by the German burgomaster, which is the head of a city's executive council. The Municipal League felt that this worked well, and suggested that any city adopting a city manager should adopt the other professional reform elements as well. The National Short Ballot Association also heavily advocated for city managers, as well as at-large elections. The NSBA felt that the city-manager plan satisfied both the goals of efficiency and democracy, as administration was insulated from politics directly, but still under the control of the council.

After Galveston had experimented with the Commission Plan, other cities began to look into the council-manager plan. The Board of Trade in Lockport, New York endorsed the plan and presented it to the State Legislature for consideration. Unfortunately for reformers, the plan did not gain the necessary support. However, due to the publicity of the effort, the proposal was referred to as the Lockport Plan. After other unsuccessful attempts at adoption in both LaGrande and Eugene Oregon, the council-manager plan was finally approved by the voters of Sumter, South Carolina on June 11, 1912. While Sumter was the first, it was a relatively small town of around 8,000 people. In 1913, Dayton, Ohio became the first large city to adopt the plan.

These reforms were most popular in cities with populations between 25,000 and 250,000, usually in suburban areas with a more homogenous population. These features are important, because city managers tended to work best in cities large enough to afford one, yet small enough to have a consensus (Elliot & Ali, 1988; Harrigan & Vogel, 2000).

These reforms were also more common in cities with fewer immigrants or unions, and where party systems were less entrenched, usually newer, Western cities (Bridges & Kronick, 1999; Welch & Bledsoe, 1988).

Cities adopting these professional reform elements are generally called “reform” cities. Those cities that stuck with an elected mayor, partisan elections, and district based elections are typically referred to as “unreformed” cities. However, the term reform implies some sense of normative values, making unreformed seem bad. Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004) suggest referring to these two types as “administrative” and “political,” but this implies that administrative cities aren’t political and political cities aren’t administrative. Svara (1990, p. 11) uses the terms “reform” and “traditional.” This terminology is appropriate, and is equally positive and inclusive, and will be used to distinguish between the two types.

Reform Success

The reform movement did not initially take the country by storm. For the first few decades, there was little real success. Even as corrupt bosses such as William Tweed were brought down, the machines they ran kept on running smoothly. George Washington Plunkitt felt sorry for reformers. To him, they were nothing more than “morning glories –looked lovely in the mornin’ and withered up in a short time, while the regular machine went on flourishin’ forever, like fine old oaks” (Riordon, 1948, p. 23). “The fact is,” said Plunkitt, “that a reformer can’t last in politics” (p. 25). Plunkitt was wrong.

While reformers “lost most of their battles,” they won the war for adopting certain structural changes (Banfield & Wilson, 1963, p. 148). This fight took decades, but reformers were as persistent as machines were entrenched. Municipal reformers rode the "general climate of reform," which produced everything from the FDA to child labor laws, to promote their ideas of "good government" (Welch & Bledsoe, 1988, p. 5). Reformers were successful where they could write the rules of the political game, especially in newer cities where reform opponents were weaker (Bridges & Kronick, 1999). Areas with fewer immigrants, fewer working class organizations, and lower turnout were some of the earliest to adopt professional reforms. The working class opposed professional reforms everywhere. Where they were weaker, they usually lost.

At this point reform is not new. The professional reform movement is over, as is the increase of council-manager cities (Frederickson et al., 2004). The professional reform model was meant to solve corruption, inefficiency, and management issues, and for the most part, it did. Council-manager cities are more likely to be innovative and rate efficiency as more important (Nelson & Svara, 2012; Svara, 1990).

The federal role in the success of reformers should not be minimized. During the Great Depression, the federal government stepped in to help cities, expanding welfare and Social Security. General purpose governments were seen as more corruptible by FDR's New Deal government, so special district governments were established which were not under machine control (Foster, 1997; Harrigan & Vogel, 2000). While reformers had laid an impressive groundwork, the New Deal may finally have run machines out of business by providing jobs and taking over their social welfare function (Connolly, 2010; Judd, 1988). In addition, growth in trade unions provided secure jobs and mass media took over the machine's function for disseminating information (Hofstadter, 1955).

Reform Issues

While reformers were largely successful in implementing professional reforms, this does not mean there are no issues surrounding them, and although many things improved, “reforms can make things worse as well as making them better” (Ostrom, 1980, p. 317). As problems were solved, the issues of the reform system that solved them became more apparent (Box, 1998). Cities adopting professional reforms have lower rates of participation, less minority representation, little competition, and bureaucracies that often overshadow the public (Bridges, 1997a; Lineberry & Sharkansky, 1978).

The first major set of issues are democratic. It was argued that professional reforms would make a city more democratic due to the break-up of machine control (Svara, 1990). The first Model City Charter stated that professional reforms would help an organization work better and remove “the evils in city government due to defective and undemocratic organization” (1915, p. 23).

However, reformers were often disingenuous, knowing that professional reforms were not very democratic, and that government wouldn’t be accessible to those without wealth, education, or status. Above all, “reformers feared mass democracy” (Judd, 1988, p. 113). Reformers distrusted politicians and electorates, relying instead on expertise and efficiency, being moved by “an implicit contempt for what we ordinarily understand to be the democratic process” (Kaufman, 1956, p. 1072). Cities were seen as corrupt, run by “ignorant voters” (Hofstadter, 1955, p. 174) and the “most ignorant classes” (Strong, 1898, p. 62). Even in 1941, the National Municipal League’s charter defended at-large elections with the argument that “it is difficult to find capable leaders distributed throughout the city by wards” (National Municipal League, 1941, p. 3). Many reformers had previously advocated for outright suffrage restrictions, believing that many urban residents were not intellectually or morally capable of voting responsibly (Connolly, 2010). This was admittedly difficult to pull off politically, so reformers looked for other ways to diminish lower class influence (Trounstine, 2008).

Another democratic issue lies in the position of city manager. Manager aren't elected, but are still political in the sense that they affect political outcomes. Often the direct source of a policy, they can also campaign for council members with whom they have aligned in order to maintain their position. They play a vital role in the budgetary process, which can be "troubling to people who want the budget to be an instrument for democratic governance" (Nice, 2002, p. 66). Being insulated from politics also means there is little to worry about in terms of political fallout from bad decisions. As Callow wrote, "If representation is any measure of the prevalence of democracy, then the city manager plan is conspicuously inadequate" (Callow, 1976, p. 187)

In the search for professionalism, reform governments may have sacrificed political responsiveness. Being less political, however, does not make a government more effective. Non-partisan and at-large elections produce a lower level of connection between politicians and voters, and cities where lower class voices are not heard may not "deal boldly" with larger issues (Banfield & Wilson, 1963, p. 186). Traditional cities on the other hand increase a government's service orientation, emphasize accountability to voters, and make people feel like they have more of a say in government (Craw, 2008).

Even early advocates of scientific management warned of this. Wilson wrote that civil service should be "intimately connected to the popular thought" (1887, p. 217), and Goodnow argued that "politics must have a certain control over administration" (1914, p.

24). Gulick expanded on this idea, writing that while professionals are important, “the common man is a better judge of his own needs in the long run than any cult of experts” (1937, p. 11). He added that experts should serve, not rule –be “on tap, not on top” –and that “the essential validity of democracy rests upon this philosophy.”

While professional reformers couldn’t officially prevent people from voting, their reforms wound up having just that effect. Reform coalitions were narrow, so in order for them to work, they had to find ways to exclude some people (Bridges, 1997b). Non-partisan elections in particular tended hurt mobilization efforts and reduce lower income voter turnout (Hajnal & Trounstine, 2010; Salisbury & Black, 1963). This matters for the simple fact that when groups don’t vote, governments aren’t as responsive and areas that vote less receive less in terms of government expenditures (Griffin & Newman, 2005; Hajnal, 2010; Martin, 2003). As much as leaders say they represent everyone, “the blunt truth is that politicians and officials are under no compulsion to pay much heed to classes and groups of citizens that do not vote” (Key, 1949, p. 527).

On the other hand, cities with traditional structures have higher voter turnouts and are better able to engage citizens (Caren, 2007; Oliver, 2001; Wood, 2002), and simply switching to partisan elections would increase turnout by itself (Holbrook & Weinschenk, 2014). If raising voter turnout is the goal, it can easily be done, although this may not be a priority for everyone in charge (Hajnal, 2010).

Another issue of professional reforms is that of class. Most early reformers were middle and upper class citizens, and cities that first adopted professional reform elements tended to be populated by large numbers of professionals. The professional and business friendly ideas of these reformers often translated into governmental practices, essentially creating a government by and for the upper class (Finegold, 1995; Sherbenou, 1961). The adoption of professional or business practices for government may be “grossly inappropriate,” as borrowing certain techniques also means you borrow that discipline’s values (Hart, 1984, p. 112). When governments are run like a business, “market inequalities are translated into political inequalities” (McCabe, 2005, p. 420). This creates issues in a government where people are meant to be treated equally.

Professional reforms were “rooted in class tension” and meant to “enhance the influence of the better classes” (Judd, 1988, p. 85) to the point where reform advocates did “battle” against the working class (Connolly, 2010, p. 53). Reformers believed that the best educated and qualified should run the government, and it seemed to be the intention of many reformers to rid government of corruption by getting rid of people, specifically the lower classes who weren’t good enough to not be corrupt. Many professional reform advocates came from families or groups which held power before waves of immigrants shifted the political balance. These and other motives meant that the reform movement was a complicated mix of “efficiency and elitism, clean government and racism, the common good and exclusion” (Bridges, 1997a, p. 30).

Proponents of reform argued simply that professional reforms created a more honest, efficient government. Opponents, however, argued that they took power away from the working class. It was claimed that at-large elections would focus the attention of the government on the entire city, but this may have just wound up being the interests of the elite. City wide elections cost more, which keep lower classes out, and it may be easier to focus on the whole city if representatives come from all areas. Non-partisan elections require people to rely more on name recognition, which leads to officeholders who are white, male, upper-middle class, and Republican (Hawley, 1973; Welch & Bledsoe, 1988). Previously, minority, working class, and socialist candidates had done well in local elections. After professional reforms took effect, this was no longer the case. Overall, "reform added an upper-middle class, conservative bias to urban politics and the policies that are derived from the political process" (Welch & Bledsoe, 1988, p. 1).

Race is another concern when dealing with professional reform. Reform governments are not as representative of minority concerns, and each additional element makes these effects worse (Karnig, 1975; Oliver, 2001). Non-partisan and at-large elections diminish access to residentially segregated groups. On the other hand, districts help geographically isolated groups and can lead to greater representational equity on council, as they are cheaper and require less media attention (Heilig & Mundt, 1984; Karnig & Welch, 1980; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967). At-large elections are discriminatory and may be a violation of equal protection and minority voting rights (Parker, 1990; Welch & Bledsoe, 1988). While district based election tend to result in a proportionate number of minorities in office, at-large elections can cut this in half. Even the first Model City Charter in 1915 warned that at-large elections have a disadvantage in not ensuring minority representations.

Some argue that even if minority representation happens, municipal fiscal restraints can limit minority benefits, which can be disappointing (Heilig & Mundt, 1984; G. E. Peterson, 1994). And just because proportional representation happens doesn't mean favorable policies will make it through a legislature. However, minority representation on councils does improve minority acquisition of government jobs and can increase trust and knowledge among minority communities (Bobo & Gilliam, 1990; Sass & Mehay, 2003).

Although professional reforms seem to hurt minority candidates, their effect on women is slightly different. While districts may help minorities due to segregation, women are not as geographically isolated. Because of this, at-large elections actually give women a slight bump over district based elections (Trounstine & Valdini, 2008; Welch & Karnig, 1979). This is obviously complicated when looking at minority female candidates (Karnig & Welch, 1979).

Finally, professional reform may have an effect on crime rates and police spending. Thomas Stucky (2003, 2005) has found that cities with traditional structures have more police per capita and lower rates of violent crime. The effects of these structures are additive, so crime rates tended to fall with every additional traditional element. In addition, reform cities may be less likely to introduce community policing programs or develop relationships with poor communities. This may be due to the willingness of mayors to accept grants for community oriented policing due to electoral pressures, while managers may focus more on the long term costs of new officers and programs (C. Choi, Turner, & Volden, 2002). Others have disputed these claims, finding that governmental elements have no effect or even that cities with elected mayors have slightly higher crime rates (Ren, Zhao, & Lovrich, 2011; Zhao, Ren, & Lovrich, 2012)

Reform Failures

Advocates of professional reforms were successful in many ways. After decades of pressure they succeeded in implementing their preferred governmental elements and wrested urban power away from machines. However, reformers didn't realize all of their aspirations. While political machines have gone away, machine politics has not. Corruption and graft still exist, especially in the rewarding of contracts, and the bureaucracies that were meant to make municipal government more professional are often synonymous with inefficiency. The reform vision of making government more democratic also fell short. Progressives “hoped efficiency and democracy would go hand in hand. This never happened” (Mattson, 1998, p. 129). Reform was meant to insulate government from politics, but wound up insulating the government from its citizens (Clingermayer & Feiock, 2001). There were fewer local parties, no local representatives, and unelected managers with no ties to the community. As Callow wrote, “reform has not ‘gone to hell,’ but it hasn’t unlocked those pearly gates either” (1976, p. 190).

Because of the issues mentioned above, many cities have been switching back to the traditional model of municipal government. As cities got bigger, the “good governments” couldn’t always keep pace. Even as early as 1953, Stene and Floro wrote that cities were abandoning the manager plan for reasons such as poor service and difficulty in knowing who was in charge. Before 1965, most cities were adopting a council-manager model of government. Since that time, however, more cities have adopted mayors (C. G. Choi, Feiock, & Bae, 2013; McCabe & Feiock, 2005). This includes larger cities such as Richmond, Virginia (2003) and San Diego, California (2004) (Rubin, 2010). Many cities also abandoned at-large elections, with major western cities such as San Diego (1988) and Albuquerque (1974) adopting district based elections (Bridges, 1997a; Svara, 1990).

More than a century after Sumter, South Carolina adopted a city manager, it may even be the case that there is no difference whatsoever. Reforms may have had the desired impact in the short run, but business interests may run cities the same way machines had. Either form of government can establish control and focus on their own interests at the expense of the larger community (Trounstine, 2006). On a more positive note, traditional cities with an elected mayor and appointed department heads may be just as professional (Carr & Karuppusamy, 2010). The problems of traditional governments can exist even with professional reforms, and professional reform structures are not needed for governments to improve. For cities debating a new form of government, there is now very little practical reason to adopt professional reforms.

Summary

Urban growth in America created major problems for city governments. In most large American cities, political machines established themselves as the de facto power structure in government. The problems with this system were numerous, and Progressives and reformers of all stripes rightly led the charge for change. Three reform structures in particular were focused on to make government more honest and efficient. At-large elections, non-partisan elections, and the city manager were heralded and adopted in cities across the country. These professional reforms solved many of the issues they were intended to, and political machines have largely died out. But like heads on the hydra, for every issue that was solved, a new one grew back in its place. Cities became less democratic in structure. Minorities and working class citizens were less well represented, and getting elected to office became a much more difficult prospect. After an initial wave of reform swept municipal governments, the adoption of these reforms slowed, and in many cases were reversed. After more than a century of implantation, the benefits of these reforms have become less obvious, and the drawbacks are becoming clearer.

CHAPTER III

DIRECT DEMOCRACY REFORMS

The problems of machine politics in urban government drove many to look for new answers. However, professional reforms were not the only proposed solutions to these issues. Seeing that cities had become not only less professional but less democratic, Progressives advocated strongly for direct democracy reforms. These reforms gave citizens the ability to directly affect policy action. The wisdom of this has been debated vigorously ever since. This chapter will explore how direct democracy reforms came about, and examine what has resulted from citizens taking control of their own government.

The Reforms

Democracy in America is typically indirect. Voters generally elect representatives to carry out various government duties and to make their voices heard, but rarely vote on issues directly. In some situations, such as the Electoral College, voters are twice removed, voting for electors who in turn vote for the President. For many Progressive reformers, making governments better, more democratic, and more responsive required removing the middleman.

In order for democracy to work well in practice, people must regularly make their preferences known (Oliver, 2001). To make citizen’s voices heard, reformers focused on three related mechanisms: the initiative, the referendum, and the recall. As opposed to the indirect form traditionally practiced, these elements are a form of direct democracy, which “transfers legislative power directly to the people in an effort to ensure that public policy is not inconsistent with the popular will” (Park et al., 2010, p. 402). Taken together, these three elements turn citizens into another branch of the government, placing the powers, checks, and balances of other branches into the hands of ordinary citizens.

The initiative allows citizens to draft a bill and submit it to local voters directly for approval (Harrigan & Vogel, 2000; Zimmerman, 1999). After collecting a specified number of signatures, the proposal is placed on the ballot for a vote. If approved, the bill has the same standing as any ordinance or amendment passed by a legislature. Through this process, citizens can claim a major legislative function for themselves.

The referendum allows measures voted on by a legislature to be approved or rejected by voters. Measures can be placed on the ballot in one of two ways. Councils or legislatures can place a measure on the ballot to be voted on by citizens, or, through signing a petition, voters can themselves require that an issue considered by the council be placed on the ballot. In this way, legislation passed by a council can be overturned, serving as a citizen veto (Elliot & Ali, 1988).

The third element of the group is the recall. This process allows for the immediate removal of an elected official from office (Zimmerman, 1999). While unpopular officials can be removed in any regular election, the recall allows this removal to happen mid-term. Through the same petition process that the initiative and referendum follow, a certain signature threshold must be met to trigger a recall. Some recalls may focus simply on removal of an official, while others may offer a replacement (Zimmerman, 1997).

Depending on how it is defined by either state or city governments, a recall can either be a political or legal maneuver. If it is a legal issue, there must be some legal justification for removing the official from office (mishandling funds, wrongful termination of employees, etc.). In this situation, the recall serves as sort of citizen impeachment process. If it is political, the justification can be as simple as not liking how a legislator has voted. Other restrictions, such as not being recalled in the first or last six months of a term, are also common.

History and Justification

The idea of direct democracy is not new, with most historians tracing the concept to the Athenian Assembly. Abbott (1915) writes that the first examples of these elements in a representative democracy can be traced to 133 B.C. in Rome. When Tiberius Gracchus, a Roman Tribune, could not get an agrarian bill through the Senate, he took it to the people, who voted on it directly –possibly the first referendum. The first recall, Abbott writes, happened during the same event, when Octavius (another Tribune) was removed from office by a vote of the people for vetoing the agrarian bill.

The modern practice of direct democracy can be traced to around the 15th century in Switzerland. The *Landsgemeinde* was an annual open-air meeting where citizens would vote on local government policies (Schmidt, 1989; Zimmerman, 2001). The modern referendum was established by the Swiss Canton of Valais in 1844, which stated that no law could take effect without approval by a majority of voters (Piott, 2003). The *Landsgemeinde* is still practiced in some Swiss cantons.

In America, elements of direct democracy can be seen as early as the 1640s in the New England Town Meeting. In the town meeting, all eligible voters would assemble and decide on key budget and policy issues, with a small council chosen to oversee operations until the next meeting (Elliot & Ali, 1988). The town meeting has since become a revered example of democratic government, but it is not the only basis for the idea in the US. The Declaration of Independence states that "it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish" their government, and Article 5 of the Articles of Confederation mentions the recall, giving states the power to recall delegates and "send others in their stead."

When Progressive reformers saw the state of city government in the 19th century, they drew upon many of these direct democracy ideas and elements to find solutions. If laws could be made and abuses could be corrected by citizens through direct legislation, it would remove the power of the city boss or political machines (Sullivan, 1893). The recall would further eliminate boss rule, as corrupt elected officials could be removed and replaced by those not beholden to any machine (Zimmerman, 1997).

Many leaders believed that creating an informed public would save America, and that the initiative, referendum, and recall (IRR) would accomplish this, as these elements encourage voters to follow government more closely (Mattson, 1998; Zimmerman, 1997). Some authors, however, saw this plan as overly idealistic. Hofstadter wrote that Progressives hoped to "restore popular government as they imagined it to have existed in an earlier and purer age," with IRR being part of that plan (1955, p. 255). Hofstadter believed that the movement for direct popular democracy was an attempt to realize "Yankee-Protestant" ideals of personal responsibility and good citizenship, which he defines as political participation without self-interest. To him, this goal was not always adapted to reality.

Most, however, supported the elements. Although some of the inspiration did come from Switzerland, Sullivan wrote that it was not a “foreign method” of government, and could be seen in the town meeting. Arguing for the adoption of direct democracy elements, he asked “what so-called public business can be right in principle, or expedient in policy, on which the American voter may not pass in person?” (Sullivan, 1893, p. 4).

As advocates of professional reforms created groups, direct democracy reformers did the same. In 1892 in Newark, New Jersey, the People’s Power League was founded. Several hundred reformers joined in a matter of weeks (Piott, 2003). By June of that year, it had merged with the People’s Union, and by January of 1893, it became the Direct Legislation League of New Jersey. On July 21, 1896, a national conference on direct legislation was held in St. Louis, and was attended by William Jennings Bryan, Eugene V. Debs, and Samuel Gompers. The group became the National Direct Legislation League.

Political heavyweights from around the country began to support the adoption of IRR. Teddy Roosevelt stated that “I believe in the Initiative and Referendum, which should be used not to destroy representative government, but to correct it whenever it becomes misrepresentative,” and Woodrow Wilson said that “we are cleaning house and in order to clean house the one thing we need is a good broom. Initiative and Referendum are good brooms” (Schmidt, 1989, pp. 9-10). These presidents were major reformers, being just as adamant about direct democracy reforms as they were about professional reforms.

Wisconsin Governor and Senator Robert La Follette felt that these elements would be so effective as a check on elected officials that citizens would never have to use them –the proverbial weapon you never have to fire (Zimmerman, 1997). The mere threat that citizens could recall an official or overturn a piece of legislation that strayed too far from public opinion would be enough to keep officials in line, serving as the "gun behind the door" (Park et al., 2010)

By 1915, the National Municipal League Model City Charter included sections on the recall, the initiative, and the referendum, calling for their adoption in cities across the country. For the recall, they wrote that "any officer or officers holding an elective office provided for in this charter may be recalled and removed therefrom by the electors of the city as here provided" (National Municipal League, 1915, p. 13). Arguing for the initiative, they wrote that "the people shall have power at their option to propose ordinances including ordinances granting franchises or privileges, and other measures and to adopt the same at the polls" (pp. 15-16). For the referendum, they stated that "the people shall have power at their option to approve or reject at the polls any measure passed by the council or submitted by the council to a vote of the electors" (p. 19).

Adoption and Survival

Much like professional reforms, the earliest converts to these direct democracy reforms were newer, Western cities, most of which were in California. In fact, 25 California cities adopted IRR before the state constitution was amended. The first city to begin adopting these elements was San Francisco in 1898 through a voter approved charter. Vallejo, California followed later that same year (Matsusaka, 2005; Zimmerman, 1999), and it was not long after adoption that cities began using these elements.

Los Angeles voted on a new city charter on December 1, 1902, which was approved January 22, 1903 and included all three direct democracy reforms

(Zimmerman, 1997). The recall provision was immediately used to remove city councilmember J.P. Davenport. The Municipal League itself even got involved, organizing a successful recall of Los Angeles's mayor in 1909. In 1905, the city of Pasadena used the initiative to adopt the recall. In 1931, following a dispute over the city manager, Pasadena recalled its entire city council.

These reforms spread quickly, with many cities adopting what became known as the Des Moines Plan (Judd, 1988). This system included many professional reforms mentioned in Chapter 2, with a commission form of government, at-large, and non-partisan elections. It also included the initiative, referendum, and recall. Des Moines adopted the system in 1908. By 1909, 23 cities followed suit. By 1910, there were 66 cities, and by 1915 there were 465. By 1920, about 20% of cities nationwide with over 5,000 people were governed by this system.

Currently, 70% of Americans live in either cities or states where IRR is available (Matsusaka, 2004). State level ballot measures often get a significant amount of attention. Recalling a governor is, after all, a big deal. However, as Gordon (2004) found, local initiatives are much more likely to qualify for the ballot and be approved than their statewide counterparts. Ballot measures are much more common in large, growing, diverse cities, as these factors make it harder for legislators to anticipate the needs of its citizens. Even where IRR is not present, public opinion polls often serve as unofficial referenda, giving lawmakers an indication as to how they should vote (Roberts, 2004).

The adoption of these reform elements was not without opposition, however. In 1906, an initiative in Oregon taxed specific classes of companies, including telephone and telegraph companies (Elliot & Ali, 1988). The Pacific States Telephone and

Telegraph Company did not pay, prompting Oregon to sue. The case made its way to the US Supreme Court, with PSTT arguing that the initiative and other forms of direct democracy violated Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution, which states “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.” In a unanimous decision, however, the Court decided that the issue was under the scope of Congress and not the judiciary ("Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Oregon," 1912). When Congress admits a state or accepts a representative from a state with the IRR process, it is acknowledging that that state’s government is republican.

A similar case, Hartig v. City of Seattle, dealt with the initiative at the city level. The court ruled that even in a republican government, the power ultimately came from the people. In its decision, the Court ruled that:

> “There can be no question of the right of the city to adopt and carry into effect the initiative and referendum plan of government; for it can scarcely be contended that this plan is inconsistent with a republican form of government, the central idea of which is a government by the people. Whether the expression of the will of the people be made directly by their own acts or through representatives chosen by them is not material. The important consideration is a full expression.” ("Hartig v. City of Seattle," 1909).

