An interpretation of the Franco-German relations from Versailles to Locarno.

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UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE

AN INTERPRETATION OF THE
FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS FROM
VERSAILLES TO LOCARNO

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty
Of the Graduate School of the University of Louisville
In Partial Fulfillment of the
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Department of Political Science

By

John Paul Keith, Jr.

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An Interpretation of
Franco-German Relations from Versailles to Locarno
1918-1925
"A reason for the partial submergence of the economic motive in the effective publicity on international relations is probably to be found in the less perfect receptivity of the public to the drab details of wide commercial movements as contrasted with its eagerness and capacity to absorb accounts of the seemingly simple and heroic acts of great men. Biography is admittedly fascinating. Certain types of publicists have for this reason come to describe history as something of a drama in which the fate of nations is determined by the decisions of outstanding statesmen who, for all that is said to the contrary, may have derived their light from their inner consciousnesses. But, except in the new biography, heroes are philanthropic, idealistic, and humanitarian. They are not influenced by thoughts of mere gain. Hence, when we describe the acts of nations in terms of the deeds of famous individuals, the economic motive is often thrust unconsciously into the background.

"The euphemist who overlooks economic realities is a poor pedagogue for he explains events in terms of a fictitious causation. On the other hand, one should not become doctrinaire on the subject of the economic determination of national policies. There are many different kinds of reasons for action. There are often powerful psychological forces, springing from other than economic causes, which bear down upon foreign offices and state departments and persuade or coerce them into decisions. The function of the scholar is to sift what evidence he has
and to determine the motives as best he can with an unswerving loyalty to the ideal of Truth."

* B.H. Williams "Economic Foreign Policy of the U.S." pgs. 2, 3, 7
Introduction

If we look briefly at the history of Germany we see that fifty years before the World War she was only a mass of small unorganized states. With the coming of Bismarck occurred the unification of Germany into a world power of highest rank. When the war began, Germany was rapidly approaching a position of supremacy in Europe and, in many respects, a position of supremacy in the whole world. In 1914 Germany was in the full tide of industrial and commercial power. Out of the half dozen principal branches of modern industrial production, she had achieved double or more than double the output of England in iron and steel, machinery, electro-technical products, and chemicals. She lagged only in coal and in textile production. Her commercial merchant marine was rapidly expanding, the volume of her foreign trade was exceeded only by that of England. The United States alone was clearly ahead of her in the world industrial field, and had there been no war even the American supremacy might soon have been challenged.*

The Government of Germany, from the time of its unification, had been a monarchy. At the time of its near-supremacy, Wilhelm was the man in power. Bismarck had made it his policy to see that the whole of Europe was a group of monarchies with Germany the strongest. If this policy had been continued after his dismissal, Germany would to-day probably be one of the world powers in more ways than in name.

* Peter Reinhold - The Economic, Financial, and Political State of Germany Since the War.
The French have always been a direct contrast to the Germans. There is more than one reason for this statement. The national character of the French is for economic stability and equilibrium which is considered stagnation by the Germans. The French, as a whole a logical thinking nation, think in terms of the past, while the Germans, aspiring and ambitious, think in terms of the future, no matter how obscure and uncertain it may seem.

With these facts in view we can readily see why France was ready when the war began. It is hardly logical to fix here the blame of the war on either of these countries or any other country. Nevertheless, when it came about, France, according to her age-old policy of economic security, was fully prepared, having almost given up her place in the industrial and commercial world by the ever-increasing rate of her rivals. In fact, the position of France in commerce at the beginning of the war was unique. In the first place, most of the population of France was engaged in agriculture, thus making France less dependent on trade for livelihood. In the second place, the character of the French industries made her also independent as to competition with other countries. Her industries consisted mainly of the luxury, art, and fashion type, thus differing from Germany and all other countries. The above obliged France to import all the necessities such as machinery, cotton, iron, and coal. All these made up the conditions before the war.

The tariff question before the war was very interesting. France had a policy of protection that was constantly

* K. Kalantarian - The German Economic Policy
changing from strict protection to almost free trade, according to the whim of the political group in power or of the economic condition of the country. Germany maintained a policy of protection in all those channels where it seemed plausible. You will recall that the unification of Germany was not only built on the tariff but was also made possible by it.

The colonial policy of the two countries was the only phase in which they seemed to be similar. Both were for gaining as many colonies and as much territory as they could in other countries and for building up, to the best of their abilities, their respective relations on as many as possible points on the globe.

In respect to the merchant marine of the two countries, Germany was by far the superior. France unsuccessfully tried to increase the number of her own merchant ships by a system of bounties.

One other factor to remember before turning to the Treaty of Versailles is that at the close of the Franco-German War in 1870, when France was defeated, the Alsace-Lorraine territory was taken by Germany and annexed. This strip of land was very valuable as will be seen later. Other obligations were thrust upon France by her eternal foe that did not cause a feeling of subordination but rather one of revenge which we see again at the Treaty of Versailles.*

* Charles F. Horne, editor - The Great Events by Famous Historians Vol. 18
Chapter 1
From Compiègne to Paris

On November the 11th the Armistice was signed by Germany. The fighting of the World War was brought to a close. All the nations that had participated were in the throes of exhaustion. Germany and France were probably the most hard hit of the major nations. These two were wrecked —socially, economically, financially, and commercially.

Most of the fighting had been on French territory and all of this land had been literally devastated. The number of soldiers lost by France while fighting was 1,385,000; 40,000 civilians were slain; and the number of soldiers and civilians wounded was 3,000,000. The total population of France at this time was 40,000,000. The cost of her property destroyed was valued at $10,000,000,000. The national debt was increased from $6 billions in 1913 to $30 billions in 1918. The net financial loss of France has been estimated at $24 billions.

But before we go on with the story, it is fitting to go back and look at the War in its last stages, leading up to the Armistice.

On the 8th of January 1918, Woodrow Wilson proclaimed his famous "Fourteen Points". Up to this time Germany had been making steady headway to victory. The Western Front had been pushed forward again and again. Then came the United States, bringing an end to the German advance, bringing a world crisis and, as a result of this latter, bringing anarchy. The United States proclaimed the principle of justice to all fighting people. They supported democracy.

* Cooke and Stickney, editors - Readings in European International Relations - page 546
and opposed anarchy. The Allied powers immediately adopted the American principle and the "Fourteen Points".

The first treaty made by opponents in the war was between Russia and Germany. (Roumania had signed a treaty but that was a minor country.) The Germans, who had a few weeks before heralded the American principles along with the Allied Powers in the hopes of winning over the United States, broke down and allowed the old methods of treaty making to hold. They twisted the "Fourteen Points" around until they were able to satisfy all their wants. They, figuratively, divided Russia and put her in such a position that the Allies could no longer count on her even as a "benevolent neutral". Their triumph over Russia so much encouraged the Germans that they still dreamed of being the leaders of the world. The peace with Russia was called the "peace without annexations". This treaty on the part of Germany completely won over the Americans. Wilson said, "Force and conquest, massacre and desolation, such as the world had not known through all the centuries of modern civilization, against this was to be pictured the great final drama of battle in the West".* The great German general, Ludendorff, had made all his plans. Four definite assaults were to be made on the line. Each had been carefully planned and no force had been omitted. The last ounce of strength was to be used. No reserve was saved in case of loss. It was the plan of the leaders that if this failed, there would be no use in further carrying on the war. It hardly seems possible

*C.F. Horne-editor "The Great Events of the Great War" Vol. 6 pg. 84
that human beings could have plotted out such a massacre.

The first of this series of "Kaiser Battles" began at Picardy. An attempt was made to break the line at the point of British defense. This was the heaviest day of fighting of the War. The British succeeded in holding the line and the first of the "Kaiser Battles" was a failure.

The second battle was that of Lys on April 9, 1918. The British were again attacked by the combined forces of the Germans and their allies in an attempt to cut off the British from the other Allies. This battle was almost a success for the Germans. The British line was broken and much ground was lost before the retreat could be stopped.

The third battle was that of Aisne. This point was closer to Paris and the French troops broke their line and retreated. The Germans covered the ground rapidly and got within 40 miles of the French capitol before they were stopped. The Americans came to the rescue and the third great battle ended in failure.

The last project of Ludendorff was called the "Peace Battle". He called upon every reserve that remained, knowing that unless this battle was won all would be lost. A terrific drive was started on the 15th of July. This ended in defeat for the Germans.

General Foch, commander of the Allied Nations' army, now began his counter attack which lasted until the 8th of November when the Germans requested terms. The German army officials are reported to have asked for peace terms from
their government long before. They realized the disastrous results that would follow, but the men in power failed to see anything in this light. They saw hope for a greater Germany in the dim obscurity. Although these men failed to see defeat in the great project of Ludendorff, the mutiny of the German navy at Kiel caused them to realize the futility of German success. When finally terms were asked for, the Kaiser and Prince Max abdicated, throwing the government into chaos. This could not, however, have made conditions any worse.

