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Antiochus Epiphanes.

Brougher Petty Maddox
University of Louisville

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UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE

ANTIOCHUS EPIPHANES

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty
of the Graduate School of the University of Louisville
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

Department of History

by

Brougher Petty Maddox

1944
Brougher Petty Maddox

ANTIOCHUS EPIPHANES

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Name of Director:  W. C. Mallalieu

Date:  October 1944
To
Ida Roe and
C. Sidney Maddox,
my parents,
in affectionate appreciation.
ABBREVIATIONS


Bactria W. W. Tarn, The Greeks in Bactria and India.

BM British Museum Catalogue

CAH Cambridge Ancient History.

Diod. Sic. Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca

Hel. Civ. W. W. Tarn, Hellenistic Civilisation


House Sel. E. R. Bevan, House of Seleucus, Vol. II.


I Macc. I Maccabees.

II Macc. II Maccabees.


Justin Justin's epitome of the History of Trogus Pompeius.


Livy Titus Livius, History of Rome.

OGIS Dittenberger, Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae.

Polyb. Polybius, Histories.


P. Tebt. Tebtunis Papyri
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INTRODUCTION

While the writer was an undergraduate he spent two Summers in the Panamint mountains above Death Valley, California. Hiking with one of the few old-timers remaining in that region, he noticed that "the old desert rat" would stoop occasionally to pick up certain rocks which he would examine closely. Some went into a pouch he carried. They were later crushed and "panned." If they made a "showing" in the gold-pan, the prospector would retrace his steps and arduously search for the parent vein. In similar fashion the writer has ventured upon interesting features in the life and character of the man, Antiochus Epiphanes. It is the aim of this dissertation to seek all of the facts concerning his life, assay them and then seek to accurately appraise them uninfluenced by the propaganda of the past.

I. THE PROBLEM

1. Statement of the problem. The problem of this dissertation is the critical study of all the sources of the life of Antiochus Epiphanes, in an earnest effort to properly evaluate them and thus arrive at an accurate appraisal of the relations of Antiochus IV Epiphanes with the Jews of Palestine.
2. **Justification of the problem.** There are valid reasons for a restudy of this phase of the history of Antiochus Epiphanes. Writers have been prone to refer to his policy of Hellenization as forced upon his unwilling subjects when even antagonistic sources plainly say that the privileges of Hellenism were earnestly sought and considered a mark of the king's special favor.¹

Again the tendency of historians up to the last decade has been to overlook the vast importance of the history of the Middle and Far East upon the policy of the Seleucids. This bias is caused by an understandable lack of knowledge on the part of western writers about these vast inland reaches of this mysterious oriental Empire.

The Character of Antiochus itself has been obscured by the bitter hatred of his adversaries. It is easy to comprehend the motives behind the disparagement of Antiochus by his detractors. The Jews looked upon him as their great enemy. They spoke of his desecration of their temple as "the abomination of desolation." One of their five great festivals was in celebration of the rededication of the temple after the forces of their persecutor no longer contaminated the sacred precincts. The Hellenistic writers on the other hand, apart from their descending to the level of mere gossip-mongers at times, were definitely anti-Syrian in their sympathies. Guided by these sources the historians

have termed Antiochus a fool, vain, silly and theatrical. ²

His title was misunderstood or consciously twisted and a pun made by changing his name from Epiphanes, Illustrious (as they interpreted it), to Epimanes, Madman. ³ While admitting the ability of the man, modern writers follow the earlier trend calling him, hysterical, half-mad;⁴ blustering, savage and terror-stricken;⁵ superficial, Bohemian;⁶ vindictive.⁷ Tarn however in this decade has drawn a brilliant picture of him as a forceful, intelligent and far-seeing ruler who might have done great things had his success not been precluded by his early death.⁸ Swain, another writer of this decade has said, "although hardly a statesman of the first rank, he was an intelligent and able man."⁹

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2. Bactria, p. 183; Cf. pp. 35, 75.

3. Polyb. 26:14; Athen. 10:439a; Livy 41:20. The proper translation of Epiphanes, as Antiochus title, should be manifest god. It is possible also to translate it in the less exalted sense of Illustrious. The latter sense is necessary to the turn of the pun.


6. B.S., 131.


9. Swain, p. 79.
More particularly Otto\textsuperscript{10} has recently made a careful study of this period which has been fruitful especially in dealing with the origins of the Sixth Syrian War. Tarn has brought out the importance of the eastern influence on the policy of this ruler.\textsuperscript{11} Just recently Swain has rightly pointed out the fact, hitherto given insufficient consideration, that there was a general upsurge of the oriental peoples throughout the East.

This dissertation will concern itself more specifically with the problem of the relation of Antiochus to his Palistinian-Jewish subjects and the Maccabean Struggle in the light of a corrected view of Antiochus' general character and policy.

II. THE SOURCES

1. Ancient Sources.

a. Polybius. Polybius is our best source for the general history of this period. His work (as we have it) is not complete but the fragments extant are very helpful. Polybius was an accurate and critical historian. He wrote to justify the ways of Rome. He admitted that he sought to persuade the Achaean League to send a force to Egypt to oppose Antiochus there, yet he fairly sought to give an unbiased

\textsuperscript{10} W. Otto, Op. Cit.

\textsuperscript{11} Bactria, Loc. Cit.
appraisal of the Syrian's character. Polybius does not have any information concerning the Jews or the Maccabean struggle. His knowledge was delimited by the western part of Syria in the East. When Antiochus III or his son Epiphanes went East they dropped out of sight.

b. Appian. This Alexandrian historian who wrote about the middle of the Second Century A.D. divided his history upon ethnographic lines. His Syrian Wars shed light on the subject discussed here. Appian is very brief but he crowded an abundance of material into a small compass. He is quite reliable and of large importance.

c. I Maccabees. I Maccabees is our best source for the struggle between the anti-hellenic Jews and their Syrian overlords. It is of course biased. Perhaps the author was an eye witness to the events described.

d. Daniel. The eleventh chapter of Daniel is as excellent a picture of the Seleucid relations with Egypt as we have when the peculiarities of its style and purpose are understood. The accuracy of the account of the war between Antiochus and the Ptolomies ceases after the day at Eleusis and the persecution of the Jews which followed. Verses 11:40 ff. are not clear. Charles says that the rest of the chapter is prophecy and was not completely and accurately fulfilled. 

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The brevity and obscurity of the apocalyptic style of the book make it difficult to understand.

II Maccabees. Jason of Cyrene wrote a five volume work on the Maccabean struggle. A later writer made a one book epitome of Jason which is known as II Maccabees. The Second Book of the Maccabees has recently experienced a great turn of fortune. From the lowest opprobrium it has been raised to the heights by the championship of Neise in his Critic der beiden Makkabäer and his Geschichte der Griechischen und Makedonischen Staaten. "It is an edifying disturbance of accepted opinion." Rostovtzoff says of the two Maccabees and Josephus, "These sources are sufficiently based on good evidence to give a picture which is substantially correct."

Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews. Josephus, son of Mattathias, a priest, was one of the leaders of the Jews in their rebellion against Rome during the First Christian Century. He was captured by Vespasian and became a favorite of the man who was soon to be Emperor. The Antiquities was written in Greek for a Roman audience in order to familiarize the Romans with the essentials of Jewish history. Josephus was not above touching up the narrative. He shows confusion in his history of the period before the outbreak of the revolt against Antiochus. His account of the revolt differs from that of the two books of the Maccabees.

I. Livy. Titus Livius wrote 142 books on the history of Rome. Books 41-45 bear on the subject of this inquiry. Livy was neither critical nor accurate. He was manifestly biased in favor of Rome. He has served history most by preserving otherwise unpreserved portions of Polybius.

II. Diodorus Siculus. The forty books of Diodorus covered a period of eleven hundred years. Unfortunately only the first five are extant in their entirety. The other books, important as they are, are available only in miserable fragments discovered here and there. Books 29-34 cover the period under investigation.

III. Strabo. The Geography of Strabo has historical notes in it. From these notes fragmentary information can be gleaned for the whole period.

IV. Justin. In Augustus' time Trogus Pompeius (Justinus), wrote 44 books upon the subject of the history of Macedon and the Diadochi. The work was good but is only extant in an epitome which Justinus drew up. It is important for western history, but when the East is discussed the epitomist mangled the information miserably. For the Eastern Campaign of Antiochus it is important in that it is often the only source available.

V. Cassius Dio. Dio has a few crumbs of knowledge about Antiochus. The information is most fragmentary and none of it is not given in some other source.
2. Modern writers.

a. W. W. Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilization*. This standard work is helpful in understanding the dominant civilization underlying the world history of the period under examination.

b. W. W. Tarn, *The Greeks in Bactria and India*. This book has been the greatest contribution to the knowledge of the subject of this study. Tarn has been very daring in many of his statements but subsequent investigation has vindicated much of his pioneer work. He paints Antiochus Epiphanes as an able, brilliant and resourceful ruler. While he quails at the word "statesman", Tarn's characterization certainly would indicate that classification for his hero. Tarn is one of the few who have taken the history of the middle and Farther East into account in his evaluation of Seleucid history.

c. Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*. This epoch-making contribution stands alone in its unique contribution to the study of Hellenistic History. The vast store of knowledge necessary to the social and economic approach to the history of the period has been found in the brain of this Russian scholar. He opens new fields of information in the study of causation as he reveals and correlates these underlying causes behind the events of history.

d. Bevan, *The House of Seleucus*, Vol. 11. This is a good
standard work in the field of Seleucid history. It is carefully done and of practical help.

e. W. Otto, Zur Geschichte der Zeit des 6 Ptolemäers. Tarn speaks of this book as the best in the field. It is a careful study of the subject from the Egyptian point of view. Rostovtzeff follows Tarn in rejecting the view of this author with regard to the results of Eleusis.

f. W. Kolbe, Beiträge zur Syrischen und Judischen Geschichte. Kolbe has worked out the chronology for the period carefully and from excellent sources. His chronology is accepted as standard.

g. E. Schurer, A History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ. Here is a careful and exhaustive work much of which, however, has now been outdated.

h. W. M. Ramsey, The Cities of St. Paul. The vast knowledge of this student of Hellenism is of value to us in the study of the Greek City in the Seleucid Empire in the part of his work which takes up a historical study of the city of Tarsus.

i. Bouche-Leclercq, Histoire des Seleucids. This is the best of the French works in the field. It is carefully and thoroughly prepared. The author goes into all the problems of the subject. Pages 123-315 cover the Seleucids from Antiochus III to Antiochus V.

3. Other Works.

a. Cambridge Ancient History. This standard work is especially helpful in the chapter by E. R. Bevan on Syria and the Jews in
Volume VIII. The Third volume of plates is helpful in a study of the coins of Antiochus Epiphanes.

b. E. T. Newell, Royal Greek Portrait Coins. This volume contains the coins by which the succession of Antiochus IV to the throne of Syria is traced. Because of the unavailability of the British Museum Catalogue, this volume has been most helpful.

c. J. McKee Adams, The Struggle of the Jews with Hellenism. In his thesis Dr. Adams carefully and exhaustively traces the conflict between the Jews and Hellenism back to its sources. It is unfortunate that it has not been printed.

d. J. W. Swain, "Antiochus Epiphanes and Egypt." This is one of the outstanding studies on the subject. The author carefully investigates Antiochus with regard to Egypt. His chief contribution is his emphasis upon the rise of the forces of orientalism throughout the Eastern part of the Hellenistic world.

III. ORGANIZATION OF THE REMAINDER OF THE DISSERTATION.

Chapter Two will be concerned with the historical background of the immediately preceding period of Seleucid history. The policy of Antiochus III the Great, his eastern campaign, his relations with Rome and the results of Magnesia are necessary to a proper understanding of the events in Epiphanes' day. The reign of Seleucus IV, Antiochus Epiphanes' brother, is included for the same reason.
Chapter Three will lay the immediate background for the productive period of Antiochus Epiphanes' life. It will trace the influences of his life as a hostage at Rome; his period of Hellenic influence during his stay at Athens; the method by which he succeeded to the throne, first as regent for his nephew, and later as sole ruler. It will be necessary to include an analysis of Antiochus' character in order to understand properly his life. A brief survey of the economic and social conditions of the Seleucid realm will conclude the chapter and complete the necessary background to a proper understanding of the reign of Epiphanes.

Chapters Four and Five will be concerned with the reign of Antiochus. The Fourth Chapter will quickly survey the Policy of Antiochus, the Egyptian War and the affairs in the East in the light of the latest information available with occasional corrections by the author in the light of the sources as he can best evaluate them.

The Fifth Chapter will confine itself to the Palestinian Jewish problem. A very brief summary of the post-exilic history of the Jews will be followed by an investigation of the Hellenizing policy of Antiochus. The policy of Hellenization of the Jews will then be discussed and the results of the clash between the two forces set forth.