The recall was also challenged in court. In 1909, the Supreme Court of Washington ruled that the recall of an elected official was constitutional and that, like the Pacific Telephone case, was a “political and not a legal question” ("Hilzinger v. Gillman," 1909). In this decision, it was established that officials do not have the right to hold office for an entire term, as an election is not a contract (Zimmerman, 1997).

Criticism of Direct Democracy Reforms

Surviving early legal assaults did not mean that critics of direct democracy reforms went away. Critics argue that special interests can jam initiatives through the same way that legislation is pushed through, and the expense of running a campaign and meeting signature thresholds is often prohibitive (Zimmerman, 1999, 2001). Sides entering an initiative campaign battle with money are at a distinct advantage. Looking at 15 campaigns, Lydenberg (1979) found that 11 were won by the side that spent the most money. It is not even the case that corporations or private entities always prevail. In one of Lydenberg's cases, a union won. In another, the city of Boston won. The cost of these campaigns can rival or even surpass other more traditional democratic outlets. In 1998, $400 million was spent on initiatives nationwide. In 2000, $326 million was spent on the Presidential race (Matsusaka, 2005).

In terms of the voting process, it can be difficult for voters to make fully informed decisions. As anyone can put any sort of initiative on a ballot, different options may not get the attention they deserve, and people may wind up making decisions they later regret (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004; Lupia & Matsusaka, 2004). Even voters who make every reasonable effort may still feel overwhelmed by the sheer number of topics. For example, in 1991, voters in St. Ann, Missouri were presented with 68 ballot measures (Zimmerman, 2001). And simply having more things to vote on may not make people vote more. People with lower income or less education do not vote any more than usual, making IRR somewhat unrepresentative (or at least no more representative than normal), and a lack of party cues may make some voters feel alienated (Magleby, 1984). The majority rule aspect of IRR brings up other issues. The rights of minorities may not always be considered, and courts frequently strike down initiatives that are unconstitutional at some level. In addition, public opinion may change rather rapidly, and an initiative with high levels of support may soon become hated.

Historically, the biggest critic of direct democracy reforms was probably Walter Lippmann. He argued that while the initiative and referendum may let issue be placed on a ballot, voters were still only able to vote “yes” or “no” to an issue, which was often abbreviated (Lippman, 1932). The quality of a mass election, according to Lippmann, is based on the quality of choices that voters have, and these choices are more often than not selected by a small group of people. While an individual or a small group could really think about an issue, large groups can do little more than assent or dissent. The goals of participation held up by supporters of direct democracy reforms can’t be met, argues Lippmann, because he had met no one, “from a President of the United States to a professor of political science, who came anywhere near to embodying the accepted ideal of the sovereign and omnicompetent citizen” (Lippman, 1925, pp. 20-21). He even talks sarcastically of the hope that we can breed an ideally democratic individual. Short of that, we must rely on education, and no one has enough time or interest to be completely informed, especially when earning a living and raising children. People who try “will be as bewildered as a puppy trying to lick three bones at once” (1925, p. 25).

The referendum process in particular has been criticized by those concerned with public debt. Writing fairly early, Goodnow argued that referenda may increase debt because people won’t deal with costs now, either because they wish to pass the burden onto future generations or because “they are so ignorant as to the amount of the city’s indebtedness that they are unable to act intelligently” (1904, p. 121). He generally feels that the referendum will be of no real benefit. The one exception he makes is the New England Town Meeting, which gets a pass, again due to the almost religious reverence that American political thinkers place on that system. Clingermeyer and Feiock (2001) further argue that since large scale debt has to be approved by referenda in some cities (more so in council-manager cities than mayor-council cities), that borrowing can be limited. While this was designed to create more fiscal accountability, it has ironically forced governments to look for revenue in different places, making things much more complex and less accountable.

In Defense of Direct Democracy

While the critics are many, direct democracy reforms have more than their fair share of advocates. Critics seem to believe that legislators are better than the mob for making laws. But, as Cronin (1989) states, legislators are chosen by the people. How is it, he argues, that the average citizen can choose good leaders but not good laws? People may not be perfect, but neither are legislators. The presence of ill-informed voters is an argument against democracy in general, not just direct democracy (Matsusaka, 2005). The average citizen may not understand every detail of a law, but “voters appear sufficiently competent to make informed choices” (Bowler & Donnovan, 1998, p. 42). Voters generally know enough to recognize if a bill lines up with their ideology, and knowing what groups are in support of each side can help make ballot measures almost partisan. In fact initiatives may reflect society’s preferences better than a legislator because they are individual issues, while candidates are bundles of issues.

Older theorists such as A.D. Lindsay argued that, while voters may not always have sound judgement, “the qualification for voting is not wisdom or good sense but enough independence of mind to be able to state grievances” (Lindsay, 1947, p. 270). In his famous analogy comparing laws to shoes, he states that “only he, the ordinary man, can tell whether the shoes pinch and where; and without that knowledge the wisest statesman cannot make good laws" (p. 270). The ability to address these grievances, as in the initiative process, gives people a way to show where the laws "pinch." Giving these direct democratic outlets force is important, because "experts do not like being told that the shoes they so beautifully make do not fit. They are apt to blame it on the distorted and misshapen toes of the people who have to wear their shoes. Unless there is power behind the expression of grievances, the grievances are apt to be neglected" (p. 271).

On a practical level, fears that direct democracy reforms will replace legislatures are drastically overstated. Even in areas that frequently use direct democracy elements, less than 1% of new laws come from initiatives (Schmidt, 1989). The circulation of large numbers of initiative petitions is an indicator of voter dissatisfaction with legislative unresponsiveness, and as such direct democracy is used more as a corrective than an alternative, making up for "legislative sins of omission" and protecting people from legislative abuse (Lieb, 1902; Qvortrup, 2005; Zimmerman, 1999, p. 148). However, due to the sheer size of governments, "a significant measure of representation" is here to stay (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 131).

At the city level, the fear that interest groups may overtake the IRR processes is also overblown. Adams (2012) and Gordon (2004) both argue that due to the size and lower cost, local level initiatives allow citizens to address issues that are important to them, with no indication that the average voter is made worse off. While this may not be true at the state level due to higher advertising costs and signature thresholds, at the local level, direct democracy is much closer to the progressive ideal. And although this may not completely remove interest group influence from politics, it does provide a good outlet for the voice of citizens and can even produce reforms initially blocked by lobbyists in the legislature.

Direct democracy reforms have other benefits as well. Direct democracy campaigns can increase voter turnout in both presidential and mid-term elections, often transforming low information midterms into high information elections, and increasing turnout by up to 9% (4.5% in Presidential elections) (C. J. Tolbert, Grummel, & Smith, 2001). This can especially improve turnout among voters with lower levels of education because initiative campaigns provide information to voters (C. J. Tolbert, Bowen, & Donovan, 2009). At the city level, Hajnal (2010) found that the presence of one or more ballot measure can cause a 6% increase in voter turnout. Frequent use of IRR may further facilitate turnout in some cases because the mobilization mechanisms are already in place –you don't have to start from scratch each time (Donovan & Neiman, 1992).

Results of Direct Democracy Reforms

Beyond the arguments about the wisdom of direct democracy, it is helpful to see just how these reforms have been used. John Matsusaka (2004) writes that the type of initiatives and referenda that are passed promote the will of the majority, serving the many and not the few. This is value neutral though, and doesn't tell us whether the policies are good or bad. This also doesn't enable us to definitively state what sort of polices will be pursued by direct democracy advocates, as the will of the majority may change rather drastically in a short amount of time. For example, Matsusaka writes that the initiative process led to fiscally conservative policies from 1970-2000, with initative cities spending less than non-initiative cities. However, from 1902-1942, initiative cities spent more. He argues that it takes legislatures time to catch up to public opinion, and while they are catching up, citizens are acting. Ideologically, IRR is not liberal or conservative, promoting the will of the majority no matter what that is.

Referenda are often used to approve bond issues or regulate public utilities or franchises (cable, water, etc.), or to ensure balanced budgets or set a minimum level of spending (Rubin, 2010). In many cases they are used for annexation, incorporation, or consolidation (Clingermayer & Feiock, 2001; Elliot & Ali, 1988).

While public utilities and bond measures may not be all that exciting, ballot measures can also be used for a wide variety of other more hot button issues (drugs, gambling, same-sex marriage, etc.). In 2014, Washington D.C. passed Initiative 71, legalizing marijuana use in the city. Also in 2014, the minimum wage was increased in San Francisco through a referendum, and in Seattle, the threat of an initiative may have brought about an ordinance increasing wages. This ordinance promptly faced the threat of a referendum.

An initiative in Austin in 1994 reversed an ordinance extending benefits to same-sex partners. A 1993 initiative in New York City established term limits. In 1996 voters approved an initiative for casinos in New Orleans (Zimmerman, 2001). A referendum in Churchill County, Nevada legalized prostitution, and at the state level Colorado voters shot down an Olympic bid supported by businesses, Oregon adopted women’s suffrage, and in 2004 alone, 11 states banned same-sex marriage (Barber, 1984; Matsusaka, 2005). States where the initiative is an option are more likely to have restrictive laws on abortion and to allow the death penalty. They are also more likely to have term limits and lower executive salaries.

In 1970, recalls were initiated in Connecticut following moves to integrate school systems (Zimmerman, 1997). In 2010, 57 mayors faced recall elections, with 15 resigning or losing the recall (Holeywell, 2011). These recalls can be for legitimate reasons. For example, felony charges against Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick led to an attempted recall campaign in 2008. However, other examples are much less clear-cut. In 2011, Jonestown, Colorado initiated a recall of Mayor Mark Romanowski prompted partly due to a plan to switch from diagonal to parallel parking spaces. Romanowski survived the recall (Holeywell, 2011).

The recall was intended to help rid cities of boss control, and in the years surrounding WWI, this was generally how it was used. However, they are frequently used now when people are unhappy with the outcome of an election. Opposition leaders can use the recall to speed up their opportunity to run against an official or simply bog down a mayor with so much electoral concern that he or she can't govern (Holeywell, 2011). These recall attempts can also be costly. In 2010, Mission Viejo, California spent nearly $300,000 on a special recall election. While it is certainly important to remove bad elected officials from their office, many cities are spending large sums of money for what amounts to partisan bickering.

Beyond the operation of government and hot button issues, IRR has also changed the structure of local government greatly. In fact, many changes to professional structural reforms discussed in Chapter 2 were brought about by direct democracy reforms (Bridges, 1997a). A referendum was used to establish district election in 1977 in San Antonio. More recently Modesto, California voted to switch to district based elections in 2009, and Colorado Springs voted to switch to a mayor-council system of government in

2010 and 2011. Many reformers who advocated for IRR wanted to accomplish their own goals or put themselves in power, but would see the structures used for opposite ends, providing a path for citizens unhappy with reforms to change them (Mattson, 1998; Trounstine, 2008).

The merits of these various measures, whether term limits or the minimum wage, can be debated endlessly. However, a serious issue arises when an initiative, referendum, or recall takes place that is later seen as a mistake. For example, ballot measures banning same-sex marriage were common in the early 2000s. Since then, however, public opinion has shifted dramatically, to the point where it is highly unlikely that they would pass now. Opinions on marijuana usage have followed a similar trend. Even the recall of politicians can sometimes be looked at as a mistake. When a fleeting opinion or an impulse vote is made law, it can have serious consequences for years in the future.

Conclusion

In an era of reform, elements of direct democracy became standard in many US cities. Corrupt politicians and officials loyal to party bosses had caused many to support a system which gave power directly to the citizens. The results of these direct democracy reforms have been as far reaching as they are diverse.

Critics have had concerns about these processes since their beginning. Issues of money, time, attention, expertise, and mob legislation being made law are constantly cited as problems with direct democracy. With so many problems, why even bother?

Supporters counter that direct democracy reforms are not nearly that bad. They give people a path to affect their government. People are smarter than most critics give them credit for, and courts can check unconstitutional issues and protect minority rights (although it can take a while). Unlike professional reforms, which have frequently been reversed, people generally like the IRR process, and no one wants to get rid of it. Despite concerns about special interest control, most people generally like the decisions that are made. It may even affect people's mood, as areas with more direct democracy opportunities are happier, with a greater sense of control leading to better policies (Frey & Stutzer, 2000).

The most dramatic defense of direct democracy reforms may have come from David Schmidt, who wrote that citizen lawmakers were like Prometheus, who stole the "lawmaking fire from the political gods who once monopolized it" (1989, p. vii). Despite its issues, "direct democracy keeps community life vital and public institutions accountable" (Roberts, 2004, p. 315).

However, there is certainly room for improvement. Benjamin Barber (1984) suggests having a multi-choice format rather than simply voting "yes" or "no." For example, people may vote yes, but state that the issue is not a top priority at the moment. Consulting with judges beforehand and creating a faster method for judicial review of initiatives and referenda may help avoid costly legal issues and the risk of violating minority rights.

Direct democracy, like any other form of democracy, is an ongoing process. While issues may always be present, the opportunity for democratic growth and advancement at the city level is truly great. As Frederic Howe wrote, "the initiative, the referendum, and the recall have carried democracy still further and made the city the most democratic instrument in America and in many ways the most democratic agency in the world. This was the first great step toward the redemption of the city" (1915, p. 117).

CHAPTER IV

A SURVEY OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH

The structural reforms discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 –city manager, at-large elections, non-partisan elections, initiative, referendum, and recall –have been studied for decades. Many authors have examined the relationship of these structures to local government outcomes, performance, and demographics.

One particular line of research has focused on the way these structures relate to municipal expenditures. Financial data is relatively easy to access, is quantifiable and easy to understand, and important for many concerned about government spending levels. Work on this topic has covered a wide array of times, locations, and methods. Because of this, the results and conclusions can vary greatly.

As this work seeks to examine the effects of municipal structures on spending outcomes, this body of research is especially relevant. A thorough review of the literature concerning municipal spending and efficiency will be presented. Following this, it will be shown what gaps and issues are present and what further research has been called for by past scholars. Finally, the purpose of this study will be addressed, and it will be shown how this research will fill gaps and answer calls for more research.

Professional Reform Research

The majority of the research into government structures and municipal spending has focused on the effects of professional reforms (city managers, at-large elections, non-partisan elections). The number of cities adopting these reforms rose rapidly in the first half the 20th century. Surprisingly, this rise seems to have been based largely off of theory and political ideology rather than quantifiable data. It was not until the 1960s that the first major inquiries into the role these structures played on spending and efficiency were undertaken.

One of the earliest authors to study the link between form of government and spending was Booms (1966). In his article, he mentions the lack of any hard data to back up the changes that cities were undertaking. To him, many of these changes were being made based on “hope” (p. 188). He set out to see whether the structural changes going on (specifically switching from a mayor-council form to a council-manager form) had any effect on the level of local public expenditures. Booms looked at 73 cities from Ohio and Michigan with populations between 25,000 and 100,000, and found that cities with professional managers spent less per capita than mayor led cities.

Following Booms, Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler (1967) wrote what would become the most influential study on the issue for decades. They sought to examine the impact of professional and traditional structures on local policies, specifically taxation and expenditures. They used data from 200 of the 309 U.S. cities which had more than 50,000 people at the time, and found that cities with professional structures in place spent and taxed less per capita than cities with traditional structures. The findings of Booms and Linebery and Fowler were not terribly surprising. Most expected their results. But they did give quantitative support to reform theorists, and established the idea that manager led cities were more efficient.

Decades later, Stumm and Corrigan (1998) reached a similar conclusion. In a survey of 149 US cities, they compare cities with council-manager forms of government to cities with strong mayor forms. They found that cities with the council-manager form have lower per capita expenditures and property tax rates than do cities with strong mayors.

More recently, Chapman and Gorina (2012) examined municipal government structures and state tax limits. Using data from 378 cities with at least 50,000 people, they found that city managers are more frugal than mayors, spending 8.3% less per capita.

Lyons (1978) reached a similar conclusion, but added a more thoughtful interpretation. His study of 285 cities with at least 50,000 people in both 1960 and 1970 found that cities with professional reforms did spend less. However, he attributed this to the responsiveness of governments. For him, cities with professional reforms responded to pressures that called for less spending, while cities with traditional structures responded more to calls for higher levels of spending. It was not that one was necessarily better than the other. Both forms were responsive, just to different pressures.

Other authors have reached drastically different conclusions. One of the first to examine the relationship between spending and structure was Edgar Sherbenou (1961). Comparing 24 manager led cities to 25 mayoral cities, Sherbenou found that council-manager cities spent and taxed more per capita, but also had lower debt levels. He notes that some manager cities did spend less, but the range of spending was much greater, making them much less predictable.

In a much smaller study, Nunn (1996) examines seven cities in Texas with council-manager governments and compares them to seven cities in Indiana with strong mayor forms. His findings suggest that manager cities spent more per capita on capital projects (water, sewers, roads, etc.) than did mayor led cities.

French (2004) looked at the effects of these forms on smaller cities. Most studies were limited to looking at municipalities above a certain population level (25,000 or 50,000 typically). French looked at cities below this level, studying 559 cities with populations between 2,500 and 25,000. He found that cities with the council-manager form of government spent more per capita than cities with other forms, and that services provided were not any better or worse.

Coate and Knight (2011) set out to look at fiscal policy determinations under the two main forms of government. Their results were noticeable, finding that cities led by mayors spent about 16% less per capita than those led by managers.

While these studies have led to drastically different results, many more have shown that form makes little difference at all. The first major study to do so was done by Morgan and Pelissero (1980). In this work, they used 11 matched pairs (11 cities that changed government structure and 11 that did not). They found that making a switch to a new form of government made no difference whatsoever.

A more extensive study was performed by Deho and Mehay (1987). Looking to re-examine old hypotheses, they recreated Booms’ study from 1966, looking at 73 cities with populations between 25,000 and 100,000 in Michigan and Ohio. They also studied 191 cities in the US with the same population range. They looked at basic expenditure sources (police, fire, etc.) and found no significant differences in fiscal variables. They conclude that political competition is present everywhere. Even unelected managers are accountable to an elected council. This leads them to support the median voter model. They conclude their article by writing:

> "In the debate over the optimal organization of municipal government it does not appear that simply appointing a professional city manager either mutes the forces of electoral politics or provides incentives for efficiency that did not previously exist. If matters were so simple, the urban fiscal crisis could have been solved long ago." (Deno & Mehay, 1987, p. 639)

Hayes and Chang (1990) found similar results. Looking at larger cities (greater than 150,000), they find no apparent differences in efficiency levels, as managers are not necessarily any better than executive administrators with access to the same technology and methods.

In a study of 504 American cities, Jung (2006) found no major difference in spending between the two forms, with the exception of police spending, where manager led cities spent slightly less per capita. They found that cities with the traditional mayoral structure often hired professional managers anyway, which blurred many lines of distinction between the two forms in terms of spending or performance.

In a more recent examination, Carr and Karuppusamy (2010) found further evidence of similarities in spending levels. Studying cities in Michigan, they found no link between government structure and per capita spending. They argue, as did Hayes and Chang and Jung, that cities with mayoral structures and appointed department heads can be just as professional. They find that total population of a city, its per capita income, and its intergovernmental revenues are more of a predictor for spending than is structure.

Ruhil, Schneider, Teske, and Ji (1999) found that results can even be split within sets of reforms. Using survey data, they find that city managers may be better able to enact efficiency measures than mayors, but they also found that cities with districts are better able to enact these measure than cities with at-large elections.

Other structural elements have also been added into the mix of study. MacDonald (2008) examined spending as it relates to form of government, type of council election, and also how large the council was, finding that spending levels were not related to any of them.

Using a large data set (2,310 observations) Craw (2008) writes that there is no real consensus as to whether one type of government structure spends more or less. He goes on to say that city structure may not matter as much as inter-local competition. Cities without much nearby competition may not fear raising spending as much as those surrounded by other cities.

Direct Democracy Reform Research

While much research has been done on the relationship between professional reforms and spending, much less has been done looking at how direct democracy structures affect spending. This may be because data on the topic is not as readily available as data on form of government, and not every city in the US has access to these reforms. This has steered much of the research toward California in the US (which keeps good records) and Switzerland, which is regarded as the home of modern direct democracy reforms. This literature is also much more recent. Still, while not as extensive as the literature on professional reforms, the findings on direct democracy reforms are just as diverse in terms of spending outcomes.

Looking at 2,361 small US cities, Gabrini (2010) focuses his attention not just on total spending, but on spending in specific areas. He examines per capita spending on police and public health expenditures and finds that the presence of direct democracy provisions (initiatives, referenda, and recalls) have little influence in constraining local government spending, and may actually increase it.

Gordon (2009) had similar findings. She writes that at the state level, having the initiative available is associated with lower spending, but states the need to examine these effects at the local level. Using data from California's Secretary of State, she categorized cities based on how frequently they used the initiative (low = 0, moderate = 1-2, and high = 3 or more). She found that cities with more initiatives in the 1990s had more own source revenue and higher levels of spending. In California, she writes, it may be that cities are limited in their taxing and spending options by state action (Prop 13, for example), so they rely more heavily on initiatives for financial decisions. She writes that it may also be the case that cities that spend more have more initiatives because people are upset with those levels of expenditures.

Looking at data from Switzerland, Funk and Gathmann (2011, 2013) reach the opposite conclusion. They find that direct democracy (in the form of referenda and initiatives) tends to decrease government spending. They find that increasing the signature requirements for initiatives can increase spending, while lowering the requirement lowers it (a 1% increase in required signatures leads to a .4% increase in spending, while a 1% decrease in required signatures leads to a .6% decrease). The easier it is for initiatives to qualify for the ballot, the more of them will theoretically exist and the lower spending will be. The effect of referenda is even greater. Having mandatory budget referenda in an area can decrease spending by 12%.

Still, not all authors find a connection. In an attempt to see if the Swiss analysis of spending and IRR can be applied to the US, Farnham (1990) looked at 735 cities and found that the presence of direct democracy structures had a modest to no effect on local spending.

Just as Ruhil et al. (1999) found that results can be split even within sets of reforms, Park et al. (2010) found that different direct democracy reforms can have different effects on finances. Looking at what extent revenue choices depended on direct democracy provisions in city charters, they find that the presence of the initiative may increase a city's revenue while the presence of the recall and the referendum may limit it.

And finally, John Matsusaka (2004) found that the effect of direct democracy reforms is based largely off of the views of the people. He found that from 1970-2000, the initiative led to fiscally conservative policies (spending less than non-initiative areas). From 1902-1942, however, areas with direct democracy available spent more. Direct democracy, he argues, is not ideologically liberal or conservative. He concludes that direct democracy promotes the will of the majority in spending no matter what it is.

Gaps in the Literature and Calls for Further Study

While there is a wide range of literature on the relationship between reform structures and spending, there are still several gaps that need to be addressed. The largest gap is in the literature on direct democracy. Most authors dealing with the topic only focus on the availability of direct democracy structures (whether or not a city can have an initiative, for example). However, since a large majority of cities in the US have these elements available (Matsusaka, 2004), this may not tell us much. It would be much more useful to examine what effects the actual implementation of these reforms has on spending. Presently, Gordon (2009) is the only author to study the use of direct democracy. However, her study focuses only on California and only on one element –the initiative. There is no nationwide study on their use and nothing dealing with the use of the referendum or the recall.

In dealing with professional reforms, most authors simply compare the difference between council-manager cities and mayor-council cities. Many of these authors focus on only one element of reform. No author examines all six of the major Progressive era reforms. Park et al. (2010) do examine four, adding council-manager government as a variable in their study of direct democracy, but this ignores at-large and non-partisan elections. As the results from these studies are so varied, it may be that examining these reform elements together could show some connection.

Even if all six were examined, no author comes close to comparing the two sets of reforms to determine which type is more likely to promote efficiency. Most of the studies listed simply re-examine old findings. While this is certainly valuable (and indeed, this work will do that as well), the studies do not attempt to find any more productive outlet for future research.

These gaps and the need for further research have been pointed out by many authors in the field. Calls for further study on the topic of professional reform have even grown in recent years. Booms (1966) was one of the earliest, asking future studies to look at the effect of the entrepreneurial spirit on government spending. More recently, though, Jung (2006, p. 364) stated that future study "would help politicians and practitioners in designing their preferred forms of governing arrangements." French (2004) and Craw (2008) both call for more research on efficiency. DeSantis and Renner (2002) advocate studies looking at how structural elements of government affect efficiency, equity, and effectiveness. Chapman and Gorina (2012) call for further research concerning the form of government and tax limits (especially for smaller cities). And Carr and Karuppusamy (2010) call for looking beyond only the form of government, which could include looking at direct democracy.

There are also calls for more research into direct democracy reforms. Farnham (1990) called for more tests of governmental institutions and citizen influence on local expenditures. B. E. Adams (2012) laments that we know so little about the local initiative process compared to the statewide process. Most relevant to this work however is a call by Gabrini (2010), who advocates not just for further study on the effects of the presence of direct democracy structures, but on how often they are used, as adoption of these mechanisms is not enough to constrain spending. “Researchers interested in direct democratic innovations in local government should focus on the use of the mechanisms rather than their mere presence to determine whether they exert any influence on decision making” (2010, p. 223). He also calls for taking into account the effect of professional and traditional structures. This work will address this need very closely.

Purpose of Study

The results from previous research have been decidedly mixed. Older ideas regarding spending and reform structures, particularly those that say council-manager cities spend less, are still treated as the default theory. However, recent studies have shown this theory to be much less solid than it once was. Newer studies seem even to trend towards refuting old ideas outright. Of the studies listed here, those finding that council-manager cities spend less are over eight years older on average than those showing that mayor-council cities spend less, and nearly twice as old as those finding no difference.

