The Kentucky mountains during the Civil War.

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The Kentucky Mountains During the Civil War

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Department of History

by

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The material for this thesis was collected and used for reports in the seminar on "Kentucky During the Civil War", at the University of Louisville during the winter of 1924-25. The subject was chosen because of its relation to the seminar topic in order that the writer might have the benefit of the suggestions and criticisms of the members of the class.

The "Kentucky Mountains" has been used as a general term covering the following counties situated in the eastern and southeastern portion of the state, namely: Breathitt, Clay, Floyd, Harlan, Jackson, Johnson, Knox, Laurel, Letcher, Lincoln, Magoffin, Morgan, Owsley, Perry, Pike, Pulaski, Rockcastle, Wayne, Whitley, Wolfe. (1)

Because there were no definite military campaigns in Kentucky after 1862, the subject was limited to 1861 and 1862, when organized armies of both the United States and the Confederacy were passing through the Kentucky mountains. (2)
Introduction
Introduction.

In the early days of 1861, Kentucky, torn between her allegiance to the Federal government and her sympathy for the South, with her citizenry so divided that hardly a family in the State stood united, vainly endeavoured to carve out for herself a niche of security in the midst of the chaos of war. Continuing her position as one of the United States, she yet attempted to assume a position of neutrality towards the two belligerents, -- the United States of which she was a part, and the Confederacy. On May 20, 1861, Governor Beriah Magoffin, on his own initiative and without the endorsement of the Legislature, issued a proclamation of neutrality warning both the Union and Confederate governments to keep their military forces off Kentucky's soil. Such a position, unique in history, probably, in its conception, was of course, untenable. It is not for us here to inquire into its causes nor even into the violations of neutrality except in so far as it effects that part of Kentucky included in this study. Technically, the period of neutrality was ended September 18th, 1861, when the Legislature passed resolutions requiring Governor Magoffin to demand the unconditional withdrawal of the Confederate forces from the State.(4)

But before this had happened two events had occurred which presaged for southeastern Kentucky that its territory would become the first theatre of war in the state, in a conflict where neither side valued for itself the immediate territory occupied. These two events were the establishment of Camp Dick Robinson in Garrard county for the enlistment of Union troops, -- to which recruits began to flock August 6th; (5) and the entrance into the state via Cumberland Gap of General Zollicoffer and about 5000 Confederate troops in September, simultaneously with the occupation of Columbus, Ky., by General Polk, September 3-12th, 1861.(6) Each of these happenings is considered by various authorities as the
first violation of Kentucky's neutrality. (7) Believing as I do that the neutrality of Kentucky was violated much earlier by the Confederate government in sending accredited recruiting officers into the state (8), there will be no attempt to discuss that question here. In passing, however, it might be interesting to consider the directions given to Lt. Nelson, who established Camp Dick Robinson. All of the histories refer to this camp as one organized solely to recruit Kentucky men into the Federal army. (9) That this was not at all the primary object of Nelson's mission may be ascertained from the following instructions placed upon him: (10)

Adjutant-General's Office,
Washington, D.C., July 1, 1861.

Lieut. William Nelson, U.S.N., Cincinnati, Ohio:

Sir: Your services having been placed at the disposal of the War Department for the performance of a special duty, the Secretary of War directs me to communicate to you the following instructions:

It being the fixed purpose of the General Government to maintain the Constitution and execute the laws of the Union and to protect all loyal citizens in their constitutional rights, the Secretary directs that you muster into the service of the United States five regiments of infantry and one regiment of cavalry in East Tennessee and one regiment of infantry in West Tennessee, to receive pay when called into active service by this Department............ You will also, at the same time, muster into the service, or designate some suitable person so to do, in Southeast Kentucky, three regiments of infantry, to be commanded and officered in the same manner as herein provided for the Tennessee regiments.

All of the regiments aforesaid will be raised for service in East and West Tennessee and adjacent counties and in East Kentucky.

............... L. Thomas, Adjutant-General
Thus the mountaineers were to be the first Kentuckians mustered into the Union army on their own soil. And at Barbourville, on September 18th, the Home Guards of Knox county fired the first shots to stay the march of the Southern armies into the state. (11) And from that time until the end of 1862, this southeastern section of Kentucky witnessed the passing and repassing of soldiers of both armies, and much of the time had its territory covered with Union or Confederate camps.

Yet this section of the state, sparsely settled, with scanty fields and small farms yielding a bare subsistence for those who tilled the soil, containing no railroads or other means of transportation, and with no cities to serve as bases of supplies, held little that could render it valuable to the contending parties. It was desired by them only because for each, through it lay the way to the promised land. For the North, it was merely the high road to East Tennessee where dwelt a loyal and oppressed people, seeking deliverance from the Confederacy which they had opposed; and through which ran the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad carrying the products of the farmlands in the Mississippi valley to the armies in Virginia. For the South the mountain defiles of Kentucky were the gateway to the Bluegrass of Kentucky where the population, it believed, was loyal to its cause; where rich farmlands were laden with supplies so needed by the South accustomed to drawing its subsistence from the rich Northwest, while its own soil was devoted to the staple cotton; and last but by no means least, the road through the mountains led towards controlling the state for the Confederacy, thus rounding out its territory geographically and carrying the border to the Ohio river. (12) These then were the objects for which the armies were striving when they passed to and fro, or fought valiantly along the rivers or upon the narrow mountain roads in southeastern Kentucky.

Since carrying aid to the East Tennesseans was one
of the primary objects of the North in these campaigns, it will be necessary to consider for a moment just what their situation was.

Briefly, the situation was this. "On the sixth of May, 1861, the legislature of Tennessee passed an act of secession, subject to a vote of the people on June 8th following; and on the seventh of May, 1861, it ratified a military league, offensive (13) and defensive, between the State and the Confederate States." During May, Governor Harris raised most of the troops provided for by the legislature and the state was overrun with soldiers. The only section that was not enthusiastically for secession was East Tennessee. Here a Union meeting was held at Knoxville on May 30th, which adjourned to meet at Greeneville June 17-20. As a result of this meeting a memorial was presented to the legislature on June 18, asking that the counties of East and Middle Tennessee so desiring be allowed to form a separate state. Meanwhile on June 8th, the State had voted overwhelmingly for secession, East Tennessee alone standing firm for the Union. Before any action was taken in the legislature in regard to the memorial, Governor Harris issued a proclamation on June 20th declaring Tennessee a member of the Confederacy. (14) From this time the East Tennesseans were in open rebellion to the rest of the State and were constantly making appeals to the Federal government for aid.

President Lincoln considered the campaign to East Tennessee second only to the capture of Richmond. (15) Over and over again he urged upon the military commanders the necessity of this movement to relieve a loyal people and to control one of the great arteries of supplies for the Southern armies. He even urged the building of a railroad to facilitate it. (16) Military leaders were made and unmade, given commands and removed from them in the Department of the West solely on the basis of their celerity in organizing this attack. Most of the commanding officers failed to share President Lincoln's enthusiasm for the particular objective. (17) They regarded his interest in the matter as springing from humanitarian impulses and political considerations, overwhelmed as
he was by constant demands from Governor Andrew Johnson and the Tennessee members of the national legislature. (18) They regarded the expedition from a military and strategic point of view as of less importance than the line of attack from Louisville to Nashville. (19) But President Lincoln was tenacious and no commander was allowed to overlook it.

Perhaps the best statement of the attitude of the Federal government in this matter is found in two letters to General Buell written by General McClellan and by President Lincoln. In a letter of instructions to General Buell when he was placed in command of the Department of the Ohio, November 7th, 1861, General McClellan said: "The military problem would be a simple one could it be entirely separated from political influences. Such is not the case. Were the population among which you are to operate wholly or generally hostile, it is probable that Nashville should be your first and principal objective point. It so happens that a large majority of the inhabitants of Eastern Tennessee are in favor of the Union. It therefore seems proper that you should remain on the defensive on the line from Louisville to Nashville, while you throw the mass of your forces by rapid marches, by Cumberland Gap or Walker's Gap, on Knoxville, in order to occupy the railroad at that point, and thus enable the loyal citizens of Eastern Tennessee to rise, while you at the same time cut off the railway communication between Eastern Virginia and the Mississippi." (20) President Lincoln wrote to General Buell on January 6th, 1862, "Of the two, I would rather have a point on the railroad south of Cumberland Gap than Nashville — first, because it cuts a great artery of the enemy's communication, which Nashville does not; and, secondly, because it is in the midst of loyal people, who would rally around it, while Nashville is not. Again, I cannot see why the movement on East Tennessee would not be a diversion in your favor rather than a disadvantage, assuming that a movement toward Nashville is the main object. But my distress is that our friends in East Tennessee
are being hanged and driven to despair, and even now I fear are thinking of taking rebel arms for the sake of personal protection. In this we lose the most valuable stake we have in the South." (21)

Thus for a year southeastern Kentucky was the scene of conflicts and watched with varying emotions the entrance and exit of several armies.
Chapter I

Military Campaigns
Chapter I.

Military Campaigns in the Mountains.

Although the primary movements in both the Northern and Southern armies in the Kentucky mountains during 1861 and 1862 were concerned on the Tennessee border, there were three minor campaigns in eastern Kentucky centering along the Louisa fork of the Big Sandy river. Since the troops in this region were usually acting alone and not with any great degree of cooperation with those on the Tennessee border, (except during Bragg's and Kirby Smith's invasion), these will be taken up under a separate topic, instead of chronologically. The military affairs on the Tennessee border will be considered first and then these along the valley of the Big Sandy and the Virginia border at Pound Gap.

As we have seen on July 1, 1861, Lieutenant William Nelson, U. S. N., had been placed on special duty with the War Department and sent to Kentucky. On July 14th, Lt. Nelson met with leading Unionists of southeastern Kentucky and plans were made for recruiting thirty companies of infantry and five of cavalry. Officers were appointed as follows:

Colonel of the First Regiment of Infantry: Speed S. Fry, of Danville,
" " " Second " " " : Theophilus T. Garrard, of Clay county,
" " " Third " " " : Thomas E. Branlette of Adair county,

with W. J. Landrum and Frank L. Wolford, of Casey county as Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel, respectively, of the cavalry to be raised. In his report of this meeting Lieutenant Nelson discusses the difficulties of transporting arms, supplies and ammunition from Cincinnati to the Tennessee border, a distance of 240 miles. He further adds "The gaps in the mountains are all guarded by rebel troops, but not in sufficient numbers to prevent my going through whichever gap I may select, there being seven." (22)

At the Union meeting at Greeneville, Tenn., a committee of safety had been appointed. This committee, impressed by
the loyal spirit of Lieut. Samuel P. Carter, U. S. N., a young Tennessean in the Navy who had written inspiring letters urging continued loyalty to the Union, asked President Lincoln to appoint him Brigadier-General and to assign him to the command in East Tennessee in case U. S. troops should be organized. As a result, on July 10th, Lieut. Carter received orders from the Adjutant-General's office to "proceed to East Tennessee and organize a camp of instructions of United States volunteers." He consulted with Lieutenant Nelson at Cincinnati and it was planned for him to go to the upper counties of East Tennessee and organize a sufficient force of mountaineers armed with country rifles to maintain his position until Nelson could arrive with the promised arms and equipment. On his way to carry out this plan, Lieut. Carter met his brother, James P. W. Carter, at London, Ky., on August 1. He had just escaped from East Tennessee where he had gone on a mission for President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton to endeavour to make arrangements for the loyal mountaineers to cross over into Kentucky to receive their arms and equipments, should that plan seem more practicable. The determination of the Administration to hold East Tennessee is shown by the fact that there were three people all sent on the same mission more or less. Mr. James Carter assured his brother that his presence in Tennessee would only lead to his arrest by the Confederate forces and at his suggestion Lieutenant Carter established his headquarters at Barbourville in Knox county, just 30 miles from Cumberland Gap. A company of Colonel Garrard's regiment was there in course of organization. By the third of August nearly one hundred refugees from East Tennessee had arrived at Barbourville and Boston, Ky. Others joined them, the men armed with squirrel rifles, knives and stout sticks. Camp Andrew Johnson was established for them, two miles from Barbourville and there the First Tennessee Infantry was organized, numbering 800 men by the middle of August. (23)

Meanwhile, the day after the election in Kentucky,
August 6th, 1861, recruits began flocking in to Camp Dick Robinson, in Garrard county, and by the middle of August all the companies were filled. Col. Landrum had turned the cavalry over to Col. Frank Wolford, but the infantry regiments, with the officers appointed stood ready to be mustered into the service. (24)

Already the question of securing supplies and equipment for the troops became that of paramount importance. The Tennessee troops were in a destitute condition, many of them without shoes and coats, to say nothing of the accoutrements of war. Lieut. Carter, therefore, visited Lieutenant Nelson, and secured his promise that if Carter could send transportation, with necessary guard, he might have the desired supplies. But when the train arrived at Camp Dick Robinson, Nelson was obliged to retain the troops for the defense of his camp, so great was the feeling against it. Not only this, but Lieutenant Nelson was obliged to request that the rest of the Tennessee force join him to assist in defending Camp Dick Robinson should it be attacked. In the last week in August the move was effected much to the bitter disappointment of the East Tennesseans, who were loth to move any farther away from their homes. Soon the Second Tennessee regiment was organized and mustered into the service and Camp Dick Robinson was further augmented by the organization of an artillery company under command of Capt. Abram Hewett. (25)

Such were the Union forces organized in southeastern Kentucky when General George H. Thomas, a trained soldier of long military experience was ordered to assume the command, superseding Lieut. Nelson September 10th. He found a force of raw recruits with no discipline and a camp with no equipage of any kind. Somewhat dismayed with the task before him, he set to work to bring men and camp under military organization to render the force an efficient one. Kniffin and In Battle, Perrin's "History of Kentucky", Mr. Kniffin tells of his own efforts as a member of General Thomas' staff, to secure supplies.
for the camp. Since ordinary methods brought no results, Mr. Kniffin followed General Fremont's example of making requisitions on the depots at Louisville and Cincinnati. Getting no results from this, the young man proceeded to Louisville and found plenty of supplies available if he could pay cash for them when delivered. Although neither General Thomas nor Col. Swords, the Commissary officer at Louisville had any available funds from the government, Mr. Kniffin arranged for the purchase of the supplies, promising to pay on delivery. Within a few days one of the Louisville merchants appeared at Camp Dick Robinson with a small quantity of the goods. Realizing that the merchants had arranged this as a test of his ability to pay before sending further orders, Mr. Kniffin resorted to desperate measures, -- he gave the man a check on a Lexington Bank in which he had no funds. Fearful of arousing General Thomas' disapproval, the young man hastily made his way to Lexington where he obtained an interview with the President of the Bank whose check he had used. He explained the situation to the banker, who promised to honor the check and wait until the money should be obtained from the government. (27) This story is included to show the almost insurmountable difficulties under which the officers labored in trying to organize the volunteers in 1861 in Kentucky.

While these preparations were being made in Kentucky for the Union cause, let us rest assured that the Confederates over in East Tennessee were no less active. On July 9th, General Leonidas Polk, in command of Department 2 of the Confederacy, urged Pres. Davis to create East Tennessee into a separate department, appoint General F. K. Zollicoffer of the Tennessee Army as a brigadier of the Provisional Army of the Confederacy, place him in command and give him 10,000 troops. (28) On the 11th of July, the Secretary of War requested Gov. Harris of Tennessee to send two regiments to East Tennessee. (29) The regiments were sent on July 18th (30) and on the 26th, General Zollicoffer was ordered to assume command of East Tennessee to "preserve peace, protect the railroad and re-
pel invasion." (31) By August 28th Zollicoffer had 33 infantry companies, almost without exception raw troops, and 6 cavalry companies guarding the principal gaps, patrolling the numerous paths leading across the mountains and maintaining a garrison at Cumberland Gap. (32) No mention is made in any of the orders or reports of an offensive campaign in Kentucky, as the attitude of the East Tennesseans was so hostile as to cause much alarm.

On September 3rd, General Polk's forces occupied Columbus, Ky., and on the sixth, General Grant's Union forces occupied Paducah. (33) That a concerted movement had been planned by the Confederates is seen by the fact that on September 7th received orders from Richmond to "take the arms" as the neutrality of Kentucky had been broken by the occupation of Paducah by the Federal forces. (34) On the 9th, General Zollicoffer replied that he had ordered 3 regiments into Kentucky and others would follow rapidly. (35) By September 12 there were 3 regiments at Cumberland Ford, Ky., with 3 others ordered up and General Zollicoffer stated that he would be ready for a forward movement as soon as he had strengthened his position at Cumberland Gap and Ford and the intervening mountain passes. (36) Meanwhile General S. B. Buckner, C. S. A., and Governor Harris of Tennessee had wired General Zollicoffer urging him not to enter Kentucky on the grounds that such a military movement would have a bad effect politically in Kentucky. Since this was not received until the night of the 13th, it was too late and the invasion had already been made. (37)

On the 8th of September General Polk had addressed the Governor of Kentucky offering to withdraw the Confederate troops on condition that the troops of the Federal government would withdraw simultaneously and with a mutual guarantee that neither Federal nor Confederate troops would enter or occupy any part of Kentucky in the future. (38) General Zollicoffer also sent Governor Magoffin the following letter on September 14th:

"Sir: The safety of Tennessee requiring it, I have occupied the moun-
tain passes at Cumberland Ford and the Three Log Mountains, in Kentucky. For weeks I have known that the Federal commander at Hoskins' Cross-Roads, was threatening the invasion of East Tennessee, and ruthlessly urging our people to destroy their own railroad bridges. I postponed this precautionary measure until the despotic government at Washington, refusing to recognize the neutrality of Kentucky, had established formidable camps in the central and other parts of the State, with a view first to subjugate our gallant sister and then ourselves. Tennessee feels, and has ever felt, towards Kentucky as a twin sister. Their people are as one people in kindred, sympathy, valor, and patriotism. We have felt, and still feel, a religious respect for Kentucky neutrality. We will respect it as long as our safety will permit. If the Federal forces will now withdraw from their menacing position, the forces under my command shall instantly be withdrawn.

Very respectfully,

F. K. Zollicoffer,
Brigadier-General.
According to Shaler the first recorded skirmish with the Confederate forces took place at Barbourville, Ky., on September 18th, where about 300 Home Guards attempted to withstand a force of 800 of Zollicoffer's troops. (43) In the fight which took place about daybreak, the Federal loss was 12 killed and 2 prisoners while the Confederates lost 1 killed and 4 wounded. The Home Guards fled and left the Confederates in occupation of the town. (44) The Confederates retired to Cumberland Ford and on September 21st, General Zollicoffer reported to General A. S. Johnston that his position at Cumberland Ford was not nearly so strong as he had imagined and could easily be turned by strategy. He asked for half dozen pieces for pivot guns. (45) On September 23 General Johnston ordered him to proceed to fortify the position at Cumberland Gap and Ford and the intervening passes in the 3 mountains so that they can be held by the fewest possible troops, thus freeing the men for other operations. He added further, "A forward movement from your present position at this time cannot be made. Your advance into Kentucky and your route must be timed by and in its direction combined with, the movements of General Buckner (at Bowling Green), now advancing into Kentucky. When this position, military and political, is better developed, you will receive full information and special orders." (46)

Meanwhile, on September 20th Col. T. T. Garrard with his regiment, the Third Kentucky, had been sent forward to a position on the Rockcastle River, 13 miles from London, Ky. He had orders to fortify the position, build huts for his men and repel all intruders, keeping in communication with Col. Sidney Barnes whose regiment, the 8th Kentucky, had been placed at Irvine to prevent communication between the Confederate forces collecting at Hazel Green and West Liberty and Cumberland Gap. Also to prevent the passage of any recruits attempting to join the Confederate army at the Gap. (47) On September 18th, General Anderson, commanding the Department of Cumberland, had requested Mr. Samuel Gill of the State Military Board to recommend that Home Guards with their arms
rendezvous at Lexington, Camp Dick Robinson and other points. Some of these Guards with Colonel Wolford's cavalry were encamped at Laurel Bridge, 6 miles south of London. (49) On September 26th, General Zollicoffer sent forward to break up this camp at Laurel Bridge the 11th Tennessee regiment, 1 battalion of the 15th Mississippi regiment, and the First Tennessee cavalry. After driving in the Federal pickets, the Confederates advanced and captured a part of the baggage of the encampment, chasing the retreating cavalry and Home Guards for several miles. Colonel Garrard, in command of Camp Wildcat, where the retreating forces took rescue, reports laconically, "Colonel Wolford came into camp bringing with him the Home Guard under Colonel Brown." (50) The Confederates captured 2 of the pickets and 1 other prisoner, 8000 cartridges, 250000 caps, 3 kegs of powder, 2 wagons and teams, 3 horses, 25 pairs of shoes and several guns. (51)

At the same time a detachment composed of a regiment of infantry with two cavalry companies (52) was sent to the salt works in Clay county, whence they carried away all the salt there, -- 200 barrels, -- returning with it to Cumberland Ford. This was the real purpose of both movements as salt was a very scarce article in the Confederacy. The officer commanding was instructed to receipt for the salt with the expectation that the Confederate government would pay for it at the regular price at the works, 40¢ a bushel. (52)

The Confederates again retired to the Ford and on October 3rd, General Zollicoffer wired General Johnston for permission to meet halfway a force supposed to be moving towards Barboursville to meet him. This was given but on October 6th a reconnoitring party returned from London with the report that there has been no appearance of the enemy there. (53) Meanwhile a detachment was sent into Harlan county where General Zollicoffer had learned there were 500 or 600 organized men under arms (Home Guards). Thirteen men in small armed parties were captured on this expedition (54)
A detachment was also sent into Whitley county but no further report of their expedition was made. General Zollicoffer had expected to make an attack in combination with Col. Stanton, encamped near Jamestown, Tennessee but Col. Stanton was ordered to join General Buckner at Bowling Green. Before his departure, however, he was ordered to break up Union camps at Thompkinsville and Burkesville and Albany, all in Kentucky. The camp at Albany consisted of some Home Guard companies, including those from Casey and Lincoln counties and some of the 12th Infantry, U.S.V., under Col. William Hoskins. General Zollicoffer planned to move on the advanced force entrenched at Rockcastle Hills and then to move down by Somerset and Monticello or by Columbia and Burkesville in the hope of capturing any force at Albany. Before Genl. Zollicoffer reached the Rockcastle Hills position, however, Col. Hoskins, unable to hold the Home Guards, was forced to retire to Camp Goggin, in Pulaski county, on the Cumberland river. (55) General Zollicoffer was so convinced that any advance would be made via Somerset and Jamestown, Tenn., that on stores the 18th of October he ordered commissary to Jamestown, Tenn. On the 18th, General Zollicoffer having moved up towards London, there was a skirmish between pickets in which the Confederates lost 1 killed and the Unionists 1 killed and 1 prisoner. (56)

In the Federal forces at Camp Dick Robinson, General Thomas had repeatedly requested re-enforcements, saying that with four good regiments, well-trained and well-equipped he could take East Tennessee. On September 30th, General Mitchell, in command of the Department of the Ohio at Cincinnati, ordered 6 regiments of infantry with 2 batteries of 6-pounders to report to General Thomas. (57) On October 1st, General Thomas, writing to thank General Mitchell for his aid, suggested that General Mitchell send a column of about 4 regiments up the Big Sandy, move it down through Floyd, Letcher and Harlan counties, while his column advanced via Barbourville. General Thomas believed such a movement would secure the railroad in East Tennessee. (58) But before any further plans could be made.
General Anderson was replaced by General Sherman as commander of the Department of the Cumberland on October 8th and on October 10th, General Mitchell received orders to proceed to Camp Dick Robinson and there prepare the troops for a forward movement. General Mitchell wrote to General Thomas of his assignment and asked that General Thomas make every preparation in his power for this expedition. (59)

It was evident that the Administration would brook no delay in the expedition into East Tennessee, constantly urged on as it was by East Tennesseans at Washington, who little understood the problems attached to moving an army through a poor mountain country. General Thomas, who had been bending every energy to perfecting the arrangements for such a move, felt that he had been superseded without just cause. He appealed to General Sherman, who promised to do everything in his power to retain General Thomas. (60)

Meanwhile, on October 16th, Secretary of War Cameron visited General Sherman at Louisville and it was decided to leave Mitchell at Cincinnati. Mr. Cameron begged General Sherman to take the offensive, to seize Cumberland Gap and Ford, and to get possession of the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad. (61)

While all this was happening, General Sherman, who had visited Camp Dick Robinson, ordered General Thomas to move his command to Crab Orchard or Mount Vernon in order to be nearer his advance guard on the Rockcastle river. On October 19th, General Albert Schopf was ordered to take command at Camp Wildcat from which Colonel Garrard had been announcing the advance of the Confederates. (62) The 17th Ohio and 73rd Indiana had been ordered up to re-enforce Colonel Garrard and in addition, Col. Wolford's cavalry, the 14th Ohio, and a battery of artillery, with the Tennessee brigade, were now sent forward. (63)

The expected action took place on October 21, when General Zollicoffer advanced upon the naturally fortified position of the Federal troops on the Rockcastle Hills. Camp Wildcat was
located at the junction of the Richmond, Mt. Vernon and London roads, and was well fortified from the front but could easily be turned by a force moving from the valley in its front by another road passing Round Hill to its rear. The 33rd Indiana was placed on the Round Hill. (64) About 350 men were deployed around the hill as skirmishers. In a few minutes, the Confederates who were hidden in the woods, commenced firing. As the firing began, 250 of Wolford's cavalry, dismounted, joined the Indiana troops. The fire was unusually severe which caused the line of cavalrymen to waver but they rallied and held their ground. The advancing Tennessee regiments, two in number, thought the men making for the fortifications were their own troops and did not fire. The Union Colonel in his report says they came almost upon the fortifications with bayonets fixed, declaring themselves "Union men" and "all right," The firing continued for over an hour, but as the 33rd Indiana received large re-enforcements, and the Confederates none at all, they retired from the field and at two in the morning General Zollicoffer retreated towards Cumberland Ford. While this attack was being made on the Round Hill, another part of the Confederate force had stormed the position from the front but to no avail. General Schoepf had about 5000 men and General Zollicoffer about 5400. The Federal loss was 4 killed and 20 wounded, the Confederate 11 killed and 42 wounded. Col. Coburn, however, reported 30 Confederate dead found on the battle field. (65)

General Zollicoffer fell back to Flat Lick, Knox county, and then to Cumberland Ford. Realizing that the rains would soon render the Cumberland Gap road impassable, and believing the Union advance would be via Somerset and Monticello on Jamestown, Tenn., he determined to strengthen the fortifications at Cumberland Gap and leave a small garrison there; to blockade all the passes through the mountains so that they would be impassable; and to move his entire command, if possible, to a position between Monticello and Somerset on the Cumberland River, in order to obtain supplies from Nashville by boat and to command the coal region. (66) On the 28th, his
cavalry scouts drove back a similar detachment of the enemy at Laurel Bridge, capturing 3 prisoners. On the 30th, a small picket of the cavalry which was posted on the road as far back as Barbourville was fired at from the bushes. On chasing the attacking party, they killed 1 man and captured 4 horses. On November 4th, General Zollicoffer, at Cumberland Ford, received word from Jamestown, where he had stationed 6 cavalry companies, that the Union forces were approaching 6000 strong. General Zollicoffer immediately started to the relief of Jamestown with 5 regiments, a battery of artillery and some cavalry, going via Jacksboro and Montgomery. On the 8th he had arrived within 23 miles of Montgomery, having covered 71 miles in 2 days. Receiving word by a courier that the information was false, he fell back to Jacksboro. By November 17th, he had blockaded all the mountain passes so securely that was assured the enemy could not pass over the mountains between Pound Gap in Virginia and Jacksboro, Tennessee, a distance of about 120 miles. He therefore started his advance guard via Wartburg, Tenn. to Jamestown, Tenn., and Monticello, Ky. By November 27th, General Zollicoffer had established his camp at Mill Springs, Ky., 13 miles west of Monticello, on the south bank of the Cumberland River. (69)

The battle of Camp Wildcat was a decided victory for the Union and both General Schoepf and General Thomas desired to push their advantage by pursuing the enemy towards Cumberland Gap. General Schoepf moved down to within 3 miles of London with the 14th and 17th Ohio and the 33rd Indiana and 2 batteries, sending the 3rd Kentucky and the Tennessee regiments ahead to London. (70) General Thomas established a supply depot at Crab Orchard, whence the stores came by a turnpike the 34 miles from the railroad at Nicholasville; from Crab Orchard there was a narrow mountain road to London. (71) On October 29th, General Sherman ordered General Thomas not to advance any further on the Cumberland Gap and route, (66) on November 12th, ordered General Thomas to be prepared
for a retrograde movement as he feared that General A. S. Johnston was planning an advance to separate his own and General Thomas' commands. (73) On the same day General Thomas ordered General Schoepf to fall back from London towards Crab Orchard or Nicholasville. It was on this retrograde movement that the East Tennesseans almost mutinied. Many through down their arms by the side of the road and refused to march. They were dismayed at the prospect of no campaign for the relief of their own beloved and suffering country. Fortunately, they had gone only as far as Mt. Vernon when the order was countermanded. (74) Meanwhile, General Buell had superseded General Sherman in command and had assumed command of the newly created Department of the Ohio. (75) This on November 15th.