A Sixth and final Chapter will be devoted to a Summary of the results of this investigation.
CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The year 221 B.C. saw three young rulers, Philip V, Ptolemy IV Philopator and Antiochus III, upon the thrones of the three hellenistic monarchies of Macedonia, Egypt and Syria. Philip was a popular ruler, "the darling of Hellas." It looked as though he might unite the Greeks. In 215 after a naval brush with the Romans had forced him out of the Adriatic he allied himself with Carthage, hoping for help from their fleet. The Romans invoked the aid of Aetolia against Philip. Having thus blocked the fleet of Philip, while deeply involved with Carthage, Rome left the fighting in Greece to the Aetolians. Rome then made peace with Philip in 205. Aetolia being left to its own devices was forced to make as graceful an exit from the war as was possible under the circumstances. ¹

I. ANTONYCHUS III, THE GREAT

1. His policy. Ptolemy III had allowed the Egyptian army to deteriorate. Antiochus, the energetic and ambitious young ruler of Syria saw this condition as his opportunity to restore

the empire of his ancestor Seleucus I. This seemed to have been his life's ambition.²

He had neither attempted to make conquests in India nor to take possession of defeated Egypt, but had risked and finally suffered war with Rome for the sake of a few cities in Thrace because they had belonged to Seleucus.³

But that is to get ahead of the story. Antiochus determined to take advantage of the weakness of Egypt and wrest Asia Minor and Palestine from his young, indolent, inattentive and art-loving contemporary.⁴ In this however Antiochus had reckoned without the ability of Sosibius, the Egyptian general, who held the Syrian off with his Palestinian fortresses until a mercenary army of Greeks could be assembled. The Egyptians also opened a Pandora's box of future troubles for themselves in that they armed the natives and sent them into the battle. This turned the tide for Egypt but the expedient cost the Ptolemies endless trouble, for the natives learned that they could fight and beat a Greek army. The native revolts thereafter kept the country in constant strife.⁵

a. The Battle at Raphia. At Raphia just north of the Egyptian border in 217 the armies met. Antiochus leading

². Bactria, p. 189.
³. Loc. cit.
⁴. Polby., 5:34; Cf. 14:11,12.
⁵. Hel Civ., p. 19.
the cavalry charged against the Egyptian left wing commanded by Philopator. He won this conflict but instead of turning his force against the enemy center or the left wing, he led the cavalry in a foolhardy pursuit of the fleeing Egyptians. The Egyptian forces left on the field on their part were successful and when Antiochus returned he found the bulk of his army beaten. Ptolemy did nothing to follow up this decisive victory but retired to Egypt and gave himself up to drunken reveling. He did not even attempt to retake Seleucia in Pieria which Antiochus had captured in 219.6

b. The "Anabasis." The defeat at Raphia did not dishearten young Antiochus. He justified himself by feeling that if the whole army had fought as well as he had, the battle would have been won.7 He considered the reverse as temporary and set about restoring his empire with youthful vigor. His cousin, Archaeus was in charge of affairs in Asia Minor. Archaeus gave evidence that he was playing the role of independent king. Antiochus attacked him energetically and finally one of his friends, Bolis by name, betrayed him into Antiochus' hands.8 After three years of fighting in alliance with Pergamum, Asia Minor was pacified. Antiochus then began his "Anabasis" in the East. His strategy was not to reconquer

6. Polby. 5:82ff.
7. H. W., p. 49.
8. Polby. 8:15-34.
Parthia and Bactria, both of which had revolted, but to re-establish the Seleucid authority among the eastern Satraps. This successful campaign was widely heralded as a duplication of the feat of Alexander and the title "Great King" was bestowed upon him. His prestige among his subjects and outside his kingdom was greatly enhanced by his success in this venture.9

2. Treaty with Philip V. Antiochus, the Great, still had his heart set on the conquest of Egypt but did not dare to move South with a possible hostile Philip behind him. Therefore after the death of Philopator he invited Philip to share the foreign provinces of Ptolemy with him, and they signed the treaty in the winter of 203-202 which so shocked Polybius.10 They hoped that Egypt torn by a revolt of the natives would not be able to offer much resistance.11

a. Second Macedonian War. The brutal conduct of Philip following this notorious treaty induced Rhodes and Pergamum to call upon Rome for help thus bringing the disastrous Second Macedonian War upon him.12 While Rome was busy with Philip, Antiochus set about the conquest of the coast of Asia Minor and the annexation of Palestine and Phoenicia.

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11. H.W., p. 51; Cf. Supra, p. 15.
Ptolemy's general Scopus wrested Judea away from Antiochus in 199 but at Panium, near the headwaters of the Jordan, Scopus was finally defeated the next year and 122 years of Ptolemaic rule of the eastern approaches to Egypt was at end. This was an economic blow, for this territory because of its control of the eastern trade routes had been a necessary part of the economy of Egypt.

b. Roman Attitude toward Antiochus III. Following their victory over Philip at Cynoscephelae, the Romans sent L. Cornelius Lentulus and three others to Antiochus for a "determined assault on the king." They sought to pose as protectors of Ptolemy V. Antiochus made the announcement that he had already made peace with Egypt, that Egypt had renounced all her Syrian, Asiatic and Thracian dependencies and that his daughter, Cleopatra, was betrothed to Ptolemy. Holleaux concludes, "he made the Romans look extremely foolish." This piece of statesmanship removed the Roman pretext for interference and the new territory remained in the hands of Antiochus.

Rome was wearied by her wars with Carthage and Macedonia and had her hands full in Spain. The party of Cato was opposed to extending her responsibilities in the East

13. Ibid., 16:39.

14. CAR VIII, pp. 186,7; Polyb. 18:49-52.
because of the debilitating influence of the East upon the Romans which he considered corrupting.\textsuperscript{15} There was no immediate clamor in Rome for war with Antiochus.\textsuperscript{16} Deep in the heart of Rome however was a fear of the Eastern powers with their great military tradition. Alexander had probably entertained ambitions in the West. His successors had been ambitious men and Phyrrus had even fought and defeated Rome on Italian soil. The defeat of Philip left the power of Antiochus as the threat which Rome feared. Rostovtzeff concludes,

\begin{quote}
We are therefore not surprised to find that the Romans after the Second Macedonian war gradually but systematically made war with Antiochus inevitable, though Antiochus tried by every means to avoid it (193 B.C.). They wanted to weaken the great Oriental conqueror while they were on more or less good terms with Greece and before Philip was willing and prepared to cooperate with him.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

Although Rome did not at first seem to desire war and Antiochus did all in his power to forestall it, Eumenes II of Pergamum and the Aetolians did want war. Eumenes sought to regain his power in Asia Minor while the Aetolians sought revenge upon Rome for what they considered her betrayal at the close of the Second Macedonian War.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} H. H. Scullard, \textit{Op. Cit.}, p. 278.
\item \textsuperscript{16} \textit{Hel. Civ.}, pp. 23, 4.
\item \textsuperscript{17} H. W., p. 55.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Polyb. 18:34; \textit{Livy} 35:13.
\end{itemize}
3. War with Rome.

a. In Hellas. Rome sent Antiochus an ultimatum regarding the Thracian cities in 193. Although he had not made sufficient preparation for war Antiochus in March of the next year accepted the Aetolean invitation to "liberate Greece." He sought to unite all the Greeks in a struggle against Rome. He landed 10,000 men at Demetrias (a large enough army to start a war but insufficient to fight one) and waited in expectation that all the Greeks would join him. The Aetolians fought bravely, but Philip could not forget his grudge against the Aetolians, and the Achaean League along with Philip supported Rome. Ere long his unsupported force was caught by his enemies and cut to pieces at the old death trap, Thermopolae.

b. In Asia. The Romans saw that it would be unsafe for them to ignore Antiochus this juncture. They gathered a large army in 189 under the leadership of L. Cornelius Scipio, who was accompanied by his brother Africanus, the conqueror of Carthage, and sent it into Asia. Antiochus superstitiously thought his fortune had forsaken him. He failed to make a stand at the Hellespont and soon thereafter his army was destroyed at Magnesia.

20. Loc. Cit.
c. Result of the War. The treaty of Apamea which followed in 188 was disastrous for Antiochus. The Romans demanded that:

1. Antiochus retire from Europe and all of Asia Minor West of the Taurus.

2. An indemnity of 15,000 Euboian talents was to be paid to Rome, 500 at once, 2500 upon the ratification of the peace by the people of Rome, and twelve yearly payments of 1000 talents each.

3. Antiochus give up his fleet and his war elephants promising to limit his navy to ten ships and to cease the use of elephants in the army.

4. Antiochus surrender Hannibal and certain other political refugees.

5. Antiochus pay Eumenes the 400 talents he owed him and likewise furnish some grain promised Eumenes by Antiochus, the Great.

6. Twenty hostages be given to guarantee the fulfillment of the treaty by Antiochus.

Rome thus became the dominant force in Asia. She never allowed the Syrian kingdom to recuperate. Assassinations, confusion and quarrels within the kingdom and the royal

house ensued and Rome always supported the elements of disruption.\textsuperscript{22}

Henceforth the Hellenistic World ceased to be a political unit. Rostovtzeff says,

I have already insisted upon this unity and expressed my conviction that unless the Hellenistic world is treated as a single whole, its political development in the third century B.C. can hardly be fully understood. The Roman intervention put an end to this unity. No doubt there were still diplomatic relations between the various kingdoms and cities, dynastic marriages were still used as political weapons and were very popular among the Greeks... but all this was now of very little importance. Rome through her agents, especially the Pergamene kings, kept a watchful eye on these relations and would not tolerate even the possibility of a real rapprochement between the important Hellenistic powers.

In fact the Hellenistic world was now split into three groups, which were in no direct contact with each other: Macedonia and Greece formed one group, Asia Minor another, Syria and Egypt the third.\textsuperscript{23}

Syria remained independent but with her fleet gone and the most hellenized part of her empire lost, she was doomed to become by degrees an Oriental state. Antiochus only lived a year after Apamea. He was killed in 187 while attacking a temple state in Elymais.\textsuperscript{24} He had been so weakened that he was unable to entertain any hope of revenge.

\textsuperscript{22} Bevan, \textit{CAR} VIII, 495.

\textsuperscript{23} Hel. World, pp. 55, 6.

\textsuperscript{24} Strabo 16:1:18.
II. SELEUCUS IV

Antiochus the Great married Laodice, the daughter of Mithradates. They had six children that are known to us. All of them became important figures in history. The eldest son, Antiochus, was associated with his father in the government from 208 until his death. This younger Antiochus was married to his sister, Laodice. His untimely death in 192 made Seleucus the next in line for the succession at the age of 30 years. Other daughters were Cleopatra I, "the Syrian," who married Ptolemy V, and Antiochis who was later the queen of Cappadocia. The other son was a second Antiochus who was later to follow his brother in the succession as Antiochus IV. Seleucus married his sister Laodice, who had previously been the elder brother's wife. He had two sons by her, Demetrius, who later succeeded him, and Antiochus with whom his uncle Antiochus was later to be associated as regent.

1. His Policy. Scant mention is given Seleucus IV in the sources. He did not come to the throne as an untried novice. Bouche-Leclercq says that

La vicroyauté de Thrace avait fait preuve de capacités diplomatiques et militaires au cours de la malheureuse guerre engagée par son père contre les Romains.

25. Polyb. 5:43.

For six years after the death of his elder brother, Antiochus, Seleucus was the heir-apparent to the throne. As king his course naturally was not a brilliant one. The debacle at Magnesia had effectively doomed any aggressive plans for the kingdom. The only sound policy possible was to abstain from expensive adventures and thus be able to meet the expense of the crushing indemnity. Bevan says that Seleucus dealt prudently with the situation. A contemporary opinion of him says, "He caused an exactor to pass through the land," indicating the financial strait the kingdom was in and the heavy taxes necessary for the payment of the Roman indemnity. The exactor was doubtless the chief minister, Heliodorus, whom II Maccabees connects with an attempt to rob the temple at Jerusalem.

Outside of his dominions Seleucus followed the policy of peace at any price. Boučé-Leclercq calls attention to a fragment of Diodorus which says that Seleucus prepared to cross the Taurus in aid of Pharnace in his war with Eumenes II of Pergamum but upon consideration of his realm's relation


28. CAH VIII 494f.


30. II Macc; Cf. below pp. 49, 50.
to Rome "il renonce a son entreprise." Seleucus probably began the policy which his brother so ably augmented—the strengthening of the Greek element within the empire. He was on friendly terms with the Achaean League and further kept his interest in Greek affairs by giving his daughter to Perseus of Macedon in 177. This was a great event. The Rhodian navy sent a guard of honor to escort the princess to her new home. Rome of course was suspicious and "firent retomber leur mauvaise humeur sur les Rhodiens." Reuter maintains that Seleucus sought to create a Panhellenistic alliance against Rome, but one is inclined to agree when Rostovtzeff says the evidence is too scanty to support this view.

2. **Attitude of Egypt.** Egypt again began to take an aggressive attitude toward Syria after the disaster at Magnesia. The Egyptians had offered their support to Rome in the campaign against Antiochus III. Eumenes II of Pergamum had been given most of Asia after the war but Egypt had received nothing—not even Coele-Syria. Polycrates the military leader of Egypt

32. H. W., p. 186.
35. H. W., pp. 1492,3 n. 125.
decided that the time to regain this province had come. The sudden death of Ptolemy V however precluded this effort. Cleopatra, his wife, became regent for the boy Philometer. Although she had transferred her loyalties to Egypt she did not pursue the war with Syria which had been contemplated.36

Seleucus IV's career was cut short while he was yet in his early forties. The chief minister, Heliodorus, murdered the king in order that he might rule in his stead.37 No details of this event are known.

C'est pourê, avoir ainsi compris son rôle et s'y être tenu que Séleucos IV reste une figure un peu effacée entre son père, "le Grand" it son frère, "l'Illustre" .... En tout cas, il ne laissait pas déchoir la dignité royal; il amintent le culte de ses ancêtres et le sien, doté d'un flamine spécial.38

CHAPTER III

THE RISE TO POWER OF ANTIOCHUS IV
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THE RISE TO POWER OF ANTIOCHUS IV

Antiochus III married a princess-Laodice, the daughter of Mithradates, king of Pontus, who himself had married a Laodice, the sister of Seleucus II. Thus the wife of Antiochus III was his first cousin. The royal couple had six children. The age of all the children is not known but Epiphanes was the third son, the second with the name Antiochus. One wonders how they managed to identify the different boys and one's wonder is increased by the knowledge that one of the girls was named Antiochis.¹

I. EARLY LIFE

As a lad Antiochus could entertain little hope of ever reigning as successor to his father. His elder brother, Antiochus, was associated with his father as early as 208 according to the Babylonian records.² Upon his brother's demise the next eldest brother, Seleucus became the heir-apparent, and Antiochus' position remained essentially unchanged.