This dissertation will use the most current data available. The data used in even the most recent studies are now well over a decade old (Carr and Karuppusamy and Coate and Knight both use 2002 data). Much has changed since then. Financial crises, pension and budget shortfalls, and municipal bankruptcies have all changed the landscape that these cities operate in. Updating the debate with new data will show where things stand now.

The fact that results are so hard to determine may also show the need to look at the debate from a new angle. The new angle in this case will be the addition of the use of direct democracy structures. Overall there is much less research on direct democracy reforms than on professional reforms as it relates to spending, and still less research on their use. While this limited amount of attention does not constitute a gap necessarily, the field would benefit from further research. Studying what effect the use of these elements has on spending will be very useful.

One of the most useful things this study will do is to establish a dataset of direct democracy measures. It is possible that so little work has been done because so little information is readily accessible. There is no nationwide database of local direct democracy measures. Some states keep records of their own, but this number is exceptionally low, and only a few had statewide records of local elections available. For this dissertation, I have created an extensive list of local ballot measures to help study their effects on local spending.

Improvements in government administration at all levels and for all structures have taken place. Old data and theories may no longer apply, and may give scholars and practitioners misleading information. A newer study will help to determine if the pattern established by the literature is continuing, and could help to change former ideas or settle current debates. This dissertation will attempt to accomplish just that. The calls by scholars, as well as the benefits for practitioners, provide more than adequate justification for this study. A more extensive examination such as this could also provide a framework for scholars to use when researching other developing forms of governance structures and how they relate to spending.

CHAPTER V

DATA AND FINDINGS

As stated in the last chapter, the goal of this dissertation is to examine the effects of structural reform elements on municipal spending using the most current data available. Older studies have shown mixed results, and older ideas are still treated as theory despite new evidence. Even the most recent studies are now out of date, and much has changed in the world of municipal finance. This study will serve as a much needed update.

As the debate has become more muddled, a new angle is also needed. While previous studies have examined whether or not direct democracy measures were available for a city's use, this study is more interested in how frequently they have been employed. As mentioned earlier, the fact that so many cities have these processes available makes it hard to determine what effect they actually have. If the presence of these elements does not explain differences in city action, perhaps their use will.

Research Design and Hypotheses

To determine the effects of structural reform elements, this dissertation will employ linear regression models in a single year financial study. A one year study of municipal spending is standard in the literature (Booms, 1966; Carr & Karuppusamy, 2010; Chapman & Gorina, 2012; Craw, 2008; Gabrini, 2010; Hayes & Chang, 1990; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Salisbury & Black, 1963; Sherbenou, 1961; Stumm &

Corrigan, 1998). Data on expenditures will be analyzed with information on the structural elements of general purpose municipalities, specifically professional and direct democracy reform elements.

The primary dependent variable being examined is government spending. More specifically, we are interested in per capita expenditures, which is the standard method for examining spending in municipalities (Booms, 1966; Carr & Karuppusamy, 2010; Chapman & Gorina, 2012; Coate & Knight, 2011; Craw, 2008; French, 2004; Funk & Gathmann, 2011; Gabrini, 2010; Jung, 2006; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; MacDonald, 2008; Morgan & Pelissero, 1980; Nunn, 1996; Sherbenou, 1961; Stumm & Corrigan, 1998).

This variable is typically used to measure efficiency (Booms, 1966; Chapman & Gorina, 2012; Deno & Mehay, 1987; French, 2004; Hayes & Chang, 1990; Jung, 2006; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Morgan & Pelissero, 1980; Stumm & Corrigan, 1998). As stated in Chapter 1 this is more a measure of spending than of actual efficiency. Whether it is called spending or efficiency, the results are comparable and will fit with the existing literature.

In addition to looking at overall spending, I will also examine the levels of police and social service spending to see what effects these structures may have not just on how much money is spent but on what it is spent on. Looking at spending in specific policy areas has been done by Gabrini (2010) and Morgan and Pelissero (1980). Social services include expenditures on public welfare, hospitals, and health issues. Police and social service spending will be examined by per capita expenditures as well as a percent of overall spending.

The main explanatory variables being studied are the reform elements of government (professional and direct democracy), but several demographic and financial control variables will be included as well. This will provide a wide range of factors to determine what may affect spending levels.

The primary question which will be explored is whether or not local government structures have an effect on spending. Research related to these questions has led to mixed results. Those who find that reformed cities spend less argue that the professional structure of these cities helps eliminate wasteful spending. Some argue that in traditional cities, there can be political incentives to keep spending and taxes low to please voters or increase spending to satisfy interest groups. Others argue that there is no statistical difference whatsoever. Much less work has been done concerning direct democracy reforms, and likewise, the results have been mixed. The common view may now be stated to be that there is no significant difference based on these structural elements. This leads us to our first set of hypotheses.

H_0: There is no significant difference in terms of spending between reformed and traditional local governments.

H_{0A}: There is no significant difference in terms of spending between cities based on the use of direct democracy elements.

In addition to overall spending, this dissertation will examine police and social service spending, both overall and as a percentage of total spending. There is little existing research, so the assumption is there is no difference.

H_{0B}: There is no significant difference in terms of proportions of total expenditures or overall spending for police relating to structural elements.

H_{0C}: There is no significant difference in terms of proportions of total expenditures or overall spending for social services relating to structural elements.

However, while the literature as a whole suggests that there is little difference in terms of spending, more recent studies have indicated that traditional elements may in fact lower spending levels. Using this, we arrive at the first alternate hypothesis of the dissertation.

H_1: The presence of traditional structures is related to a city's expenditures.

This hypothesis can be established based on the trajectory of the literature. Cities justified much of the adoption of reform elements through arguments of professionalization. While this may have given those cities an advantage early on, it can hardly be argued that current traditional cities do not hire or have no access to professional employees. This would negate much of the advantage of reformed cities, which, along with the possible political motivation to keep costs low and services at desired standards, could tip the scale in favor of traditional cities.

A second alternate hypothesis concerns the use of direct democracy elements. The use of initiatives, referenda, and recalls (IRR) would seem to indicate an active and involved citizenry. This could imply a government that is creative and focused on the needs of its residents. While this may raise spending in some areas, it could just as easily lower it in others. This would support H_{0A}. But the fact that policy may be catered towards citizens' actual needs may shift the focus of that spending. While overall spending may not change, there may be a real difference in where that money goes. This should be evident when looking at the difference in spending for police and social services.

H_2: While no overall difference in spending will exist, direct democracy elements are related to spending priorities.

Combining these hypotheses, I am proposing that traditional government structures will lower spending, while direct democracy structures will shift the spending priorities of citizens.

Data

To find out financial information, most authors have relied on spending data from the Census survey of State and Local Governments released every five years. However, due to budget issues, this data was not made available for 2012. Instead, financial data came from the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, which provided data on 112 of the largest cities in the United States for the year 2012. The Lincoln Institute (LI) is no stranger to the study of how structures affect spending, having funded studies by Park et al. (2010) and McCabe and Feiock (2005). Of the 112 cities the LI provided information for, 111 were used (Washington D.C. was thrown out due to structural differences, specifically not being a part of a state).

The Lincoln Institute provides a database of Fiscally Standardized Cities, which was developed to facilitate more accurate financial comparisons across municipalities. This measure is designed to account for differences in spending responsibilities, as service delivery is structured differently depending on which city is being studied. This creates a standard measure to compare municipal finances. To do this, the Lincoln Institute combines the spending of general purpose municipal governments with a proportional share of the spending done by overlaying governments based on population.

This provides a more complete picture of the taxes raised from citizens and businesses and the spending done on their behalf.

The Lincoln Institute does note that the data is not perfect, as it would be nearly impossible to determine the exact level of per capita spending in so many municipalities. However, this is not fundamentally different from issues found in Census data. While not perfect, the financial data is sound and reasonable. Information regarding police and social service spending also came from the Lincoln Institute.

Data concerning government structures came from the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) , which conducts the Municipal Form of Government Survey every five years. This is the primary source for almost any researcher on the subject. The 2011 survey was used for this dissertation. The survey provided information on form of government, type of elections, and availability of IRR measures. As the survey is voluntary, the response rate can sometimes be lacking. Holes is the data were filled by looking at city charters. Most cities in the study had charters accessible through either the American Legal Publishing Company or the Municipal Code Corporation, two extensive databases of city charters, codes, and ordinances. This provided an update of the data used in previous studies.

For professional reforms, ICMA data was used to determine which reform elements were present in each city. Cities were classified as being either mayor-council or council-manager and partisan or non-partisan. Cities could also hold elections using districts, at-large, or a mix of the two, with some municipal representatives being elected by districts and others elected at-large. The data did not lend itself to looking at all three types of election forms. Because of this, cities with mixed elections were combined with cities holding only at-large elections. In both of these types, candidates are elected at large. The literature has argued this gives more of an advantage to wealthier, white candidates and blunts the electoral effectiveness of minorities.

Combining these professional elements, a variable was created for overall level of reform, similar to Lineberry and Fowler (1967). This was used to see if cities that adopted more professional reforms had any noticeable changes in spending. A score of 1 was given for each professional reform adopted. Cities with mixed elections were given half of a point as a way to include the effect of that form of election. Cities were given a score from 0 (no professional reforms) to 3 (three professional reforms).

In looking at the use of direct democracy measures in these cities, a new database had to be created. There is currently no national level database for the use of direct democracy measures. Some states such as California, Virginia, and Ohio keep records of local elections at the state level. One website, Ballotpedia, makes an admirable attempt at aggregating election data, but these records are far from complete and in no way official.

To create this list, I contacted Secretaries of State, County Clerks, or City Clerks, depending on what office was responsible for overseeing elections and keeping records. I also went through sample ballots and election results for every election held in each of the 111 cities from 2007-2012. The result was a list of 869 direct democracy measures that qualified for the ballot in those municipalities, the first national level data on the frequency of use. Of the 111 cities, 93 had at least one form of IRR on the ballot. This time period was chosen to account for issues of causation. This dissertation is meant to look at how structural elements, including the use of direct democracy, affect spending.

Using past ballot measures would show how they affect spending, and ensure that it is not spending which is affecting ballot measure usage.

Data for the control variables used came primarily from the 2010 Census. Population was included to determine if larger cities had greater expenditures than smaller cities. It has also been suggested that larger cities will use more direct democracy measures, as they are typically more diverse. This would make it less likely that everyone’s needs will be met through ordinary legislative processes, and more likely that ballot measures will be used.

Race was included to determine any impact that diversity may have on spending or direct democracy measures. For this measure, the percentage of a city classified as white only, not Hispanic or Latino was used. This was chosen due to differences in minority population across the country.

Age is listed as the percentage of a city’s population that is 65 years old or older. Age was included to see what effect an aging population may have on the level of social service spending, and because it has been argued that older citizens are more politically active, and that spending may cater more to their needs.

As the study will look at government expenditures, another variable will be income. This was included for the fact that cities with higher incomes may have more tax dollars to spend. For this measure, Census data of per capita income for the past 12 months (2009-2013) was used. This helps guard against short term changes in the economy and gives a more accurate picture of the income of a city’s residents.

Education was also included, given as the percentage of residents 25 and older with at least a Bachelor’s Degree. Any linkage to education and spending may show a relationship between higher education and a desire for better government service provision.

The final control variable concerns the relationship and control that state governments exercise over their cities. This is measured by whether or not a state is considered a Home Rule state or a Dillon's Rule state. In Dillon's Rule states (named after 19th century Judge John F. Dillon), state governments are able to control local government structure, financing, and authority. In Home Rule states, however, more power is given to municipalities. Data for this measure came from the National League of Cities. Most states were fairly straightforward about their classification. Others were more complicated. Alabama employs Dillon's Rule only in regards to counties. California charter cities are under Home Rule, which includes all of the state's cities studied except Fremont. Florida's rules are mixed, but since Home Rule laws do not apply to taxes, they were classified as Dillon's Rule. Nashville is under Dillon's Rule, while the other three Tennessee cities studied are not. Louisiana cities are classified based on whether they were chartered before or after 1974. Indiana employs Dillon's Rule for townships only.

An attempt was made to test for political culture using Daniel Elazar's methodology. This was attempted to see if different cultures in different cities brought about different results. However, this was excluded due to problems it caused with the rest of the data. Even without other data being examined, culture was not found to be statistically significant.

Rules Regarding Structural Elements

For the most part this information was straight forward, though a few cities stood out. Portland was the only city without either a mayor-council or council-manager system of government, having a commission form instead. Anchorage and Spokane in some situations have multiple councilmembers representing the same district.

As far as the availability of IRR, almost all cities studied had these structural elements available (91 had the initiative, 102 had the referendum, 88 had the recall, and 85 have all three). However, the rules regarding their use vary greatly. Some cities only allowed initiatives for changes to the city charter while others covered any sort of ordinance. Many cities prohibit referenda on the budget or on capital projects.

There is also a wide range of signature requirements for getting a measure placed on a ballot. Some cities require a certain percentage of the population, while others focus on registered voters. This can be a percentage of the total number registered or a percentage of the total voters who turned out in a previous election. Due to these different signature thresholds, the use of IRR may be practically limited, even if technically available. This further supports the effort to examine how frequently direct democracy measures are actually used rather than simply whether or not they are available.

There were also restrictions on recall elections. In most areas, a recall could not happen at the beginning or the end of an elected official’s term (usually the first or last six months).

How Democratic Are Direct Democracy Measures?

One concern regarding direct democracy mechanisms is that in some cases they may be required by state and local law. The volume of direct democracy measures may be more related to the state’s relationship to municipalities than the municipalities’ relationships to their citizens. If this is the case, can they really be considered all that democratic?

I would argue that this does not pose any issue to the democratic nature of these measures. Even if a measure is required, the people still get to vote. By having the opportunity to make that decision, they act as legislators, and, as discussed in Chapter 3, may grow to become more informed about laws. This is similar to arguments made for automatic voter registration.

What Did the Measures Do?

Citizens voted on a wide array of topics during this time. Most were fairly routine, although some were quite consequential, causing opponents and proponents to face off in often heated campaigns.

A large percentage of the measures passed by cities in this time period were bond measures, focused on approving or rejecting government spending. Sometimes this was new spending, while in other cases it was a continuation of spending that was already taking place. Where legal, taxes on marijuana were extremely popular (cities in California passed six and cities in Colorado passed two). Other tax measures received mixed support. Cities were split on hotel taxes, and property tax increases appeared unpopular across the country. And while not certain, police, fire, and other public safety measures were likely to pass.

Another large portion of ballot measures were simply attempts to modernize codes, ordinances, or charter language. This updating of language also included updating tax codes (taxing cell phones rather than just landlines, for instance).

More relevant to this study, several cities changed their procedures for direct democracy reforms. Corpus Christi (2010), Albuquerque (2007), Akron (2009, 2010), Chattanooga (2012), Memphis (2008), El Paso (2007), and Houston (2012) all voted to change the way citizens voted on ballot measures in their city.

Another group of ballot measures relevant to this study dealt with changes to professional reforms. The cities of Springfield (2007), Detroit (2009), Warren (2010), and Colorado Springs (2011) all switched from at-large elections to a mixed system, with some councilmembers elected from districts and others elected at-large. Colorado Springs also switched to a mayor-council form of government (2011). Modesto (2008) switched entirely to district based elections. Austin (2012) switched to district elections and a mayor-council form of government. The lone city to move in the direction of professional reforms was Tulsa, which failed to pass a referendum switching to a council-manager form of government in 2010, but passed an initiative switching to non-partisan elections.

Other measures were not as typical, and often meant to make a political point. Referenda were passed in Madison, Wisconsin (2011) and San Francisco (2012) declaring that corporations are not people. A pair of San Francisco initiatives in 2008 attempted to rename public facilities: a sewage treatment plant after George W. Bush and Alcatraz as a Global Peace Center. The most unique measure, however, was from Denver in 2010, where an initiative attempted to establish an Extraterrestrial Affairs Commission to help protect residents from aliens and their vehicles.

These measures were often very close, and not always well accepted by citizens. A 2009 recall of a Nashville city councilor succeeded by just two votes, and two referenda in 2010 in Memphis reversed referenda passed in 2008.

In the years studied, there were only nine recall campaigns that qualified for the ballot in the cities being examined. Of those, only one, the Nashville recall mentioned above, was successful, and that only by two votes.

It should be noted that due to wording, supporters of some topics could wind up taking opposing views. The 2011 Public Transit referendum in Cincinnati, for example, was actually an anti-transit measure. Supporters of transit had to vote “No” on a public transit measure. Often in these situations, a “Yes” is a “No” and a “No” is a “Yes”.

What Does the Data Show?

Looking at the data gives us a glimpse of the structure of municipal government where a large number of Americans live. Nearly one fifth of the US population lives in these municipalities, not including the metropolitan areas. Table 1 provides data on per capita expenditures. The data for direct expenditures, police spending, and social service spending are all skewed right.

Table 1

Per Capita Expenditures 2012

	Mean	**Median**	**SD**	**IQR**	**N**
Direct Expenditures	$6,037	$5,889	1,769.27	2,265	111
Police Spending	$371	$359	122.67	142	111
Social Service Spending	$615	$430	636.59	664	111

Table 2 provides information on governmental structures present in cities. While it has been suggested that the council-manager structure is more popular overall in the US, the mayor-council form is much more common among large cities, with 68 municipalities having that form. This is the only traditional reform element that was more common. Non-partisan elections were much more common than partisan elections (88-23) and 75 cities had some form of at-large election for council members. Cities adopted 1.57 of the three reform elements on average, with a median of 1.5.

Table 2

Professional Reforms

Form of Government	Mayor-Council = 68	Council-Manager = 42	n = 110
Partisan or Non-Partisan	Partisan = 23	Non-Partisan = 88	n = 111
District or At-Large/Mixed	District = 36	At-Large = 75	n =111
	Mean	**Median**	**N**
Level of Reform	1.57	1.5	111

Table 3 presents information concerning direct democracy reforms. These elements are present in most cities, with the referendum being the most commonly available, most commonly used, and most commonly passed. The average city had 2.53 of these reforms available to use. There were 784 referenda on ballots in these 111 cities, which was over nine times more than initiatives and recalls combined. There were 76 initiatives in the cities used for the dissertation. Only nine cities had a recall election qualify for the ballot, and only one of those passed. These numbers were pulled upwards by a few cities with high rates of direct democracy measures. San Francisco, for example, had 82 total measures on the ballot. Anchorage and Albuquerque each had 50, and Baltimore had 43. However, the median number was just 4. Overall, direct democracy measures had a fairly high success rate. Measures that were placed on the ballot had a 79% mean success rate, with a median success rate of 89%. The mean number of successful measures was 6.29 per city, with the median being 3.

Table 3

Direct Democracy Reforms

Initiative Available	Yes = 91	No = 20	n = 111			
Referendum Available	Yes = 102	No = 9	n = 111			
Recall Available	Yes = 88	No = 23	n = 111			
Total Direct Democracy Measures Available	Mean = 2.53	Median = 3.00	n = 111			
	Total	**Mean**	**Median**	**SD**	**IQR**	**n**
Initiatives	76	0.68	0.00	1.84	1.00	111
Initiative Approved	41	0.37	0.00	0.93	0.00	111
Referenda	784	7.06	4.00	10.38	9.00	111
Referenda Approved	656	5.91	3.00	8.70	7.00	111
Recalls	9	0.08	0.00	0.27	0.00	111
Recalls Approved	1	0.01	0.00	0.09	0.00	111
Total Direct Democracy Measures	869	7.83	4.00	11.52	9.00	111
Total Successful Measures	698	6.29	3.00	9.08	7.00	111
Success Rate		0.79	0.89	0.27	0.33	93

Table 4

Other Variables

	Home Rule = 45	Dillon’s Rule = 66	n = 111			
	Total	**Mean**	**Median**	**SD**	**IQR**	**n**
Population	60,320,609	543,429	319,294	887,351.43	374,025.50	111
Race (% white only)		46.07%	45.60%	17.18	24.35	111

Age (% 65 and older)		11.01%	10.90%	2.03	2.20	111
Income		$25,632	$24,766	5,925.60	6,056.00	111
Education (% 25 and older with at least a bachelor's degree)		29.61%	28.90%	9.40	10.10	111

Table 4 lists the demographic and control variables. As a whole, these cities are much younger, much more diverse, and about as well educated as the rest of the country. Incomes were generally lower than the nation as a whole, but these numbers did not necessarily include their often wealthier suburban areas. More cities were classified as being in Dillon's Rule states (66-45).

For the relationships between individual variables and spending levels, correlation matrices were produced and two-sample T-tests were done for the four nominal variables. Correlations for the other nine variables are presented in Table 5, with significance levels indicated. There is a significant positive correlation between spending and population (p<.0001), and with race and total initiatives (p<.01 for both). Income, the total number of referenda, and the overall level of reform were also significant (p<.05). The level of reform and race were negatively associated with spending. All other significant variables were positively associated

Table 6 shows the relationship between direct spending per capita and the three professional reforms, as well as whether or not a city operates under Home Rule. In this analysis, form of government is significant (p<.01), with manager led cities spending around $878 less than mayor led cities. The difference between voting in district or at-large elections is marginally significant (p<.1), with district based cities spending around

$783 more. Looking at these variables, it would appear that professional reforms tend to be associated with lower per capita spending in cities.

Table 5

Correlation Matrix, Direct Spending

	Direct Spending	*Level of Reform*	*Total Initiatives*	*Total Referenda*	*Total Recalls*	*Population*	*Race*	*Age*	*Income*	*Education*
Direct Spending	1									
Level of Reform	-0.22678*	1								
Total Initiatives	0.289821**	0.039795	1							
Total Referenda	0.194222*	-0.06799	0.54998	1						
Total Recalls	-0.04908	-0.02337	-0.03898	0.103641	1					
Population	0.392802***	-0.1437	0.044241	0.050267	-0.01288	1				
Race	-0.25852**	0.028687	0.054558	-0.03827	0.010822	-0.1788	1			
Age	0.051997	-0.28546	0.05077	0.069758	0.028332	-0.06615	0.061372	1		
Income	0.224486*	0.129629	0.394188	0.283438	-0.04316	0.176027	0.316444	-0.08617	1	
Education	0.128662	0.036358	0.243995	0.114793	-0.04731	0.106762	0.346981	-0.2351	0.860833	1

Signif. codes: *** = 0.001, ** = 0.01, * = 0.05
Significance indicators shown only for direct spending

Table 6

Two Sample T-Tests, Direct Spending Per Capita

	Mean	**Mean**	**T Score**	**DF**	**P-Value**
Form of Government	5495.833 (Manager)	6373.824 (Mayor)	-2.87	107.97	.0050 **
District/ At-large	6565.972 (District)	5783.453 (At-large)	1.91	49.358	.06144 †
Partisan/ Non-Partisan	5951.136 (Non-Partisan)	6366.696 (Partisan)	-.850	28.832	.4023
Home Rule/ Dillon's Rule	5845.985 (Dillon's)	6317.756 (Home Rule)	-1.34	84.551	.1824

Signif. codes: ** = 0.01, † = 0.1

Table 7 is the correlation matrix for police spending per capita. Race and population are both significant (p<.01), and income and referenda are marginally significant (p<.1). As in Table 5, race is negatively correlated with spending, while population, income, and total referenda are positively associated.

Table 8 shows the relationship between the four nominal variables and the level of police spending per capita. Form of government is once again significant (p<.05), with manager led cities spending around $46 less per capita on police than those led by mayors. Voting in at-large elections was again found to be marginally significant (p<.1), with those cities spending less. It should be noted that the third professional reform, non-partisan elections, does not seem remotely significant for spending levels in any model. Party labels in municipal elections do not appear to have any correlation to or effect on spending outcomes, whether they are for police, social services, or simply overall per capita spending. While proponents may have other arguments for non-partisan elections, per capita expenditures do not appear to be one of them.