When General Thomas moved his headquarters to Crab Orchard on October 31st, he sent Col. Wolford's cavalry and Col. Bramlette's regiment to re-enforce Co. Hoskins at his camp on the Cumberland River between Somerset and Monticello. Col. Hoskins continually reported that the enemy were advancing on that road but General Thomas did not credit the rumor. (76) However, the two Tennessee regiments and the 3rd Kentucky were left at London under General Carter, while Thomas received orders on November 17th to proceed to Columbia via Liberty. The roads were so bad that he was forced to proceed by Danville and Lebanon to reach Columbia. Before the move could be entirely effected, General Schoepf was ordered to Somerset, where Col. Hoskins was threatened with General Zollicoffer's advance, Col. Wolford and Bramlette having been ordered to Columbia. General Thomas' headquarters were finally established at Lebanon. This put him at a base which could be supplied by rail from Louisville, instead of on the Cincinnati and Lexington line. (77)

On November 30th a memorandum of General Thomas' command gives the distribution of his troops as follows:

Camp Dick Robinson: 31st Ohio Infantry and Hewett's battery
Crab Orchard: 33rd Indiana
Columbia: 1st Ky infantry and 1st Ky cavalry.

Somerset: Ky. infantry, 17th Ohio, 38th Ohio and Battery B, Ohio artillery

London: 3rd Ky. infantry, 1st and 2nd Tennessee infantry.

Lebanon: 10th Indiana infantry, 2nd Ky. infantry, 14th Ohio infantry, with Battery C, Ohio artillery, and 2 Kentucky infantry regiments on route. (78)

By November 26th, the Confederate and Federal forces were again facing each other, this time along the shores of the Cumberland River in a more fertile valley, instead of in an almost bare mountain country. The first reported skirmish in the new position took place on November 26th, between Col. Hoskin's pickets and General Zollicoffer's, their two camps being 12 miles apart and on opposite banks of the river. 4 of the Confederates were killed. Col. Hoskins reported that he had destroyed all the boats on the river for several miles above and below his camp and that General Zollicoffer had only two very small boats with which to cross at Mill Springs. (79) On December 2nd, Gen. Zollicoffer took 4 pieces of artillery up the river 3 miles to a position opposite Camp Hoskins and when he opened fire, shelled the Unionists out of their encampment. When this force retired, General Schoepf, hearing the Confederates had constructed boats and were planning to cross the river at Mill Springs, ordered the 17th Ohio and part of Wolford's cavalry to take up a position opposite Mill Springs. This order was disobeyed. A small cavalry force of the Confederates was encountered and the Union troops fell back to camp on the Fishing Creek. Fishing Creek, between Mill Springs and Somerset, runs into the Cumberland 5 miles above Mill Springs. It is 30 miles long and runs in a deep ravine. It can be crossed at 2 places, one 7 miles from the junction with the Cumberland and one 11 miles up. The Unionists had fortified the one higher up and had a force near the one only 7 miles up. On the 7th of December, the Confederate cavalry crossed at both places, finding the enemy had fallen back.
General Schoepf, finding his position at Fishing Creek untenable as it was flanked by 3 roads, had fallen back to a position 3 miles beyond Somerset which could be held by his small force and which commanded the roads to Stanford and Crab Orchard. (80)

On the 8th of December, the Confederate cavalry encountered some cavalry and infantry pickets in the fortifications at the Fishing Creek crossing. The cavalry picket of the Unionists fled in confusion and refused to aid the infantry picket (35th Ohio) who, being in an open field, after forming and delivering 3 volleys, retreated to the woods and returned to camp in small parties. The Ohio company lost 1 killed, 1 wounded and 15 missing. Confederate loss was reported at 1 wounded and 2 horses killed. (81)

Meanwhile General Zollicoffer had cavalry patrolling the south side of the river as far as Burkesville. His forces, consisted of 7 1/2 infantry regiments, 18 cavalry companies and one 6-pounder battery of 6 guns, and as General Schoepf's order to occupy the ground opposite Mill Springs had failed in execution, General Zollicoffer now had his forces about equally divided, some on each side of the river. (82)

On December 3rd, General J. T. Boyle had been ordered to Columbia with orders to throw out his pickets towards the Cumberland. On the 7th (date not given in report), the Confederate picket at Creelsborough was fired at across the river and by some men in a boat. 2 men in the boat were killed and the Confederates lost a horse. On the 9th and 10th, Union pickets fired from the north bank of the river at the Confederate cavalry patrolling Rowena, 30 miles below Mill Springs. On the 11th an expedition of Southern cavalry was sent to the north bank, which killed 3 and captured 11 Home Guards. On the 13th a similar party of cavalry which had crossed the south fork of the Cumberland were fired on, losing 1 killed and 1 wounded (83)

When General Schoepf had requested re-enforcements,
the two Tennessee regiments at London had been sent to re-enforce him. It had been almost impossible to subsist them at London, as the country surrounding could supply nothing and the roads were so bad that transportation from Crab Orchard was difficult. (84)

On December 18th at sunrise, General Schoepf left Somerset with 3 regiments and 4 pieces of artillery, going towards Mill Springs. After advancing 3 miles the road became impassable for the artillery which was left. The infantry advanced 6 miles farther to within 2½ miles of Mill Springs and there met the Confederate cavalry and a few shots were exchanged. General Carter, with 2 regiments and 2 pieces of artillery at the same time advanced by a road farther south and almost parallel to the one taken by General Schoepf (both were on the north bank of the Cumberland). He too met with about 80 of the Confederate cavalry but having only infantry, had to use his artillery at long range across Fishing Creek to disperse the cavalry, who soon fled. (85)

On December 16th, Major General G. B. Crittenden, who had been assigned to command of the forces at Cumberland Gap on November 11th (86), telegraphed the Confederate War Department from Knoxville that General Zollicoffer was threatened by very superior forces in front and on his left flank and that he had been ordered to recross the river. (87) This order was not obeyed however, as General Zollicoffer’s means of crossing were too limited to attempt it in face of the enemy.

On December 27th, Col. Bramlette at Columbia reported that he was threatened by a force from Jamestown, Tenn. and that it was reported that the Confederate force was moving towards Burkesville. (88) Wiring General Buell for instructions, General Thomas ordered to move forward, not to re-enforce Col. Bramlette but to form a conjunction with General Schoepf and attack the Confederates on their left flank while Genl. Schoepf attacks in front. The On December 31st, General Thomas left Lebanon in direction of Columbia. (89)
General Thomas was some time in reaching Columbia, but on January 10th, he left there en route towards Somerset. The rains had rendered the roads so impassable that in 3 days he had advanced only 16 miles to Webb's Cross Roads. General Thomas said the road was the worst he had ever seen. On January 17th, General Buell issued peremptory orders to General Thomas to proceed, not to Somerset but to a position directly in front of the enemy at Beech Grove and Mill Springs and further told General Thomas it was not enough to hold General Zollicoffer in check but his forces must be captured or dispersed. (90)

While the Federal troops were moving forward, General Crittenden had arrived and assumed command at Mill Springs. He realized fully his precarious position. If he were attacked by a superior force, he could only recross the river at great loss. His command was so isolated that he could not hope for re-enforcements of any kind. On January 13th a battery of artillery had been ordered to Jamestown, Ky., by General Buell, to support General Boyle so the possibility of supplies reaching the Confederates from Nashville had disappeared. He was out of reach of the commissary at Knoxville and behind him lay barren mountain counties. On learning that General Thomas had reached Logan's Cross Roads, 10 miles north of Beech Grove on the night of January 17th, General Crittenden called a conference of his officers. It was decided to advance the next morning and attack General Thomas before General Schoepf could join him from Somerset. The streams were so swollen from the recent rains that it was hoped General Schoepf would be unable to cross Fishing Creek. (91)

When General Thomas encamped at Logan's Cross Roads the night of the 17th, the 4th and 10th Kentucky, the 14th Ohio and the 18th U. S. regulars had not come up. He decided to await them at the cross roads and also to wait here to get into communication with
General Schoepf before advancing. The 10th Indiana, Wolford's cavalry and one battery of artillery took the most advanced position on the road leading to Beech Grove and Col. Manson, commanding, placed strong pickets 2 miles further in advance. At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 18th a few of the Confederate cavalry approached these pickets and opened fire but when it was returned they fell back. General Schoepf visited General Thomas during the day and received orders to send 1 battery, the 12th Kentucky and the 1st and 2nd Tennessee regiments to support General Thomas until his own troops came up. The 14th Ohio and the 10th Kentucky, on arrival, had been ordered forward on the Roberts post and Danville road to capture a large train of forage wagons. On the same day the 4th Kentucky and a battalion of Michigan engineers with another artillery battery joined General Thomas. (92)

Such were the Union forces. At midnight, Jan. 18th, General Crittenden's forces moved out of Beech Grove in the following order:

"1st. The brigade of General Zollicoffer, in the following order: In front, the independent cavalry companies of Captains Saunders and Bledsoe; then the 15th Mississippi regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. Walthall; then the 19th Tennessee, commanded by Col. D. N. Cummings; then the 20th Tennessee, commanded by Col. Battle; then the 25th Tennessee, commanded by Col. S. S. Stanton; then 4 guns of Rutledge's battery, commanded by Captain Rutledge.

2nd. The brigade of General Carroll in this order: in front, the 17th Tennessee, commanded by Lt.-Col. Miller; then the 28th Tennessee, commanded by Col. Murray; then the 29th Tennessee, commanded by Col. Powell; then 2 guns of McClung's battery, commanded by Capt. McClung.

In rear were the 16th Alabama, as a reserve, commanded by Col. W. B. Wood, and the cavalry battalions of Lt.-Col. Branner and Lt.-Col. McCollam."(93)
On the morning of the 19th about daybreak the pickets of Wolford's cavalry were fired upon by the advancing forces of the Confederates. They fell back slowly and notified Col. Manson. Col. Manson immediately formed his own regiment, the 10th Indiana, on the road to await the attack, he then hurried to the tent of Col Fry, and ordered him to form his regiment, the 4th Kentucky, to meet the attack. Col. Manson then went in person to inform General Thomas of the advance. The General immediately ordered him back to his command and it is indicative of General Thomas' belief in discipline that in spite of the fact that Col. Manson fought gallantly and helped to achieve a Union victory, General Thomas afterwards had him arrested for leaving his command at such a time, instead of sending an aide to notify the commanding officer. General Thomas ordered the other troops to the support of the 10th Indiana and 4th Kentucky, leaving the engineers and 1 company of the 38th Ohio as a guard for the camp. Col. Fry immediately filed his regiment through a hole in the fence to a high point parallel to and near the fence, in a field to the left of the road. The Southerners attempted to flank Col. Fry's men on their left but he ordered two companies to head them off and continued to hold his position. A section of artillery and the Tennessee brigade (12th Ky. and 1st and 2nd Tenn.) were ordered to attack the Confederates on their right while the 2nd Minnesota and the 9th Ohio replaced the 4th Kentucky and 10th Indiana, who were nearly out of ammunition. For nearly half an hour neither side gained while the firing was kept up on both sides. Then the 9th Ohio, shouting as they ran, charged with their bayonets and at that attack the enemy column wavered and fell back in disorder and confusion. At the fence at the end of the field they rallied somewhat but were forced back in great confusion and throwing away their equipment and arms they beat a rapid and disorderly retreat towards Beech Grove. During the battle, the forces were very close together. In going through the woods, Col Fry met an officer wearing a rain-
coat which completely covered his uniform. This man said to Col. Fry
"We mustn't fire on our own men". Col. Fry answered, "Of course not."
Just then the officer's aide appeared and firing, killed Col. Fry's
horse. Realizing the officer was a Confederate, Col. Fry fired and
his man fell. It proved to be General Zollicoffer. His death con-
tributed greatly to the confusion and dismay of the Southerners,
who seemed at a loss without their leader.

General Thomas' entire command pursued the retreat-
ing army and by night the artillery batteries were in position shell-
ing the encampments at Beech Grove and Mill Springs. General Schoepf
arrived the night of the 19th with the 17th, 31st, and 38th Ohio.
They had crossed Fishing Creek on a cable, each man going hand over
hand. On advancing the next morning, the Unionists found that the
entire force had crossed the river during the night and had burned
the boars, so that pursuit was for the time being impossible. So
precipitate had been the flight that no attempt had been made to
destroy any of the stores, the camp or anything else. The flight
was made with no semblance of order or discipline, many of the
troops going to their homes in Tennessee. The Federal loss was
19 killed and 127 wounded. The Confederate loss as reported by
General Crittenden was 125 killed, 309 wounded and 99 missing.
General Thomas reported the Confederate loss so far as known as
192 killed, 89 prisoners wounded and 68 not wounded. All the Fed-
eral commanders in making their reports comment on the bravery of
the Southerners. General Crittenden said that many of his men
were forced to throw down their arms since many were using flint
lock muskets which were rendered absolutely useless by the heavy
rain which fell during part of the engagement. The engagement lasted
about 2 hours and represented a very real victory for the Union
army. It was probably the most important engagement on Kentucky soil
before the battles of Richmond and Perryville. (94)

General Crittenden's command was utterly demoralized.
Some of the newspapers stated that many of the men reached Nashville
before they stopped retreating. General Crittenden strove to reorganize his army at Gainesboro, Tennessee, the while he was subjected to the most severe and unjust criticism. The desire to place the blame on someone resulted in the most violent accusations against General Crittenden, -- that he was drunk the entire time, that he advanced against the advice of his officers, etc. (95) So overwhelming was the blame heaped upon him and so vituperous were the newspaper attacks that General Crittenden demanded and was accorded a Board of Inquiry which acquitted him of all blame. For had he failed to attack and awaited the combined advance of Generals Thomas and Schoepf, his entire force would probably have been forced to surrender and the loss to the Confederate army been still greater. But, although he was raised in rank to a Major-Generalcy, he had lost the confidence of the people and his men and on Feb. 26th, 1862, General Kirby Smith succeeded him as commander of the district of East Tennessee. (96)

With the victory at Mill Springs and the precipitate flight of the defeated Confederate forces, the mountains in southeastern Kentucky were cleared of all Confederate troops except a small garrison defending the impregnable Cumberland Gap. General Buell planned to operate into East Tennessee with General Carter's brigade against Cumberland Gap, and a strong force under General Schoepf through Monticello, Ky., and Jamestown, Tenn. On January 26th, General Carter was ordered to London, Ky., and General Schoepf to Monticello. (97) On Jan. 31st, General Buell countermanded his order for the movement of General Schoepf's brigade and on Feb. 6th, General Thomas' entire command, except the brigade at London, was ordered to Lebanon. One regiment, Col. Landrum's, was left to guard the stores at Mill Springs. (In their flight the Confederates had made no effort to destroy the large quantities of stores at Mill Springs, which represented no small part of the victory) Thus ended the first attempt of the Federal forces to control Cumberland Gap and to reach East Tennessee. (98)
General Buell's reasons for ordering the abandonment of the movement through Monticello are set forth in considerable length in a letter of General McClelland written on February 1, 1862. He says, "The obstacles I have had to fight against are the want of transportation and the condition of the roads. The former along has been an insuperable obstacle to an advance into East Tennessee, and when that is overcome I feel it my duty to tell you, with the light of the experience we are now having, that the latter will effectually bar our progress in that direction on a footing which will promise anything but failure. I will give you my reasons; you can judge what they are worth:

It is 200 miles or thereabouts from our depots (at the terminus of the railroad) to Knoxville or the nearest point on the Tennessee Railroad. At the best supplies are meager along the whole route, and if they suffice for a trip or two must by that time be entirely exhausted for any distance that we can reach along both sides of the road.

From Somerset to Jacksborough we will scarcely find any at all. East Tennessee is almost entirely stripped of wheat by the enemy. In the productive region there is still a small surplus of corn and wheat. We must supply two-thirds of the ration from our depots here, and we must of course depend on them also for our ordnance and other stores. It will take 1,000 wagons constantly going to supply 10,000 men. We can judge of the effect of that amount of hauling on the dirt roads of this country by the experience we have already had. Forty of the 80 miles from Lebanon to Somerset are of that sort of road, and it is evident that it would soon become impassable, to obviate which I have five regiments now engaged in corduroying it throughout; but it is a tedious work, too much so to be undertaken on the whole route to East Tennessee. If the number of troops and consequently the amount of hauling is increased the difficulty is increased in a greater proportion. The limited amount of forage on the route will be speedily exhausted, as besides provisions for our men we must have forage for our animals; a thing that is not to be thought
In my previous letter I set down 3 divisions (say 30,000 effective force) as the force that would be required for East Tennessee, two to penetrate the country and one to keep open communications. I believe that is the least force that will suffice, and it ought to be able to establish itself promptly before it can be anticipated by a force of the enemy sufficient to make the result doubtful. With railroads converging from the east, west, and south, it ought not to be difficult for them to get a pretty formidable force in that country in ten days. The people of East Tennessee are loyal, and will remain so, though submitting to the power that has subjugated them. They will rise whenever they can see themselves properly supported and we can put arms in their hands, but not before in any efficient manner. It would be cruel to induce them to do so on any other conditions.

For the reasons I have stated I have been forced reluctantly to the conviction that an advance into East Tennessee is impracticable at this time on any scale which will be sufficient. I have ordered General Carter's brigade to move on the Gap, but I fear very much that even that will be compelled to fall back for supplies, such is the condition of the roads over which they have to be hauled." (100)

General Carter moved from London down to Cumberland Ford and on February 14th, 1862, a reconnaissance was made from this point towards Cumberland Gap by the First Battalion Kentucky Cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Mundy. They attacked the Confederate cavalry picket, killing 5, wounding 2 and taking 2 prisoners, besides securing 8 horses and some arms. On advancing within range of the artillery at the Gap, the Confederate guns were trained on them and they were forced to retreat. At this time General Carter had 7 regiments in his camp and the Confederate garrison at the Gap consisted of only 2, the 4th and 11th Tennessee regiments. Col. Rains, in charge of the post, requested re-enforcements. He expected an immediate attack, but a heavy snow fall followed by constant rains kept the enemy from advancing. On the 18th, hearing that 3 regiments are advancing
to his support, he said that if they arrive before he is attacked, the fortification can be held against any attack from the front. He urged that the other mountain gaps be guarded along the East Tennes-
see border. (101)  

On March 3rd, General Carter again planned to advance, having built boats to cross the river which was not fordable. Again rain fell and the creeks and the river became so swollen as to ren-
der the roads absolutely impassable. The bridge over Clear Creek was covered and on discovering this, General Carter countermanded his order to advance. General Carter reported his effective force at a-

bout 3,300 men. He also said that his men were on short rations and if the bad weather continued it would be impossible to get supplies to them. (102) On March 9th, General Carter reported that about 1,000 East Tennesseans had arrived in the neighborhood of his camp and that most of them had entered the service, so that in a short time he will have 2 new regiments. (103) About the same time Gen-
eral Carter wrote to Colonel Garfield at Piketon, suggesting that he go through Pound Gap and attack Cumberland Gap from the rear while he, Carter, attacked from the front. By March 23rd, however, General Buell had ordered Col. Garfield, now General, to Bardstown, Ky. He planned to send him with his forces to strengthen the Cumberland Gap expedition, of which Garfield was to be placed in command. (104) On March 26th, however, Brigadier-General George W. Morgan was placed in command of the Seventh Division of the Army of the Ohio, to be com-
piled of the troops under General Carter at Cumberland Ford, the 33rd Indiana, 19th Kentucky and Foster's Wisconsin Battery then en route to Bardstown from eastern Kentucky. General Garfield was ordered to report in person to General Buell (105)  

While General Buell was arranging for additions to the force at Cumberland Ford, General Carter was bending every effort to secure the success of his column and the seizure of the Gap. On March 8th, learning of a rebel force in the vicinity of Big Creek Gap, General Carter despatched a force consisting of the Second East Tennessee and the 43rd Indiana and a detachment of the First Battalion, Ky. cav-
alry, under Col James Carter, to disperse them. They marched via Boston, Ky., to Big Creek Gap. On arriving at the northern end of the Gap they learned that the force on the Tennessee side was two companies of the First Tennessee cavalry, C. S. A. The road, blockaded some time before by Zollicoffer's men, prevented the advance of the cavalry who were therefore ordered around by another road. The infantry were divided into two commands, and at 9 p. m. started their march across the mountains, a distance of only 9 miles. The roads were steep however, and some of the infantry got lost. About 1200 men arrived at the rebel camp at day break and completely surprised them. After a skirmish of about 5 minutes the Confederate cavalry fled. They sustained a loss of 5 killed, 15 wounded and 15 prisoners. The Union troops marched on to Jacksboro, a town 5 miles away, and after raising the Union flag, proceeded to Fincastle and then to Woodson's Gap. In this neighborhood the troops destroyed a saltpeter works, destroying also 1000 pounds of saltpeter and 11000 pounds of bacon. On the 19th, Col. Carter received an order to return as a Confederate force had been sent out to attack him. (106) On hearing of this advance of the Federal troops, General Kirby Smith had sent 2000 troops under Col Leadbetter to Clinton while he himself went to Cumberland Gap, collected all the force that could be spared and on the 18th started for Jacksboro. Finding that the enemy had retired when he reached Woodson's Gap, the troops were returned to the Gap while General Smith returned to Knoxville. (107)

At Cumberland Ford, General Carter, hearing that part of the garrison had been withdrawn to attack the force he had placed at Woodson's Gap, decided to attack Cumberland Gap before the regiments withdrawn could have returned. Accordingly, General Carter gave orders for the following force to be ready to march on the morning of the 21st: 1st East Tenn., 7th Ky., 16th Ohio, 49th Indiana and First Battalion of Ky. cavalry with one section(2guns) of the Ninth Ohio Battery. When they had advanced within 2 miles of
the Gap, General Carter was overtaken by a messenger telling him
the 4 Confederate regiments, by forced marches, had returned to
the Gap. Realizing the useless of an attack under those conditions,
General Carter determined to remain in front of the Gap for a day or
so to examine the fortifications. He advanced on the Southerners'
right and bivouacked for the night close to their line of defense.
The next morning the 16th Ohio were sent out as skirmishers and
soon drove the Confederates from the woods into their lines. The
Confederate riflemen were protected by rifle pits. The two guns
were placed in position directly in front of the Gap and continued
firing all afternoon. Three regiments of infantry occupied the
same ridge as the guns. This fire was returned from seven different
works, one on the top of the Cumberland Mountains to the left of the
Gap, one on the side of the mountain, also to the left; one in the
Gap and four on the right or west side of the Gap. In the after-
noon the 49th Indiana were deployed on the right where they discovered
another battery which opened up on them but failed to do any damage.
The Union troops again passed the night in front of the Gap but moved
the next morning on their way back to the Ford. They had encamped
both nights in the snow and sleet and had endured many hardships. [108]
General Carter added that in his opinion the only way to take the Gap
is by a flank movement and attack on the Tennessee side.

