
Sean Lee Welch

University of Louisville

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/etd

Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
https://doi.org/10.18297/etd/2133

This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. This title appears here courtesy of the author, who has retained all other copyrights. For more information, please contact thinkir@louisville.edu.
CONTENTIOUS SPACES: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LATIN AMERICAN RESISTANCE CAMPAIGNS, 1956-2006

By

Sean Lee Welch 
B.A., Indiana University- Southeast, 2012

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of the
College of Arts and Sciences of the University of Louisville
In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts in Political Science

Department of Political Science
University of Louisville
Louisville, Kentucky

May 2015
CONTENTIOUS SPACES:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LATIN AMERICAN RESISTANCE CAMPAIGNS, 1956-2006

By

Sean Lee Welch
B.A., Indiana University- Southeast, 2012

A Thesis Approved on

April 21, 2015

By the following Thesis Committee:

______________________________
Jason Gainous, Ph.D., Committee Chair

______________________________
Tricia Gray, Ph.D.

______________________________
Jennie Burnet, Ph.D.
DEDICATION

For everything she’s given me,

this thesis is dedicated to my Mom.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank the members of my Thesis Committee: Dr. Jason Gainous, Dr. Tricia Gray, and Dr. Jennie Burnet. Giving guidance and support, each of them provided important perspectives in the development of this research. A number of others have been enormously helpful over the course of my academic career. My interest in Latin America was encouraged and supported in no small part by Dr. Cliff Staten. As an undergraduate, Dr. James Barry really made me think about the big and loaded concepts like violence, power, and revolution. Dr. Anne Caldwell and Dr. David Buckley have provided me with invaluable intellectual insights and thoughtful advice. Finally, I would like to thank my Grandpa. Reading virtually everything I have written, he continually challenges and encourages me.
ABSTRACT

CONTENTIOUS SPACES:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LATIN AMERICAN RESISTANCE CAMPAIGNS, 1956-2006

Sean L. Welch
April 21, 2015

Why do resistance campaigns have different outcomes? Specifically, why do some resistance campaigns succeed, while others fail or fall somewhere between success and failure? Examining Latin American resistance campaigns between 1956 and 2006 through a theoretical lens of spatial agency, the varying outcomes of resistance campaigns (success, partial success, and failure) could be explained schematically by the same conditions. Generally, successful campaigns had the same conditions present, which include: facing an authoritarian regime; the ability of the campaign to build cross-class alliances that included urban elements; military shifts through defection, desertion, or open rebellion; the United States’ withdrawal of support for the regime; and cultures of resistance. Of particular significance, given Latin America’s urban-tilted population distribution after World War II, no resistance campaign in the region from the Cuban Revolution on could succeed without being able to operate in urban areas and capturing urban support.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acknowledgements</th>
<th>iv</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter One: Introduction</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Myth of <em>Foquismo</em></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up a Creek without a Paradigm</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview of Thesis</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Two: Theory Development &amp; Methodology</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency, Structure, &amp; Space</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Logic of Resistance</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Integrated Framework of Resistance</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Collection and Data Analysis</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Latin American Context</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Three: Latin American Resistance Campaigns</strong></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla Movements &amp; Revolutions</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Transitions</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup, Counter-Coup, and Counter-Revolution</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Four: Results &amp; Analysis</strong></td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Five: Discussion &amp; Conclusion</strong></td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum Vitae</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The Myth of Foquismo

In the early hours of New Year’s Day 1959, Fulgencio Batista, the dictator who had dominated Cuban politics for decades, fled Cuba for the Dominican Republic. A week later, after making their triumphant trek across the country, Fidel Castro and his bearded guerrillas (los barbudos) entered Havana. In 1956, having sailed from Mexico, this band of guerrillas invaded Cuba. Landing in Oriente Province in eastern Cuba, they set up their base of operation high in the Sierra Maestra. This small and dedicated group of revolutionaries would “make” a revolution by mobilizing peasants in guerrilla warfare, weakening the regime, gaining the support of the masses, and overthrowing Batista. Subsequently, Ernesto “Che” Guevara (Guevara 1961) and Régis Debray (Debray 1967) codified this strategy as foquismo. The “Cuban model” would go on to be apotheosized and imitated throughout Latin America.

Believed the world over as the story of Batista’s overthrow, the above story is not entirely true. The “mountain mystique” of foquismo, the fixation with the primacy of rural guerrilla operations, ignored the urbanizing nature of Latin America and its urban-tilted population distribution after World War II (Russell et. al 1974: 37-38). Likewise, the emphasis on “making” a revolution ignored the specific conditions that made revolution possible in Cuba, and later in Nicaragua. No doubt, these revolutions were the result of human actions and intentions, but they were only made within particular
contexts and with a number of crucial conditions present (Wickham-Crowley 1992; Dix, 1983, 1984). Why were these cases successful? To focus on the initial success of regime change, the confluence of conditions in Cuba and Nicaragua that favored success included: personalistic, corrupt, and exclusionary dictators in Batista and Anastasio Somoza DeBayle; cross-class alliances that included urban elements; military shifts through defection, desertion, or open rebellion; the United States’ withdrawal of support for the regimes; cultures of resistance.

But, why do other forms of resistance succeed, fail, or fall somewhere between failure and success? Importantly, the success or lack thereof for other forms of resistance can also be explained by the conditions explaining the successes in Cuba and Nicaragua. In other words, the conditions for successful resistance campaigns included: ability of the campaign to build cross-class alliances with urban elements; facing an authoritarian regime; a state apparatus that was experiencing military shifts through defection, desertion, or open rebellion; express or tacit support of the campaign from the United States; and some sort of culture of resistance that the struggle could be rooted in. Of particular significance, given Latin America’s urban-tilted population distribution after World War II, no resistance campaign in the region from the Cuban Revolution on could succeed without being able to operate in urban areas and capturing urban support.

**Up a Creek without a Paradigm**

This project originated as a meta-theoretical analysis of structure and agency as they relate to regime change (Mahoney and Snyder 1999; Berejikian 1992; Kitschelt 1992; Sil 2000). At their extremes, neither structure nor agency gives an adequate account of regime change. On the one hand, extreme structuralism is overly deterministic
and presents overly conditioned subjects, leaving little room for human actions and intentions (Dryzek 1992: 521; Imbroscio 1999: 46), finding perhaps its best expression in Althusser’s “authorless theatre” full of actors “forced to be actors, caught by the constraints of a script whose authors they cannot be” (Althusser 1970: 193). An extreme structuralism is problematic for explaining regime change because it does not account for change very well. If change is considered, then it is located outside of structures in notions of collapse or breakdown, or other influences exogenous to the system (Sewell 1992: 2-3). On the other hand, an extreme agency presents a autonomous, unencumbered individual freely willing ends, detached from any social or corporeal context (Markell 2003: 10-12). Such an extreme agency is problematic because it lends itself to the notion of “making” a revolution, which, of course, is unrealistic. Put simply, agency indicates undersocialization and structure is indicative of oversocialization (Mahoney and Snyder 1999: 5).

Each with their own deficiencies, the problem became how to reconcile structure and agency with regards to regime change. Anthony Giddens (1976, 1979, 1981, 1984) seemed to have “solved” the agent-structure problem by positing that structures are “dual,” that they are recursive insofar as they are “both the medium and the outcome of the practices which constitute social systems” (Giddens 1976: 27). But, how could this manifest itself in an empirical way? Almost so obvious as to be imperceptible, the answer was to posit space as a structure (Sewell 2001). Aware of the postmodernization of space, the detaching of spatial notions from any corporeality (Soja 1987, 1989; Foucault 1980: 68-69), there was an initial hesitancy to consider as space anything other than the physical environment, either natural or artificial. However, this crude reaction was
unteatable due to the importance of abstract social spaces—whether referred to as “webs” of relationships (Arendt 1998: 182-183) or “social capital” (Putnam 1995: 67)—that are intangible but no less real. So, while actions and intentions drive events in the world, these actions and intentions are only realized within social contexts such as abstract space and corporeal space (Dessler 1989: 443).

In looking at how regime change operates in different spaces, revolution was an obvious point of departure. But, it became clear that revolutions, understood as highly novel (Huntington 1968: 264; Skocpol 1979: 4-5), not only presented insurmountable methodological issues in themselves, but also that they had processes and dynamics comparable to other phenomena. The literature has really struggled with this latter point, and has tended to consider any sort of major political upheaval revolutionary (Goldstone 2001). Although this strategy is inadequate, the phenomena similar to revolutions cannot be ignored. Accordingly, serving to classify before comparing (Kalleberg 1966), innovative concepts like “contentious politics” (McAdam et al. 1997, 2001) or “resistance campaigns” (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011) integrate revolutions and similar phenomena under a singular rubric. For reasons discussed below in detail, resistance campaign was a more appropriate unit of analysis than contentious politics, and the campaigns chosen were those cases in Latin America from 1956 through 2006.

Included among resistance campaigns are democratic transitions, which may come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the democratization literature as the Latin American cases of democratization are portrayed as being controlled by elite dispositions and calculations, particularly those of the military (Linz and Stephan 1996: 150; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 48). Of course, there will be mention of the “popular
upsurge” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 53-56), but elites are the central focus of processes that are, to use Juan Linz’s dichotomy (1978: 35), more reform than rupture. Yet, elite centric analyses of regime change tend to be overly voluntaristic (Remmer 1991), and, downplaying or ignoring collective, social, and class-defined actors (Collier 1999: 8), obscure the fact that “social mobilization is undoubtedly indispensable” (Garretón 1989: 275) in regime change. As such, the similarities between democratic transitions and revolutions are obscured. At the same time, in general, scholarship on Latin America is primarily concerned with the actions and intentions of elites (Eckstein 1989: 2). Emphasizing popular mobilization and action from below, the choice of Latin America as the arena of analysis is a direct challenge to such elite-centric work.

Further challenging convention, this project not only takes the concept of resistance campaign from the trailblazing work of Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan (2011), but also their postulation that non-violent strategies are not necessarily passive and that they can be effective in achieving maximalist demands like regime change. However, missing from their account is a fundamental underpinning for resistance strategies, a radical logic of resistance that really explains the dynamics of regime change. Providing such an underpinning, this project utilizes a conceptualization of power that does not equate it with violence (Mills 1956: 171). This is not to say that violence does not work in achieving maximalist goals. But, for a resistance campaign, regardless of whether it is predominantly violent or non-violent, to be successful in achieving regime change, the regime it challenges must have lost its power. While this will be further elucidated below, suffice to say that a regime loses its power when it loses
its support, becoming vulnerable to regime change when large segments of society actively turn against it (Arendt 2006: 220; Arendt 1972a: 101-102).

The significance of this project is not necessarily the interplay between agency and structure as they pertain to regime change. Plenty of people have addressed this already (Mahoney and Snyder 1999; Berejikian 1992; Kitschelt 1992; Sil 2000). Nor is positing space as structure especially significant or novel (Sewell 2001). Broadly, analyzing resistance campaigns is significant because the questions raised and addressed are “first-order questions,” those big “questions that draw people to study social life in the first place, and that are constantly raised anew in the minds of nonspecialists” (Rule 1997: 46). Specifically, the significance of this project is that space is emphasized and posited as a structure, but not at the expense of agency, and within an integrated framework of bottom-up, popular resistance that is not defined by the dependent variable, while also explaining the logic of resistance through a specific conceptualization of power. Additionally, what results from this comparative analysis of resistance campaigns can be described as both knowledge accumulation and knowledge generation (Mahoney 2003: 132-133).

Overview of Thesis

The first two sections of Chapter Two deal with theory development. “Agency, Structure, & Space” fleshes out what is meant by space, how it can be conceived of as a structure, and how resistance can exercise agency within such structures. Accordingly, this section largely deals with the interaction between space and strategies of resistance, explaining how different strategies operate, and explaining the logic behind them. The second section of Chapter Two builds upon the preceding section and elucidates the
dynamics of resistance through a radical conceptualization of power. A combination of theory development and methodology, the third section deals with concept formation and case selection. Specifically, this third section addresses issues with analyzing revolutions exclusively, surveys possible conceptual alternatives to overcome such issues, and then settles on “resistance campaigns” as the unit of analysis. Discussing the deductive and inductive elements of this project, the fourth section deals with data collection and data analysis, while also discussing how cases and variables were revised through the process. Chapter Two concludes by reviewing trenchant variables in the Latin American context, setting the stage for the next chapter.