Probably the only assets not destroyed in Germany were its natural resources and its national spirit. The economic structure had, during the past four years, been converted into a war machinery. Every possible resource had been renovated to fit the war needs. Thus, when the war closed, the economic structure was completely destroyed. The foundation of this gigantic structure was German finance. It was now in dire straits. All the securities, currency, gold (practically all of this had been exported), and savings had been wiped out.

The terms of the Armistice at Compiègne, November 11, 1918, were very indefinite and caused the complete downfall of Germany. They stated that the terms of a treaty would be drawn up with the "Fourteen Points" of Wilson as a basis. This much was agreeable to the defeated. But the additional terms, such as the evacuation of all conquered territory, the repatriation of all prisoners, the surrender of the entire fleet including all of the submarines, the surrender
of guns, aeroplanes, rolling stock, and ammunition, the return of Alsace-Lorraine, withdrawal beyond the Rhine, cancelling of the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, and, to complete the list, the full responsibility of causing the war, were very disagreeable and humiliating to Germany.**

* The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed by Russia on the one hand and the Central Powers on the other on March 3, 1918. Its terms were equal to the unconditional surrender of Russia. The Treaty of Bucharest was signed by Roumania and the Central Powers on December 5, 1917.

These two treaties imposed upon Roumania and Russia extreme measures and huge losses of territory. They were later pointed out at Paris as showing the violent and barbarous war aims of Germany.

** The Armistice - signed November 11, 1918 at Compeigne
Chapter II
The Mechanism of the Conference and Wilson's Covenant

Now that the fighting had stopped, the Peace Conference was called to meet at Paris for making the peace terms of the Armistice definite. All the Allies were to meet and make their declarations, grievances, and claims. At the time of the Armistice the people of all the countries were for world peace, the Wilsonian policy of settling the terms of the Peace, and the outlawing of war. After a month or so, however, this glitter of the war days wore off. "As the call for love and service to mankind grew less intense, the voice of self-service and self-love grew strong again. Few men have such broad vision that they can see earth as a whole or can realize all the influence of that which happens far in the East upon him who dwells, perchance, in the farthest West. In the months that followed the Armistice, the thoughts of each ordinary man centered more upon his own nation, his own neighborhood, his own family, his own comfort." Each nation in turn viewed the situation from its own national viewpoint. By the time of the Peace Conference the complete reaction had come. Most of the nations brought definite plans for the national security of itself. They all seemed to favor the destroying of the defeated or, at least, the economic crippling so that no fear of them would be possible in the future.

* C.F.Horne - The Great Events of the Great War... Vol. 7 pg.14
The Conference met in January, 1920. The Supreme Council, constituted at the first meeting, was composed of the two ranking delegates of each of the Five Great Powers, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States. This group, "the Council of Ten," as it was often called, gradually superceded by first "the Big Five", and later, "the Big Four" composed of Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando, carried on the main work of the conference. This was the failing point of the Conference. Four men literally remade Europe. "The Big Four" who dominated the Versailles Peace Treaty, were not economists. They probably gave little consideration to the trade balance of the various countries. M. Clemenceau, reflecting the views of the French people who had been bled white in every way, thought first, last, and always of the permanent security and of the maximum possible indemnity to help repair damage----and to cripple Germany."* The French people felt that they had been overwhelmed during the War of 1870, and subsequently paid an indemnity to Germany of one billion dollars, which for those days seemed a fantastic sum, besides giving up two of their best provinces, Alsace and Lorraine. Then the World War had been brought home to every French family by way of death or of the maiming of one or more of its members. It affected them still more because it had been fought entirely on French soil. Consequently, one of the cornerstones of the Treaty was mapped out by France

*F.J.Lisman--"This Unbalanced World"--Barron's Weekly Oct.26 1931
as being a guaranty on the part of England and the United States against further attacks on France by Germany. The views of Clemenceau are regarded as the most biased of all the nations represented, but it cannot be forgotten that they were also the most powerful. Orlando, the Italian delegate, was a man that represented his country also, and his ideas of a treaty were much the same as Clemenceau's. Lloyd George, on the other hand, was at the beginning of the Conference inclined to follow Wilson, who was the only one at the Conference that seemed to have any idea as to the magnitude and the size of the undertaking. Lloyd George was, however, forced to abandon this idea as his term of office as peace delegate to Paris expired while the Conference was still going on. In order to be reelected, he was forced to adopt a platform of "Hang the Kaiser" and "Make the Germans pay shilling for shilling". When he returned to the Conference, his influence could no longer be used to further Mr. Wilson's ideals.

Mr. Wilson insisted that the first point to be taken up be that of the Covenant of the League of Nations. He had a definite plan for this League which he presented to the "Big Four". They were forced to discuss it first because of the dominant position held by Mr. Wilson. The United States was the least effected by the War. They were about the only country in the world that had food and money, and all the other nations were dependant on these. Mr. Wilson adopted the principle of abstinence and the other
nations were forced to agree with him because of this independent position of the United States. The Covenant of the League was thus made an integral part of the general treaty.

The leading features of the Covenant of the League of Nations were: The two leading institutions of the League were the Assembly and the Council. The Assembly was the general body in which all states which are members of the League, are represented. In the Assembly, each state was equal to every other state and casts a single vote. The Council was a smaller and far more important body. As sketched in 1919, it was to be composed of five permanent members, one each from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, together with four members elected annually by the Assembly, that is, nine in all. To the Council which meets normally four times a year and which can be summoned, in addition, in any pressing emergency, important functions were assigned. In the first place, it must at once act as a body of conciliators the moment a dispute which threatens war arises. As peace is its great concern, it is authorized to formulate plans for the reduction of armaments. It must also attempt to abate the evils which have arisen from the private and competitive manufacture of guns and munitions. A very serious responsibility fell upon it in connection with the system of mandates. Under this system, the colonies taken from Germany, as well as many of the provinces appropriated from Turkey, were not considered to be the property of the powers to which they were assigned, but possessions held in trust for the League,
to which an annual report of their administration is due.*

With the Covenant came the secret sessions of the "Big Four". It had been proclaimed before the Armistice that all the methods of "old diplomacy" would be done away with.** The "Big Four" had 145 sessions as compared with 111 held by all the rest of the groups. These meetings of the Big Four were held in secret behind locked doors, with no one else present. What was the reason for all this secrecy and methods of old diplomacy? The intentions of these men were good but they failed to carry them out, or perhaps they were not based on the right grounds. The reason was partly the Press. The opinion of the Big Four on this is expressed by the words of Lloyd George. He said, "If the Press intervenes in the early stages of the negotiations, it will crystallize opinions and agreement will be made more difficult." A unanimity of votes was necessary and this was thought to be impossible if the Press was allowed an open hand. Politics would be brought into play along with the Press. A very tragic incident of the Press had already caused a difference of opinion in France, and this experience along with the above named reason caused the Press to be withheld.

In making the Peace, it was deemed a matter of first importance to make impossible a revival of the Teuton aggressive spirit against France, because the territorial cessions and the reparations demands of France would

---pg. 744

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* Schuwill
The History of Europe ---

**Wilson's "Fourteen Points"
Point One -- "Open covenants of peace openly arrived at...."
naturally cause the German people to seek future opportunity to be revenged. With a population almost, if not quite, double that of the French Republic, Germany would be a constant menace to the nation which had suffered so terribly in the past by reason of the imperialistic spirit prevalent in the German Empire. The fear of this menace strongly influenced the French policies during the negotiations at Paris. In fact, it was hard to avoid the feeling that this fear dominated the conduct of the French delegates and the attitude of their Government. They demanded much, and, recognizing the probable effect of their demands on the German people, sought to obtain special protection in case their vanquished enemy attempted in the future to dispossess them by force of the land which they had been compelled to surrender or attempt to make them restore the indemnity paid.

The agenda of the Treaty was; The Covenant, the boundaries of Germany, Germany outside of Europe, armaments and reparations, financial and economic clauses and other miscellaneous clauses.

In this first part, the League Covenant, the League of Nations was planned out in its every detail, as has been before mentioned. It was Mr. Wilson's idea that it be made an integral part of the Treaty and Germany has only him to thank because he held out against the entire Conference for its principles and even on one occasion threatened to leave the Conference on this account. The European people, however, misunderstood the Covenant in that they took it to

* The Treaty of Versailles-Part I - Section II
mean that "America had entered the War, and that Mr. Wilson
had come to Paris as final proof that the people of the
United States would unhesitatingly consent to bear all the
burdens, run all the risks, accept all the difficulties,
incident to perpetual intermixtures in European affairs.

"At the moment when the Treaty of Versailles was being
made, all the European Allied peoples were demanding
passionately, incessantly, unreservedly, the realization of
all their material claims. Yet all took it as a foregone
conclusion that the people of the United States, who had
resigned all title and interest in the fruits of the common
victory, would be satisfied to accept a contract, by which
Europe subscribed, with reservations, to the vaguest sort
of moral principles, while the United States undertook the
most specific and far-reaching material responsibilities."*
It was on this account that the peoples of Europe made
such a strenuous objection to the Treaty after the American
Congress refused to ratify it, because the Allied statesmen
constructed their settlement with Germany on the grounds
that such would be the interpretation of the future relation
of the United States with Europe.