¹ Supra, 23.

l. **At Rome.** The young man was sent to Rome following the Roman victory at Magnesia as one of the twenty hostages. As to the length of his stay in Rome, most authorities say that he was there thirteen or fourteen years. Tarn's conjecture would imply that Antiochus remained in Rome from the time of his father's defeat at Magnesia until the death of Seleucus. He takes up the whole period with the Roman visit. Consideration must be made of the time necessary to travel from Rome to Athens and from Athens to Syria by way of Pergamum. He resided at Athens long enough to attain the office of general and was in office long enough for coins to be struck which bear his name. No doubt it took time also for Antiochus to complete his negotiations with the Pergamene kings and prepare the Asian army for the invasion of Syria. One is led to conclude that about two years before Seleucus was killed, Demetrius was sent to replace his uncle at Rome; Antiochus, realizing that a younger brother was a poor insurance risk in the court of an oriental despot, settled down in the "healthy" climate of Athens and there occupied his energies as one of the chief magistrates of Athens until he was interrupted by the news of this brother's death.

3. App. Syr., 39; Supra, pp. 21, 2.


5. Cf. p. 31 n. 12.
As a hostage at Rome the young prince was separated from the usual cortege of eunuchs and flattering courtiers which would have dominated his environment had he lived in the east. The ordered freedom and the political morality of the Republic were the admiration of the Greek world of that day.\(^6\) In Rome he circulated in a republican atmosphere where he was treated as an equal. He was well received by the young Roman aristocracy and became intimate with many.\(^7\) The unceremonious freedom and the undignified familiarity of Rome left its stamp upon him. On the less desirable side, "il avait vecu au milieu d'une société prematurément corrompue, où l'hypocrisie remplacait la vertu, en attendant que le vice put s'y étaler librement."\(^8\) One can imagine that a young man of his energy and intellect would seek to discover the sources of strength in the Colossus to the west which had toppled his father's kingdom as easily as Alexander had conquered the same territory. The Roman influence was strongest during the first five years of his reign. He


8. Bouche-Leclercq, Histoire des Seleucids (Paris: 1913), p. 245. Swain (pp. 90 ff.), draws an unlovely picture of the political scene in Rome about this time. He outlines in detail the rise of a new aristocratic clique and speaks of their "gangster-like activities" after they rose to power.
loved to toy with the political institutions of the Republic and even played at running for office and acting in the capacity of an elected official. This was "a passing phase which culminated in the building of a temple at Antioch to Jupiter Capitoline." One wonders whether in all this Antiochus was not playing a part, hoping to convince the Senate that he would be subservient to them.

2. At Athens. Antiochus stopped at Athens "on his way home" from Rome. His standing, liberality and pleasing personality won for him the good will of the citizens there. His popularity was so great that he was elected to be General of the Hoplites. Bevan cites an inscription which "is believed to be a copy of a decree passed by the Athenian people thanking Eumenes for having set their late general upon the throne of his fathers." There are extant coins issued by Athens with the Athenian Owl and Antiochus' name associated with the name of two other officials. The characteristic Seleucid symbol, the elephant, assures the identification. This

11. CAH VIII, p. 497; OGIS, 248
12. BMC, Attica p. 36, No. 328, Pl. xi. Silver Attic tetradrachm, 16·7 grammes. Cf. Hill, Historical Greek Coins (London:1906), pp. 140-43, in support of the elephant badge as characteristically Seleucid. Prof. L. L. Howe, of U. of L. Hist. Dept. told the writer in conversation "On some of the specimens the features of the goddess Athens on the obverse (to me at least), very strongly resemble Antiochus."
coin established Antiochus' Athenian citizenship and his position as an official.

3. **Seizure of the throne.** During Antiochus' residence in Athens, Seleucus was assassinated by Heliodorus, one of the court officers. Eumenes II of Pergamus aided Antiochus in gaining the throne by setting him at the head of the Pergamene army. Seeing his substantial backing the opposition melted away. The well known loyalty of the Greeks for the royal house made it easy no doubt for Antiochus to overcome even Heliodorus, who as an established public administrator had doubtless entrenched his administration of national affairs well in view of the coming coup d'état.

Antiochus Epiphanes at first ruled as regent for his


14. Appian, *Loc. cit.*, says that Eumenes, now suspicious of Rome saw this as his opportunity to gain the friendship of Syria. Rome would be expected to favor Antiochus, the Romanized Prince, to either of Seleucus' sons or a Syrian usurper who was an unknown quantity, says Bouché-Leclercq, *Op. Cit.* Swain pp. 78, 9, says, "modern writers gravely misrepresent his (Eumenes), character and importance when they depict him as a mere "lackey" of Rome." He had recognized Rome's military might and was scheming to use it for his own purposes—the promotion of Greek culture and life. Another reason for supporting Antiochus was that Eumenes II could not allow a regicide in an adjoining kingdom to go unpunished or rule in unmolested peace.

15. *OGIS*, 247. Heliodorus was a citizen of Antioch and a σύντροφος of the king, *One having been brought up with the royal children.* One might surmise that he possibly planned to bulwark his authority by marrying Laodice (Cf. p. 23), and then declaring himself regent for her younger son by Seleucus IV, Antiochus.
infant nephew, Antiochus, as regent. The hypothesis that he married his sister Laodice to secure possession of her child is now generally accepted. Coins were later issued with no change save the substitution of the portrait of Epiphanes for that of the boy Antiochus. The numismatic evidence is confirmed by Cuneiform documents for the years 175-169 which bear the dating "Antiochus and Antiochus Kings." This change in conception would make the child Antiochus IV, and Epiphanes would become Antiochus V. The time honored order has not been replaced however because of the disruption and misunderstanding such a course would produce.

At the time of the accession of Antiochus Epiphanes, his nephew Demetrius, the legal heir to the throne was in Rome as a hostage for his father. He was forced to remain there as hostage for his usurping uncle. A contemporary account described Epiphanes as "A contemptible person, on whom the royal dignity has not been conferred, but who shall come by stealth and shall win the kingdom by intrigues."  

16. Thus she was married to all three of her brothers in succession—Antiochus, Seleucus IV and Antiochus IV Epiphanes.


18. CAH VIII, p. 498.


As Demetrius was but a child, perhaps eleven or twelve years of age, it was fortunate for the realm that a strong hand was on the helm.

4. Epiphanes sole ruler. In the year 170 Antiochus was in Cilicia subduing an uprising. Andronicus was managing the kingdom in his absence. For some reason he had the young Antiochus destroyed. At the same time Andronicus killed Onias III, the exiled ex-high-priest of the Jews. Coins thereafter born the image of Antiochus as king indicating that he assumed complete authority over the kingdom at that time.

II. PERSONALITY OF ANTIOCHUS

The reputation of Antiochus Epiphanes preceeds him wherever his name is mentioned. His name is the symbol for pitiless persecution and oriental despotism at its worst. In a large measure this prejudice can be attributed to the

21. Diod. Sic. 30:7:2. Andronicus was put to death by Epiphanes when he returned (Cf. II Macc 4:37,8). Although the older sources are unfriendly to Antiochus Epiphanes, none of them say that the king had the boy put out of the way. Bevan thinks that Andronicus would hardly have killed the boy if he had not believed Antiochus would have been glad (CAH VIII, 504). The murder of the boy however would have had little motive on Antiochus' part because Demetrius, the legitimate heir was yet alive and in Rome. The early coins and inscriptions do prove that the child lived for some years and was not destroyed as soon as his uncle arrived in Syria.
early historians. The Jews considered him as the enemy of their nation and its faith. The Romans likewise were unfriendly. The result is that the uncritical reader finds only an unsympathetic picture of the man revealed. If all the evil things said about Antiochus were true, he would indeed hardly be worthy of the bottom-most reaches of perdition. Daniel speaks of him as "A contemptible person... who shall come by stealth and shall win the country by intrigues... he shall practice treachery." The chief characterization of I Maccabees is summed up in the word arrogance. Jason of Cyrene childishly complained, accusing Antiochus of "thinking in his arrogance that he would make the land navigable and the sea traversable on foot, he was so intoxicated in mind." Polybius tried to overcome a strong personal bias against the enemy of Egypt and the usurper of his friend Demetrius' kingdom, but he said that Antiochus' virtue broke down in the face of temptation and that he attacked Egypt in the face of all his promises. Ling said some thought he was "undoubtedly mad." Down through history the Jew has never forgiven Antiochus. Bevan has continued the charge that he was a superficial "Bohemian" who allowed

23. II Macc. 5:21.
the external glories of hellenism to possess his mind. Otto has painted a brilliant picture of a half-mad hysterical king who was the grave-digger of his empire.

It is surprising to discover in contrast to such evil reports that even antagonistic sources have been forced to speak praise of the Syrian. Livy concedes that Antiochus had a truly kingly spirit with regard to his munificence to cities and his care for divine worship. He says that Antiochus' magnificent public spectacles surpassed those of all other kings. Polybius also mentions these qualities and further congratulates him, describing his conduct of the Egyptian as "energetic, daring in design, and worthy of the royal dignity." Appian, who is the most objective source, called him spirited and illustrious and averred that he governed with a firm hand. The greatest compliment paid the king's capacity is the statement of Appian that the Roman Senate rejoiced at his death, and then, and only then, dared to enforce the terms of the treaty of Apamea by destroying the military power of Syria which Antiochus had rebuilt so well.

To the writers of all ages the king has been an enigma. Even when they make statements in praise of him they inevitably end on a harsh note. There seemed to be so many contradictory elements in his nature. He was an oriental monarch; yet he played at being elected to republican office and then acted the part of a Roman judge in the market place. He played pranks on his highest courtiers and was effusive in his hospitality to utter strangers. He wandered through the city of Antioch with but one or two companions and was often found in the shops of the goldsmiths and silversmiths, its world famed artizans. He invited the world to his celebration at Daphne which outshone the Roman triumph of Amelius Paulus and then played the fool throughout. What did he mean?

Modern psychologists would pronounce him an insecure personality. His insecurity had been fostered from childhood. Intensely ambitious he was born the third son of an oriental monarch with all expectation of future power precluded by his two older brothers. Pampered in his youth, son of a

32. Polyb. 26:1; Athen. 5:193f.; Livy 41:20.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 30:26.
father who had won great renown as a conqueror, his early manhood was spent as a hostage for a father who had been ignominiously defeated. At Rome everything was foreign to him. He was not even a citizen, whereas he had been the son of a king. Finally when he came to his kingdom it was with the help of an hereditary enemy, and at first he was only regent for his infant nephew. Physically he was menaced by the malady which was to later shorten his career so disastrously. Above all the king of the richest country in the world was forced into an obsequious abasement before Rome which culminated in the stinging insult of Eleusis. It is little wonder that the king had difficulty in adjusting himself. What so many have overlooked is that he overcame his problems and became a strong ruler—one of the strongest in a strong family.

A final summary of his character as king would follow this order. There was no doubt that he had a good mind in spite of his mad pranks. The burning ambition of the house of Seleucus dominated his career. These characteristics were augmented by the personal charm and imagination which made


him a perfect diplomat although his ethics were not of the highest order (a factor which would enhance his usefulness as a diplomat in any period of history). His training in Rome stimulated his gregarious tendencies and he never was able to accept the restraints of court etiquette. He liked people and sought their company. He manifested a personal interest in the work of the world-famed artizans of his capitol city, he talked with lowly strangers, he bathed in the public baths and enjoyed his practical jokes upon his fellows there. 38 It is almost pathetic to picture him as he came uninvited to banquets or entertainments seeking enjoyment and company only to have the guests become so abashed in his presence that they shyly departed leaving the king alone. 39 One must not overlook his vigorous energy nor his perfect mastery of himself as he met his enemies so suavely in diplomatic encounters that he made the Romans think that he enjoyed their crude oppression. He was a savage oriental in punishing the rebellious. He undoubtedly blundered in pressing his campaign in Egypt as he also blundered in his relations with the Jews. Antiochus personally had little to do with the Jewish problem. He sought to punish the recalcitrant and the rebellious but the undoubted savagery

38. Polyb., 26:1:12–14; Athen. 10:439a; Cf. Livy 41:20.
39. Ibid., 30:26:8.
of the religious persecution of the Jews was perhaps the work of subordinates who were influenced by the desire on the part of the Greeks and hellenizing Jews of the city of Antioch (Jerusalem), to stamp out the unhellenized Jews. 40 All in all however he appears before us as a strong vigorous ruler who Tarn says could have changed the history of the world had he not died so soon. 41

III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

1. Territory. The loss of Asia Minor west of the Taurus by Antiochus III was a blow to the kingdom. Much of the loss however was compensated for the addition of Southern Syria and Palestine to the kingdom of Egypt's expense. The kingdom as it came to Epiphanes was shorn of one third of its territory. Antiochus III had gained the title "great king" for his successful expedition in the east, but Magnesia had dissipated his control there. The ancient Satrapy of Parthia not only recovered her independence but was now reaching out to the Caspian Gates. Demetrius of Bactria had annexed the Seleucid provinces east of the Persian desert. 42 What had been the ancient kingdoms of Assyria and Babylon

40.
42. Bactria pp. 189, 90.
was now more than ever the core of the empire and furthermore this section was not vulnerable to the Romans. Syria, Phoenicia and Palestine became the western borders of the empire.

2. **Prosperity.** Syria was not ruined by the losses at Apamea. Its prosperity was not even seriously undermined. The wealth of Southern Syria probably surpassed that of Asia Minor.\(^{43}\) The indemnity following Antiochus the Great's defeat, of course, made for a difficult financial situation, no matter how temporary. One result was the rigid curtailment of the ambitious political and military enterprises in which Antiochus the Great had been so completely immersed.

The Seleucids even at this time could probably be said to be the wealthiest kings in the world.\(^ {44}\) Justification for this statement is seen in the following financial achievements.

1. Seleucus IV and Antiochus IV were able to pay the enormous tribute to Rome of 15,000 talents in thirteen years.

2. Antiochus made large and munificent gifts to many cities in the Greek world.\(^ {45}\)

3. Syria maintained a large and well equipped army and Epiphanes was able to conduct an expensive war in Egypt.

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43. H.W., pp. 695.

44. H.W., 703. "The Seleucids who succeeded Antiochus III. . . were still enormously wealthy, probably more so than their Egyptian rivals.