Table 7

Correlation Matrix, Police Spending Per Capita

	Police Spending	*Level of Reform*	*Total Initiatives*	*Total Referenda*	*Total Recalls*	*Population*	*Race*	*Age*	*Income*	*Education*
Police Spending	1									
Level of Reform	-0.14862	1								
Total Initiatives	0.011749	0.039795	1							
Total Referenda	0.167497†	-0.06799	0.54998	1						
Total Recalls	-0.06787	-0.02337	-0.03898	0.103641	1					
Population	0.250647**	-0.1437	0.044241	0.050267	-0.01288	1				
Race	-0.30434**	0.028687	0.054558	-0.03827	0.010822	-0.1788	1			
Age	0.064726	-0.28546	0.05077	0.069758	0.028332	-0.06615	0.061372	1		
Income	0.15463†	0.129629	0.394188	0.283438	-0.04316	0.176027	0.316444	-0.08617	1	
Education	0.096646	0.036358	0.243995	0.114793	-0.04731	0.106762	0.346981	-0.2351	0.860833	1

Signif. codes: ** = 0.01, † = 0.1
Significance indicators shown only for police spending

Table 8

Two Sample T-Tests, Police Spending Per Capita

	Mean	**Mean**	**T Score**	**DF**	**P-Value**
Form of Government	342.9524 (Manager)	388.7353 (Mayor)	-2.01	99.083	0.0477 *
District/ At-large	401.4444 (District)	356.2400 (At-large)	1.84	68.993	0.0707 †
Partisan/ Non-Partisan	369.3750 (Non-Partisan)	376.7391 (Partisan)	-0.21	28.58	0.8319
Home Rule/ Dillon's Rule	367.7273 (Dillon's)	375.5556 (Home Rule)	-0.35	108.89	0.7264

Signif. codes: * = 0.05, † = 0.1

Table 9

Two Sample T-Tests, Social Service Spending Per Capita

	Mean	**Mean**	**T Score**	**DF**	**P-Value**
Form of Government	608.2143 (Manager)	621.6029 (Mayor)	-0.12	106.04	0.9086
District/ At-large	787.0833 (District)	533.1333 (At-large)	1.64	45.139	0.1083
Partisan/ Non-Partisan	627.9432 (Non-Partisan)	567.8696 (Partisan)	0.42	36.582	0.677
Home Rule/ Dillon's Rule	571.8182 (Dillon's)	679.5556 (Home Rule)	-0.90	102.18	0.3721

Table 10

Correlation Matrix, Social Service Spending Per Capita

	Social Service Spending	*Level of Reform*	*Total Initiatives*	*Total Referenda*	*Total Recalls*	*Population*	*Race*	*Age*	*Income*	*Education*
Social Service Spending	1									
Level of Reform	-0.03105	1								
Total Initiatives	0.284502**	0.039795	1							
Total Referenda	0.152407	-0.06799	0.54998	1						
Total Recalls	-0.01617	-0.02337	-0.03898	0.103641	1					
Population	0.204706*	-0.1437	0.044241	0.050267	-0.01288	1				
Race	-0.20489*	0.028687	0.054558	-0.03827	0.010822	-0.1788	1			
Age	0.043504	-0.28546	0.05077	0.069758	0.028332	-0.06615	0.061372	1		
Income	0.137019	0.129629	0.394188	0.283438	-0.04316	0.176027	0.316444	-0.08617	1	
Education	0.026975	0.036358	0.243995	0.114793	-0.04731	0.106762	0.346981	-0.2351	0.860833	1

Signif. codes: ** = 0.01, * = 0.05
Significance indicators shown only for social service spending

Table 9 presents the results of a T-test done for social service spending. Unlike direct spending and police spending, social service spending levels do not appear to be associated with professional reforms. Table 10 shows correlations with the level of social service spending per capita. Population and race are significant (p<.05), as is the number of initiatives (p<.01), with race being negatively correlated to social service spending and population and initiatives positively correlated.

When looking at the percentage of overall spending that goes toward police service (Tables 11 and 12), the number of initiatives are the only variable with any significance (p<.1), and they are negatively associated with the percent of spending for police. Looking at percentage going towards social services (Tables 13 and 14), race (p<.05) and initiatives (p<.1) are both significant, with race being negatively associated and initiatives being positively associated.

Looking simply at the bivariate analyses, it would appear that cities with professional reforms spend less overall, with city managers, at-large elections, and the overall level of reform being associated with lower spending. The use of direct democracy structures is associated with higher spending levels overall. Referenda were associated with greater police spending, while initiatives were associated with greater social service spending and a lower percentage of spending for police. For structural variables, non-partisan elections and recall use were not significant. For the demographic variables, cities with higher white populations tend to spend less per capita than more diverse areas and larger cities tend to spend more. Cities also spent more as per capita incomes rose. Age and education were not significant. It is also interesting to note that in none of these models was a city being classified as Home Rule or Dillon's Rule significant. Despite some cities having more freedom for taxing and spending purposes, there appears to be little real difference in how they spend.

Table 11

Correlation Matrix, Percent Police Spending

	Percent Police Spending	*Level of Reform*	*Total Initiatives*	*Total Referenda*	*Total Recalls*	*Population*	*Race*	*Age*	*Income*	*Education*
Percent Police Spending	1									
Level of Reform	0.034034	1								
Total Initiatives	-0.15677†	0.039795	1							
Total Referenda	0.104596	-0.06799	0.54998	1						
Total Recalls	-0.02202	-0.02337	-0.03898	0.103641	1					
Population	-0.07599	-0.1437	0.044241	0.050267	-0.01288	1				
Race	-0.06476	0.028687	0.054558	-0.03827	0.010822	-0.1788	1			
Age	0.073363	-0.28546	0.05077	0.069758	0.028332	-0.06615	0.061372	1		
Income	0.005764	0.129629	0.394188	0.283438	-0.04316	0.176027	0.316444	-0.08617	1	
Education	0.017049	0.036358	0.243995	0.114793	-0.04731	0.106762	0.346981	-0.2351	0.860833	1

Signif codes: † = .1

Significance indicators shown only for percentage police spending

Table 12

Two Sample T-Tests, Percentage Police Spending

	Mean	Mean	T Score	DF	P-Value
Form of Government	0.06362858 (Manager)	0.06281198 (Mayor)	0.23	90.437	0.8169
District/ At-large	0.06416298 (District)	0.06253499 (At-large)	0.43	65.34	0.6651
Partisan/ Non-Partisan	0.06367511 (Non-Partisan)	0.06072091 (Partisan)	0.63	30.6	0.5324
Home Rule/ Dillon's Rule	0.06404211 (Dillon's)	0.06162692 (Home Rule)	0.73	108.39	0.4646

Table 13

Two Sample T-Tests, Percentage Social Service Spending

	Mean	Mean	T Score	DF	P-Value
Form of Government	0.10308844 (Manager)	0.08775053 (Mayor)	1.04	96.684	0.3015
District/ At-large	0.10474095 (District)	0.08815999 (At-large)	0.94	52.755	0.3518
Partisan/ Non-Partisan	0.09844523 (Non-Partisan)	0.07476057 (Partisan)	1.45	40.147	0.154
Home Rule/ Dillon's Rule	0.08924802 (Dillon's)	0.09982897 (Home Rule)	-0.72	100.91	0.4744

Table 14

Correlation Matrix, Percent Social Service Spending

	Percent Social Spending	*Level of Reform*	*Total Initiatives*	*Total Referenda*	*Total Recalls*	*Population*	*Race*	*Age*	*Income*	*Education*
Percent Social Spending	1									
Level of Reform	0.097217	1								
Total Initiatives	0.168487†	0.039795	1							
Total Referenda	0.042019	-0.06799	0.54998	1						
Total Recall	0.005122	-0.02337	-0.03898	0.103641	1					
Population	0.095884	-0.1437	0.044241	0.050267	-0.01288	1				
Race	-0.19288*	0.028687	0.054558	-0.03827	0.010822	-0.1788	1			
Age	-0.01115	-0.28546	0.05077	0.069758	0.028332	-0.06615	0.061372	1		
Income	0.072345	0.129629	0.394188	0.283438	-0.04316	0.176027	0.316444	-0.08617	1	
Education	-0.00951	0.036358	0.243995	0.114793	-0.04731	0.106762	0.346981	-0.2351	0.860833	1

Signif codes: * = .05, † = .1
Significance indicators shown only for percent social service spending

Multivariate Findings

This dissertation analyzes the relationship between spending and structural variables using standard linear regression. The first multivariate model was done using direct spending per capita as the dependent variable, with the results in Table 15.

> Direct Spending = a + Form Dummy + Partisan Dummy + District Dummy + Level of Reform + Initiatives + Referenda + Recalls + Home Rule Dummy + Population + Age + Race + Income + Education

Table 15

Multivariate Analysis of Direct Spending

	Estimate	**T-Value**	**P-Value**
Intercept	4986	2.20	0.0301 *
Mayor-Council or Council-Manager	572.4	0.55	0.5848
Partisan or Non-Partisan	-121.1	-0.11	0.9119
District or At-large	-71.70	-0.11	0.9138
Level of Reform	-189.6	-0.20	0.8449
Total Initiatives	218.0	2.15	0.0341 *
Total Referenda	-12.44	-0.68	0.4968
Total Recalls	-194.1	-0.36	0.7212
Home Rule or Dillon's Rule	239.1	0.75	0.4577
Population	.00053	2.98	0.0036 **
Age	16.64	0.20	0.8417
Race	-29.06	-2.99	0.0035 **
Income	.09944	1.65	0.1023
Education	-25.65	-0.70	0.4855

n = 110
R^2 = .3588
Signif. codes: ** = 0.01, * = 0.05

According to the model, the number of initiatives was significant at the .05 level. Each additional initiative that qualified to be placed on the ballot in a city correlates to a $218 increase in per capita spending. Two control variables were also seen as significant. Population was statistically significant and had positive association with per capita expenditures. While each additional person in a city raised spending by just .053¢, this could add up quickly with larger cities. Race was also significant, with less money spent per capita as a city got less diverse (more white). Age, income, and education were not significant demographic factors in the model. With the exception of the total number of initiatives, no structural or financial variable was statistically significant. This would appear to support the broad view that professional reform structures do not affect levels of local spending, but would indicate that at least one direct democracy structure is associated with higher spending.

The next models examined police spending and social service spending per capita to determine if the presence of these structures affected in what areas money was spent.

> Police Spending = a + Form Dummy + Partisan Dummy + District Dummy + Level of Reform + Initiatives + Referenda + Recalls + Home Rule Dummy + Population + Age + Race + Income + Education

> Social Service Spending = a + Form Dummy + Partisan Dummy + District Dummy + Level of Reform + Initiatives + Referenda + Recalls + Home Rule Dummy + Population + Age + Race + Income + Education

Table 16 shows the results for police spending and Table 17 for social services. In both models, only two variables were determined to be significant: race and the total number of initiatives that qualified for the ballot. Race was only marginally significant to social service spending, and the number of initiatives was only marginally significant for police spending.

Race followed a similar pattern in both models as it did for overall expenditures in Table 15. As cities grew less diverse (higher percentage of whites), per capita spending went down in both police and social service categories ($2.60 and $7.40 respectively)

Initiatives, though, showed something interesting in terms of this study. As the number of initiatives in a city grew, the amount spent on police went down (about $13 per capita per additional initiative). But with each additional initiative, social service spending went up by nearly $98. The data appears to show that initiatives are associated with changes in where money is spent in municipalities, with an inclination to spend more on social services than on police. No other demographic, or structural variables were found to be significant.

Table 16

Multivariate Analysis of Police Spending

	Estimate	**T-Value**	**P-Value**
Intercept	282.1	1.68	0.0969 †
Mayor-Council or Council-Manager	38.52	0.50	0.6207
Partisan or Non-Partisan	-43.47	-0.54	0.5931
District or At-large	-5.921	-0.12	0.9042
Level of Reform	-11.27	-0.16	0.8757
Total Initiatives	-13.39	-1.78	0.0788 †
Total Referenda	1.860	1.37	0.1729
Total Recalls	-42.60	-1.06	0.2931
Home Rule or Dillon's Rule	-11.87	-0.50	0.6196
Population	.00001702	1.29	0.2004
Age	5.275	0.85	0.3950
Race	-2.610	-3.62	0.0005 ***
Income	.006599	1.47	0.1439
Education	-.5353	-0.20	0.8445

n = 110
$R^2 = .263$
Signif. codes: *** = 0.001, † = 0.1

Table 17

Multivariate Analysis of Social Service Spending

	Estimate	**T-Value**	**P-Value**
Intercept	388.7	0.43	0.6699
Mayor-Council or Council-Manager	93.71	0.22	0.8235
Partisan or Non-Partisan	80.57	0.18	0.8545
District or At-large	-337.3	-1.27	0.2065
Level of Reform	146.6	0.38	0.7066
Total Initiatives	97.83	2.40	0.0182 *
Total Referenda	-5.953	-0.81	0.4180
Total Recalls	-6.016	-0.03	0.9780
Home Rule or Dillon's Rule	24.49	0.19	0.8495
Population	.00008992	1.26	0.2105
Age	11.56	0.35	0.7296
Race	-7.424	-1.91	0.0597 †
Income	.02657	1.10	0.2750
Education	-13.62	-0.93	0.3568

n = 110
R^2 = .2017
Signif. codes: * = 0.05, † = 0.1

Similar to the last models, I also examined police and social service spending as a percentage of overall expenditures. The results are in Tables 18 and 19. Looking at totals can be useful, but looking at percentages can help show the priority that cities place on each area. Of the cities studied, St. Louis has the highest percentage of overall spending on police (just over 12.5%), showing that police spending may be prioritized more there than in other places, while Worcester, Massachusetts spent essentially 0% on social services ($1 per capita). Flint, Michigan was an interesting case. In 2012, it had the highest percentage of social service spending (48%) and the lowest percentage of police spending (2.7%).

A high or low rate of spending in one area does not necessarily indicate the desirability of such services, however. A city's percentage of police spending may be higher or lower based on the level of spending in other areas. Because of this, it is helpful to look at both spending percentages and overall spending levels.

> % Police = a + Form Dummy + Partisan Dummy + District Dummy + Level of Reform + Initiatives + Referenda + Recalls + Home Rule Dummy + Population + Age + Race + Income + Education

> % Social Service = a + Form Dummy + Partisan Dummy + District Dummy + Level of Reform + Initiatives + Referenda + Recalls + Home Rule Dummy + Population + Age + Race + Income + Education

Table 18

Multivariate Analysis of Percentage Police Spending

	Estimate	**T-Value**	**P-Value**
Intercept	5.060	1.90	0.0609 †
Mayor-Council or Council-Manager	.03431	0.03	0.9778
Partisan or Non-Partisan	-.4304	-0.34	0.7385
District or At-large	-.2704	-0.35	0.7290
Level of Reform	.1395	0.12	0.9028
Total Initiatives	-.3593	-3.01	0.0034 **
Total Referenda	.05512	2.57	0.0118 *
Total Recalls	-.5123	-0.80	0.4245
Home Rule or Dillon's Rule	-.3666	-0.97	0.3342
Population	-.0000001774	-0.85	0.3987
Age	.1237	1.26	0.2094
Race	-.01056	-0.92	0.3579
Income	-.00001526	-0.22	0.8303
Education	.03207	0.74	0.4592

n = 110
R^2 = .1385
Signif. codes: ** = 0.01, * = 0.05, † = 0.1

Table 19

Multivariate Analysis of Percentage Social Service Spending

	Estimate	**T-Value**	**P-Value**
Intercept	6.149	0.53	0.5956
Mayor-Council or Council-Manager	1.886	0.35	0.7239
Partisan or Non-Partisan	1.568	0.28	0.7787
District or At-large	-4.594	-1.36	0.1757
Level of Reform	3.441	0.70	0.4868
Total Initiatives	.8754	1.69	0.0937 †
Total Referenda	-.1092	-1.18	0.2431
Total Recalls	.6483	0.240	0.8151
Home Rule or Dillon's Rule	.3284	0.20	0.8412
Population	.0000003946	0.44	0.6641
Age	.07832	0.19	0.8537
Race	-.08871	-1.79	0.0761 †
Income	.0002547	0.83	0.4092
Education	-.1411	-0.76	0.4519

n = 110
R^2 = .1338
Signif. codes: † = 0.1

Once again, the number of initiatives was significant in both models (at the .01 level for the percentage of police spending and the .1 level for the percent spent on social services). As was the case with overall levels of spending on police and social services (Tables 16 and 17), cities with more initiatives on the ballot tended to focus spending more on social services than police (.36 percentage points less for police, .88 percentage points more for social services). It should be noted that the relationship between initiatives and lower police spending was much more significant that the relationship to higher social services.

Referenda showed a different pattern. When looking at the percentage spent on police, each additional referendum that was placed on the ballot was associated with .06

percentage points more for police spending. While initiatives are associated with lower levels, referenda are associated with higher levels.

Once again, the only demographic variable found to be significant was race, with a lower percentage of expenditures going to social services as cities grew less diverse. This was found only to be marginally significant. Also as with previous models, no professional reforms were found to be significant.

Examining the data further, we discover that some cities seem to stand out. San Francisco had 82 direct democracy measures. Hialeah, Florida was only 4.2% white. New York's population was more than twice that of LA's. The most problematic observation, however, was Flint, Michigan. For per capita social spending, the studentized residual was 8.24 standard deviations. San Francisco's, by contrast, was just 1.18. For the percent social spending, Flint's studentized residual was 6.05. Because the observations for Flint were so far from what was expected, further investigation is needed.

At the time the spending data was collected (2012), the city of Flint had been placed under emergency management by Governor Rick Snyder. No other city in this study was known to be in this situation. Due to its unique financial situation and higher than expected totals, it is justified to re-examine the models for social service spending.

Table 20

Multivariate Analysis of Social Service Spending (No Flint)

	Estimate	**T-Value**	**P-Value**
Intercept	61.09	0.110	0.91293
Mayor-Council or Council-Manager	265.1	1.187	0.23831
Partisan or Non-Partisan	30.03	0.138	0.89073
District or At-large	-55.58	-0.815	0.41710
Level of Reform	-110.7	-0.688	0.49288

Total Initiatives	96.17	3.077	0.00273 **
Total Referenda	-6.416	-1.142	0.25631
Total Recalls	81.97	0.490	0.62557
Home Rule or Dillon's Rule	-157.8	-1.576	0.11828
Population	.0001133	2.066	0.04151 *
Age	30.58	1.190	0.23703
Race	-7.777	-2.60	0.01079 *
Income	.02363	1.272	0.20647
Education	-.5379	-0.047	0.96246

n = 109
R^2 = .3269
Signif. codes: ** = 0.01, * = 0.05

Table 21

Multivariate Analysis of Percentage Social Service Spending (No Flint)

	Estimate	**T-Value**	**P-Value**
Intercept	4.001	0.508	0.6126
Mayor-Council or Council-Manager	3.297	1.044	0.2991
Partisan or Non-Partisan	1.041	0.338	0.7363
District or At-large	-.9418	-0.977	0.3310
Level of Reform	-.6875	-0.303	0.7628
Total Initiatives	.8582	1.943	0.0550 †
Total Referenda	-.1140	-1.436	0.1544
Total Recalls	1.561	0.660	0.5111
Home Rule or Dillon's Rule	-1.711	-1.209	0.2295
Population	.0000006368	0.822	0.4131
Age	.2756	0.759	0.4499
Race	-.09237	-2.186	0.0313 *
Income	.0002243	0.854	0.3951
Education	-.005441	-0.034	0.9731

n = 109
R^2 = .1888
Signif. codes: * = 0.05, † = 0.1

Removing Flint from the equation strengthens the results found in Tables 17 and 19. For per capita social service spending, the number of initiatives is now significant at the .01 level, and race is significant at the .05 level. Population is now also significant at the .05 level. For the percentage of overall spending going towards social services, the total number of initiatives and race are still significant, with race being significant at the .05 level. All variables are correlated in the same direction as they were before. As Flint had such a high level of social spending yet no initiatives, taking it out may have strengthened the relationship between initiatives and social spending.

Discussion

Structural Variables

The models examined present us with some very intriguing results. Most variables were not significant for per capita expenditures in a city. Fitting well with existing research, there was no statistical difference between cities with professional reform structures and cities with traditional structures. Having a city manager lead the executive office, holding at-large elections, and the overall level of reform were significant in a bivariate analysis, but when controlling for other factors, this was not the case.

My alternate hypothesis (H_1) was not supported, while support was present for the null hypothesis (H_0). The data shows that neither traditional nor reform structures are related to spending levels. It is most likely true, as I stated earlier, that traditional cities have just as much access to professional workers and techniques as reform cities, thus eliminating any advantage in efficiency that one would have over the other. However, the political concerns surrounding spending may have been overstated and are likely to be non-existent. While there are certainly theoretical arguments to be made regarding the benefit of reform and traditional structures, from a financial standpoint, the choice does not seem to matter. There is no difference in spending levels related to professional reforms.

The same cannot be said of direct democracy elements. In every multivariate regression model run (and four of five bivariate analyses) the number of initiatives that qualified to be placed on a city ballot was determined to be significant. The number of referenda was significant in one (and two bivariate models). This alone is worth investigating further, and does not support the null hypothesis (H_{0A}). It appears that the use of direct democracy is, in fact, associated with more spending.

This is important, because what limited research has been done has produced somewhat mixed results. With overall per capita expenditures, initiatives are associated with higher spending. The more initiatives a city has on the ballot, the greater the per capita expenditure level.

Gordon (2009) found in California that cities with higher numbers of initiatives had higher spending. She theorized that this may be because municipalities are limited by state rules (Proposition 13, for example). Cities that wished to spend more would have had to use ballot initiatives to do so. As whether or not cities were considered Home Rule or Dillon’s Rule did not show any significance, this is not a likely explanation nationwide (though still possible in California). These findings do support hers on a national scale, although there are other reasons why this may be the case.

The origins of initiatives and referenda may play a role. Referenda, whether they are popular or simply referred to the voters by a city council, all originate with a legislature and serve as after the fact validations of legislation. Initiatives are more of a grassroots effort, originating from the citizens themselves. It may be the case that citizens desire a higher level of spending than councilmembers, mayors, or managers are comfortable proposing. And as a majority of initiatives are successful, it would appear people are perfectly willing to accept measures that would raise their own taxes. This shows a likely disconnect between citizen preference and the proposals of legislators.

The truly interesting finding is how the use of these direct democracy measures is associated with spending for police and social services. For spending totals, having more initiatives on the ballot is associated with lower levels of police spending and higher levels of social service spending. When looking at spending percentages, the same pattern is present, with more initiatives being associated with a lower percentage of overall expenditures going to police and a higher percentage going to social services. This relationship is strengthened when removing an outlier, Flint, Michigan, from the social service equations.

While only significant for the percentage of police spending, referenda are associated with a greater focus on police. The same general pattern holds true in both bivariate and multivariate models. So while initiatives are associated with lower police spending, referenda have the opposite relationship –again, showing a disconnect. This is similar to the results concerning revenue found by Park et al. (2010), where initiatives increase calls for revenue growth while referenda limit them.

While it is possible that voters and legislators have different priorities, the presence of a confounding variable may offer another explanation for this relationship. It is likely the case that social interest in political matters could produce more initiatives, but also lead to higher levels of social capital and less crime. Cities with this sort of capital may be more likely to produce initiatives while at the same time require less spending on police.

It is not unreasonable to assume that people living in cities with high rates of initiative use have similar overall preferences as people living in areas with low initiative use. People everywhere want safe streets, good infrastructure, and healthy communities. If cities with more ballot initiatives, and one would assume more active citizens, are any indication, local legislators in cities with lower initiative use should focus more on social services.

Recalls were not significant in any model. It has been argued that recalls could be a reaction to elected officials spending more or less than citizens prefer. But the data shows no relation between recalls and expenditures. This does not rule out the possibility that a recall threat could keep government spending in check, but if citizens are unhappy enough to initiate a recall election, it is likely to do with something other than spending.

The relationship between initiatives and spending gives us enough evidence to reject H_{0B} and H_{0C} and to support H_2. The presence of direct democracy is associated with spending priorities.

Control Variables

Most control variables were not significant in the multivariate models, although some associations may be present in bivariate models. Age, education, and income did not play a role in any multivariate model. This was surprising. Cities with older populations do not necessarily require more social service spending. Cities with higher per capita incomes do not have higher per capita expenditures, although income was significant in bivariate analyses. Being classified as a Home Rule city or a Dillon’s Rule city was likewise not significant. Despite having more freedom to spend money and on how that money is spent, Home Rule cities were not any more or less likely than Dillon's Rule cities to spend it.

Race was the primary demographic variable that showed signs of association with spending levels, showing significance in all but one multivariate model and all but one bivariate model. It was not significant for percent police spending in either case. Overall spending, police spending, and social service spending went down as municipalities became more white, and the percentage spent on social services also went down.

Overall per capita spending is likely to go up in more racially diverse areas because there is a more diverse demand for city services and a more complex system of interest groups. Trying to satisfy several different groups is likely going to cost more than satisfying a more homogenous population. As far as per capita spending in specific areas, this is most likely a secondary effect. With minorities earning less and possessing less wealth than whites in the US, it is likely the case that more diverse cities have more of a need for social services. Therefore, it is income and wealth inequality that is the likely culprit.

I do not believe that more diverse cities necessarily need any higher levels of police spending than non-diverse areas. However, many criminal justice and policing policies implemented at the local level are racially biased, affecting minorities at significantly higher rates than whites. This could be due to the fact that as minority populations grow in an area, the fear of crime among whites increases (Pickett, Chiricos, Golden, & Gertz, 2012). In more diverse cities, this could easily lead to higher levels of police expenditures.

While differences in social spending are likely due to income inequality and other economic issues, differences in police spending are likely due on some level to racially biased practices or stereotypes. In both of these instances, it is not race itself, but rather systematic racial biases that cause spending to rise and diverse cities to spend more.

The only other demographic variable that was statistically significant was population. For overall spending per capita, larger cities spent more than smaller cities. This could be due to larger cities simply having a larger number of interest groups vying for resources. It is also likely to be due to other costs that large cities have which cities with smaller populations do not. For example, larger cities are more likely to have larger, costlier public transit systems or to have museums, parks, or other large public facilities. These costs would not necessarily be reflected in police or social spending, but would explain why overall spending is higher. Population was significant and positively correlated in three bivariate analyses.

Conclusion

For this dissertation, the findings regarding spending and spending priorities are incredibly valuable. The use of direct democracy reforms is associated with spending levels in cities. However, these variables are not likely to be causal. It is more likely that the presence of a confounding variable is responsible for the association. As mentioned already, that variable is most likely citizen activism or interest. More involved citizens are more likely to organize an initiative campaign and collect a qualifying amount of signatures and more likely to demand more social services from their cities. And the representatives elected by active citizens may be more likely to listen and provide voters with what they want.