"In 1919, the material interests of the European visitors
and the moral enthusiasm of the American President, combined
to make the basic principle of the Peace Settlement."**
This moral enthusiasm of the President was expressed when
he said that the general plan of the League was;(1) That it

* Frank H. Simmonds "How Europe Made Peace Without America" p.28  
** Frank H. Simmonds "Can Europe Keep the Peace" p.11
should be strong enough to prevent a future attack upon nations; (2) To make the world safe for democracy; (3) To remove in a measure the immediate causes of war; (4) To provide peaceable means of settlement of disputes; (5) To promote a closer friendship of nations; (6) To have an international union against war; and last, to organize the world. Whether or not all these principles have been carried out in the League Covenant is left to the individual opinion, but I believe that it can be truthfully said that the President did all in his power to embody the above in the Covenant. The fight that the President had to put up for the Covenant was almost superhuman, but it was included in the final Treaty.

To have some idea of the repelling forces, let us look at the policy of the French. "The important fact is that the settlements in favor of France under the Treaty were of a nature which made the continuance of peace between the two nations doubtful if Germany possessed the ability to regain her military strength and if nothing was done to prevent her from using it. Under these circumstances, a special protective treaty seemed a practical way to check the conversion of the revengeful spirit of the Germans into another war of Invasion."

There were also two other clauses of the Covenant that the French opposed. The first is quoted; "The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest

*Robert Lansing "The Peace Negotiations" pg. 185
point consistent with the national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

"The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstance of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments."*

The other clause opposed by the French was that which proposed that the colonial possessions of the Central Powers be given over as Mandates to the supervision of the League. It read: "The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such people should be entrusted to advanced nations, who by reason of their resources, their experience, or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League."**

* The Treaty of Versailles -- Part I, Article 8
** The Treaty of Versailles -- Part I, Article 22
Chapter III

The Boundaries of Germany

The second part of the Treaty, however, seemed to quiet the French opposition mentioned above as the boundaries of the New Germany were made. As can be readily seen on the accompanying map, Germany lost much to France. First, let us look at the Saar Basin. This was a small tract of land (738 square miles) between the boundaries of Germany and France. It belonged to Germany, but the French asked for outright annexation of it at the Conference because of the German destruction of French mines during the War at Lens, Valenciennes, and other places. This Basin is very important because of its coal fields. Before the war it produced 18 million tons of coal annually. This section was almost completely German in population. The conference refused France the right of annexation but a compromise was made, the terms being:--The Saar Basin was to be detached from Germany and a separate state was to be created, with the League as a guiding hand. The government was to consist of five men, one from France, one local, and three neither French nor German. These were to be appointed by the League yearly. The ownership of the mines was to go the French. In 15 years after 1920, a plebiscite was to be held in this area and this would determine the government--whether French, German, or a continuation of the autonomous rule of the League. But if the plebiscite went back in favor of the Germans, the Germans would be forced to buy the mines outright from the French with gold.

Next came the decision as to Alsace-Lorraine. This is also
indicated on the map. Provision for the return of this territory was written in the Armistice. It read: "The territories which were ceded to Germany in accordance with the preliminaries of Peace signed at Versailles on February 26, 1871, and the Treaty of Frankfort of May 10, 1871, are restored to French sovereignty as from the date of the Armistice of November 11, 1918."* Alsace-Lorraine is very important as an industrial and a mining center. It is about the size of Connecticut and Vermont (5,695 square miles). Its population at the present is about 1,795,000. It is important for three reasons: (1) At Fischelbraun is the only important oil well in Germany; (2) Its rich potash mines; and (3) The Lorraine iron fields. In 1913, these fields produced 21,000,000 tons of iron. "In spite of all that has been written about the supposed affinities and desires of the population of Alsace-Lorraine, it must not be forgotten that the national interests of Germany and France are vitally concerned in its possession, not merely in the general sense of the desire to keep or to recover something which has been fought over as a matter of national honor, but in the very definite respects of military advantage and economic power. And there have been times when these considerations were put nakedly in the foreground as the dominant motives."** The sovereignty of this territory has been the subject of controversy for many decades in Europe. The most propounded argument is that it should be

* The Armistice at Compeigne Article 51

** Lord and Haskins—*Some Problems of the Peace Conference* 
Pg. 100
governed by that country which has the largest percentage of its native citizens in the province. This ethnological argument was broken down by the fact that the countries, Austria and Switzerland both had the larger percentage of German-speaking people, yet they remained independent. The argument which won out in the Conference was that of national safety. "International boundaries may be drawn along ethnic, economic, geographic, historic, or strategic lines. One or all of these elements may influence the decision, but whatever argument may be urged in favor of any one of these, the chief object in the determination of the sovereignty to be exercised within a certain territory is national safety. "National safety is as dominant in the life of a nation as self-preservation is in the life of an individual. It is even more so, as nations do not respond to the impulse of self-sacrifice."* Hence, the fact that Alsace-Lorraine was almost eighty-five percent German-speaking in 1910 did not effect the terms of the Treaty.

The next step taken in the Treaty was the fixing of the relations of Germany with Austria. The Treaty read, "Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly the independence of Austria, within the frontiers which may be fixed in a Treaty between that State and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations."** Like terms were included for the new Czecho-Slovak state, Poland, Russia,

* Lansing-- The Peace Negotiations-- Pg. 102
** The Treaty of Versailles Part 3 Section 4 Article 80
and the new Russian States. By these terms France was building up her policy of security. By these, she put Germany in such a position that no secret alliances or agreements of any kind could be made or in any way could a union be made by which Germany could join with any other power against France.

Following the above, we find the decision as to the boundary between Germany and the new Poland. The most important concession of the eastern boundary of Germany was that of Upper Silesia. This territory was extraordinarily rich in minerals and important industrially. For example, just before the war, its coal production was 44,000,000 tons yearly—three times as great as that of the Saar Basin and 23% of Germany’s total output of coal. It furnished 34% of her production of lead ore; and 81% of her zinc. "The loss of so immensely valuable a territory would mean a severe blow to the economic life as well as to the pride of the German people. It was a sacrifice that could be fairly demanded only if the majority of the population in Upper Silesia desired union with Poland. As to the wishes of the population, the evidence was strongly in favor of Polish claims, but it was not absolutely conclusive. Hence, the Conference finally resolved that in so grave a matter the decision must be left in the hands of the people themselves by plebiscite."* There were also three other provinces left to a plebiscite in this area; Terchen, Arva, and Szepes (Zips). This decision of the eastern boundary relates to the topic for two reasons: first, because France

* Haskins and Lord -- Some Problems of the Peace Conference pg. 186
literally was responsible for the decision and second, because it was one of the foundations of the French policy. The French were interested in this territory because they wished to see it joined to the new Poland. Another point was that the separation of this important mining section would further cripple the Germans and slow down their possibilities of ever using it again to the height of the Great Powers.

Now came the making of the new Poland. This establishment of Poland, or rather the reestablishment, was the one point in the Treaty that was an honest application of the principles of the Fourteen Points as laid down by Wilson and on which the Treaty was supposed to have been built. On the principle of the reestablishment, all the Powers agreed, but this was only the beginning. What were the boundaries to be? Poland had been erased from the map so long that it remained only a name, a memory, or a cause rather than a country. The boundaries finally laid down included most of East Prussia, West Prussia, and the province of Posen. At this decision, Germany could hardly make any legitimate protest, but she did on the point that France was only doing this to place a 'buffer' state between her and Russia, in order to prevent any coalition. A further development of this will be seen in the post-war years.

To get a view of the Polish opinion let us look at the opening words of Ignace Paderewski's speech to the Polish people. "The Polish nation is to-day living through
solemn moments. I suppose that in its eventful history there was never a time more solemn, more fateful than the present. The fate of our country is at stake; powerful people holding in their hands the destiny of the world, are building a framework for our independent existence, are deciding the frontiers of our State, and soon will pronounce a final sentence, from which, no doubt for long years, there will be no appeal, perhaps for many generations. Violent bursts of hope and of joy and anxiety are strongly shaking our national spirit. From every side, from every corner of our former commonwealth, people are coming here to Warsaw and going there to Paris, in frock coats and smock frocks, in old-fashioned country dress, in mountaineer costume, and they cry aloud and implore that their distant province should be united to the Polish State."