4. The enormous wealth displayed in the festival at Daphne manifested the wealth of Syria. 46

3. Economic resources. The land and especially in Southern Syria and Palestine produced a great variety of commodities of good quality. Agriculture was in a flourishing condition with enough production to supply the domestic needs and also provide a surplus for export. Posidonius says, "and all the people of Syria because of the great plenty which their land afforded were relieved of any distress regarding the necessaries of life" and therefore lived as in a continuous feast. 47

The industries of the kingdom are well known. The textiles of Babylon, the dye stuffs of Phoenicia, the glassware of Tyre and Sidon were famous. The unguents, scented oils and perfumes of the world were largely produced in this territory. The prodigality of the kings of Syria in their expenditure of precious ointment is well known. 48 Pottery from the country was exported throughout the world of that day. Especially were the Syrians famed for their work in adorning their glassware with precious metals and gems. Syria stood very high in the realm of the toreutic arts.

47. Quoted by M. Rostovtzeff, H. W., p. 697.
4. International trade. The wealth of Syria made her prominent in the world of trade. Political and commercial relations were especially close between Rhodes and Syria. An illustration of this is the naval escort furnished by the Rhodians to conduct the daughter of Seleucus IV Philopator on her way to Macedonia to become the bride of Perseus. There were many Syrians at Rhodes. That city in conjunction with Ephesus and Miletus, became the clearing house for Syrian goods and trade. The great overland caravan routes connecting the Greco-Italian world with Arabia, India and China all passed through the Seleucid realm enriching it thereby. The Euphrates route, the West Arabian route, the Chinese "silk route" and the land routes of the Indian trade all traversed Selucid territory.

Some violent methods of public finance were resorted to in this period of financial difficulty. This subject will be treated in a subsequent chapter. Suffice it to say here that the wealth of the many temples within the realm was tremendous. These hardy realists of course could be counted upon to draw from these resources when emergencies such as the Roman indemnity arose.

5. **Resulting policy.** It is not surprising in the light of the financial strength of the empire to note that Syria never surrendered her political aspirations or hopes for recovery and consolidation of the empire after the debacle at Magnesia. Seleucus IV was "l'ennemi sournois et irreconciliable de Rome"\(^{50}\) Antiochus Epiphanes was anxious to enlarge and consolidate his empire and made vigorous efforts in that direction.

\(^{50}\) Cf. p. 49.
CHAPTER IV

THE REIGN OF ANTIOCHUS EPIPHANES --

EGYPT AND THE EAST
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EGYPT AND THE EAST

The policy of Epiphanes for the first five years was the same as that inaugurated by his father after Magnesia, and which his brother Seleucus had steadfastly adhered to. This policy was one of adherence to the treaty of Apamea, avoidance of friction with Rome, strenuous efforts to pay the huge Roman indemnity and peace at any price. They also strengthened the Greek element in the empire by founding cities which were centers of Greek culture.

The year 169 saw a great change in the policy of Epiphanes. There were several contributory factors to this change. The Third Macedonian War had begun two years before and Perseus was somewhat successful during the first phases of that conflict. War with Egypt seemed to be forced upon Syria by the machinations of the two advisors of young Ptolemy VI Philometor, Eulæus and Thenæus. The sudden death of the boy Antiochus, while Epiphanes was in Cilicia suddenly placed the uncle in complete authority. Perhaps the most important single factor in the change of policy on the part of Epiphanes may have been that he had been veiling his intentions up to this time and now felt that he was able
to seek openly the fulfillment of his ambitions. The Roman indemnity was paid. A new generation of soldiers was now ready to fill the ranks of the army. The finances of the nation had recuperated materially. The king was ready,

Symptoms of disintegration were calling for the king's vigorous attention.

The most important was the steady orientalization of the Empire. It found its expression in many and various phenomena.

One was the gradual transformation of the Greek mentality of the Greek settlers in the Seleucid Empire. They became in spirit, religion, and life more Oriental. Another was the rise of national spirit among the Oriental subjects of the Seleucids—the Arabs, the Jews, and the Iranians. 1

Otto says,

So richtig an sich sein Gedanke gewesen war, gegenüber dem vordringenden Orient wieder energisch die Hellenischierungspolitik der ersten Seleukiden aufzunehmen, das hellenische Element in seinem Reich auf jede Weise zu stärken, und durch den Hellenismus das auseinanderfallende Reich wieder fester zusammen auffassen, so abwegig war der Gedanke, auf dem Wege des Dekretierens eine volle Uniformierung der völkisch so verschiedenartigen Elemente des Reiches gerade in einer Zeit der Wiedererweckung des bodenständigen Elements herzustellen. 2

Rome was determined to undermine the strength of the kingdom at every turn. In the East and the South the former dependencies were increasingly powerful—Parthia, Bactria, Armenia

1. H.W., p. 63.

and the Nabataean kingdom.

I. ANTIOCHUS' POLICY

Rostovtzeff contends that there is not sufficient evidence to sustain the theory that Seleucus IV Philopator attempted to create a Panhellenistic alliance against Rome. Likewise there is no indication that Epiphanes sought to Romanize his kingdom and "establish a modus vivendi between his Asiatic kingdom and Rome." Tarn has made a strong case for the preeminence of the East in the plans of Antiochus in opposition to Otto, who holds that Antiochus' chief ambition was the conquest of Egypt. Tarn's view has been accepted by the later writers, Rostovtzeff and Swain. Antiochus thus sought to maintain the status quo in the West in order to avoid a second front in the West while he attempted to subdue Armenia and Parthia. Tarn proves his point to the satisfaction of the present writer. This view revolutionizes the traditional view of Antiochus' foreign policy and also puts a different aspect upon the Jewish revolt.

1. Unification of the Kingdom. I Maccabees records Antiochus attempt to unify his kingdom.

Then the king wrote to his whole kingdom that they should all become one people, and everyone should give up his particular practices. And all the heathen assented to the command of the king.5

He wanted to make the kingdom strong enough to resist any designs of the Romans to further weaken his empire by intervening in the internal affairs of the kingdom. Tarn says:

Antiochus IV knew Rome very well, and, as I see it, his consistent attitude was that there must be no quarrel with her at any price; what was lost in the West was lost forever. But the East remained. Rome had no concern with the East; a new world could there be called into being to redress the balance of the old, and Alexander's empire in Asia, east of the boundary which Rome had dictated, might be restored without any risk of giving offence to Rome.6

Antiochus thought,

...the success of Rome was due to her centralization, one ruling city and one civilization, and he set to work, so far as he could, to carry out the same ideas in his own empire, though naturally on different lines.7

His only hope for unity in his polyglot empire was to make Greek civilization common to all and to unify the ruling force in himself as divine monarch (as Alexander had been), Olympian Zeus manifest on earth in bodily form. He did not leave his intention to surmise but remodeled his coinage accordingly and brought out two issues with the Olympian

5. I Macc. 1:41,2.
7. Ibid.
Zeus enthroned and holding Victory on his hand with the inscription \( \text{BAE}1 \text{E} \text{N} \text{Σ} \text{A} \text{T} \text{I} \text{O} \text{X} \text{O} \text{Y} \text{Θ} \text{E} \text{O} \text{Σ} \text{Ε} \text{T} \text{Ι} \text{Φ} \text{Α} \text{Ν} \text{Ο} \text{Σ} \) "of King Antiochus, God Manifest". The king definitely in the new series forsook the family god, Apollo, for the Zeus of Alexander.

a. Finance. The religious basis of the ruling force of the Seleucids led to the infamous policy of temple plunder which Antiochus, the Great inaugurated. The historic policy of the Seleucids had been one of religious toleration. Antiochus III himself had followed this course during the larger part of his reign as his early conduct toward the Jewish temple proves. Jason of Cyrene avers that "kings did honor to the place and glorified the temple with most noble gifts, so that even Seleucus, king of Asia from his own revenue provided all the expense of the sacrificial service."

The financial drain following the defeat at Magnesia necessitated an increase in revenue and the Seleucid rulers, reversing their former policy, turned to the wealthy temples for amelioration of their financial stringency. The first


11. II Macc. 3:2,3.
instance of the use of this method was the pillage of the temple of Bel in Elam by Antiochus III in which expedition he lost his life. Seleucus IV continued the policy in a safer manner. II Maccabees relates that Heliodorus, the minister of finance, visited Jerusalem, which was just another Temple state to him, and attempted to enter the Holy of Holies and confiscate the Temple treasure. The author then says that the attempt was frustrated by angels who scourged the would be desecrator of the sanctuary and drove him away. Heliodorus is without doubt the "exactor" mentioned in Daniel. Epiphanes brought pressure upon the Jews by investing an amenable high priest with authority at Jerusalem. Thus the money found its way into the royal treasury without violence. Tarn rejects the story that Epiphanes sought to sack the temple at Nanaia. Rostovtzeff suggests that he probably did not need to but resorted to the same means that he had used so successfully at Jerusalem. The latter

13. II Macc. 3:1-40. Cf. Swain, pp. 76, 7, thinks this miracle was to cover up intrigue between Heliodorus and the anti-hellenistic element of the kingdom.
15. II Macc. 4:39.
16. Bactria, Appendix VII.
17. H.W., p. 1439 n. 115; II Macc. 4:39f.
opinion is supported by the statement of Jason of Cyrene that the priests at Nanaia brought the money out to Antiochus.18 These exactions were continued in Egypt where "He had also sacrilegiously despoiled most of the temples."19 This policy was not a great success. The people never admitted the claim of the Seleucids to be vice-gerents of the gods on earth. The people met it with a fierce and fanatical resistance wherever it was projected.

b. Colonization. The treaty of Apamea forbade the Syrians to recruit mercenaries from any country west of the Taurus. If Antiochus were to adhere to the terms of the treaty, the only possible way for the Seleucids to build up the Greek element in their army was to plant Greek colonies in the realm and seek to curtail infanticide among the Greek citizens. The Seleucids were popular among the Greeks so the natural decision was to follow the policy begun by the founders of the dynasty, Seleucus and Antiochus. Many of the colonists were Greek20 but in the time of Epiphanes it is not to be assumed that all of the citizens of these colonies were Greek in race. By this time there was a large

18. II Macc. 1:15.
group of Hellenized barbarians who were anxious to take up Greek customs and Greek city life and thus receive the advantages thereby appertaining. The Seleucids placed these cities only where the king needed a strong garrison city in a threatened district. They were composed of strangers and for foreigners. "The interests of these strangers lay in maintaining the Seleucid power, to which they owed their privileges and their favoured position to their new country."21 Epiphanes' aim then was to

... knit together the various parts of his empire by extending and consolidating the net of urban communities which to some extent existed before Alexander and was further developed by him and his successors and by the early Seleucids.

These urban centers were intended to be his points d'appui. In them the process of amalgamation—social and cultural—of the upper classes of the population was far advanced. The idea of Epiphanes was to reap the results of this natural process and to form out of the orientalized Greeks and the hellenized Orientals, mostly residents in the cities, one political and social group, closely knit together round a city life organized more or less on Greek models, and round a common Greco-Oriental religion in which the royal cult should play an important part. With the help of this class Epiphanes hoped to solidify the old and new urban centres of his kingdom, to achieve a more reliable unity of his empire, and to secure success in his active foreign policy.22

c. The πολίς. The founding of Greek cities was done in one of two ways; either by planting a new πολίς with a


22. H.W., p. 64.
Greek constitution at some strategic point or by reorganizing and refounding some already existant town as a πόλις. The latter process was used in the refounding of Jerusalem and Babylon. The latter peculiarly kept its native name.  

Tarn makes this peculiarity one of his proofs that Antiochus intended Babylon to be his new Capitol in a unified empire.  

There were a good many centers which could not claim the full rank of the πόλις but were military colonies. Much of the settlement of the Greeks was done indirectly by other cities. 

This is what enabled it to be done at all, for only the king could found a πόλις... even the foundation of a single πόλις meant for the king hard work. He had to find land for the city, build the wall, supply food, seed-corn, cattle and tools to give the people a start, remit taxation until the city had found its feet and decide personally innumerable housing, economic and social questions; give a constitution and get political life started; and settle the city law.  

The characteristics of a πόλις in the Seleucid empire differed from and are not to be confused with the classical Greek city states. They are difficult to ascertain but to the best of our knowledge they were the following: 

1. Autonomy within the limits of the suzerainty of the king, "Thus the constitution... was a compromise, a sort of  

25. Ibid., p. 6, N. 1.
limited monarchy where democratic freedom and autocratic rule tempered and restrained each other. 26

2. A wall for protection.

3. Greek political forms i.e. A council, an Assembly, a division of the Greek population into tribes with consequent rotation of prytanies, an elected magistrate and a gymnasium. 27 "In every Hellenic city the common religion of the Tribe was an extremely important element in the life and the thought and the patriotism of all citizens. 28

4. Common religious worship. "The entire body of citizens was knit together by their common religion." . . . The Jews were absolved from the ordinary laws and regulations of the city, if these conflicted with the Jewish religion:" 29

5. The gymnasium was not only the center of physical training but was the center of intellectual training for the common man as well. 30 It was the outstanding characteristic of a Ἱππολίτης. Indeed "the noblest feature of Greek city life was its zeal and provision for education. The minute carefulness with which those Asian-Greek cities legislated and provided for education . . . rouses the deepest admiration. 31


6. The king retained no interest in the land. 32

7. The consent of the king was required for a town or a colony to become a πόλις. 33 It cost Menelaus 150 talents to purchase the privilege for Jerusalem. 34

8. The city controlled its own finances. In fact it was a partially self-governing state within a state. 35

The Seleucids were always popular with the Greeks. Probably one reason for this is that they favored the Greeks and Greek cities greatly and the Greeks desired to retain their privileges. One result of this policy was that, the Seleucids, always kept the citadel of the cities in Greek hands. 36 The justification of this policy was demonstrated in the increase of the Phalanx of Epiphanes to 20,000 as compared with 16,000 in the army of Antiochus the Great. In the East however the Bactrian war only set Greek against Greek and so weakened the power of the Greek race as a whole that Greek hegemony was shattered by the Orientals and their Oriental culture, says Tarn. 36a

32. Bactria, p. 31; W. S. Ferguson, Loc. Cit.
33. Ibid., p. 9.
34. II Macc. 4:9.
36. Polyb. 5:48, 14; Bactria, pp. 22, 26, 32.
2. **Eastern Policy.** As we have seen the natural expression of any ambitions Antiochus Epiphanes might have had for expansion was to find its maximum possibilities in the East. The work of realigning the eastern satrapies had not been completed by his father. Even on his famous "anabasis" for which he received such acclaim the "Great King" had not reconquered Bactria and for some reason had dropped his campaign against Parthia and made a treaty of alliance with the king. He had nonetheless reestablished firmly the authority of the Seleucids in the East. Epiphanes now set out to continue the work of eastern aggrandizement.

