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REPRESENTATION AND RESTRAINT: CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF
FRACTIONALIZATION AND STATE-BUILDING

By

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B.A, University of Louisville, Kentucky, United States, 2018.

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of the
College of Arts and Sciences of the University of Louisville
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Master of Arts in Political Science

Department of Political Science
University of Louisville,
Louisville, KY

May 2019

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A Thesis Approved on

April 26, 2019

by the following Thesis Committee:

Jason Gainous, Thesis Director

Kristopher Grady

Michael Menze

DEDICATION

To my father

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ABSTRACT

REPRESENTATION AND RESTRAINT: CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF FRACTIONALIZATION AND STATE-BUILDING

David Lian
April 26, 2019

This study seeks to understand the relationships between democracy, ethnic-linguistic-religious (ELR) fractionalizations and state-building. The speed of a country's economic recovery from war is used as proxy to determine the state-building process. Using Cox PH model, I conducted a large sample hazard analysis of 107 conflicts, having polity and ELR as explanatory variables. I found that competitiveness of political participation and executive constraints are associated with state-recovery while ethno-linguistic fractionalizations have the reverse effect. I propose that the institutional feedback process is equal to the product of negative executive power centralization and representation minus fractionalization; as in $F = -e(r - f)$. Positive feedback, as a result of higher fractionalization than representation or due to high degree of centralization, leads to a dynamic equilibrium that causes state weakness in the long run.

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EPIGRAPH

*And the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech.
And it came to pass, as they journeyed from the east,
that they found a plain in the land of Shinar; and they dwelt there.
And they said one to another,
Go to, let us make brick, and burn them thoroughly.
And they had brick for stone, and slime had they for mortar.
And they said, Go to, let us build us a city and a tower,
whose top may reach unto heaven;
and let us make us a name,
lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth.
And the Lord came down to see the city and the tower,
which the children of men builded.
And the Lord said, Behold, the people is one,
and they have all one language; and this they begin to do:
and now nothing will be restrained from them,
which they have imagined to do.
Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language,
that they may not understand one another's speech.
So the Lord scattered them abroad
from thence upon the face of all the earth:
and they left off to build the city.
Therefore is the name of it called Babel;
because the Lord did there confound the language of all the earth:
and from thence did the Lord scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth.*

Genesis 11:1 – 9 (KJV)

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

The topics of state-building, political institutions and ethnic dynamics each possess vast amounts of research and discussion in political science as well as other discipline and inter-disciplinary areas. Ethnic power relations, conflicts and state failures have significant implications on international security. One of the most serious challenges the world face today are not just threats of conventional states against each other, but also crises characterized by the lack of the political order and strong institutions. These failures are often the consequences of intrastate, interstate war, or the combined impacts of both. Ethnic adhesion and state-weakness can have devastating impact on the lives of many people and threaten the prospects of peace and post-war reconstruction efforts. Weak states often fall prey to various transnational security threats that produces implications beyond their borders. These threats range from organized crimes, weapon proliferation, terrorism, displacements, mass migration, epidemics, environmental degradation, to cross-border insurgencies and conflicts (Rice and Patrick 2008).

Within the frame of regime characteristics, the scholarship approaches the causes and persistence of conflicts as well as condition of state-building from a wide variety of perspectives. Some argues that democracy promotes peace externally as well as internally (Russett et. Al 1995, Ray 1998; Rummel 1997). Others suggest that democracy or rushed democratization in the context of complex ethnic and religious bonds may not be as simply helpful as it has been thought to prevent conflicts (Abulof and Goldman, 2015;

Edward Flores and Nooruddin, 2009). However, little attention has been given to the potential dynamics of the interaction between ethnolinguistic diversity and components of polity in empirical fashion. Likewise, such interactions' impact on state-building is also given little empirical scrutiny. A concrete survival analysis of ethnolinguistic fractionalization's intercourse with characteristics of regime institutional arrangements can be useful to draw a defensible conclusion to understand causes of state-weakness.

I conducted aggregate large-sample hazard analyses of economic recovery, regime characteristics, and ethnic fractionalizations. The examination of a state's speed economic recovery from conflict, measured in terms of GDP per capita, is utilized as the appropriate proxy in determining the aspects of state-building. The survival analysis is concerned with the relationship between the amount of years it takes for states to reach conflict recovery and explanatory variables of Polity IV components and ethnic, linguistic and religious (ELR) fractionalizations. Through my findings, I established the causal explanations of the interaction between power centralization, representation and fractionalization and their impact on state-building.

I propose *the institutional feedback process model* as a way to understand the prospect of state-building success in multi-national states. Central components of this model are the levels of representation and centralization in state decision making institutions and processes. Based on the scope of the analysis and findings, I argued a country's negative effects of ethnic fractionalization are diagnosed by facilitating sufficient level of representations in successful multi-national states. State-weakness in ethnically fragmented countries are caused by low representation and high centralization of both symbolic and functional power, in which ethnic grievances accumulate in *positive*

feedback cycle that is detrimental to both long-term stability of a state and may lead to state-breakdown in the events of institutional thresholds such as war, as well as civil conflict, revolution, regime change or abrupt power transition. Moreover, such states may also be difficult to recover from these events.