Further than this the Polish nation had been promised a port on the Sea. The realization of this was far more tedious than it was expected. Danzig, was the logical port to offer Poland but this city at the mouth of the Vistula had been built up by Germany and it was in truth a German city. To give it over to the Poles was an open breach of the Fourteen Points and in entire opposition to the principles of the whole Conference. Another solution to the problem was sought. It was establishment of the Free City of Danzig. By this, since the Conference could not give Poland access to the sea on ethnographic grounds, it was stated that, "The Allied and Associated Powers undertake to establish the town of Danzig, together with the rest of

* Ignace Paderewski---address made in Warsaw in May, 1919 Great Events of the Great War - Vol. 7 - Page 102
the territory described in Article 100 (the narrow strip of territory surrounding the city -- a total population of about 300,000), as a Free City. It will be placed under the protection of the League of Nations." At the same time, the Allied and Associated Powers undertook to establish a Treaty between the Polish Government and the Free City of Danzig which had the following objects: (1) To include the Free City of Danzig in the customs frontiers of the Polish Government; (2) To ensure Poland of the free use of the Danzig port and waterways; (3) To give Poland control of the railways in the City, and also control of the means of communication; (4) The right to improve the above works; (5) To provide against the discrimination of Polish citizens in the Free City; (6) To manage the foreign relations of Danzig as well as the diplomatic protection of the citizens abroad. To sum all the above into the one phrase, Danzig was separated from Poland only technically, but united with her geographically and economically.

This discussion of Poland cannot be complete without the mention of the Corridor. This is the strip of land that connects Poland major with the Baltic Sea. This Corridor separates Germany from East Prussia. East Prussia is a pure German province, 15,000 square miles in area with a population of 2½ million. It is a marvellously tilled territory which stands out in contrast to the undeveloped

* The Treaty of Versailles -- Part 3 -- Article 102
territories of its neighbors. The Poles wished to obtain part of this territory in order that they have complete control of the shortest railway route from Warsaw to Danzig. They obtained the right to a plebiscite in the desired area but their hopes were dashed by the large majority of German votes which reverted the territory to the Germans. The Corridor, however, remained. The sovereignty of this territory was derived on ethnographic grounds. It had a majority neither German nor Polish, but was constituted mainly of Laschubs, who are Slavic, and other isolated groups of alien peoples. Since the establishment of the Polish sovereignty in the Corridor, the majority of Germans have left and now it is predominantly Polish. The main objection of Germany to this is the fact that the Corridor separates them from East Prussia. These decisions concerning Poland were carefully planned by the French. They saw in the new Poland an ally against Germany. By building up Poland and making her as strong as possible, it insured the security of France. By gaining for Poland these valuable concessions, Poland was put under obligation to France. All these concessions only increased the hatred of Germany for France and built up more and more the desire for revenge.*

The boundary between Germany and Denmark was to be determined according to the wishes of the population. By this Germany lost little territory. As this does not concern the Franco-German action it will be passed over with only the mentioning of it.

The next part of the Treaty was the decision of

* H.W.V. Temperly, editor - A History of the Peace Conference of Paris - Vol.II - Chapter 4
Heliogoland. This was a small island in the North Sea at the mouth of the Elbe River that had been used during the war as a very important fortification. The fortifications, military establishments, and harbors were to be destroyed by Germany and were not to be reconstructed in the future. This destroyed any hope of Germany to ever endanger Western Europe by water.

Last came the decision as to Belgium. This is outstanding because Belgium had been a neutral at the beginning of the war and Germany had forced her into the war. The Belgians had fought side by side with the Allied Powers. They had suffered more than any other nation because of the German occupation lasting almost during the entire war. When the war was ended, Belgium expected much in compensation. When the council of the Ten was called, Belgium was excluded, likewise in the Council of Four. This was not their only disappointment however, because they expected a correction in the boundary on the frontiers of Holland and Luxemburg, two neutral countries which were not members of the Peace Conference and consequently not subject to the jurisdiction of it. The only boundary correction that was made was a very small addition to Belgium on the German frontier. According to the Treaty, the Kreise, Malmédy, and Lüpen were transferred to Belgium (376 square miles; 61,000 population).*

One matter affecting Holland did, however, concern the Conference, namely the neutrality of Belgium, which had been compulsory and guaranteed by three treaties -- one

* Ibid. Chapter III Part IV
between the Five Great powers and Belgium, one between these powers and Holland, and one between Holland and Belgium (1839). Belgium thus obtained a hearing at the Conference with the object "to free Belgium from that limitation on her sovereignty which was imposed on her by the treaties of 1839, and, in the interest both of Belgium and of general peace, to remove the dangers of Belgium and the disadvantages arising from the said treaties." Belgium and Holland were accordingly invited to appear before the Conference in order to set forth their views with regard to such a revision. The Belgians maintained that she had been given weak frontiers in 1839 on the ground that she was to be protected by the Great Powers; such protection having failed disastrously in 1914, she should be given frontiers which would enable her to hold her own with her neighbors, in war and in peace. Belgium argued that the unlimited sovereignty which had been promised her in President Wilson's seventh point ought to carry with it the frontiers that had been denied her in the days of her weakness. Holland had no objection to the abandonment of Belgium's neutrality, which had been guaranteed to her as well as to Belgium, but she would not consider for a moment any concession of her own territory. She declared, however, that she was ready to discuss amicably with Belgium any adjustments of conditions of navigation, etc. A Commission was appointed and it set to work immediately, but when the Conference was ready to adjourn it had no report as yet to make so Holland was successful in every way. "If the territorial status of Belgium has not been essen-
tially bettered by the war, her economic status is certainly worse. No share in a problematic indemnity will compensate her for her direct losses, not to speak of her other expenses -- the stripping of her resources, the enforced idleness of her factories, the disappearance of her foreign markets and her transit trade."* A hero in 1914, is Belgium to remain a cripple for the future? The German is gone, but he left ruin and disillusion behind him. Belgium now looks at the prosperous Holland, that remained neutral, and the Luxemburg that succumbed, and wonders that in the future which course she will follow. There is little doubt. For the future, Belgium's security lies in a strong League of Nations and in that such a League stands for. At first, Belgium took the League as a "mere scrap of paper", but now she realizes that cooperation with the League is the best, since it was the sense of international right that brought the world to Belgium's side in the Great War, and it is in the broadening and deepening of that sense that the chief hope lies in the future. Also Belgium found a friend in France. France desired allies and by the building up of Belgium she would have another country under obligation to her. Belgium was a very desirable ally because of her intense hatred for Germany. Another fact to be remembered is that Belgium separates France from Germany, thus making Belgium too a 'buffer state'.

* Haskins and Lord -- Some Problems of the Peace Conference
** Goschen's Report on his last hours in Berlin. Cooke and Stickney - Readings in European International Relations - Page 382
Chapter IV

German Rights and Interests Outside of Germany

This section of the treaty was not so much advocated by France as it was by England. By the treaty, however, Germany was forced to renounce all her rights, titles, and privileges, whatever their origin, in the territory outside her European frontiers. This meant that Germany no longer had any title to her overseas possessions. This point is relevant to our subject only in the fact that this concession helped France in her policy of security. It completed the isolation of Germany from the rest of the world. Of all the former German colonies, France received only a portion of equatorial Africa and the Mandate of a section of Togoland. The rest of the German colonies were distributed as follows:*

- German East Africa; Tanganyika territory - British Mandate
- Ruanda and Urundi - Belgium Mandate
- Kionga Triangle - restored to Portugal

- German Southwest Africa; Mandate of Union of S.A.

- Kamerun; French Cameroon - French Mandate
- French equatorial Africa - restored to Fr.
- British Cameroon - British Mandate

- Togoland; French Togoland - French Mandate
- British " - British "

- Western Samoa; New Zealand Mandate

- Nauru; British Mandate

- Former Kaiser Wilhelm Land; Australian Mandate

* The Treaty of Versailles -- Part III
The lease of Shantung, negotiated from China in 1898, was renounced in favor of Japan. This was especially to apply to the Kiaochow peninsula.
Chapter V

The Disarmament of Germany

By the terms of the Armistice, Germany agreed to dissolve her army and to surrender to the Allies practically the whole of her military and naval equipment. This included her battle fleet, her submarines, her heavy artillery, her machine guns, her munitions, and her airplanes. A great power was rated as such in European affairs by the approximate proportion of its army and navy to the size of the country. Although this was not what historians usually wrote in their books, it was what every diplomat knew. The purpose behind the disarmament measures of the Paris diplomats is therefore clear: it was to reduce Germany from the status of a great power. However, it was stated in the Treaty thus: "In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval, and air clauses which follow."* This clause in the treaty that forces disarmament on Germany seems to be the one so long sought by France. By it, Germany was limited to a standing army of 100,000. These were to be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory and to the control of the frontier.

Universal compulsory military service was to be abolished in Germany, and the army was to be constituted wholly of volunteers, serving for a period of twelve years.

* The Treaty of Versailles -- Part V -- line 1-3
All the fortifications, fortresses, and field works situated in Germany to the west of a line drawn 30 miles to the east of the Rhine were to be disarmed and dismantled and to remain so, and the construction of any new fortification was strictly forbidden.

The naval clauses were just as severe in that they limited the navy to 6 battleships (small type), 6 light cruisers and 12 each of the destroyer and torpedo types. This can be compared with that of France which was then 10 battleships, 14 cruisers, and 147 of the other types, together with 42 submarines, which were strictly forbidden the Germans. Also the navy force was limited to 15,000 men, including officers.