When General Morgan went into Kentucky to take charge
of the division at Cumberland Gap, he found the roads from Crab Orchard
and Mount Vernon almost impassable. He drove from Lexington in an open buggy
in order to arrive as quickly as possible. He wrote of the trip, "At
many places the narrow roads, walled in by the mountains, had become
torrents and sometimes the horses were obliged to swim."

General Morgan found the country around had been en-
tirely exhausted by the occupation of Carter's command and by the pre-
vious foraging of the enemy. It was necessary to haul forage from
30, 40, and 50 miles and at last from a distance of 80 and 90 miles.
General Morgan increased the number of guns from 6 to 22, the worth-
less arms were replaced by new ones, a supply of ammunition secured
and a floating bridge was built across the Cumberland river. Means of supplying the troops with fresh meat were secured, since some of the men had not tasted meat for several months and were threatened with scurvy.

As soon as he arrived at Cumberland Ford, April 11th, General Morgan made a reconnaissance of the enemy's position and was convinced that the enemy had grouped too many of his fortifications on the left of the Gap, depending too much on the natural strength of the right. He discovered a knob to the right of one fortification (Ft. Pitts) and believed that if he could but occupy that hill with siege guns he could take the Gap. He ordered an armed reconnaissance by the brigades of General Carter and Col. de Courcy. Although the men were ordered to avoid a skirmish if possible, they were attacked by the Confederates and lost 1 man mortally and several slightly wounded. General Morgan reported the Confederate loss as 7 killed and 8 wounded and branded as an untruth the statement in the Southern papers that his loss was 150 killed and 300 wounded and the Confederate loss 30.

Morgan's plan of attacking the Gap from the North was never put into execution for before his siege guns arrived, the Confederate engineer constructed a strong work protected by rifle pits, on the summit to the right of Ft. Pitts, thus rendering his chosen hill an untenable position. General Morgan therefore resolved to execute a flank movement and force the enemy to evacuate his position by cutting off his line of supplies and communication, or else to come out for a fight in the open field. This seemed and was believed by many to be an impossible manoeuvre. It was universally thought that the route through Cumberland Gap was the only one within a range of 80 miles for the passing of an army with cannon. In addition it meant putting the men on half rations and letting the horses go without forage much of the time. Nevertheless, General Morgan determined
34.

on this attempt. The mountains east of the Cumberland Gap were so impassable as to be out of the question; on the west were Baptist, Roger's and Big Creek Gaps, which were generally used only as bridle paths, though light wagons had been known to pass through them. All were at this time strongly blockaded.

About the 18th of May, to divert the Confederate's attention from his real plan and to threaten his supply depot at Clinton, Tenn., General Morgan sent General Spears with 6 regiments to camp at the commencement of the 18 miles of blockade at the foot of Pine Mountain, on the route to Big Creek Gap and 35 miles west of Barton Cumberland Gap. General Kirby Smith immediately occupied the front of Big Creek Gap with 2 brigades of infantry, 2 regiments of cavalry and two batteries of artillery. General Morgan planned to cross Pine Mountain and go through Roger's Gap which is 20 miles west of Cumberland Gap, 15 miles east of Big Creek Gap and 39 miles southwest of Cumberland Ford and which enters Powell valley immediately opposite the mouth of the road leading to Knoxville. This important point would threatened the Gap, Clinton and Knoxville. General Carter was to be left to guard the Ford, while General Morgan attacked in front and General Spears led the attack on the rear. But before this plan had gone into execution, as soon in fact as they had crossed the Cumberland River, General Barton withdrew from Big Creek to Cumberland Gap. Foiled in this strategy also, General Morgan next determined to abandon entirely his position at Cumberland Ford and advance his whole force over the mountains. His first preparation for this attack was to have the sides of the Pine mountain mined to keep the Southerners from attempting to strike at his line of supplies. These mines were never sprung.

While General Morgan was carefully laying his plans and bending all his energies for a forward movement, General Kirby
Smith was not idle in preparing to counter the attack if he could not forestall it. On March 10th he reported to President Davis that the force in East Tennessee was badly disorganized. There had been no one in command since General Crittenden left in January to join General Zollicoffer at Mill Springs. Regiments and small squads of soldiers were acting entirely independently and without any military organization or restraint. Most of the troops were only twelve months' volunteers and particularly the East Tennesseans could not be induced to organize for the war. (109) On April 15th, General Smith reported that he had under 2000 men at the Gap, 2500 at Chattanooga and 2500 scattered elsewhere in his department. (110) And on the 17th, he wrote General Stevenson, who had assumed command of the garrison at Cumberland Gap, that as all available troops in the department had been sent to Corinth, he must not look for reinforcements. He assured General Stevenson that in case an attack was made on the rear of Cumberland Gap, he would send him every man he could from Knoxville. (111) On April 26th General Smith asked for reinforcements, saying 7000 East Tennesseans had gone over to join General Morgan's forces at Cumberland Ford and that additional troops had also arrived there from the valley of the Sandy (Garfield's brigade). (112) The next day he wrote to General Humphrey Marshall at Abingdon, Virginia, asking his cooperation in defending Cumberland Gap. (113) On May 28th, General Smith made a report of his department to the War Department at Richmond as follows: "My troops at Cumberland Gap and in Powell's Valley number some 7000 and this is really the effective force of my command. It has effectually baffled every effort made by the enemy to cross the Cumberland Range, and by being kept constantly in motion has impressed him with an exaggerated idea of its magnitude. This command, composed of new levies from Tennessee, Northern Alabama, and Georgia troops, has been afflicted with almost every disease incident to camp life. With a paper force of 17000, scarcely 8000 are effective; regiments 800 and 900 strong report
only 200 or 300 for duty. A decided improvement in the health of the command is now perceptible and a daily increase in the effective force is reported. The arms of the sick have been issued, so as to keep every gun in service. There are still, with new troops and recruits, about 3000 effective men in the department unsupplied. This, with the sick who are returning to duty, calls for a supply of at least 5000 arms, which should be furnished as soon as practicable. The effective force under General Leadbetter at Chattanooga is about 900 infantry, 400 cavalry, and 8 pieces of light artillery. The inadequacy of the force at Chattanooga and my inability to reinforce it is a matter of serious anxiety." (114)

On June 6th, General Stevenson at the Gap was informed that two columns of the Union troops were advancing on Chattanooga and that Colonel Reynolds had been ordered from Powell's valley to Chattanooga and General Barton to Clinton. Should Chattanooga fall and East Tennessee be abandoned, General Stevenson's line of retreat was to be via Abingdon, Virginia. (99)

On the same day, June 6th, General George Morgan began his famous march over the Cumberland mountains, one of the most interesting and romantic happenings of the war in the west. His line of march placed the First Battalion, Kentucky Cavalry, Col. Munday's, in advance followed by the 3rd Ky. Infantry, -- these as an advance guard; next came the siege guns, a battery of artillery and de Courcy's brigade; next, another brigade of infantry (Baird's) with Wetmore's battery of artillery. Carter's brigade and Lanphere's battery acted as a rear guard. Heavy fatigue parties were constantly employed in front in making and repairing roads, which were again blockaded after the rear guard had passed. General Morgan said it was amazing to see the astonishment of the people at the passage of enormous cannon over roads regarded by them as difficult and dangerous for lightly-laden
wagons. Old men, women and children flocked to the roadside and everywhere the troops were hailed with delight.

On the 9th, General Spears had been ordered to clear the blockade from the Big Creek Gap and advance by the Valley road to join General Morgan at Roger's Gap. He was further instructed next day to send 200 men under a daring officer to burn the railroad bridge over the Tennessee river at Loudon, but this undertaking failed as Loudon was occupied by two Confederate regiments.

On the 10th, the brigades of de Courcy and Baird encamped on the north side of the Cumberland mountains and on the following day they descended into Powell's Valley and camped in a dense forest which screened their position.

General Buell, in reply to a request from General Morgan, telegraphed the latter that General Negley was fully employed in Middle Tennessee and that while he was opposite Chattanooga his stay could not be depended upon and he could render General Morgan no assistance. He added, "The force now in Tennessee is so small that no offensive operations against East Tennessee can be attempted, and you must therefore depend mainly on your own resources." This was received by General Morgan on the 9th when he was at Lambdin's, a farmhouse 21 miles southwest of Harrodsburg, Ky. To this the General replied that he had gone too far to withdraw, that a retrograde movement would impair the morale of his troops and that his one hope of success lay in a bold and daring policy. On the 11th, General Morgan proceeded to descend the south side of the mountains with his advance guard, de Courcy's brigade. This passage consumed a whole day and night. The night of the 12th General Morgan received another telegram from the commanding General which he regarded as a definite command to fall back. It read: "Considering your force and that opposed to you, it will probably not be safe for you to undertake any extended offensive operations. Other operations will soon have an influence upon your designs and it is therefore better for you to run no risk at present." General Morgan perforce gave up his campaign and ordered a countermarch to Williamsburg, Ky.
He himself, returned to Lambdin's to meet General Carter's column which had not yet passed over the mountain and he also sent a courier to General Spears to stop his advance. Col. de Courcy's brigade had been detained in Powell's Valley by the fact that the mountain road was blocked by the cannon and soon a message came from him with news that Cumberland Gap was being evacuated. At the same time word was received of the evacuation of Big Creek Gap. When this information was transmitted to General Buell, he replied with a rather non-commital permission to proceed, promising that General Mitchell should threaten Chattanooga but warning General Morgan that he would have only his own command to rely upon. Upon this somewhat ambiguous statement, General Morgan again issued orders for the advance.

General Carter was instructed to join his commanding officer at Roger's Gap, via Big Creek Gap where General Spears was to await him. Baird's brigade, although it had completed the retrograde movement was again ordered to cross the mountain and in spite of the hardship involved, cheerfully moved up.

By the 15th, Baird's and deCourcy's troops were at the foot of Roger's Gap and since the Powell Valley was full of Confederate cavalry the supply trains were ordered to the rear and the men were forced to subsist on the country. This second advance, according to General Morgan, was made against the best judgment of 3 of his brigade commanders, whose opinion he valued highly.

General Spears' brigade arrived without wagons and without tents and as they had cleared the blockade immediately before marching, a day was allowed for rest; General Carter's command had also marched 75 miles and needed a day's rest.

The final advance was made at 1 A.M. on the morning of June 18th along two parallel roads, -- the old and new Valley roads. On arriving at Thomas' it was discovered that the Confederates had evacuated the post, their rear guard leaving at 10
A. M. and de Courcy's brigade, the Federal advance, taking possession at 2 P. M. (116)

Some of the trials experienced by the men in this march through the mountains are too interesting in their portrayal of mountain warfare to be overlooked. The reports of the officers fairly bristle with their pride in the way the men withstood hard labor and many privations. As these reports also contain the only details of the various skirmishes, a few quotations will be given.

From the report of Capt. Foster, 1st Wisconsin Battery, Chief of Artillery, comes the following: "Machinery for the movement of this battery (Parrott siege guns), over steep ascents and descents consisted of about 800 feet of 1 inch, 100 feet of 1 1/2 inch rope, 3 large and 2 small snatch blocks, 1 double and 1 single tackle block. This was all the tackle of any kind that could be obtained in time to be of any use to move without hindrance to the forces of this division. To move this battery a distance of 41 miles over the Cumberland Mountains and over roads considered impassable by the enemy for light artillery seemed a herculean task which the heart would almost shrink from undertaking, for many of the ascents would form an angle of 30 degrees with a horizontal place and this to be overcome, knowing that we were in many instances to make a corresponding descent.

On June 7th, Foster's 1st Wisconsin Battery, under command of Lt. Anderson moved forward and being a light battery met with but little difficulty the first few miles. 200 men from the infantry were detailed to assist in overcoming the steep ascents and descents which was to be done by ropes and pulleys. The ropes and pulleys were in constant use or readiness and the men were obliged to be constantly on the alert for the ascents were not only steep but along sideling places where, were the gun carriages once overturned, they would have fallen over precipitous rocks varying in height from 100 to 500 feet. In many instances where the turns in the road were than
at right angles and this up steep sideling ascents rendering it almost impossible to turn with teams. At many times was the whole force both of men and horses, used upon the same rope. On arriving at the top of the Humboldt Mountains the men and horses seemed nearly exhausted, many of the horses being entirely broken down and will be worthless hereafter. Both men and horses have been upon short rations and forage. It was impossible for subsistence and forage trains to follow close upon the troops over such terri-bly rugged roads. Many of my command have been the overland route to California and all concede there was nothing to compare with these steep ascents and descents on the route.

Foster's First Wisconsin Battery, which had been obliged to wait for an ammunition train to precede it up the moun-tain, started at 5 P. M. and after working hard through the night, without one moment's rest and part of the time in almost total dark-ness, (the moon being eclipsed), without rations or forage for the last 18 hours, arrived in Powell's Valley without serious injury only overturning a battery wagon and breaking its trail at 3.30 A. M. on the morning of the 12th of June. This was the most difficult part of the mountain to overcome that we had encountered. The road was winding, narrow and very stony and steep and all the entire de-scent very sideling so much so that we were constantly in imminent danger of being precipitated down the almost perpendicular banks over jagged rocks for several hundred feet, in which case it would have been sure death to man or beast.

On the 12th of June we were ordered to countermarch, recross the mountain and move to Williamsburg. When this order was first known to the men they desired rather to shed their blood in Tennessee and leave their bones bleaching in Powell's Valley than to retrace their steps over the mountains; but like good soldiers they sadly but resolutely put their shoulders to the wheels literally and commenced the ascent of the mountain upon the southern side. The 20-pounder Parrott guns were put in the advance and started at
10 o’clock. The road had become much worn and rutted, loose stones had fallen into the track and filled it in places which had to be removed, and which rendered it almost impossible for the horses to get a foothold; but after 11 hours of hard labor the task was accomplished and at 1 o’clock, June 13th, we camped at the foot of the mountain on the northern side. That same evening orders were received to march back to Powell's Valley upon which the soldiers fairly yelled with delight and seemed so anxious to return that they could hardly wait for morning to come."

General Spears reported that when the advance of his command, after having opened and removed a heavy blockade through Pine and Cumberland Mountains, entered Big Creek Gap on the evening of the 11th, they were fired on by the pickets of the enemy, which resulted in a rather severe skirmish. As the troops advanced through the Gap the enemy’s pickets lying in ambush, fired upon them from rocks and other places of concealment. They were repulsed and driven from their ambush with a loss of 2 dead and several wounded. General Spears' command continued its way through the Gap, the men sleeping on their arms. The next morning they proceeded with the work of opening the blockade, while their advance pickets kept up a heavy skirmish with the enemy's cavalry. The Federals captured 3 of the Confederates with their horses and equipment and 2 or 3 citizens who were aiding the Confederates. No sooner had General Spears arrived in the valley than he was ordered to return to his former position, which he re-occupied. Learning that the Confederate cavalry were advancing in his rear in considerable force, Col. Spears kept his men in ambush on each side of the road opposite Big Creek Ford and in the mountains. On the morning of the 15th, the pickets were attacked but were unable to draw the enemy after them, so General Spears sent Col. Houk, Cooper and Shelley to the valley with orders to advance across it and attack the enemy on the ridge, at which place they seemed to be assembled in force. They did so and succeeded
in driving them across the Clinch River, alarming them so much that they filled the boats with rails, set them on fire and turned them loose down the river, then they retreated to Knoxville. The Union soldiers captured some prisoners, some 60 tents, burned and destroyed 57 others and destroyed about $800 worth of camp equipage. (118)

Col. de Courcy's troops were led through Roger's Gap and he says of the fighting done, "The skirmished which took place betwixt the enemy's cavalry and the pickets of my brigade were not of sufficient importance to demand more than a passing notice. His troops formed the advance guard and first entered the evacuated fort. They found the enemy had destroyed a considerable amount of his stores and had thrown several cannon over the cliff, had spiked others and taken some away. 7 were found in position. The tents had been left standing but were cut into slits. A large quantity of stores which they had not had time to destroy were taken charge of by the Federals. (119)

 Brigadier-General Baird in his report said that after re-crossing the mountains through Roger's Gap for the second time, his troops were almost exhausted. He wrote, "By this time the effects of severe labor began to be apparent; the feet of many were blistered and those not naturally robust had given out. Our scanty supply of 5 days' rations was, moreover, exhausted; yet the men, pleased at the idea of moving towards the enemy did not complain. After 2 days' rest we again advanced, without bread, with coffee for a single meal, and no other food but fresh beef which we drove along." General Baird also made this sage remark: "I have in this connection to commend to the notice of the commanding general the patient fortitude with which my men, without the stimulus and eclat of successful battle, and notwithstanding the discouraging effects of our countermarch, endured the privations they were called upon to encounter. I beg that he will also remember the zeal, intelligence and efficiency with which
the officers in command of the troops carried forward the work. Had the identical results which have been achieved been consequent upon a severe struggle, with heavy loss of life, they would have received a reward which they can now only look for in the satisfaction of having done their duty." Another officer says, "Although we all would have gladly entered an encounter with the enemy, we as officers of the artillery of this division, believe that more good results will be derived from the bloodless victory than with an encounter, and acknowledge that strategy displays more military skill than fields stained with blood."

Such were the events and opinions concerning them, viewed from the Northern angle. What of the Southerners during this time? So energetic and zealous a commander as Kirby Smith would never abandon any post without a struggle unless he felt the situation so hopeless that he dared not risk his men.

On June 6th, General Kirby Smith was faced with a very serious dilemma. The two strategic points in his department were Cumberland Gap and Chattanooga, separated by 180 miles, -- with a difficult line of communication. Each was threatened by a force superior to the entire force at his command. To concentrate at either point meant the abandonment of the other. In addition, a heavy column with artillery was reported at McMinnville, Middle Tennessee, threatening Kingston.

General Smith had disposed his troops as follows: General Stevenson was at the Gap with 400 troops and a good supply of provisions, as well as plenty of ammunition. The 4000 troops under General Barton and Co. Reynolds who had been operating in Powell's Valley and who prevented Morgan's advance through the mountain passes, had been withdrawn. Col. Reynolds's brigade went to rail on the 6th to Chattanooga. Barton's brigade was ordered to the terminus of the Kentucky railroad, 10 miles south of Clinton, Tenn. Thus, the whole force, with the exception of the garrison at Cumberland Gap could be concentrated by rail at any point between Chattanooga and Morristown.
Col. Allston's cavalry had been ordered to Kingston, leaving a small force in Powell's Valley to watch the roads over the mountains. Two regiments had also been ordered to Chattanooga from Florida. (120)

On June 7th, General Barton was ordered to follow Col. Reynolds to Chattanooga and Col. Allston was given additional directions to watch the approaches to Knoxville, particularly the crossing at the junction of the Powell and Clinch rivers and the intersection of the Fincastle road with the road to Cumberland Gap from Knoxville, 4 miles beyond Maynardsville. He was also to watch the mountain passes and report any advance to General Stevenson at the Gap. He was informed that General Barton had been ordered to leave a small garrison at Clinton for his support and told that in case he had to fall back before a superior force he was to proceed to Knoxville, probably via Clinton (121). That same day the Unionists opened fire on Chattanooga and the Confederates apprehended a severe attack.

On the 11th, General Barton's command was still at Knoxville awaiting transportation and when news was received of Morgan's advance into Powell's Valley, he was ordered on the 12th to Clinton. He was to destroy all the boats on the Clinch River and then to move as rapidly as possible to Tazewell. Col. Reynolds was ordered to join him there. A cavalry company was ordered to Maynardsville to observe the crossings of the Clinch river from its mouth to the crossing of the Knoxville road. General Barton was directed to leave a small cavalry force at Clinton and to see that the boat was kept on the south side of the river under guard so that it could be destroyed in case of necessity. (122) The 52nd Georgia regiment was also ordered to Tazewell. General Leadbetter was informed by General Smith of the change in the disposal of troops due to the advance from Kentucky. This left but two regiments at Chattanooga but General Leadbetter was told he could expect no assistance unless the commanding General were successful in Powell's Valley. (123)

On the 12th of June, General Smith asked instructions from Richmond as to the line of his retreat, should retreat become a
necessity, -- whether he should move towards Georgia or Virginia. President Davis decided on the Georgia line because of the vast amount of stores in Georgia. On the 13th Col Allston was ordered to watch the movements around Big Creek Gap and towards Clinton. To him fell the task of preventing a crossing of the Clinch and of protecting Knoxville from any advance until the operations in the Powell Valley would release troops to re-enforce him. General Stevenson was holding the enemy in check in front of Wilson's Gap.

While this movement of troops was taking place, General Mitchell again attacked Chattanooga and on June 14th when this word was received came news also of Morgan's retirement ot Kentucky. General Smith decided on the evacuation of Cumberland Gap. General Stevenson was ordered to remove all of his best guns, to render the others useless and to destroy his camp equipage. He was to remove all his ordnance. General Barton was to cover the retreat and Col. Allston was ordered to report to General Stevenson to assist in this. General Smith himself went to Chattanooga. (124)

Following instructions, General Stevenson retired to Tazewell and General Barton to Bean's Station. On the 19th, General Stevenson was ordered to prepare to make a stand at Clinch Mountain and Bean Station, throwing his cavalry back on scouting expeditions to Powell's Valley and the Gap. General Barton was sent to Knoxville. (125) There they awaited an attack but as General Buell had forbidden any forward movement on a large scale, no such movement was made.

The reasons for the evacuation of Cumberland Gap were best stated in a letter to the Inspector General at Richmond from General Smith. He said: "General Buell seems to be directing the movement against this department. Since the withdrawal of the army from Corinth they have been largely re-enforced, and the enemy in overwhelming numbers are systematically moving to the occupation of East Tennessee. I can no longer, with my small force (5,000) mobilized, defend the line from Cumberland Gap to Chattanooga; to prevent the sepa-
ration of my force one point or the other must be given up. During
the withdrawal of the troops in Powell's Valley to the relief of Chat-
tanooga the enemy removed the obstructions from the roads leading over
the Cumberland Mountains, and also obstructed and fortified the road
to Cumberland Gap from Kentucky. These facts make that point compara-
tively unimportant, and I have ordered its evacuation, concentration
towards Chattanooga for the defense of that line. Anticipating this
movement the stores have already been almost entirely removed from the
department.

General Stevenson, supported by Barton, will conduct
the movement, while, with Reynolds' and Taylor's brigades (3500), I
proceed to the relief of Chattanooga. Stevenson, if not too hotly
pressed, will, with his command in hand, hold the line of the railroad
in the hope of co-operation from Beauregard. This I hope will soon
be received, for the line into Georgia by Chattanooga has always been
a favorite plan of invasion, and, with the defenseless condition of
Georgia and Halleck's facility for transporting his army, may be made
the most dangerous move in their campaign. I have striven for an op-
portunity to strike a blow; the enemy have invariably retired at my
approach and with every advantage would give me no opportunity. My
command has been almost broken down by constantly moving from one end
to the other of the line. Communicating by telegraph and acting in
concert from behind natural defenses of great strength they have
foiled every effort made by me." (126)

As this thesis is about Kentucky and not Tennessee,
no account of the brief incursions into Tennessee from Cumberland Gap
will be made. Kirby Smith placed his forces to defend the railroad
but General Morgan made no effort except to send out small foraging
parties or small groups to destroy a railroad bridge, etc.

Col. John Morgan, Confederate cavalry leader started
for Kentucky from Knoxville on the 4th of July, 1862, with 900 men.
His troops included his own regiment, and a regiment of Georgian partisan rangers, with a Texas squadron and 2 companies of Tennessee cavalry. His route lay through Tompkinsville, Glasgow, Lebanon, then on to Harrodsburg, Lawrenceburg, Versailles, Georgetown, Paris and Winchester to Richmond. On the way he met no organized troops to resist him. General Jerre T. Boyle, who had been appointed military commander of the State on May 27th, 1862, was mainly trying to organize forces to resist Morgan at Lexington and Frankfort. The whole population and the few military officers in the state had been thrown into a state of panic by the news of Morgan's raid. Consternation and confusion reigned. General George Morgan refused to come out of Cumberland Gap as he feared that this cavalry attack was merely a diversion for General Kirby Smith, whose forces in East Tennessee, largely re-enforced, always threatened the Gap.