CHAPTER II: STATE, INSTITUTIONS AND WAR

The state, according to Max Weber, is “a human community that successfully claims the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in a given territory” (Duncker & Humblot 1919). The dissection of this definition gives the components constitutive of the state: the human community, the territory, the legitimacy, and the present of monopolistic use of force. A failing or fragile state in the modern context, therefore, possesses the negative qualities of these components, such as a weak government and bureaucratic apparatus that lacks sufficient rational-legal legitimacy and the exclusive coercive force to maintain law and order. It is a state that is often encountered with strife over issues relating to its territory and severe adhesion of its human community.

Following Huntington (1968), I define institutions as “stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior.” They are underlying rules of the game that organize social, political and economic relations (North, 1990; Harper et al., 2012). Formal institutions can be written constitutions, laws, regulations and policies enforced by authorities in official capacity, while informal institutions include social norms, traditions and customs that define behaviors (Leftwich & Sen, 2010; Berman, 2013). Strong and stable institutions provide predictability. Huntington measured the strength of institutionalization in the *autonomy*, *coherence-disunity* and the *complex-simplicity* features. A strong institution is autonomous; its organizations and procedures are

independent of the outside influence and insubordinate to the norms other than its own (1968). This is to say that its reliance is not vulnerable to a group and its established procedures can moderate the impact of the new group entering the political arena. A healthy institution is coherent in a sense that the consensus needed within the boundary of the institution is not prone to the external intrusions. Its complexity allows for prevention of possible vacuum of power as the institution's extra-elements can step in to be in charge when the original element tasked to carry out the purpose was to weaken.

A regime, being a set of governing institutions, regulates the exercise of power in a state. Representation is a vital and integral component of a democratic regime. The procedural definition of democracy focuses on the process of electing leaders through a fair, honest and regular election (Dahl 1971; Schumpeter 1942). Thus, a democratic regime based on such definition would be that of possessing the institutional arrangements which facilitate the government appointed through such electoral process. Proceduralists' concepts and arguments such as Robert Dahl (1971)'s polyarchy and procedural minimal for such polyarchy to exist argue that certain conditions such as political and civil rights are necessary to facilitate free and fair elections. The proceduralist notion of democracy requires contestation and participation. For proceduralists, democracy is neither about stability nor efficiency nor economic justice or single institutional package as a constitution; these may be conditions more broadly included by the substantive definitions with wide varieties of conditions. The conceptual measurements of democracy are themselves diverse within political science, as much as the existence of various patterns of democracy from consensus to majoritarian models, proportional to single-member representations that impact the behaviors of parties, interest groups, voters,

coalition formation frequencies, legislature performance, and executive-legislative relations.

Ethnicity and Nationalism

It is established in the field of international relations that nationalism is a cause of violent conflict among states (McCartney 2004; Cederman, Warren, and Sornette 2011; Mansfield and Snyder 1995). Conflict could take place internally with the presence of ethnonationalism or oppression of a national minority by the dominant group.¹ The scholarship on nationalism has put the focus on both the origin and the creation of nationhood and nationalism. The multiple theoretical camps to explain such origins include the primordialist, modernist and instrumentalist approaches. Primordialists such as Anthony Smith (1986)'s theory emphasizes nationalism's ties to the ancient times; these ties may be ethnic, racial or religious. These characteristics are carried by symbols, values, memories, name, solidarity or the myths, especially ones containing the common ancestor. The instrumentalist's variety views of nationalism, asserting nationalism to be of a tool (O'Leary 2001), emphasizes the role of agency in their argument on the origin of nationalism. For instrumentalists, nationalism is the elite strategy; assuming the rational choice theory, stoking it is less expensive for the political elite than delivering economic promises to the people. The dynamic relation between the elite and the populations provided by the instrumentalist theory connect to the relationships between the state and regime, the nation and nationalism, and the conflicts and cooperation.

¹ See *Greed-driven* (Collier & Hoeffler 2002), *Grievance-driven* (Gurr and Scarritt 1989), *Opportunity-driven* (Fearon & Laitin 2003) theories on the initiations of civil wars

Goldstone (2008) argued that “multiple pathways” to the failed state are the escalation of ethnic conflict, state predation, regional or guerilla rebellion, democratic collapse, and succession or reform crisis in an authoritarian state. His delineation of ethnic escalation as a factor is also synonymous with the other scholars’ indication of state failure. Benjamin Reiley and Elsin Wainwright’s (2005) identification of the indicators of state failures in the South Pacific region, as more languages being spoken by Papua New Guinea alone than in all of Africa. While ethnic diversity could be positive in which the vast level of diversity could lead to unavoidable power-sharing that promote the longevity of democracy, ethnicity could be exploited to undermine state legitimacy. This is true especially when it is muddled with the effort to “mobilize support to achieve economic gain” and the presence of disputes over land which had been the most precious resource across the region. As ethnic conflict contributes to the state-weakness (Goldstone 2008) and ethnic fractionalization is argued to be correlated to lower development (Alesina et al. 2003), the following hypotheses are addressed:

H1: Higher levels of ethno-linguistic or religious fractionalization contributes to a lower level of conflict recovery.