In respect to the air forces the Treaty read, "The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces." Thus Germany was reduced to a minor power, never to rise again. Her army was deprived of the characteristic equipment of the machine-age and obliged to renounce the use of heavy artillery, tanks, poison gas, and airplanes; her navy was forbidden to build, buy, or own submarines, her war-harbor of Heligoland was destroyed, her fortifications on the left bank of the Rhine could not be maintained. In short, she was to be open to invasion from every side and she would be unable to defend herself when invaded. She was put in such a position that she would never be able to invade another country by land, air or water. This was the realization of the long sought desire of France.

* The Treaty of Versailles - Part 5, Section 3, Article 198
She felt that the disarmament of Germany would render security both for herself and for the newly erected boundaries of Europe.
Chapter VI

The Financial and Reparations Clauses

The first clause of the reparations section of the Treaty fixed the war guilt. It read, "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."*

This did not relate merely or primarily to the legal liability for damage which had been accepted by Germany in the Armistice, but it was designed to establish the fact that the war had been caused by Germany, and it was required of German representatives to sign this document as a confession of crime. It was the disclosure of the purpose of the Allied peoples to deal with the Germans as a guilty people. This guilt clause was the climax of the Treaty. Up to this time, feeling had been held in to a certain extent. It had appeared first in the French spirit of revenge, then by the British in their desire for the German colonies, but each time Wilson was able in a measure to suppress these. This final clause expressed with utter unanimity by the Allied peoples ruined the whole purpose of the Treaty, in that it destroyed the fundamental principles on which the Treaty was supposed to have been based. "The Germans must

* The Treaty of Versailles -Part 8, Section 1, Article 231
be guilty because all Allied peoples unanimously believed and knew them to be guilty. In no democracy was there opposition; in all, the verdict was unanimous. The very failure of the German people to acknowledge the truth thus established, became a new proof of the accuracy of the indictment."

With the above as a basis, the Reparations clauses were put down. The Allies recognized the inability of Germany to pay for the entire war, so they specified definite items for which compensation was to be made. These were; first, all damage done to civilians of the Allied and Associated Powers and their property; second, the restoration of Belgium; and last, the restoration of that part of France which the Germans had destroyed. The amount of this reparation was to be determined by a Reparation Commission appointed at the Conference. In these clauses the Conference was not writing a mere contract of dollars and cents, but it was dealing with blood-raw passions still pulsing through the people's veins. It was impossible to ignore the human factors, but provisions were made whereby they could be reduced or eliminated later, and whereby, the Reparation Commission, in the processes of enforcement, might become a flexible instrument of wisdom and justice. "No one can understand the peace treaty who does not know and cannot measure the human conditions under which it was brought forth. It is singular but true that peace seemed very beautiful during the war, but almost hateful when the war ended. From a superficial survey of the conditions that prevailed at the Peace Conference one would have been quite justified
in assuming that many of the participants preferred war with all the horrors to any peace short of that which they demanded. Their demands had their genesis in deep-rooted and almost ineradicable hatreds and in the insistent desire for self-protection against future danger. *Although the Allied Powers had agreed to a Peace upon the basis of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, and the principles of settlement were to be formulated not in the interest of Germany, but to promote the real interest of the Allies themselves and to advance the cause of world peace and future security, public opinion changed so much that the delegates were forced to change also. Examples of this change are shown in France by the placards proclaiming "Que L'Allemagne paye d'abord" (Let Germany pay first) which covered the walls of Paris during the days of the Conference, by the refusal of the French to adopt any immediate taxation measures, insisting that Germany should assume the burdens of the war, and in England by the reelection of Lloyd George on the basis of an increase in the severity of the terms of peace, especially those of reparation. Public opinion had been roused to a white heat of fear, hatred, and distrust. Facing these facts, one can easily realize the impossibility of arriving at a treaty free from passion and a sense of wrong. With this in mind, the demand for the immediate payment of $50,000,000 as the first installment of Reparations, together with almost 400,000 head of live stock and immense quantities of coal and dyestuffs, can be partly

* Baruch -- The Making of the Reparations and Economic Sections of the Peace Treaty  pg. 5 & 7
justified. The remainder of the Reparations and the report of the Commission will be given later. The handing over of the live stock, coal, and other supplies by Germany to the devastated areas of France and Belgium was justified in the minds of the French as only legitimate. The Germans compared France demanding these to Shylock demanding his pound of flesh to which his bond entitles him. They depict France as fanatic, blinded by hatred, possessed with the mania of destroying her enemy, and acting contrary to her obvious interest.
Chapter VII

The Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, June 28, 1919

On May the 7th, 1919, the Treaty was ready for presentation to the German delegation. They were told peremptorily that no round table discussion was to be allowed. They might, however, communicate in writing their objections to the terms submitted. This they did. Count Von Brockdorff-Rantzau, the head of the German delegation, made a very lengthy protest which stated the German views. He pointed out the fact that the treaty was supposed to have been based on justice and that Germany, cut to pieces and weakened, could hardly meet the demands of her enemies on reparations. "No limit is fixed, save the capacity of the German people for payment, determined not by their standard of life, but solely by their capacity to meet the demands of their enemies by their labor. The German people would thus be condemned to perpetual slave labor."*

M. Clemenceau made a reply to the numerous protests of the Germans that stated: the international rights which she claimed were only temporarily withheld; that it was not proposed to exclude her from the League permanently, nor to erect economic barriers against her; that there must be a transition period during which the economic balance was to be restored; and that Germany was to redeem her reputation. He maintained that it was a peace, not of violence, but of justice; that it was not based on condonation of the

* Count Von Brockdorff-Rantzau -- Letter to M. Clemenceau as President of the Paris Peace Conference. From "Great Events of the Great War" Vol 7 -- see bibliography.
events of 1914-18; that reparation for wrongs inflicted was of the essence of justice; that Germany was responsible for the war because for many years her rulers had striven for a "position of dominance in Europe" and attempted to "dictate and tyrannise to a subservient Europe"; that they sought to "sow hostility and suspicion instead of friendship between nations; that they had developed a system of espionage and intrigue which enabled them to stir up internal rebellion and unrest, and even to make secret offensive preparations within the territories of their neighbors, whereby they might strike them down with greater security and ease"; that the German Revolution could not be counted as absolving the German people from these crimes against Humanity and Right, for the Revolution had been stayed until the German armies had vanished by a war of conquest; and finally that it was impossible to expect the free nations of the world "to sit down immediately in equal association with those by whom they have been so grievously wronged". This article consisted of some 20,000 words and expressed perfectly the Allied attitude. Finally, after much dilly-dallying on the part of the Germans, they were summoned to Versailles, their counter-proposals having been rejected as fast as they were offered. A curt ultimatum was issued that they should either sign without delay or there would be a renewal of the war.*

Thus on June 28, 1919, the Powers of the World met at the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles, in the exact spot where the German Empire had been proclaimed in 1871, on the fifth

anniversary of the historic pistol-shot which killed the Austrian archduke and which had ever since filled the world with its deafening echoes. The Treaty was ready in almost the original form that it had been presented to the Germans on May 7. The two German delegates, Bell and Müller, practically unknown men, signed the Treaty. All the original delegates had resigned, refusing to accept the terms of the Treaty. Thus was signed a Treaty that was to change the policies, economic, financial, and political, of practically every nation of Europe, especially those of France and Germany.

In spite of the humiliating conditions, Germany was forced to sign, she still had her undying spirit. Germany hardly felt that she was vanquished; she felt proud of the formidable resistance she had so long opposed to the entente; her armies may have given way in the end, but at least they had not known defeat and she had always kept the war within the bounds of the enemy's territory. She was conscious that her strength in numbers surpassed those of France. Furthermore, the Germans cherished at heart the conviction that she had a brighter future than France and the hope that France may die because of her own very victory.

Thus, although the Germans seemed humiliated at the terms of Versailles, their never dying spirit still burned and these acts of France only added fuel to the flame of hatred between the two nations.
Part II

From Versailles to Locarno

1919-23
Chapter I

The Policy of Germany

"In the eyes of all peoples, the policies of other nations seem based upon selfish considerations, while their own appear firmly established on right and reason. But, in fact, all national policies are similarly founded upon purely parochial estimates of domestic interests and foreign dangers. And, in support of these policies, every people employs the means it deems most appropriate, displays the same unconcern for the effect of its policy upon other nations, and rejects with utter scorn proposals for amendments coming from abroad. Similarly, all peoples found their programme of peace upon the renunciation of weapons useless in their own hands, but dangerous in those of others."

In keeping with these principles we may state that the policy of Germany since the War has been that of escape from the system of the Treaty of Versailles through abolition of reparations payments, removal of the unilateral disarmament circumstances and, finally through revision of the territorial clauses of the treaty.