By the time Morgan reached Richmond—about July 20th, General Boyle's efforts were bearing fruit and General Green Clay Smith, with Cola. Wolford, Metcalfe and Wynkoop, were endeavouring to surround him. Learning of this, General Morgan, who had previously determined to make a stand there, decided to move on to Crab Orchard. There his telegrapher attached his portable battery to the telegraph leading from Stanford to Louisville and learned the exact position of his pursuers. He left Crab Orchard at 11 O'clock, reaching Somerset, 28 miles away at sunset. The telegraph was again used, and all General Boyle's previous orders to pursue him were countermanded. After a night's rest without molestation, he busied himself with destroying the vast amounts of governments stores which had been collected there by the Federal troops who found them in Zollicoffer's camp after the defeat and flight of the Confederate army at Mill Springs. They consisted of clothing, blankets, shoes, hats, and such things, in addition to the arms and ammunition. Colonel Morgan also destroyed 120 government wagons there and at Crab Orchard. From Somerset, Morgan made his way down through Monticello in Wayne county, passing out of
state into Tennessee, where he encamped at a place between Livingston and Sparta. (128)

By July 19th a force of 1800 was collected at Frankfort under Col. Maxwell and started towards Georgetown. Col. Wolford, with volunteer cavalry was ordered towards Richmond and Winchester to intercept Morgan and protect the supply trains to Cumberland Gap. On the morning of the 20th, General Green Clay Smith, with a force of 595 men, composed of 230 men of the 9th Pa. cavalry, 165 of the 18th Ky. infantry, 100 Cincinnati police and 100 Home Guards who had started with him from Lexington, and about 500 more under Col. Metcalfe (including part of his regiment, the 7th Ky. cavalry and some Home Guards), whom he had met 6 miles from Paris, arrived in Paris only to find that the Southerners had moved on. Being joined by Col. Maxwell, General Smith had ordered a forward movement when he received information that Morgan had been re-enforced and was returning to Paris. He therefore awaited attack for a day and night, sending Col. Metcalfe meanwhile on a reconnoitreing expedition. Finding that the report had been a false one, he left Col. Metcalfe at Paris and pushed on to Winchester, accompanied by Capt. Wadsworth and his Home Guards. At Richmond, he was further re-enforced by 5 companies of the 9th Pa. cavalry and some of Col. Metcalfe's men as well as an additional company of Home Guards.

Col. Maxwell was left in charge of the infantry at this point while the cavalry pushed on. Learning that Morgan had burned the bridge over Dick's River on the Crab Orchard road, General Smith took the Lancaster and Stanford route. Within 12 or 13 miles of Somerset word was received that Morgan had passed out of the state and General Smith retraced his steps to Stanford.

General Smith explains his failure to catch the Confederates as follows: "On the entire trip I am forced to say that I never received a word of intelligence as to the movement or whereabouts of the enemy save through the scouts I sent out from my command and from intelligence received at and near Paris. It was my conviction that Morgan intended to attack Lexington, believing the
troops had all been withdrawn and in pursuit of him. I was therefore anxious and particular to protect the city and the Government stores deposited there; hence I kept the woods watched until I ascertained the line of Morgan's retreat was through Richmond. I could receive no communication from a force anywhere in front of me until after I left Richmond and almost reached Lancaster, then I ascertained that Colonel Wolford, with 300 or 400 Home Guards, was somewhere in Pulaski. I immediately dispatched him to fall in front of Morgan and impede him as much as possible. I do not know that the messenger reached him; but after I got into Pulaski I sent another messenger to him and learned for the first time his troops had been disbanded, with no prospect of using them under three or four days; hence I abandoned the pursuit and returned under orders to this point." (129)

In regard to Col. Wolford, Morgan's famous telegrapher, George A. Elsworth said that Col. Wolford had telegraphed General Boyle that his force was green and insufficient to attack Col. Morgan. (130)

While the Confederate Morgan was invading Kentucky, the Federal Morgan at Cumberland Gap was carrying on at Cumberland Gap, strengthen his fortifications, sending out small foraging parties, and begging for re-enforcements so that he could advance. On the 14th of July, he appealed to Secretary of War Stanton, saying that on May 11th he had requested that two regiments of cavalry should be stationed along the line of the railroad between Louisville and Nashville and a similar force along the line of supplies from Lexington to Cumberland Gap. He called attention to the fact that had this been done the Confederate Morgan's first raid could not have taken place. He anticipated that Morgan would try to cut off his supplies for a few days, while General Kirby Smith attacked him in front. But no such attack materialized. In this letter he added, "Holding this Gap amounts to nothing if we simply remain here to eat rations." (131) On the same day he wired Col. Fry that he realized his line of communication was in danger but that he was powerless as he had no cavalry, -- or scarcely enough for picket duty. (132)
On July 15th, Lt. Craighill of the Engineers arrived at the Gap to prepare temporary fortifications. He said in regard to it, "The importance of the position in a political and military point of view cannot be overestimated." (133)

General Buell replied to Morgan's telegram of the 14th as follows: "It is hoped and expected that you will be able at least to convoy your trains and you should try and strengthen your position sufficiently to spare some troops to guard your line." (134) This was not too encouraging for General Morgan, who replied that he had a force of 1200 men away from the post who, on their return would be stationed at Crab Orchard, London and Barbourville. He explained his past failure to guard the line as follows: "Two reasons have prevented me from sending infantry to protect my line of supplies. The line is 150 miles in length and the roads, even at this season, so wretched as to render small trains absolutely necessary; hence it is impossible to furnish a sufficient number of infantry escorts to protect them, and I believe that infantry stationed at intermediate points cannot protect a long line against sudden forays of partisan troops who will operate by interior by-roads. But my main reason was that I regarded Morgan's incursion as a probable diversion in favor of Smith whose line is on the Clinch and whose force is considerably stronger than mine." (135)

It may have been only a coincidence that on the same day that this letter was sent, General Morgan tendered his final resignation and requested to be immediately relieved, because of the serious illness of his wife. (136) A few days later, however, General Buell wrote him that his services in his present position were so essential to the cause that he could not consent to his withdrawal. (137)

Further orders sent to General Morgan on the 19th of July directed him to construct, as soon as practicable, a strong work for the defense of the Gap, which could be held by 1 regiment of infantry with artillery, to supply the garrison for a siege of at least 20 days; and to hold himself in readiness to take the offensive, the
while keeping himself informed of the Confederates' position. (133)

To this Morgan answered that the Gap could no more be held by one regiment than by 1 man; that he had been trying to collect supplies but is very short as Wolford had seized one of his trains, (doubtless for his volunteer cavalry organized to pursue the Confederate Morgan.) (139)

The next day, July 24th, Lieutenant Craighill made a report to General Buell in regard to the fortifications at the Gap, telling him that the defensive system of fortifications would have to be of considerable extent as at least 6 or 8 points must be occupied, the most distant being not less than 20 or 3 miles horizontally and the greater difference of the line between any two of the points being 1200 or 1300 feet. (140)

Late in July General Buell learned that most of the troops in East Tennessee were to be concentrated at Chattanooga and he immediately wrote Morgan in regard to an advance, suggesting Knoxville and inquiring when Morgan could move and how he could cooperate with him. (141) Morgan named the 20th of August because by that time the fortifications at the Gap would be completed, which would render that position secure in case of defeat in the Knoxville expedition. He expected to receive from 600 to 8000 Tennessee recruits by the 15th and had agreed to send an escort for them. His supplies were short at they were cut off from Lexington for 10 days by the Confederate raid. (142)

While General Morgan was strengthening his position at the Gap and the rest of Kentucky was engaged in the panic of John Morgan's raid, events were transpiring in Tennessee which were to affect Kentucky in a very short time. On June 25th, President Davis wrote General Smith that General Hath had been ordered to Chattanooga for duty and that large re-enforcements had been sent to his department. (143) Two days later General McCown with his division of the Army of the West left Tupelo, Miss., for Chattanooga and General Bragg promised to move promptly on General Buell's rear, since Buell was reported on his way to attack Chattanooga, via Huntsville, Ala. (144) Additional Alabama regiments were ordered to East Tennessee and two battalions and one
company of cavalry. (145) General Smith sent Morgan into Kentucky and Forrest into Middle Tennessee while he continued to mobilize his command so they could move against General Morgan at the Gap, or against Middle Tennessee, in whichever place the need arose. (146)

By the 7th of July, he began to consider the possibility of an offensive move against Cumberland Gap and requested General Stevenson, in the Clinch valley, to secure information as to the possibility of sending a cavalry force into southeastern Kentucky to cut off provisions and ammunition while the attack in front was made. (147)

The troops were organized into two divisions, -- General Stevenson with 4 brigades of infantry and one of cavalry occupied the line of the Clinch River while General Seth with 3 brigades of infantry and General McDowell with 2 of infantry and 1 of cavalry held Chattanooga. There were about 10,000 effective men in each division. In his letter to President Davis setting forth this organization, written on July 14th, General Smith stated that in his opinion the Federal armies would undertake no further campaigns in the south for the summer, but would concentrate on securing East Tennessee, which territory would prove an excellent base for extensive operations in the south during the coming winter. (148)

Rumor that General Buell was concentrating at Bridgeport and that General Morgan (Federal) was moving on Knoxville from Cumberland Gap, caused General Bragg to hasten the movement of the Army of the Mississippi under General Hardee from Tupelo, Miss., to Chattanooga. The order to move was given July 13th. (149) About the same time, word having been received of Col. John Morgan's uninterrupted progress in Kentucky, General Stevenson was advised that in all probability the force at the Gap had been reduced and that it was a favorable time to push operations against the Gap or even to enter Kentucky. (150)

On July 24th, in a letter from General Smith to General Bragg the first suggestion of that invasion of Kentucky which came
to be referred to as "a brilliant blunder, a magnificent failure", was made. General Smith wrote, "Can you not leave a portion of your forces in observation in Mississippi, and shifting the main body to this department, take command in person? There is yet time for a brilliant summer campaign; you will have a good and secure base, abundant supplies, the Tennessee can be crossed at any point by the aid of steam and ferry boats, and the campaign opened with every prospect of regaining possession of Middle Tennessee and possibly Kentucky. I will not only co-operate with you, but will cheerfully place my command under you subject to your orders." This on July 24th. (151)

Learning that General Morgan had nearly a month's supplies at Cumberland Gap, General Smith realized that it would take too long a time to reduce that force and release him to co-operate with General Bragg. He therefore suggested to General Bragg that he be allowed to march directly to Lexington instead of investing the Gap for any length of time. To this General Bragg replied that he did not consider it wise for him to move too far into Kentucky, leaving Morgan in his rear until he, Bragg, had fully engaged Buell on the left. At this time, August 10th, no decision had been reached as to whether Bragg would advance to Nashville or Lexington, although he expressed a preference for the move towards Lexington. (152) Plans were also made for the advance of General Humphrey Marshall via Pound Gap into Kentucky to take place simultaneously with that of General Kirby Smith. The two officers held a personal conference at Knoxville early in August. (153)

By the 11th of August, General Smith's plans were perfected and communicated to Richmond. One phrase of that report seemed significant: "My advance is made in the hope of permanently occupying Kentucky." These plans were successfully carried through. (154)

This campaign into Kentucky had a three-fold object:
1st. To secure supplies, -- to draw upon the rich and fertile Bluegrass for the stores so needed by the Confederacy;
2nd: To secure volunteers for the army and then to enforce conscription in the state.

3rd: To hold Kentucky for the Confederacy and carry the boundary line to the Ohio River. (155)

Once again troops began marching through the mountains to make their way through southeastern Kentucky towards the Bluegrass. This time there was no force sufficient to detain them in the barren district of the Kentucky mountains. General Smith left Knoxville on the night of August 12th, crossing the mountains by Roger’s Gap with 4 brigades of infantry, 6000 strong, and proceeded to Barboursville, arriving on the 18th. General Morgan’s force at that place had been called in the night before. (156) Meanwhile another column, commanded by General Heth, moved from Clinton through Big Creek Gap with 2 brigades of infantry, the artillery and subsistence tains, but did not arrive until the morning of the 22nd, due to the almost impassable roads. On first learning that an advance against him was in progress, General Morgan assured General Buell that he believed his command could hold any force likely to be brought against it. The morning of the 15th, General Morgan sent Capt. Martin via cavalry, Cumberland Ford to observe Roger’s and Big Creek Gaps. On the 17th Capt. Martin was attacked within 16 miles of Roger’s Gap by Col. Ashby’s cavalry, 800 strong, and 50 of his men were reported missing. (157) Meanwhile, Col. John Scott with 900 cavalry (First Louisiana), and a battery of mountain howitzers, went up sent up from Kingston, Tenn., Monticello and Somerset to London, Ky. Col. Houk at London, had 180 men from the garrison at Cumberland Gap. They were able to offer some resistance to the advance of the Confederate cavalry, but after skirmishing for an hour, were forced to retire. After 5 days of privation and dangers, they reached Cumberland Gap. Col. Scott captured 75 prisoners, killed and wounded about 50 and secured 40 or 50 wagons, 175 mules, some camp equipage and about 50 guns with some ammunition. (158) During the night of the 16th, also, General Stevenson moved up in front of the Gap on the Tennessee side and drove in the pickets. There was
some skirmishing with slight losses on both sides. The next morning the
guns from the pinnacle forts forced him to withdraw his artillery but
he remained in position. Major-General Mccown with two divisions occupied
Cumberland Ford shortly after the establishment of headquarters for Gen.
Smith at Barbourville, so General Morgan found himself completely sur-
rounded by the Southerners.

Unable to obtain supplies in the territory he occupied, and realizing that it was impossible to bring them over the mountains
from East Tennessee, while he at the same time feared the psychological
effect of a retrograde movement, General Smith determined to proceed
to Lexington and on the 27th of August started forward his advance guard
via Big Hill and Richmond. On the same day, General Bragg started from
Chattanooga, but his way lay through Middle Tennessee and not through
the mountains. As it is the mountain counties of Kentucky that concern
this paper, the movements of these two generals will not be followed but
attention will again be directed to General Morgan and his Federal gar-
rison, holding the Gap while surrounded by the Confederates.

When General Morgan telegraphed General Boyle at Louis-
villa of the advance of 20000 men into Kentucky, Boyle told Secretary
Stanton that it was physically impossible for the Confederates to have
that many men in the field. The report was soon confirmed however, and
on the 15th, General Morgan suggested to General Buell, either that he
make a conjunction with General Boyle's forces at London and fight, or
that he wait quietly until General Smith's army was starved out, -- for
he knew that General Smith could not obtain subsistence for longer than
3 weeks in the neighborhood of the Gap, while he could hold the Gap for
5 weeks with his present provisions. (153) General Morgan was con-
vinced that the Confederates planned to starve him out, or at least, to
try to do so, before they attempted an attack on the Gap. He suggested
on the 19th that a force of 8000 men be sent to attack Cumberland Ford,
while a similar force come up by Lambdin's, 21 miles southwest of Bar-
bourville and 12 miles East of Boston; such an advance, he felt confi-
dent, could take the two divisions at Cumberland Gap. (160) At the
same time General Morgan sent a similar message to General Halleck, saying the Confederates expected him to evacuate the post. "This", he adds, "I shall never do. It is for you to open the road. What you most want is cavalry and horse artillery, with a heavy column to follow after; but you must act at once, for our supplies are limited. In the mean time I will not be idle. If the enemy attacks, he will be crushed."

(151) On the 22nd, General Halleck wired him to "hold on firmly; you will soon be re-enforced." (152) About the same time General Boyle sent word to General Buell that he regarded Morgan's position as critical. (153)

To save the horses from starvation and in order to provide a guide for forces coming to his relief, on August 25th, General Morgan sent out Col. T. 2. Garrard with 8 companies of his own, the 3rd Kentucky Infantry (400 men), mounted, and Munday's First Battalion, Kentucky cavalry, (200 men). An encounter near Mcke, Ky., in which they were successful according to General Morgan, are the only record of this little expedition. (154) On the morning of the 31st, 275 more men were sent out to join Col. Garrard. By this time, too, the garrison had been on half rations for ten days, but had sufficient for 2 months beans and rice and were able to secure some cattle. The men were in good spirits and pledged themselves to hold the fort if attacked.

On the 28th, General Wright, the commanding General of the newly created Department of the Ohio, reported to General Halleck as follows: "The troops are being disposed there upon the line leading to Cumberland Gap and the one to Nashville with a view to operations along both. Till today, I conceived the first the most important; but an officer (Col. Garrard) just in from the Gap says Morgan has supplies for 60 days from the 20th. Buell's case therefore seems to demand the first attention and I shall increase the force on the Nashville line as fast as may be possible." (155) In reply Halleck said that the relief of General Morgan at the Gap was considered of first importance. (155)

On September 1st, the Confederate forces were withdrawn from Cumberland Ford, but after the battle of Richmond and defeat of the Union forces, the enemy still successfully cut off Morgan from
and re-enforcements. The road being clear for a short distance into Kentucky, Col. de Courcy's brigade was sent to Manchester, Clay county where General Morgan thought he could obtain supplies. On September 10th he also sent two expeditions to blockade the gaps in the mountains through which the Confederates had advanced, hoping thus to cut off their ammunition and line of communications. One detachment of 200 picked men from the 1st and 2nd Tennessee regiments went to Roger's Gap and a second squad of 400 from General Spears' brigade succeeded in blocking Big Creek Gap. The latter met a company of Kentucky cavalry on their way to join General Kirby Smith and succeeded in taking nearly 100 prisoners, besides killing 12. Small expeditions were also sent to Barbourville and London to capture any stragglers there. In all about 500 prisoners were taken and about 170 of the Confederates killed or wounded. On the 10th General Morgan also sent out an aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Medary, with a verbal message for General Wright that by eating the mules the garrison could hold out 60 days. The aide passed through Manchester and learning that the effort to secure flour had been unsuccessful, he informed General Wright that in his own opinion General Morgan could not possibly hold out longer than 20 or 30 days. (167)

When it became no longer possible to secure forage for on Sept. 12th, the mules, the quartermaster informed General Morgan and suggested that they be sent towards the Ohio river by way of Manchester. General Morgan decided against this for 2 reasons, -- he still hoped to use them for food, or if became necessary he wanted to have them to harness to the cannon so that might not fall into the Confederates' hands. The garrison was comparatively secure from attack, but if they held out two weeks longer, it would be impossible to remove the cannon. Under the circumstances, and as he had received no word from the outside since the battle of Richmond, the commanding officer felt it imperative that he hold a council of war and without expressing his own opinion, learn how his officers considered the predicament.

Accordingly on the 14th, a council composed of Brigadier-
Generals Spears, Baird and Carter, with Lt. Craighill, the engineer, as recorder, deliberated and unanimously agreed upon evacuation. General Carter delayed matters one day more waiting for some word of re-enforcements, but when none came, plans were formulated for immediate evacuation.

First, the mines and cliffs were mined to prevent the army of General Stevenson from following. Next the 4 30-pounders which had to be left were spiked and hurled over the mountain sides. On the 16th a large train was sent toward Manchester under Col. de Courcy of the 33rd Indiana and 2 companies of the 3rd Kentucky and the 9th Ohio battery. At dark on the 17th, the regular pickets were withdrawn and Lt.-Colonel Gallup, Provost Marshall for the post, with 200 picked men, assumed the task of covering the retreat. Late in the day Col. Gallup went to the enemy's lines with 3 letters, under a flag of truce. While he was engaging the officer in an hour's conversation, somebody set fire to a part of the quartermaster's establishment. It could, of course, be seen from the meeting place of the two officers and seemed almost like a warning to the Confederates of what was going on. Col. Gallup satisfied the officer by ascribing the smoke and flame to the burning of brush on the mountain side. About 10 P. M. came the upsetting news that a sentinel had deserted, supposedly to the enemy; by this time the hills were ablaze with flame; Capt. Patter commenced to explode the mines and the Confederates awoke to the situation. The Confederate pickets were advanced but were driven back by Col. Gallup. At midnight, Col. Carter commenced the descent, dangerous and slow,—had General Stevenson attacked in force he would probably have defeated the Unionists. Baird followed Carter, while Spears, whose brigade had been placed in battle formation on the north side of the Gap at the foot of the mountain to prevent any attack through Baptist Gap, now fell into line. The pickets were out till dawn when they burned the last of the stores.

The march did not stop until Flat Lick was reached.
miles from the post. From there the column advanced by 2 parallel roads along Goose and Stinking Creeks and arrived near Manchester the night of Sept. 19th. The next day was spent at Manchester. The retreating column was attacked in the rear by Confederate cavalry (General Stevenson's) who were repulsed by the 6th Tennessee. Meanwhile, Col. John H. Morgan, the Confederate cavalry leader was despatched to Booneville to head off the Federal Morgan, and General Humphrey Marshall at Mt. Sterling, was urged by General Smith to co-operate in cutting off this retreating force. The Federal General sent him commissary ahead to Booneville; followed by Generals Jarter and Baird, while the commands of Col. de Jourcy and General Spears went straight to Proctor.

The Confederate cavalry, under Morgan, were now in line with the Federal troops and they burned the steam mill at Proctor before his arrival, leaving however when they realized they were about to be surrounded. The march from Proctor to Hazel Green proved worse than anything yet encountered as water was scarce along the ridge, to be found only in holes down 30 or 100 feet among the cliffs. The North Fork Road had been entirely destroyed but was plentifully supplied with water, so again the command was divided, Spears and de Jourcy going by the ridge, while Baird and Jarter took the road. The Confederate Morgan, who had been attacking on the flank and rear, now passed in front and began blockading the narrow ridges and deep defiles of the well nigh impassable road.

From Hazel Green the Federalists advanced to West Liberty, expecting to meet General Humphrey Marshall there. On this march, the rear of de Jourcy's brigade was attacked by the Confederate cavalry and 100 head of cattle were dispersed. Morgan's cavalry dismounted and fought as infantrymen. 6 or 8 were reported killed and wounded. A two days' halt was made at West Liberty awaiting attack from General Marshall's forces. But by this time, General Morgan had cut his line and was between his forces. Part of his force came from Virginia to within 15 miles of West Liberty but learning that Morgan was there, retreated.

Col. Morgan had so obstructed the road to Grayson
with heavy timber, that once the entire force was obliged to detour and make a new road. The Union troops endeavoured to act on the defensive, attacking the cavalry of the Southerners while the men were engaged in blocking the road. The Federalists pushed Col. Morgan so hard that "on three successive nights he was forced to move on" leaving his hot supper to the advancing troops of the other Morgan. On October 1st, the retreating garrison arrived at Grayson and there their pursuit by the Confederate cavalry ceased. The Federal loss was 80 men in killed, wounded and prisoners. On October 3rd, the entire force reached Green-ups burg on the Ohio River. (188)

The troops under General Morgan, it seems to the writer, suffered more than any other forces in the Kentucky mountains, and received less glory for their achievements. Their attack upon Cumberland Gap in June had involved incredible hardship and represented the use of strategy to a high degree. No less skillful was this passage of over 6000 troops through a destitute country, undertaken in the face of and this retreat, directly towards a victorious army. That it should have been the subject of a Board of Inquiry seems incredible. Yet such was the case. The evidence seemed to clear General Morgan of all blame, though General Halleck's acquittal seemed very ungracious, probably because he was somewhat responsible for the failure to send re-enforcements which rendered retreat a necessity.

On October 3rd, General Morgan's army had reached its goal on the Ohio River and the mountains were free from his men. Five days later the battle of Perryville was fought and the counties of southeastern Kentucky became the theatre of another retreat, -- that of Generals Bragg and Kirby Smith to East Tennessee via Cumberland Gap.

From London, General Smith's army passed up through Big Hill and Richmond; there a battle took place most disastrous to the Northern arms. From thence he proceeded to Lexington where he established headquarters to await the arrival of General Bragg. With the subsequent events, -- the arrival of Bragg, Buell's return to Kentucky, the inauguration of the Provisional Governor at Frankfort, -- this
this paper is not concerned. On October 8th the 2 armies met at Perryville and a battle involving heavy losses was fought. The Confederates, faced by a larger army, were forced to turn their faces southward and on October 10th began to retreat. They were pursued as far as London by a part of General Buell's army.

From Perryville, the forces of both General Bragg and General Smith were moved to Bryantsville and then to Lancaster. At Lancaster they separated, the Army of Kentucky under General Smith retiring via Big Hill to London, while General Bragg's forces took the more direct route through Lancaster, Grab Orchard and Mt. Vernon to London.

On the night of the 13th, General Buell sent General Woods' division, (6th), the remainder of General Crittenden's corps, (2nd), and General McCook's corps, (1st), on the Stanford road, while General Gilbert's, (3rd), marched on the Lancaster road. At Grab Orchard, General McCook's and General Gilbert's corps were halted, while General Crittenden, with General W. S. Smith's division (2nd) as the advance guard, continued the pursuit to London, both on the direct road and the branch road to Manchester. (69)

General Joe Wheeler had been put in command of all the Confederate cavalry with orders to cover the retreat of both wings of the army. On the 13th, General Wheeler, after leaving small forces to guard the fords on Dick's River and the Bryantsville road, crossed over to the roads leading from Danville to Lancaster and Stanford. His own command was placed on the Lancaster road and Col. Wharton's (8th Texas), on the Stanford road. The Federal troops were pressing forward but when the cavalry would dismount and get their artillery in place, the pursuing infantry were ordered to deploy their lines for battle and hence they proceeded with their march very slowly. Wheeler's command arrived at Lancaster of the afternoon of the 15th and after a fight prevented the Federals from approaching nearer than to within 2 or 3 miles of the town. Learning that Col. Wharton was hard pressed near Stanford, General Wheeler left Col. Morgan and Col. Ashby (who had joined him at Lancaster), to protect the road from Lancaster to Big Hill while he left at 10 P. M. to
to the assistance of Col. Wharton. General Wheeler arrived at his position near Stanford early on the morning of the 15th (?) and allowed Col. Wharton to fall back towards the main army. Wheeler's brigade then engaged the enemy almost constantly, falling back slowly through Crab Orchard. The 19th Brigade continued in pursuit and pressed forward within two miles of Mount Vernon. The next morning this brigade formed the advance of Smith's division of the 2nd army corps. On passing 2 miles beyond Mount Vernon, the Confederates were found drawn up for battle. The 6th Kentucky went forward as skirmishers. Going forward another 4 miles, the cavalry were found dismounted and acting as infantry and artillery. A company of the 2nd Indiana started the skirmish but were relieved by the 6th Kentucky who caused the Confederates to retire rapidly after a brisk fire of half an hour. The Federal loss was 1 killed and several wounded. The Confederates lost 11 killed and 2 wounded.