Chapter Three presents a narrative of the eighteen campaigns in Latin America between 1956 and 2006. These were categorized into three categories, including “Guerrilla Movements & Revolutions,” “Democratic Transitions,” and “Coup, Counter-Coup, & Counter-Revolution.” The cases are categorized according to where they are commonly put in the literature. In other words, the guerrilla movements are grouped with the revolutions because they explicitly aspired to revolutionary goals in the style of the Cuban Revolution (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 30-31). Similarly, the ouster of Marcos Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela in 1958 and the transitions from military rule in the Southern Cone are put together as they eventuated in democracies. Additionally, the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973, the attempted overthrow of Hugo Chávez in 2002, and the Contras in Nicaragua through the 1980s are all put together as reactionary campaigns against left-wing governments.

As will be shown, these categorizations are imprecise. As an example, more rupture than reform, the Venezuela 1958 campaign is more comparable to the processes
that led to the overthrow of Batista in Cuba and Somoza in Nicaragua than the campaigns in the Southern Cone against the military regimes. Nonetheless, these categorizations serve an important organizational purpose. Regardless, for each of the three sections certain campaigns lead. For example, the campaigns against Batista and Somoza lead “Guerrilla Movements & Revolutions,” the campaign against Pérez Jiménez leads “Democratic Transitions,” and the campaign against Allende leads “Coup, Counter-Coup, and Counter-Revolution.” Generally, these leading campaigns are given more attention than the other cases and are described in more detail so as to highlight the society-wide shifts in power away from the respective regimes. Finally, Chapter Four analyzes the findings and Chapter Five concludes with a discussion of significance and considers some factors not discussed, as well as some issues.
CHAPTER TWO: THEORY DEVELOPMENT & METHODOLOGY

Agency, Structure, & Space

Space is a social phenomenon that ranges from the abstract to the corporeal. Regarding the former are those “webs” of relationships, which, though intangible, are no less real than the visible, corporeal world (Arendt 1998: 182-183). These “webs” can find articulation in civil society, which has been described as a sphere of societal communication and association autonomous of the state (Cohen and Arato 1992). Because it creates social spaces conducive to engagement and participation through social capital, “features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1995: 67), civil society is considered a vital aspect of democracy. It should come as no surprise then that civil society was the “celebrity” of the democratic transitions of the late twentieth century (Linz and Stepan 1996: 9) and that the “popular upsurge” of civil society against authoritarianism was critical in “restructuring public space” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 49-56). Nonetheless, what is important is that it is in abstract social spaces of society that grievances are imbued with meaning, where grievances can find resonance and possibly fester into open resistance (Simmons 2014).

Social spaces shape repertoires of collective action (Tilly 1978: 151-158, 224-225) and grievances can find resonance in what can be referred to as cultures of
resistance. Broadly signifying a history or tradition of struggle (la lucha), culture of resistance is described well by James Scott (1990: 151), who said, “Over time…modes of collective action become part and parcel of popular culture,…enacted by a large repertory company whose members know the basic plot and can step into the available roles.” So, while Marx observed that people can be frustrated in “revolutionizing themselves” because “the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living” (Marx 1972: 437), it seems that, conversely, a tradition can also assist people in “revolutionizing themselves.” Similarly, in resistance it is necessary for those subordinated by the dominant order to coordinate and communicate their actions by carving out social spaces free from control and surveillance from above (Scott 1990: 118). Part and parcel of the establishment of such “off-stage” spaces of resistance are abstract spaces.

Less abstract, space can refer to the physical environment. Easily taken for granted as it is often primordial, this space can be artificial in addition to natural. Space can refer to the built environment with networks of streets, ports, railways, or it could refer to jungles, mountain ranges, coastlines, and river valleys. By no means is this list exhaustive, but it does to show that the spaces concerned with presently are physical spaces that can be used, seen, and experienced (Sewell 2001; Kohn 2004), while also highlighting the broad categorization of space as urban or rural. From the degree of forestation to the development of infrastructure, space can facilitate or inhibit the movement of people, goods, and information, and can thus enable or constrain action. What is more, space cannot be stood outside of, but, as a structure, space is also pliable
and must be seen as “dual” (Giddens 1976, 1979, 1981, 1984), as dominating and liberating, shaping and shaped by people.

Those non-state actors who oppose a government and move to challenge it must accept the physical environment as given. By recognizing this, would-be challengers can exercise spatial agency by turning spatial constraints into advantages, working with and within given spatial structures (Sewell 2001: 55-56). Because they are often facing states, opponents with superior financial, coercive, and organizational resources, it is important for revolutionary movements to exploit any regime weakness. This is what the Chinese Communist Party did when it withdrew to the countryside to engage in guerrilla war after failed attempts at urban insurrection. After World War II, other revolutionary movements in such places as Central America, Lusophone Africa and Southeast Asia would take advantage of peripheral areas outside of state control (Goodwin and Skocpol 1994; Skocpol 1976).

Such spaces are ideal for violent insurrection. Beyond serving to stretch the enemy over a vast area, they also serve as corporeal off-stage spaces that offer protection from persecution and repression (Scott 1990: 118). Put differently, devoid of tight-administrative control, such spaces provide sanctuaries for rest from combat, the provision of food, rearmament, and military training (Goodwin and Skocpol 1994: 266-267; Zunes 1994: 510). Moreover, touching upon abstract space, guerrillas can benefit from establishing themselves in such peripheral areas insofar as such locations are often home to a culture of resistance opposed to the dominant order (Wolf 1969: 293-294). Indeed, these rural spaces can easily become sites of multiple sovereignty, what Trotsky
referred to as “dual power” (Tilly 1978: 192), which is why “intrag regional geopolitics” are important to look at when studying resistance (Goodwin 1994: 744).

Able to constrain the movement of people, goods, and information, space is able to constrain, as well as facilitate, social processes, significantly structuring the composition of a given society. This is especially evident in agricultural production, which, in contrast to capital-intensive economic activity like manufacturing and oil extraction, is labor-intensive and positively correlated with rural population (Coronil 1997: 28-29). If there is a large agricultural labor force, then there is a large rural population. Listing twentieth century revolutions, Figure 1 and Table 1 below highlight this. Therefore withdrawal of revolutionaries from the centralized authority of urban centers has not only been done in order to have some “breathing room,” but also to establish bases of support amongst the peasantry.

While mobilizing the peasantry was not the revolutionary strategy of the Bolsheviks in Russia, which was largely focused on urban centers, the spontaneous revolt of the peasantry was absolutely necessary (Huntington 1968: 266-274; Skocpol 1979: 112-113) in a country that had 67% of its population employed in agriculture only four years prior to the outbreak of the revolution in 1917 (Goldsmith 1961: 442). Since there is a power in numbers (Arendt 1972a, 1972b, 1998, 2006), peasant participation in revolutions, whether autonomous or mobilized, has provided “the dynamite that finally exploded the old order” (Moore 1966: 228). The exception to the peasantry being the sine qua non of revolutions are the cases of revolution in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Iran, which are identified in Table 1 in bold. The revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua would be as
urban, if not more, as they were rural, while the revolution in Iran was almost entirely urban in composition.

Figure 1

![Twentieth Century Revolutions](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agricultural Labor</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>70% ('30)</td>
<td>10% (1900)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1917</td>
<td>67% ('13)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>69% ('50)</td>
<td>10% ('53)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>76% ('40)</td>
<td>10% ('53)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>71% ('40)</td>
<td>11% ('55)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>72% ('50)</td>
<td>19% ('55)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>14% ('55)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cuba</strong></td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>42% ('53)</td>
<td>37% ('55)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>82% ('60)</td>
<td>15% ('60)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>69% ('60)</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>81% ('60)</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>88% ('60)</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nicaragua</strong></td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>43% ('80)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iran</strong></td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>40% ('78)</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Percentage ('70)</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Result</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Those struggling for social change within urban spaces, especially those who use non-violent strategies, not only emerge as serious challengers, but also succeed in getting their demands met. The emergence, continuance, and success of urban resistance, especially non-violent, does come as somewhat of a surprise though. To elucidate this, it is helpful to consider how resistance is comprised of many off-stage spaces and strategies of resistance. The off-stage strategies of resistance include various low-profile techniques, such as foot-dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, and sabotage (Scott 1985: xvi-xvii; Scott 1990: 4-5). Avoiding direct and open confrontation, such tactics are integral to resistance and can assume a violent or non-violent character. Related to off-stage tactics are the off-stage spaces of resistance mentioned above, both abstractly and corporeally, those spaces free of control and surveillance from above, while also facilitating coordination and communication within the campaign (Scott 1990: 118). Though off-stage spaces and strategies are consistent with both rural and urban spaces, characterized by a scattered population over a segment of territory largely illegible to outsiders, the countryside is particularly well-suited for guerrilla-style campaigns.

No doubt, cities are sites of subversive activities, of dissent, conspiracy, as well as riots and rebellions. But, cities do have disadvantages when it comes to spaces and strategies of resistance. For example, by facilitating the movement of troops, putting down an insurrection is part of the logic of the centralized grid (Scott 1998: 55-62). Possibly the most notorious case of this is Haussmann’s rebuilding of Paris during the
Second Empire (Jordan 1996: 188-192; Pinkney 1958: 36). Not only can urban planning facilitate the defensive crushing of resistance, but it can also preempt such acts of defiance through normalization, regulation, and surveillance. Centralized observation and organization that is part and parcel of the urban apparatus is indicative of an atomizing gaze that observes, inspects, and achieves surveillance (Foucault 1995: 141-143, 145, 171). As Foucault succinctly said, “Visibility is a trap” (Ibid: 200). Finally, cities are manipulated to exude an aesthetic of authority, to demonstrate national strength and unity to foreigners and the citizenry through grand edifices, vistas, squares, monuments, and an attention to uniformity that dramatizes rule. As material expressions of authority, such spaces are often used by the government for parades, inaugurations, processions, and coronations. Partially, if not wholly, symbolic and ceremonial spaces, capitals are particularly well-suited for these purposes (Kohn 2003: 6-7; Scott 1990: 58; Scott 1998: 56, 58, 62).

So, how does resistance successfully operate in urban areas? Henri Lefebvre (1991: 164-165) posits distinct and inseparable notions of space in dominated space and appropriated space. The former is indicative of imposition, and cities are obviously examples of dominated space, as are their constitutive elements, such as the urban grid and infrastructure. A form of domination and control of space (Harvey 1989: 262), regimes, as mentioned, will often use the built-environment to demonstrate authority, national strength, and unity. However, space shapes people, but it is also shaped by people, and can be appropriated through various acts and popular spectacles like demonstrations (Ibid: 262). Among many others, an example of dominated space being appropriated in resistance is Tiananmen Square. Where Mao announced the founding of
the People’s Republic, the Square became the Chinese equivalent of Red Square, a ceremonial space for choreographed demonstrations and May Day parades (Lees 1994: 458). As a physical extension of the Communist state, the Square became a target for protestors in 1989. Though brutally repressed by the regime, the protestors resymbolized and altered the meanings of the space.

Turning constraints into advantages, successful urban resistance turns the disciplinary elements of urban space against its adversary. Urban resistance takes advantage of the visibility of public space, contesting and appropriating spaces and their proscribed meanings through collective action that inverts the gaze, turns surveillance into spectacle, and transforms the panoptic machine into theater (Green: 9). More specifically, the public space of the built-environment is characterized by theatricality as it is a place to see and be seen (Hénaff and Strong 2001). Accordingly, public spaces, like plazas and squares, can become like stages for protestors to demonstrate. Such occupation of a limited public space by protestors, whether a dozen or thousands, is a concentration tactic that differs from dispersive tactics like boycotts and stay-aways (Schock 2005: 51-52), as well as the less dramatic and less forceful off-stage forms of resistance that are not eye-catching and do not necessarily make headlines (Scott 1985: xvi-xvii; Scott 1990: 4-5).

Strikes, sit-ins, protests, and the like are forms of “on-stage” resistance. While violent and non-violent strategies often coexist in resistance (Bermeo 1997; Zunes 1994: 403-404; Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: 9-10), whereas the violence of non-state actors can only take a guerilla, off-stage form, non-violent strategies can be both off- and on-stage, indirectly and directly confronting the enemy. On-stage resistance strategies even
assume a non-acting, but watching, broader public who might be inspired to join the cause. It is crucial to note that rarely do entire societies rise all at once. Rather, demonstration effects on the part of early risers—often students, artists, and intellectuals—triggers processes of diffusion, extension, and imitation among normally quiescent groups (Green 2010: 4; Huntington 1991: 100-106; Tarrow 1998: 145; Lohmann 1994; Weyland 2012). With a focus on East Germany, specifically Leipzig, Susanne Lohmann observed this aspect of demonstration as it relates to urban space, noting that mass demonstrations would start with people crossing Karl Marx Platz (now Augustusplatz), before moving along the Ringstrasse, picking up more and more people along the way. As Lohmann (1994: 67-68) says, “[T]he convenient layout of the city center facilitated the spontaneous coordination of thousands and later tens and hundreds of thousands of individual participation decisions.”