The terms of the Treaty of Versailles came to the German people as an utterly incomprehensible decision. In the pronouncements of Wilson they had seen the promise of a generous peace and a prompt restoration of the German nation to its pre-war position. And, as a consequence, the complicated and terrible conditions of the Paris Settlement seemed at one time a violation of the Armistice terms and the

* Simonds -- Can Europe Keep the Peace pg. 129
the revelation of a purpose to make German recovery impossible for all time. As a consequence the Germans have adopted the above policy.

First in regard to the Reparations. Germany was required to deposit $50,000,000 with the Allied Governments immediately before the amount of the final sum was decided. The amount of this first payment, however, gave the Germans a clue that it would be enormous. On May 1, 1921, the Commission had fixed the German debt at approximately $31 billions. Under this programme, the amount due December 31, 1922, would have amounted to $1,100,000,000. At this time, the Germans had paid but $554,000,000. The Commission, however, unanimously reduced them for the year of 1922, so that $875,000,000 was due for that 20 months period. In the four years' time, Germany had paid in cash and deliveries in kind about 1200 million dollars, about half of which had gone toward costs of the armies of occupation. Owing to interallied arrangements, most of the remainder had gone to Belgium. France had realized nothing in liquid form which could be applied to her costs of reconstruction. In November 1922, Germany asked for a moratorium of three or four years, excepting for certain deliveries in kind for the devastated areas, giving as reason the economic conditions of the country. This filled the French with apprehension. The British, however, sided with the Germans. On this rock Britain and France parted.

Immediately thereafter, the British adopted a policy of abstaining from the principal debates and decisions of

* Office of the Reparation Payments - The Execution of the Experts Plan to May 17, 1930
the Reparations Commission. Germany was in default on her deliveries of coal and other materials. The Reparations Commission declared the default a voluntary one, and the French, supported by the Belgians, on January 11, 1923, moved into the Ruhr Valley in order to collect, under duress, the reparations which Germany, according to the French, were wilfully withholding. The Ruhr constituted one of the greatest coal and industrial areas of the world and was the very heart of economic Germany. Great Britain's protest against the French action encouraged Germany to declare it illegal. Ruhr government and factory officials, as well as the workers, were exhorted from Berlin to balk the French designs by means of the formidable weapon of passive resistance. Against this first plan of Poincare's that of a small body of experts supervising the Ruhr industries and turning the profits into the French treasury, he was obliged to bring a vast army across the Rhine in order to set the recalcitrant Germans to work under military compulsion. The result was never in doubt, and in September 1923, Germany surrendered unconditionally. The first attack upon the Treaty of Versailles had failed.*

* Noyes and Fuller - The French Occupation of the Ruhr
ed to offer security against immediate destruction.* Another revolution was hanging. A communist revolt occurred in the neutralized territory along the Rhine. In order to put down the revolt, the German Government requested permission to move troops into the area. Without waiting authorization, the Germans marched 20,000 men into the area and overcame the revolution. The French protested.

Difficulties also arose over aircraft. The Treaty prohibited Germany from having any military airplanes. But what was the difference between military and commercial planes? Germany finally reached an agreement to the effect that planes having certain qualities of speed and strength were to be regarded as military planes and hence prohibited.

Likewise, questions arose as to the maintenance of armed police forces. The danger of revolution and of crime following the armistice in 1918 became so great that the Germans established several new police organizations. These forces were fully armed and the Allied Governments soon said that it was a military force, the existence of which violated the peace treaty. Likewise the Allies complained at the end of 1920 that Germany had failed to destroy a large quantity of arms. In answer to these protests, it was stated that it was ethically unsound and physically impossible to attempt to keep the largest nation in Europe in a prostrate condition, while her neighbors armed to their heart's desire.

*Schevill- A History of Europe pg. 753
As to the revision of the territorial boundaries, the Germans were stopped. Their only victory was in the plebiscites: In the Schleswig zones, the southern section elected Germany, in eastern Prussia both plebiscite areas went to Germany; in Upper Silesia the plebiscite went to Germany, but the allies were resolved that this rich mining and industrial area should not remain with Germany and insisted on dividing it between Germany and Poland in such a way that the overwhelming preponderance of its coal and zinc mines were handed over to the resuscitated Slav State.

With all these evasions stopped Germany remains—and remains—unshaken, and German policy is still for revision.
Chapter II

The policy of France

As has frequently been pointed out, a continuous insistence on security is the dominant motive of the French policy. The insistence, logical enough in its essentials, seems on its particulars to amount to an obsession. Yet what the French actually mean by security is neither quite simple, nor by any means self-evident. It is not, for example, merely a question of frontiers, armies or limited guarantees. On the contrary, it is primarily the French desire of the establishment in Europe of a system of order. And, quite naturally, their system of order conforms to French conception.

Clemenceau, thus, at the Peace Conference made every effort to insure France security. "He was unimpressed by Wilson's idealistic programme, which was the League of Nations, and he was unconvinced by Foch's prescription of permanent occupation of the left bank of the Rhine. He regarded the former scheme as Utopian, and the latter as a vagary of a military mind. For him the single formula of security was the preservation of the war time associations of his own country with the two English-speaking nations." He thought that he had realized this when it was included in the Treaty of Versailles, but when the United States Senate rejected it, the Treaty of Guarantee fell and Clemenceau's policy was in ruins and his own political career was at an end.

* Frank Simonds -- Can Europe Keep the Peace? pg. 157
The international relations of Europe until recently have been based on the principle of the Balance of Power. This was the dividing up of the nations by alliances, since they could no longer be divided into states of equal military and economic power, to the point that no state would be able single-handed to impose its will upon the rest of the world. Such was the case at the beginning of the Great War. In 1917 the situation suddenly changed; the Tsar of Russia was overthrown; Russia withdrew from the war; a Bolshevist Government came into power; it repudiated the obligations of the old regime and proclaimed its intention of bringing on a world revolution. Russia, the ally of France, had become the enemy. The French therefore, believe that there is danger that these two outcast states of Europe -- Russia and Germany -- might form an alliance to overturn the Versailles settlement, and dominate the continent. Under these impulses of the Balance of Power conceptions and believing in the implacable hatred of Germany, French policy aimed to keep Germany weak and to find new allies to bolster up the French position to offset Germany's superior man-power.

Thus we see France in the next period negotiating with the powers of England, Belgium, Poland, Luxembourg, and the new Slavic States for treaties of defense against Germany or to serve as allies for her. She tried to get the League to establish an international army, and Britain and the United States to guarantee the Peace, but these measures failed.
With Germany temporarily crippled by disarmament and economic barriers, France set out to hunt for allies. The first was the small state of Belgium, who had suffered from the German invasion and had failed to get her desires granted at the Peace Conference in regard to territorial expansion and the control of the mouths of her two rivers, the Scheldt and the Meuse, her only outlets by water to the Sea, which were held by Holland and Luxembourg respectively (see map on next page). Thus in September 1920, the French and Belgium military staffs drew up a military agreement providing for reciprocal aid in case of attack. The question as to the legality of the treaty immediately arose. The League of Nations Covenant provided that all treaties should be registered at Geneva. This, the French and Belgium Governments declined, in fact they even refused to publish the text of the document. They simply registered some letters stating that such an agreement had been entered into. It was defensive against Germany in case either was attacked by her. The French followed this up with an economic agreement which would tie the two countries more closely together. Thus we have France with her first ally.*

Next came Poland. It has already been shown that France was responsible mainly for the creation of this state to act as a buffer between Germany and Russia. It was natural for Poland to seek aid from France, and it was natural for France to ask aid from Poland in time of war with either Russia or Germany because of Poland's strategic location.

* Lindsay Rodgers - The Keystone of French Foreign Policy
"In 1920 France rushed aid to Poland before any alliance had been made -- the occasion being war between Poland and Russia. In February 1921, the situation was consolidated by the signing of a political agreement between Poland and France in which they agreed to act together in all questions of foreign policy relating to the regulation of international affairs, in the spirit of the peace treaties and in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations."*

This agreement, like that with Belgium, was followed by a commercial treaty opening the two countries' markets at a low tariff. France also forwarded a loan of £100,000,000 to Poland. She had saved the Poles, she now became the guarantor of their existence, and the strong Polish army, presently to rise, would measurable replace the Russian on the eastern frontiers of Germany. For the construction of this policy, the famous Millerand is mainly responsible.

His policy found wider extension under his successors in Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-Slavia and Rumania. In January 1924, the French Government signed an alliance with Czecho-Slovakia in regard to any attempted union of Germany and Austria or in case of any questions arising regarding their security or that of the peace treaties. This agreement was not military as in the case of the Belgium alliance. Similar agreements were entered into with Yugo-Slavia and Rumania. Thus the Little Entente became like Poland, not only a military, but a diplomatic bulwark of French policy. "But on the other hand, French policy itself was now definitely

* Buell -- Europe, A History of Ten Years pg.67
This map indicates the position of Belgium and Holland. The control of the mouths of the Meuse, Scheldt and the Rhine are all held by Holland. It is also to be noted that these are practically the only accesses that Belgium has to the sea.