Democracy and State-building

Byman and Pollack (2001) point to the role of agency, as in the instrumentalist explanation of nationalism, in the likelihood of violent conflict as charismatic leaders can manipulate the national sentiment to make conflict more likely. Moreover, the power being unchecked and vested in a leader is the characteristic of the lack of executive restraint in which could be considered as an authoritarian feature. The theory of

democratic peace (DPT) on dyadic peace established by conventional knowledge on the likelihood of democratic regimes going to war ground itself on the fact that democratic leaders are more accountable to their people. They also espouse norms of compromise that makes use of force unlikely against similar regimes (Russett et. Al 1995, Ray 1998). Likewise, the domestic democratic peace theories (DDPT) hold that democracies are also found to have less frequency of intrastate wars, genocides, and democides as it pacifies nationalism (Rummel 1997). The arguments might not hold in all cases. Abulof and Goldman (2015) argued that in the context of Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) states where complex ethnic and religious bonds are present within a state, the more democratic the regime, the more likely it is to devolve into a civil war; and suggested to “democratizing nationalism” as the long-term solution for peace.

Several scholars have stressed the importance of sequences in democratization; Mansfield and Synder (1995) suggest that creation of strong and capable governing institutions should take precedence to the democratization. This argument also reflects a broader anocracy thesis highlighting the higher frequency of transitional and intermediary regimes between democracy and autocracy to erupt violence (Hagre et al. 2001). The similar idea is reinforced Paris (2004) and Clague et al. (1996) who argued that rushed democratization at an early stage of post-conflict period poses dangers to achieving credible peace. The weak and immature democratic institutions provide the opportunity for the autocratic hijacking of the electoral process, and the citizen’s resorting of arms to pursue political goals due to the lack of strong civil society (Paris, 2004). Echoing Paris and Clague et al., Flores and Nooruddin (2009)’s demonstrating the relationship between early democratization and the likelihood of relapse into the conflict, argue for “managed

transition to democracy” that likely involve delaying the election and extended period of caretaker government, providing the necessary period for foreign governments and multilateral institutions to implement prerequisites for a thriving democracy.

Scholarship has questioned on the potential of democratic institutional structures and dynamics on the potency to create ethnic division and violence. This is not to assume that features of authoritarian regimes have any less likelihood or ability to create such scenarios. Yet does democracy create nationalism is the question that came to be addressed by scholars such as Spencer (2008) in whose study of the “illiberal consequences of liberal institutions in Sri Lanka” argued;

... the origin of ethnic divide between Sinhala and Tamil, and much of peculiar nastiness of the past 20 years of conflict lies in the institutional structure and working dynamic of representative democracy in Sri Lanka.

The view, as in instrumentalism, can be explained by the presence of self-interest politicians using nationalist appeals to contend for power; and in that process, the agents utilizing such opportunity might not be any less potent or constrained in the democratic system than in an authoritarian one. Linz (1990) echoed a similar view on the impact of institutional arrangements; the presidentialism, which Sri Lanka had switched from the parliamentary model, can create unstable democratic regimes due to the rigidity, and potential dual legitimacy and regime crises that can arrive with unexpected developments. These are “ranging from the death of the incumbent to the judgment committed under the pressure of unruly circumstances.” It is also argued that presidentialism in democratic systems are stuffed with paradoxes between latent

suspicion of executive authority and personification of power with the plebiscitarian claim to the legitimacy.

H2: Higher level of executive constraint contributes to a higher level of conflict recovery.

The main interest of this project is not to find whether autocratic or democratic regimes are more likely to go to any war or commit atrocities than their respective counterpart and intermediary systems. It is rather what happens after the war in with various fates and degrees of performance in state-building efforts. The relationship between democracy and economic development and stability is one of the most immensely studied subjects in political science with varieties of both overlapping and contradictory models (Boix and Stokes 2007). Valid arguments have been made on the existence of the strong correlation between democracy and development (Lipset 1959; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Boix and Stokes 2003). Hence, the following hypothesis is addressed:

H3: Higher levels of democracy contributes to a higher level of conflict recovery.

CHAPTER III: DATA AND METHODOLOGY

To examine the recovery relative to each country's regime characteristics and ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity, I used the existing data accounting the conflict episodes from Correlates of War (COW) Project and the corresponding available data conceptualizing the country's recovery. While it is difficult to accurately measure a state's recovery from conflict, the positive change in the annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is the most available conceptual measurements as a proxy to determine a country's recovery. COW's post-1945 conflicts are matched by corresponding Maddison Historical Statistics' MDP version 2018 accounting annual GDP data for each relevant state as the unit of analysis. Alesina et al. (2003)'s analysis of Ethno-Linguistic-Religious (ELR) Fractionalization and Systemic Peace's Polity IV data are retrieved for diversity and regime characteristics data respectively.