His first step was the refounding of Babylon as a πολός "with a theatre and at least one Gymnasium" As has been mentioned it is the only city so refounded that kept its Oriental name. The coins prove that Antiochus followed this course with a purpose, for they show the head of the king with the radiant crown of Helios and with the inscription ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΑΝΤΙΟΧΟΥ of King Antiochus. On the reverse side, the Fortune of Babylon is enthroned like Zeus, holding victory

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on her hand. 39 "No other city had ever been enthroned on any king's coinage." 40 This all points to the intention upon Epiphanes' part to make Babylon (the city which had been destined as Alexander's capitol), his own capitol city, retaining the name it had under Alexander.

II. THE EGYPTIAN WAR

The Egyptian war was not a part of the plan and program of Antiochus Epiphanes. He wisely determined to give Rome no reason for offense while he concentrated his efforts upon the reconquest and reorganization of the eastern part of his realm as his forefathers had know it in better days. 41a The king of Syria had been planning an eastern campaign when Egypt became a menace to him on the South.

1. Causes. In the days of Seleucus IV Ptolemy V had entertained hopes of vengeance against Syria. His father-in-law, Antiochus III, had seized Coele-Syria during Ptolemy's boyhood and when he grew to manhood he determined to exploit the disadvantage of the conquered Syrian kingdom to secure the return of this rich province to Egypt. 41 The loss of

40. Bactriá, p. 188.
41a. Supra p. 47.
41. CAH VIII 496.
Coele-Syria was a great financial loss to Egypt and we notice an economic as well as political decline in the southern kingdom.\footnote{42} The untimely death of Ptolemy at the age of twenty-nine brought these ambitions to a halt. Cleopatra, his wife, became the regent for her son Philometor and in her capable hands the kingdom was not plunged into war.\footnote{43} If it was true that she received half the revenue from the disputed border province as claimed, one can see why she was satisfied to maintain the \textit{status quo} with Syria.\footnote{44} The young queen-regent too died suddenly and in her youth even as her husband had done before her leaving her young son in the hands of two notorious eunuchs as regents.\footnote{45} In order to inhibit the interference of Rome, they managed to have the official acclamation of the young Philometor a little over a year after his mother's death at the tender age of sixteen.\footnote{46} The young king was under the complete control of the anti-Syrian party in the persons of his two regents Eulaius and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[42] H.W., p. 713.
\item[43] CAH, \textit{Loc. Cit.}
\end{footnotes}
Lenaius. Of them and their influence Otto says,

Schuld hieran ist das neue, besonders unwürdige Regiment, das jetzt anstatt der syrischen Königs-tochter Ägypten geleitet hat; haben es doch Eulaios und Lenaios, die ja wohl beide Orientalen (s.S.2), und ehemalige Sklaven waren, gewagt, sich als Vormun- der des unmündigen Königs aufzuspielen und die Regierung zu usurpieren, wenn sie auch nicht wie Kleopatra offizielle Regentern geworden sind. Das Menschen, wie sie, die Herrschaft über Ägypten erlangen und langere Zeit behaupten konnten, zeigt uns dessen Niedergang besonders eindringlich; es zeigt uns zugleich die starke Degeneration des einst so stolzen makedonisch-griechischen Herrnelements, das sich unwürdigen Orientalen beugte, all das eigent- lich nur verständlich, wenn der Ptolemäerhof damals schon sehr stark das Gepräge eines orientalischen Hofes mit dessen Haremswirtschaft und dauernden Haffin- trigen getragen hat. Eulaios scheint von den beiden der Führende, Lenaios speziell derjenige gewesen zu sein, welcher die Verwaltung der Finanzen an sich gerissen hatte.47

The regents determined to precipitate a war with Syria and win back Phoenicia and Palestine. Antiochus while planning an expedition to the east heard of their plans for war from Appolonius whom he had sent as his representative to the coronation of Philometor.48

Antiochus made a trip of inspection to the border provinces and regarrisoned them with new troops,49 sending Meleager at the same time as his envoy to Rome with orders to inform the Senate and protest that Ptolemy was entirely unjust in

47. Ibid., p. 24.
48. II Macc. 4:21.
attacking him. 50

2. First Egyptian Campaign. Antiochus Epiphanes met the attack of the Egyptians and was commended for his energetic daring which Polybius, who was pro-Egypt, 51 termed worthy of the royal dignity. 52 The Egyptian offensive was crushed above Pelusium and Antiochus at the same time won a naval victory of Pelusium. 53 In the eyes of Polybius, Antiochus acted discreditably at Pelusium either by some ruse in the battle or by his capture of the young Philometor, whom Eulaius had advised to flee with his treasure. 54 Bevan holds that in some manner Antiochus induced the garrison at Pelusium to revolt. 55 Alexandria was terrified and certain that Egypt would fall to Antiochus, says Livy in his highly inaccu-


51. Ibid., 29:23.


52. Ibid., 28:18.

53. Livy 44:19.

54. Polyb. 28:18,21; Diod. Sic., 30:17; Jos. Ant., 12:5:2; Swain, says, "(they) saw that flight would discredit the king and thus make them the more indispensible." pp. 80,1.

rate account of this struggle. Otto believes that the citizens of Alexandria were called to arms in their defence. There was a revolution in the Capitol. The citizens refused to bow to Antiochus and set up the younger brother of Philometor as King Euergetes II, a title taken from a former Ptolemy who had been victorious over Syria.

Rome was embroiled in her war with Macedonia which did not go so well for her in its first stages and the impulsive Antiochus was encouraged to take advantage of his successful defense of the border and invade Egypt. He made his way from Pelusium across the Delta to Memphis.

The statement of Jerome that Antiochus was crowned king of Egypt is borne out by coins found with the effigy of Antiochus as king of Egypt. We now have found a papyrus (Tebt. III,1), in the ordinary form of the kings of Egypt, issuing a decree to the cleruchs in the Crocodilopolite nome. Otto contends that Antiochus was merely acting as regent for his nephew as he had done in Syria.

In the enthusiasm of the moment the impulsive king of Syria forgot about Rome and his determination to avoid trouble with

56. Livy, Loc. Cit.
her on any account. If he was crowned, he quickly moved to obviate any difficulties thereby involved by opposing the new Ptolemy at Alexandria not in his own name as conqueror of Egypt but in the name of his other nephew Philometor who was in the camp of Antiochus. This he thought would win the Alexandrines over to his side and likewise placate the Greek world for already emissaries were arriving at Memphis to blame the war on Eulaius and plead for mercy for Egypt. To this Antiochus replied that he and his nephew were allies. He denied being at war with Egypt. He sought the favor of the Greek element of the Egyptian population by such expedients as presenting each of the Greek residents of Naucratis with a gold stater. Otto contends that Antiochus sought to win over the Egyptian native element to himself. The natives of Egypt had been extremely restive ever since they had fought side by side with Greeks at Raphia. They had made trouble for Ptolemy V continuously and their revolt may have been the reason that Ptolemy V did not prosecute his projected invasion of Coele-syria before he died. Our sources all corroborate

60. Polyb. 28:20,23.
61. Ibid.
the statement of Daniel that Antiochus Epiphanes was a master of intrigue. 64

In any event Antiochus continued his march on Alexandria and besieged the city. The Alexandrines under Euergetes II made a stout resistance. A sudden report that Jerusalem had risen in his rear caused Antiochus to raise the siege and hasten off to quell the new disturbance which menaced his supply lines. He left Philometer in Memphis and also left a large garrison at Pelusium thus holding the key in Egypt in order to invade it when he chose leaving the two brothers to fight it out for Egypt and then purposing to destroy whichever of them was the victor. 65

3. Revolt in Antioch (Jerusalem). II Maccabees explains that the reason for the revolt at Jerusalem was that Jason, whom Antiochus had replaced as high priest, while living as an exile had heard that Antiochus had died. He thus struck suddenly at Jerusalem seeking to dislodge his brother who had succeeded him and thus present the successor to Antiochus with a fait accompli and perhaps be retained in the high priesthood by the new Seleucid ruler. Jason stormed Jerusalem. The Jewish masses were on his side. 66 When he failed

64. Daniel 11:20.
65. Livy 45:11.
66. CAH VIII, 505.
to take the citadel where Menelaus had taken refuge, his troops looted the city.67 Antiochus, thinking that Judea was in revolt "set out from Egypt like a wild beast and took the city by storm."68 Jason of Cyrene tells in exaggerated language of the brutality of the Syrian soldiers as they too were loosed upon the city.69 Of course the loyal hellenists as citizens of the Πολις would be spared. They were the loyal nucleus of the city who had held the citadel for the king.

Both First and Second Maccabees state that at this time Antiochus Epiphanes despoiled the Temple.70 He is said to have taken away 1800 talents from the temple and in the language of an enemy, "hurried off to Antioch, thinking in his arrogance that he would make the land navigable and the

67. There were two parties at least in Jerusalem. The citizens of Antioch, the Greek city and their hellenized sympathizers formed one party. The strict Jews and anti-hellenistic people would naturally form another party which was probably pro-Egyptian. Jason was a hellenist. He had been the leader of the hellenizing movement in Judea. His act was not pro-Egyptian nor anti-Syrian so much as it was Anti-Menelaus. Jason hoped to replace Menelaus under the Seleucid rule now that Antiochus was dead (as he thought).


69. Ibid.

70. I Macc. 1:20-24; II Macc. 5:15ff.
sea traversable on foot, he was so intoxicated in his mind."71

4. Period between Campaigns. With Egypt in a turmoil, Judea pacified, his treasury replenished from the loot of Egypt and Jerusalem and his army victorious, Antiochus was in an excellent position. He could settle down in his capitol and there keep in touch with the result of the Third Macedonian War and then take suitable steps as the opportunity afforded itself.

The first siege of Alexandria spread dismay in the economic and commercial world.72 Egypt had been a strong sea power in the Aegean and her trade was especially important to Rhodes. They at the suggestion of Rome sent an embassy to Antiochus urging peace.73 After the siege Antiochus sought the good wishes of the Greeks and the Romans by sending an embassy to Rome with 150 talants, 50 for the Romans and 100 to be distributed among the Greek cities on the way.74 These presents served to soften the refusal of Antiochus to cease hostilities, for even Rome had sent envoys headed by Titus Numisius to try to make peace; but they had "returned to Rome without achieving anything at all."75 Perseus was still in

71. II Macc. 5:21.
72. House Sel., p. 140.
74. Ibid., 28:22.
75. Ibid., 29:25:1-5.
the field so Antiochus was in a position to be adamant.

The Achaeans were about to send aid to Egypt during the winter but petty Roman jealousies interfered and Egypt was left to her own devices. In this state the brothers Ptolemy recognized the wisdom of working together. "Antiochos s'était trompé une foi de plus, et toujours parce qu'il s'exageait l'incapacité des ses adversaires." Cleopatra II, their sister, seemed to have been the moving genius behind the rapprochement. The Alexandrines opened their gates to Philometor and thus obviated any difficulty in the way of recognition by Antiochus Epiphanes. Both of the brothers now wore the crown and exercised the royal authority. Antiochus struck as soon as the news arrived that the brothers were united. Polybius said that Antiochus forgot all that he wrote and spoke about merely desiring to put the rightful king on the Egyptian throne. "Χαλεπόν εσθλόν ἐμεναξάν," moralized Polybius, it is hard to be good.

5. Second Egyptian Campaign. The Syrian fleet took Cyprus as soon as the army had begun its march south. From Pelusium the Syrian soon overran all of Egypt but Alexandria for the second time. At Rhinocolura envoys arrived from Philometor

76. Ibid., 29:23.
78. Ibid. 29:23:5; Livy 45:11.
offering thanks to his uncle and stating that all was well and the throne had been regained to his satisfaction. Antiochus' reply was an ultimatum demanding Cyprus and Pelusium with its surrounding country. A time limit was attached to the demand. Time was precious for the decision either had been already made or soon would be in Macedonia. If Rome should win, Antiochus only hope was to present Rome with a fait accompli. There was no hope save in Rome for Egypt.