Since there is a visual impact of collective power that is conveyed by vast assemblies, on-stage resistance not only speaks to members, but also adversaries (Scott 1990: 65). Beyond the domestic arena, this resonates in the international sphere as a resistance can use theatrum mundi to its advantage. The magnification of resistance, that is, the increase in audience thanks to the proliferation of visual communication can turn the gaze back upon a regime in a visualization that inspects, observes, and achieves surveillance within international relations (Green 2010: 9). Manifesting in different ways, the general concept is that of a “boomerang pattern” whereby a resistance campaign appeals to international actors that are able and willing to place pressure on the target state or adversary (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 12-13). This international pressure can put the resistance campaign’s enemy in a difficult situation because “high-intensity”
coercion, highly visible acts of violence that crush dissent (Levitsky and Way 2010: 57), against unarmed protestors often has the whiff of massacre (Bellin 2012: 132). Again, as Foucault said, “Visibility is a trap” (Foucault 1995: 200).

**The Logic of Resistance**

It has long been posited that the chance of revolution will decrease in likelihood as states’ increase their arsenals and technological capacities (Arendt 1972b: 146). The logic that non-state actors would not be able to fight an increasingly advanced state apparatus, the logic assumes that violence is all that is available. This is partially consistent with the above argument that resistance in urban areas is disadvantaged, especially if the resistance is violent. However, it was further noted that resistance in urban areas can exercise spatial agency by foregoing violence in favor of more non-violent strategies. While this superiority of non-violence over violence may come as a surprise, the strategic logic underpinning resistance can be better understood by looking at a certain conceptualization of power that is neither an equation of power with violence (Mills 1956: 171) nor an account of power that totalizes and brings everything into the field of power (Foucault 1990: 11, 92-93, 95-96, 99-100).

According to Hannah Arendt (1972a, 1972b, 1998, 2006), power can never be the property of an individual, but only the collective acting in concert. There is, in other words, power in numbers. Elucidating the power of non-violent action, Arendt (1998: 200-201) says:

> Popular revolt against materially strong rulers…may engender an almost irresistible power even if it foregoes the use of violence in the face of materially vastly superior forces. To call this “passive resistance” is certainly an ironic idea; it is one of the most active and efficient ways of action ever devised, because it cannot be countered by
fighting, where there may be defeat or victory, but only by mass slaughter in which the victor is defeated, cheated of his prize, since nobody can rule over dead men.

Conceptually speaking, the extreme of violence would be one against all, while the extreme of power would be all against one. Of course, this is an ideal spectrum as power and violence, like non-violence and violence, often operate in tandem (Arendt 1972b: 140-141, 149), a coincidence applicable to both an opposition and a regime. However, the presence of violence does not necessarily mean the presence of power, and an increasing reliance on violence may be indicative of power being lost (Ibid: 152). Even if resistance were to forego the use of violence completely, as in Eastern Europe during the 1980s, such cases of popular pressure can hardly be considered docile or passive.

Clearly, in a contest of sheer violence between the state and non-state actors the state will remain superior. But, such a superiority lasts only so long as the power of the government remains intact, as long as commands are obeyed and the security apparatus is willing to use its weapons (Arendt 1972b: 147-148). As Arendt said, “That all authority…rests on opinion is never more forcefully demonstrated than when, suddenly and unexpectedly, a universal refusal to obey initiates what then turns into a revolution” (Arendt 2006: 220). This shifting of power proceeds from the fact that institutions are not monolithic, that, for example, even authoritarian regimes are propped up by actors whose loyalties can shift. Such shifts in power is a matter of legitimacy, which is necessary for the arrival of popular discontent, when authority loses its power, when voluntary associations turn into civil disobedience, and dissent into resistance (Arendt 1972a: 101-102).
A significant feature of the loss of legitimacy and subsequent withdrawal of consent is that they are representative of a sort of negative power, which could possibly find expression in powerful off-stage resistance, thus taking on a more positive character. Such an understanding of power lends itself to resistance in any sort of space and a diversity of settings. Yet, on-stage resistance strategies, which are explicitly and positively powerful insofar as people are required to come together and act in a liminal space, almost necessarily happen in urban spaces, or, rather, within the built environment, a definite space serving as a “space of appearances” (Arendt 1998: 194, 199). Likewise, if the prerequisite for power to be generated is people living closely together, then cities can be thought of as inherently powerful (Ibid: 201). Accordingly, increases in urbanization and urban population will correspond to increases in urban spaces as centers of power.

An Integrated Framework of Resistance

Moving from ambiguous and broad constellation of understandings and meanings towards a more concrete concept of resistance (Adcock and Collier 2001), revolution seemed a good place to start. Focusing extensively on outcomes of revolutions, Samuel Huntington’s *Political Order in Changing Societies* and Theda Skocpol’s *States and Social Revolutions* are “classics” in understanding revolutions. Defining revolution narrowly, Huntington (1968: 264) says:

A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies. Revolutions are thus to be distinguished from insurrections, rebellions, revolts, coups, and wars of independence.
Similarly, distinguishing social revolutions from rebellions and political revolutions, Skocpol (1979: 4-5) says:

Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures; and they are accompanied and carried through by class-based revolts from below. Social revolutions are set apart from other sorts of conflicts and transformative processes above all by the combination of the two coincidences: the coincidence of societal structural change with class upheaval; and the coincidence of political with social transformation.

In stressing the fundamental alterations of society and politics, the theme that ties these definitions of revolution together is that revolutions are to be understood in a highly restricted manner, and, as a result, that revolutions are to be considered both rare and novel. Furthermore, explicit in Huntington’s definition and implicit in Skocpol’s, revolutions are violent affairs.

Conceptually and methodologically speaking, revolutions present a number of seemingly insurmountable issues. Revolutions are problematic because they hinge upon outcomes, both initial success and long-term, fundamental alterations of society and political institutions. Regarding the latter, determining what constitutes a revolutionary transformation is incredibly difficult. For example, the popular mobilization in Eastern Europe during the 1980s succeeded in bringing down the Soviet satellite governments, but did it alter social cleavages to an extent that can be considered revolutionary (Dix 1991)? There is even a clash between Huntington and Skocpol as far as what cases are considered revolutions. While Huntington (1968: 275) considers Guatemala in 1944 to be a case of revolution, Skocpol, along with Jeff Goodwin (1994: 276n21), does not. In fact, taking on Huntington, Charles Tilly (1978: 193) says that depending on how one interpreted rapid and fundamental, it could be argued that no revolution has occurred, or
could occur. Skocpol is not immune to such criticisms though, and Stephen Walt (1996: 13n30) observes that some of the examples of revolution given by Skocpol as revolution may not even meet her own definition of revolution.

Regarding the outcome of initial success, this is not nearly as difficult to determine as the far-reaching transformations that are necessary to be considered a revolution. Nonetheless, the short-term outcome of success is a prerequisite to be a revolution. Put differently, the defeat of the ancien régime must occur before there can even be fundamental transformations of society and political institutions. Therefore, since failed revolution is a contradiction in terms, to solely analyze revolutions would be to select on the dependent variable (Geddes 1990). Such an emphasis and preoccupation with outcomes has the effect of neglecting dynamics and processes of mobilization that revolution has with other phenomena (McAdam et al. 1997; McAdam et al. 2001; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Shifting away from the exclusivity of revolutionary outcomes, both short-term and long-term, towards processes of collective action, resonates with Tilly’s notion of a “revolutionary situation.” Describing this emergence of dual power, Tilly said, “The revolutionary moment arrives when previously acquiescent members of that population…form an alternative body claiming control over the government, or claiming to be the government…and those previously acquiescent people obey the alternative body” (Tilly 1978: 192, emphasis in the original).

Not every major upheaval should be considered a revolution (Goldstone 2001). Likewise, as it is important to maintain the conceptual integrity of revolutions, to maintain their rarity and novelty, the definitions of revolution given by Huntington and Skocpol should not be altered. At the same time, as resistance par excellence, revolution
would need to be included in an analysis of how space shapes resistance. Thus, instead of diminishing it, stretching it conceptually, revolution can be subsumed under another categorization that has less defining characteristics (Collier and Mahon 1993: 846; Sartori 1970: 1040-1041). A starting point would be to subsume revolution under contentious politics, which is understood as episodic, public, collective interactions involving the state as mediator, target, or claimant of demands. Significantly, that contentious politics is episodic distinguishes it from the continuous, making it distinct from such regularly scheduled events like voting and associational meetings, though these can become implicated in contentious politics. Further, contentious politics is not defined by outcomes (McAdam et al. 1997; McAdam et al. 2011).

Yet, contentious politics is still too broad insofar as it includes both contained contention, which operates within institutional processes, as well as transgressive contention, which operates outside of institutional processes. Respectively, this would bring the official inquiry and later impeachment against Richard Nixon and the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya during the 1950s into the same category (McAdam et al. 2001: 5-8). So, while revolution was too restrictive as a unit of analysis, making it so that one would be hard-pressed to find more than twenty cases of revolution in the twentieth century, contentious politics is too broad, and it would not be difficult to come up with thousands, possibly hundreds of thousands, of cases of contentious politics, which is simply unfeasible for the task at hand. A solution to this dilemma would be to move down Sartori’s “ladder of abstraction” (Sartori 1970: 1040-1041), that is, to refine contentious politics in a way that is still broader than revolution.
In looking for a concept that is broader than revolution and more restricted than contentious politics, it would be helpful to keep the notion of a revolutionary situation in mind because it captures something missing from contentious politics. A fitting concept is John Walton’s (1984: 13) concept of “national revolts,” which represents the “field of insurrectionary processes that lie beyond the…bounds of routine politics,” including such cases as the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines, the civil war in Colombia known as La Violencia, and the anti-colonial Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya. National revolt is more restrictive than contentious politics, broader than revolution, and does touch upon the revolutionary situation. However, a national revolt may be too restrictive as it is exclusively violent and the concept that is needed here does not necessarily require the extremity of the revolutionary situation, though it does need something like it, namely a serious challenge and threat to authority, particularly that of a government. In this regard, a concept such as Elisabeth Wood’s (2000: 4-6) notion of “insurgent paths to democracy” is helpful, but, ultimately, insufficient as there would be no failures.

Both broad and relatively narrow, with violent cases and non-violent cases, as well as variation in outcomes, the best concept to use here is “resistance campaign,” which is episodic and confrontational contention comprised of non-state actors with maximalist demands that are either anti-regime, anti-occupation, or secessionist. With such aims, resistance campaigns have relatively distinguishable beginning and end dates, leadership, discernible events, and, though not necessarily, names. Accordingly, resistance campaign excludes random riots, spontaneous mass acts, and those campaigns crushed in their infancy before even getting off the ground (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 12-15). Just to clarify, all revolutions are resistance campaigns, but not all
resistance campaigns are revolutions. Likewise, all resistance campaigns are instances of contentious politics, but not all contentious politics are resistance campaigns. Further, all national revolts are resistance campaigns, but not all resistance campaigns would be national revolts. Using resistance campaigns as the unit of analysis also serves the analytical purposes of classifying before comparing (Kalleberg 1966). It is worth noting, however, that campaign connotes a high level of agency. Though relatively unproblematic, it should be pointed out that resistance is often much more contingent and lacking in organizational/ideological coherence than is implied by campaign (Kalyvas 2003).

Conveniently, a list of resistance campaigns already exists. After formulating the concept of resistance campaign, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) identified and collected all the resistance campaigns between 1900 and 2006 in their Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) data set, totaling 323 campaigns. Since NAVCO is too large and varied for present purposes, I restricted case selection to a single region and further restricted the time frame. Selecting eighteen campaigns, found in Table 2, the only resistance campaigns chosen were those in Latin America between 1956 and 2006 that were anti-regime in orientation. With the exception of the case of the FARC in Colombia, which is still going on (McCoy 2015), all of the campaigns had come to an end before 2006. It should also be pointed out that there were more than eighteen campaigns in NAVCO for Latin America between 1956 and 2006, but, as will be discussed below, certain campaigns were excluded, while others were merged. Moving between Scylla and Charybdis, between a single-country case study and a large-N cross-national analysis, this sample comprised of eighteen anti-regime campaigns represents an
intermediate number of cases that can be analyzed in a substantively based, conceptually
oriented way (Stepan 1978: 290-291).