Survival Analysis

I use Cox proportional hazard model to determine the effect of covariates on the conflict recovery. In this case, a state's recovery from the conflict is studied as a proxy of its state-building. I designated Ethno-Linguistic-Religious (ELR) Fractionalization and Regime Characteristics determined by polity score and components as relevant explanatory variables in the survival analysis. Furthermore, four additional variables are also added as the potential determinants of survival. These are the duration of the conflict

by year, pre-conflict income status determined by GDP per capita in 2011 USD, and conflict intensity determined by the ratio of pre-conflict GDP per capita and lowest GDP per capita during the conflict. The annual GDP per capita growth is added to ensure the accuracy of the model's testing in my analysis as higher growth rate should reflect higher chance of recovery.

Case Selection

The relevant cases are selected from Correlates of War (COW)'s list of post-World War II conflict episodes. I did not differentiate between COW's categorization of Inter-state, intra-state, non-state or extra-state wars. This is because all wars impact the state negatively. If two or more episodes take place simultaneously within a state, or if another conflict recommences by one year, they are counted as one episode. An example of these is Angolan Guerilla War of 1974-1975, War of Angola of 1975-1976, Angolan Control War of 1976-1991, and Angolan War of the Cities of 1992-1994 have taken place simultaneously within the territory of Angola. Interstate conflicts taking place in two sovereign territories are expanded and each counted as two cases. An example of these is the Korean War of 1950-1953 where the war took place in the territories of both Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK/North) and Republic of Korea (ROK/South). Conflicts that have taken place in more than two sovereign territories are censored from analysis due to the possible complication that may cause by the dilution of its overall intensity into multiple states. An example of these is Arab-Israeli War of 1948-1949 which took place in the State of Israel, the British Mandate of Palestine, the Sinai Peninsula of the Kingdom of Egypt and southern territories of the Lebanese Republic. The cases without corresponding available MDP's GDP data are also excluded. Examples

of these include the conflicts that have taken place in the territories of the State of Eritrea and the Federal Republic of Somalia.

The case selection in my analysis allowed for 809-817 observations of recovering years; the observations containing Polity IV's categorization of the state's authority into cases of foreign interruption (-66), interregnum or anarchy (77) and transition (-88) are also deleted. This is to prevent the potential contamination of the results by these numerical values. An example of these is the recovery period of the War of Bosnian Independence of 1992 and subsequent Bosnian-Serb Rebellion of 1992-1995. The outcomes of these wars put Bosnia and Herzegovina under the NATO-led multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) for Dayton Peace Accords. IFOR is then succeeded by multinational Stabilization Force (SFOR) and United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) until the termination of the mission's mandate in 2002 by UNSC Resolution 1423.

Measuring Recovery

The measure of conflict recovery is determined by the positive change in the country's post-conflict GDP. I use a similar approach used by Flores & Nooruddin (2009) who determined that the country be considered economically recovered from conflict once it reestablished the pattern of consumption and investment before the conflict. I determine the rate of conflict recovery by the year of change from t_2 to t_1 , the first being the year after the conflict has ended and t_1 being the year when the country reaches back to the level of the GDP per capita prior to the breakdown of conflict. Alternatively, the year when another conflict episode begins in which the case is counted as relapsed. As Flores & Nooruddin argued, a conflict may take place as the result of deteriorating

economy; therefore, the highest annual GDP per capita within the five years before the conflict should be taken as the recovery threshold; I followed the similar strategy. If no data for a country are available within the five years, I used the closest available previous year data for the country's year in which conflict had commenced.

Limitations of GDP Measurement

The use of GDP for conflict recovery measurement possesses its limitations; the scrutiny of its dependability for the measure of conflict intensity in advance to my data analysis found that several cases, such as Colombian, Sri Lankan, Nepalese, and Burmese civil wars, did not demonstrate any retraction of their Gross Domestic Products (GDP) in the years of the ongoing internal conflicts. This may be because of a conflict could be geographically confined to a portion of the country that may not be economically significant, or a war may instead be slow-burning, and its overall intensity is diluted over a long period of time. While the challenges of internal validity are present with the use of GDP as a country's economic performance is subjected for a wide variety of factors, its viability in measuring the country's level of consumption, investment, net export and public expenditures remains the practical tool to conceptualize post-conflict recovery rate, and the dataset's coverage of necessary timeframes and countries allows for strengthening the external validity of the analysis for the generalization more than other possible alternative measurements which data availability does not provide necessary timeframe as much as GDP data.

CHAPTER IV: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

My analyses of 107 cases consisting of 616 observations by year are categorized into four parts. The first part (Table 1.) consists of polity and two of its components, as well as three economic variables as relevant covariates along with fractionalizations. The second part (Table 2.) of my analysis examined the interactions of the regime types and fractionalizations. This is achieved by the multiplication of polity score and ELR Fractionalizations in each observation. All covariates consisted of the first analysis are then added. The results of the first analysis support the expected impact of fractionalizations on post-conflict recovery; supporting Hypothesis 1. The higher degree of ethnic fractionalization is found to contribute to a longer duration of recovery. Likewise, a higher level of language diversity is also associated with worse prognosis with a coefficient of -0.844. While religious fractionalization demonstrates similar prognosis with the negative coefficient of hazard analysis, the impact is not statistically insignificant. The higher polity score is associated with longer duration until conflict recovery, contrary to Hypotheses 2. However, the higher degree of executive constraints and political competitiveness are found to reduce the risk and are associated with better prognosis of conflict recovery, supporting Hypotheses 3. The detailed findings are shown in Table1.