The one way in which the use of direct democracy measures is potentially causal is in fostering this sense of citizen activism. If people realize that they can directly affect policies on their own, that sense of empowerment may lead them to be more open in expressing their desires to local leaders. However, it may take time for that empowerment to grow.

Beyond creating an updated, national level dataset, these findings have helped to settle the debate over professional reforms and have also expanded the idea that the use of direct democracy plays a role in spending. The finding that the frequency of direct democracy reforms (especially initiatives) is associated with overall spending levels and spending priorities is theoretically significant, as is the fact that professional reforms seem to make no difference at all. While state laws may affect spending in some areas, nationwide it is more likely the case that people simply want different levels of spending than they are being provided. The significance of race in spending, while not strictly based on structure, is also an important finding. The next chapter will suggest new ground for research in structure, democracy, and spending.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This dissertation concerned itself with one of the most enduring questions in government: does structure matter? And if it matters, what is the effect of different structural elements on policy outcomes? Based on the results presented here, it is clear that the answer depends largely on the structure. Some do not appear to matter, while others can matter a great deal.

In this study, structural elements found in general purpose municipalities were examined. In looking at structures, cities give us a unique opportunity for study simply because there are so many of them. There is just one federal government and 50 state governments, but there are tens of thousands of general purpose municipalities. The structural, institutional, demographic, and economic variety provides enormous opportunity to explore structures and their effects.

The main goal of this dissertation was to examine the effects of structural reform elements on municipal spending. Research on this topic has been mixed and inconclusive as a whole. Furthermore, most studies focused on the presence of a relatively small number of reform structures. This work fits well with the existing literature, but also serves as an expansion, looking not only at the presence of certain structures but at their use. This has also served to update the findings, as even the most recent data used prior is nearly a decade and a half old.

The main proposition and central thesis of this work was that differences in spending between local governments are no longer due to professional structures as they were in the past, and that future differences will have more to do with democratic elements. The results presented in this dissertation support this thesis. Structure matters, but so does democracy.

What We've Learned

The six Progressive era reforms were meant to improve city government, increase efficiency, and stop corruption. To a large extent they were successful. However, a century later, some of these reform structures no longer appear to matter.

The three professional reform structures examined (city managers, at-large elections, and non-partisan elections) were meant to make cities more honest and efficient, especially in an era of party bosses and machines. Although many of the justifications for these reforms were questionable, they likely did improve municipal governments. They were meant to solve corruption, inefficiency, and management issues, and for the most part, they did. Even cities which did not adopt these reforms may have learned from and benefitted from their methods. In the process though, these reforms may have lowered voter turnout, weakened minority representation, and placed bureaucrats ahead of citizens.

More recent debate has focused on what effects professional reforms have on spending. As shown in Chapter 5, professional reforms do not seem to be associated in any way with spending outcomes or spending priorities. In five multivariate analyses, there was no statistical difference between cities based on professional reforms. Cities that adopted them were not any more likely to spend more or less than traditional cities.

There was some significant difference in bivariate models (identified in T-tests) for city managers and at-large elections, but when examined with other variables, no relationship was found between structural reforms and spending.

This is not to say that these reforms were never important, only that there is no longer any difference in spending based on those structures. Early on, it's likely that reform cities were more professional than traditional cities. Over time, however, there was nothing stopping cities with mayors from also hiring professional administrators, and any advantage that reform cities had was likely diminished.

The other structural elements examined were direct democracy reforms (initiatives, recalls, and referenda). Though much older, the Progressive movement pushed these reforms back into the spotlight. They were meant to give power back to citizens through direct legislation, correcting abuses and removing corrupt politicians along the way. Taken together, these reforms turned citizens into their own branch of government, able to craft and veto legislation and effectively impeach representatives. These have problems as well, as they require time, money, and expertise on the part of citizens and risks taking away the rights of those in the minority.

Much less attention has been paid to the relationship between direct democracy reforms and spending. Most of the research that has been done has looked simply at the presence of these structures. This dissertation examined how frequently each was used, creating a new nationwide dataset in the process.

The findings presented here suggest that there is a much greater relationship to spending with these reforms than with professional reforms. In particular, greater use of the initiative is associated with higher levels of per capita spending. More interesting is the fact that increased use of the initiative is associated with lower police spending and higher levels of social service spending, both overall and as a percentage of total spending. Referenda were found to be associated with a higher percent of police spending (the opposite relationship as initiatives).

It is likely that both initiative use and changes in spending priorities are related to a city having active and involved citizens. Some cities are friendlier toward the idea of direct democracy than others, with lower signature thresholds needed for a measure to qualify for the ballot. This makes it much easier for measures to qualify in some places than in others. This was one of the reasons use of the measures was considered rather than just their availability. Even so, for the initiative, recall, and referenda, it takes active citizens to make direct democracy happen.

Direct democracy reforms also bring up the question as to whether or not elected leaders are responsive to citizens. If a city has a larger number of initiatives, it could imply that elected leaders are not dealing with everything citizens feel needs to be dealt with. Since there is a significant difference in spending outcomes associated with higher levels of initiatives, it is likely that in at least in some areas representatives are not responsive.

It should also be noted that citizen input does not mean that all decisions will be perfect. Initiatives and referenda can be used for rather ill-advised goals, effects are not always thought through, and special interests can lead or attack an initiative campaign. But the same can be said of decisions made by a city council. Council ordinances are often frivolous and special interests can influence decisions there just as much. Decisions may not be objectively better or worse using direct democracy, but the fact that people have the option available to use makes the process worthwhile and offers a control over an unresponsive council.

Finally, several demographic variables were examined. Race was determined to be significant in four of five multivariate models, with spending decreasing as cities grew less diverse (more white). It is likely that structural biases affect these spending patterns to some degree. Police spending may increase with the number of minorities due to racially biased practices such as racial profiling and a higher likelihood of being pulled over in a vehicle, and minority/white wage gaps could explain the need for more social service spending in cities. There may also be a political factor, as minority populations may be more inclined to elect liberal and redistributive leaders.

Population was significant only for overall spending. This is most likely due to a larger number of interest groups competing for resources and costs that are borne by larger cities that smaller cities do not incur, such as larger parks, public transit, or airports.

Age, education, and income had no association with spending levels or priorities. It should be noted, however, that this study looked only at income itself, and was not able to take other factors such as cost of living into consideration. Future studies may wish to expand the income variable.

The level of financial self-determination was also examined by studying whether or not a city was considered Home Rule or Dillon’s Rule. Despite some cities having more freedom in their ability to tax or spend, there was no statistical difference between the two classifications in terms of spending or priorities.

Some limitations to this study should also be noted. First of all, looking only at spending does not address the quality of the services provided. As stated earlier, this is very difficult to measure, but future research may attempt to quantify government outcomes. Perhaps comparing police spending to changes in crime rates or social service spending to rates of childhood asthma and obesity could be a good start. Spending totals are also from after the recession. Re-examining these results later may show if the economic climate has played any effect. Finally, as stated in Chapter 5, there are some instances where cities have higher levels of some variable than other cities. While the number of cities examined was limited due to available data, a larger study may show whether these cities are truly abnormal or more in line than they appear here.

New Structures, New Efficiency, New Democracy

This dissertation has examined structural reform elements and how they affect municipal spending. In doing so, it has looked at existing structures and found that certain direct democracy reforms are much more significant to spending than professional reforms. But where should the study of municipal spending go from here? Using the example of participatory budgeting, this section will attempt to guide future research and offer a new way to explore spending and efficiency.

Democratic Structures and Participatory Budgeting

Previous research has found serious issues with current government structures in terms of democracy (Elliot & Ali, 1988; Lineberry & Sharkansky, 1978; Trounstine, 2008). While current structures may have democratic issues, it may be that “the cure for the ailments of democracy is more democracy” (Dewey, 1954, p. 146). In looking to address these issues, participation offers an intriguing opportunity. Going forward, it may be the case that participation is the key for a more democratically, politically, and economically efficient form of local government.

As fiscal inefficiency is dealt with, democratic inefficiency becomes more of a concern. For all of the successes and failures that resulted from the professional reform movement, in the end, fiscal efficiency may not be enough to satisfy citizens –they want to be involved and to know their input will be paid attention to (Leighninger, 2006). Citizens are autonomous and improvable, and people are ready to have responsibility for deciding what their government should do (King & Stivers, 1998; Thompson, 1970).

As McCabe writes, “participation in the decisions that affect one’s life is the touchstone of democratic thought” (2005, p. 420). In fact, democracy is “unthinkable” without free participation (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995, p. 1). This is typically seen as a beneficial goal, as participation in the decision making process can promote responsibility, equality, and trust (Cohen & Fung, 2004; Hajnal, 2010; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). G. B. Adams and Balfour (2004) write that deliberation in society can help people who disagree live together and make a society more ethical. To them, it may in fact be unethical not to deliberate.

The two most prominent theories of democratic involvement are participatory and deliberative democracy. These two forms are related, with both arguing that democratic engagement is beneficial and provides a better understanding of your own interests, the interests of others, and the public good (Hildreth, 2012). In this context, the ideas of participation will refer to deliberative democracy. While deliberation may be an element of participatory democracy, we are focusing primarily on the governmental aspect of democracy and the structural channels that are involved.

Participatory Budgeting

In studying new and better local government structures, perhaps the most promising is participatory budgeting (PB). Worldwide, it has been the biggest experiment in democratic participation at the local level in decades. PB was started in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre in 1989 (Pateman, 2012). Tens of thousands of residents participate annually, and the process has spread to hundreds of cities worldwide.

In participatory budgeting, large groups of citizens meet to address the needs of the city and decide what policy actions are needed to help meet those needs. In these meetings, ideas are discussed and developed into proposals directly by citizens. These ideas are then voted upon, and those which garner the most support are adopted. What sets this apart from a simple town hall meeting is that people actually control a percentage of the city's budget. The policy and spending decisions that they make are followed through with and have real effects. This process can allow people who may otherwise be disenfranchised to participate in the political process and allow new ideas and possibilities to be discussed. This meets our definition of structure, as it is a formal element of government which determines who is in a position to affect policy outcomes.

The results have been impressive. In Porto Alegre, water and sewer services have been expanded to nearly 100% of the city's population, the quality of administration has increased, and resources have been redistributed to poorer residents (Fung, 2003, 2006). The number of schools in the city has quadrupled, and from 1985 to 1996, the Health and Education budget increased from 13% to 40%. The results elsewhere have displayed a wide range of diversity, with funding being allocated for anything from health care to parks to libraries to security cameras.

Participatory budgeting, while growing worldwide, is still only in its infancy in the US, and has not been around long enough to provide sufficient data to study. Still, it is spreading. The first area in the US to adopt this program was Chicago's 49th ward, led by its alderman, Joe Moore (Newcombe, 2012). It has been extremely popular, and has since spread to eight wards in the city. New York City began the process in 2011, and now 28 districts are participating, allowing up to $25 million to be spent by residents, 50,000 of whom voted in 2015 ("Particpatory Budgeting," 2016). In 2013, PB spread to St. Louis and San Francisco, and is now in 3 districts in each city.

The first city-wide experiment in PB in the US was in Vallejo, California, where $3.2 million was dedicated to policy actions decided upon by residents. Boston (Pierce & Peters, 2015) and Seattle ("Seattle Participatory Budgeting," 2016) are setting aside $1 million and $700,000 respectively for younger residents (11 or 12 through age 25) to allow them the ability to create the kind of future they want for the city. Cambridge, Massachusetts has set aside $500,000 for PB, and Greensboro, N.C. has given $100,000 to each of its five districts.

Limitations to Citizen Participation

As optimistic and democratic as participatory budgeting and deliberative democracy may seem, there are still some concerns. One is the ability of citizens to understand the process and where money and resources are needed most. Citizens must commit themselves to being informed if they are to participate (Callahan & Yang, 2005). There may also be some resistance on the part of professional administrators to giving up authority (Callahan, 2000). Having to listen to and work with citizens may alter normal working patterns and bring more scrutiny than administrators are used to, which may not be welcome. And with many cities facing huge budget issues, it may be the case that some areas barely have enough money to keep the water on, much less set aside money for citizens' projects.

There is also a concern that citizens may be left out, even if the exclusion is unintentional. People with full time jobs and families may not be able to spend time formulating policies. This is a concern because the underrepresented may be the citizens who are most in need of policy changes. Aside from ability, there is the concern that people may be passive. Budgeting and policy making can be frustrating. People may go in with visions of funding an amphitheater, but wind up focusing on sidewalk repair, which is useful but not terribly exciting. After the excitement of a new program wears off, some fear that people may prefer "the easy chair" of being a customer over the hard work of participatory involvement (Vigoda, 2002, p. 527).

These issues are not impossible to solve, however. Training could be given to administrators for how to better interact with residents. Training already exists in many places for citizens who engage in PB, explaining the process to them to ensure everyone knows what is going on. Childcare could be provided at meetings to help parents participate. Time off work could be guaranteed, much like it is with jury duty. Participation is tough, but if citizens and administrators feel it is worth the effort, it is perfectly within reach. If these structures prove to be successful in the US and these limitations can be overcome, it could usher in a new era of municipal reform.

Going Forward and Democratic Efficiency

As discussed in Chapter 1, one way to examine efficiency is through a political lens. Looking at political capital and votes as inputs and outputs provides a much more complex view of what makes an action or policy efficient. It is often the case that political efficiency can bring about much more satisfactory results than economic efficiency. After all, what good does it do for a program to be provided cheaply if it is not what people want or need?

As we discovered in Chapter 5, cities with higher levels of initiative use tend to have spending priorities that differ from cities with lower levels of use. It is likely that allowing citizens to directly participate in the budgeting process may further shift spending to areas that people need. If this winds up being the case, it could change the way future research treats the ideas of spending and efficiency.

Efficiency then, would no longer be used interchangeably with spending in research. It would not even simply be about getting the most "bang for your buck" in a standard input-output ratio. Rather, it would be about getting the right bang for your buck. Efficient cities would be those in which spending priorities more closely align with citizens' needs and preferences, which have been stated in a deliberative and participatory way. This expands on Deborah Stone's idea that "the best way to organize society to achieve efficiency is to provide a democratic governing structure that allows for…contests to be expressed and addressed in a fair way" (2002, p. 79). Defining efficiency in terms of citizen preference and participation would change the terms of debate greatly.

As study continues into the relation between municipal structures and efficiency, it is clear that there are new avenues to explore. The most promising appears to be structures that call for greater levels of participation among citizens. As cities move forward, they should always remember to listen to their citizens and seek out input.

Participatory budgeting offers a promising path forward, allowing communities to make real decisions that affect their daily lives. In doing so, spending levels remain constant (though shifted) and people begin to take a more active role in their government.

Conclusion

This dissertation has re-examined, updated, and expanded the debate concerning municipal structure and spending. Previous researchers have been focused on the same path for decades, with widely varied results. This work has added new elements to the debate, namely the frequency of direct democracy reforms. Hopefully this will serve as a means to move researchers into newer, more fertile grounds for study.

While most authors focused on the effects of professional reforms, these are no longer significant factors when looking at government spending. However, direct democracy measures are significant, and their use is associated with very real changes to spending and spending priorities. In particular, initiatives are associated with a shift in spending from police to social services, as well as more per capita spending overall.

Due to the significance of direct democracy reforms, it is likely that differences in spending will have more to do with citizen participation than with professional structures. Participatory budgeting was presented as a new structure for examination by researchers. Most work on this topic has focused on broad ideas of democracy. Based off the results presented here, however, it is likely that PB will have real effects on spending as well. Studying the effects of newer democratic structures can move the academic argument forward and may reform how cities are governed and improve the lives of citizens.

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Appendix A
Ballot Initiatives, Referenda, and Recall Elections, 2007-2012

Birmingham, Alabama
- N/A

Mobile, Alabama
- N/A

Montgomery, Alabama
- N/A

Anchorage, Alaska
- 2007 Proposition 1, Smoking ban repeal (R) (failed)
- 2007 Proposition 2, Parks Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 3, Safety and Transportation Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 4, School Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 5, Education Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 6, Roads Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 7, Fire Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 8, Facilities (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 9, Land (R) (failed)
- 2007 Proposition 10, Districting (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 1, Facilities Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 2, School Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 3, Education Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 4, Parks Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 5, Roads Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 6, Safety and Transportation Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 7, Fire Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 8, Taxi Service (I) (failed)
- 2009 Proposition 1, School Bonds (R) (failed)
- 2009 Proposition 2, Education Bonds (R) (failed)
- 2009 Proposition 3, Road Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition 4, Park Bonds (R) (failed)
- 2009 Proposition 5, Facilities Bonds (R) (failed)
- 2009 Proposition 6, Safety and Transportation Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition 7, Fire Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition 8, Police Bonds (R) (failed)

- 2009 Proposition 9, Taxes (R) (passed)
- 2010 Proposition 1, Road Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2010 Proposition 2, Safety Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2010 Proposition 3, Fire Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2010 Proposition 4, Transportation Bonds (R) (failed)
- 2010 Proposition 5, Land (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 1, School Bonds (R) (failed)
- 2011 Proposition 2, Education Bonds (R) (failed)
- 2011 Proposition 3, Facility Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 4, Road Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 5, Park Bonds (R) (failed)
- 2011 Proposition 6, Safety and Transportation Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 7, Fire Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 8, Police Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 9, Property Tax (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 10, Vehicles (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 11, Alcohol (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 1, Education Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 2, Road Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 3, Park Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 4, Medical Service Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 5, Equal Rights (I) (failed)
- 2012 Proposition 6, Language Update (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 7, Property Tax (R) (passed)

Mesa, Arizona

- 2007 Proposition 300, Tourism (I) (passed)
    - 2008 Proposition 300, Zoning (R) (passed)
    - 2008 (March) Question 1, Spending Limitation (R) (passed)
    - 2008 Proposition 400, Housing/slumlords (R) (passed)
    - 2008 Question 1, Public Safety Bonds (R) (passed)
    - 2008 Question 2, Street Bonds (R) (passed)
    - 2009 Proposition 300, Development Project (R) (passed)
    - 2010 Question 1, Spending Limits (R) (passed)
    - 2010 Proposition 420, Spring Training Facility (I) (passed)
    - 2010 Question 2, Bed Tax (R) (passed)
    - 2010 Question 3, Gas System Bonds (R) (passed)
    - 2010 Question 4, Water System Bonds (R) (passed)
    - 2010 Question 5, Wastewater System Bonds (R) (passed)
    - 2010 Question 6, Electrical System Bonds (R) (passed)
    - 2010 Question 7, Gas Franchise (R) (passed)
    - 2012 Question 1, Park Bonds (R) (passed)
    - 2012 Proposition 460, Mayoral Vacancy (R) (passed)
    - 2012 Proposition 461, Capital Program (R) (passed)

- 2012 Proposition 462, Election dates (R) (failed)
- 2012 Proposition 463, Commencement of Terms, (R) (failed)
- 2012 Proposition 464, Primary Election (R) (failed)

Phoenix, Arizona

- 2007 Proposition 1, Public Safety Tax (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 2, Salaries (R) (failed)
- 2007 Proposition 3, Expenditures (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 4, Nomination (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 5, Canvass (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 6, Initiative (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition A, Parks (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 1, Budgeting (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 2, Zoning (R) (failed)

Tucson, Arizona

- 2009 Proposition 200, Public Safety (I) (failed)
- 2009 Proposition 400, Spending Limits (R) (failed)
- 2010 Proposition 400, Sales Tax (R) (failed)
- 2010 Proposition 401, Charter Changes (R) (failed)
- 2012 Proposition 409, Road Bond (R) (passed)

Little Rock, Arkansas

- 2007 Measure 1, Mayoral Powers (R) (passed)
- 2007 Measure 2, Mayoral Powers (R) (passed)
- 2011 Measure 1, Sales Tax (R) (passed)
- 2011 Measure 2, Sales Tax (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure 1, Street Bond (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure 2, Drainage Bond (R) (passed)

Anaheim, California

- 2010 Measure J, Public Works Projects (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure K, Prohibit Red Light Cameras (R) (passed)

Bakersfield, California

- 2010 Measure D, Pensions (R) (passed)

Fremont, California

- 2008 Measure MM, Hotel Tax (R) (passed)

Fresno, California

- 2010 Measure A, Government Structure (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure F, Financial Management (R) (passed)

Huntington Beach, California

- 2010 Measure N, Charter Amendment (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure O, Charter Amendment (R) (failed)
- 2010 Measure P, Utility Tax (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure Q, Telephone Antenna Installation (R) (failed)
- 2012 Measure AA, Tax Rate Extension into Newly Annexed Area (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure Z, Tax Limits Amendment (I) (failed)

Long Beach, California

- 2007 Measure A, Government Operation (R) (passed)
- 2007Measure B, Salary Limit Commission (R) (failed)
- 2007 Measure C, Extending Term Limits (R) (failed)
- 2007 Measure D, Election Requirements (R) (passed)
- 2007 Measure E, Land Use (R) (passed)
- 2007 Measure F, City Prosecutor Function (R) (passed)
- 2007 Measure G, Tax Revisions (R) (passed)
- 2007 Measure H, Public Safety Tax (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure G, Utility Tax Rate (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure I, Property Tax Increase (R) (failed)
- 2010 Measure B, Marijuana Tax (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure C, Hiring of Veterans (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure D, Tax Clarification (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure GG, City Manager Restructuring (R) (failed)
- 2012 Measure N, Minimum Wage and Sick Leave (I) (passed)
- 2012 Measure O, Election Date Change (I) (failed)

Los Angeles, California

- 2007 Measure LAUSD-L, Campaign Contributions, Term Limits (R) (passed)
- 2007 Measure M, Retirement (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure S, Utility Tax (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure A, “Gang Prevention” Property Tax (R) (failed)
- 2008 Measure B, Affordable Housing (R) (passed)
- 2009 Measure A, Government Structure (R) (passed)
- 2009 Measure B, Utilities (R) (failed)
- 2009 Measure C, Disability Benefits (R) (passed)
- 2009 Measure D, Pensions (R) (passed)
- 2009 Measure E, Tax Benefits to Business (R) (failed)
- 2011 Measure G, Government Personnel, Pensions (R) (passed)
- 2011 Measure H, Campaign Contributions (R) (passed)
- 2011 Measure I, Government Organization (R) (passed)
- 2011 Measure J, Government Budget (R) (passed)
- 2011 Measure L, Libraries (R) (passed)
- 2011 Measure M, Tax (R) (passed)
- 2011 Measure N, Term Limits (R) (passed)
- 2011 Measure O, Tax (R) (failed)

- 2011 Measure P, Budget (R) (passed)
- 2011 Measure Q, Government Personnel (R) (passed)

Modesto, California
- 2007 Measure I, Government Organization, Change to Districts? (R) (passed)
- 2007 Measure J, Government Organization, If Yes to Measure I, Straight Districts or Mixed? (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure M, Mayoral Oversight (I) (passed)
- 2008 Measure N, District Elections (I) (passed)
- 2009 Measure A, Sewer Service Extension (R) (failed)
- 2009 Measure B, Sewer Service (R) (failed)
- 2009 Measure C, Sewer Service (R) (failed)
- 2009 Measure D, Sewer Service (R) (failed)
- 2009 Measure E, Sewer Service (R) (failed)
- 2010 Measure J, Elections (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure K, Elections (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure L, Sewage (R) (passed)
- 2011 Measure N, Utility Tax (R) (passed)
- 2011 Measure P, Sewage (R) (passed)
- 2011 Measure Q, Employee Benefits (R) (passed)
- 2011 Measure R, Employee Benefits (R) (passed)
- 2011 Measure S, Employee Benefits (R) (passed)

Oakland, California
- 2008 Measure J, Telecommunications Tax (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure NN, Property Tax (R) (failed)
- 2008 Measure OO, Budget (I) (passed)
- 2009 Measure D, Budget (R) (passed)
- 2009 Measure H, Tax Clarification (R) (passed)
- 2009 Measure C, Hotel Tax (R) (passed)
- 2009 Measure F, Marijuana Tax (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure BB, Police Funding (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure V, Marijuana Tax (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure W, Telecommunication Tax (R) (failed)
- 2010 Measure X, Property Tax (R) (failed)
- 2011 Measure H, Government Structure (R) (failed)
- 2011 Measure I, Property Tax (R) (failed)
- 2011 Measure J, Employee Benefits (R) (failed)

Riverside, California
- 2008 Measure A, Zoning, Rooster Limits/Housing (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure V, Hotel Tax (R) (passed)
- 2011 Measure I, Library Tax Continuation (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure E, Government Structure (R) (failed)

- 2012 Measure F, Government Structure (R) (failed)
- 2012 Measure G, Election Rules (R) (failed)
- 2012 Measure H, Personnel, Remove Ability of City Manager to Approve or Disapprove Appointments to Office (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure J, Public Works Bidding (R) (failed)
- 2012 Measure K, Charter Language Modernization (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure M, Government Structure (R) (failed)

Sacramento, California

- 2008 Measure O, Communication Tax (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure B, Utility Tax (I) (failed)
- 2010 Measure C, Marijuana Tax (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure M, New Charter (R) (failed)
- 2012 Measure T, Yard Waste (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure U, Sales Tax Increase (R) (passed)