Within another 2 miles, the cavalry were found again dismounted being on the hill-sides opposite an open valley. The 9th Indiana were the engagement skirmishers this time, during which several of the Confederates were killed and wounded and a number, including a captain, were made prisoners. The rest of the day was one continuous skirmish and from Mount Vernon on the cavalry pursued its policy of blocking the road with fallen timber. The Confederates arrived that at Big Rockcastle Creek, having 30 or 40 prisoners with them.

On the 17th, the march was continued to Camp Wildcat, skirmishing taking place between the two forces continually and the Confederates keeping up their practice of cutting down trees to obstruct the road. General W. J. Smith, whose division, the 6th, led the advance on this day, lamented the fact that he had no cavalry to stop this. Meanwhile, General Cruft had a sharp skirmish on the Madison road with part of General Kirby Smith's forces, advancing towards Goose Creek, in Clay county. 11 of the Confederates were taken prisoners and several were wounded. They were in the act of driving off a lot of mules and 20 cattle.

On the 18th, the 41st Ohio and the 9th Indiana of the
19th brigade, advanced a few miles in front of Camp Wildcat and had a sharp skirmish with the cavalry of the Confederates in which the latter lost several men and officers. The next day, the brigade having been ordered to Pitman's Cross Roads, the 41st Ohio was deployed as skirmishers. The roads were all blocked with heavy timber. Within 5 miles of Pitman's, they came upon the Confederates, but as these were engaged in felling trees to block the road, it was only by the most strenuous effort of the pioneer company that they were enabled to come up with the Southerners about sundown, ½ mile from Pitman's. There was a sharp skirmish during which 1 man was wounded on the Union side. Both sides then lined up in battle array, but about 10 P. M., the Confederates, not having been attacked as they expected, took up their march again. The next morning a small detachment of the Union troops was sent through London. They brought 25 prisoners. The Confederate cavalry was reported 6 miles beyond. The brigade then marched to Camp Wildcat according to instructions, arriving on the 22nd.

Reconnaissances were also made from Camp Wildcat along the Roundstone Creek on the Madison Road and to the Paint Lick bridge but only a few stragglers were found. On October 14th, Col. John Scott, a brigade commander in the Confederate cavalry, wrote to General Joe Wheeler, Chief of Cavalry, asking permission to take his command out via Somerset. He was then on the road leading from Crab Orchard to Stanford, 2 miles from the former place. He claimed to have permission for this independent move from General Bragg, and stated it was necessary because of the jaded condition of his horses, — he had been in front of General Kirby Smith's army since it entered Kentucky in August. The next day, General Bragg's Chief of Staff wrote General Wheeler that Col. Scott had been arrested for disobedience of orders and his command turned over to the next in rank. Col. Chorton had been ordered to send after the brigade and bring them back to aid General Wheeler. This apparently was not done and the next report of them comes in connection with their passage through Kentucky from Somerset to Jamestown, Tenn. On the 17th, Col. Howard reported that
he had been skirmishing for three days and nights with Col. Wofford's cavalry. This cavalry of the Federals had started out accompanying the 19th brigade in its pursuit from Danville on the Lancaster road. In the skirmish on the 16th, the Confederates lost 2 killed and 4 missing. They were engaged by 500 of Col. Wofford's men. Although the Unionists tried to cut him off, Col Howard succeeded in getting all of weapons to Jamestown, having passed over the mountains at Mountain Gap. (170)

General Bragg's army and then General Smith's passed out via Barbourville, Flat Lick and Cumberland Gap, the cavalry sustained by two infantry brigades, first from General Bragg's and then from General Smith's commands, protecting their rear. No enemy was encountered but the bad roads and limited supplies rendered the task an arduous one. General Smith wrote to General Bragg from Cumberland Gap on October 22nd, "The head of my command has just arrived here. My men have suffered on this march everything but actual starvation. There must be not less than 10,000 of them scattered through the country trying to find something upon which to live. Of the provisions left for me at Cumberland Ford all were taken by General Cheatham's command excepting 40 barrels, and all along my route reports reach me of the provisions left for my men being seized by the Army of the Mississippi. Unless some provision is made for me ahead the remaining 6000 men now left in the ranks will also have to scatter through the country to pick up something to eat." (171)

General Buell explains the failure of his troops to continue the pursuit beyond London as follows: "It was not expedient to continue the pursuit beyond London, partly because it was impracticable in a manner to afford any material advantage; partly because, without advantage, it took the troops out of the way when they were likely to be required elsewhere. They were therefore promptly turned upon other routes toward Tennessee." (172)

Thus ended the famous invasion of Kentucky. The Confederates did not realize their hopes of holding the State, but they
did secure some supplies and recruits. Both Bragg and Buell were severely censored for their conduct of their campaigns. This movement into Kentucky seems to me to have been so daring an undertaking that it resembles a magnificent gesture in a lost cause. Whatever its aspects from a military point of view, it contains a romantic appeal that will always win sympathy for its gallant leaders.

The mountains of Kentucky suffered no more from invasions through Cumberland Gap, though that fortress remained in the hands of the Confederates for about a year, when it was again taken by the Federals in Burnside’s East Tennessee campaign. (173)
Operations in Eastern Kentucky.

The operations in Eastern Kentucky have been considered separately as they were separate campaigns, except for the co-operation during Bragg's invasion. They affected operations in the southeastern part of the State, however, as we shall see.

When General Thomas superseded General Nelson as commander of Camp Dick Robinson, Sept. 10th, 1861, the Kentuckian was sent to Maysville, Kentucky, to recruit Union troops among the neighbors of his boyhood. These troops were soon to be used against a Confederate force which had been collecting in the eastern mountainous district of Kentucky since the early days of September. (174)

Two of the Confederate leaders with a large following were Humphrey Marshall and the Hon. John J. Breckenridge. They were early reported as recruiting troops for the Confederacy. General Marshall, who conducted the campaigns in Eastern Kentucky for the Confederates, was a character deserving of a biography by himself. Perhaps no man whose life was linked with the Kentucky mountains at this time was so picturesque. An enormously fat man, who had a habit of going to sleep standing up, he was little suited to the arduous campaigns in the mountains in the winter. His size and his wit presented Falstaffian aspects that were not over-looked by his contemporaries on both sides. Particularly Mr. Prentice of the Louisville Journal, poked fun at him in season and out. Having no small estimate of his own importance and ability, General Marshall sometimes presented difficulties to the President and Commanding General of the Confederate States. He was found one time by Col. William Preston, securely hidden in the mountain fastnesses. Col. Preston complained of the difficulty in locating him and asked if he had gone to such lengths to hid from the Yankees. General Marshall replied that he was not running away from the Yankees but from Major-Generals in the Confederate army. That presents very well his attitude during the war, expressed in long-drawn out letters to President Davis and General Lee. (175)

But to return to that fateful Fall of 1861 in Kentucky.
On September 16th, John Fisk, Speaker of the Senate in the Kentucky Legislature and Robert Buckner, Speaker of the House, wrote General Thomas at Camp Dick Robinson that on the following Saturday the State Guards from the neighboring counties would assemble in Lexington. Their purpose ostensibly, was to drill but it was feared they would make a demonstration and General Thomas was asked to send a regiment to protect the town and government stores there. General Anderson, to whom the request had also been presented, authorized the movement and Col. Bramlette with the 7th Kentucky and some of Col. Wolford's cavalry were sent to Lexington. (176) On the 22nd, Col. Bramlette wrote to General Thomas, "Breckinridge and others fled the night we reached here and in advance of our arrival, having been warned by a scamp by the name of Smith from Nicholasville. They are not far I learn today, from Mount Sterling, at a little place called Hazel Green and it is thought are concentrating forces in that vicinity." (177) An amusing but unverified story appeared in a letter to the Louisville Journal to the effect that Mr. Breckinridge made his way through the mountains disguised in a woman's skirts. (178) Col. Bramlette's appearance disconcerted the Confederates so that there was no further demonstration in Lexington.

His report referred to above, was made to General Thomas on the same day that Speaker Fisk wired the Hon. Robert Buckner that Humphrey Marshall was assembling a force at Drennan Springs in Henry County. (179) On the 23rd, Major E. L. Dudley (of the State Home Guards), received a despatch from Frankfort saying that Humphrey Marshall at the head of 1000 cavalry was in Owen county supposedly moving towards Frankfort. Marshall, finding himself forestalled, moved over towards Caney Creek, on the border between Owen and Scott counties. His intention seemed to be to make a dash for Hazel Green, where Breckinridge was encamped. Col. Bramlette was of the opinion that from Hazel Green they would go down through Breathitt, Perry, and Clay counties to join Gen. Zollicoffer at Cumberland Ford. It is evident that this force did make its way to Hazel Green though no official
record was found. (180) Breckinridge and Marshall made their way to Virginia and both entered the Confederate Army. General Marshall was assigned the command in Eastern Kentucky on November 1, 1861. (181)

The Confederate sympathizers collected at Hazel Green were in sufficient numbers to continue to attract attention. The camp for recruiting was moved to Prestonburg. On Oct. 7th, at the request of General Nelson, the 2nd Ohio regiment went to Olympian Springs 20 miles east of Mt. Sterling to keep out the small bands of recruits going to join the camp at Prestonburg. (182)

On October 8th, the very day he assumed command of the Department of the Cumberland, General Sherman wrote General Nelson to try to surprise the camp at Prestonburg, either by a sudden march or by chartering a steamboat and going up the Sandy. Because he was aware of the lack of arms and munitions, he did not order the expedition, but left it entirely with General Nelson. (183) On the 10th, Nelson received a letter from Col. Harris, 2nd Ohio, Col. Grigsby and Major Hurt (Kentucky Militia), saying the forces at Prestonburg were planning to move forward on the 12th and asking for reinforcements. Nelson, who applied to Sherman, was referred to Thomas at Camp Dick Robinson. The 33rd Ohio and the 21st Ohio were sent to him.

When General Nelson reached Olympian Springs he ordered Col. Grigsby's militia and the 2nd Ohio to move to McCormick's Gap, at the point where Menifee, Powell and Wolfe counties meet. Col. Harris was ordered to move at daylight and the State troops at 8 o'clock. The militia refused to move forward and all but 120 broke up, turned in their arms and marched home. This left Col. Harris unsupported. Nelson wrote that there were 3 important gaps in the mountains, -- McCormick's, Betty's Gap and Youum, the Confederates at this time controlling the latter two. If they got McCormick's also, they would be able to come down to the Bluegrass whenever they chose. If Nelson held it, he could flank the other two and move to Prestonburg. (184)

On the 22nd, the 2nd Ohio, 1 section of Konkle's light battery and 1 company of cavalry advanced on West Liberty from McCorm-
mick's Gap. The Confederates, several hundred, strong, under Capt. Jack May, resisted, but they were easily driven out of the town and Col. Harris was in control by 8.30, having reached the town at day break. (185)

That night, Major Robinson of the 33rd Ohio marched on Hazel Green with two companies and arriving at 4 A.M., surprised the town and captured some of the best-known Southern sympathizers. The next day, Nelson with the rest of the 33rd Ohio and the 21st Ohio, 4 guns and a wagon train moved up. Being thus in possession of the two roads leading to Prestonburg, he moved forward as rapidly as possible.

On November 5th, Nelson occupied Prestonburg, which Col. Williams (of Mexican War fame), was forced to abandon since he had only 2 rounds of ammunition and his troops were in an unorganized condition, for the most part unarmed. Col. Williams retired to Piketon to meet his ammunition and Nelson followed fairly closely.

On the 7th, Col. Sill, with his own regiment, the 33rd Ohio, a company of each of the 2nd, 33rd and 59th, under Major Hurt, 2 Kentucky companies and 142 mounted men (from the wagon teams) under Col. Metcalfe, and 36 gentleman volunteers, probably the last of the Knight Errants, under Col. Apperson, accompanied by a section of artillery started up John's Creek to approach Piketon from the east and cut off the Confederates or "turn them". At daybreak the following day, Nelson himself marched on the State road direct to Piketon, 28 miles, -- in command of the 2nd, 21st, and 59th Ohio regiments, a battalion of Kentucky volunteers under Col Chas. A. Marshall and 2 sections of artillery.

The Confederates had Captains Thomas and Clay with cavalry as outposts on the river road. They met the advance guard of Nelson's column about 15 miles from Piketon and were fired on but not pursued as Nelson had no cavalry. On their return to headquarters, they were again sent out with 2 companies of infantry and 20 mounted men. This force were stationed near Ivy Creek, where Capt. Thomas had already burned the bridge. They hid the horses in a mountain cave and
the entire force, 250 strong, took up a position one half mile in front of the burned bridge. General Nelson describes the situation very vividly, "The mountain is highest along the river and very precipitous and thickly covered with timber and undergrowth, and the road, which is but 7 feet wide, is cut along the side of it about 25 feet above the river, which is close under the road. The ridge descends in a rapid curve and very sharp to the creek, or rather gorge, where it makes a complete elbow." The Confederates were scattered along the mountain side in ambush. They did not fire until Col. Marshall's men, the advance of the column, were right upon them around the curve. They then opened fire with shotguns and rifles, killing 4 and wounding 13 of Col. Marshall's men. At this, the Federal column wavered and fell back. The cannon were put in position in the road and the Kentucky troops ordered to charge but this was without effect. Meanwhile the 2nd and 21st Ohio regiments made their way up the mountain side, thus gradually forcing the Confederates back. Confederates on the hills across the river also annoyed Nelson's command. In an hour and 20 minutes, the Confederates had retreated, leaving a number of dead and wounded upon the field and 6 prisoners unwounded. General Nelson reported his loss as 6 killed and 24 wounded, saying that he had been told the Confederates left 32 dead on the field. Col. Williams reported his loss as 10 killed, 15 wounded and 40 missing, (of these, some returned to their homes and some made their way to Williams' camp at Pound Gap). Williams optimistically reported Nelson's loss at 300 killed with "the usual proportion of wounded". His men made a stand at the burnt bridge, but the Unionists didn't pursue. The Federal troops mivouacked 4 miles beyond Ivy Creek that night and the next day made their way very slowly towards Piketon. Their progress was slow because of the heavy rains, mud, fallen trees across the road, bridges burned by the Confederates, etc. The newspapers said that the Confederates overshot, being stationed along the very steep defiles, and that very few of their shots came anywhere near the Union troops.
The expedition down John's Creek was meanwhile advancing. On the night of the 8th, Col. Williams other reconnoitring party, under Capt. Holliday encountered the advance guard of the Union detachment and there was a slight skirmish which resulted on the Confederate side in 1 man wounded and 1 horse killed. Col. Williams reported that Capt. Holliday killed 8 of the Federal troops but Col. Sill made no mention of such loss. The next night another party of 150 under Capt. Shawn of the Confederacy, ran into 10 men under Col. Metcalfe and according to Col. Sill's report, the captain himself was wounded. The cavalry returned in haste to Piketon reporting that the enemy were advancing in full force up John's Creek. Col. Williams immediately began his retreat from Piketon. This occupied all of the 9th. As Col. Sill approached the town his advance was detained for an hour by a company of sharp shooters stationed near the ford. There was a skirmish, the Federal troops being deployed on the hillside flanking the road. The Confederates lost 1 man killed and 3 wounded, the Unionists, 1 man wounded. Meanwhile Col. Williams moved his rear guard of 400 and when the Ohio and Kentucky troops entered the town they found it entirely deserted by the soldiery.

It is an interesting commentary on human nature that Nelson, who had no cavalry reported that if he had only had cavalry he could have taken or slain the whole of his enemy, while Williams, with cavalry reported, "Infantry armed with rifles are the men for this country. Cavalry is almost useless except for picket duty."

At that the contest was hardly an equal one. General Nelson had about 2500 men while the utmost that Col. Williams could muster was 1100. Williams' men were poorly armed, badly clothed and totally undisciplined. Many of them were barefooted and as they marched through the cold November rain to Pound Gap their tracks were blood stained. Col. Williams retired to Pound Gap, just over the Virginia line there to await re-enforcements and the arrival of the commanding General before attempting another invasion of Kentucky. (186)

After the battle of Piketon, General Nelson's command
was withdrawn. Due to the lack of supplies and the lateness of the season for mountain warfare, it was felt that the enemy would not be able to operate in this district at this time. No definite order for this withdrawal was found but General Sherman wrote General Thomas on November 12th, "Nelson has succeeded in breaking up Williams' party and I will direct him to return as rapidly as possible towards Paris and Lexington. (187) And on December 23rd, General Buell wrote, "My orders, on the return of General Nelson, were for one regiment to remain at Prestonburg, and that at the time was supposed to be sufficient, and perhaps would have been if it had remained there; but it was withdrawn to Louisa by the State authorities, to be mustered in, and recently, on the appearance of the force at Prestonburg, retired to the mouth of the Sandy." (188)

General Humphrey Marshall assumed command of the forces at Pound Gap on November 28th. His command consisted of Williams' regiment, 800; Trigg’s 54th Va., 560 (stationed at a point 18 miles northwest of Jeffersonville, Va., to protect the salt works near Abingdon; Jeffress' battery, 60; Major Thompson's mounted battalion, 400 strong, raised by an order of Gen. Zollicoffer for 12 months' special service, -- to defend the mountain gaps in the counties of Lee, Scott and Wise, Va., and unwilling to leave their own state; Moore's battalion, 400, and Stuart's regiment, 600, had been ordered to him, but had not arrived.

On the 10th of December, Marshall had advanced to within 1 mile of Prestonburg with Williams' regiment, coming up through Whitesburg, Letcher county and on through Floyd county. Meanwhile the 54th Virginia had come up from Richlands, Va., via the Louisa Fork of the Sandy and by way of Piketon. The cavalry had been advanced as far as West Liberty to "inspire our friends and to prevent the enemy from stripping the country of its stock." Paintsville was occupied by the 22nd, with about 1100 men; the mounted battalion was at Licking Station, 15 miles west, covering the roads which led from the direction
of Lexington and Paris. (189)

The Virginia battalion (29th) joined the camp on December 30th, making a total of 2400 men. Headquarters had been established 8 miles west of Paintsville on the road to Prestonburg. The situation was a commanding one on a hill and some entrenchments had been thrown up. The cavalry had been called in and were encamped on Jennie’s Creek, while one company of Williams’ regiment occupied Whitsburg, Letcher county and one remained at Prestonburg.

Although General Marshall’s advance was uncontested, General Buell had been full awake to the situation and had made plans to resist him. On December 2nd, the 14th Ky. Volunteers at Oatlettsburg was ordered to Prestonburg, “with a view of giving security to the inhabitants in the region of the Big Sandy and of punishing marauding bands of the enemy who annoy that part of the state.” This move was stopped at Louisa since the Confederates had already occupied the town.

Special orders No. 35 were issued from General Buell’s Headquarters on December 17th, forming a brigade for duty in Eastern Kentucky, constituted as follows:

18th Brigade

Col. James A. Garfield, Commanding

42nd regiment Ohio: Col. Garfield

40th " " " Granor

14th " Ky.: " Moore

6th " " " Lindsey

Capt. McLaughlin’s squadron of Ohio cavalry and 3 squadrons of the First Kentucky cavalry (Col. Wolford’s), were attached to the brigade. The order stated that the brigade was organized to operate against the “rebel” forces threatening and indeed actually committing depredations in Kentucky, through the valley of the Big Sandy. Col. Garfield was commanded to “go first to Lexington and Paris and to place the 40th Ohio regiment in such position was will best give a moral sup-
port to the people in the counties on the route to Prestonburg and Pike-
ton and to oppose any further advance of the enemy on that route. He will
then proceed to the mouth of the Sandy, with the least possible delay,
and move the force in that vicinity up the river and drive the enemy back
or cut him off. Having done that, Piketon is probably the best place
to occupy to guard against further incursions."(190)

About the time that General Marshall arrived at Paints-
ville, Col. Garfield started to meet him, leaving Louisa, Ky., with 9
companies of the 42nd Ohio, 3 companies of the 14th Ky., and Major Mc-
Laughlin's squad of cavalry. They arrived and encamped at a place on
George's Creek, 13 miles from Paintsville on the evening of the 24th of
December. Their tents and supplies were carried on a flatboat as their
wagons had not arrived from Catlettsburg. About 29 wagons, almost
empty were forwarded to carry the supplies on from George's Creek, but
even the empty wagons could hardly get over the miserable roads.

From this camp, Col. Garfield dispatched a message to
Col. Cranor at Mt. Sterling, (the 40th Ohio had been placed here accord-
ing to the above order), telling him to march to Prestonburg via Hazel
Green and Burning Spring, sending a strong party of cavalry via West
Liberty and Licking Station to drive in the Confederate forces on that
route and to protect Col. Cranor's flank and to rejoin him before he
reached Prestonburg. From Prestonburg he was to move down the river and
hold himself in readiness to attack the enemy's position or cut off his
retreat. (191) This on December 28th.

Three days later the force moved up George's Creek 8 miles.
All of January 2nd and 3rd were required to move the wagon trains over
Brown's Hill to the headwaters of Tom's Creek, a distance of 3 miles.
It required a working party of 100 men besides. Scouting parties en-
countered and drove back 100 Confederate cavalry from Tom's Hill, 2½
miles on the way to Paintsville on the 4th and the next day drove in sev-
eral small scouting parties, killing 1 man. On the 6th, Col Garfield's
command moved to the mouth of Muddy Branch. and that night Marshall
moved 2 regiments of infantry and some artillery from their fortified
hill to the south bank of Paint Creek. The scouts reported to Marshall that the Unionists were advancing in force and upon receiving this news Marshall immediately broke camp, burning many of his wagons and all sorts of provisions, such as corn, oats, sugar, rice, etc. General Marshall had also intercepted Col. Garfield's letter to Col. Cranor, and he decided to leave his cavalry on guard at Paint Creek, while he advanced to the Prestonburg road leading to Saylersville and attacked Col. Cranor. The roads were in such condition that it took 2 days to reach the road leading from Saylersville to Prestonburg. The cavalry masked the retreat.

Colonel Bolles, of the 2nd Va. cavalry, had been ordered by General Cox, commanding the Department of the Kanawha, to co-operate with Garfield in view of the fact that bands of Confederates were coming in from the Virginia side of the Sandy, and he joined Garfield on the 6th at noon. Thus re-enforced with cavalry, the Federalists occupied Paintsville. The Virginia cavalry were immediately sent, 300 strong, to attack the Confederate cavalry on Jennie's Creek, while the infantry continued its march in the direction taken by the Confederate General. At 8 that night they entered the Confederate camp, which was four miles above Paintsville. The retreat had been so hasty that the campfires were still burning and there was every evidence of panic and disorder. Having reached his objective, Garfield started down Jennie's Creek to the relief of Col. Bolles. But before Garfield arrived, Col. Bolles' advance of 60 men had attacked 200 Confederate cavalry, killed 6, wounded several, and sent the rest scampering back among the hills. Col. Bolles lost 2 killed and 1 wounded. The Virginia cavalry now returned to its command, but 6 companies of Col. Wolford's cavalry under Lt.-Col. Letcher arrived, having met Col. Cranor on the road. Col. Cranor had construed Marshall's movement as an intended attack and not having sufficient force to fight him, had come down Paint Creek instead of going on to Prestonburg. 450 cavalry under Col. Letcher went down Jennie's Creek to attack any Confederate cavalry that might have been left there, while 1100 picked men went under Col. Garfield up the Big Sandy towards Prestonburg. 10 miles along the road, the Confederate
pickets fired and retreated. About 9 that night the Federalists had advanced to the mouth of Abbott's Creek, one mile from Prestonburg. The Confederates were in their camp, 3 miles up the creek, according to the information received by the Union commander. The next morning the northern troops went up Abbott's creek 1 mile, then crossed over to Middle Creek, which empties into the Big Sandy just opposite Prestonburg. Garfield thought that this manoeuvre would cut off the Confederate retreat from Abbott's Creek. He found, however, that the Southerners were encamped about 2\(\frac{1}{2}\) or 3 miles up the creek at its forks.