Latin America was chosen as the region of focus because it has been host to a
swath of different sorts of resistance campaigns, from revolutions and guerrilla
movements, to democratic transitions, to popular coups, counter-coups, and counter-
revolutions. Further, with its common Iberian tradition and relatively similar trajectory of
development (Gilbert 1994: 30), Latin America is fairly manageable as a region to
analyze. Additionally, in emphasizing action from below, the choice of Latin America as
the arena of analysis is a direct challenge to the scholarship on Latin America that is
“painfully” centered on elite concerns and perspectives (Eckstein 1989: 2). The restricted
time frame was chosen as NAVCO only goes up until 2006, and, starting from this point,
I worked back to 1956. Having identified and selected resistance campaigns working
back from 2006, I stopped at 1956 as it marks the beginning of the Cuban Revolution.
Marking a new era throughout Latin America, the importance of the Cuban Revolution
cannot be overstated, and, as such, this study takes it as the point of departure.
Table 2

Latin American Resistance Campaigns, 1956-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Agricultural Labor</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Regime</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Violent</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>42% (1953)</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>Personal (1953-1959)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1956-1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democracy (1974-1976)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Military (1977-1983)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Military (1964-1966)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect Military (1967-1970)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect Military (1986-1995)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democracy (1981-1992)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Personal (1993-2000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Democracy (1959-present)</td>
<td>Partial Success</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1964-present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>End Year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>Military (1965-1985)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>1984-1985</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>Military/Personal (1974-1989)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>1983-1989</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>35% (1960)</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>Military/Personal (1949-1958)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>24% (1970)</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>Democracy (1933-1973)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>Democracy (1959-2005)</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Data Collection & Data Analysis**

Beginning with revolutionary theory (Huntington 1968; Skocpol 1979; Dix, 1984, 1984; Goodwin and Skocpol 1994; Wickham-Crowley 1992; Tilly 1978), this project was largely deductive in its early phases. Over time, the project evolved and shifted from twentieth century revolutions to Latin American resistance campaigns, with the revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua serving as pivots. That said, evinced by the above allusions to Figure 1 and Table 1, the twentieth century revolutions were maintained as points of comparison. For the sake of brevity, since the resistance campaigns duplicate the variables of revolution and then add more, the process of data collection and analysis will almost exclusively focus on the resistance campaigns, occasionally making comparisons with the revolutions.

Unless otherwise noted, the data for the percent of the population employed in agricultural and percent of the population considered urban are taken from World Bank...
(1978; 2001; 1983; N.d.) data. For both these variables efforts were made to obtain information that corresponded to the year the resistance campaign broke out. If this information was unavailable information that predated the campaign and was close to the year it began. Unless indicated otherwise, the information for agricultural labor and urban population corresponds to the year the campaign began. The violence variable was taken from NAVCO and indicates whether the campaign was predominantly violent or not with a simple “Yes” or “No.” Violence includes acts that harm people, property, or destroy infrastructure (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 13). The year the campaigns began and ended was also taken from NAVCO. If a campaign was less than a year, then it just has one year. However, the year for the cases in in Table 1, which was cross-referenced with Dix (1983), only refers to the year the revolutions began.

A crucial distinction between the cases in Table 1 and Table 2 is that the latter includes an outcome of “Success,” Partial Success,” or “Failure,” while outcome is embedded within the revolutions since they are all successes. The outcomes for the resistance campaigns were initially drawn from NAVCO. With the other outcomes understood in relation to success, as varying degrees of privation, a success in considered “the full achievement of its [resistance campaign] stated goals (regime change, antioccupation, or secession) within a year of peak activities and a discernible effect on the outcome, such that the outcome was a direct result of the campaign’s activities” (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 14). Another important distinction between Table 1 and Table 2 is that the latter includes regime-type(s) for the duration of the resistance campaign. Suffice to say, the revolutions in Table 1 occurred in countries that were hardly bastions of freedom, including traditional monarchies, colonial regimes, and
narrowly based military or personalistic regimes (Huntington 1968: 275; Goodwin and Skocpol 1994: 267-268).

Given the amount of ink spilled over the importance of regime-type as a factor in understanding revolution (Huntington 1968; Skocpol 1979; Dix 1983, 1984; Wickham-Crowley 1992; Goodwin and Skocpol 1994), it seemed appropriate to extend it to resistance campaigns. However, regime-type was considered as a secondary variable because, at least initially, the primary concern was a narrow focus on space. Initially, Polity (2012) was considered for determining regime-type. Ranging from -10 (authoritarian) to 10 (democratic), Polity is helpful in that it is a spectrum that provides some level of nuance. However, given the number of cases, I felt that a typological account of regime-type would be preferable and I wanted to list the regime(s) for the duration of a resistance campaign as such. A recent study by Mainwaring and P. rez-Liñán (2013: 67-68) put together a list of all the Latin American political regimes from 1900-2010, categorizing them as either democratic, semi-democratic, or authoritarian. While not without merit, this tripartite typology was insufficient as it was too simplified. Ultimately the new data on regimes produced by Geddes, Frantz, and Wright (2014), which provides transition information for the 280 autocratic regimes in existence from 1946 through 2010, was settled upon. As shown in Table 2, this usage of regime-type is more nuanced than the tripartite scheme and is more general than the continuous Polity scores.

Essentially data-set observations that lend themselves to correlation-based inferences (Brady and Collier 2004: 278, 283), the approach thus far was in itself not sufficient and did not capture well the processes of resistance campaigns. Therefore, this
approach was supplemented by causal-process observation (Brady and Collier 2004: 278, 283) that can be used to make valid descriptive inferences, fleshing everything out, and looking at the emergence and continuance of campaigns in addition to their outcomes. Put differently, for a richer understanding of resistance campaigns in Latin America, the aim here is to trace the processes (Bennett 2008; Bennett 2010; Collier 2011; Mahoney 2010) of the resistance campaigns. Indeed, as David Laitin (2002: 631) said, “[N]arratives address the questions of processes.” For process-tracing it is important to be meticulous and evenhanded in collecting and evaluating data in order to account for potential biases in the evidence (Bennett 2010: 211). Further, process-tracing relies on within-case analyses and casts a wide net in order to consider alternative explanations and possibly bring them into the fold. In this sense, process-tracing has both theory-testing and theory-generating elements (Bennett 2008: 704).

Beyond levels of urbanization, regime-type, and violence, other important variables that were discovered and then incorporated were the ability of a campaign to garner cross-class support with urban elements, United States support for the campaign or regime, as well as military shifts through defections and desertions in the ranks, negotiation with the opposition, or open rebellion. Beyond cross-class alliances, another variable pertaining to social space is culture of resistance, which was mentioned above as shaping repertoires of collective action. While an elusive variable, in many instances a culture of resistance is indicative of a history of struggle (la lucha) and is a way grievances are imbued with meaning that can turn into open resistance (Simmons 2014). As such, culture of resistance is a way to address the out-of-context presentation of the campaigns’ year(s) in Table 2. As an example, the campaign that ousted the personalistic
regime of Marcos Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela only registers 1958 for the year. But, this obscures the decades of resistance building towards January 1958 when Pérez Jiménez was overthrown, as well as the resistance that predated the dictator. In some ways, culture of resistance mitigates issues such as this.

As will be noticed, the variables discovered through process-tracing and incorporated into the analysis were not put with the others in Table 2. Though these variables can certainly be thought of in terms of the presence or absence of certain conditions, their vast variation makes them difficult to neatly categorize and organize as was done with violence, regime-type, outcome, and year(s). For example, the U.S. support for a regime or campaign was not always clear-cut. Regarding the campaigns of democratic transitions in the Southern Cone, there was ambivalence as the U.S. supported the military regimes, but also wanted to support, at least rhetorically, the cause of democratization. Regardless, the variables discovered through process-tracing could definitely be converted into more concrete categorical variables and this would be quite fruitful, but this difficult task is beyond the scope of this project.

Process-tracing was not only supplemental to the correlation-based inferences, but was also able to refine them through an inductive process. More specifically, the data from NAVCO (outcome, year(s), and cases) were initially taken at face value and organized as is done in Table 2. However, Table 2 actually reflects the adjustments made after process-tracing. The adjustments began with the cases. NAVCO had twenty-eight resistance campaigns in Latin America from 1956 to 2006. Through process-tracing this was brought down to eighteen as cases were either merged or excluded. For example, NAVCO has a non-violent campaign in El Salvador from 1979-1981 that was a failure,
while there is the FMLN campaign that ran from 1979-1991, was violent, and a partial success. After process-tracing it became clear that these campaigns were one in the same, and the former was merged with the latter. It should be noted that some campaigns in NAVO resulted from merging different organizations, such as the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) and The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) in Venezuela. Similarly, the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP) and the Montoneros in Argentina were merged in NAVCO as a single campaign. Such mergers were not altered.

Campaigns where there was significant popular mobilization, but had direct U.S. intervention, as in Dominican Republic in 1965 and Panama in 1989, were excluded. Of course, with the Contras in the 1980s and Guatemala in the late 1960s, some of the cases that made the cut come very close to having direct U.S. involvement. Though coups may be included as resistance campaigns, they need to have a popular dimension. Thus, the military rebellion in Argentina in the late 1980s was excluded as a case because it was comprised only of state actors in the form of the military looking to gain concessions from the democratic regime. Some cases could have been included but were unable to be because of a dearth of relevant material. For example, the process democratization in Mexico could have been included. However, while there is an abundance of material on this process, most of the focus is on elites at the expense of popular mobilization. The work of Vikram Chand (2001) is an exception to this, but it was not enough for that case to be included. While it would not have hurt to have the Mexican case, with an intermediate number of cases, it did not really add anything.

After the number of campaigns was set, they were classified into three categories. The revolutions and guerrilla movements are identified in Table 2 as Cases 1-10, the
democratic transitions are 11-15, and a category comprised, respectively, of a coup, counter-coup, and counter-revolution are 16-18. While distinct, they are all still under the singular rubric of resistance campaign. Beyond revising cases, the outcomes were also adjusted. Some of the outcomes for the cases did not match according to NAVCO’s own definition of success. For example, the Nicaraguan Revolution is considered a failure in NAVCO, presumably because the Sandinistas found themselves in a war with the Contras and were unable to institute a revolutionary program as in Cuba.

Yet, long-term revolutionary transformations and whether the Sandinistas achieved such ends are irrelevant because Somoza was overthrown in 1979, representing the full achievement of the campaign’s stated goals within a year of peak activity and directly tied to the activities of the campaign. So, regardless of the long-term, this was a success by NAVCO’s standards. But, over the course of process-tracing, NAVCO’s standards of success were inadequate. Therefore, success was redefined as a campaign achieving regime change, partial success was defined as a regime’s inability to defeat the campaign, and failure was if the regime defeated the campaign. Finally, the years in which campaign’s began and ended are sometimes fuzzy, difficult to determine, and often with exception. For the most part, the years given in NAVCO were maintained.

To address some possible concerns, since process-tracing is often used with only a handful of cases, using narrative for eighteen cases may raise eyebrows. But, the within-case analysis of the campaigns can be thought of as a method to extract information from the individual cases and then integrate them into a broader narrative. Differently, because description is a cornerstone of process-tracing, care does need to be exercised so as to avoid an “infinite regress” (King et al. 1994: 86), the fact that every
cause has a cause (Slater and Simmons 2010: 888). However, this is less of a problem since the causes for the emergence of the resistance campaigns are generally taken for granted. Further, there is not an attempt here to explain everything, partially in recognition that, since every aspect of social reality is infinitely complex, no description or explanation, no matter how “thick” or how many factors go into it, will come close to capturing the reality of the world in its entirety, but will be, at best, a reified version (King et al. 1994: 42-43).

Since there are no primary sources used in this study, a final methodological note is with regards to the dangers of relying on secondary historical literature. On the one hand, there may be selection bias on the part of the source author(s) due to errors, omissions, and/or exaggerations. On the other hand, the social scientist using secondary historical literature could be attracted to the sources that confirm expectations (Lustick 1996). Yet, it is worth recalling that accounting for potential biases in the evidence is the reason why it is important for process-tracing to be meticulous and evenhanded in collecting and evaluating data (Bennett 2010: 211).