San Diego, California

- 2008 Measure A, Exempt City Safety Officers From Managed Competition (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure B, Government Structure, Strong Mayor (refer to 2010) (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure C (June), Government Structure (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure C, (November), Budgeting (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure D, No Alcohol on Beaches (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure C (June), Personnel, Veterans (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure D (June), Structure, Strong Mayor (Whether to Make the Strong Mayor System Permanent or Return to Previous Manager System) (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure B, personnel (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure C (November), development (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure D (November), sales tax increase (R) (failed)
- 2012 Measure B, Personnel (I) (passed)
- 2012 Measure M, Contracting (I) (passed)

San Francisco, California

- 2007 Measure A, Transit (R) (passed)
- 2007 Measure B, Organization (R) (passed)
- 2007 Measure C, Facilities, (R) (passed)
- 2007 Measure D, Library (R) (passed)
- 2007 Measure E, Organization (R) (failed)
- 2007 Measure F, Personnel (R) (passed)
- 2007 Measure G, Parks (R) (passed)
- 2007 Measure H, Parking (I) (failed)
- 2007 Measure I, Organization (R) (passed)
- 2007 Measure J, Free Internet (R) (passed)
- 2007 Measure K, Public Advertising (R) (passed)

- 2008 Measure A (February), Parks (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure B (February), Personnel (I) (passed)
- 2008 Measure C (February), Alcatraz Peace Center (I) (failed)
- 2008 Measure B (June), Personnel (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure C (June), Personnel (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure D (June), Term Limits (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure E (June), Organization (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure F (June), Housing (I) (failed)
- 2008 Measure G (June), Parks (I) (passed)
- 2008 Measure H (June), Term Limits (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure A (November), Health Care (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure B (November), Housing (R) (failed)
- 2008 Measure C (November), Term Limits (R) (failed)
- 2008 Measure D (November), Parks (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure E (November), Elections (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure F (November), Elections (R) (failed)
- 2008 Measure G (November), Personnel (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure H (November), Public Works (R) (failed)
- 2008 Measure I (November), Organization (R) (failed)
- 2008 Measure J (November), Organization (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure K (November), Safety, Prostitution Law (I) (failed)
- 2008 Measure L (November), Public Works (R) (failed)
- 2008 Measure M (November), Housing (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure N (November), Environment (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure O (November), Services (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure P (November), Organization (R) (failed)
- 2008 Measure Q (November), Revenue (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure R (November), Facilities (GWB sewage plant) (I) (failed)
- 2008 Measure S (November), Tax Reduction (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure T (November), Welfare (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure U (November), Iraq Funding (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure V (November), Curriculum (I) (passed)
- 2009 Measure A, Budget (R) (passed)
- 2009 Measure B, Personnel (R) (passed)
- 2009 Measure C, Facilities (R) (passed)
- 2009 Measure D, Zoning (I) (failed)
- 2009 Measure E, Zoning (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure B (June), Safety (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure C (June), Organization (R) (failed)
- 2010 Measure D (June), Personnel (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure E (June), Safety (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure F (June), Housing (R) (failed)
- 2010 Measure G (June), Transit (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure A (November), Earthquakes (R) (failed)

- 2010 Measure B (November), Personnel (I) (failed)
- 2010 Measure C (November), Organization (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure D (November), Election (R) (failed)
- 2010 Measure E (November), Election (R) (failed)
- 2010 Measure G (November), Personnel (I) (passed)
- 2010 Measure H (November), Term Limits (R) (failed)
- 2010 Measure I (November), elections (I) (passed)
- 2010 Measure J (November), hotel tax (I) (failed)
- 2010 Measure K (November), hotel tax (R) (failed)
- 2010 Measure L (November), safety (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure M (November), safety (R) (failed)
- 2010 Measure N (November), property tax (R) (passed)
- 2011 Measure B, Transit (R) (passed)
- 2011 Measure C, Personnel (I) (passed)
- 2011 Measure D, Personnel (R) (passed)
- 2011 Measure E, Governance (R) (failed)
- 2011 Measure F, Elections (R) (failed)
- 2011 Measure G, Sales Tax (R) (failed)
- 2011 Proposition H, School Assignment (I) (failed)
- 2012 Measure B (June), Facilities (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure M, Trash Pickup Bidding (I) (passed)
- 2012 Measure B (November), Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure C, Housing (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure D, Elections (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure E, Taxes (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure F, Facilities (R) (failed)
- 2012 Measure G, Policy (Corporations Not the Same as People) (R) (passed)

San Jose, California

- 2008 Measure J, Utility Tax (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure K, Utility Tax (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure L, Fire Station (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure M, Parks (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure N, Library (R) (passed)
- 2009 Recall 7, Madison Nguyen (failed)
- 2010 Measure K, Gambling (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure U, Marijuana Tax (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure V, Employee Benefits (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure W, Employee Benefits (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure B, Employee Benefits (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure D, Minimum Wage (I) (passed)
- 2012 Measure E, Gambling (I) (failed)

Santa Ana, California

- 2008 Measure D, Elections, Term Limits (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure E, Elections (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure GG, Elections, Term Limits (R) (passed)

Stockton, California

- 2008 Measure U, Telecommunication Tax (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure G, Public Housing (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure H, Fire Department (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure I, Marijuana Tax(R) (passed)

Aurora, Colorado

- 2007 Ballot Issue 2A, Zoning (R) (passed)
- 2009 Issue 2A, Term Limits (R) (passed)
- 2009 Public Library Issue 4A, (R) (failed)
- 2010 Issue 2B, Medical Marijuana (R) (passed)
- 2011 Issue 300, Library Tax (R) (failed)
- 2011 Issue 301, Recreation Tax (R) (failed)
- 2011 Question 2F, Term Limits (R) (passed)
- 2012 Issue 2A, Terms (R) (passed)
- 2012 Issue 2B, Transportation Bonds (R) (failed)
- 2012 Issue 2C, Fire (R) (passed)

Colorado Springs, Colorado

- 2007 Issue A, Charter Updates (R) (passed)
- 2007 Issue B, Mayoral Term Limits (R) (passed)
- 2007 Issue C, Mayor/Council Pay (R) (failed)
- 2007 Issue D, Health System (R) (passed)
- 2007 Issue E, Television Franchise (I) (passed)
- 2008 Issue 200, Revenue Collection (I) (failed)
- 2008 Issue 201, Business Taxes (I) (failed)
- 2009 1A, Property Tax (R) (failed)
- 2009 1B, Spending (R) (passed)
- 2009 1C, Park Tax (R) (failed)
- 2009 1D, Federal Grants (R) (passed)
- 2009 Issue 300, Revenue Collection (I) (passed)
- 2009 Issue 2C, Property Tax (R) (failed)
- 2010 Issue 2B, Infrastructure (R) (passed)
- 2010 Issue 2C, Park Tax (R) (passed)
- 2010 Issue 300, Mayor-Council (R) (passed)
- 2011 Issue 1A, Mayor-Council, mixed at-large/district (R) (passed)
- 2011 Issue 1B, mayoral power (R) (passed)
- 2011 Issue 2B, Health Care (R) (passed)
- 2012 Issue 1A, Health Care (R) (passed)

Denver, Colorado
- 2007 Referred Question 1A (November) Capital Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2007 Referred Question 1B, Heath Service Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2007 Referred Question 1C, Library Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2007 Referred Question 1D, Public Works Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2007 Referred Question 1E, Park Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2007 Referred Question 1F, Public Facilities Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2007 Referred Question 1G, Cultural Facilities Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2007 Referred Question 1H, New Construction Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2007 Referred Question 1I, Public Safety Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2007 Initiated Ordinance 100, Marijuana Enforcement (I) (passed)
- 2007 Referred Question 1A (May) Term Limits (R) (passed)
- 2007 Referred Charter Amendment 1A (January) Elections (R) (passed)
- 2008 Initiated Ordinance 100, Vehicle Operation (I) (passed)
- 2008 Referred Question 1A, IR Election Dates (R) (passed)
- 2009 Initiated Ordinance 300, Vehicle Operation (I) (failed)
- 2010 Initiated Ordinance 300, Extraterrestrial Affairs Commission (I) (failed)
- 2011 Referred Question 2A, Government Employees (R) (passed)
- 2011 Initiated Ordinance 300, Sick Leave for Employees (I) (failed)
- 2012 Referred Question 2A, After School Program (R) (passed)

Ft. Lauderdale, Florida
- 2008 Question, Clerks and Auditors (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question 1, Elections (R) (failed)
- 2012 Question 2, Property (R) (failed)

Hialeah, Florida
- 2008 Charter Changes, Government (R) (failed)
- 2010 Charter Changes, Elections (R) (failed)
- 2011 Charter Amendment, Mayoral Salary (R) (passed)

Jacksonville, Florida
- 2010 Charter Referendum, Election Date (R) (failed)

Miami, Florida
- 2008 Charter Amendment, Citizens Bill of Rights (R) (passed)
- 2010 Ballot Measure, Parking (R) (failed)

Orlando, Florida
- N/A

St. Petersburg, Florida
- 2007 Referendum Question 1, Zoning (R) (passed)
- 2007 Referendum Question 2, Elections (R) (passed)

- 2007 Referendum Question 3, Elections (R) (passed)
- 2007 Referendum Question 4, Elections (R) (passed)
- 2007 Referendum Question 5, Council vacancy (R) (passed)
- 2007 Referendum Question 6, Language (R) (passed)
- 2009 Charter Amendment, Elections (R) (passed)
- 2009 City Charter 1, Council vacancy (R) (passed)
- 2009 City Charter 2, Elections (R) (passed)
- 2011 Charter Amendment 1, City Leasing (R) (failed)
- 2011 Charter Amendment 2, Economic Development (R) (passed)
- 2011 Charter Amendment 3, Planning (R) (passed)
- 2011 Charter Amendment 4, Redistricting (R) (passed)
- 2011 Charter Amendment 5, Management (R) (passed)
- 2011 Charter Amendment 6, Budget (R) (passed)
- 2011 Charter Amendment 7, Budget (R) (passed)
- 2011 Charter Amendment 8, Language (R) (passed)

Tampa, Florida

- 2008 Tampa Charter Amendment, Council Attorney (R) (passed)
- 2011 Economic Development Property Tax Exemption, Taxes (R) (passed)

Atlanta, Georgia

- 2008 Question 1, Taxes (R) (passed)
- 2008 Question 2, Taxes (R) (passed)
- 2008 Question 3, Taxes (R) (passed)

Columbus, Georgia

- 2012 Articles I, IV, VIII, Personnel (R) (passed)
- 2012 Article III, Council Meetings (R) (passed)
- 2012 Article VI, Executive Branch (R) (passed)
- 2012 Article VIII, Laws (R) (passed)
- 2012 Appendix 2, 6, Mayoral Hiring (R) (passed)
- 2012 Appendix 2, 7, Elections (R) (passed)

Chicago, Illinois

- N/A

Fort Wayne, Indiana

- N/A

Gary, Indiana

- N/A

Indianapolis, Indiana

- N/A

Des Moines, Iowa
- N/A

Kansas City, Kansas
- 2010 Sales Tax Question, Tax (R) (passed)

Wichita, Kansas
- 2012 Ballot Question, Hotel Tax (R) (failed)
- 2012 Ballot Question (November), Water Fluoridation (I) (failed)

Lexington, Kentucky
- n/a

Louisville, Kentucky
- 2007 Library Question, Library Tax (R) (failed)

Baton Rouge, Louisiana
- n/a

New Orleans, Louisiana
- 2008 Proposition A, Supplies Tax (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition B, Programs Tax (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition C, Employees Tax (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition D, Maintenance Tax (R) (passed)
- 2008 HRC Amendment, Oversight (R) (passed)
- 2008 HRC Amendment (November), Planning (R) (passed)
- 2010 HRC Amendment, Recreation (R) (passed)
- 2010 HRC Amendment 2, Sewers (R) (passed)
- 2011 HRC Amendment, Railroads (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition, Property Tax (R) (failed)
- 2012 HRC Amendment, Council Elections (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition, Property Tax (R) (failed)

Shreveport, Louisiana
- 2008 Proposition 1, Street Tax (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 2, Recreation Tax (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 3, Payroll Tax (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 4, Public Safety Tax (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 5, Benefits Tax (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 1, Water Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 2, Parks Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 3, Street Bonds (R) (passed)

Baltimore, Maryland
- 2007 Question A, Procurement (R) (passed)

- 2008 Question A, Government Structure (R) (passed)
- 2008 Question B, Education Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Question C, Library Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Question D, Community Development Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Question E, Economic Development Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Question F, Parks Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Question G, Public Building Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Question H, Opera House Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Question I, Art Museum Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Question J, Children’s Museum Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Question K, Theater Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Question L, Aquarium Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Question M, Science Center Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Question N, Art museum Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Question O, Zoo Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Question P, Symphony Hall Bond (R) (passed)
- 2010 Question A, Surplus Funds (R) (passed)
- 2010 Question B, Sustainability (R) (passed)
- 2010 Question C, Procurement (R) (passed)
- 2010 Question D, School bond (R) (passed)
- 2010 Question E, Community Development Bond (R) (passed)
- 2010 Question F, Public Buildings Bond (R) (passed)
- 2010 Question G, Economic Development Bond (R) (passed)
- 2010 Question H, Aquarium Bond (R) (passed)
- 2010 Question I, Art Museum Bond (R) (passed)
- 2010 Question J, Art Museum Bond (R) (passed)
- 2010 Question K, Park Bond (R) (passed)
- 2011 Question A, School Funding (R) (passed)
- 2011 Question B, Council Age Requirement (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question A, School Bond (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question B, Parks Bond (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question C, Community Development Bond (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question D, Economic Development (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question E, Public Building Bond (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question F, Art Museum Bond (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question G, Zoo Bond (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question H, Science Center Bond (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question I, Art Museum Bond (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question J, Water Amendment (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question K, Election Dates (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question L, Elections (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question M, Audits (R) (passed)

Boston, Massachusetts

- N/A

Springfield, Massachusetts

- 2007, Binding Question 1, Representation (At-large to hybrid) (R) (passed)
- 2009, Binding Question 1, Mayoral Term Length (R) (passed)

Worcester, Massachusetts

- 2007 Question 1, Gambling (R) (passed)

Detroit, Michigan

- 2009 Proposal C, Museums Tax (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposal L, Infrastructure Tax (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposal M, Facilities Tax (R) (failed)
- 2009 Proposal N, Housing Tax (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposal S, Public Safety Tax (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposal T, Transportation Tax (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposal, Charter Revision (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposal D, Representation (at-large to hybrid) (I) (passed)
- 2009 Proposal S, School Bond (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition C, New City Charter (R) (passed)

Flint, Michigan

- 2008 Proposal, Land Use (R) (failed)
- 2009 Proposal, Property Tax (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposal 1, Jail Tax (R) (failed)
- 2011 Proposal 2, Police Tax (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposal 1, Public Safety Tax (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposal 2, Marijuana Enforcement (R) (passed)

Grand Rapids, Michigan

- 2010 Proposal 1, Taxes (R) (passed)
- 2010 Proposal 2, Personnel (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposal 1, Personnel (R) (failed))
- 2012 Proposal 2, Marijuana Enforcement (I) (passed)

Warren, Michigan

- 2010 Question, Library Tax (R) (passed)
- 2010 Charter Amendment 1, Council Size (I) (passed)
- 2010 Charter Amendment 2, Council (at-large to hybrid) (I) (passed)
- 2011 Question, Street Tax (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question, Public Safety Tax (R) (passed)

Minneapolis, Minnesota

- 2009 Charter Amendment 168, Tax Board (R) (failed)
- 2010 Charter Amendment, Redistricting (R) (passed)

St. Paul, Minnesota,

- 2009 City Ballot Question, Elections (R) (passed)

Jackson, Mississippi

- N/A

Kansas City, Missouri

- 2007 Question, Sales Tax (R) (passed)
- 2008 Question 1, Tax (R) (passed)
- 2008 Question 2, Lending Regulation (R) (passed)
- 2008 Question 3, Smoking Ban (R) (passed)
- 2008 Question 1 (November), Transit (R) (failed)
- 2010 Question 1, Permits (R) (passed)
- 2010 Question 2, Inspections (R) (passed)
- 2010 Question 1 (November), Sales Tax (R) (passed)
- 2010 Question 2 (November), Redistricting (R) (passed)
- 2010 Question 3, Public Safety (R) (passed)
- 2011 Question, Taxes (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question 1 (August), Taxes (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question 2 (August), Sewer Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question 1 (November), Judges (R) (failed)

St. Louis, Missouri

2012 Proposition R, Council size (R) (passed)
2011 Proposition E, Tax (R) (passed)
2010 Proposition F, Fines (R) (passed)
2010 Proposition L, Police (R) (passed)
2008 Proposition S, Police (R) (passed)
2007 Proposition P, Parks (I) (passed)

Lincoln, Nebraska

- 2007 Charter Amendment, Mayoral Duties (R) (passed)
- 2008 Charter Amendment, Contracts (R) (passed)
- 2010 Arena Bond, Arena Tax (R) (passed)
- 2010 Charter Amendment, Biennial Budget (R) (passed)

Omaha, Nebraska

- 2011 Recall, Mayor, Jim Suttle (failed)

Las Vegas, Nevada

- 2012 Recall, Steve Ross (failed)

Reno, Nevada

- 2010, WC-2, City/County Consolidation (advisory only) (R) (passed)

- 2012, RNO-1, At-large to District (advisory only) (R) (passed)

Albuquerque, New Mexico

- 2007 Recall District 9, Don Harris (failed)
- 2007 Proposition 1, Date of Elections (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 2, Contribution Limits (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 3, Appointment to Boards (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 4, City Councilor Salary (R) (failed)
- 2007 Proposition 5, Recall Procedures (R) (passed)
- 2007 Bond Measure, Public Safety (R) (passed)
- 2007 Bond Measure, Community (R) (passed)
- 2007 Bond Measure, Parks (R) (passed)
- 2007 Bond Measure, Facilities (R) (passed)
- 2007 Bond Measure, Library (R) (passed)
- 2007 Bond Measure, Street (R) (passed)
- 2007 Bond Measure, Public transit (R) (passed)
- 2007 Bond Measure, Sewer (R) (passed)
- 2007 Bond Measure, Zoo (passed)
- 2007 Bond Measure, Housing (R) (passed)
- 2009 Bond Measure, Public Safety (R) (passed)
- 2009 Bond Measure, Community (R) (passed)
- 2009 Bond Measure, Parks (R) (passed)
- 2009 Bond Measure, Facilities (R) (passed)
- 2009 Bond Measure, Library (R) (passed)
- 2009 Bond Measure, Street (R) (passed)
- 2009 Bond Measure, Public Transit (R) (passed)
- 2009 Bond Measure, Sewer (R) (passed)
- 2009 Bond Measure, Zoo (R) (passed)
- 2009 Bond Measure, Housing (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition 1, Election Laws (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition 2, Salary (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition 3, City Clerk (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition 4, Petition Signatures (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition 5, Budget (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition 6, Elections (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition 7, Zoning (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition 8, Charter Dispute (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition 9, Candidate Signatures (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition 10, City Attorney (R) (passed)
- 2009 Transportation Gross Receipts Tax (R) (passed)
- 2011 Bond Measure, Public Safety (R) (passed)
- 2011 Bond Measure, Community (R) (passed)
- 2011 Bond Measure, Parks (R) (passed)
- 2011 Bond Measure, Facilities (R) (passed)

- 2011 Bond Measure, Library (R) (passed)
- 2011 Bond Measure, Street (R) (passed)
- 2011 Bond Measure, Public Transit (R) (passed)
- 2011 Bond Measure, Sewer (R) (passed)
- 2011 Bond Measure, Museum (R) (passed)
- 2011 Bond Measure, Housing (R) (passed)
- 2011 Bond Measure, Zoo (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition, Red Light Cameras (R) (failed)
- 2011 Gross Receipts Tax Revenue Bond (R) (failed)

Buffalo, New York
- 2011 Proposition 1, Personnel (R) (passed)

New York, New York
- 2010 Proposal Number 1, Term Limits (R) (passed)
- 2010 Proposal Number 2, Election and Government Administration (R) (passed)

Rochester, New York
- 2011 City Proposal One, Mayoral Succession (R) (passed)

Syracuse, New York
- n/a

Yonkers, New York
- 2007 Charter Amendment, Budgeting (R) (passed)
- 2008 Charter Amendment 1, Personnel (R) (passed)
- 2008 Charter Amendment 2, Charter Updates (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposal 1, Police (R) (failed)
- 2010 Proposal 1, Appointments (R) (passed)
- 2010 Proposal 2, Succession (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposal 1, Appointments (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposal 2, Structure (R) (passed)

Charlotte, North Carolina
- 2008 Street Bonds, Streets (R) (passed)
- 2008 Housing Bonds, Housing (R) (passed)
- 2008 Neighborhood Improvement Bonds, Neighborhoods (R) (passed)
- 2010 Street Bonds, Streets (R) (passed)
- 2010 Housing Bonds, Housing (R) (passed)
- 2010 Neighborhood Improvement Bonds, Neighborhoods (R) (passed)

Durham, North Carolina
- 2007 Street and Sidewalk Referendum, Infrastructure (R) (passed)
- 2010 Street Improvement Bonds, Infrastructure (R) (passed)

Greensboro, North Carolina

- 2007 Recall, Dianne Bellamy-Small (failed)
- 2008 Street Bonds, Streets (R) (passed)
- 2008 War Memorial Bonds, Facilities Renovation (R) (failed)
- 2008 Parks and Rec Bonds, Parks (R) (passed)
- 2008 Housing Bonds, Housing (R) (passed)
- 2009 Natural Science Center Bonds, Facilities (R) (passed)

Raleigh, North Carolina

- 2007 Parks and Rec Facilities Bonds, Parks (R) (passed)
- 2011 Transportation Bonds, Transit (R) (passed)
- 2011 Housing Bonds, Housing (R) (passed)

Akron, Ohio

- 2007 Issue 17, Income Tax (R) (failed)
- 2008 Issue 7, Clerk Appointment (R) (failed)
- 2008 Issue 8, Scholarship Plan (R) (failed)
- 2008 Issue 9, City Property (R) (passed)
- 2009 Issue 5, Recall Procedure (R) (passed)
- 2009 Recall, Mayor Don Plusquellic (failed)
- 2010 Issue 11, Economic Development (R) (failed)
- 2010 Issue 12, Recall procedures (R) (passed)
- 2010 Issue 13, Intergovernmental Agreements (R) (passed)
- 2010 Issue 14, Campaign Finance (R) (passed)
- 2010 Issue 15, Civil Service (R) (passed)
- 2010 Issue 16, Energy (R) (failed)
- 2010 Issue 17, Public Safety Tax (R) (failed)
- 2011 Charter Amendment, Council Meetings (R) (passed)
- 2012 Charter Amendment, Concurrent Elections (R) (passed)

Cincinnati, Ohio

- 2008 Issue 7, Red Light Cameras (R) (passed)
- 2008 Issue 8, Council Election (R) (failed)
- 2009 Issue 8, Public Utilities (R) (passed)
- 2009 Issue 9, Public Transit (R) (failed)
- 2011 Issue 44, Electrical Service (R) (passed)
- 2011 Issue 45, Gas Service (R) (passed)
- 2011 Issue 46, Campaign Finance (R) (passed)
- 2011 Issue 47, Garbage Fees (R) (passed)
- 2011 Issue 48, Public Transit (R) (failed)
- 2012 Issue 4, Term Length (R) (passed)

Cleveland, Ohio

- 2007 Recall, Joe Santiago (failed)

- 2008 Issue 35, Election Process (R) (passed)
- 2008 Issue 36, Police Review Board (R) (passed)
- 2008 Issue 37, Contracts (R) (passed)
- 2008 Issue 38, Civil Service (R) (passed)
- 2008 Issue 39, Redistricting (R) (passed)
- 2008 Issue 40, City Procedure (R) (passed)
- 2009 Issue 17, Planning Board Members (R) (passed)
- 2010 Issue 18, Redistricting (R) (passed)
- 2010 Issue 19, Charter Review (R) (passed)
- 2012 Charter Amendment, Personnel (R) (failed)
- 2012 Issue 1, Civil Service (R) (passed)

Columbus, Ohio
- 2008 Issue 17, Garbage Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2008 Issue 14, Public Safety Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2008 Issue 19, Parks Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Issue 15, Street Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2008 Issue 16, Water Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Issue 18, Sewer Bond (R) (passed)
- 2009 Issue 1, Income Tax (R) (passed)
- 2010 Issue 12, Council Procedure (R) (passed)

Dayton, Ohio
- 2007 Charter Amendment 1, Bond Payment (R) (passed)
- 2007 Charter Amendment 2, Contracts (R) (passed)
- 2007 Charter Amendment 3, Estimates (R) (passed)
- 2008 Issue 10, Council Procedure (R) (passed)
- 2008 Issue 11, Boards (R) (passed)
- 2008 Issue 12, City Attorney (R) (passed)
- 2008 Issue 13, Government Contracts (R) (passed)
- 2010 Issue 15, City Meetings (R) (passed)
- 2010 Issue 16, Civil Service (R) (passed)
- 2010 Issue 17, Property Tax Limits (R) (failed)
- 2010 Issue 18, Residency (R) (passed)

Toledo, Ohio
- 2007 Charter Amendment 22, Balanced Budget (R) (passed)
- 2008 Issue 1, Income Tax (R) (passed)
- 2009 Issue 1, Income Tax Allocation (R) (failed)
- 2009 Issue 2, City Council Size, (I) (failed)
- 2010 Issue 3, Income Tax (R) (passed)
- 2012 Issue 1, Income Tax (R) (passed)
- 2012 Issue 5, Park Tax (R) (failed)