General Marshall's forces were disposed as follows:

The battery was placed in the gorge of the mouth of the Left Fork of Middle Creek. To the right on the ridges were Williams' regiment, Moore's regiment and part of the mounted battalion, dismounted; Triggs' regiment occupied the height covering the battery; 2 companies were held in reserve in the rear of the battery; while two companies were on the heights commanding the other side of the creek. (Thomas' and Clay's)

Col. Garfield's troops arrived on the scene about 10 in the morning but he drew them up on the side of a semicircular hill and made no move until 12 O'clock when he sent 20 mounted men dashing across the plain to draw the Confederates' fire and disclose their position. Two Kentucky companies were sent to pass along the same ridge occupied by Garfield's forces (where Capt. Thomas and Clay had their forces). One company of the 40th and one of the 42nd Ohio waded through the creek, with the water waist high, to attack the forces on the opposite ridge. From their position these last troops were the only ones that could be reached by the Confederate battery's guns. Soon the engagement along the ridge across from Garfield's position became sharp as the major portion of General Marshall's forces were there. Two companies of the 14th Kentucky were sent to re-enforce
Col. Garfield's right, at which the Confederates were withdrawn across the creek. 90 men were now sent to the left and after more fighting, about 2 o'clock, Col. Cranor was sent to re-enforce them with 150 men of the 40th and 42nd Ohio and the 22nd Kentucky. Meanwhile the Confederate cannon was moved to a point on the ridge near Col. Moore's regiment from which point it could fire upon Garfield's right and upon his reserves. 120 men from the 22nd and 14th Kentucky were sent across the creek almost opposite Garfield's position and stormed the ridges from the enemy's right flank thus preventing his attempt to outflank the Unionists. Thus the troops fighting the Confederates on their front and right, forced them back from the heights near the creek.

At 4.30, General Marshall ordered a retreat. As it was dark it was not safe to start any pursuit for fear the men would get confused in the darkness and fire at their own forces. Soon the sky was ablaze with the light of the Confederate stores being burned, as the troops retreated.

Col. Garfield reported, "Twenty-five of his (Confederate) dead were found on the field and 60 more were found next day thrown into a gorge. A field officer and 2 captains were found among the dead. Our loss was 1 killed and 20 wounded, 2 of whom have since died. We took 25 prisoners, among whom was a rebel captain. Not more than 300 of my force were actually engaged, and the enemy had not less than 3500 men."

On the same subject, General Marshall wrote, "I think our loss will amount to 11 killed and 15 wounded; not more. The loss of the enemy was very severe. I understand he will report 1 killed and 10 or 12 wounded; his usual practice. We suppose his loss to be over 250 killed and about 300 wounded. These are the estimates of the neighbors. We saw his dead borne in numbers from the field, and the embarkation of his wounded was attested by several, who place these estimates upon the number. The field itself bears unerring testimony to his severe loss. I can only say to you, general, that my troops acted firmly and enthusiastically during the whole fight; and, though the enemy num-
some 5000 to our 1500, they were certainly well whipped. If I had had brandy for my men, (some of whom had had nothing to eat for 30 hours) I should have renewed the action after night; but an enemy greater than the Lincolnites (starvation) summoned me to reach a point where we might obtain food for man and horse." General Marshall was most insinvant over the Union claim of a decisive victory, insisting that his was the victory. Colonel Garfield was satisfied, however, as he had succeeded in attaining his object, -- to dislodge the Confederate force in Eastern Kentucky. (132)

Some of the newspaper stories of this fight were very amusing. A great point was made of the fact that the Confederates had cannon while the Unionists did not, -- in fact General Buell had refused to send any to Garfield, telling him it would only be in the way. Garfield himself, comments on the fact that most of the Confederate shells failed to explode. By way of proof, however, a 6 pound cannon ball was sent to the editor of the "Frankfort Commonwealth". In a letter to the "Louisville Journal", one of the soldiers in the 22nd Kentucky wrote, "The rebels overshot all the time and their shells fell without exploding. Perhaps some Union man made them and filled them with saw-dust to pay for the trick played off at Washington." (194)

Quite characteristic of the mountaineers as they are presented in fiction is this account, "The editor of the "Mt. Sterling Whig has conversed with several young men who belonged to Marshall's rebel army but made their escape. They give a deplorable account of the sufferings of these troops. To use the language of one of them, he says,"The boys will fight the devil when they have whiskey, but when they have not got this, their condition makes them unhappy and miserable and there is not much fight in them then.'" (195)

Marshall pursued his course next day to Martin's Mill on Beaver Creek, 16 miles away, -- arriving there 3 days later. Here he remained and conceived a new line of action, which would give him the advantage of river transportation for supplies, (held by the Unionists during the campaign just finished), and which would force the
Unionists overland. This was the occupation of the line of the Kentucky River above the 3 forks of that stream. He was starting to place his troops on this line when he was ordered to fall back to Pound Gap on January 24th. By Feb. 2nd, he was at the Gap, with all of his force out of Kentucky except Col. Williams command which has received permission to occupy the Kentucky side of the mountains in Letcher, Harlan or Pike counties. On the 13th, Capt. Witcher was also ordered back into Kentucky to observe the enemy around Piketon.

Wolford's cavalry was moved to West Liberty on Jan. 31st, to act as scouts towards Whitesburg and Piketon and to suppress any uprising in Magoffin and the adjacent counties. The 14th Kentucky remained at Paintsville to guard the stores and the rest of the force removed to Piketon, except one squadron of cavalry which was waterbound at Prestonburg.

General Garfield, on hearing that General Marshall had ordered the militia of the Virginia counties adjoining Pound Gap to muster at the Gap, started out to attack that place before the militia could come up. He took with him 65 infantry under Col. Cranor, Majors Pardee and Cook and 100 cavalry under Major McLaughlin and started up the river. The detachment reached the foot of the Cumberland range on the night of the 15th. The force of mounted men raised for this special service under Major Thompson still held the Gap. They had built some defenses on the top of the mountain and had blockaded the road on the Kentucky side, according to custom, by felling heavy trees across it.

Very early the next day Major McLaughlin led his cavalry up the main road while the infantry were guided up a little used path about 1 miles to the left. Part of the infantry under Col. Cranor were sent around the foot of the mountain to attack from the rear, coming up the mountain on the Virginia side. This road, cutting off the retreat was missed. The other detachment of infantry under Col. Garfield was delayed beyond the time set by the heavy snows, so when Major McLaughlin made his attack in front, receiving no support, he was forced to fall
Please note that the original thesis lacked a page no. 80.
affected a surprise. When they were discovered the Confederates formed in line of battle but after about 6 rounds had been fired, retreated in some disorder. Major Thompson said the re-enforcing company got lost in the fog, and when they finally found themselves between two columns of the Union men, went down the mountain on the northern side and passed around the foot of the mountain to the Virginia side.

Receiving word at this time of Col. Cranor's attack upon the force left at the foot of the mountain on the Virginia side, Major Thompson, believing himself completely surrounded by a superior force, ordered a retreat by the afore-mentioned road, which the Federal troops had failed to guard. Major Thompson reported that he made a stand 4 miles away, but Col. Garfield reported that his force pursued the Confederates for 6 miles until they were all dispersed. They retreated to Abingdon.

As everything had been abandoned in the rapid flight of the Confederates, Col. Garfield burned the huts on the summit of the mountain and such stores as he could not immediately use for his men. No casualties were reported. (198)

General Marshall remained in Virginia and busied himself with raising the militia in the counties adjacent to Pound Gap and with writing letters and long reports. On March 26th all of the 18th Brigade was removed from Eastern Kentucky except the 40th Ohio and the 15th Kentucky with the 1st Squadron Ohio Cavalry. Col. Cranor was placed in command with orders to move to Prestonburg on April 9th. His orders particularly stressed the necessity for protection for the citizens of the valley. (199)

When General Kirby Smith planned to invade Kentucky in the summer of 1862, he met General Marshall at Knoxville and it was decided that while one entered the State from East Tennessee, the other would come in from Virginia. General Marshall was delayed by General Loring, however, who deemed this expedition of Marshall's part untimely and who desired the detain the Kentuckian's command to further his own plans of operation. The President intervened and Marshall was
free to take up his march. On the 19th of September, President Davis wired him that he had expected General Marshall to be en route to Kentucky before that time. (200) General Marshall took his old path through Pound Gap, Piketon, Prestonburg, across to Saylersville and on to Mount Sterling. General Kirby Smith ordered General Marshall on September 24th to pursue General George Morgan, making his way from Cumberland Gap to the Ohio River. (201) As stated above, General Morgan waited two days at West Liberty expecting an attack by General Marshall but there was no information was to why this attack was not made. General Marshall would have a hard time in this modern age when co-operation is the watchword, for he was certainly an individualist, — in warfare at any rate. He showed himself most unwilling to accept orders from anyone but the President, and his force was of little value, it seemed to me, in this concerted movement. After the battle of Perryville, General Marshall retired via Bryantsville, Harrodsburg and Camp Dick Robinson, then on through Richmond to Mt. Sterling. On October 15th, General Smith wrote General Bragg that he had given General Marshall to go to Pound Gap, via Richmond, as the route through Pound Gap was still open. (202)

His only pursuers were 381 men recruited for the 14th Kentucky cavalry, who had with them 1 piece of artillery, the property of the citizens of Maysville, Ky., — a volunteer crew of whom accompanied the troops. These left Maysville under Mr. Wadsworth Thursday, October 16th. On Friday night they reached Sharpsburg, near Mt. Sterling and learned that General Marshall was at Ticktown, 7 miles from Mt. Sterling on the Hazel Green road. On Saturday 17 of Marshall's men were captured at Mt. Sterling and Capt. Wadsworth immediately sent his mounted men(70) with some Home Guards and volunteers from the citizenry towards Ticktown. These captured 40 stragglers, but did not dare to attack Marshall, whose force numbered about 3000. The 22nd Michigan was ordered up to assist in the pursuit but was immediately recalled. Mr. Wadsworth in his report of Oct. 29th, 1862, said, "I went on to Mount Sterling again to endeavor to protect my district
with the 392 recruits, not in the service of the United States, against Humphrey Marshall's horsemen. Marshall, with his train and artillery, and such of his infantry as did not desert, has easily escaped, without any pursuit except such as I have detailed, through Prestonburg, and on his way to Abingdon, Virginia. I should say 1000 to 1200 of his men had deserted him. I captured 150 and 50 horses, besides muskets, pistols, etc. His horsemen remain behind in Kentucky to plunder and ruin the people. On Saturday I heard of 600 under Witcher and 400 under Camron in Morgan and Bath counties, and 150 in Powell, beyond Staunton, under Gay, Bradshaw, and other thugs, murdering, plundering and burning. (203)

Marshall, with such of his command as he could persuade to leave Kentucky, retired to Abingdon, Va. On November 5th, Col. John Dils, whose regiment, the 39th Kentucky, was in process of formation, went to Piketon. Some Confederates, (as far as I could learn these were a part of Marshall's men who remained in Kentucky), about 600 in number, had a camp at Coal Grove, which Col. Dils at once attacked. Although the force attempted to retreat at his approach, he captured 75 prisoners, 150 guns, some horses and mules and camp equipage. Some of the prisoners, who had been in the Confederate army refused parole, preferring to take the oath of allegiance to the United States or to join the Union army. Col. Dils was a fire-eater. He claimed that his men had captured more men and property than any force ever sent up the Big Sandy and added "We challenge investigation." (204)

His triumph, however, was short-lived; Col. Cranor was again appointed commander of the force in the Sandy Valley, but Col. Dils refused to recognize his authority because his (Dils) regiment was not yet mustered into the service of the United States. On Dec. 3, without the knowledge or consent of Col. Cranor, who had established the Headquarters of the District of Eastern Kentucky at Louisa, Col. Dils ordered some push-boats down the river, loaded with commissary and quartermaster supplies for his regiment. Four miles below Pres-
tonburg, 200 of the 39th, who were acting as escort for the boats, were attacked by about 800 Confederates, mostly mounted, under the command of Col. Clarkson, of the Virginia State Line Cavalry.

After a spirited skirmish in which the Confederates lost 2 men killed and 7 wounded while the 39th lost 2 killed and 25 prisoners, the Confederates captured the boats, whose stores their Colonel valued at $250,000.00. Col. Cumnor said that considerable of the stores taken were recaptured as the Confederates did not take the trouble to destroy them, but Col. Clarkson reported that they destroyed all that the men did not want as plunder. Col. Cumnor sent out several detachments to guard the stores and to recapture them after they were taken, but according to Col. Clarkson, the only encounter after the capture was with Col. Dills that same night on the road between Prestonburg and Piketon. The Virginia Cavalry occupied Piketon and then moved on over into their own state. (205)

General Marshall never achieved very much in his inroads in the Kentucky mountains. His idea, in operating that way, was originally to send cavalry dashing into the Bluegrass on raids such as those made famous by Morgan. His forces never really equipped by the Confederate government for this service, but at least he had the acumen to plan for it long before Morgan succeeded in doing it. Marshall himself felt that he had not received the support he had been led to believe he might have from the government and was somewhat vociferous concerning this. He was no disciplinarian and never organized well the troops at his disposal so perhaps the Confederate authorities were wise in not granting all of his requests. He did succeed, however, in keeping alive the enthusiasm for the Southern cause in the mountainous district of Eastern Kentucky.
Chapter II

Home Guards and Guerrillas.
Chapter II.
Home Guards and Guerrillas in the Mountains.

The information in regard to these two classes of fighters is so very meagre and scattered as regards the mountains that it is difficult to make any definite statements concerning them.

In the report of the Military Board of Kentucky, Sept. 3, 1861, in regard to the arms issued to State troops, it is reported that in the 4th Congressional District rifles and muskets have been issued to Home Guard companies in the following counties:

- Wayne 1 company of infantry 44
- Pulaski 2 companies of infantry 88
- Lincoln 1 company of infantry 44

Total 176

In the same district, arms were issued to State Guards only in Pulaski county where 1 company of infantry received 40 muskets and 6 swords.

In the Sixth Congressional District, muskets were issued at the rate of 44 to the one company organized in Knox county and at the same rate to the one company organized in Clay county. (207)

There were no references anywhere to Home Guard companies in Eastern Kentucky (mountains), in the year 1861.

On September 16th, 1861, General Anderson requested Mr. Samuel Gill, of the Military Board of Kentucky, to order the Home Guards to rendezvous at Lexington, Camp Dick Robinson and other convenient places in order that they might be used against the Confederates, but chiefly that their arms might not fall into the hands of the Southerners. (208) The Home Guards of Barbourville were the first to make a stand against the advancing army of General Zollicoffer, as stated above. On September 30th, another camp at Laurel Bridge in Knox county was also attacked and the forces routed. These forces consisted of the Home Guards under Col. Brown and part of Col. Wolford's cavalry. They retreated to Camp Wildcat, where they proved a source of annoyance to Col. Garrard, as the problem of feeding them loomed large and as they were undisciplined and destroyed the soldierly system in his camp. They numbered over 250, as Col. Garrard wrote General
Thomas that Col. Brown had succeeded in enlisting 250 of twelve months' men. These, I presume, were enlisted for service in their own localities.

That the Home Guards assisted the regular United States Volunteers in these early days in southeastern Kentucky, is shown by the fact that Col. Hoskins collected the Home Guards of Lincoln and Pulaski counties to aid him in his attack on the Confederate cavalry at Albany and Traversville, Tenn. (203) Again, on November 6th, General Schoepf reported from London, "The Home Guard report to have had a skirmish with the enemy's scouts yesterday, getting the advantage in several respects." (210)

When General Zollicoffer moved over on the Cumberland at Mill Springs, his cavalry had frequent skirmishes in 2 of which Home Guards were mentioned. As these parties generally fired at each other across the river, it seems probable that the Guards were not rendezvoused for this service. (211)

General George Morgan in his official report of the campaign against Cumberland Gap, March 28th to June 18th, 1861, makes no mention of any assistance from Home Guards. The "Louisville Journal" however, contained an interesting account of their part in the attack, which seemed worthy of notice. The account was in a letter to the "Cincinnati Commercial" from a correspondent at the Gap. He wrote, "There was one little episode in the transactions of the last few days that I wish to relate, for the purpose of doing justice to a brave people, as also to a somewhat malignant institution, the Home Guard. It seems that Capt. Ferry, Quartermaster at Flat Lick, telegraphed General Morgan on the 15th for permission to take the convalescent soldiers in the hospitals and the Home Guards in Harlan and adjacent counties, and make a diversion in his favor in front of the Gap, whilst the General moved on the rear. Permission was as readily granted as asked. No sooner did the brave and hardy mountaineers constituting the Home Guard of this section know that they would be permitted to go on the expedition than they commenced to as-
semble by scores. It reminded me very much of the stories I have read of Lexington, Concord and Bunker Hill. They left their plows in the furrows, their harvest fields, their shops, and came with gun in hand to perform what they could and avenge the wrongs which they had suffered. I have no doubt a Fourth Avenue exquisite, ay, even yourself, would have laughed could you have seen the Captain's army, for truly it was a motley affair, comprising 170 convalescent soldiers and 335 Home Guards. The latter were without coats in a great measure, had on the much despised 'butternut breeches' and were as nondescript an assembly as the eye of mortal man ever rested upon. But they would fight....... Capt. Ferry moved on the Gap as he was ordered, and encamped within 4½ miles of it, after running in the rebel pickets, with the intention of making a demonstration soon in the morning. During the night a messenger was sent to him informing him of the evacuation and occupation of the Gap by General Morgan. The men composing the 'Flat Lick army' were not a little disappointed at not having a shot at the enemy at all events, but it was willed otherwise."

When General Kirby Smith moved over into Kentucky in August, 1862, the Home Guards made numerous attacks upon his foraging parties and caused him considerable annoyance. (213)

In the Sandy Valley, the mountain counties did not organize Home Guard companies so early as they did in the counties bordering on the Tennessee border. When Col. Garfield was ready to leave the valley after his successful campaign against Humphrey Marshall, he addressed a letter to the State Legislature urging the formation of Home Guard companies in that district. He said, "There is now no organized force of the enemy in Eastern Kentucky, and if the Union men could be furnished with arms and the militia thoroughly reorganized the whole region could be easily protected in future. I believe there is no further danger of an invasion from beyond the borders of the State, but there will be for a long time hereafter constant danger to the citizens from small bands of reckless men, who have
no other object than to rob and plunder." (214) This letter was written on March 6th, and on March 17th, just before it adjourned, the Legislature, with its usual habit of following the line of least resistance, adopted resolutions asking the "commanding officer in Eastern Kentucky" to leave there a force sufficient to protect that part of the State. (215)

The people themselves seem to have had more initiative, for some companies of Home Guards were organized. On March 27th, the "Louisville Journal" published a letter telling of the capture of some prisoners by the Home Guards of Wolfe county. It contained the following, "The Home Guards of Wolfe county, having recently obtained some arms from the State, have been active in guarding the private passes which lead through the mountains southeast of Mt. Sterling, through which mountain passes the rebels from Kentucky have passed out to the South and returned to Kentucky at their pleasure, visiting Humphrey Marshall's camp in their travels. About a week ago one squad of these Guards took a couple of prisoners of Boone county, who had a large bag of letters taking out to Kentucky rebels and saddle bags stuffed as full as they could hold of gold lace to be used on rebel uniforms. One of the men had a pass from the War Department at Richmond. The next day another squad of the same Guard arrested 3 other prisoners...... All five of the prisoners were taken on Frozen Creek in the county of Breathitt....The Union men in Wolfe and Breathitt have had a hard time until recently when they procured some arms from the State and now they say that the rebels shall not pass through their region of the mountains. The public roads leading out of Kentucky have been abandoned by the rebels for some months as they were not safe in passing them. Their private ways seem now to be pretty well stopped." (216)

In August, the Home Guards of Pike and Floyd counties fought some bands of guerrillas. This will be discussed later. After the battle of Perryville, not only the valley of the Sandy but all the rest of the State was overrun with small bands of marauders. Then Col. Cranor was ordered again to the Sandy Valley, General Wright wrote,
Please note that the following one quarter size page was inserted between pages 88 and 89 in the original thesis.
About this same time, General Marshall reported that Capt. Caudill, who had been left with 9 companies of infantry in Letcher county at Whitesburg, had been constantly engaged with the Home Guards (numbering 600) and on the whole very successfully, though one party of 40 Home Guards had entered Whitesburg, killed several citizens and burned the house of all Capt. Caudill's relatives, in addition to taking his wife off as a prisoner. (20:2:409)
"From this regiment (39th Ky) and from the Home Guards of the various counties you will be able to draw much assistance. (217) This was on October 13th, 1862.

A month later Col. Hawkins, 5th Kentucky Regiment, J. S. A., wrote to Governor Hawes concerning affairs in Eastern Kentucky, urging that Confederate troops be organized for service in Kentucky to compete, so to speak, with the Home Guards, now that the regular Confederate army had been withdrawn. He gives the most comprehensive report I found concerning Home Guards, -- "John Dills, Jr., the leader against us in that country, has from 400 to 600 troops and Home Guards on the Sandy. If to this number the Home Guards of Pike, Floyd, Johnson, Lawrence, Carter, Rowan, Morgan, Wolf, Magoffin, Perry, Breathitt, and Letcher Counties be added, it will swell the number to more than a full regiment, armed and equipped. Their policy is to organize these mountain counties as speedily as possible against us. Taking advantage of our retreat from the State, they are trying to convince the people that we have given the State up. In this way they seduce many many into their Home Guard organizations. They threaten others that they shall abandon the State unless they join them and take up arms against the South. In this way they are fast subjugating the people, and, if permitted to pursue their policy undisturbed until spring, that whole country will be organized against us." (218)

Thus it would seem that many Home Guard organizations owed their existence to the presence in the State of armed bands of plunderers. Since almost all of the troops operating in the mountainous district were forced at one time or another and to a greater or less extent, to subsist off of the country, it is sometimes difficult to tell whether the reference is to organized bands, operating as partisan rangers under the military control more or less of the United States and the Confederacy, to regular troops led by law-abiding officers, or to those men bent upon plunder who took advantage of the civil strife to prey upon an unprotected population. It is a
recognized fact that the Confederate War Department sanctioned the organization of companies for guerrilla warfare, during the early stages of the war. These were afterwards referred to as "partisan troops". (213) General George Morgan organized one such company near Cumberland Gap for guerrilla service, under Clift, an East Tennessee leader. (220) That is the only reference to such an organization regularly connected with the Federal service, in regard to guerrillas.

The situation differed somewhat in the two districts, -- Eastern Kentucky and Southeastern Kentucky. In Eastern Kentucky the guerrillas at first were largely deserters from General Marshall's forces, or troops organized under him who refused to leave Kentucky and stayed in Kentucky with or without the consent of the commanding officer. These were Confederate sympathizers. The first guerrilla depredations in Southeastern Kentucky came from bands of troops organized in the border counties of Tennessee, called "independent companies" and recognizing no authority to speak of. Later, when the Confederates took the country, many of the Union men left their homes and lived in the mountains, retaliating upon the Confederate troops by guerrilla methods.

An editorial in the "Louisville Courier" for April 18th, 1862, presented the situation in Southeastern Kentucky very well. Mr. Prentice wrote: "Border Warfare: Since Zollicoffer made hisstand to Southeastern Kentucky and decimated the counties of Wayne, Clinton, Pulaski, etc., that portion of the state has been infested by bands of armed robbers who have roamed over the adjoining counties into Tennessee and occasionally made raids upon the southern tier of counties in our state. Then Zollicoffer was encamped at Mill Springs, these bands had possession of Clinton county and were assured in stealing stock of every description in large amounts, killing peaceable citizens suspected of loyalty and running off negroes. They were rebels not directly connected with the Confederate army, but in effect protected by it, as they were within its lines. A deputation of citizens waited on Zollicoffer and informed him of the acts committed, urged him to give them protection in their lives and prop-
erty. To these representations the rebel general replied that he had nothing to do with them, that they were not a part of his army and that therefore the citizens must look elsewhere for protection, this, too, after his proclamation that he had come into that part of the state for the purpose of protecting the people in their constitutional rights. After the rebel rout at Mill Springs some of the citizens of the border counties formed themselves into companies of Home Guards to defend themselves against the secession marauders who were still in the mountains across the state line, our troops having been withdrawn and the whole country left unprotected for some 70 or 80 miles along the State line. The result is that a border warfare has been kept up in which a number of men have been killed at their homes and in skirmishes. "We have heard it charged that our Home Guards under circumstances of great and peculiar aggravation have resorted to retaliatory measures, and made excursions into Tennessee seizing property and avenging the assassination of their neighbors. We shall not stop to inquire whether this is true or not for it is certain that no aggressions were committed by Kentuckians until Tennesseans under Polk and Colliroffer invaded our State." (21)

In the early days of the war, Champ Ferguson, Jim Chrisman and a man named Arthur, these last two citizens of Wayne and Knox county, respectively, were among the leaders of these bands, who rejoiced in such names as the "Bull Pups" or "Wild Cats".(23)

That the Union men did not hesitate to resort to the same measures is shown by a notice that Kirby Smith posted. This read,

Headquarters Conf. Forces.,
Army of East Tenn.,
August 20, 1862.

To the Citizens of Knox County and the Adjacent counties of Ky.,

"Finding that you have been deceived by the misrepresentations of our enemies and have been induced by them not only to leave your homes but also to resort to the cowardly practice of bushwhacking, I now promise you that if you return quietly to your homes
and lead orderly lives you will not be disturbed but will be protected in your rights.