**The Latin American Context**

Latin America has a long history of military participation in politics and intervention in crises. In many cases, this role as a central force in politics has been given to the military constitutionally, making the military the ultimate arbiter of national affairs. Beyond this right and obligation to intervene in certain circumstances, the armed forces is often urged and expected to do so by the broader population (Kline and Wiarda 1985: 88). Since military intervention almost always comes with important and active civilian support, the military, at least initially, acquires a messianic image (O’Donnell and
Schmitter 1986: 31). Nonetheless, since WWII, Mexico is the only country in the region that has had no military coup. Between 1948 and 1998, every country in Latin America except Mexico and Costa Rica had at least one significant period of military rule. Most, unfortunately, have had multiple military governments and coups (Fitch 1998: 1).

Despite the commonality of militaries interfering in domestic politics, this is not to suggest that the military in Latin America is monolithic. For instance, there are important differences among military regimes. Although by no means exhaustive, there are the right-wing, bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s (Collier 1979), and there are also the populist and inclusionary military regimes led by reformist officers as in Peru and Panama beginning in 1968 (Ropp 1992: 210).

Related to politicized and interventionists militaries, Latin America has a history of non-democratic rule going back to Spanish colonialism. Indeed, the Latin American experience with democracy even in the twentieth century was checkered (Huntington 1991) as oligarchies and some sort of authoritarianism were the norm for many of the countries in the region. A quick glance at Table 2 highlights the prevalence of authoritarian regimes. Tacitly or expressly supporting authoritarianism, the U.S played no small part in this regard. With a tremendous historical influence and a demonstrated willingness to directly intervene, the “hegemonic presumption” of the U.S. vis-à-vis Latin America is notorious (Lowenthal 1976) and has led to a fierce anti-Americanism in the region (McPherson 2003). Going back to the mid-nineteenth century, the influence and penetration of the U.S. would be especially strong in Central America and the Caribbean.
While U.S. meddling in Latin America was not unprecedented, U.S. involvement and intervention would grow in scope and intensity with the end of WWII and the beginning of the Cold War. After the Cuban Revolution the U.S. became bound and determined to stop revolution from being exported to other countries throughout the region (Brands 2010). It is worth pointing out that, with the exception of a single case, all of the resistance campaigns analyzed here began prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall and often faced regimes assisted by the U.S. Nonetheless, as mentioned above with the military, U.S. foreign policy is not monolithic as it can take a wide variety of different forms of support or lack thereof, and is even highly ambivalent at times. For example, the Reagan administration awkwardly gave rhetorical support to the democratic opposition in the Southern Cone in the 1980s, while it also had made friendly overtures to the military governments there, buoying them, at least temporarily, with material and diplomatic support (Lowenthal 1991: 392).

Turning now to space, urban space is not an entirely new phenomenon in Latin America. As in the indigenous empires of Mexico and Peru, there were pre-Columbian cities. During the sixteenth and seventeenth century, most of today’s Latin American cities were founded by the Spanish or Portuguese. With instructions for urban development handed down from the monarchies in Spain and Portugal (Morse 1974; Kinsbruner 2005), the colonial period would introduce a regimented and uniform urbanism, the distinguishing characteristic of which being the primacy given to the plaza (Low 2000; Gade 1976; Holston 1989: 113-119). More precisely, the grid plan followed by most colonial towns and cities in the region provided for a central plaza that was often the locus of civic and religious institutions, and public events. In addition, there is often a
range of secondary plazas, radiating out from the center, linked by major avenues and transit lines (Rosenthal 2000: 46). The panoptic scheme is apparent here. Indeed, as “a manifestation of the local social order, [of] the relationship between citizens and citizens and the authority of the state” (Jackson 1984: 18), “conceived and executed as propaganda vehicles, symbolizing and incarnating civilization” (Crouch et al. 1982: xx), the built environment of colonialism has been described as an “architecture of conquest” (Fraser 1990).

Since independence, Latin America has had a pattern of centralized state authority (Stepan 1978; Vélez 1980), which was most evident in the administrative centers that were major cities. During this post-colonial period, many of the countries experienced civil wars between rural and urban forces. When these conflicts came to an end urban elites turned inwards, focusing their energies on refashioning their capitals, imposing Haussmannian grandeur on the colonial grid, widening of thorough-fares, constructing diagonal avenues, and creating new public spaces and buildings (Rosenthal 2000: 43-44). Against this backdrop, the history of the Latin American city became a long contest over the exercise of urban public space, the struggle of different sectors to carve out both physical space and social space in the milieu. Etched into the collective memory, this struggle has often been violent, making the city a place of spectacle and protest, as well as fear (Ibid: 33-34, 38).

Nonetheless, from the sixteenth to the middle of the twentieth century, the regional economy was dominated by the production of agriculture (Gilbert 1994: 30). Given the labor-intensive nature of agricultural production, this meant that the vast majority of the population was rural, of which most were peasants. And while there may
have been centralized state authority in Latin America, such state authority only weakly reached into the countryside (Wickham-Crowley 1987: 478-479). Weakly penetrated and geographically isolated, it was difficult to maintain law and order within such rural areas (Hunter 1964: 10), and guerrillas would exploit such off-stage spaces and set themselves up as the authority there (Wickham-Crowley 1987).

Migration to urban areas continued throughout the twentieth century, and, with 44% of the region’s population living in settlements of 20,000 inhabitants or more, Latin America attained an urban tilt by the 1960s (Gilbert 1994: 26, 30). This urban-tilted population distribution meant that a “Chinese solution” of revolutionary peasant mobilization was not an option for would-be revolutionaries. In other words, as a sheer numbers game, peasant support and military strength would not be enough for victory and urban sectors could not be ignored (Dix 1983, 1984; Wickham-Crowley 1992: 154). As Abraham Guillén (Gugler 1982: 66), the intellectual mentor of the Uruguayan Tupamaros, said, “Strategically, in the case of a popular revolution in a country in which the highest percentage of the population is urban, the center of the operations of the revolutionary war should be in the city…The revolution’s potential is where the population is.” Of course, this is true of most collective action and not just “revolutionary” action.

Of particular significance in urban resistance in Latin America are students and universities. No doubt, the rebellious student is a part played the world over and throughout the world college campuses are hotbeds of radicalism. Indeed, a privileged sanctuary to rethink the world (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 37), with quadrangles, plazas, and other clearly marked places to gather, college campuses are ready-made spaces for
political demonstrations, and guarantee not only an audience, but an audience likely to be receptive to transformative ideas and visions (Sewell 2001: 61). In Spanish America, however, the university takes on further spatial and cultural significance, and is as, if not more, defining of the urban landscape as the colonial plaza. As one of the most enduring and prestigious institutions brought to the New World, the origins of the Spanish university go back to the medieval European model that emerged in the twelfth century with the university as a corporation of students, electing the rector and his counselors (Góngora 1979). Especially after the Córdoba movement in 1918, what university autonomy meant during the twentieth century was a guarantee of free thought and discussion, as well as student election of administrators, which gave students tremendous influence. Furthermore, university autonomy protected university grounds from the warrantless entry of police, even if they were in direct pursuit of a suspect (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 35).

With autonomy the campus is where rules and scripts contesting authority are enacted, while also providing a safe backstage where actors can retreat when under attack, and where they can resume their everyday identities when demonstrations are over (Calzadilla 2002). As a protected enclave, the autonomous university would give impetus to the development of student power, facilitating the formation of opposition organizations during dictatorships and repressive periods (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 23, 35). Quite common, particularly after the Cuban Revolution, guerrilla movements would originate in the universities as urban-educated organizers, often of middle- and upper-class backgrounds, would “go to the countryside” and establish rural-urban links with the peasantry, mobilizing them in guerrilla warfare. Of the more striking cases of university
resistance was the Central University of Caracas in the 1960s, which served the guerrillas as a recruiting and financing center, safe area, as well as an ammunition and weapons dump for rural and urban operations (Ibid: 37).

Predominantly rural and agrarian in orientation until the mid-twentieth century, most Latin Americanists, at least until the 1980s, confined their study to the countryside, delineating, for example, the complex relations between peasant villages and the national state, rural rebellion, and sources of identity and community in the periphery (Rosenthal 2000: 33). Of course, there was often an “urban bias” to such analyses insofar as they were often accounts given by urban intellectuals based on urban assumptions. Among other ways, an urban bias manifested itself methodologically through a top-down emphasis on elites and “high-politics” (Kalyvas 2004: 167-168). But, to reiterate, significant scholarly attention has been given to rural Latin America. After the Cuban Revolution the “mountain mystique” (Russell et al. 1974: 37-38) would not only take hold of researchers, it would also enthrall would-be revolutionaries.
Guerrilla Movements & Revolutions

Revolutions occurred in Cuba and Nicaragua because there was a coincidence of a number of conditions, including: “sultanistic” dictatorships; cross-class alliances; military shifts through defection, desertion, or open rebellion; the United States’ withdrawal of support for the regimes; and, finally, cultures of resistance. Addressing the first condition, that of regime-type, Fulgencio Batista and Anastasio Somoza Debayle represented a specific type of rule known as sultanism, which is characterized by personalism and corruption, exclusion and repression of society, as well as the absence of an ideological platform (Chehabi and Linz 1998). Beyond Batista and Somoza Debayle, other cases, among others, of sultanistic regimes include Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, the Shah in Iran, and Marcos in the Philippines. Nevertheless, Batista would dominate Cuban politics from 1933 until 1958. Except between 1944 and 1952, this dominance was achieved through de facto or de jure presidential power (Domínguez 1998: 113). Going back to his father, Anastasio Somoza García, Somoza Debayle’s family had ruled Nicaragua since 1936. Somoza Debayle and his brother, Luis, would rule jointly from 1956 to 1967, and then Somoza Debayle would rule alone from 1967 through 1979 (Booth 1998: 132-133).

The nature of sultanistic regimes makes them susceptible to overthrow. Crucial in this process in Cuba and Nicaragua were cross-class alliances that were also urban-rural
alliances. In Cuba, the M-26-7 guerrillas, many of whom were from relatively privileged backgrounds and had university educations (Draper 1962: 11; Wickham-Crowley 1992: 23, 26), established themselves in the Sierra Maestra and created strong bonds with the peasantry there (Bonachea and San Martín 1974: 100-102). Interestingly, the Sierra Maestra is located in Oriente province, which has a history of rebellion unparalleled by any other region in Cuba. For example, in the nineteenth century there were a number of major slave revolts there (Blackburn 1963: 88-89). Also in the nineteenth century, Oriente was a bastion of anti-colonialism and the main site of resistance to the Spanish (Thomas 1971: 245-246). Furthermore, between 1902 and 1958, Oriente had been the source of about half the cases of “major peasant struggle” (Domínguez 1978: 436).

Like their Cuban counterparts, many in the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) came from privileged backgrounds and had university educations (Dix 1982: 283; Wickham-Crowley 1992: 213). Although the Sandinistas were not initially successful in their attempts at guerrilla warfare through much of the 1960s (Gugler 1982: 65), they would find support in the montaña of north-central Nicaragua (Black 1981: 83; Booth 1982: 117, 149), and came to control large stretches of the mountainous countryside (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 278). As indicated by their name, the Sandinistas traced their lineage to Augusto Sandino, the guerrilla leader who had successfully ended the U.S. Marine Corps’ occupation of Nicaragua before being assassinated by Somoza García in 1934. Accordingly, the Sandinistas would draw on a culture of resistance that went back to Sandino’s own movement against the U.S. Specifically, departments that Sandino controlled, such as Jinotega, Matagalpa, and Nueva Segovia, became Sandinista strongholds in the 1970s (Booth 1982: 41-46; 116-121).
While peasant support and guerrilla warfare were important, in themselves they could not bring about victory as the revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua were reflections of their societies, that is, they were as urban, if not more, as they were rural (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 8-9; Dix 1983, 1984). Along with the Iranian Revolution, which was almost entirely urban in terms of character and locus of resistance, the primacy of urban actors and urban spaces is what distinguishes the revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua from other twentieth century revolutions. The most sustained and intense urban resistance in Cuba and Nicaragua came from universities. As mentioned above, guerrillas in Cuba and Nicaragua came from universities, which served as a sort of incubator of revolution. In Nicaragua, student opposition to the Somoza dynasty went as far back as 1939 when students in León were jailed for burning a campus portrait of Somoza García and the Sandinistas would grow out of the anti-Somoza student movements of 1944-1948 and 1959-1961 (Booth 1982: 108, 138). During the 1970s, liceos (secondary schools) and universities became key recruiting grounds and seedbeds for the Sandinistas, while the university community in León organized and led various anti-government rallies (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 222-223, 277).