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
- N/A

Tulsa, Oklahoma
- 2008 Proposition 1, Sales Tax (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 2, Bond Measure (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition 1, City Auditor (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition 2, Term Length (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition 3, Settlements (R) (passed)
- 2010 Proposition 1, Economic Funds (R) (passed)
- 2010 Proposition 2, Election Date (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 1 (February), Elections (R) (failed)
- 2011 Proposition (August), Utility Franchise (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 1 (November), Change to Council-Manager (R) (failed)
- 2011 Initiative Petition Proposition 1, Mayoral Duties (I) (failed)
- 2011 Initiative Petition Proposition 2, Election Dates (I) (passed)
- 2011 Initiative Petition Proposition 3, Non-partisan Elections (I) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 1, Election Law (R) (passed)

Portland, Oregon
- 2007 Measure 26-89, Charter Review (R) (passed)
- 2007 Measure 26-90, Update Civil Service (R) (passed)
- 2007 Measure 26-91, Form of Government Change (R) (failed)
- 2007 Measure 26-92, Development Provisions (R) (passed)
- 2007 Measure 26-93, Employee Benefits (R) (passed)
- 2008 Measure 26-94, Children Investment Tax (R) (passed)
- 2010 Measure 26-108, Campaign Finance (R) (failed)
- 2010 Measure 26-117, Emergency Vehicle Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure 26-126, Tort Law (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure 26-127, Spending (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure 26-128, Law (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure 26-129, Language Updates (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure 26-130, Language Updates (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure 26-131, Emergency Fund (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure 26-132, Vacancies (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure 26-133, Vacancies (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure 26-134, Position Updates (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure 26-145, Employee Benefits (R) (passed)
- 2012 Measure 26-146, Restore Art and Music Education (R) (passed)

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
- 2010 Ballot Question, Government Structure, Tax Board (R) (passed)
- 2010 Charter Amendment 1, Economic Opportunity (R) (passed)
- 2010 Charter Amendment 2, Government Structure (R) (passed)

- 2010 Bond Measure, Infrastructure (R) (passed)

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
- 2011 Question Pittsburgh 1, Library Tax (R) (passed)

Providence, Rhode Island
- 2012 Question 8, Infrastructure Bond (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question 9, Charter Language (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question 10, Charter Review (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question 11, Charter Language Clarification (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question 12, Charter Language (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question 13, Government operations, Employees (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question 14, Government Operations, Personnel (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question 15, Government Operations, Personnel (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question 16, Emergency Management (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question 17, Personnel, Nepotism (R) (passed)
- 2012 Question 18, Elections Redistricting (R) (passed)

Chattanooga, Tennessee
- 2010 Ordinance 12424, Employees (R) (passed)
- 2012 Ordinance 12566, Government Structure (R) (passed)
- 2012 Ordinance 12525, De-annexation (R) (passed)
- 2012 Ordinance 12631, Recall Procedure (R) (passed)

Knoxville, Tennessee
- 2010 City Charter Amendment, Ballot Measure Process (R) (passed)
- 2012 City Charter Amendment, Pensions (R) (passed)

Memphis, Tennessee
- 2008 Referendum 1, Term Limits (R) (passed)
- 2008 Referendum 2, Elections (R) (passed)
- 2008 Referendum 3, Utilities (R) (passed)
- 2008 Referendum 4, Employees (R) (passed)
- 2008 Referendum 5, Elections (R) (passed)
- 2008 Referendum 6, Mayoral Vacancy (R) (passed)
- 2008 Ordinance 5265, Employee Residence (R) (passed)
- 2008 Ordinance 5232, Recall Procedure (R) (passed)
- 2010 Memphis Residence, Employees (R) (passed
- 2010 Ordinance 5347, Elections (R) (passed)
- 2012 Ordinance 5464, Gas Tax (R) (failed)

Nashville, Tennessee
- 2009 Recall, Pam Murray (passed) (2 votes)
- 2009 Amendment 1, English (R) (failed)

- 2009 Amendment 2, Ballot Measure Process (I) (failed)
- 2011 Amendment 1, Government Facilities (R) (passed)
- 2012 Metro Charter Amendment 1, Employees (R) (passed)
- 2012 Metro Charter Amendment 2, Employees (R) (passed)
- 2012 Metro Charter Amendment 3, Sheriff (R) (passed)
- 2012 Metro Charter Amendment 4, Charter Language (R) (passed)
- 2012 Metro Charter Amendment 5, Government Structure (R) (passed)

Arlington, Texas

- 2008 Proposition 1, Parks Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 2, Street Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 3, Library Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 4, Fire Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 5, Drainage Bond (R) (passed)
- 2010 Proposition 1, Street Tax Renewal (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 1, Alcohol Sales (I) (passed)

Austin, Texas

- 2008 Proposition 2, Development (I) (failed)
- 2012 Proposition 11, Emergency procedure (I) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 3, Switch to District, Mayor (I) (passed)

Corpus Christi, Texas

- 2007 Crime Control Proposition, Crime (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 1, Street Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 2, Fire Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 3, Police Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 4, Health Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 5, Facilities Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 6, Parks Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 7, Planning Bond (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 8, Safety (R) (passed)
- 2010 Charter Amendment 1, IRR Procedure (R) (passed)
- 2010 Charter Amendment 2, City Auditor (R) (passed)
- 2010 Charter Amendment 3, Court (R) (passed)
- 2010 Charter Amendment 4, Terms (R) (passed)
- 2010 Charter Amendment 5, Public Property (R) (passed)
- 2010 Charter Amendment 6, Elections (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 1, Street Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 2, Facilities Bonds (R) (failed)
- 2012 Proposition 3, Facilities Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 4, Parks Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 5, Museum Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 6, Health Bonds (R) (passed)

- 2012 Proposition 7, Safety Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 8, Economic Development Bonds (R) (passed)

Dallas, Texas
- 2007 Trinity River Proposition, Public Works (I) (failed)
- 2009 Proposition 1, Hotel Construction (I) (failed)
- 2009 Proposition 2, Tax Subsidy Limit (I) (passed)
- 2010 Proposition 1, Alcohol Sales (I) (passed)
- 2010 Proposition 2, Alcohol Sales (I) (passed)
- 2010 Proposition 3, Public Land Sale (R) (failed)
- 2010 Proposition 4, Public Land Sale (R) (failed)
- 2012 Proposition 1, Street Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 2, Flood Protection Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 3, Economic Development Bonds (R) (passed)

El Paso, Texas
- 2007 Proposition 1, Elections (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 2, Recall Procedure (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 3, Personnel (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 4, Salaries (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 5, Council Procedure (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 6, Language (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 7, Personnel (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 8, Personnel (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 9, Personnel (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 10, Personnel (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 11, Personnel (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 12, Finances (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 13, Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 14, Language (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition, Sewers (I) (failed)
- 2010 Proposition, Employee Benefits (I) (passed)
- 2012, Proposition 1, Park Bond (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 2, Museum Bond (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 3, Hotel Tax (R) (passed)

Fort Worth, Texas
- 2007 Collective Bargaining (I) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 1, Alcohol Sales (I) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 2, Alcohol Sales (I) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition, Crime Control District (R) (passed)

Garland, Texas
- 2007 Charter Amendment 1, Term Limits (R) (passed)

- 2007 Charter Amendment 2, Term Limits (R) (passed)
- 2007 Charter Amendment 3, Elections (R) (passed)
- 2007 Charter Amendment 4, Elections (R) (passed)
- 2007 Charter Amendment 5, Claims (R) (passed)
- 2007 Charter Amendment 6, Committees (R) (passed)
- 2007 Charter Amendment 7, Committees (R) (passed)
- 2007 Charter Amendment 8, Council Rules (R) (passed)

Houston, Texas
- 2010 Proposition 1, Street Tax (I) (passed)
- 2010 Proposition 2, Council Requirements (R) (failed)
- 2010 Proposition 3, Red Light Cameras (I) (failed)
- 2012 Proposition 1, Language (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 2, IRR Procedure (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition A, Safety Bond (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition B, Parks Bond (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition C, General Bond (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition D, Library Bond (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition E, Property Bond (R) (passed)

Lubbock, Texas
- 2009 Bond Proposition 1, Street Bond (R) (passed)
- 2009 Bond Proposition 2, Fire Safety Bond (R) (passed)
- 2009 Bond Proposition 3, Recreation (R) (failed)
- 2009 Bond Proposition 4, Recreation (R) (failed)

San Antonio, Texas
- 2007 Proposition 1, Street, Bridges, and Sidewalk Improvements (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 2, Drainage Improvements (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 3, Parks Improvements (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 4, Library Improvements (R) (passed)
- 2007 Proposition 5, Public Health Facilities (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 1, Term Limit Expansion (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 1, Street, Bridges, and Sidewalk Improvements (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 2, Drainage Improvements (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 3, Parks Improvements (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 4, Library Improvements (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition 5, Public Health Facilities (R) (passed)
- 2012 Charter Proposition, Council vacancies (R) (passed)
- 2012 Proposition (November), Pre-K SA (R) (passed)

Salt Lake City, Utah
- 2007 Proposition 1, Public Safety Bond (R) (failed)
- 2009 Proposition 1, Public Safety Bond (R) (passed)

Chesapeake, Virginia
- N/A

Norfolk, Virginia
- N/A

Richmond, Virginia
- N/A

Virginia Beach, Virginia
- 2012 Advisory Referendum, Light Rail (R) (passed)

Seattle, Washington
- 2007 Charter Amendment 17, Organization (R) (passed)
- 2007 Charter Amendment 18, Organization (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition 1, Housing Tax Levy (R) (passed)
- 2009 Referendum 1, Plastic Bag Fee (R) (failed)
- 2011 Referendum 1, Infrastructure (I) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 1, Education Levy (R) (passed)

Spokane, Washington
- 2007 General Obligation Parks and Recreation Facilities (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition 1, Public Safety Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition 2, Charter Amendments (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition 1 (November), Public Safety Bonds (R) (passed)
- 2009 Proposition 2 (November), Community Bill of Rights (I) (failed)
- 2009 Proposition 3, Community Bill of Rights (I) (failed)
- 2009 Proposition 4, Community Bill of Rights (I) (failed)
- 2010 Proposition 1, EMS Levy (R) (passed)
- 2010 Proposition 1 (November), Education Levy (I) (failed)
- 2011 Proposition 1, Charter Amendment (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 2, Charter Amendment (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 3, Charter Amendment (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 4, Charter Amendment (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 5, Charter Amendment (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 6, Charter Amendment (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 7, Charter Amendment (R) (failed)
- 2011 Proposition 8, Charter Amendment (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 9, Charter Amendment (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 10, Charter Amendment (R) (failed)
- 2011 Proposition 11, Charter Amendment (R) (passed)
- 2011 Proposition 1 (November), Community Bill of Rights (I) (failed)

Tacoma, Washington

- 2007 Proposition 1, Health Care (R) (passed)
- 2008 Proposition 1, Term Limits (R) (failed)
- 2010 Proposition 1, Parks Levy (R) (passed)
- 2011 Initiative 1, Marijuana Enforcement (I) (passed)

Madison, Wisconsin

- 2009 Garver Arts Incubator Referendum, Arts (R) (passed)
- 2010 Madison Area Technical College Referendum, Facilities bond (R) (passed)
- 2011 Political Contribution Question, corporations are not people (R) (passed)

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

- 2007 Recall, Mike McGee (failed)
- 2008 Municipal Referendum, Paid Sick Leave (I) (passed)

Appendix B
Spending Levels and Percent by City

City	State	Direct Expenditures Per Capita (2012)	Police Spending Per Capita (2012)	Social Service Spending Per Capita (2012)	Percentage of Overall Spending (Police)	Percentage of Overall Spending (Social Services)
Birmingham	Alabama	$6,741	$414	$229	6.142%	3.397%
Mobile	Alabama	$4,332	$316	$190	7.295%	4.386%
Montgomery	Alabama	$4,194	$267	$1,278	6.366%	30.472%
Anchorage	Alaska	$5,252	$419	$91	7.978%	1.733%
Mesa	Arizona	$4,202	$379	$200	9.020%	4.760%
Phoenix	Arizona	$5,019	$347	$193	6.914%	3.845%
Tucson	Arizona	$4,284	$413	$206	9.641%	4.809%
Little Rock	Arkansas	$4,282	$309	$110	7.216%	2.569%
Anaheim	California	$6,896	$392	$457	5.684%	6.627%
Bakersfield	California	$5,680	$307	$1,015	5.405%	17.870%
Fremont	California	$6,275	$374	$1,491	5.960%	23.761%
Fresno	California	$5,553	$382	$924	6.879%	16.640%
Huntington Beach	California	$4,620	$440	$479	9.524%	10.368%
Long Beach	California	$8,666	$582	$1,234	6.716%	14.240%
Los Angeles	California	$9,071	$594	$1,181	6.548%	13.020%
Modesto	California	$6,684	$306	$925	4.578%	13.839%
Oakland	California	$9,986	$560	$1,617	5.608%	16.193%
Riverside	California	$6,653	$440	$999	6.614%	15.016%
Sacramento	California	$7,475	$402	$833	5.378%	11.144%
San Diego	California	$6,030	$313	$532	5.191%	8.823%
San Francisco	California	$12,904	$464	$2,723	3.596%	21.102%
San Jose	California	$6,479	$324	$1,454	5.001%	22.442%
Santa Ana	California	$5,461	$435	$490	7.966%	8.973%
Stockton	California	$5,568	$410	$970	7.364%	17.421%
Aurora	Colorado	$4,736	$332	$208	7.010%	4.392%
Colorado Springs	Colorado	$6,146	$292	$1,334	4.751%	21.705%
Denver	Colorado	$8,349	$363	$1,422	4.348%	17.032%

Ft. Lauderdale	Florida	$7,148	$800	$1,554	11.192%	21.740%
Hialeah	Florida	$6,237	$413	$872	6.622%	13.981%
Jacksonville	Florida	$6,343	$360	$90	5.676%	1.419%
Miami	Florida	$6,953	$539	$875	7.752%	12.584%
Orlando	Florida	$7,023	$675	$104	9.611%	1.481%
St. Petersburg	Florida	$4,790	$566	$222	11.816%	4.635%
Tampa	Florida	$6,717	$612	$208	9.111%	3.097%
Atlanta	Georgia	$8,767	$457	$168	5.213%	1.916%
Columbus	Georgia	$4,204	$251	$291	5.971%	6.922%
Chicago	Illinois	$8,058	$516	$389	6.404%	4.828%
Ft. Wayne	Indiana	$3,030	$228	$16	7.525%	0.528%
Gary	Indiana	$4,995	$195	$53	3.904%	1.061%
Indianapolis	Indiana	$6,347	$242	$1,249	3.813%	19.679%
Des Moines	Iowa	$5,456	$317	$420	5.810%	7.698%
Kansas City	Kansas	$6,038	$328	$161	5.432%	2.666%
Wichita	Kansas	$4,455	$245	$167	5.499%	3.749%
Lexington	Kentucky	$3,111	$158	$82	5.079%	2.636%
Louisville	Kentucky	$3,806	$158	$62	4.151%	1.629%
Baton Rouge	Louisiana	$4,553	$301	$241	6.611%	5.293%
New Orleans	Louisiana	$5,980	$399	$42	6.672%	0.702%
Shreveport	Louisiana	$4,948	$365	$73	7.377%	1.475%
Baltimore	Maryland	$7,126	$598	$194	8.392%	2.722%
Boston	Massachusetts	$6,100	$502	$448	8.230%	7.344%
Springfield	Massachusetts	$5,270	$249	$28	4.725%	0.531%
Worcester	Massachusetts	$4,570	$226	$1	4.945%	0.022%
Detroit	Michigan	$7,558	$547	$400	7.237%	5.292%
Flint	Michigan	$8,951	$248	$4,308	2.771%	48.129%
Grand Rapids	Michigan	$4,513	$297	$337	6.581%	7.467%
Warren	Michigan	$4,341	$299	$366	6.888%	8.431%
Minneapolis	Minnesota	$6,848	$451	$1,174	6.586%	17.144%
St. Paul	Minnesota	$5,838	$418	$475	7.160%	8.136%
Jackson	Mississippi	$3,507	$229	$41	6.530%	1.169%
Kansas City	Missouri	$5,089	$467	$244	9.177%	4.795%
St. Louis	Missouri	$6,283	$787	$124	12.526%	1.974%
Lincoln	Nebraska	$4,330	$171	$116	3.949%	2.679%
Omaha	Nebraska	$6,169	$244	$133	3.955%	2.156%
Las Vegas	Nevada	$5,519	$318	$520	5.762%	9.422%
Reno	Nevada	$4,905	$321	$205	6.544%	4.179%
Albuquerque	New Mexico	$3,682	$363	$142	9.859%	3.857%
Buffalo	New York	$7,821	$334	$972	4.271%	12.428%
New York	New York	$12,229	$614	$1,838	5.021%	15.030%

Rochester	New York	$7,647	$473	$650	6.185%	8.500%
Syracuse	New York	$8,224	$388	$674	4.718%	8.196%
Yonkers	New York	$8,480	$462	$1,457	5.448%	17.182%
Charlotte	North Carolina	$6,823	$370	$2,367	5.423%	34.691%
Durham	North Carolina	$4,565	$358	$424	7.842%	9.288%
Greensboro	North Carolina	$4,540	$351	$330	7.731%	7.269%
Raleigh	North Carolina	$4,323	$299	$247	6.916%	5.714%
Akron	Ohio	$4,962	$224	$389	4.514%	7.840%
Cincinnati	Ohio	$7,588	$495	$673	6.523%	8.869%
Cleveland	Ohio	$7,769	$479	$1,222	6.166%	15.729%
Columbus	Ohio	$5,560	$359	$507	6.457%	9.119%
Dayton	Ohio	$5,500	$389	$533	7.073%	9.691%
Toledo	Ohio	$4,482	$367	$628	8.188%	14.012%
Oklahoma City	Oklahoma	$3,425	$308	$18	8.993%	0.526%
Tulsa	Oklahoma	$4,119	$243	$250	5.899%	6.069%
Portland	Oregon	$5,889	$332	$506	5.638%	8.592%
Philadelphia	Pennsylvania	$6,796	$397	$1,252	5.842%	18.423%
Pittsburgh	Pennsylvania	$6,595	$294	$704	4.458%	10.675%
Providence	Rhode Island	$5,242	$461	$0	8.794%	0.000%
Chattanooga	Tennessee	$10,448	$374	$1,815	3.580%	17.372%
Knoxville	Tennessee	$8,045	$375	$63	4.661%	0.783%
Memphis	Tennessee	$8,491	$503	$453	5.924%	5.335%
Nashville	Tennessee	$6,561	$314	$412	4.786%	6.280%
Arlington	Texas	$4,285	$267	$522	6.231%	12.182%
Austin	Texas	$6,247	$376	$353	6.019%	5.651%
Corpus Christi	Texas	$4,159	$268	$188	6.444%	4.520%
Dallas	Texas	$6,206	$305	$819	4.915%	13.197%
El Paso	Texas	$4,165	$225	$640	5.402%	15.366%
Ft. Worth	Texas	$4,869	$347	$523	7.127%	10.741%
Garland	Texas	$5,837	$212	$843	3.632%	14.442%
Houston	Texas	$5,226	$358	$489	6.850%	9.357%
Lubbock	Texas	$7,112	$256	$1,531	3.600%	21.527%
San Antonio	Texas	$6,213	$263	$710	4.233%	11.428%
Salt Lake City	Utah	$5,100	$346	$104	6.784%	2.039%
Chesapeake	Virginia	$4,468	$176	$400	3.939%	8.953%
Norfolk	Virginia	$5,910	$280	$757	4.738%	12.809%
Richmond	Virginia	$6,502	$446	$303	6.859%	4.660%

Virginia Beach	Virginia	$4,594	$202	$422	4.397%	9.186%
Seattle	Washington	$7,830	$357	$430	4.559%	5.492%
Spokane	Washington	$4,810	$279	$221	5.800%	4.595%
Tacoma	Washington	$8,517	$379	$176	4.450%	2.066%
Madison	Wisconsin	$4,829	$359	$498	7.434%	10.313%
Milwaukee	Wisconsin	$6,035	$470	$627	7.788%	10.389%
Mean		$6,037	$371	$615	6.306%	9.354%
Median		$5,889	$359	$430	6.185%	8.136%
Standard Deviation		1,769	123	637		
IQR		2,265	142	664		
N		111	111	111	111	111

Appendix C
Professional Reforms

City	State	Form of Government	Partisan or Non-partisan	District, At-Large, or Mixed	Level of Reform
Birmingham	Alabama	MC	NP	D	1.0
Mobile	Alabama	MC	NP	D	1.0
Montgomery	Alabama	MC	NP	D	1.0
Anchorage	Alaska	MC	NP	D	1.0
Mesa	Arizona	CM	NP	M	2.5
Phoenix	Arizona	CM	NP	M	2.5
Tucson	Arizona	CM	NP	M	2.5
Little Rock	Arkansas	CM	NP	M	2.5
Anaheim	California	CM	NP	AL	3.0
Bakersfield	California	CM	NP	AL	3.0
Fremont	California	CM	NP	AL	3.0
Fresno	California	MC	NP	D	1.0
Huntington Beach	California	CM	NP	AL	3.0
Long Beach	California	CM	NP	D	2.0
Los Angeles	California	MC	NP	D	1.0
Modesto	California	CM	NP	D	2.0
Oakland	California	MC	NP	M	1.5
Riverside	California	CM	NP	D	2.0
Sacramento	California	CM	NP	M	2.5
San Diego	California	MC	NP	D	1.0
San Francisco	California	MC	NP	D	1.0
San Jose	California	CM	NP	M	2.5
Santa Ana	California	CM	NP	AL	3.0
Stockton	California	MC	NP	AL	2.0
Aurora	Colorado	CM	NP	M	2.5
Colorado Springs	Colorado	MC	NP	M	1.5
Denver	Colorado	MC	NP	M	1.5
Ft. Lauderdale	Florida	CM	NP	M	2.5
Hialeah	Florida	MC	NP	AL	2.0
Jacksonville	Florida	MC	P	M	0.5

Miami	Florida	MC	P	D	0.0
Orlando	Florida	MC	NP	D	1.0
St. Petersburg	Florida	MC	NP	D	1.0
Tampa	Florida	MC	NP	M	1.5
Atlanta	Georgia	MC	NP	M	1.5
Columbus	Georgia	MC	NP	M	1.5
Chicago	Illinois	MC	NP	D	1.0
Ft. Wayne	Indiana	MC	P	M	0.5
Gary	Indiana	MC	P	M	0.5
Indianapolis	Indiana	MC	P	M	0.5
Des Moines	Iowa	CM	NP	M	2.5
Kansas City	Kansas	MC	NP	M	1.5
Wichita	Kansas	CM	NP	M	2.5
Lexington	Kentucky	MC	NP	M	1.5
Louisville	Kentucky	MC	P	D	0.0
Baton Rouge	Louisiana	MC	P	D	0.0
New Orleans	Louisiana	MC	P	M	0.5
Shrevport	Louisiana	MC	P	D	0.0
Baltimore	Maryland	MC	P	M	0.5
Boston	Massachusetts	MC	NP	M	1.5
Springfield	Massachusetts	MC	NP	M	1.5
Worcester	Massachusetts	CM	NP	M	2.5
Detroit	Michigan	MC	NP	M	1.5
Flint	Michigan	MC	NP	D	1.0
Grand Rapids	Michigan	CM	NP	M	2.5
Warren	Michigan	MC	NP	M	1.5
Minneapolis	Minnesota	MC	NP	D	1.0
St. Paul	Minnesota	MC	NP	D	1.0
Jackson	Mississippi	MC	P	D	0.0
Kansas City	Missouri	CM	NP	M	2.5
St. Louis	Missouri	MC	P	M	0.5
Lincoln	Nebraska	MC	NP	M	1.5
Omaha	Nebraska	MC	NP	D	1.0
Las Vegas	Nevada	CM	NP	M	2.5
Reno	Nevada	CM	NP	M	2.5
Albuquerque	New Mexico	MC	NP	D	1.0
Buffalo	New York	MC	P	D	0.0
New York	New York	MC	P	D	0.0
Rochester	New York	MC	P	M	0.5
Syracuse	New York	MC	P	M	0.5
Yonkers	New York	MC	P	D	0.0
Charlotte	North Carolina	CM	NP	M	2.5