The provinces of Eupen and Malmedy are plebiscite areas that were given to Belgium by the Treaty of Versailles.
embarked upon the defence of the status quo, not only on the Rhine, but on the Vistula, the Danube, and even the Dniester!*

Along with the above alliances France had hopes of a revival of the ill-fated alliance of 1919 with England. France had wished a clear-cut agreement with England ever since the Entente Cordiale, and had finally obtained it in the Treaty of Guaraná, only to have it dashed to pieces by the refusal of the United States Senate to ratify it. Negotiations were made for a defensive treaty with England against Germany, but France considered them one-sided because the British refused to accept the inclusion of Poland in the defensive clause. The British opposed this inclusion of Poland because they considered Poland a protege of France - an artificial creation that threatened the British position in the Baltic. At Cannes in 1922, an alliance was discussed at length, only to end in failure because of this irreconcilable difference over the Polish frontier. Finally, after other attempts at negotiations, Poincaré broke the Entente Cordiale by invading the Ruhr and by seeking further continental alliances.

* Simmonds -- Can Europe Keep the Peace? pg.159
PART III

Teutonic and Gallic Conflicts Rectified
Chapter I

The Rhineland and the Ruhr Invasion

The Rhine River flows through Western Europe in such a manner that it is considered by the French as a natural boundary between France and Germany despite the fact that the French have only had control of this area but once. The Germans have held to this territory throughout the centuries, except in the case above mentioned when Napoleon realized the long-desired French policy. This territory, usually referred to as the Rhineland territory, is the very heart of the German industrial world and is also very rich in minerals. This territory was still in dispute at the close of the Great War as can be seen by the decision about Alsace-Lorraine. The province of Alsace and part of that of Lorraine are bordered by the Rhine. Thus, by the return of these two to France, a part of her policy was realized. There remained, however, the Ruhr territory.*

The economic factor, which gives the French some basis other than imperialism for the desire to control the Ruhr, is brought at this point of outstanding importance. The iron deposits of Europe lie in the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine while the coal deposits lie in the Ruhr. Both are more advantageous if controlled by one sovereignty. Economically, it is more advantageous to bring the coal to the iron for industry. Hence, France, since she owns the iron deposits, considers it her right to control the coal areas also.

* Parker T. Moon - Imperialism and World Politics - Chapter 17 - Part 2
Another factor to remember is that the nations of the world are rated as great by their dominance in trade, industry, and international affairs. It is also a proven theory that these dominant nations provide the world with coal. For instance, in 1913, the United States, Great Britain, and Germany supplied the world with 81% of the coal used that year. The total output of the coal of Germany and the areas whence it came were:

- Alsace-Lorraine............. 3,800,000 tons
- Saar Basin................. 13,200,000 tons
- Upper Silesia............. 43,800,000 tons
- The Ruhr................. 130,700,000 tons

Total for Germany in 1913...191,500,000 tons *

From what has already been said it can be seen that France really did have some reason to believe that Germany was fast approaching her if not already her equal in the qualifications for a greater and more dominant power. "Within a generation (this refers from the time when Germany acquired the Alsace-Lorraine territory in 1871) Germany had by 'peaceful penetration' entered the markets of the world. Spheres of influence were staked off in some lands; colonies were obtained in others. In common with her European neighbors, this Hohenzollern state embarked on a policy of imperialism. Every continent felt the touch of German Kultur; every sea carried argosies under the German Flag. What Bismarck had done at home with blood and iron, his successors determined to do abroad with coal and iron."**

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* John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, pg. 88

If these were the instruments by which Germany had become the rival of France, France certainly put an end to them at Versailles. Alsace-Lorraine was returned to France, the Saar mines were given to her and the sovereignty of that territory to the League; Upper Silesia was taken from Germany and left to a plebiscite; all the German colonies were taken, the spheres of influence dissolved and the German navy surrendered or destroyed. The only asset of those named above left to Germany was the Ruhr.

Now that the Treaty had been signed France, looking over Germany, saw this and decided that she needed it more than Germany.*

With reparations as the main basis France occupied the Ruhr on January 11, 1923. She made this decision on several grounds. Poincare stated the French views in a note to the Germans, July 30. It read: "There must be no misunderstanding about our purpose in the Ruhr; there is no question of seeking there the immediate and total payment of reparations; we know very well that the exploitation of the Ruhr by the Allies would not by itself alone procure the necessary sums, even if the German Government, in conformity with the treaty of peace, had allowed us to take the coal and collect the taxes we had decided to levy there. What we desired first and especially was to create in Germany by the seizure of pledges and by coercion, the will to pay; to create such embarrassment in the economic and political structure of the Reich that the execution of the treaty would be preferred to this embarrassment; to

* Cooke and Stickney - Readings in European International Relations - Page 897 - Dariac's Report to President Poincare May 28, 1922.
obtain what we have not obtained for the last four years, namely, the recognition of Germany of her obligations, not from the general and theoretic point of view but from the practical point of view."

Poincare had in mind the defaults of Germany in her reparation payments. The first default came in May, 1921. By the Peace Treaty, Germany was to pay $5,000,000,000 in gold of which she only paid $1,250,000,000. By the decision of the Reparations Commission of May, 1921, Germany was to pay during the years 1921 and 1922 an annual sum of $500,000,000, plus a sum equal to 26% of her exports, which latter sum had been estimated very conservatively at $500,000,000 a year. This made a total of $2,000,000,000 for the two years. Of this Germany paid $500,000,000, which was another default. Germany also defaulted in her payments of coal and wood to France. Of the almost 14 million tons of coal she was supposed to deliver in 1922, France only received a little over 2 million tons. This last default led to the decision taken in the invasion of the Ruhr valley. France felt right in doing this because the Peace Treaty provided that in case of a wilful default, the nations can go in and take economic, financial and any other sanctions that they desire to take. This decision was most serious, however, because the French, in occupying the Ruhr, drew deliberately away from England, who was strongly opposed to any such action.

The Germans received this strangulation of their in-

* Henri Lichtenberger -- The Ruhr Conflict -- pg. 3
industrial center by the French military forces as illegal, piratical, brutally imperialistic and ruinous, not only to Germany but to the rest of Europe. It is evident that there was a radical difference between the French and German points of view.

The Germans organized and determined to resist the French action with "passive resistance". The French were just as resolved in their action and the conflict became of a vitally serious character.

The result was that German trade collapsed under the crushing weight of the burdens imposed by the Ruhr conflict. With these two functions, the industry and the trade, cut, the finances of Germany collapsed also. Thus, France failed to obtain the end she sought and also learned that force was a weapon of the past. From this time on a change can be seen in the French policy.*

* From a personal interview with Sir Herbert Ames, Minister of Finance of the League of Nations, 1919-1926
Chapter II

The Dawes Plan and Germany

In occupying the Ruhr in January 1923, France had exacted her pound of flesh and obliged Germany to surrender. She had forced German finance into bankruptcy and had brought about, or induced the Germans to bring about, the complete social and economic disorganization of the Reich. By the end of August 1923, the Germans had reached the end of their tether and made an abject submission. The government had paid the heavy bill of passive resistance by running off more and more paper marks from the printing presses until it took millions and even hundreds of millions to buy an American dollar, whereas, in pre-war days, the dollar was quoted as a little more than four. The national treasury was now bankrupt and the entire individual savings wiped out, leaving Germany a nation of paupers. Business too, was at a standstill because of the worthlessness of the mark and the fact that German trade had been cut off from the rest of the world since the outbreak of the War.

The hope of a prompt stabilization of Europe had rested upon the Anglo-French entente. That hope had long since disappeared in a welter of recriminations. The English were loud in their denunciation of the French occupation of the Ruhr.* The effect of this out-cry hardened the French and they determined to stand pat.

"Among the Germans, organized resistance to the occupation had ceased with the bankruptcy of their government. But

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* Cooke and Stickney - Readings in European International Relations - Page 938 - The Dawes Report 1904
German resentment still glowed with an intense heat. Superficially, at least, it appeared as strong as the deep sense of unredressed injury which animated the people of France."

In May 1923, Germany asked that the reparation question be referred to an international body of experts. Britain was in favor of this and invited the United States to participate in this inquiry to determine Germany's capacity to pay. France was reluctant at first but the acute financial situation forced her to enter. In November 1923, the Reparations Commission established two committees of experts from various countries, the first to study the means of balancing the German budget and of stabilizing the mark; the second was to determine the amount of German capital exported abroad and the possible methods of bringing it back to Germany.

The Americans that served on this Commission were Owen D. Young, Henry M. Robinson, and General Charles G. Dawes, whence the name the 'Dawes Plan'. These men served without official connection with the United States Government.

The Committee met in Paris in the early spring of 1924. Their plan was outlined as two-fold; first to study the Currency; and second to study the Budget. The first task of the experts was to determine how much the German people should be asked to pay. The Dawes Plan was necessarily intricate in its actual details. Its main features were,

* Auld -- The Dawes Plan and the New Economics -- pg.33
wholly
by contrast, very simple. It was an economic plan although "political considerations necessarily set certain
limits within which a solution must be found."