In Cuba, the University of Havana had a long history of student resistance and openly opposed Batista from the very beginning through demonstrations and other, often violent, acts (Farber 1876: 181-182). At the end of August 1956, the M-26-7 guerrillas and the Revolutionary Directorate (DR), a clandestine student organization, made a pact to coordinate and pursue simultaneous uprisings (Bonachea and San Martín 1974: 69-72). Most dramatic and daring of its actions, in March 1957, the DR attacked the presidential palace and attempted to assassinate Batista, though they ultimately failed in this aim.
Nonetheless, students and the autonomous campus of the University of Havana provided by far the most significant resistance to Batista in Havana, which largely remained in Batista’s control until the very end (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 187). On the opposite end of the island, the core of urban resistance to Batista would come from Santiago de Cuba located in rebellious Oriente. Especially important here was the urban wing of M-26-7. Headed by Frank País, who was as much the face of the struggle against Batista as Fidel, the urban underground carried out operations in urban areas and also served as the crucial lifeline to the guerrillas, providing them with new member, supplies, and funding (Bonachea and San Martín 1974: 93-95; Gugler 1982: 62).

Highlighting Santiago’s revolutionary commitment, after País was killed by Batista’s forces, some sixty thousand citizens of Santiago attended his funeral. Subsequently, on August 1, 1957, a spontaneous general strike brought Santiago to a standstill (Franqui 1980: 218-220, 258). Similarly, in Nicaragua the urban character of the revolution was evinced by cross-class cooperation, which, importantly, brought the middle- and upper-class into opposition against Somoza. After the assassination of leading opposition voice Joaquín Chamorro by Somoza’s National Guard in January 1978, the Broad Opposition Front (FAO) led several joint business-labor strikes that hit the regime hard, virtually shutting down the national economy (Midlarsky and Roberts 1985: 178). Further, the more moderate FAO would be linked to the more radical Sandinistas by the endorsement of the latter by *Los Doce*, a group of twelve prominent Nicaraguan individuals forced into exile by Somoza. From middle- and upper-class backgrounds themselves, *Los Doce* were seen by many as a non-partisan authority that
legitimated the Sandinistas (Dunkerley 1988: 251). As in Nicaragua against Somoza, in revulsion over the regime’s corruption and repression, the Cuban middle- and upper-class turned against Batista (Domínguez 1978: 128; Farber 1976: 24).

Alienated from increasing segments of society, Batista and Somoza also came to be opposed by the Catholic Church in their respective countries (Thomas 1971: 982-983; Thomas 1963: 454-455; Black 1981: 318-320). Amongst this societal alienation, Batista and Somoza also faced loyalty shifts within their armed forces. There had been opposition to Batista among military officers since the mid-1950s and there was even an unsuccessful coup attempt in April 1956. Then, in 1957, there was the Cienfuegos Naval Revolt, which was also unsuccessful, but a still a blow to Batista (Thomas 1971: 884, 961-973). Further, especially when compared to the guerrilla army, the Cuban military became increasingly demoralized and even came to experience revulsion at Batista’s increasing willingness to use terror tactics (Farber 1976: 22; Thomas 1963: 455; Draper 1962: 14). The National Guard in Nicaragua probably did better in fighting guerrilla advances than their Cuban counterparts. They had, after all, received counterinsurgency training in the U.S. and fought effectively against the Sandinista focos in the 1960s (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 268). Regardless, as the popular tide rose, morale and discipline deteriorated, while desertions were widespread (Booth 1982: 173-174).

Clients of the U.S., both Batista and Somoza eventually lost the support of their patron. In Cuba, the U.S. had given express consent to the conspirators of what became the Cienfuegos Naval Revolt. In early 1958, the U.S. also imposed an arms embargo on the Batista regime, leaving Batista with the sense that he had been deserted by his friends (Thomas 1971: 961, 985). Likewise, amidst human rights abuses, the Carter
administration withdrew its support for the Somoza regime (Booth 1982: 128-130, 178-179; Tulchin and Walter 1991: 252-253). Having been deeply penetrated by the U.S., both Cuba and Nicaragua were especially sensitive to its influence (Lowenthal 1976: 202-203). Therefore, the increasing withdrawal of the U.S. from the conflicts in Cuba and Nicaragua resulted in sharp declines in morale among the respective regimes and their supporters, particularly among the armed forces (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 272). In contrast, the U.S. withdrawal of support for the regimes in both cases represented a sort of negative support for the opposition and a symbolic victory that was surely emboldening.

By the end, Batista and Somoza had engendered the opposition of virtually sector of society. Immediately after Batista fled a general strike was called that shut down Havana and signaled the end of the old regime, discouraging any attempts to establish a successor regime. At the same time, since the guerrilla troops were simply too few, the urban underground assumed power, policing the streets and taking over the administrative machinery (Bonachea and San Martín 1974: 318-325; Franqui 1980: 484, 505-506; Gugler 1982: 62). In Nicaragua, cities in the north and west increasingly became sites of major anti-Somoza uprisings, often independent of Sandinista influence or control, until the regime fell on July 19, 1979. These urban insurrectionary centers included Matagalpa, León, Chinandega, and Estelí (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 232). In 1979, the National Guard had to fight off urban insurrection along with FSLN forces on at least five fronts, thus spreading out and weakening the military (Booth 1982: 149, 172-175). Amidst rural fighting and insurrections in major towns, a general strike called for
June 5 paralyzed the country. Within six weeks Somoza was put to flight (Gugler 1982: 65).

Considering themselves heirs of *foquismo* and drawing inspiration from the Cuban Revolution, the majority of the guerrilla movements were predominantly rural in orientation. The main exceptions to the primacy of rural guerrilla warfare were the campaigns in Argentina and Uruguay where rural fighting was not feasible given the large urban populations. As a matter of fact, the respective urban populations were highly concentrated with roughly half of Argentina’s population in the city and province of Buenos Aires (Gillespie 1982: 76), and roughly half of Uruguay’s population located in the capital of Montevideo (Brum 2014: 390). For their part, the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP) tried to establish a rural *foco* in Tucumán, believing it would become the “Cuba of Argentina” (Gillespie 1982: 155n73), though the Montoneros saw this as old-fashioned and inappropriate (Ibid: 195-196). Similarly, as a last ditch effort the Tupamaros in Uruguay made an attempt at rural insurgency shortly before their defeat (Brum 2014: 388).

In Venezuela, the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) were able to establish some urban bases of support in addition to their rural presence. Notable here were the ties between the guerrillas and the Central University of Venezuela in Caracas, which went back to students’ role in the struggle against Marcos Pérez Jiménez (Levine 1973: 147-150). Specifically, the UCV served the guerrillas as a recruitment and financing center, a safe area, as well as a weapons dumps for urban and rural operations (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 37). Additionally, the guerrillas had bases amongst the popular sectors in the barrios and
superblocks that also went back to the struggle against Pérez Jiménez (Levine 1973: 150). As an example of such support, guerrillas often used houses in these areas as impromptu safe-houses or makeshift infirmaries (Velasco 2009: 164). However, amidst revulsion over the guerrillas’ increasing urban violence, the MIR and PCV lost the support of the popular sectors (Ray 1969: 132-133). Likewise, fortunes declined for the Montoneros (Gillespie 1982: 203) and Tupamaros (Brum 2014: 399; Waldmann 2011: 727) as the guerrillas increased their violence. Simply, urban terror led to a loss of the guerrillas’ romantic image, “a vital antidote to the essential ugliness of violence” (Gillespie 1982: 216).

The other guerrilla movements could carry out urban attacks. In the 1980s, Shining Path was able to explode bombs and assassinations in Lima (Starn 1995: 410-411). Likewise, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) would lead an urban bombing campaign during the 2002 presidential campaigns (Saab and Taylor 2009: 459). In El Salvador, while not provoking the mass urban insurrection that was intended, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) launched a massive offensive in November 1989. The FMLN occupied parts of San Salvador for nearly a week, and, given the scale and intensity of the attack, shook the confidence of the regime (Peceny and Stanley 2001: 165-167). Yet, these guerrilla movements, as well as those in Guatemala and Colombia, were, at best, only weakly planted in urban areas (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 154-155, 194, 297). The lack of urban support and lack of urban presence is a major reason these campaigns did not succeed. An exception, though, to this point regarding the need to capture urban segments may be Guatemala in the 1960s, which, as indicated in Table 2, was overwhelmingly rural, approximating levels comparable to
many of the twentieth century revolutions. Indeed, while the Guatemalan guerrillas in the 1960s were weak in urban areas, they did well in striking down roots among the regional peasantries and approached the “tipping point” for revolutionary overthrow (Ibid: 163, 194).

Although largely unable to establish themselves in urban areas, many of the guerrilla movements did especially well in establishing themselves as the figures of authority in areas of the countryside outside of administrative control (Wickham-Crowley 1987: 486-488). Moreover, in such rural spaces these guerrilla movements would have greater military strength and rural support than the revolutionaries in Cuba and Nicaragua (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 7, 154-155, 288-289). Accordingly, in El Salvador, Peru, Colombia, and Guatemala, the guerrilla combatants were largely peasants and numbered into the thousands (Ibid: 214). Intricately related to the ability to establish multiple sovereignty in the countryside and build extensive bases of support amongst peasants were cultures of resistance that the guerrillas’ struggle could be rooted in. But, while many had cultures of resistance, the majority of these guerrilla movements cannot be described as organic or autonomous peasant uprisings. The FARC, however, is the exception to this rule. As the oldest armed organization on the continent and arguably the world (Ortiz 2011: 127), the FARC originated as an overwhelmingly peasant movement that did not exploit a culture of resistance as much as they grew out of it (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 145-146, 295-296).

State authority has traditionally been weak in the countryside of Colombia (Hunter 1964: 10), and there is a long history of violence that the FARC could root their struggle in. For example, at the turn of the nineteenth century there was guerrilla warfare
in the coffee zones of Tolima and Cundinamarca (Bergquist 1978: 158-160), and these departments encompassed part or all of what became Huila, Caldas, Quindio, Risaralda, and Meta, all of which became FARC guerrilla zones (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 134).

More immediate in the formation of the FARC was La Violencia. Beginning in 1948 after the assassination of the Liberal and populist leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, La Violencia was the culmination of Liberal-Conservative conflicts, and resulted in the deaths of close to 200,000 people in the next fifteen years or so, most of which were in the countryside (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 17). Within this anarchic context, as a means to defend themselves from the widespread violence, particularly that of Conservative armed groups, emerged the autonomous “peasant republics” (Ortiz 2011: 131). After a massive campaign led by the Colombian military to eliminate the peasant republics, the FARC “rose phoenixlike out of the ashes of the peasant republics in south-central Colombia” (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 26).

The FARC’s staying power is very much related to their origins in the peasant resistance of La Violencia and their attempt to overthrow the Colombian government evinces a high level of continuity. For example, a map of the violence of the 1940s and 1950s would look quite similar to a map of violent incidents in the twenty-first century (Chernick 2007a: 52). The conflict has continued to be primarily rural and the FARC has even lost many of its links with urban, middle-class sectors like students, intellectuals, and the Communist Party (Ibid: 70). Regardless, over four decades after the FARC’s formation the conflict had an epicenter of a hundred municipalities comprising roughly a tenth of the total municipalities, then expanding outward to cover about half of the country (Ibid: 52). No doubt, the other countries with guerrilla movements had
impressive cultures of resistance, but they were mostly inferior when compared to the FARC’s culture of resistance.

In El Salvador, there had been Indian revolts in Izalco, Atiquizaya, and Cojutepeque in the late nineteenth century (Lindo-Fuentes 1994: 133; Williams 1994: 75). Then, in late January and early February 1932, massive uprisings were carried out in the western highlands by Indians and peasants with the assistance of the Communists. In what is known as the Matanza (slaughter), this uprising was crushed by the military (Pérez Brignoli 1995; Lindo-Fuentes, et al. 2007; Paige 1997: 120-122). Tracing their lineage to these events in 1932, the FMLN would take their namesake from Farabundo Martí, a Communist leader and organizer of the period. Benefitting from this tradition, by 1985 the FMLN controlled approximately a quarter of El Salvador’s territory (Midlarsky and Roberts 1985: 191-192).