If, on the contrary, you persist in firing upon my soldiers from the woods you will be hung when you are caught and your home and property will be destroyed." (224)

At the very end of the year 1862, Major John Mason Brown, 10th Ky. cavalry, wrote of the citizens of Knox and Whitley counties, "Their only defense against a pillaging and murdering foe is their rifles and an unconquerable love for their homes and their Government. I was implored by numbers of them to represent to headquarters that bushwhacking was with them an inexorable necessity in their present unassisted condition, which could and would cease with the presence of efficient aid." (225)

Toward the end of 1862, General Wright stated that Eastern Kentucky "has been since the commencement of the war the scene of almost constant guerrilla warfare and there is less in the way of subsistence for man or horse than is to be had in other and not more productive sections." (226)

After Col. Garfield had succeeded in dislodging Gen. Humphrey Marshall from Kentucky soil, he sent out two special expeditions against small predatory bands. As none of these encounters are noticed in the Confederate reports, it is to be presumed that these men were either deserters from the Confederate forces, or independent bands organized in the mountains. One detachment of 150 infantry were sent from Garfield's Headquarters at Paintsville to the quarters headquarxx of the Little Sandy where two companies of rebels, according to Garfield, were engaged in plundering. About the same time another detachment of 110 were sent to Piketon where they dispersed another marauding band and captured several leading Secessionists. This was in January, before Col. Garfield moved down to Piketon. Later, on March 5th, Capt. Garrard of the 22nd Kentucky infantry was sent down the road from Piketon to Found Gap as far as Elkhorn Creek, and then up the Creek to its mouth. Here a band of marauders under Capt. Menifee were robbing the people and acting as scouts for General Marshall." (227) No re-
port of the results of this expedition were given. Curiously enough, General Marshall himself complains of the action of Menifee in August, 1862, saying he will not have an independent company enter the territory before his command and terrify the people and destroy the property. His agitation may have been due to the fact that at this time Menifee was reported to be recruiting in Kentucky for General Floyd's command, and General Marshall regarded Kentucky as his own special field for obtaining accessions to the Confederate army. (228)

Colonel Marshall, of the 16th Kentucky infantry, makes the only reference found to "Union guerrillas" by that name, although undoubtedly this type of warfare was necessitated for them by the fact that they were run out of the towns for the most part. Col. Marshall wrote, "We have some 12 or 14 prisoners in the jail here. Among them is a search colonel by the name of Nollellan; also 2 lieutenants out of that celebrated band of desperadoes under Capt. Witcher. They were taken a few days ago by a party of Union guerrillas." (229) Captain Witcher was at that time, April 28, 1862, a member of General Marshall's brigade, yet he, Menifee and a Capt. Jenkins are often referred to as the ring-leaders.

A letter from the "Louisville Journal" for June 2nd, is typical of the reports of the depredations in the mountains from early in 1862 on to the end of the year: "A letter from Wolfe county seen by the editor of the Frankfort Commonwealth, gives the names of the person carried off by the robbers and murderers in that section. They were Samuel Hurst, his son William Hurst, John W. Hazelrigg and Joel W. Gordon from West Liberty. These are as respectable men as any in that county and their only offence is that they are Union men. They carried off with these men 15 others from Hazel Green and vicinity. They also broke into a store there and robbed it of its contents. They stole, moreover 18 horses from the neighborhood. This is bad enough but in addition they murdered James Barnett of Breathitt county, James Frisby of Morgan county and others whose names are not mentioned. The editor of the Commonwealth says he is a man whose statements may be relied upon. Until recently these bandits have contented themselves with horse stealing.
but now they are growing bolder and are adding murder to robbery. We hear of their outrages through Bath, Montgomery, Floyd, Wolfe and all along the line of their rendezvous in Virginia through the gaps in the Cumberland mountains. As to calling them soldiers, in any sense of the term, it is a misnomer, -- they have nothing soldierly either in action or purpose. They may be called, instead of guerrillas, gorillas, -- a sort of exaggerated monkey recently discovered in the interior of Africa who have something of the human form, -- walk on 2 legs, have extraordinary cunning and strength and seem to be the very incarnation of the devils who were driven into the swine and instead of being drowned seem to have made their escape into the wild deserts of Africa." (230)

One of the most famous encounters between Home Guards and guerrillas in Eastern Kentucky took place in August, 1862. The best account found was in the "Louisville Journal" for August 14th, 1862. The article is entitled "The Guerrillas in Eastern Kentucky". "We have just conversed with a highly intelligent gentleman, a citizen of Piketon in Pike county, recently driven out from home by the guerrillas. There was a skirmish at Piketon on Monday of last week (Aug. 4th), between some of the Home Guards and a greatly superior force of the guerrillas, another on Tuesday near that place and a third on Wednesday at Peter Creek on the edge of Pike county. At Piketon the Home Guards numbered only 65 but drove out the rebels on Monday, none being killed on either side. After the skirmish near that place on Tuesday, 3 rebel bodies were found upon the scene of conflict. Subsequently, however, the rebels mustered in much stronger forces and our Guards retreated from Piketon. On Wednesday at Peter Creek, 3 Home Guards were killed, and a considerable number of guerrillas. The Guards at that point numbering only 70 men, twice defeated the rebels to the number of 150, but the strength of the enemy being increased by re-enforcements to 300, the Guards retreated. At Piketon, the rebels, after the retreat of the Home Guards, robbed our informant of property worth from three to five thousand dollars and took from other Union men the whole of their stock, etc. Among the guerrilla leaders were Menifee, Moore, Witcher and Harmon. Menifee was afterwards seen driving off a drove of stock a mile long towards
the Virginia line." According to the reports of General Marshall it seems that the Fifth Kentucky regiment, J. B. A., was in process of formation at this time. (230) In a letter to General Boyle from a Mr. Bowman, a citizen of Catlettsburg, Manifee, Witchen and Jenkins are referred to as the guerrilla leaders, the three commanding a band of 500 mounted men. Mr. Bowman, writing on August 26th, says the entire force at Piketon does not exceed 1000 men. (231)

After the battle of Perryville, General Marshall had great difficulty in persuading any Kentucky troops to cross over into Virginia with him. In fact, some he left in Kentucky because he knew they would not leave, some who had been in the 12 months' companies he was forced to muster out of the service, and others frankly deserted. Some of his new recruits went over into Virginia, but of these four companies of infantry raised in Bath county deserted so rapidly that by the time General Marshall reached Middle Creek there were not 20 of them left. Mr. Tadsworth, whose Home Guards conducted the only pursuit of General Marshall in his retreat from Kentucky, estimated that from 1000 to 1200 of Marshall's men, deserted, remaining in Kentucky largely to plunder. He mentioned Witchen and Cameron as leaders of bands of 600 and 400 respectively. (232) On November 17th, Col. Irwin was assigned to the District of Eastern Kentucky with orders from General Wright to break up the guerrilla bands. (233)

By the end of 1862, the situation in both southeastern and eastern Kentucky might well be summed up in the words of Humphrey Marshall who wrote on Nov. 18th of that year, "In the border counties of Kentucky, the war is deadly and fiercely waged, although the participants are all mountaineers, and their numbers are comparatively small." (234)
Chapter III

Condition of the Country.
The Condition of the Country.

The rugged and mountainous district known as the Kentucky Mountains, a part of the Cumberland Plateau, is threaded by five large rivers which head in its territory, forming narrow, steep-sided valleys between the winding ridges. The five large rivers which have their beginning in this region, namely the Big Sandy, Little Sandy, Licking, Kentucky and Cumberland, cover it with a network of streams, creeks and forks. Ridges separate these streams in their tortuous paths, while in the southeast the Cumberland and Pine Mountains parallel each other in a northeast-southwest direction 10 to 12 miles apart. The mountains between these two ranges are called the Log Mountains west of Yellow Creek, and the Black Mountains east of the same stream. These mountains range in height from 2500 to a little over 4000 feet in places. In the most northern section and to the west of Pine Mountain, the ridges more often form a high plateau suitable for agricultural purposes, while in other places they are only wide enough for the narrowest mountain road. In the valleys to the west, castellated forms are numerous as we see from the name of Rockcastle county and river. Here sheer walls of rock rise, sometimes as high as 200 feet straight up from the mountain stream and it is impossible to communicate from valley to valley across the intervening ridge. In most of the district, however, the valley walls do not rise so precipitately and the bottoms which swing from side to side of the stream as it wends through the valley offer considerable level land along the rivers, though not along the smaller creeks. This then was the character of the country through which the tramping soldiers passed during the first two years of the war. (235)

Since the Cumberland Gap and Ford were the scene of so many struggles at this time, it seemed fitting to include a description of both. This description of the Gap comes from a letter written by a soldier in General George Morgan's command and was published in the
"Louisville Journal" on July 4th, 1832. "Cumberland Gap is noted as the cornerstone of 3 States, Kentucky, Virginia and Tennessee. It is a low gap, flanked on both sides by high mountains, which are topped by heavy ledges of rock. The entrance to the Gap is through a most lovely portion of Powell's Valley which is almost a flat, with here and there a grove of willow trees and Lombardy poplars underneath one of which is an inexhaustible spring of sulphur water. There must at some time have been a watering place here and maybe your older experience remembers it. One Spring, which is also sulphur, has been walled with marble and the ruins of neat cabins attest the fact that it was at least visited for its medicinal qualities.

Mr. Connelley, who was born in the Kentucky Mountains, has written a description of Cumberland Ford, where General Zollicoffer encamped in September, 1811. "Around this valley are three high mountain peaks, 1300 feet. They rise above the river, overlooking the valley and are joined to mountains that extend southeast and northwest for long distances through the country. At the southern end of this valley Cumberland River breaks through Pine Mountain forming two of these high peaks and flows in a half circle around the town (Pineville) to the north. This break, known as 'The Narrows' is only about 100 to 200 feet wide, -- just wide enough for river and road beside it, with walls of almost perpendicular height on each side. An army invading the Gap region from Central Kentucky would necessarily have to pass up the river through the Narrows to the Gap. Two miles north of the Narrows at the northern end of the present town of Pineville, the mountains close in to within 1200 feet of each other. Here, on the brow of a hill that projects from the main mountain on the east side of the river and commands a good view of this pass to the entrance of the valley from the north, strong breastworks were thrown up (by Zollicoffer), overlooking the present suburb of the town of Pineville known as West Pineville. The breastworks are in good state of preservation even today. Further up Cumberland River on the same side another foot-hill from the same mountain is wedged in between the mouth of Straight Creek which flows
into Cumberland River from the east, and the river, which holds a com-
manding view of Cumberland Ford, the only suitable crossing place in the
river for miles around. Breastworks were thrown up on this hill and
from this fact it is known today as Breastworks Hill." (236)

This Gap, a natural fortress, was the prize for which
the Northern forces were striving in their campaign in Kentucky. The
chief difficulty in achieving it was the absence of transportation fa-
cilities. In winter, or the rainy season as some of the commanders
called it, the roads through the mountains were often impassable. Time
and against troops had to be moved because it was impossible to get sup-
plies over the road. To obviate this condition, President Lincoln sug-
gested that a railroad be built, as a military necessity, to connect the
loyal regions of East Tennessee and western North Carolina with Kentucky.
The President, in his message of December 3, 1861, continued, "Kentucky
no doubt, will cooperate, and, through her legislature, make the most
judicious selection of a line. The northern terminus must connect with
some existing railroad; and whether the route shall be from Lexington
and to Nicholasville to Cumberland Gap, or from Lebanon to the Tennessee line
in the direction of Knoxville, or on some still different line can be
easily determined. Kentucky and the general Government cooperating,
the work can be completed in a very short time, and when done it will be
not only of vast present usefulness but also a valuable permanent improve-
ment, with its cost in all the future."(237) A committee of Kentucky men
was appointed to discuss the route of such a railroad but that was as
far as the matter progressed.(238)

Meanwhile the military commanders were having to detail
men to work the roads so that supply trains could pass over them. Gen-
eral Buell said the only way to improve the roads effectually was to cor-
duroy them or puncheon them 16 feet wide. On January 17th, 1862, this
was ordered done to the road between Danville and Somerset and four reg-
iments were ordered to push it forward as rapidly as possible.(239)

General Zollicoffer attempted to use the Cumberland River
to get his supplies from Nashville, but Federal artillery soon put a stop
On July 22nd, 1862, General George Morgan wired Colonel Fry, Chief of Staff for General Buell: "Lieutenant Craighill, military engineer, has telegraphed to General Totten strongly recommending that a military road be immediately constructed from Crab Orchard to this place (Cumberland Gap), and the quartermaster of this division be instructed to contract for working the same, at a cost not to exceed $150,000.00. The work should be under the supervision of a United States engineer. Without such a road it will be impossible to hold this position after the rainy weather sets in, as the country for 100 miles to the rear is low and the country in front will soon be entirely exhausted." (240)

Governor Andrew Johnson, whose unrelenting insistence upon East Tennessee regardless of the fate of the rest of the nation rendered him most obnoxious to all military commanders in the West, wrote the Secretary of War four days later and said that General Morgan was pressing very hard the question of construction a military road. He added, "If the railroad you intended to construct when I left Washington had been then commenced it would have been now completed and the cost of construction saved in transportation, and a connection with that portion of Tennessee formed which would have segregated and destroyed the unity of the contemplated Southern Confederacy." (241)

In spite of the invasion of Kentucky by General Kirby Smith, General Morgan did not lose sight of his road for on August 24th he again wrote, "We must gain absolute possession of our line to Lexington before we can commence the construction of the military road." (242) According to Collins a military notice was served on slave holders in Fayette and Madison counties on the 24th, ordering them to furnish at a stated time a specified number of able-bodied negro men to be used by the United States government in repairing the road between Mt. Vernon and Cumberland Gap. General Boyle is quoted as saying that if the government will furnish the necessary materials he will impress enough negroes to build a railroad from Lexington to
Cumberland Gap in two months. (243) The Confederate victory at the battle of Richmond and the subsequent events put all thought of road-building from the minds of both General Morgan and General Boyle.

In the Valley of the Sandy, transportation facilities furnished the same problems. General Garfield moved his supplies on flat boats and later on ferry boats up the river. This, however, was only navigable all the way up to Piketon at certain seasons of the year. General Nelson left the region because it was impossible to get supplies to him. General Garfield found the roads so impassable that he could hardly get empty wagons over them. When General Morgan retreated from Cumberland Gap up towards Greenup'sburg on the Ohio river, they were forced to construct a new road part of the way from West Liberty to Grayson, Ky. (244) Kentucky's lack of roads was as lamentable in 1861 and in 1921, and she was probably stuck a little deeper in the mud and mire then than now. In every military report from every military commander on both sides there is complaint of the condition of the roads.

This lack of transportation facilities resulted in a lack of supplies which forced the armies to look to the country they occupied for sustenance. Although General Zollicoffer evidently had arranged to secure supplies from East Tennessee, he yet depended upon the country for forage and some supplies for there are a number of reports of foraging parties, and he is constantly reporting "the country is poor." He left his position at London and Cumberland Gap and crossed over to Mill Springs, partly because he could draw supplies from Nashville by boat but also because the counties of Wayne, Pulaski, Cumberland and Clinton offered the products of a river valley. He planned to secure supplies for other sections of the army as well as subsist his own troops. When Mill Springs fell into the hands of the Federals after the Battle of Logan Cross Roads, (or Mill Springs), the Union troops found immense quantities of supplies collected at that place. (245)

All testimony points to the utter exhaustion of supplies in Laurel, Knox, Clay and Whitley counties. When General Carter moved
back to London after the battle of Miss Springs, he several times wrote General Thomas of the impossibility of securing food for his men. And when General Morgan arrived in April to take charge of the men, he found some of them with scurvy as they had had no meat for months. (246)

When General Kirby Smith invaded Kentucky through the Gaps in the mountains west of Cumberland Gap, it was, of course, impossible for him to haul supplies over these narrow mountain passes to subsist so large an army. He found the country absolutely destitute and wrote General Bragg that he would either have to fall back to East Tennessee or go on to Lexington where he could get supplies. General Morgan said that the Confederate forces would starve in 3 weeks, occupying the territory just north of the Gap (247) and a newspaper correspondent reported the Southern troops as living on parched corn and apples (248).

Now as to the method of obtaining supplies from the country. From the records, it seems that the commanders on both sides had no desire to plunder the people but wanted to give value received. Unfortunately, the citizens of Kentucky looked upon Confederate money and bonds as worthless. And, while General Zollicoffer desired to conciliate the people as far as possible, he did not hesitate to take what he needed whether they were pleased with the pay or not. The Union commanders were in somewhat the same position, as they had no money at their command in the early days of September and October, 1861, and their promises to pay were not looked upon with any great amount of enthusiasm by a people who really needed their meagre supplies for themselves. General Schoepf reported that there were complaints from the inhabitants that the soldiers took what they wanted, and General Zollicoffer ordered an investigation of some depredations committed by his men. (249) General Schoepf explained the situation in a Letter from London, Kentucky, November 2nd, 1861: "The county of Laurel will not supply forage for more than 10 to 30 days, and even now the utmost dissatisfaction prevails among the inhabitants. Zollicoffer had already plundered the county to a large extent, and we are at this time virtually plundering the people of what little they have left. Our promises
to pay are looked upon by the people as a mere sham, amounting to nothing. We are taking at the point of the bayonet what the citizens really need for the support of their families, without returning to them anything available therefore; thus turning against us a public sentiment which we should endeavor to cherish." (249)

But worse than the seizures of supplies by the two armies, far worse, were the depredations committed by the guerrillas, for they plundered for the sake of the game as much as for need of the things taken. As General Green Clay Smith puts it, in August, 1862, speaking of the region of southeastern Kentucky, "There is not a particle of grain in the country. The rebels have consumed it all, -- in many cases leaving farmers entirely destitute of fodder for their stock, -- though this could not have occasioned much inconvenience, because guerrillas take both fodder and stock. (250)

If conditions were bad in Southeastern Kentucky, they were worse in the Valley of the Sandy. Here Col. Williams and Capt. Jack May began to collect troops in September and there is no mention of any transportation of supplies in connection with the Confederate forces in this district until they came back to Kentucky towards the end of 1861. General Nelson was forced to leave because of lack of subsistence. From the amount of stores left by General Marshall when he retreated from Brown's Hill, near Paintsville, early in January, it is evident that he had collected a large supply from the country through which he passed. These, of course, were burned by his order, and on their retreat from Kentucky they almost starved. General Marshall, as has been stated, excused his retreat after the battle of Middle Creek on the score of starvation. And he writes from Letcher county that they are taking away from their friends food that should be left for their children and families. On February 2nd, General Marshall, writing from Letcher county, just 6 miles from Pound Gap, describes conditions with a vividpen: "You can have no conception of the state of affairs here General; starvation stares these people in the fact. They are most averse to parting with a peck of corn or
a pound of meat and daily the women beg for the retention of the means of sustaining themselves and their children. It is no sham or affected apprehension they feel. I much fear they only see what spring-time will startlingly reveal as a stern reality. (251)

Garfield, travelling in the wake of Humphrey Marshall found the country bare. On January 8th, he wrote from Paintsville, "The vicinity of the rebel camps presents a scene of utter desolation. They have appropriated and destroyed an immense amount of property." Prestonburg likewise was stripped of supplies and almost deserted. The Union men could not find forage for a single day for their horses and were obliged to send them back to Paintsville. (252) In his proclamation to the "Citizens of the Sandy Valley", Col. Garfield said that the United States waged no war of plunder, he invited the people to return to their homes, and invited any who had suffered from outrages of the Union soldiers to bring their complaints to him, that justice might be done them and the soldiers punished. (253)

Added to the other difficulties of obtaining subsistence in Eastern Kentucky, on the 22nd of February, 1862, Piketon suffered severe damage from the worst flood in the history of the valley. Not only were Col. Garfield's large quantities of government stores carried away, and much of the rest seriously damaged, but the citizens suffered fearfully. The steam saw-mill and flour mill at Piketon, the only one in the county, was carried away and Col. Garfield had to feed the people from the remaining government supplies until they could obtain some aid from the surrounding country. (254)

With the retreat of Marshall, as has been pointed out, many remained behind to plunder and apparently the whole country was alive with marauding bands. No property of any kind was safe and no supplies of any kind could be kept with security.

A loud lamentation was sent up over the loss of grain and cattle in the Bluegrass during Morgan's raids and during the occupation by Generals Smith and Bragg, but proportionately the loss was as nothing compared to that of the mountains. It was literally their all that was taken, first by one side, then by another, or if not, by
worst thief of all, — the guerrilla.

But food and forage were not the only property taken or destroyed in the mountains during these eighteen months. Houses were occupied or burned, stores were pillaged, mills were commandeered, and finally the salt works at Manchester were destroyed.

In the early months of September and October, 1861, the newspapers abounded with stories of the depredations committed by General Zollicoffer's troops. Stories of houses entered and all sorts of household property wantonly destroyed, featherbeds ripped open, women's and children's wearing apparel slashed with swords or worn in rough horseyplay by the men. Of stores entered and all their contents made way with. Of fine residences used to stable horses, — in short all of the usual plundering stories that are told by an invaded people. (255) Naturally there was no way of checking up on these stories which may have been the grossest exaggerations. The statement was also made that all the houses in Barbourville were "gutted" before the Southern troops moved across to Mill Springs. (255) As these were the first reports made of conditions in an occupied territory, the reports were naturally more numerous and more detailed.

Sometimes the destruction of property was brought about by the desire of the Union men to keep the Confederates from getting possession of the property. Such was the destruction of all the boats on the Cumberland River, first all the ferry boats near Camp Hoskins, Pulaski county (257) and later for several miles along the river (258). This was in November and in December, General Schoepf reported from Somerset, "Having reason to believe that he (Zollicoffer), contemplates going into the coal business on the Cumberland, I shall send out a party tomorrow and destroy the boats alongshore to the coal banks." (259)

One of the few objects of real interest to the Confederates, was the salt works in Manchester, Clay county. General Zollicoffer sent an expedition to it, and when General Kirby Smith entered Kentucky his troops seized the wagon trains going from Lexington to Cumberland Gap and then used the empty wagons to haul salt. This was one of
the scarcest articles in the South and was much desired by all her army commanders. General Cruft was placed in charge of the expedition sent to destroy the works and he reported that over 1000 men were worked in details for one night and a day and a half in handling the salt and dismantling the works. Loyal citizens in the neighborhood, who depended on this place for their salt were allowed to take away considerable amounts so that no suffering would result to them. General Cruft said the Confederates had carried away from 3500 to 4000 bushels of manufactured salt and there was every indication that they were planning to send in for the existing supply and that their leaders counted upon these works as a regular source of supply. He therefore considers the demolition of them a military measure as the country around could not subsist the large number of soldiers that would be necessary to protect it from such incursions. The works were all the property of Union citizens, one of the 5 belonging to Col. T. T. Garrard of the 3rd Kentucky infantry. A Commission was appointed to determine upon the compensation to be received by the owners. This was not done until after the retreat of Generals Smith and Bragg had been effected, -- Oct. 23rd and 24th, 1862.

In the Valley of the Big Sandy, the same sort of thing was taking place, with each side claiming to protect the rights of the citizens while the other side was accusing it of destroying all sorts of property. On his return to Kentucky, after the removal of General Nelson's troops from Piketon, General Humphrey Marshall wrote to the Adjutant General: "The Army of the United States, invited here to defend this people, halted at no excess. They burned and ravaged the towns, insulted females, stole wearing apparel, and killed stock, and frequently deprived poor people of the means of subsistence." (261) Two weeks later, Colonel Garfield thus described the activities of General Marshall's men: "These two forces (Col. Williams and a Virginia regiment), amounting to from 2000 to 2500 men, increased by irregular bands of local rebels; mostly mounted, are now in Paintsville, and are throwing up works for defense and sending out marauding parties in va-
rious directions, who are committing frequent murders, driving off cattle, and destroying the property of Union men." (262)

In an agricultural district where the land is poor, the farms small and the crops, for the most part, scanty, the seizure of all food, forage, cattle and hogs, meant practically the seizure of all the property. Coupled with the destructions of their homes, this spelled for the mountaineers, the loss of their little all. Probably in no section of the state was the loss as proportionate. There was no section of Kentucky that was so constantly the theatre of martial movements in 1861-62, as were the mountains, -- it was inevitable, therefore, they should suffer most from the destruction of property, and loss of their crops and cattle.
Chapter IV

Attitude of the People
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Attitude of the People.

It has been largely assumed by all writers concerning the Kentucky mountains during the Civil War, that the mountaineers were solidly for the Union. The investigation made in connection with this thesis would tend to disprove this assumption. Some parts of the mountains, it is true, were almost unanimous in their support of the Federal Government, but other parts were equally zealous for the Confederacy.

The elections in Kentucky, 1861, are often quoted as showing by their results, the attitude of the people. A philosophical discussion as to whether elections ever indicate anything might bring us to the conclusion that they cannot be accepted as a register of public opinion, but since they are included by most of the historians of Kentucky as evidence, they will be considered here. On June 20th an election of congressional candidates was held in Kentucky. A special session of Congress had been called by the President for July 4th, and it was necessary to hold a special election for Congressmen in Kentucky. Only one of the mountain counties, Morgan, voted the Southern Rights ticket, or rather voted a majority for that ticket in this election. All the rest were carried for the Union. (263)

An election for representatives in the State Legislature was held on August 5th, 1861. In that election the following counties in the mountains returned majorities for the Southern Rights candidates: Morgan, Wolfe, Johnson, Magoffin, Breathitt, Perry, Letcher, Floyd and Pike. (264) This evidently represented a mountainous district of considerable size, devoted to the Secession cause.