6. Eleusis and after. June 22, 168, saw the doom of Perseus at Pydna. Victorious Rome could now settle accounts with the Easterner. At Eleusis about four miles from Alexandria a Roman embassy led by C. Popilius Laenas met Antiochus. The king recognized the Romans from his long stay in the Roman capitol. He knew the Roman mind and doubtless guessed their mission. The churlish Roman acted in a most offensive and exceedingly arrogant manner. He refused to greet the king until he had delivered his ultimatum that the Syrian withdraw from Egypt and Cyprus at once. When Antiochus asked for time to consider the matter, the Roman drew a circle around the king, with his walking stick, and forbade him to leave the circle until he had a reply for Rome. Antiochus Epiphanes was not ready to try conclusions with Rome just

80. Livy, Loc. Cit.
yet and there was but one possible reply, acquiescence to all that Rome demanded.81

Polybius said that Rome could act in Egypt because Perseus' fate had been decided. Had Antiochus not been certain of this "he would never,' I think, 'have obeyed the Roman behests.'"82 After the fixed number of days Antiochus and his whole army left Egypt "deeply hurt and complaining indeed." Popilius then hurried up to Cyprus to see that the Syrian troops were evacuated.83 Otto looked upon Eleusis as the end of all Antiochus' hopes. He says:

Der Tag von Eleusis, der den König so Plötzlich um all seine Hoffnungen gebracht hatte, das Unglück, das ihm zugestosen war, hat ihn nicht gefestigt, sondern hat ihn zerschlagen. Das zwiespältige Bild, das, anscheinend unausgeblichen, in der antiken Überlieferung uns entgegentritt, beruht doch wohl darauf, dass der in seinem Innersten getroffene Mann sich damals stark gewandelt hat. Der bizarre, ja etwas leichtfertige Zug, der diesem von Haus ausbegabten, von sich selbst überzeugten Menschen zu eiger gewesen sein musz, ist unter dem unerwarteten Schicksalsschlage, der ihn betroffen hat, zum bestimmenden Zuge seines Wesens geworden; der König wurde ein innerlich zerrissener, nervöser Mansch. Er hat sich durch tolle Streiche, durch verschwenderische Hanlungen, die ihm seine unbeschränkte Königliche Macht zu zeigen schienen, zu betäuben versucht, hat sich eben immer wieder, um das auf ihm lastende Minderwertigkeitsgefühl zu überwinden, vorzuspiegelnversucht, dass er, der Groszönig Asiens, noch etwas vermochte, und hat dementsprechend gehandelt, sich weiter grozze Ziele gesteckt.84

81. Polyb. 29:27; Livy 45:12; Diod. Sic. 31:2; App. Syr. 66; Justin 34:3:1f.
83. Ibid. 29:27.
In contrast to this gloomy picture Bevan says that Antiochus had turned from bankruptcy to riches and had changed the balance of power in the East against the Romans' will.  

Tarn takes up the cudgels with Otto, contending that Antiochus expected to be turned out of Egypt and did not mind failure in this adventure, for it was not a real objective with him but only a rash hope. All must agree with Tarn that the day at Eleusis demonstrated great self-control on the part of a fiery character such as Antiochus Epiphanes, who swallowed the insult, with a victorious army at his back, and an insulting boor before him.

Soon thereafter Antiochus sent envoys to Rome to congratulate them upon their victory over Perseus. They "assured the Senate that their king regarded the peace which the Senate had imposed as preferable to any victory". and that commands of the gods would not have been more dutifully obeyed.

IV. THE EAST

1. First Eastern Campaign. Soon after the Egyptian struggle Antiochus Epiphanes came to agreement with Eucratides. He


86. *Bactria*, p. 192; Swain, p. 87, considers Torri's argument here to be conclusive.

87. *Ibid*.

recognized him as king and sponsored his campaign to win Bactria. Rostovtzeff insists that Eucratides was an independent king. Tarn contends that they had divided the potential Seleucid realm into two parts with Antiochus as ruler of the West and Eucratides as sub-king in the East after they had conquered it. It does not seem unreasonable to presume that the two men were in some sort of agreement under which Eucratides went east in the name of the Seleucid king to wrest the Satrapy of Bactria from the Euthydymids who had asserted their independence of their Seleucid masters. Antiochus for his part was to settle affairs in the west and then the two armies were to attack the rebels in Parthia from the east and the west in a concerted

89. H.W., p. 1493, n. 125.

90. Bactria, p. 203. Tarn worked out this hypothesis in an effort to discover a sufficient justification for the \( \Pi\sigma\ο\mat{\imath}\eta\) at Daphne (which was a Greek form of Triumph). He could not follow Otto and the older historians in accepting the Egyptian War as such a justification. In casting about for a solution to this problem Tarn discovered that the chronology generally accepted for Eucratides and the Euthydymids was by no means definite. He then was the first to study the whole problem intensively. His investigation led him to make Eucratides contemporary with Antiochus Epiphanes (in fact he claims they were second cousins). With Eucratides as a sub-king, Antiochus could then claim his victories as Antiochus' own and thus celebrate a triumph at Daphne which would match that of Aemilius Paullus and at the same time demonstrate that his ambitions were centered in the East, (Cf. Below p. 71). This view is now accepted in its essentials (Cf. n. 89 also Swain).
drive. If this hypothesis is correct (and it seems quite plausible), Eucratides called upon the loyalty of the Greek cities of Bactria, raised the standard of revolt against the usurpers and in a brief period of time with a small force became in the name of Antiochus the "Savior" of Bactria. This title had the special significance of an individual rescuing a territory from an opponent—in this case rescuing the Seleucid cities of Bactria from the rebel Euthydymid, Demetrius.91

The ease of the victory in Bactria can be explained according to Tarn92 by two closely connected facts which seemed to be well known to both Eucratides and Antiochus. The Euthydymids in their bid for power had definitely gone counter to the policy of the Seleucids which favored the Greeks over the Iranians. Naturally the Greek citizens would resent the loss of their special favors and would look to any general for help who would be disposed to restore them to their favored position. Again because of the special favor of the Seleucids, the Greek-Macedonian settlers of the Seleucid kingdom were always loyal to the person of the reigning Seleucid when it was possible. So it was the most natural

91. Ibid., pp. 175, 204.
thing in the world for the Greeks in Bactria to look upon Antiochus as their "Savior" and as they were the military back-bone of the country their assistance to Eucratides would be decisive.

This victory on the part of Antiochus Epiphanes' ally enabled Antiochus to flaunt his triumph at Daphne in the face of the Rome which had so degraded him at Eleusis.

2. The ΠΩΜΠΗ at Daphne. The festival at Daphne was a direct answer to the "games celebrated in Macedonia by Aemilius Paullus." That it was primarily a military triumph on the Greek style is indicated by the fact that the first section of the procession was the review of Antiochus' strong army—stronger than that of his father at Magnesia.

Polybius' vivid description of Antiochus army is classic.

It was headed by five thousand men in the prime of life armed after the Roman fashion and wearing breastplates of chain armor. Next came 5000 Mysians, and immediately behind them 3000 Cilicians, armed in the manner of light infantry, wearing gold crowns. Next came 3000 Thracians and 5000 Gauls. They were followed by 20,000 Macedonians of whom 10,000 bore golden shields, 5000 brazen shields and the rest silver shields. Next marched 250 pairs of gladiators, and behind them 1000 horsemen: from Nisa and 3000 from Antioch itself; most of them had crown and trappings of gold and the rest trappings of silver. Next to these came the so-called "companion cavalry," numbering about 1000, all with gold trappings, and next the regiment of "royal friends" of equal number and similarly accoutred; next 1000 picked horse

93. Athen. 5:194, 10:139=Polyb. 30:25:1
94. Ibid., Bactria, p. 194; Supra 53.
followed by the so-called "agema" supposed to be the crack cavalry corps, numbering about 1000. Last of all marched the "cataphract" or mailed horse, the horses and men being armed in complete mail as the name indicated. Of these too there were about 1500. All the above wore purple surcoats in many cases embroidered with gold and heraldic designs. Next came 100 chariots drawn by six horses and 40 drawn by four horses, and then a chariot drawn by four elephants and another drawn by a pair, and finally 36 elephants in single file with their housings. 95

One notices immediately that the elephants were in the second most important section of the parade—the final section. This direct breach of the treaty of Apamea which forbade the keeping of elephants at all was another brazen warning to Rome that Antiochus was not to be trifled with. Only if Antiochus had been victorious elsewhere than in Egypt would he have been in a position to flaunt this breach of the treaty so deliberately.

The predilection of the ancient writers to ignore anything but western history has deprived us of information and likewise imposed upon our evaluations in this period of history a distinct western bias. A dated inscription affords the information that Antiochus went to Babylon during the summer following the Spring Festival at Daphne, and there celebrated in August-September 166 ΧΡΟΙΕΡ ΚΑΙΑ. The inscription records a gift made to Epiphanes by Philippus, who may be the Philip mention in II Maccabees as Antiochus:

95. Ibid.
minister for affairs. The inscription refers to Antiochus as "Savior of Asia." The term χαριτοτέρεια signifies a sacrifice of thanking for something which the celebrant considered a deliverance. . . he (Antiochus) must have attached great importance to holding them at his destined capitol, or he would never have gone to Babylon in the hot weather; they were obviously a thanksgiving for the "saving of Asia" during the first Eastern campaign with the assistance of Eucratides either as ally or sub-king.

Antiochus now brought out a new series of coins upon which Zeus has the features of Antiochus and he now takes the full title ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΑΝΤΙΟΧΟΥ ΘΕΟΣ ΕΠΙΦΑΝΗΣ ΝΙΚΗΦΟΡΟΣ, of King Antiochus, god manifest, victorious.

Eucratides made a campaign into India but failed to accomplish his mission there and in 159 was slain in battle by the Parthians.

3. Second Eastern Campaign. Antiochus to the best of his knowledge in 165 had settled things in Judea and set out for the East. He reduced Armenia and forced the king to acknowledge his supremacy. Next he went to Elymais.

96. II. Macc. 13:23.
97. OGIS, 253.
Tarn insists that this was a peaceful visit to Susa and connects it with his marriage to the goddess Atargatis. He then went to Gabae on the road to Ecbatana. The king was showing his might to his vassals on his way eastward to attack Hekatompylos, the capitol of Parthia. Tarn says that Eucratides was in India at the time and could not join him in the campaign, but Antiochus had the main army with him and would have been fully able to cope with the Parthia of his day just as his father would have been in his had not death taken them both so suddenly, for Epiphanes died at Gabae of consumption, the disease which had cut down so many of the Macedonian kings.

Thus he died in his youth and the kingdom was left to the mercy of the dynastic struggles of the family and the watchful hindrance of the Romans. Otto gives us a gloomy summary which seems distorted.

Als Epiphanes im Frühjahr 163 v. Chr. Vorzeitig, wohl und der Schwindsucht, fern im Osten in der Landschaft Persis starb, da war das Seleukidenreich, das er zu einer wirklichen Großmacht wieder zu erheben geholfen hatte, bereits ein endgültig ge-

104. II Macc. 9:1.
107. App. Syr., 66; Cf. II Macc. 9:1,2.
While Antiochus lived Rome regretted not enforcing the disarmament clauses of the treaty of Apamea. This is proved by the fact that they saw to it that the Syrian army was wrecked immediately after he had died. But Antiochus' army was stronger than that of his father, Antiochus III, and many Romans knew that had there been competent generalship at Magnesia the outcome might well have been a different story altogether.

The reputation of Antiochus Epiphanes in the world was great. Polybius said that his "power was irresistible." Jason of Cyrene says that he was "stronger than any other king." Had he lived but two more years Tarn assures us that he would have finished the conquest of Parthia and then would have been able to join Eucratides in Bactria and they together might have been able to reestablish the kingdom of Alexander in the East. As it was he failed because he died.

110. Diod. Sic. 31:17a=Polyb.
111. II Macc., 1:13.
The Seleucid empire was never the same again. The Jews were able to free themselves from the declining power of the succeeding Seleucids whose internecine strife for the benefits of the declining kingdom finally destroyed it. Antiochus had greatly weakened the power of the Greeks in the Farther East and caused the failure of the promising experiment of the Euthydymids in India.
CHAPTER V

ANTIOCHUS AND THE JEWS
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Once the fact is established that Antiochus was primarily interested in the East and there based his ambitions for the renascence of the Seleucid Empire, the other events in his reign fall naturally into their proper perspective. The Egyptian War, known as the Sixth Syrian War, becomes a side issue. In preparation for the Eastern Campaign Antiochus needed a settled border in his rear. His early successes by their magnitude and ease prompted him to overreach himself temporarily and seize for himself the diadem of Egypt. This foolhardy step was quickly repented of and the crown relinquished in favor of his young nephew Philometor. By the same token the Maccabean struggle with the Seleucids is dimmed to its proper magnitude. Antiochus did not consider the problem worthy of his personal attention, neither did he allow it to deter his projected campaign in the East. The king cannot completely shake off the onus of his persecution but the barbaric savagery of the execution of the king's commands should probably be attributed to the underlings who in their hatred of the Jews gave free reign to their sadistic natures.1

1. Cf. below, p. 9ff.
I. JEWISH POST-EXILIC PERIOD

1. Oriental Phase. The captivity in Babylon destroyed the historic Jewish kingdom. After a period of about seventy years small groups of pious Jews were allowed to make their way back to their homeland. There they rebuilt their ancient shrine and often found the Satraps easy masters. This was made possible by the liberal policy of the Persians. Under Cyrus, the Persians, who had surplanted the Babylonian rulers, sought the good will of subject peoples by allowing them some privileges. Under the Persian rule this small band of religious devotees lived quietly in their holy city. The virtual autonomy of the Persian period allowed the development of a well-organized ruling caste of priests.

2. Greek phase. Suddenly into the comparative quiet of the Persian empire plunged Alexander. The power of Persia toppled. The world wondered at the ease with which the empire was overcome. Daniel portrays Persia as a two-horned ram attacked by a he-goat (the symbol of Alexander). He says, "the ram had no power to stand before him, he cast him to the ground, and trampled upon him, there being none to rescue the


3. Ibid., p. 61.
ram from his power." Thus it seemed to the innocent bystander in Judea.

a. Alexander. Alexander was not, however, just another military conqueror. His conquest was as much a conquest in the realm of culture as it was in the realm of military. He openly sought to carry the civilization of Hellas to the barbarians. His policy of Hellenization was later modified and recognition was given to the distinct advantages discovered among the Persians. "The union of oriental and occidental was attempted in every city of western Asia." His early death opened the way for a continuous series of wars of succession on the part of his generals and their descendants.

b. The Ptolemys. A few short years after Alexander's death, Ptolemy I had secured his grip upon Coele-Syria and Palestine remained a part of the Egyptian empire for 122 years. "The successors to Alexander retained his strong Hellenistic bent, and Palestine... in a special sense, might be regarded as having borne the brunt of the Hellenistic attack." Ramsay says that the Hellenizing policy of

7. Supra, p. 13.
the Macedonian rulers was a noble and generous one especially in the realm of education and produced excellent results in Western Asia generally. 9

The most efficient methods that the Greeks used in their attempts to hellenize the Jews were permeating and fusive. They did not use force until Epiphanes' reign. Under Philadelphus an intricate system of supplemental commercial routes was opened up which made communication through Palestine easier and thus brought the forces of Hellenism into readier contact with the Jews. 10 The extension of religious favors to the Jews "opened the hearts of the Jewish leaders at Jerusalem." 11 The intermingling of peoples in the empire naturally aided in establishing the dominant culture throughout the realm.