In Guatemala, the eastern highlands demonstrated a propensity for revolt in the nineteenth century (Woodward 1985: 98-99). With the Guatemalan Revolution of 1944, there was a tradition of peasant collective action and mobilization (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 134). Additionally, the Revolutionary Movement 13th November (MR-13) and the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) in the 1960s would administer Indian locales through the village cofradía (guild or brotherhood), which had been the bulwark of resistance against white conquerors for centuries (Ibid: 148). Finally, before forming the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) in 1982, the guerrillas that reemerged in the mid-1970s benefitted from an increasingly radicalized indigenous sector resulting from the military’s repressive actions (Premo 1981: 450-451).
While not an autonomous or organic uprising per se, Shining Path’s peasant links were most comparable to the FARC’s. Not only did they have a “substantial reservoir of support” (Palmer 1986: 129) in rural areas, particularly in Ayacucho, but many of the students who made up the revolutionary cadre were of peasant origins (Starn 1991: 70-71, 85). Regarding cultures of resistance, with a long history of popular upheaval and fierce independence in the Peruvian Andes, the Senderos may have had a stronger culture of resistance than the FARC. Indeed, many Ayacuchans like to claim a history of revolt, which includes, among others, the Taki Onqoy movement of the 1560s, the Iquichan rebellions of 1825-8, and the insurrection in 1883 against the Chilean invaders during the War of the Pacific (Starn 1995: 401). Playing on the Inkarri myth of resurrection after conquest, Sendero guerrillas burned ballot boxes and announced their intention to overthrow the Peruvian state in an Andean village on May 17, 1980, marking the 199th anniversary of the execution of neo-Inca rebel Tupac Amaru by the Spanish (Starn 1991: 63). By 1990, Shining Path was so powerful that Peru’s civilian government had ceded more than half the country to military command (Ibid: 63).

As far as a culture of resistance in Argentina, the Montoneros took their name from the rural, plebian horsemen who had fought to emancipate their country from the Spanish and then staunchly resisted the centralizing tendency of the Argentine state (Gillespie 1982: 2). The Montoneros were also rooted in the quasi-revolutionary Peronist movement, though they were gradually edged out by the Peronist of the Right and Perón himself (Lewis 2002: 42, 87-90; Feitlowitz 1998: 4-5). While they did not invoke popular folklore or have a connection to Peronism like the Montoneros, there was a long tradition of working class militancy that the ERP could have exploited (Collier 1999: 45).
Regardless, with 539 bombings in 1972 alone (O’Donnell 1988: 296), both the ERP and the Montoneros grew out of a particularly tumultuous period. In contrast, Uruguay had a much weaker culture of resistance. Although Uruguay in the nineteenth century was unstable, with foreign interventions, military interventions, as well as dictatorships (Collier 1999: 72), during the first half of the twentieth century, Uruguay was both stable and prosperous (Fitzgibbon 1954; Hanson 1938). Uruguay was even considered the “Switzerland of America” (Canel 1992: 276). Uruguay’s weak culture of resistance is further evinced by the fact that the Tupamaros’ namesake was taken from Tupac Amaru, the eighteenth-century neo-Inca rebel leader in distant Peru (Joes 2007: 81)!

In Venezuela, the culture of resistance was very much rooted in opposition to dictatorships, first Juan Vicente Gómez and then Pérez Jiménez. This tradition was not exclusively that of those who made up the PCV and MIR, but also the ruling political parties. Likewise, the guerrillas by no means had a monopoly on peasant mobilization. As a matter of fact, AD had had established strong bases of peasant support as early as 1936 (Powell 1971). In this regard, the guerrillas were significantly overmatched, and the loss of urban support spelled defeat. The guerrillas’ inability to build significant alliances with other classes is also related to the fact that Venezuela was democratizing and had competitive elections whereby demands could be channeled institutionally (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 17). Further there had been two military revolts in 1962, but both were suppressed by loyalist forces. Thereafter, the military showed high levels of solidarity in its anti-guerrilla campaign (Ibid: 66, 199-200). Finally, Venezuela received more counterinsurgency attention from Kennedy than any other Latin American country. Specifically, Washington provided $60 million in military assistance, provided training
for the Venezuelan army and air force, and Kennedy even suggested installing a hotline to Caracas in order to stay current on developments there (Brands 2010: 65).

Although the FARC has maintained that the Colombian regime is oligarchic (Chernick 2007a: 52), Colombia has been democratic the whole of the FARC’s formal duration. Similarly, though Alberto Fujimori carried out an autogolpe in 1992 (Ron 2001: 588), the majority of Sendero’s fighting has been against a democracy. Both the FARC and Sendero would face strong and united militaries that were particularly committed to eliminating the guerrillas (Ruhl 1981; Starn 1991:72; Wickham-Crowley 1992: 64-65, 84, 296; Ron 2001: 587). Lacking significant cross-class alliances and facing united militaries, both the FARC and Sendero had the additional obstacle of facing states supported by the U.S. The U.S. aided Peru through bilateral assistance programs, as well as anti-drug aid and humanitarian aid (Palmer 1992: 79). U.S foreign policy towards Colombia from the mid-1980s until September 11, 2001 was dominated by countering the narcotics trade. After 9/11, however, the U.S. redirected the focus to also include counterterrorism as evinced by the $600 million annual assistance program from 2000 to 2005 known as Plan Colombia. Thus, the FARC’s mobilization has spanned and endured the Cold War, the Drug War, and the War on Terror (Chernick 2007a: 51-52, 75).

Given the obstacles that the guerrillas in Colombia and Peru faced, the presence of extensive guerrilla-peasant links and exceptionally strong cultures of resistance in both countries seem to be crucial in explaining the endurance of the FARC and Sendero. Indeed, without these it seems unlikely that Sendero would have even been able to emerge as a serious challenger and lasted as long as they did because of their ideological rigidity and terroristic militarism. Fiercely doctrinaire, Sendero considered themselves
Gang-of-Four Maoists, and painted slogans on the walls of Andean villages, proclaiming “Death to the Traitor Deng Xiaoping,” despite the fact that most peasants in Ayacucho had never heard of the Chinese leader (McClintock 1989: 83). Brutal and sectarian, Sendero had no qualms with killing peasants (Starn 1991: 75) or assassinating individuals from Peru’s legal Left. Thus, Sendero came to be reviled by the entire political spectrum domestically and internationally (Ron 2001: 570). Sendero’s violence against the civilian population was ultimately greater than that of the military and the guerrillas had their support dissipate (Chernick 2007b: 289-290, 305; Starn 1995: 410-411).

As in Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru, guerrillas in Argentina or Uruguay faced democracies for some or most of the respective conflicts. In Uruguay, the military had initially been intrigued by the spectacular actions of the Tupamaros (Brum 2014: 393). But, this was when the Tupamaros mainly used Robin Hood tactics like robberies and not full blown terrorism (Waldmann 2011: 721). While there was initially ambivalence, the military became directly involved in the conflict in September 1971 as consensus grew in the barracks that the military needed to extirpate the single most important source of organized violence in Uruguay (Porzecanski 1973: 67). The Uruguayan military had benefitted from military aid and training from the U.S. (Ibid: 64), and after six months the Tupamaros had almost entirely ceased to exist (Waldmann 2011: 722).

In Argentina, the military seized power in March 1976, and launched a massive attack against the guerrillas (Navarro 1989: 243). Promising to restore order, the military’s seizure of power was welcomed with open arms (Schneider 2000: 777; Feitlowitz 1998: 15). By 1977, both the ERP and the Montoneros were effectively neutralized. On September 28, 1977, the military command in Tucumán province
announced that the ERP guerrillas operating in that area had been wiped out. Ten days later, it was announced that the ERP and Montoneros had lost 80% of their forces, but the military maintained its mission to “eradicate subversion” and “restore the values…of morality” (Navarro 1989: 243). Furthermore, the guerrillas in Argentina not only faced the police and the military, but right-wing squads, most active of which being the Argentina Anticommunist Alliance, which had access to important U.S. loans for the purchase of arms (Lewis 2002: 90-91). Moreover, recommending $49 million in military aid for the 1977 fiscal year, the military regime would receive discreet approval from the Ford administration (Escudé 1991: 140-141).

The guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala did not face democracies, but still found it difficult to build society-wide coalitions against their respective regimes. The FMLN, along with their civil ally the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), could build a coalition that incorporated peasants, workers, students, and middle-class groups (Midlarsky and Roberts 1985: 190), but, unlike their revolutionary counterparts in Cuba and Nicaragua, could not attract the upper-class to the cause. Committed to autocratic rule and the continued existence of oligarchic economic rule, the so-called “fourteen families” exerted pressure on the Salvadoran state to suppress the forces of revolution (Midlarsky and Roberts 1985: 190-191; Peceney and Stanley 2001: 164). Accordingly, extremely anti-communist and in alliance with the upper-class, the Salvadoran military was relatively united against the opposition (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 283). After 1982, a period of minimalist reforms and elections took some of the wind out of the guerrillas’ sails (Ibid: 282-283), while it also provided some legitimacy in the eyes of international observers and a rhetorical tool for supporters, notably the U.S. Providing large-scale

In Guatemala, much of the guerrillas’ lack of success mirrored the Salvadoran experience. Following the CIA-orchestrated overthrow of Jacobo Árbenz in 1954, the military, in alliance with the Guatemalan upper-class and the U.S., maintained an authoritarian and counterrevolutionary regime that effectively suppressed popular demands through repression of labor activists, students, peasants, Indians, and opposition parties (Ruhl 2005: 56-57; Booth 1991: 51, 57-58). Indeed, ruling in some fashion for close to five decades, there are few institutions in Latin America that are as infamous for human rights abuses and extreme repression as the Guatemalan military (Ruhl 2005: 55, 79). However, a guerrilla movement did burst onto the scene in 1962 following an abortive coup against the use of Guatemalan territory to train the Bay of Pigs invaders. As such, virtually all of the guerrilla leadership in Guatemala came from the desertion of officers following the suppression of the revolt (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 65, 67, 147). Initially, because of these military ties, it was difficult for some officers to seek out the guerrillas and kill them (Adams 1970: 269). Nonetheless, the guerrilla activities would be sharply curtailed in the late 1960s by extreme repression and counterinsurgency (Booth 1980: 51).

Stepping up military aid and training to Guatemala in the mid-1960s, the role of the U.S. in wiping out the guerrillas as major political actors for more than a decade cannot be overstated. In fact, the intense counterinsurgency campaign in 1966 and 1967 was largely organized and guided by U.S. Green Berets (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 17, 67, 194-195). Guerrilla activity was revived in the mid-1970s, provoking widespread

Just as in El Salvador, despite liberalization the Guatemalan political and economic elite continued to dominate Guatemalan society (Ibid: 101). Also similar to El Salvador, the Guatemalan political opening coaxed some groups back into the legal political arena as civil society gained strength (Booth 1991: 59; Ruhl 2005: 57). Nonetheless, while moving towards civilian governance, the military continued its counterinsurgency campaign, even massacring entire villages (Booth 1991: 58-59). By the 1990s, the URNG lacked the ability to fundamentally disrupt the economy or seriously threaten the government, but they still could not be defeated. As a result, in December 1996 the newly elected government of Álvaro Enrique Arzú signed a final peace accord (Peceny and Stanley 2001: 173-174). Although segments of the military supported thee peace agreement, many did not because they felt that the military had generally succeeded in defeating the guerrillas and that such an agreement conceded a partial success to the guerrillas (Arana 2001: 91; Jonas 2000: 68n31). However, the
URNG did not have much bargaining power in the negotiations, and, after becoming a political party, had been reduced to a minority position in the legislature. This stands in sharp contrast to the situation in El Salvador (Peceny and Stanley 2001: 173).

By the late 1980s, the FMLN had achieved a stalemate insofar as they could disrupt the economy, impose losses on the military, and destabilize the government indefinitely (Peceny and Stanley 2001: 166; Wood 2000: 4-5). Given the relative strength of the FMLN, there is reason to believe that their victory would have been assured had it not been for U.S. support for the regime (Midlarsky and Roberts 1985: 191). Had the Reagan administration not “scrambled to increase U.S. assistance to the beleaguered Salvadoran military” following the FMLN’s “final offensive” in January 1981, which made apparent the severity of the conflict (Carothers 1991: 92), it seems plausible that there could have been defections from the upper-class and that another major guerrilla offensive could have delivered the coup de grâce to the regime. Indeed, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Salvadoran regime came to realize that it could not defeat the FMLN and that they were highly dependent upon the U.S. The result of gross human rights abuses, in September 1991 the U.S. notified the Salvadoran military that no significant assistance would be forthcoming and that compromise with the FMLN would be necessary. In short order, the final peace accords were signed in January 1992 and the FMLN entered the legal political arena as a dominant actor (Peceny and Stanley 2001: 165-167, 173). Elisabeth Wood (2000: 4-6) would refer to the FMLN’s campaign as an “insurgent path to democracy.”
Democratic Transitions

Similar to Batista in Cuba and Somoza in Nicaragua, the regime of Marcos Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela was sultanistic (Karl 1986: 206). Then a senior officer, Pérez Jiménez was part of the coup that overthrew the Medina regime in 1945 (Burggraaff 1972: 61). Dissatisfied with the AD government that was installed after the coup, Pérez Jiménez and other officers involved in the 1945 coup led another coup in 1948, which installed a military junta instead of a civilian government (Burggraaff 1972: 94-111; Martz 1966: 81-89). Pérez Jiménez was part of this junta and increasingly came to dominate Venezuelan politics, particularly after 1949. While authority was increasingly vested in the figure of Pérez Jiménez, repression was extended from trade unions and political parties to the increasing middle-class opposition. Believing he could actually win, Pérez Jiménez ran for president in 1952. After the votes came in and indicated that he had lost, Pérez Jiménez conspired to remain in control and staged a palace coup, which was carried out on December 2, 1952 (Coronil 1997: 151-159, 166). As with Batista and Somoza, the regime of Pérez Jiménez became increasingly alienated from society and became vulnerable to overthrow.