As a result of this inflation, Germany had wiped out its domestic debt. The victorious nations, by contrast, since they were meeting the costs of their domestic debts, would be unfairly handicapped in the world markets, if they were compelled to compete with German production, freed of all domestic taxation resulting from the war. Thus the Dawes Commission took as its basic principle that equality of burdens should be the measure, hence the principle of "commensurate taxation."

The first measure of the Commission was to put Germany back on her financial feet by an international loan of $200,000,000. This was to be provided by the foreign market of bonds, chiefly in the United States and Britain. A portion of this sum was to be retained in Germany to support the rentenmark, the balance was to supply part of the funds necessary for reparations payments during the early period when direct German contributions must be inconsiderable.

There was created a central bank of issue, subject to foreign supervision, which, in addition to issuing currency, was to conduct all the complicated operation of financing the deliveries in kind on account of reparations, receiving from the government the necessary funds.

Lastly, the Dawes Plan provided for the payment of reparations on a sliding scale, which started with $250 million for the first year, $300 million for the second
and third, and rose to $625 million in the fifty. There was also established at this base a principle that at no time should any payment in cash or kind be made when such payment threatened to disturb German exchange.

Owing to her present bankruptcy and to the financial scepticism which this condition entailed, other features of the Plan put Germany under foreign tutelage by obliging her to accept allied control of her railroads, and a specified group of revenues in addition to the control of the bank of issue.

"Broadly speaking, the Dawes Plan thus proposed to fix a scale for German payments based on German capacity and safeguarding German interests. At the same time it established the principle that, subject to honest endeavour and reasonable fulfillment, Germany should be once for all freed from all threat of foreign coercion, assured not only mastery within her own frontiers, but protection against all intervention."*

The approval by France of the Dawes Plan marks the beginning of a change in her policy towards the reparation question. There are probably several reasons for this change. First is that of the Washington Conference, where France received her first blow by being put on a basis with Italy and by being ranked as a third rate naval power. The second blow came at Cannes when the German delegate reiterated the inability of his country to meet the reparations due and was granted a moratorium. The third event is

* Simonds -- How Europe Made Peace Without America -- pg292
marked by the French occupation of the Ruhr. This move
definitely hardened the British feeling toward France and
it also proved to France that force was a weapon of the past.
At this same time the condition of French finances were in
such a state that this too proved an important reason for
the French sanction of the Experts Plan.

"The supreme merit of the Dawes Plan lay in the fact
that it definitely removed the reparations issue from
politics. The German demand for an expert and scientific
determination of German capacity to pay was satisfied
absolutely. On the other hand, the French contention that
Germany could pay and must pay was similarly sustained.
Since, moreover, the schedule fixed by the London ultimatums
of 1921 had provided that Germany should pay $250,000,000
in 1921 and $500,000,000 in succeeding years, the actual
reduction was not considerable."*

But the moral value of the Dawes Plan surpassed the
material. It cut down the complicated and contradictory
provisions of the Versailles Treaty into a simple and
straightforward programme, giving the Germans a definite
contract with a dim light of national recovery and the in-
surance against interference, while it gave the French, as
well as the other Allies, an assurance of the payment of
the reparations.

The Dawes Plan was adopted at London by the Allies and
Germany in August 1924. Germany almost immediately turned
the corner to her recovery, although it was destined to be

* Simonds -- How Europe Made Peace without America -- pg.293
slow. Yet it is essential to recognize that no country passed through a period of prostration as complete as that of Germany in 1923 and 1924. Nowhere was misery so general, nowhere was suffering so universal. "No proud people had ever been forced to endure greater humiliation. Nothing of physical or mental suffering had been spared the inhabitants of the great cities. Nor is it an exaggeration to say that the limit of human endurance had been reached. Never was a race between ultimate ruin and possible recovery more closely run. Actually the salvation of the Dawes plan arrived at the eleventh hour."

*Ibid* pg. 299
Chapter III

Locarno

In Europe at this time there were two major problems—security and economic revival. The Dawes Plan was aimed at the second of these problems. The security problem remained to be dealt with. France demanded it. Germany, totally disarmed, needed it, having experienced the invasion of the Ruhr and the Rhineland revolt. France considered the young League an experiment and feared that it might be too weak to procure its ends. For this reason she had gone her own way by renewing the very system, favored before 1914, of surrounding Germany with a ring of iron. With the adoption of the Dawes Plan came the feeling that if a political agreement could be made with her ancient foe it would be a more effective method of obtaining security than either the League or the military ring.

Germany, under the able leadership of Stresemann, had abandoned her policy of Eastern Orientation and passive resistance when she realized that her immediate problem was to restore the independence of her people by obtaining the evacuation of her national soil, the abolition of financial control and the return to the councils of Europe on the footing of a great power. *

The first attempt at this political agreement was the Geneva Protocol. This protocol was created as a result of the Assembly’s request that the Council of the League of Nations draw up a plan for an agreement in which each state would promise to give "immediate and effective" assistance.

* Stresemann - address to 7th ordinary session of the Assembly of the League of Nations - Verbatim Record
to the victim of an unprovoked attack. The first line of this treaty declared, "Aggressive war is an international crime." The framers found it difficult to determine the aggressor in a given case, and the treaty simply provided that within four days after hostilities break out the Council should render a decision. Great Britain opposed it, stressing that it forwarded the idea of force rather than justice. Ramsey MacDonald, British prime minister, presented his views of universal peace on the grounds that security could only be attained by nations agreeing to submit their disputes to courts of law and to abide by the decision. France disagreed, bringing out the point the pledged word of nations was not enough. Theunis, the Belgian prime minister, supported the French by saying, "Give us an assurance of safety and we Belgians will gladly dismiss our soldiers, but can you expect us to risk our security on words alone, again and so soon?"

The Geneva Protocol resulted from the combined points of MacDonald's arbitration and Herriot's security. By the other points of the agreement the principles of Disarmament Security, and Arbitration were attempted to be realized in a unified form. It was undoubtedly the most ambitious peace plan ever discussed. It, however, failed to gain acceptance because it asked more than the great powers were ready to concede. The British view was influenced by the fear that it would endanger the close co-operation between the British Empire and the United States that had been their main-stay since the Great War. Germany was not included since this
was inter-League. This proposal, nevertheless, had its effect in the change of atmosphere that it brought over Europe. The poisoned atmosphere of the 1914 period had been injected with a new spirit of conciliation. *

Stresemann and Luther, the Chancellor of Germany, set out to solve the immediate problem of Germany as has been given above. Their first move was to negotiate with the Great Powers. A note to the Allied governments on February 9, 1925, suggested that France, Italy, Germany, and Great Britain enter a solemn obligation not to wage war against each other; and that this obligation should be assumed with the United States acting as trustee; also the recognition by Germany of a status quo on the western boundary between France and herself. This note immediately met with approval in England and from the outset British support of the Stresemann proposal was assured. The French voice was not of whole-hearted approval because the eastern boundary of Germany was excluded. Thus the eastern frontiers of Germany dominated all the discussion before the Locarno Conference. A change came, however, in the French policy by the return of Briand to the Quai d'Orsay. Briand and Stresemann continued the negotiations where Herriot had left off and by October everything was set for the Conference and it was called at Locarno, Switzerland, Representatives of Germany, France, Great Britain, Poland, Belgium, Czecho-Slavakia, and Italy were present.

In two weeks the five Locarno Pacts were signed. Four of the five treaties were no more than agreements between

Germany on the one hand and her neighbors, Belgium, France, Poland, and Czecho-Slovakia on the other, to submit all future issues to arbitration.

The fifth document was the Security Pact, which continued German and French pledges to accept the territorial status quo created in the west by the Treaty of Versailles, and the German promise to observe the conditions with respect of the demilitarized zone contained in the same compact. Great Britain and Italy also joined in guaranteeing this Security Pact. Germany and Belgium, and Germany and France mutually agreed not to attack, invade, or resort to war against each other. This meant that Germany abandoned all hope of regaining Alsace-Lorraine and that the great states gave their guarantee to the Rhineland frontier.*

Although from the technical standpoint the fact is full of loopholes, its significance arises out of the spirit of conciliation in which the conference was held and the treaties drafted. This was important because; this was the first time that Germany had been received in the council of nations as an equal; it was the first time that the statesmen of the great states had worked together under conditions of peace; and it was the initial occasion when the statesmen of the several countries worked together with the sense, not of ending by compromise some specific dispute, but of laying the foundations for a system of general pacification. The "Spirit of Locarno" was instituted as the permanent reconciliation of France and Germany. It marked the end of the moral isolation of Germany. It

witnessed the final extinction of the spirit of Versailles.

The reasons for the success of Locarno can be attributed to the negotiations of Stresemann, Briand, and Chamberlain before the convoking of the Pact. When the preliminary agreement had been reached they went to Locarno to settle minor details and to sign. Locarno treated the world to the welcome spectacle of French, German, and British statesmen in agreement for the first time since the outbreak of the Great War. As a result, there followed a period of calm and reconstruction in Europe.
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