As in the case of first part of the analysis, the results of my second part of the analysis containing interactive variables between polity and fractionalization also reject

the idea on the positive impact of higher polity score on post-conflict recovery. However, the interactions of the higher degree of democracy and fractionalizations do not have any statistical significances in Ethno-linguistic fractionalizations models. The detailed findings are shown in Table 2. The interaction between religious fractionalization and the higher polity score is found to have a negative impact on the state recovery with statistical significance.

The third and fourth parts of my analyses stemmed from the attempt to eliminate collinearities between the polity score and its components of executive constraint and political competitiveness. This is achieved by taking out the components' values from the polity score. Center for Systemic Peace's polity score is measured by subtracting "institutionalized autocracy" score from "institutionalized democracy" score (Marshall and Jagger, 2002). I extracted the relevant weighted scales of executive constraint and political competitiveness scores from both institutionalized autocracy and institutionalized democracy scores, and the overall polity score is readjusted. Therefore, the readjusted polity score does not include executive constraint's scale weight, nor competitiveness of political participation + regulation of political participation which measures political competitiveness in Polity IV. This reduces potential multicollinearities.

The results of analyses with the adjusted polity score are similar to the previous parts of analyses. However, coefficient values were slightly reduced with adjusted polity score analyses and some variables lost their statistical significance. Table 3 shows the analysis by individual fractionalization variables while Table 4 shows the results of the interaction between fractionalizations and adjusted polity score variables. Both results

echo the trends shown by analyses with normal polity score – which higher fractionalization and polity tend to have a negative impact on recovery while executive constraints and political competitiveness are positive.

Table 1. Coefficient and Hazard Ratios of Fractionalizations and Regime Characteristics as Prognosis Factors of Conflict Recovery, Survival Analysis by Individual Fractionalization Covariates

Covariates	Ethnic Fractionalization			Linguistic Fractionalization			Religious Fractionalization		
	Coefficient	Exponentiated Coefficient		Coefficient	Exponentiated Coefficient		Coefficient	Exponentiated Coefficient	
Fractionalization	-1.169	0.311	**	-0.844	0.429	*	-0.152	0.858	
Polity	-0.273	0.761	***	-0.249	0.779	***	-0.247	0.781	***
Executive Constraints	0.434	1.543	*	0.382	1.466	*	0.371	1.450	*
Political Competitiveness	0.232	1.261	**	0.200	1.222	*	0.208	1.232	*
Conflict Durations	0.105	1.111	***	0.110	1.116	***	0.082	1.086	**
GDP per capita	0.498	1.645	***	0.496	1.642	***	0.570	1.768	***
High-Low GDP Ratio	-1.864	0.155	***	-1.919	0.146	***	-1.810	0.163	***

Codes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, . p < 0.1

Table 2. Coefficients and Hazard Ratios of Interactions between Fractionalizations and Polity as Prognosis Factors of Conflict Recovery, Survival Analysis by Individual Interactive Covariates

Covariates	Ethnic Fractionalization			Linguistic Fractionalization			Religious Fractionalization		
	Coefficient	Exponentiated Coefficient		Coefficient	Exponentiated Coefficient		Coefficient	Exponentiated Coefficient	
Fractionalization x Polity	-0.125	0.881		0.060	1.061		-0.348	0.705	***
Fractionalization	-1.544	0.213	**	-0.767	0.464	*	-0.589	0.554	**
Polity	-0.205	0.814	*	-0.280	0.755	***	-0.127	0.880	.
Executive Constraints	0.384	1.468	*	0.417	1.517	**	0.308	1.361	*
Political Competitiveness	0.225	1.253	**	0.203	1.225	*	0.283	1.328	***
Conflict Durations	0.116	1.123	***	0.101	1.106	***	0.107	1.113	***
GDP per capita	0.455	1.577	**	0.498	1.645	***	0.595	1.814	***
High-Low GDP Ratio	-1.853	0.156	***	-1.862	0.155	***	-1.829	0.160	***

Codes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, . p < 0.1

Table 3. Coefficient and Hazard Ratios of Fractionalizations and Regime Characteristics as Prognosis Factors of Conflict Recovery, Survival Analysis by Individual Fractionalization Covariates and Adjusted Polity Score

Covariates	Ethnic Fractionalization			Linguistic Fractionalization			Religious Fractionalization		
	Coefficient	Exponentiated Coefficient		Coefficient	Exponentiated Coefficient		Coefficient	Exponentiated Coefficient	
Fractionalization	-1.165	0.312	**	-0.841	0.431	*	-0.093	0.911	
Adjusted Polity	-0.284	0.753	***	-0.258	0.772	***	-0.259	0.772	**
Executive Constraints	0.122	1.130		0.098	1.103		0.088	1.091	
Political Competitiveness	0.022	1.022		0.010	1.010		0.021	1.021	
Conflict Durations	0.105	1.110	***	0.110	1.116	***	0.082	1.085	**
GDP per capita	0.487	1.628	***	0.486	1.626	***	0.562	1.755	***
High-Low GDP Ratio	-1.870	0.154	***	-1.918	0.147	***	-1.813	0.163	***