To conclude the subject of election returns let us turn to the election of August, 1862. On the earnest solicitation of General Buell (265), General Boyle, the military commander in Kentucky had published an order forbidding and Southern Rights men to be candidates for election. According to the "Louisville Journal", this order was strictly observed in most of the counties, even where the Confederate sympathizers
claimed to have a majority. Morgan county was the one county which paid no heed to the General's order. The morning of the election about 100 mounted guerrillas made their appearance and proceeded to run the election with the result, that while there was a full Union ticket, it was beaten, 2 or 3 to 1, Confederate sympathizers being elected to the offices of County Judge, County Clerk, Sheriff, Assessor, Surveyor, Jailer, Coroner, etc." (235)

Everything seems to establish the fact that the counties just north of Cumberland Gap were for the Union. General Zollicoffer wrote from Cumberland Ford on September 21st, "The country in advance is so hostile it is difficult to obtain any information. The few friends we have among the country people think a large force is advancing upon us." A few days later he asked that any information that had been secured at headquarters in regard to the strength or movements of the Unionists in front of him be forwarded as the population ahead was so generally hostile he could not even push spies through it. (237)

In suggesting that he move his forces over on the Cumberland River, after the battle of Rockcastle Hills, General Zollicoffer said, "The country is not so sterile through which to make a forward movement as the one in front of me, called 'The Wilderness of Kentucky,' It cannot be more hostile. (238)

Southeastern Kentucky received a great many refugees from East Tennessee where the policy of the State authorities seems to have been to run out all of the Union sympathizers possible. The stories told by these people doubtless influenced opinion near Cumberland Gap. Then the movement of General Zollicoffer on to their own soil crystallized sentiment against the Southerners. Whatever division of opinion may have existed before the Confederate army appeared was wiped away by the exigencies of having a foreign soldiery encamped upon their soil. This feeling of unity that developed as a result of invasion was shown by the county meetings held, where both political parties promised to forget their differences and unite in driving the Tennessee troops from their soil. Report of a such a meeting in Lincoln county was made in the "Louisville Journal" for September 28th, 1861. A committee had
been appointed to draw up resolutions which pledged all the citizens, regardless of their political differences, to unite in guarding their homes against an invading foe, as well as against marauding bands. And these resolutions were ordered printed in the newspapers.

That the Union leaders counted upon the loyalty of the mountaineers in southeastern Kentucky is shown in a number of ways, -- for example, in a letter from John Fisk, Speaker of the State Senate to Robert Buckner, Speaker of the House. Mr. Fisk said, "Don't let General Thomas send too much force against Zollicoffer, but let him open the Covington and Lexington railroad promptly. Our munitions must come that way. The mountaineers will whip Zollicoffer as soon as they get ammunition. By all means send them, lead, lead, lead!" (269)

Most of the people fled before the approaching army. The newspapers reported the Confederates in possession of the smaller towns and General Zollicoffer himself says that there were practically no male inhabitants left in the country between Cumberland Ford and Barbourville. (270) The newspaper said there were only 3 males left in Barbourville and they were allowed to remain because they were secession sympathizers. (271)

Then General Zollicoffer moved back into Tennessee and then advanced again through Wayne county, he reported that he found the better class of citizens siding with him. (272) Earlier than this a Mr. McHenry had written to General Albert Sidney Johnston that the Southern Rights men were being forced "in Cumberland, Clinton, Russell, Wayne and Pulaski counties to take the oath of allegiance at the point of the bayonet by the Federal forces and Home Guards."(273) About the same time in October, a Mr. Gass, had written from near Livingston, Tenn., saying, "There is a perfect reign of terror in Kentucky. The Southern men are greatly in fear of their lives. The Lincolnites are swearing in the citizens daily, and many of our friends are made to take the oath in order to save their lives and property." (274)

After the Confederate camp was established at Mill Springs,
Colonel Hoskins wrote to General Thomas from his camp in Pulaski county on the Cumberland River, "I am anxious to hold the position, believing as I do that it is due the country from the noble stand which they have taken in favor of the Union, and once they have possessed this point there is no point of advantage for us to impede their march north until we reach the north side of the Kentucky River and I find their strength increasing by accessions of those, who, while we held possession of the counties below this professed to be good Union men."

(275) General Boyle wrote from Columbia in December that the Confederates were drafting the loyal citizens in Clinton and Wayne counties. Two hundred recruits had been reported as secured for the Confederates in Wayne, which General Boyle felt had been conscripted.

(276) When General Morgan's men were encamped in the mountains prior to their campaign against Cumberland Gap, in May, 1862, the Journal Correspondent from their camp said, "The mountaineers are true to the Union. They are opposed to any compromise of peace but require unconditional surrender. Not peace then with the leaders, -- they must stampede or suffer the doom of traitors. It would be a crying sin not to do so."

(277) When General Kirby Smith entered the State, he met only the utmost hostility in his march through the mountains. He reported the people as openly and bitterly opposed to the Confederacy, and said that if the sentiment on the other side of the mountains was not very different, nothing whatever could be expected from them.

(278) A correspondent from Cumberland Gap wrote to the Journal about this time, "Poor Mountaineers; how sorry I am for them; and don't wonder at their hostility for their little homes are being desolated. Their potatoes and all kinds of vegetables are being taken by the rebel troops, their green corn, all destroyed, fruit and everything that man or beast can subsist upon, will soon be gone and I don't see how they are to live for the next 12 months."

(279) All the reports of the Union officers operating in southeastern Kentucky in 1862 attest the unflinching loyalty and devote-
tion of the mountaineers in this section to the Federal cause. (230)

It is difficulty to ascertain whether such unanimity of opinion characterized Eastern Kentucky as was displayed in the mountain district of the southeast. That it was a recognized section of Southern Rights sentiment is shown by a letter from General J. J. Buckner to the War Department at Richmond in which he suggests that Major Breckinridge made a brigadier-general, either for the "Kentucky brigade or for a separate column, to be directed through the "strong southern-rights counties in Eastern Kentucky." (281)

By way of these passes in Kentucky many Southern Rights men had escaped from the Bluegrass. General Marshall said that at Prestonburg there were about 2000 Kentucky people collected, but that Col. John Williams had succeeded in enlisting some 600 or 700 into the Confederate service, while many of the rest acted in their own behalf and would not enter the service. (282) On October 10th, Col. Harris, stationed at Olympic Springs, wrote General Nelson that there were several thousand men at the "rebel camp" at Prestonburg and they were daily receiving accession from above and below. (283) As Nelson expressed it, "The whole mountain, whence we expected to get many soldiers, is becoming completely demoralized, and they are enlisting under Williams." (284) Just before the battle of Ivy Mountain, the Secretary of War for the Confederacy ordered General Marshall to Eastern Kentucky, with two Virginia regiments. This in order "sufficient as a nucleus to hold together the forces now at Prestonburg and on the eve of dispersing, as we are informed and to enable Col. Williams to succeed in recruiting 2 or 3 regiments more, thus forming a force sufficient to prevent the enemy from passing into southwestern Virginia by Pound Gap." (285)

General Marshall, when he started back to Kentucky, after Nelson's troops had been removed from the Sandy Valley, said he would start the cavalry on ahead to "inspire our friends who are said to be much dissipated by the insolent course of the enemy and their friends." (286) He was anxious to set up county officers under the Provisional Government of Kentucky and wrote to ask for blank commis-
sions for magistrates, sheriffs and constables, clerks and county judges.

(287) He never succeeded in setting up a Provisional Government in this district, -- or at any rate, no report of it was ever made. General Marshall also reported that recruiting was coming along "elegantly".

(288) This would tend to show that the people were sympathetic to his cause.

Marshall's precipitate flight seemed to discourage the mountaineers, somewhat, however, and after his departure, Garfield reported a marked change in the attitude of the citizens. His policy was conciliatory, promising protection to all, of whatever political sympathies, so long as they had not aided and abetted the enemy. Furthermore, the same protection was extended to all in arms against the government if they would lay down their arms. His proclamation to the citizens contained one bit of usual Kentucky Mountain "local color" in that he ordered all the citizens to banish from among them all private feuds. (233) As was usual in the mountains, the people of southern sympathies moved out with the arrival of the Union troops, but about a month later, Colonel Garfield reported that many of them were returning to their homes, while numbers of Marshall's mountain soldiers were deserted, often in squads of 30 or 40 at a time. (290) General Marshall, chagrined at the fact that his camp was often visited by Kentuckians of both political parties, ordered that all men who came over into Virginia from Kentucky should be arrested and placed in camps of instruction if they did not enlist. (291)

Perhaps Marshall struck the keynote of the attitude in the mountains when he said, "The people herewith are perfectly terrified or apparently apathetic." (292) Later when he was in Floyd County, after the battle of Hiddle Creek he wrote, "My troops now subsist by going to the fields, shucking the corn, shelling it, taking it to the mill, grinding the meal and then taking it to camp. This has been the only way they could be fed. The people of the country will do nothing. They will not assist to gather the corn nor to shell it, nor will they let us have the use of their horses or anything that is theirs, -- nothing either for love or money. They will not enter the army on either
side and seem to be actually terror-stricken. I have tried to shame them into a sense of what was due to themselves and their families, but it is of no use." (233)

When Colonel Garfield turned the command of the Department of Eastern Kentucky over to Colonel Urnan on March 26th, 1862, he wrote his successor a letter concerning the policy to be pursued in dealing with the citizens. He said, "In regard to citizens, who have been disloyal I desire to have the policy continued which I have here-tofore endeavored to preserve. While all force and rebellion against the Government must promptly be put down, it must also be remembered that the people in this valley are to live together as fellow-citizens and neighbors after the war is over. All that we can do to inaugurate peace and concord among them while the army is here should be done. The people in this valley are, in the main, very ignorant, and completely under the control of their party leaders. If those leaders in the different precincts can be placed under bonds for their future loyalty and peaceable conduct, and will take the oath of allegiance to the Government of the United States, they will probably be efficient in keeping the country quiet and loyal." (294)

Although 2 regiments of Union troops were left at Piketon and some Home Guards were organised, as has been seen, conditions were not bettered and the inhabitants seem to have carried on the war among themselves according to their own methods. The Confederates continued to depend upon their loyalty as a whole, however, and only reference was found in any letters from Confederate leaders assuming that Eastern Kentucky was loyal to the Union. This was in a letter from General Airby Smith right after his penetration into Kentucky where he had met with the hostility of the mountaineers in the southeastern section. He said the universal hostility he had met extended through the mountain region of Eastern Kentucky. (235)

After the battle of Perryville and the retreat of the Confederates, in spite of the fact that so many of his troops deserted, refusing to leave their native hills, General Marshall stated that the
mountain counties of Kentucky were as loyal to the Confederacy as the mountain counties of Western Virginia. (296)

Perhaps the conditions in the Sandy Valley towards the end of 1862 are best set forth in Col. Hiram Hawkins' letter to Governor Hawes. "In this way (by convincing the people that the Confederates have given up Kentucky and persuading them to join the Home Guards) they are fast subjugating the people, and, if permitted to pursue their policy undisturbed until spring, that whole country will be organized against us. They have adopted the wise policy of buying up our country, by paying, feeding, and clothing these soldiers and letting them remain in their native hills to hold them against us, and will succeed unless we checkmate them by a similar policy. They cannot enlist them and carry them from their country, and neither can we, and leave the enemy in possession of it. We have both tried this and failed. I am, perhaps, as well acquainted with these people as, and know their wants and what can be done with them better than, any officer in the army, for I have been with them more, in contact with them oftenest, and in command among them longer than any officer in the service, and I am convinced that they prefer to be with us, and fight for us; but they cannot quit their country and leave it in the hands of the enemy without their families suffering, many of them turned out of doors, others in penury and want, and surrounded by an insulting and barbarous foe — the Home Guards." (297)

These reports on the feeling in the Sandy Valley have been gone into in some detail and numbers of actual quotations have been given to substantiate the claim made in the beginning that the mountains were not solidly for the Union. The counties in the southeastern section never swerved in their loyalty and their love for the Federal government seemed to grow more intense with their sufferings for it, but certainly in the beginning of the war the eastern mountain district demonstrated clearly its allegiance to the Confederacy.
Chapter V

Soldiers from the Mountains.
Chapter V.

Soldiers from the Mountains.

In the Adjutant-General's report of the soldiers enlisting in Kentucky for the Union army, no report is made by counties, but the various muster rolls are given, with the place of enlistment of the various commands. As a great many of the mountaineers enlisted in the very beginning at Camp Dick Robinson, it is impossible to report very accurately concerning them, for they were soldiers mustered in at Camp Dick Robinson from other counties too. Hence it becomes necessary to depend upon less valuable sources for information in regard to these enlistments.

When General Nelson, then a Lieutenant in the Navy, was ordered to Kentucky on July 1st, 1861, the only troops he was authorized to raise in Kentucky were to come from the southeastern section. The officers chosen were selected from these counties and all the evidence points to the fact that the regiments of Colonels Wolford (1st Kentucky cavalry), Bramlette (7th Kentucky infantry), Gar­rard (3rd Ky. infantry) and Hoskins (12th Ky. infantry) came from the counties lying just north of Cumberland Gap, Knox, Laurel, Rockcastle, Pulaski and Wayne.

In Battle, Kniffin and Perrin's "History of Kentucky", Mr. Kniffin, who served at Camp Dick Robinson in the autumn of 1861, wrote of the troops collected at the camp, "Recruiting in the country southward and eastward from the camp was comparatively easy. The country is mountainous and the inhabitants were on equal terms with reference to wealth and social standing. There were few slave holders and the people accustomed to independence of thought, word and deed, had exercised the right to form their own conclusions upon the question of secession. Ready to engage in an enterprise that promised relief to their loyal neighbors across the Tennessee border, whose persecution by the State authorities at this time had awakened a thrill of indignation throughout the country, they enrolled their names under the banner of their country." (298)

Shortly after the invasion by Collicofer, the newspapers
a storm of indignation in the mountains and brought down upon their own heads numerous letters from the loyal citizens of that section, incensed at the injustice done them. The cause of their wrath was a published statement that the Honorable John J. Crittenden was going to the mountains "to arouse the hardy mountaineers and induce them to go into the service of the country." The protesters immediately asked how many soldiers were in the service from the venerable statesman's own district and then cited the troops already in camp from the mountains. They indignantly suggest that if the "bluegrass" people would fight a little more and talk less, the country would be the better for it.

One letter stated that Knox, Laurel, Whitley, Clay and Rockcastle counties each had 2 companies enlisted; that Rockcastle county had 3 companies for 12 months' service, that Knox would provide additional companies and that the adjacent counties would still provide more men; in short that this district of the mountains now had more soldiers in the service according to their population, than the same number of counties anywhere else in the state.

Another letter concluded with "Where did the soldiers at Camp Robinson come from? Ask them and more than 9/10 of them will tell you they are from the mountains. Old Pulaski has now about 700 or 800 soldiers in the field and in two months she will have 1200."

The only direct reference to the enlistment of soldiers for the Union army in the Eastern Kentucky counties was found in a letter from Col. Sidney M. Barnes, who wrote to General Thomas from Catill Springs, September 23rd, 1861, when his regiment, the 8th Kentucky Infantry was in process of formation, "We are looking for another company from Owsley County, this evening; also one from Jackson County."

Undoubtedly the ranks of the several regiments raised in the northeastern section of the State at Maysville, Catlettsburg and Louisa were swelled by accessions from the region around the Louisa Fork of the Big Sandy, but the information necessary to a definite statement is lacking.

The troops raised from the mountains early in the war did gallant service in meeting and holding back the army from Tennessee...
under General Sollicooffer. Although many of them distinguished themselves in the later campaigns, they never rendered the nation more valiant service than they gave her as raw recruits as they stood in their own hills and valleys, holding back the Confederates until help came from the states across the Ohio. They helped save Kentucky for the Union with their undaunted courage in the face of suffering and privation and with their determination to protect their country at all costs.

Then General Humphrey Marshall joined Colonel Williams at Pound Gap in November, 1861, he found that Colonel Williams had about 800 men, largely drawn from the mountain counties, in the eastern part of the state. General Marshall said they were poorly clad and poorly armed and knew nothing of discipline or drill. However he pronounced them excellent material. On the return of his forces to Kentucky, recruiting parties were sent out all over the mountains and even beyond, with the result that by December 30th, Col. Williams' regiment was recruited to the full 1000 men and a second regiment of infantry was in process of formation. His success was short-lived, however, for by January 14th, 1862, he wrote the War Department from Beaver Creek, Floyd county, "The regiment now commanded by Colonel Williams has been raised in the mountain country, but the limit seems to have been reached and the fact is that those who have not yet taken part, who are poor, will not leave their families in order to fight anybody's battles on any side."

While the Union forces controlled the Valley of the Sandy, recruiting was, of course, impossible, but General Marshall continued to expect a rush of troops to his standard when he again appeared in his native state. But he found that securing them was one thing and persuading them to leave Kentucky with him were two different matters. It was reported that almost a thousand men deserted as he made his way to Pound Gap. The 5th Kentucky, whose twelve months' service was up, demanded their honorable discharge. Nor would they enlist again on the spot, though they expressed an intention of so doing at some later date.
Two companies of recruits were retained by Marshall and the rest discharged from the service. Col. Hawkins was stationed at Prestonburg in order to receive re-enlistments from this set of mountaineers. Two captains were at the same place, recruiting and had secured several hundred men; Captain Caudill had raised 9 companies of infantry in Whitesburg, Letcher county and on hearing that these men (600) would desert if ordered out of the state, General Marshall allowed them to remain; he also recruited 4 mounted companies under Major Johnson.

Although General Marshall regarded his attempt to bring infantry recruits out of Kentucky a signal failure, yet he considered that he had saved from the wreck, as he put it, 3000 men, cavalry and infantry together. Of these about 1200 had remained in Kentucky. 900 of the Kentuckians with him had come from his own section, making about 2500 from the mountains. Add to these the deserters, and the number mounts up from so sparsely populated a district. (303)

Colonel Hawkins said of enlistments from Eastern Kentucky, "As a proof that they prefer to be with us and fight for us, I need but state the fact that although the enemy has had his army in that country much longer than we, he has failed to enlist as many by half as we have. We have enlisted men enough from that region to form a good brigade."

General Marshall thought that when the Southern armies first entered Kentucky, they should have enforced conscription. General Bragg, however, had suspended the law temporarily, warning the Kentuckians at the same time that this would be their last opportunity to volunteer. General Marshall, who encountered many difficulties in his dealings with the mountain troops stated that they had a violent antipathy to anything that approached conscription. So far as could be found out, he never made any attempt to enforce it in the mountains. (307)

Thus while the mountaineers in one section were standing for the Union, those in another were flocking to the standard of the Confederacy. Equally brave and daring, the mountaineers collected under Colonel Williams during the first months of the war, suffered even more from privation and want than did the Union men. Theirs were the real
deprivations. Not only tents and the comforts of camp equipage were lacking, but food and ammunition as well. Col. Branlette's men were without blankets or coats, but Colonel Williams' lacked even shoes. They too made a valiant effort for their adopted government and helped many Southern Rights men escape from Kentucky to the Southern army. They were unable to hold the territory, but at least they made the effort.

These numbers of enlisted soldiers seem very meager until we consider them in relation to the population. No county in the mountains had over 18,000 people in it in 1860, only 3 had 10,000 or over and 10 had under 5,500. The official statistics for 1860 are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Breathitt</td>
<td>4,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clay</td>
<td>6,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floyd</td>
<td>6,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harlan</td>
<td>5,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson</td>
<td>3,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>5,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knox</td>
<td>7,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laurel</td>
<td>5,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letcher</td>
<td>3,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincoln</td>
<td>10,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magoffin</td>
<td>3,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan</td>
<td>3,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owsley</td>
<td>5,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perry</td>
<td>3,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pike</td>
<td>7,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulaski</td>
<td>17,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockcastle</td>
<td>5,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wayne</td>
<td>10,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitley</td>
<td>7,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfe</td>
<td>3,603 (for 1870)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Such a small population could not contain so many men of fighting age, and it is evident that the response to call for soldiers was well supported in the mountains.
Conclusion.
Conclusion.

In no other region of Kentucky was there so much suffering from the war, as was found in the mountains of Kentucky. From September, 1861, until the end of December, 1862, the mountain counties of the east and southeast were almost continuously occupied by the armies of either one side or the other. And when, for a short time, they were freed from this, guerrilla warfare caused even more disaster.

Due to lack of transportation facilities, the encamped armies were forced to depend upon the immediate country for much of their subsistence and storage with the result that the country was time and again stripped of everything it possessed. Grain, corn, fruit, hogs, cattle, forage for same, all were taken from these unhappy people.

Finding that they were not safe in their lives and property when the army whose views they opposed occupied their territory, the mountaineers from the beginning, moved out before an approaching army. For example, all of the Union men in Southeastern Kentucky left their homes before General Zollicoffer established his headquarters at Cumberland Ford, and when Colonel Garfield took his troops down the river to Piketon, the Southern Rights men, often with their families, simply left the towns and took to the hills. The result of this was that for months many of the mountain men lived the lives of fugitives, never sleeping in a house, rarely seeing their families, and resorting to "bushwhacking" in their desperation.

The fact that opinion was not unanimous in the mountains tended to exaggerate conditions. Particularly was this the case in Eastern Kentucky, where the sympathy was largely with the Confederate cause, but where, in 1862, Union men began to organize to resist these sympathizers. General Kirby Smith said there were 23 counties in East Tennessee, 6 of which were loyal to the Confederacy, whose supremacy their state recognized. In Kentucky, which remained in the Union, fully 9 of the 20 mountain counties evinced strong Confederate sympathies. These nine were grouped together in the Eastern Kentucky dis-
They were Morgan, Wolfe, Breathitt, Magoffin, Johnston, Floyd, Perry, Letcher and Pike. Certainly in the early years of the war, these counties gave their allegiance to the Confederacy.

Many historians believe that the inhabitants of the entire Cumberland Plateau are the descendants of the Scotch-Irish immigrants who swept over the land about the middle of the eighteenth century, occupying the outposts in the wilderness and the pioneer country. If this be true, they brought with them and preserved the tradition of their own peculiar form of border warfare. It was fierce and deadly, with no quarter given. Any troops operating against them were forced to adopt the same method of procedure. By the end of 1862, this mountain warfare was carried on with a bitterness of which these people only seemed capable. Although the men were all mountaineers and the numbers of them comparatively small, the blows were swift and sure and they knew no quarter. Such was the condition in the Kentucky mountains after the departure of the regular armies whose disciplined soldiers conducted no campaigns through the Kentucky hills after the year 1862.
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[38] Ibid, p. 195.
[40] Ibid, p. 195
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[53] Ibid, p. 478.
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(133) Ibid, XVI, Part II, p. 158.
(137) Ibid, XVI, Part II, p. 192.
(139) Ibid, XVI, Part II, p. 207.
(140) Ibid, XVI, Part II, p. 211.
(142) Ibid, XVI, Part II, p. 239.
(144) Ibid, XVI, Part II, p. 710.
(146) Ibid, XVI, Part II, p. 723.
(150) Ibid, XVI, Part II, p. 734.


(154) Ibid, p. 752.


(158) Ibid, p. 862.

(159) Id, XVI, Part II, p. 352.

(160) Id, XVI, Part II, p. 373.

(161) Id, XVI, Part II, p. 374.

(162) Ibid, p. 1006.

(163) Id, XVI, Part II, p. 423.


(165) Id, XVI, Part II, p. 448.

(166) Id, XVI, Part II, p. 456.

(167) Ibid, p. 1006.


(169) Ibid, pp. 1029, 893.


(171) Id, XVI, Part II, 975.

(172) Ibid, 1029.


(181) Ibid, p. 175.

Please note that the following slip was inserted between pages 129 and 130 in the original thesis.
Notes numbered 183–210

not included!
[213] Ibid, Sept. 23, 1862.
[216] Ibid, March 27, 1862.
[219] Speed, Union Cause in Kentucky, p. 251.
[221] Louisville Daily Journal, April 15, 1862.
[222] Ibid, October 7, 1861.
[225] Id, XX, Part II, p. 199.
[227] Id, XVI, Part II, 765.
[228] Louisville Daily Journal, April 2, 1862.
[231] Id, XVI, Part II, p. 1145.
[232] Id, XX, Part II, p. 54.
[233] Id, XX, Part II, p. 409.
[234] Davis, Darrell Haug, Geography of the Kentucky Mountains (Frankfort, 1924), pp. 1-10.
[240] Id, XVI, Part II, p. 216.
131.

(244) War of the Rebellion, Series I, XVI, Part I, p. 335.
(245) Id, IV, p. 517.
(246) Id, X, Part I. p. 57.
(247) Id, XVI, Part II, p. 352.
(248) Louisville Daily Journal, August 29, 1862.
(250) Louisville Daily Journal, September 1, 1862.
(251) War of the Rebellion, Series I, VII, p. 58.
(252) Ibid, p. 28.
(255) Louisville Daily Journal, October 1, 10, 15, 21, 1861.
(256) Ibid, September 28, 1861.
(258) Id, VII, p. 454.
(259) Id, VII, p. 519.
(260) Id, XVI, Part I, p. 1151.
(261) Id, VII, p. 755.
(262) Id, VII, p. 25.
(263) Louisville Daily Journal, June, 1861.
(264) Louisville Daily Courier, August 6, 8, 1861.
(266) Louisville Daily Journal, August 16, 1862.
(269) Ibid, p. 269.
(271) Louisville Daily Journal, October 21, 1861.
(273) Id, IV, p. 443.
(274) Id, IV, p. 447.
[282] Ibid, p. 519.
[283] Ibid, p. 304.
[286] Id, VII, p. 702.
[287] Id; VII, p. 46.
[288] Id, VII, p. 42.
[289] Id, VII, p. 33.
[290] Id, VII, pp. 34, 603, 379.
[292] Id, VII, p. 46.
[293] Id, VII, pp. 46, 48.
[294] Id, X, Part II, p. 68.
[295] Id, XVI, Part II, Oct. 776.
[296] Id, XX, Part II, p. 409.
[300] Ibid, October 16, 1861.
[301] Ibid, October 12, 1861.
[304] Id, VII, p. 42.
[305] Id, VII, p. 43.
[306] Id, XX, Part II, pp. 330, 408.
(307) War of the Rebellion, Series I, XX, Part II, 408.

Original thesis also

included one folded map.