Durham	North Carolina	CM	NP	M	2.5
Greensboro	North Carolina	CM	NP	M	2.5
Raleigh	North Carolina	CM	NP	M	2.5
Akron	Ohio	MC	P	M	0.5
Cincinnati	Ohio	MC	NP	AL	2.0
Cleveland	Ohio	MC	NP	D	1.0
Columbus	Ohio	MC	NP	AL	2.0
Dayton	Ohio	CM	NP	AL	3.0
Toledo	Ohio	MC	NP	M	1.5
Oklahoma City	Oklahoma	CM	NP	M	2.5
Tulsa	Oklahoma	MC	P	D	0.0
Portland	Oregon	Com	NP	AL	
Philadelphia	Pennsylvania	MC	P	M	0.5
Pittsburgh	Pennsylvania	MC	P	D	0.0
Providence	Rhode Island	MC	P	D	0.0
Chattanooga	Tennessee	MC	P	D	0.0
Knoxville	Tennessee	MC	NP	M	1.5
Memphis	Tennessee	MC	NP	M	1.5
Nashville	Tennessee	MC	NP	M	1.5
Arlington	Texas	CM	NP	AL	3.0
Austin	Texas	CM	NP	AL	3.0
Corpus Christi	Texas	CM	NP	M	2.5
Dallas	Texas	CM	NP	M	2.5
El Paso	Texas	CM	NP	M	2.5
Ft. Worth	Texas	CM	NP	M	2.5
Garland	Texas	CM	NP	M	2.5
Houston	Texas	MC	NP	M	1.5
Lubbock	Texas	CM	NP	M	2.5
San Antonio	Texas	CM	NP	M	2.5
Salt Lake City	Utah	MC	NP	D	1.0
Chesapeake	Virginia	CM	NP	AL	3.0
Norfolk	Virginia	CM	NP	M	2.5
Richmond	Virginia	MC	NP	D	1.0
Virginia Beach	Virginia	CM	NP	M	2.5
Seattle	Washington	MC	NP	AL	2.0
Spokane	Washington	MC	NP	M	1.5
Tacoma	Washington	CM	NP	M	2.5
Madison	Wisconsin	MC	NP	D	1.0
Milwaukee	Wisconsin	MC	NP	D	1.0
Mean					1.57
Median					1.50

MC = Mayor-Council
CM = Council-Manager
Com = Commission
P = Partisan
NP = Non-partisan
AL = At-large
D = District
M = Mixed

Appendix D
Direct Democracy Reforms

City	State	Initiative Available	Referen-dum Available	Recall Available	Total Direct Democracy Measures Available	Initiatives	Initiatives Approved
Birmingham	Alabama	Yes	Yes	No	2	0	0
Mobile	Alabama	No	No	No	0	0	0
Montgomery	Alabama	No	No	No	0	0	0
Anchorage	Alaska	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	2	0
Mesa	Arizona	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	2	2
Phoenix	Arizona	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Tucson	Arizona	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	1	0
Little Rock	Arkansas	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Anaheim	California	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Bakersfield	California	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Fremont	California	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Fresno	California	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Huntington Beach	California	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	1	0
Long Beach	California	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	2	1
Los Angeles	California	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Modesto	California	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	2	2
Oakland	California	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	1	1
Riverside	California	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Sacramento	California	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	1	0
San Diego	California	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	2	2
San Francisco	California	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	16	7
San Jose	California	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	2	1
Santa Ana	California	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Stockton	California	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Aurora	Colorado	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Colorado Springs	Colorado	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	4	2
Denver	Colorado	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	5	2
Ft. Lauderdale	Florida	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Hialeah	Florida	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0

Jacksonville	Florida	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Miami	Florida	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Orlando	Florida	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
St. Petersburg	Florida	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Tampa	Florida	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Atlanta	Georgia	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Columbus	Georgia	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Chicago	Illinois	No	Yes	No	1	0	0
Ft. Wayne	Indiana	No	No	No	0	0	0
Gary	Indiana	No	No	No	0	0	0
Indianapolis	Indiana	No	No	No	0	0	0
Des Moines	Iowa	No	No	No	0	0	0
Kansas City	Kansas	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Wichita	Kansas	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	1	0
Lexington	Kentucky	No	Yes	No	1	0	0
Louisville	Kentucky	No	Yes	No	1	0	0
Baton Rouge	Louisiana	Yes	No	No	1	0	0
New Orleans	Louisiana	Yes	Yes	No	2	0	0
Shrevport	Louisiana	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Baltimore	Maryland	Yes	Yes	No	2	0	0
Boston	Massachusetts	No	No	Yes	1	0	0
Springfield	Massachusetts	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Worcester	Massachusetts	Yes	Yes	No	2	0	0
Detroit	Michigan	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	1	1
Flint	Michigan	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Grand Rapids	Michigan	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	1	1
Warren	Michigan	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	2	2
Minneapolis	Minnesota	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
St. Paul	Minnesota	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Jackson	Mississippi	No	No	No	0	0	0
Kansas City	Missouri	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
St. Louis	Missouri	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	1	1
Lincoln	Nebraska	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Omaha	Nebraska	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Las Vegas	Nevada	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Reno	Nevada	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Albuquerque	New Mexico	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Buffalo	New York	No	Yes	No	1	0	0
New York	New York	No	Yes	No	1	0	0
Rochester	New York	No	Yes	No	1	0	0
Syracuse	New York	No	Yes	No	1	0	0
Yonkers	New York	No	Yes	No	1	0	0

Charlotte	North Carolina	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Durham	North Carolina	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Greensboro	North Carolina	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Raleigh	North Carolina	No	Yes	Yes	2	0	0
Akron	Ohio	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Cincinnati	Ohio	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Cleveland	Ohio	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Columbus	Ohio	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Dayton	Ohio	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Toledo	Ohio	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	1	0
Oklahoma City	Oklahoma	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Tulsa	Oklahoma	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	3	2
Portland	Oregon	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Philadelphia	Pennsylvania	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Pittsburgh	Pennsylvania	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Providence	Rhode Island	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Chattanooga	Tennessee	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Knoxville	Tennessee	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Memphis	Tennessee	No	Yes	Yes	2	0	0
Nashville	Tennessee	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	1	0
Arlington	Texas	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	1	1
Austin	Texas	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	3	2
Corpus Christi	Texas	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Dallas	Texas	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	5	3
El Paso	Texas	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	2	1
Ft. Worth	Texas	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	3	3
Garland	Texas	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Houston	Texas	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	2	1
Lubbock	Texas	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
San Antonio	Texas	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Salt Lake City	Utah	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Chesapeake	Virginia	No	Yes	No	1	0	0
Norfolk	Virginia	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Richmond	Virginia	Yes	Yes	No	2	0	0
Virginia Beach	Virginia	No	Yes	No	1	0	0
Seattle	Washington	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	1	1
Spokane	Washington	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	5	0
Tacoma	Washington	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	1	1
Madison	Wisconsin	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	0	0
Milwaukee	Wisconsin	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	1	1
Total		91	102	88		76	41

Mean					2.53	0.68	0.37
Median					3.00	0.00	0.00
Standard Deviation					0.92	1.84	0.93
IQR					0.00	1.00	0.00
N		111	111	111	111	111	111

City	State	Referenda	Referenda Approved	Recalls	Recalls Approved	Total Direct Democracy Measures	Total Successful Measures	Success Rate
Birmingham	Alabama	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Mobile	Alabama	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Montgomery	Alabama	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Anchorage	Alaska	48	37	0	0	50	37	74.00%
Mesa	Arizona	19	16	0	0	21	18	85.71%
Phoenix	Arizona	9	7	0	0	9	7	77.78%
Tucson	Arizona	4	1	0	0	5	1	20.00%
Little Rock	Arkansas	6	6	0	0	6	6	100.00%
Anaheim	California	2	2	0	0	2	2	100.00%
Bakersfield	California	1	1	0	0	1	1	100.00%
Fremont	California	1	1	0	0	1	1	100.00%
Fresno	California	2	2	0	0	2	2	100.00%
Huntington Beach	California	5	3	0	0	6	3	50.00%
Long Beach	California	14	10	0	0	16	11	68.75%
Los Angeles	California	20	16	0	0	20	16	80.00%
Modesto	California	15	10	0	0	17	12	70.59%
Oakland	California	13	7	0	0	14	8	57.14%
Riverside	California	10	5	0	0	10	5	50.00%
Sacramento	California	5	4	0	0	6	4	66.67%
San Diego	California	10	9	0	0	12	11	91.67%
San Francisco	California	66	46	0	0	82	53	64.63%
San Jose	California	10	10	1	0	13	11	84.62%
Santa Ana	California	3	3	0	0	3	3	100.00%
Stockton	California	4	4	0	0	4	4	100.00%
Aurora	Colorado	10	6	0	0	10	6	60.00%
Colorado Springs	Colorado	16	12	0	0	20	14	70.00%
Denver	Colorado	14	14	0	0	19	16	84.21%
Ft. Lauderdale	Florida	3	1	0	0	3	1	33.33%
Hialeah	Florida	3	1	0	0	3	1	33.33%

Jacksonville	Florida	1	0	0	0	1	0	0.00%
Miami	Florida	2	1	0	0	2	1	50.00%
Orlando	Florida	0	0	0	0	0	0	
St. Petersburg	Florida	17	16	0	0	17	16	94.12%
Tampa	Florida	2	2	0	0	2	2	100.00%
Atlanta	Georgia	3	3	0	0	3	3	100.00%
Columbus	Georgia	6	6	0	0	6	6	100.00%
Chicago	Illinois	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Ft. Wayne	Indiana	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Gary	Indiana	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Indianapolis	Indiana	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Des Moines	Iowa	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Kansas City	Kansas	1	1	0	0	1	1	100.00%
Wichita	Kansas	1	0	0	0	2	0	0.00%
Lexington	Kentucky	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Louisville	Kentucky	1	0	0	0	1	0	0.00%
Baton Rouge	Louisiana	0	0	0	0	0	0	
New Orleans	Louisiana	12	10	0	0	12	10	83.33%
Shrevport	Louisiana	8	8	0	0	8	8	100.00%
Baltimore	Maryland	43	43	0	0	43	43	100.00%
Boston	Massachusetts	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Springfield	Massachusetts	2	2	0	0	2	2	100.00%
Worcester	Massachusetts	1	1	0	0	1	1	100.00%
Detroit	Michigan	9	8	0	0	10	9	90.00%
Flint	Michigan	6	4	0	0	6	4	66.67%
Grand Rapids	Michigan	3	2	0	0	4	3	75.00%
Warren	Michigan	3	3	0	0	5	5	100.00%
Minneapolis	Minnesota	2	1	0	0	2	1	50.00%
St. Paul	Minnesota	1	1	0	0	1	1	100.00%
Jackson	Mississippi	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Kansas City	Missouri	14	12	0	0	14	12	85.71%
St. Louis	Missouri	5	5	0	0	6	6	100.00%
Lincoln	Nebraska	4	4	0	0	4	4	100.00%
Omaha	Nebraska	0	0	1	0	1	0	0.00%
Las Vegas	Nevada	0	0	1	0	1	0	0.00%
Reno	Nevada	2	2	0	0	2	2	100.00%
Albuquerque	New Mexico	49	46	1	0	50	46	92.00%
Buffalo	New York	1	1	0	0	1	1	100.00%
New York	New York	2	2	0	0	2	2	100.00%
Rochester	New York	1	1	0	0	1	1	100.00%
Syracuse	New York	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Yonkers	New York	8	7	0	0	8	7	87.50%

Charlotte	North Carolina	6	6	0	0	6	6	100.00%
Durham	North Carolina	2	2	0	0	2	2	100.00%
Greensboro	North Carolina	5	4	1	0	6	4	66.67%
Raleigh	North Carolina	3	3	0	0	3	3	100.00%
Akron	Ohio	14	8	1	0	15	8	53.33%
Cincinnati	Ohio	10	7	0	0	10	7	70.00%
Cleveland	Ohio	11	10	1	0	12	10	83.33%
Columbus	Ohio	8	8	0	0	8	8	100.00%
Dayton	Ohio	11	10	0	0	11	10	90.91%
Toledo	Ohio	6	4	0	0	7	4	57.14%
Oklahoma City	Oklahoma	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Tulsa	Oklahoma	11	9	0	0	14	11	78.57%
Portland	Oregon	19	17	0	0	19	17	89.47%
Philadelphia	Pennsylvania	4	4	0	0	4	4	100.00%
Pittsburgh	Pennsylvania	1	1	0	0	1	1	100.00%
Providence	Rhode Island	11	11	0	0	11	11	100.00%
Chattanooga	Tennessee	4	4	0	0	4	4	100.00%
Knoxville	Tennessee	2	2	0	0	2	2	100.00%
Memphis	Tennessee	11	10	0	0	11	10	90.91%
Nashville	Tennessee	7	6	1	1	9	7	77.78%
Arlington	Texas	6	6	0	0	7	7	100.00%
Austin	Texas	0	0	0	0	3	2	66.67%
Corpus Christi	Texas	23	22	0	0	23	22	95.65%
Dallas	Texas	5	3	0	0	10	6	60.00%
El Paso	Texas	17	17	0	0	19	18	94.74%
Ft. Worth	Texas	1	1	0	0	4	4	100.00%
Garland	Texas	8	8	0	0	8	8	100.00%
Houston	Texas	8	7	0	0	10	8	80.00%
Lubbock	Texas	4	2	0	0	4	2	50.00%
San Antonio	Texas	13	13	0	0	13	13	100.00%
Salt Lake City	Utah	2	1	0	0	2	1	50.00%
Chesapeake	Virginia	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Norfolk	Virginia	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Richmond	Virginia	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Virginia Beach	Virginia	1	1	0	0	1	1	100.00%
Seattle	Washington	5	4	0	0	6	5	83.33%
Spokane	Washington	16	14	0	0	21	14	66.67%
Tacoma	Washington	3	2	0	0	4	3	75.00%
Madison	Wisconsin	3	3	0	0	3	3	100.00%
Milwaukee	Wisconsin	0	0	1	0	2	1	50.00%
Total		784	656	9	1	869	698	

Mean		7.06	5.91	0.08	0.01	7.83	6.29	78.78%
Median		4.00	3.00	0.00	0.00	4.00	3.00	89.47%
Standard Deviation		10.38	8.70	0.27	0.09	11.52	9.08	27.00%
IQR		9.00	7.00	0.00	0.00	9.00	7.00	33.00%
N		111	111	111	111	111	111	

Appendix E
Demographic Variables

City	State	Population (2010 Census)	Race (% white only, not Hispanic or Latino)	Age (% 65 years and older)	Income	Education (% 25 and older with at least a bachelor's degree)	Home Rule or Dillon's Rule State
Birmingham	Alabama	212,237	21.1	12.4	$19,650	22.5	Home
Mobile	Alabama	195,111	43.9	13.7	$23,385	26.2	Home
Montgomery	Alabama	205,764	36.1	11.8	$24,365	31.5	Home
Anchorage	Alaska	291,826	62.6	7.2	$36,214	32.8	Home
Mesa	Arizona	439,041	64.3	14.1	$24,155	24.3	Dillon's
Phoenix	Arizona	1,445,632	46.5	8.4	$23,812	26.3	Dillon's
Tucson	Arizona	520,116	47.2	11.9	$20,314	24.7	Dillon's
Little Rock	Arkansas	193,524	46.7	11.3	$29,294	37.7	Dillon's
Anaheim	California	336,265	27.5	9.3	$23,400	24.2	Home
Bakersfield	California	347,483	37.8	8.4	$23,316	20.0	Home
Fremont	California	214,089	26.5	10.2	$40,190	50.9	Dillon's
Fresno	California	494,665	30.0	9.3	$19,445	20.3	Home
Huntington Beach	California	189,992	67.2	14.2	$42,196	40.2	Home
Long Beach	California	462,257	29.4	9.3	$27,040	28.5	Home
Los Angeles	California	3,792,621	28.7	10.5	$27,829	31.1	Home
Modesto	California	201,165	49.4	11.7	$22,439	18.2	Home
Oakland	California	390,724	25.9	11.1	$31,971	38.1	Home
Riverside	California	303,871	34.0	8.6	$22,182	22.2	Home
Sacramento	California	466,488	34.5	10.6	$25,508	29.3	Home
San Diego	California	1,307,402	45.1	10.7	$33,152	41.7	Home
San Francisco	California	805,235	41.9	13.6	$48,486	52.4	Home
San Jose	California	945,942	28.7	10.1	$34,025	37.4	Home
Santa Ana	California	324,528	9.2	6.8	$16,374	11.8	Home
Stockton	California	291,707	22.9	10.0	$19,896	17.7	Home
Aurora	Colorado	325,078	47.3	8.9	$24,173	26.4	Home
Colorado Springs	Colorado	416,427	70.7	10.9	$29,062	36.3	Home
Denver	Colorado	600,158	52.2	10.4	$33,251	42.9	Home
Ft. Lauderdale	Florida	165,521	52.5	15.3	$35,605	33.0	Dillon's
Hialeah	Florida	224,669	4.2	19.1	$14,321	13.2	Dillon's

Jacksonville	Florida	821,784	55.1	10.9	$25,374	25.5	Dillon's
Miami	Florida	399,457	11.9	16.0	$21,120	23.1	Dillon's
Orlando	Florida	238,300	41.3	9.4	$25,805	32.9	Dillon's
St. Petersburg	Florida	244,769	64.3	15.7	$27,972	28.7	Dillon's
Tampa	Florida	335,709	46.3	11.0	$29,009	33.1	Dillon's
Atlanta	Georgia	420,003	36.3	9.8	$35,890	46.8	Dillon's
Columbus	Georgia	189,885	43.7	11.6	$22,856	22.6	Dillon's
Chicago	Illinois	2,695,598	31.7	10.3	$28,436	34.2	Home
Ft. Wayne	Indiana	253,691	70.3	12.0	$23,400	25.6	Home
Gary	Indiana	80,294	8.9	14.5	$15,931	12.3	Home
Indianapolis	Indiana	820,445	58.6	10.5	$24,012	27.3	Home
Des Moines	Iowa	203,433	70.5	11.0	$23,928	24.7	Home
Kansas City	Kansas	145,786	40.2	10.5	$18,574	15.1	Dillon's
Wichita	Kansas	382,368	64.5	11.5	$24,766	28.2	Dillon's
Lexington	Kentucky	295,803	73.0	10.5	$29,251	40.1	Dillon's
Louisville	Kentucky	597,337	68.3	12.6	$26,098	26.9	Dillon's
Baton Rouge	Louisiana	229,493	37.8	11.2	$23,949	32.8	Home
New Orleans	Louisiana	343,829	30.5	10.9	$26,500	33.7	Home
Shrevport	Louisiana	199,311	40.0	13.2	$23,995	24.8	Home
Baltimore	Maryland	620,961	28.0	11.7	$24,750	26.8	Dillon's
Boston	Massachusetts	617,594	47.0	10.1	$33,964	43.9	Home
Springfield	Massachusetts	153,060	36.7	10.9	$18,133	17.2	Home
Worcester	Massachusetts	181,045	59.6	11.7	$24,330	29.8	Home
Detroit	Michigan	713,777	7.8	11.5	$14,870	12.7	Dillon's
Flint	Michigan	102,434	35.7	10.7	$14,360	11.0	Dillon's
Grand Rapids	Michigan	188,040	59.0	11.1	$20,214	29.4	Dillon's
Warren	Michigan	134,056	77.1	16.1	$21,744	16.3	Dillon's
Minneapolis	Minnesota	382,578	60.3	8.0	$31,281	45.7	Dillon's
St. Paul	Minnesota	285,068	55.9	9.0	$25,695	38.3	Dillon's
Jackson	Mississippi	173,514	18.0	10.0	$18,623	26.0	Dillon's
Kansas City	Missouri	459,787	54.9	11.0	$26,889	31.3	Dillon's
St. Louis	Missouri	319,294	42.2	11.0	$23,048	29.6	Dillon's
Lincoln	Nebraska	258,379	83.1	10.7	$26,188	36.1	Dillon's
Omaha	Nebraska	408,958	68.0	11.4	$27,165	33.1	Dillon's
Las Vegas	Nevada	583,756	47.9	12.0	$25,607	21.4	Dillon's
Reno	Nevada	225,221	62.5	11.7	$26,472	28.9	Dillon's
Albuquerque	New Mexico	545,892	42.1	12.1	$26,769	33.0	Home
Buffalo	New York	261,310	45.8	11.4	$20,392	24.4	Dillon's
New York	New York	8,175,133	33.3	12.1	$32,010	34.5	Dillon's
Rochester	New York	210,565	37.6	9.0	$18,847	24.8	Dillon's
Syracuse	New York	145,170	52.8	10.6	$19,121	26.0	Dillon's

Yonkers	New York	195,976	41.4	14.7	$29,679	29.9	Dillon's
Charlotte	North Carolina	731,424	45.1	8.5	$31,556	39.8	Dillon's
Durham	North Carolina	228,330	37.9	8.8	$28,565	46.8	Dillon's
Greensboro	North Carolina	269,666	45.6	11.5	$25,861	35.7	Dillon's
Raleigh	North Carolina	403,892	53.3	8.2	$30,470	47.5	Dillon's
Akron	Ohio	199,110	61.2	12.6	$19,968	20.2	Home
Cincinnati	Ohio	296,943	48.1	10.8	$24,779	31.5	Home
Cleveland	Ohio	396,815	33.4	12.0	$16,992	14.9	Home
Columbus	Ohio	787,033	59.3	8.6	$24,351	33.1	Home
Dayton	Ohio	141,527	50.5	11.8	$16,494	16.4	Home
Toledo	Ohio	287,208	61.4	12.1	$18,760	17.2	Home
Oklahoma City	Oklahoma	579,999	56.7	11.3	$25,640	28.1	Dillon's
Tulsa	Oklahoma	391,906	57.9	12.5	$27,089	30.0	Dillon's
Portland	Oregon	583,776	72.2	10.4	$31,839	43.8	Home
Philadelphia	Pennsylvania	1,526,006	36.9	12.1	$22,279	23.9	Dillon's
Pittsburgh	Pennsylvania	305,704	64.8	13.8	$26,892	35.5	Dillon's
Providence	Rhode Island	178,042	37.6	8.7	$21,676	28.5	Dillon's
Chattanooga	Tennessee	167,674	55.9	14.7	$23,847	25.8	Home
Knoxville	Tennessee	178,874	74.2	12.6	$23,336	30.3	Home
Memphis	Tennessee	646,889	27.5	10.3	$21,454	23.7	Home
Nashville	Tennessee	601,222	56.3	10.2	$27,356	35.3	Dillon's
Arlington	Texas	365,438	44.9	8.1	$25,456	29.1	Dillon's
Austin	Texas	790,390	48.7	7.0	$31,990	45.6	Dillon's
Corpus Christi	Texas	305,215	33.3	11.9	$24,002	20.8	Dillon's
Dallas	Texas	1,197,816	28.8	8.8	$27,426	29.4	Dillon's
El Paso	Texas	649,121	14.2	11.2	$19,669	22.7	Dillon's
Ft. Worth	Texas	741,206	41.7	8.2	$24,489	26.5	Dillon's
Garland	Texas	226,876	36.7	9.2	$21,663	21.4	Dillon's
Houston	Texas	2,099,451	25.6	9.0	$27,305	29.2	Dillon's
Lubbock	Texas	229,573	55.7	10.8	$23,521	29.2	Dillon's
San Antonio	Texas	1,327,407	26.6	10.4	$22,619	24.6	Dillon's
Salt Lake City	Utah	186,440	65.6	9.4	$28,137	41.2	Home
Chesapeake	Virginia	222,209	60.4	10.4	$29,905	29.3	Dillon's
Norfolk	Virginia	242,803	44.3	9.4	$24,659	25.3	Dillon's
Richmond	Virginia	204,214	39.1	11.1	$27,184	34.8	Dillon's
Virginia Beach	Virginia	437,994	64.5	10.6	$31,934	32.9	Dillon's
Seattle	Washington	608,660	66.3	10.8	$43,237	57.4	Dillon's
Spokane	Washington	208,916	84.0	12.8	$23,965	28.6	Dillon's
Tacoma	Washington	198,397	60.5	11.3	$26,147	24.9	Dillon's
Madison	Wisconsin	233,209	75.7	9.6	$31,322	53.8	Dillon's

Milwaukee	Wisconsin	594,833	37.0	8.9	$19,229	22.1	Dillon's
Total		60,320,609					
Mean		543,429	46.07	11.01	$25,632	29.61	
Median		319,294	45.60	10.90	$24,766	28.90	
Standard Deviation		887351.43	17.18	2.03	$5,926	9.40	
IQR		374025.50	24.35	2.20	$6,056	10.10	
N		111	111	111	$111	111	111

CURRICULUM VITAE
NEAL TURPIN

3018 Leman Drive
Louisville, KY 40220
Nmturp01@louisville.edu
502-608-2140

EDUCATION:

Ph.D., Urban and Public Affairs, ABD, University of Louisville
Urban Policy and Administration Specialization
Dissertation: Structure, Spending, and Democracy: A Study of Municipal Governments

MPA, University of Louisville, 2011
Urban Policy Specialization

BA, Political Science, Transylvania University, 2009

TEACHING:

Public Administration, Fall 2015
Department of Political Science
University of Louisville

World Politics, Fall 2012
Department of Behavioral and Social Sciences
Jefferson Community and Technical College

FYE 105/Gen 102, Fall 2011-Spring 2013
Department of Reading and Academic Success
Jefferson Community and Technical College

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE:

Graduate Research Assistant, 2013-Present
University of Louisville, School of Urban and Public Affairs

PUBLICATIONS:

Neal Turpin. 2016. Public Bureaucracy and Crisis Management. In *Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance*, Ali Farazmand, ed. Springer. In progress.

Neal Turpin. 2016. Politics and Crisis Management. In *Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance*, Ali Farazmand, ed. Springer. In progress.

Steven G. Koven. 2015. *Public Sector Ethics: Theory and Application*. Boca Raton, FL. CRC Press. Assisted in drafting Chapters 2 and 3.

FUTURE RESEARCH:

Steven Koven and Neal Turpin. "Ethical Issues in High Profile College Athletic Programs."

RESEARCH INTERESTS:

Democratic Theory
Urban Politics
Transportation Policy

SCHOOL SERVICE:

Masters of Public Administration Advisory Council, 2013
    University of Louisville
    Worked with faculty on changes to program curriculum