Codes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, . p < 0.1

Table 4. Coefficients and Hazard Ratios of Interactions between Fractionalizations and Polity as Prognosis Factors of Conflict Recovery, Survival Analysis by Individual Interactive Covariates and Adjusted Polity Score

Covariates	Ethnic Fractionalization			Linguistic Fractionalization			Religious Fractionalization		
	Coefficient	Exponentiated Coefficient		Coefficient	Exponentiated Coefficient		Coefficient	Exponentiated Coefficient	
Fractionalization x Polity	-0.128	0.879		0.147	1.159		-1.154	0.315	***
Fractionalization	-1.179	0.308	**	-0.890	0.411	*	-0.234	0.791	
Polity	-0.220	0.802		-0.326	0.722	**	0.164	1.178	
Executive Constraints	0.114	1.121		0.113	1.120		-0.006	0.994	
Political Competitiveness	0.021	1.021		0.008	1.008		0.090	1.094	
Conflict Durations	0.108	1.114	***	0.105	1.111	***	0.108	1.114	***
GDP per capita	0.472	1.604	***	0.494	1.639	***	0.570	1.769	***
High-Low GDP Ratio	-1.860	0.156	***	-1.883	0.152	***	-1.869	0.154	***

Codes: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, . $p < 0.1$

CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION

The findings suggest that higher polity score to be associated with longer duration of conflict recovery. This negative effect of higher polity is also consistent in its interactions with ethnic and religious fractionalization factors. The individual effect of ethnic fractionalization is found to have a negative impact on conflict recovery. It is therefore conclusive that both ethnolinguistic heterogeneities and higher polity score have a negative impact on state-building, the higher degree of executive constraints and political competitiveness can counteract the adverse prognosis effect and contributes to state-building. The findings relating to the effect of various polity components could give interesting insights into the institutional arrangement and functionality's impact on state-building processes in post-conflict states. The positive impact of polity component conceptualizing the regulation of the central bureaucracy's chief executive suggest the potential presence of un-named influential factor and its significant role in the causal process and mechanism. I identified this factor by looking at the concepts of what these components measure.

As Polity IV conceptualizes the constraint on the chief executive power to be that of "institutional constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities." (Marshall & Jagger 2002). These constraints are imposed by "accountability groups" that may be the legislature in a western democracy, or "the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies;

the military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary.” Thus, the conceptual measure of the executive constraint components is concerned with the checks and balances that directly relates to the decision-rule power of the chief executive. The measure of overall polity, which is a factor found to have a negative impact on conflict recovery in my analysis, composed of broader concepts. Polity IV’s conceptualization of the polity includes the score of the mentioned constraints on the chief executive office; however, the overall polity score is also derived from other distinct components such as dynamics of regulation and openness of chief executive recruitments. Therefore, the combined measure of the polity includes sub-components and features not covered by the scope of the executive constraint component captures. The components covered by the polity, such as the popular election of chief executive might substantial negative effect in ethnically diverse countries. Popular election would mean that the majority wins; in ethnically fractionalized societies, these might have potential to pose higher grievances or conflict. Although the current scope of this research project have not analyzed the competitiveness of the executive recruitment, the measured components complementary to democracy and representation are found to associate with state-building. These are competitive political participation and chief executive parity or subordination.

Considering these distinctions, it is therefore conclusive that while the overall unchecked power of the central bureaucracy’s chief office contributes to the risk of relapse into violence and weaken state-building, the higher institutional constraint on chief executive office solely measuring the chief executive's decision-rule power can positively impact the conflict recovery and state-building. The un-named influential

factor is, therefore, the effect of power centralization. Furthermore, the higher level of political competitiveness's contribution toward state-building, consistent with arguments that representations and lower of the level of political exclusions are also argued to be reduction factors of ethnic tensions, grievances, and conflicts (Cederman et. al 2013). This is particularly relevant in ethnically heterogeneous states. I use these two concepts of dynamics of representation and power centralization in the formulation of my theory to demonstrate the potential causal process and mechanism of the conflict recovery that is used as a proxy to understand both state-building and state-weakness.