In order to develop the economic life of Egypt and thus facilitate the collection of large sums of money as taxes, the Ptolemies introduced the Greek business man who demanded position and privilege. Other Hellenized peoples were distributed through the empire and the Jews themselves went out from their native land and in dwelling among other

10. Ibid., pp. 223-5.
11. Ibid. Jos. Ant. (12:2:5-10), mentions munificent gifts by the Ptolemies to the Temple at Jerusalem. There is no mention of any interruption of the Temple worship save in III Maccabees which is worthless historically. The need for a translation of the Jewish Law (known as the Septuagint), indicates progress in the Hellenization of the Jews.
peoples subjected themselves to the forces of the foreign or
gentile culture. 12

The Greek cities founded in the land were centers of
Greek culture.

L’esprit tolerant et sceptique de l’hellenisme se
propageait dans les regions d’alentour, a mesure que
les colonies greco-macedoniennes s’implantaient
soutour du lac de Genezareth et dans la vallée du
Jourdain. La race Juive, deja dispersée dans la
vaste triangul compris entre Babylone, Ephese et
Alexandrie, et même plus loin en Cyrenaïque, paraissait
ne plus offrir dans sa patrie un groupe assez
compact pour resister longtemps à la civilisation
hellenique qui commençait à la cerner de toutes
parts. Les colonies grecques formaient autour de la
Palestine comme un cercle qui allait se resserrant
de plus en plus. 13

The Ptolemies were builders of cities in Palestine for the
country was in a recalcitrant mood. Each city was built with
purely military and political objects in view. There was a
line of coastal cities from Gaza to Phoenicia, another east
of the Jordan and a line to the South of Idumaea. 14 There
were numbers of Greek and Macedonian settlers as well as
Hellenized orientals in these cities. Ramsay says,

There is rarely a case in which the Greeks formed the
sole population of a city which they founded in a

12. CAH VII, 111,2.

there are more ruins of Greek walled cities in Palestine than
in any other similar area in all the world. "In this circle
of Greek towns Judea was undoubtedly a survival of the past,"
(CAH VII, 192).

foreign land. The strength and permanence of the Greek colonies was due to their power of assimilating the native population and imparting to it something of their own genius and aspirations. 15

Another element contributing to the hellenizing process among the Jews was the so-called dispersion. 16 From personal choice and by royal policy the dispersion of the Jews was extended throughout the Ptolemaic and Selucid realms. This situation continued until there were, in the day when Judea gained her independence, as many Jews outside Judea as were in it. 17 These scattered Jews remained, to a certain extent, faithful to their religious shrine. This fidelity maintained their contact with the homeland. They were however at the very least mildly hellenized and thus brought to their own people some of the results of their contact with the Hellenistic world. Jouguet says, "Alexandrian Jewry was so hellenized that it could hardly speak anything but Greek." 18


It is significant that tradition states that the Jewish Scriptures were translated into the Greek during the reign of Ptolemy II.19

Of course it is to be expected that the Jew was not the only one affected by a mingling of peoples of differing cultures and religions. The Jew was a force in the religious world of his day.20 He had a marked influence upon Gentile thinkers.

The Jewish insistence upon one supreme God, completely other than man, worshipped without images, in a temple where His presence was symbolized by darkness and silence, appealed to the best thought of the time which was moving... toward monotheism.21

c. The Seleucids. The Jews were not adverse to Syrian Rule. Josephus says that they welcomed Antiochus III as a deliverer and assisted him in holding the country against the Egyptian general, Scopas.22 There was however no change in the policy of Hellenism within Judea when the Seleucids gained control of Palestine. "While those rulers (Seleucids and Ptolemies), were engaged in an incessant struggle among themselves, they were never at variance on the issue of


Hellenization." Ferguson says, "The most striking feature in the internal policy of the Seleucids is the attempted transfer into Asia of the urban form of life theretofore characteristic of Hellas." The Jews were especially popular as colonists with the Seleucids. The religious privileges granted them kept their loyalty to the Seleucids steadfast. Their religious peculiarities marked them off from other men and kept them from uniting with other races against the king. The only breach in relations between the Jews and Antiochus the Great or Seleucus IV was during the attempted raid upon the treasury of the Jewish temple by Heliodorus, the minister of finance for Seleucus IV. There was no change in policy caused by the change of the Jews from Egyptian to Syrian rule.

II. ANTIOCHUS' POLICY OF HELLENIZATION

1. General Policy. The general policy of Antiochus Epiphanes


has been set forth in another connection. The problem now to be considered is the application of the policy by Antiochus to his realm as a whole and then seek to follow its application as it specially affects the Jews.

Antiochus Epiphanes was the last prosecutor of a vigorous policy of Hellenization. The kingdom was rapidly becoming orientalized as he came to the throne. His father had founded many cities to counteract this tendency, but the population had quickly turned Aramaean in the late Seleucid period through the influence of the unhellenized women. Otto declares, "dasz fur ihn die Kunst der Politik schon zur, Kunst des Unmöglichen gewörden war." As usual Otto's gloomy predictions concerning Antiochus seem to overdraw the dark side of the picture. Antiochus' policy met with signal success until he used force. Swain argues that Antiochus in conjunction with Eumenes II of Pergamum was seeking a resurgence of the Greeks in the face of an Oriental renascence. He has strong arguments in that Antiochus did

27. Supra, 47-55.


30. CAH VII 194.

cultivate the Greek world through generous gifts to Greek cities (p. 78); in his passive policy in the face of Rome (p. 78); in his kindness to the Greeks at Naucratis in Egypt; and in his sparing of the Greek soldiers in the army of Ptolemy after the battle at Pelusium (p. 81). In the face of the Oriental menace one would naturally suppose that Antiochus would oppose them. Many of Swain's tenuous suppositions, however, seem unjustified. His theory on the mission of Heliodorus to the Jewish Temple (pp. 76, 7); his supposition that only the Greek soldiers were spared after Pelusium; his assumption that Eulaeus and Lenaeus had "effected what amounted to a nationalistic revolution giving Orientals positions and power once held by the Greeks" (pp. 74, 5), are unconvincing. Swain then fortifies this last assumption with the declaration that the regents went bankrupt because the Greeks would not pay taxes to them (p. 75) and his proof in that Eulaeus coined some currency in his own name and debased it.

Antiochus was a throughgoing enthusiast for things Greek. That no one doubts. But Antiochus' whole policy of Hellenization was an attempt to convert Orientals to Greek culture, not to dispossess the Orientals for the benefit of the Greek race. How could he hope to succeed in such a policy were he to close the door to Greek life to anyone not
of Greek blood? Ramsay has proved that Antiochus settled some Jews at Tarsus, which he refounded as Antioch, 171 B.C. 32 These Jews were full citizens of the νόμος with special exemption from the religious obligations of citizenship. 33 At Jerusalem Jews sought and gained the reconstitution of their city as a νόμος on the Greek model. 34 The coronation of Antiochus as king of Egypt at the hands of the native priests at Memphis was indicative of the fact that he sought to please the natives of Egypt rather than to dispossess them. This was a continuation of the pro-native policy begun by Ptolemy V "which included extensive concessions to the natives." 35 One concludes that Rostovtzeff is nearer the truth when he says that Antiochus sought "to legalize a process of amalgamation between orientals and Greeks which had apparently made great progress." 36 Such a plan would suit the needs of the hour more definitely and also match more perfectly with the facts as revealed in the sources. The racial issue cannot be injected successfully by Swain.

33. Ibid.
34. II Macc. 4:9.
35. Swain, p. 86; Cf. Supra, p. 60; Papyrus Tebtunis 698.
36. R.W., 703.
2. **Jewish Hellenization.** During the first part of his reign Antiochus no doubt "considered himself as the best friend of the Jewish race, and was so considered by many of the most influential Jews in Jerusalem."\(^{37}\) In fact he had a special interest in Jerusalem and later as an act of signal favor he gave it his own name.

When Antiochus came to power he found that Onias III the high-priest at Jerusalem was doing all within his power to impede the process of Hellenization among his people.\(^{38}\) An enemy of Onias, Joshua by name, offered Antiochus 440 talents if he would make him high priest.\(^{39}\) When this was acceded to Joshua, who had now hellenized his name to Jason, offered 150 talents to the king if he would constitute the city of Jerusalem as a Greek \(\Pi \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron\).\(^{40}\) "When the king had consented, and he had taken office, he immediately brought his countrymen over to the Greek way of living."\(^{41}\) The special royal ordinances favoring the Jews were abrogated, the people put on new customs, the Gymnasium and the Greek

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37. *House Sel.* p. 169. "The conservative party was over­borne by the torrent."—Bevan.


hat became the chief symbols of the new order. Even the priests of Jehovah hastened from the Temple to the wrestling school. There is nothing of coercion in this story from antagonistic Jewish sources as yet. All went well for three years until Jason's brother went to Antiochus and outbid him for the priesthood by 300 talents. The brother, who had hellenized his name from Onias to Menelaus was installed in the high-priesthood by the Syrian army and Jason was exiled to the Ammonites.

The first act of violence perpetrated by Antiochus upon the Jews was completely justified. Jason hearing that Antiochus was dead, attacked Antioch (Jerusalem), and about half of the people joined him in the rebellion. Antiochus busy in Egypt naturally was disturbed to hear of fighting, in the rear of his large army, which menaced his supply lines. Thinking "that all Judea was in revolt, he set out from Egypt like a wild beast and took the city by storm." What unbiased reader would blame a ruler for punishing an insurrection in time of war? The thing that disturbed the Jews most, however, was the fact that Antiochus entered their Temple and profaned the holy of holies with his presence. He robbed the Temple,

42. Ibid. 4:23f.; Jos. Ant. 12:5; House Sel. p. 170; Swain 76.

43. II Macc. 5:5ff; Schurer, Vol. I, p. 204.
taking all the gold he could find—about 1800 talents worth in all. Menelaus was restored as high priest.

a. Use of force. It was at the close of the Egyptian War that Antiochus used force to hellenize the Jewish nation. The reason for his use of force grew out of the change in the international set up. Otto avers that the Jewish policy of Antiochus was a psychological reaction to the frustration of his Egyptian Policy. He then made the Jews a scapegoat for his anger and disappointment.

Wie sticht sein vorgehen gegen die Juden, sein Hellenisierungspolitik in Palestine, in der Zeit nach seiner Demutigung in Ägypten ab von jener, die er vorher getrieben hat.

Nearer the truth, one feels, is the fact that Rome had taken Egypt out of Antiochus' control. No longer was Pelusium the border fortress on the South. Judea was now the frontier. If the king's southern borders were to be secure during a prolonged campaign in the East, there must be no question about the loyalty of Judea. The king had hoped for a change in the opposition of the strict Jews. What he thought he saw was,

a loyal party, readily accepting the genial culture which was to harmonize the Kingdom, on the one hand, and on the other a people perversely and dangerously solitary, resisting all efforts to amalgamate them

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44. II Macc. 5:15-20; I Macc. 1:20-24; Jos. Ant. 12:5:3.
with the general system and only waiting the appearance of a foreign invader to rebel. 46

The ground for resistance was religion? Very well, either the religion must go or the people must be replaced by Greeks. He had no conception of what the Jewish religion was. He dared wait no longer. The Jews were already partly hellenized of their own accord and it was the "advanced party" among the Jews which urged Antiochus to take more decided steps. 47 Even after violence began Antiochus did not consider himself the enemy of the Jews but only of the violent and reactionary party. 48

b. The terror.

Then the king wrote to his whole kingdom that they should all become one people, and everyone should give up his particular practices. . . And the king sent word to. . . Judah to follow practices foreign to the country and put a stop to whole burnt offerings and sacrifices and drink offerings at the sanctuary, and to break the sabbaths and profane the feasts and pollute sanctuary and sanctified. . . . and anyone who did not obey the command of the king should die. 41

We shall probably have to look to the Hellenizing Jews, not only for the initiation but also for the systematic carrying out, of the policy. It was one of the commonest phenomena of ancient life. There was scarcely a defeated factor but summoned the public enemy into the city and by their aid took a cruel vengeance on their opponents. 50


47. W. M. Ramsay, Op. Cit. 183; Cf. II Macc. 5:23f.

48. Ibid. p. 184.

49. I Macc. 1:40ff.

The king acted in concert with the Hellenizing Jews, the wealthy and powerful citizens of the city who were advising just a little force on the "recalcitrant minority" which so stubbornly opposed them and the day would be won. Antiochus naturally thought that the problem was more political than religious. The incorrigible Jews were to him the pro-Egyptian group.

II Maccabees relates many incidents of the steadfastness of the faithful under persecution. One story is of one Eleazar who was glad to undergo torture rather than eat pork. In another instance a mother and her seven sons suffered the most cruel tortures "rather than transgress the laws of our forefathers" and were finally fried in a great pan, one at a time. Whatever the historical accuracy of these narratives, they do at least reflect an abiding faithfulness to their laws and a heroic willingness to suffer torture rather than farsake a meticulous observance of them.

52. II Macc. 6:18-31.
53. Ibid., 7:1-42.
III. THE JEWISH REVOLT

1. Causes. Rostovtzeff says, "The revolt of Judas was directed more against the ruling classes than against the central government." With this one can agree. One can likewise accept Rostovtzeff's reason for this revolt as a part of the total cause of the Jewish resistance,

Judas represented the ideals and the dreams of the large masses of the natives, a class neglected by the government and exploited by the city bourgeoisie.