Institutional Feedback Model: A Formula of State-Weakness

I propose institutional feedback model as a way to systematically understand state-weakness, considering *Horizontal Power Centralization* and *Representation* as determinants of institutional feedback process. The concept of the horizontal power centralization and representation means the roles and interaction of these two notions: power centralization and representation in operation at the national level. This is also to recognize the scope and limitation of my project which does not include the analysis of federal-unitary dimensions of the state. The dynamics of centralization-decentralizations have long been argued to be significant to state-building and its relationship to ethnic aspects of a state. Moreover, if any significant effects are found to exist through the similar approach, the relationships involving the various levels of government and the devolutions of power may be considered vertical. Meanwhile, the decision-rule efficiency and representation of the regime at the national level in my analysis are horizontal. The interactions between these two aspects in state-building feedback mechanism in my argument are laid out in the following formula:

$$F = - e (r - f)$$

while

F = feedback, e = chief executive power, r = representation, and f = fractionalization

The feedback process refers to the occurrence whose operation influence the institutional strength and weakness in its process. The feedback mechanism is a system whose outputs routed back as inputs as part of a chain cause and effect circular relationship.² In the positive feedback, the increased output creates increased input, which then creates more increased output. The positive feedback accelerates a process, while negative feedback does the opposite by reacting the input in a way to inhibit the output. The negative feedback, therefore, stabilize the internal equilibrium. This feedback relationship, well-established in other scientific disciplines, is also adopted by my argument to understand the cause-and-effect process of institutional weakness and failure. In the scenario where representation (r) < fractionalization (f); $r =$ lower, $f =$ higher


Formula: $F = - e (r - f)$

- $F = - e (lower - higher)$
- $F = - e (- representation)$
- $F = + product$
- *Positive feedback process*

² The idea of feedback process date back to 18th century Britain in economic theory. It is also applied in engineering, biological and other scientific disciplines.

The output of positive feedback increases the input and in the long run, produces institutional instability. The output of less representation and higher fractionalization would be an ethnic grievance accumulating ethnic tensions as a contributing factor to the state-weakness.

Figure 1. Positive Feedback Process in Ethnic Adhesion




In the negative feedback system, the output is inhibited by the regulation of the input. In our example, if the level of representation is higher than fractionalization, the resulting product would be negative, giving way to the negative feedback system. The example of this demonstrated as follow; representation (r) > fractionalization (f); $r =$ higher, $f =$ lower

Formula: $F = -e (r - f)$

- $F = -e$ (*higher – lower*)
- $F = -e$ (*+representation*)
- $F = -$ *product*
- negative feedback process

The output of negative feedback is one that is decelerated after the regulation of the input. In our example of the negative feedback process, the ethnic adhesions and grievances would be intervened and regulated by surplus representation factors which as an example, may facilitate negotiations or power sharing. This may result in the reduction of ethnic tensions, and the final resulting output does not contribute to the state-weakness.

Figure 2. Negative Feedback Process




Representation means the activity of facilitating the citizen's voices, concerns, opinions, views, and perspective present in policy-making processes. While a minimal amount of representation may exist in other regime types, the activity of representation is central and vital to a democracy. These activities are facilitated by the democratic institutional mechanisms of the regime such check and balances of power, protection of citizen's rights, functioning legislatures with the elected representatives, the political parties and freedom of political participation and expression. In the ethnically and

linguistically fractured states, the institutional arrangements facilitating the representation of the diverse groups of people's voices, concerns and opinions must also take alongside sufficient degree of power-sharing and autonomy. The examples of these forms of governments are federations, confederation or consociations. These arrangements ease the output of ethnic adhesion, reducing the effect of grievances. The failure to address these concerns and voices by the lack of the institutional arrangement or through systematic discrimination or suppression may lead to the accumulation of ethnic grievances without the regulation by representation effect and mechanisms.

The positive feedback process, by contributing to dynamic equilibrium rather than stability could lead to two potential outcomes. The first potential outcome would be state failure. The breakdown of state may be contributed by the event of institutional thresholds such as an outbreak of war, revolution or regime change. Syria after the Arab Spring and Iraq after the 2001 occupation is an example of such a process outcome. Being highly fractionalized multiethnic polities, the ethno-religious divisions are long present in both countries and in the region as a whole (Reilly 2019; Lynch 2016; Rosen 2010). The outbreak of the Arab Spring served as the intuitional threshold event in Syria that led to state failure and its ongoing civil war is highly sectarian in nature (Potter 2014). Likewise, the regime change facilitated by the US occupation of Iraq served as institutional threshold event that led to state failure mired in interethnic and inter-religious conflict continues to dominate the Iraqi political landscape. The second or more optimistic outcome would be facilitating escape route highly reliant upon instrumentalist agency intervention that promotes assembling of institutional mechanisms to mitigate the grievances. These may range from efforts to set up inter-ethnic or inter-religious

dialogues promoting the cross-cultural understanding, peace process, and devolution to regime restructure that open door for more representation and power-sharing among conflicting groups. The new institutional arrangements of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Bosnian War of 1992 and 1995 serve as an example of an escape route. The effort to restore peace and order in Bosnia were multi-faceted including the foreign intervention, peace accords, and justice mechanisms, as well as a new institutional arrangement that sought to find the solution to underlying ethnic grievances. The present-day political structure of Bosnian state made up of two autonomous and formerly warring entities: Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska serves as the example of an outcome facilitated by the escape route from dynamic equilibrium states.

Figure 3. Positive Feedback Outcomes



Recommendation for Future Studies

It can be expected from future venues of research for improvements in both the measures and the method in the understanding of the dynamics of the argued horizontal

representation and power centralization impact on state-building. More importantly, the expansion of the existing findings on regime types and post-conflict state-building is recommended. This means the inclusion of the examination of various patterns of democracy and representation such as the potential implications of the differing practices of consensus and majoritarian democracy in the various country and the interaction of these practices to the existing ethnic dynamics and compositions. The expansion of this research may also be complemented by including the focus on vertical representation and power centralization. These include looking at the degrees and fashions of federalism and decentralization and their interaction with the ethnic dynamics of both fractionalizations, grouping and territorial settlement aspects.

Multinational states are significantly different from multiethnic yet non-multinational states. Countries such as the United States are composed of multiple ethnicities, but no ethnic group possesses the tradition of national self-determination implicated by the territorial claims. The opposite case is true in the countries such of former Yugoslavia, China, Canada, Russia and Myanmar where secessionism continues to be the reality. The presence of these dimensions along with the political institutional arrangement from national to the regional level and their influence on representation and decision-efficiency which may impact the state-building processes are the interesting topics to study in the future. While ELR Fractionalization data only account for the degree of ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity within the state, the existing measurement such as the ETH Zurich Ethnic-Power Relation (EPR)'s Core dataset to be examined the size and power access of ethnic groups in each state.

The territorial dimension of ethnic diversity and fractionalization can first be examined by studying the administrative division and their attachment of to a national ethnic group. This is in the case of Myanmar whose administrative divisions composed of seven regions, seven states, five self-administrative zones (SAZs), and one self-administrative division (SAD). While seven regions are considered mainland Burma mostly populated by ethnic Burman, the remaining seven states, five SAZs and one SAD are named after each relevant major national minorities and ethnic groups. However, the actual ethnic settlements patterns in a state may not reflect its administrative divisions. For example, China's rapid economic development has facilitated higher internal migration and interminglement of its ethnic groups (Zhu & Blanchford 2006). This can be solved by using ETH's Georeferencing of Ethnic Power-Relation (GeoEPR) accounting the spatial configurations of ethnic concentration. These are important as to consider the political phenomena and conditions relating to ethnicity and territory, as well as the degrees and fashions of different types of ethnolinguistic diversity that exist in the state. The creation of GeoEPR dataset was also associated with the study and its finding that settle far away from the capital city and close to the border (Wucherpfennig 2011). This is also true both in the case of the multinational state of Myanmar where the concept of ethnicity draggles with territoriality and the country host one of the world's longest-running civil conflicts. This may be further contributed by the lack of effort to solve ethnic grievances under the nearly six centuries of military dictatorship with centralized unitary power arrangement.

Furthermore, better measures conceptualizing the state-building and strength are needed to complement or replace the use of post-conflict GDP are needed to control

endogeneity in the analysis and results. These may be possible by single or combined use of existing measures such as the World Bank's Gross National Income (GNI) measure and components, Government Effectiveness Indicators, Correlates of War's National Material Capabilities (NMC), Fund for Peace's Fragile State Index (FSI) and OECD's State of Fragility reports. The use of these measures to conceptualize the state-building in the future research may mean the sacrificing the larger sample size to resort to a smaller sample analysis in consideration the timeframe of these indices may cover. However, this can be compensated by the inclusion of countries with or without the experience of conflict for statistical analysis other than the hazard models. As indices of state fragility directly measure the state effectiveness, the use of change in GDP after the conflict as a proxy to capture the state-building process may not be necessary. The measure on decentralization can be retrieved from the existing indices of various decentralization practices including in fiscal, political, and administrative. While the power given to national administrative sub-units by constitutional or legal arrangements may be beneficial in understanding the different vertical power dynamics, the reality of these practices may not reflect the actual provisions in the diverse range of countries. The standardized measurements such as IMF's fiscal decentralization index, accounting for revenue collection and expenditures at various levels of government, are more appropriate for the cross-countries quantitative analysis and comparison.

CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

The implication of my findings points to the fact that democracy defined as a system to facilitate popular election and majority rule may not be sufficient to resolve underlying problems for effective state-building in ethnolinguistically fractionalized polities. It is found that while fractionalization and higher overall polity IV score are associated with longer duration of conflict recovery, the higher constraints on chief executive power, also known as centralized decision-rule, as well as the higher political competitiveness are associated with better prognosis. Therefore, while fractionalizations generally have a negative impact on the state-building, the negative effect must be compensated by surplus *representation* and *power-sharing* effects. The purpose of these emphases is to not implicate the partial findings of this project to promote ethnic homogeneity or reducing fractionalizations, but to highlight the importance of representations in the political processes in fractionalized societies. Any attempt to reduce the ethnic, linguistic or religious diversity in a state would be unfavorable and have extremely severe ethical implications. If any policy recommendations are to be derived from this research, it should only be to promote higher representation and less marginalization of any group in a society. This higher representation effect is created by democratic institutions that facilitate the citizen's voices, concerns, representation in policy-making and processes, as well as sufficient degrees of check, balances and autonomy as significantly important factors. The lack of these institutional mechanisms

creates positive feedbacks leading to the dynamic equilibrium in system operation contributing to state weakness. Future research can include more comprehensive focus on federal-unitary dimension with designated variables to expand this knowledge.

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