This cannot however be the sole reason for the Jew's resistance. Other cities were peopled by the oppressed. Other Temple states resisted the removal of their sacred funds. Nowhere else however do we see an approximation of the stubbornness and "unreasonableness of the Jews." There were additional reasons.

The core of the matter was that there was bound to be a conflict between the two systems. Both felt that they were peculiar and had the message for the world. "Exclusiveness was as pronounced in the one case as it was rigid in the other." "Yet this very spirit of exclusiveness was one of the conditions which enabled each to nurture and to bring

55. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
to maturity the life-giving germ which it bore within it." 58
As it was both have contributed to the enrichment of the world.

The Greek spirit was anti-Jewish because it was bent on
attaining the supremacy and crushing out all opposition. 59 It
was a wonderful scheme of national education—the best of its
time. It produced excellent results in Western Asia generally
"but the Jews had more to lose than to gain by being
hellenized." 60 Hellenism had no enemy among other Syrian
religions. They merely called their gods by Greek names when
using the Greek language—but the Jews were monotheists.

The antagonism between the two irreconcilable civil-
izations invested the resistance of the Jews with a
peculiar bitterness, which was so unconceivable to
the Kings and their Greek subjects. 61

But,

there shone out in that intense moment the sterner
and sublimier qualities which later Hellenism, and
above all the Hellenism of Syria, hardly knew. 62

There was a difference between the gross conceptions
of the Greek and Syrian gods and goddesses and the high
monotheism of the Jews. There was a difference between the

58. Norman Bentwich, Hellenism (Philadelphia: The
Jewish Publication Society of America, 1919), p. 27.
60. Ibid. p. 182.
high ethical ideals of the Jewish sacred writings and the practices of the Greeks who "filled the temple with profligacy and revelry, amusing themselves with prostitutes and lying with women within the sacred precincts." With all its faults, the Maccabean rising preserved the Jewish race from being merged in Hellenism and kept it free from its destiny.

2. Guerilla warfare and attempts at suppression. The only means of resistance open to the Jewish zealots was guerilla warfare. The higher classes composing the ruling cast of the πόλις were Greeks and Hellenistic Jews, many of them in the third or fourth generation. One group of zealots escaped from Antioch (Jerusalem), to Modin, where their leader Mattathias was bidden to offer sacrifice to the "manifest god." He refused, and furthermore killed a fellow Jew who had stepped forward to comply. Then he killed the officer who was enforcing the king's edict. He also destroyed the altar. With a parting invitation to the crowd to

63. II Macc. 6:4.
65. Cf. Max Radin, Op. Cit., p. 145; Only Hellenists and Greeks were allowed citizenship in a Greek πόλις. Naturally all Hellenistic Jews would seek the advantages which citizenship offered. The citizens were the ruling caste. Others could dwell in the city but could not share in its privileges.
follow him, the old priest and his sons fled to the hills. They soon organized a guerilla band which through fortunate circumstances was to wrest practical autonomy from their Seleucid persecutors. 66

This little group of rebels noted that a similar band of fugitives was annihilated when it refused to fight on the Sabbath. Mattathias and his followers determined to fight on the Sabbath if necessary for defence. 67 Thus they were compromising already in a war which was begun because the rebels could stand for nothing but the strictest adherence to their legal religious customs and restrictions.

In these early days Mattathias and his sons, later called the Hasmoneans were joined by a warlike group of Israelites called Hasidians. 68

Il s'était formé en Judée même un parti de gens qui trouvaient incommode et déraisonnable l'isolement auquel les condamnait l'observance rigoureuse de la Loi. L'était l'aristocratie de la nation... ils souhaitaient d'être délivrés par religieuse de leurs compatriotes. 69

They were characterized as "volunteers for the law," 70 which would indicate that their quarrel with Syria was religious.

68. From ἅγιοι meaning saints or righteous.
70. I Macc. 2:42ff.
Now the combined company amounted to 6000 men who not only opposed hellenization themselves but would not allow others to accept it and further forced recalcitrant Jews into an outward conformity to the Jewish law of circumcision. The Jew could not think of freedom apart from a compulsory obedience by the whole nation to their law. Later this conformity was forced on peoples of other nationality. Not long after the revolt began old Mattathias died. He had appointed his third son Judas to be captain and Simon, his second son, chief counselor.

Antiochus had departed for the East to further his plan to restore his empire in the East. Lysias, his viceroy was governor in charge of all the kingdom west of the Euphrates. The problem of the Judean insurgents was of very minor importance to Antiochus but at the same time it was essential to have a well-ordered border province. Two minor attempts were made to put down these wild hill fighters in 166. Appollonius with the aid of some Samaritans set out in pursuit of Judas but they were ambushed and slain. Apollonius' sword was thereafter worn by the outlaw.

Seron, commander of the Syrian army, with a small detachment

71. Ibid. 3:32.
72. CAR, VIII, p. 514.
73. 1 Macc. 3:10-12.
was also ambushed in the pass at Bethhoron by Judas and fled to the cities of Philistia. 74

Another ineffectual attempt to stop Judas, in 165, is recorded. 75 Three captains, Ptolemy, Nicanor and Gorgias, with a force of 40,000 men and 7000 horses came to take the country. Jason of Cyrene says that Nicanor sought to enslave the Jewish nation and thus pay the Roman indemnity of 2000 talents. He invited the slave traders to follow him offering to market the captured Jews at the rate of 90 per talent. 76 While the Greek force was divided and Gorgias was seeking to locate and destroy Judas' camp, Judas made a night attack on the main Greek camp at Emmaus of the plain and took it. The rebel restrained his well-disciplined men from looting until Gorgias returned and then bested the general, thus nipping the Greek campaign in the bud. The slave dealers had undergone the ardors of their journey in vain.

3. Serious efforts at repression. Up to this point the Jewish affair had not been greatly disturbing to the leaders

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid. 3:38-4:25.

76. II Macc. 8:10. Of course the indemnity had been paid long since but it had been so prominent that it was natural for the Jews to understand it as the object of any great attempt to raise funds. The numbers of the Syrian force are doubtless an exaggeration. One wonders how the Jews obtained such accurate information as to the exact numbers of their opponents.
at Antioch. Antioch (Jerusalem), was completely pacified and thoroughly hellenized. Judas had been considered a problem for the local administrators. They were assigned the task of mopping-up the Judean bands of recalcitrants who roamed the wilderness. The singular lack of success on the part of the underlings however finally aroused Lysia, the governor, to a personal effort. 60,000 picked men were sent south of Jerusalem to Bethsura in Idumea. By this time Judas had an army of 10,000. No doubt this expedition was from the viewpoint of the Greeks a reconnoitering movement to feel out the strength of the rebels and ascertain just what the situation required. Again Judas is alleged to have routed the Greeks. "In view of the ease with which even distinct defeats are seen to be transfigured in the imagination of the Jewish writers into victories, it may be questioned whether much damage was inflicted upon the regent's army."77 Lysias was forced however to take a serious view of the matter. He retired to Antioch to recruit more mercenaries and continue the struggle on a more active scale.78

4. Rededication of the Temple. Following this victory Judas and his brothers determined to rededicate the Temple in

78. 1 Macc. 4:26ff.
Jerusalem to Jehovah, their God. In all these struggles Jerusalem had been securely in the hands of the Greeks with a strong garrison in the citadel. Bevan surmises that Lysias allowed the Hasmoneans to enter Jerusalem and rededicate the Temple. 79 Jewish sources however insist that Judas and his party were now strong enough to hold off the garrison in the citadel and take possession of the city in their own strength. 80 The Temple was ceremonially cleansed and rededicated with great rejoicing on the same day of the year (December 25) on which it had been polluted three years before. The event was so important to them that they ordered that the same period should be observed each year as the Feast of Dedication or the Feast of Lights. 81

Thus these zealots had secured the first of their objectives—religious toleration for themselves and the possession of their Temple for the worship of Jehovah, their God. They fortified Mount Zion against the Syrian garrison and Bethzura against the Idumeans and looked forward to the future with faith and courage. 82

79. CAR, VIII, 515.
80. I Macc. 4:36ff.
82. I Macc. 4:60, 1.
4. **Period of Toleration.** One is inclined to side with Bevan and accept the death of Antiochus Epiphanes as the occasion for leniency on the part of Lysias, the Governor, who then allowed the Jews to rededicate their temple. Ptolemy Macron, the governor of Coele-Syria, was friendly toward the Jews and counseled a policy of moderation and amicability.\(^8\) When Judas went so far as to attack the citadel in Antioch (Jerusalem), however Lysias, who seems to have had control over the young Antiochus V as regent, was forced to take vigorous action. He organized a real punitive expedition against Judas in 162. Lysias and the boy king marched against Bethzura and then against nearby Bethzechariah. The fanatic zeal of Judas' men, illustrated by the heroic death of Judas' own brother Eleazar, was not enough to stem the tide of a real Greek army of superior forces. The Jews were defeated and fell back on Jerusalem. Resistance was difficult for the Jews because it was a Sabattical year. Destruction seemed certain for them until Lysias was diverted from the siege by the return of Philip, the regent appointed by Antiochus Epiphanes. Philip was nearing Antioch, the capital, at the head of the victorious Eastern Army. With this threat at his back Lysias came to

\(^{83}\) *II Macc.* 10:12.
terms with the Jews confirming their religious toleration. The Greeks then evacuated the city after destroying the fortress of the Jews on Mount Zion.\textsuperscript{84}

Thereafter the dynastic difficulties of the Seleucids were the inhibiting factor in their rule of Judea. The pacification came too late for Epiphanes, however. The Seleucid power was on the wane and the Jews enjoyed practical autonomy (at its expense) except when a strong ruler like Demetrius I or Antiochus VII Sidetes reigned.

\textsuperscript{84} I Macc. 6:19ff.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS
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CONCLUSIONS

I. PERSONALITY OF ANTIOCHUS EPIPHANES

Antiochus Epiphanes has been misrepresented in history because he has been misunderstood. He is revealed by research as a strong, vigorous character who should have a high place among rulers because of his abilities. His analysis of his kingdom's problems and his vigorous efforts to ameliorate these conditions and succeed against tremendous obstacles is laudable. Impartial judgement would deem his persecution of the Jews as an error, but an error largely due to ignorance of the true situation on his part. He knew nothing of the Jewish problem first hand and was the victim of his advisors.

II. HISTORICAL

1. Importance of the East. The eastern campaigns of Antiochus III and Antiochus Epiphanes demonstrate that the country east of Mesopotamia deserves a much higher rank in our consideration of Hellenism and its history. The Middle East

2. Ibid.
and the Farther East have been completely lost sight of in all too many cases whereas the Seleucids saw there what promised to be a most important element of their empire.

2. **Egyptian Campaigns.** There is no justification in the sources for more than two Egyptian campaigns. Polybius is too trustworthy to be sidetracked for the sake of one word, in as unreliable a work as that by Jason of Cyrene or because of a vague vision of Daniel. Livy is befuddled on the issue but has many of the facts in confused form which would lead to a two campaign view.

3. **Antiochus and the Jews.** Antiochus' policy toward the Jews on the whole must be reckoned as one of friendship. The dominant party of the Jews were hellenized and that of their own seeking. Antiochus Epiphanes saw his opponents as a recalcitrant minority and he permitted the majority in the autonomous state of Antioch (Jerusalem), to use his name and power in dealing with the few who hindered the complete hellenization of the people. His relations with the dispersion Jews was cordial.

4. **Maccabean wars.** From a military point of view the

5. p. 59, n. 51a.
6. p. 91f.
7. p. 88ff.
8. Ibid.
Maccabean wars (if they may be dignified by that name), were of little practical value. The disruption of the Macedonian kingdoms was in progress. In particular were the bonds restraining the subject peoples of the Seleucid Empire dissolving. This resulted in freedom for Parthia, Bactria and other groups which had been subject to the Empire as well as for the Jews. When the Seleucid power was weakened by dynastic strife or outside interference the Jews were able to assert some little independence—this was never complete. On the other hand whenever a strong Seleucid ruler such as Demetrius I or Antiochus VII Sidetes came to the throne, the Jewish pseudo-independence vanished.

III. RELIGIOUS

Although the Maccabean wars were of little consequence politically, the religious results of the struggle were quite significant. They have affected the history of the Jews down to the present time.

1. Preservation of monotheism. The outstanding result of this struggle was the preservation of a pure ethical monotheism in the face of a threat to its very existence. Whereas the people of Judea, led by the priesthood, has been unconcerned


11. Ibid.
heretofore, the struggle which Judas led, infused the Nation with a determination to resist any effort to destroy their religion or to alter their monotheistic conception of God. This conception has enriched the world. It paved the way for the Christian religion and the Mohammedan as well.

2. Jewish exclusiveness. The struggle demonstrated first of all the basic mutual incompatibility of the two religious and philosophical systems; Judaism and Hellenism. They were mutually exclusive until the power of Christianity merged the two philosophies.

3. Dispersion Jews. Of far reaching importance was the revival in the religious and racial loyalties of the diaspora, or the group of Jews dispersed over the world. They had heretofore been slowly but nonetheless surely drifting away from the customs of their fathers. From this point forward they develope into the heirs of Judaism both in its Christian development and in the Jewish remnant which was left after the destruction of the Temple and the scattering of the nation by Titus in 70 A.D.

4. Palestinian Judaism. From this period forward the Jewish religion became ossified and reactionary in its exclu-

12. pp. 92,3.

sion of all non-Jewish elements. The party of the Pharasees developed in this period and the Zealots drew their inspiration falsely, but nonetheless certainly, from the exploits of Judas, the Maccabee and his brethren.

5. Apocalyptic. The Apocalyptic literature flowered under the pressure of hellenistic force. The first Martyrologies were developed in this period and passed over into Christian literature as a type.

The search for a military and political messiah which so dominated the world in Jesus' day sprang up from these roots. It gave form to Messianism.

In this period Apocalyptic writings were extant. 14 Daniel in the canon and others of the Apocrypha which molded the form as a type, found their chief impetus in the Maccabean struggle. This whole development laid the background for the Kingdom of God movement initiated by John the Baptist and carried forward by Jesus.

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