In the twentieth century much of the culture of resistance in Venezuela had been rooted in resistance to Juan Vicente Gómez, another sultanistic dictator (Karl 1986: 199) who ran Venezuela like a large hacienda from 1908 until his death at the end of 1935 (Coronil 1997: 82). While resistance had been relatively contained by Gómez, it unexpectedly broke out in the rebellious festivities of Student Week in February 1928 at the Central University of Venezuela (UCV), which then turned into widespread and spontaneous demonstrations and strikes throughout Caracas (Skurski 1993: 194). Then a
student at UCV and participant in the events, future president Romulo Betancourt said, “[O]ur people suddenly made known their presence; and without leaders, without action committees or strike funds, the people organized a massive demonstration in Caracas” (Martz 1966: 24-25). Following the events of February, an insurrection planned by students and segments of the military that April was put down (Burggraaff 1972: 21-24), and there would be attempts at guerrilla warfare in the mountains of Lara, Trujillo, Miranda, and Portuguesa, but these were also unsuccessful (Powell 1971: 29-30).

Similarly, major uprisings would occur in 1936 after Gómez’s death (López Maya 2003; Yarrington 1997: 176-194; Bergquist 1986: 229-230) and in 1945 with the ouster of Medina (Burggraaff 1972: 52-78; Martz 1966: 61-62; Bergquist 1986: 256-258). The resistance to Pérez Jiménez would very much be rooted in this tradition.

Beginning as early as February 1949, at the forefront of resistance to Pérez Jiménez were students, who were often linked to the parties, notably AD and PCV. Linking student disorders to a plot to assassinate the whole military junta and several armed rebellions toward the end of 1951, the regime dissolved student organizations and closed the UCV for almost two years. Many students and professors were also arrested or exiled (Levine 1973: 147-148). With fierce repression and the closing of the UCV, all opposition was forced underground until a student strike broke out in Caracas on February 16, 1956 (Levine 1973: 148; Taylor, Jr. 1968: 49). In early 1957, UCV students formed the University Front (FU) in order to plan and coordinate anti-regime actions (Levine 1973: 149).

Following a student disorder in April 1957 (Doyle 1967: 48), the Archbishop of Caracas released a pastoral letter on May 1. Criticizing the regime for its repression,
corruption, and neglect of social problems, the letter was read from every pulpit. Then, on June 11, the major political parties formed the Patriotic Junta (JP) as a plotting organization against Pérez Jiménez (Taylor, Jr. 1968: 50-51). However, the majority of the party leadership were in exile, while students remained the most active and visible source of opposition on the ground. Particularly significant among student actions was the strike and chain of protests in November 1957 in response to Pérez Jiménez’s upcoming plebiscite (Levine 1973: 148-149). Although failing to block the plebiscite, the repression students incurred served to turn many middle-class and professional groups against the regime (Levine 1973: 148-149; Doyle 1967: 164).

Including some high-ranking officers in the plot, a major military uprising aimed at overthrowing Pérez Jiménez was being planned towards the end of 1957. Taking place in the early hours of New Year’s Day, the revolt was stopped by January 2 (Burggraaff 1972: 154-156). However, after the suppression of the revolt a close associate of Pérez Jiménez reportedly said, “The military uprising has failed, but now the revolution begins” (Doyle 1967: 310). Indeed, the military revolt had startled the upper-class into realizing the regime was crumbling. Further, encouraged by the declining U.S. support for the Pérez Jiménez regime and having received assurances from opposition leaders that overthrowing the regime would not bring drastic structural changes to the economy, the upper-classes and business community moved into outright opposition (Burggraaff 1972: 143, 145; Coronil 1997: 208-209).

While the upper-classes were cautiously moving to oppose Pérez Jiménez, the FU began sending teams of students into the lower class barrios and superblocks in order to promote unrest. Strategically located, the incorporation of these popular sectors in the
struggle meant the dispersion and exhaustion of the regime’s police in a daily battle throughout the hillside of Caracas (Levine 1973: 150). Put differently, densely packed, with complex and illegible streets (Ray 1969: 3-4), the popular sectors represented a “geography of insurrection” (Scott 1998: 61). There was also a symbolic element to the popular sectors turning against Pérez Jiménez. The crowded squatter settlements of the barrios were the result of a massive influx of urban migration unable to be absorbed by formal housing (Ray 1969: 3-5). In order to convey an urbane image of the capital to domestic elites and international visitors, Pérez Jiménez razed the barrios and replaced them with high-rise, high-density public housing called superblocks. Although this failed to eliminate barrios and the construction of makeshift housing, the superblocks were material expressions of Pérez Jiménez’s control over society. Within sight of the presidential palace, the defense ministry, and Congress, the 2 de diciembre superblocks—so named in honor of Pérez Jiménez’s 1952 palace coup—were particularly meant to convey such a message (Velasco 2009: 35-36, 46).

In addition to the above societal actors, Pérez Jiménez could not rely on the support of labor. After all, dissolving the Confederation of Workers of Venezuela in February 1949, organized labor was one of the first targets of the military junta after the 1948 coup (Powell 1971: 88). Furthermore, the regime could not rely on the support of the peasantry, which was still a sizable portion of the Venezuelan work force in the late 1950s and a strong base of support for AD going back to 1936 (Ibid: 2-3, 44-45). Steadily evicted from the land they had been granted access to by the agrarian reform of the AD government (1945-1948), many peasants considered their position to have gotten
significantly worse under Pérez Jiménez, or “El Gordito” (the fat one) as some of the peasants called him (Ibid: 92-96).

By January 1958 virtually every sector of Venezuelan society opposed Pérez Jiménez. Primarily located in Caracas, clashes between police and students were a daily occurrence, as were demonstrations and protests. Manifestoes and letters of opposition were published by a swath of professional groups and associations. The JP then called a strike to start at noon on January 21 and continue as long as was needed to force out Pérez Jiménez. Exactly at noon on January 21, factory sirens, car horns, and church bells sounded, signaling the start of the strike. Demonstrators gathered in Caracas’ El Silencio area and riots broke out in other parts of the capital. Rioters fought back against police with stones, gasoline bombs, and firearms. Buses that had not joined the strike were set on fire and police cars were attacked by students and workers, as well as doctors, lawyers, and professors. The strike continued through the next day and crowds surrounded public buildings. By the evening of January 22, the military stepped in, confronted Pérez Jiménez, and demanded his departure (Doyle 1967: 409-411; Taylor, Jr. 1968: 53-54; Burggraaff 1972: 157-158, 161-162).

In the early hours of January 23, 1958, Pérez Jiménez, along with his family and associates, boarded a plane that would take them to Trujillo’s Dominican Republic. Shortly thereafter, as news of Pérez Jiménez’s departure came over the radio and television, people took to the streets in celebration, later freeing political prisoners and looting the homes of notorious perezjimenistas. Popular pressure made sure that known associates of Pérez Jiménez would be excluded from the junta that would replace the dictatorship (Coronil 1997: 211-215; Taylor, Jr. 1968: 55; Buggraaff 1972: 164-165).
Loaded with symbolism, the most emblematic image of January 23 is a picture that features a crowd on Avenida Urdaneta surrounding the presidential palace, which is to the left of the picture, but slightly out of the frame. In the foreground is a contingent of insurgent tanks with the crowd around them. Towering above everything as the focal point of the image were four 2 de diciembre superblocks. Not long afterwards, a neighborhood delegation from 2 de diciembre presented the Caracas city council with a petition formally requesting that the neighborhood be known as 23 de enero, to be known by the date of Pérez Jiménez’s overthrow instead of his palace coup (Velasco 2009: 55, 58-59).

Caracas would remain in a “revolutionary euphoria” throughout 1958 (Wickham-Crowley 1992: 17). Among other mobilizations, in May “a screaming mob of two to three hundred, throwing rocks, brandishing sticks and pieces of steel pipe” attacked the motorcade of U.S. Vice-President Richard Nixon, who was in Caracas as the final part of a goodwill tour of Latin America (McPherson 2003: 29). Furthermore, there were coup attempts by segments of the military in July and September, both of which were partially suppressed by popular mobilization (Burggraaff 1972: 182, 186; Taylor, Jr. 1968: 58-61). Gradually, though, political elites assumed authority. On October 31, 1958, the major parties, with the exception of PCV, signed the Pact of Punto Fijo, agreeing to respect the results of the upcoming election in December, and, more far-reaching, to commit to a minimum program revolving broadly around capitalist development and a reformist democratic state (Levine 1973: 43; Coronil 1997: 219). However, shortly thereafter the nascent “pacted” democracy would find itself embroiled in a fight with guerrillas from the PCV and the MIR, a splinter group of AD.
In contrast to Venezuela, which was really a rupture where victory was marked by the Pérez Jiménez, victory in the other cases of democratization was marked by the elections of civilians as the military returned to the barracks. All of these campaigns had marked similarities and all faced military regimes that were right-wing, technocratic, and bureaucratic in nature, leading to their description as “bureaucratic-authoritarian” (Collier 1979). Chile, however, presents somewhat of a caveat and really moved beyond bureaucratic-authoritarianism towards personalistic military dictatorship since so much of the regime came to revolve around (Remmer 1989: 149). All of these military regimes came to power with “defensive” projects that were meant to reestablish order and eliminate internal threats (Stepan 1985). In Uruguay the threat was the Tupamaros, in Argentina it was the ERP and the Montoneros, and in Chile it was Marxism and the specter of Cuban-style socialism. The military in Brazil would justify its 1964 coup to society as a means to “save them from communism” (Moreira Alves 1989: 283). These military regimes eventually came to impose a state of siege on the whole of the populations they ruled over.

The terror of these military regimes produced a “landscape of terror” (Scarpaci and Frazier 1993: 2). The existence and location of downtown torture centers became public knowledge in the main cities of the Southern Cone, which served to ground a culture of fear for a wide section of the urban population (Rosenthal 2000: 55). Fear and uncertainty were pervasive as it became difficult to gauge whether one could be considered a “subversive,” and thus subject to abduction, torture, and murder (O’Donnell 1996: 253-254). Public spaces, those institutions and places that protect and promote civic engagement were almost entirely extirpated. Café life died, commuters became
unwilling to talk to each other, and all political discussion was relegated to the household in what has been described as “extreme individualization” and the “privatization of human beings” (Perelli 1994: 43-44). Such isolation and privatization largely impeded those webs of relationships and social capital, and, as a result, impeded those off-stage social spaces so important for resistance. Nevertheless, there were small indicators that could be recognized by other opponents of the regime, such as certain unconventional, albeit only slightly, ways of dressing, quick glances in the street, or going to a concert of musicians known to disagree with the regime (O’Donnell 1996: 261).

By the 1980s, the military regimes were plagued by problems of legitimacy (Stepan 1985: 318), and resistance went from being off-stage to being on-stage. The campaigns against the military regimes were very much rooted in the earlier struggles insofar as the insurrectional campaigns that ushered in the military regimes served as cautionary points of reference. For example, in Brazil urban guerrillas emerged after the 1964 military coup (Joes 2007: 72). With minimal accomplishments, by the beginning of 1972 the guerrillas were as defeated as most of them were dead, while the rest were in prison or in exile (Skidmore 1988: 122). Given the hopelessness of insurrection, by 1974 the while of the Left in Brazil turned to the democratic struggle (Weffort 1989: 345). Accordingly, the democratic struggle in Brazil and the rest of the Southern Cone would be predominantly non-violent. That said, there were some instances of violence by segments of the opposition in these countries. In Chile, students and young urban pobladores were sometimes violent and confrontational. Indeed, there was even an attempt to assassinate Pinochet (Garretón 1989: 268-269).
The campaigns against the military regimes used both strategies of dispersion and strategies of concentration. Among a plethora of clandestine actions and strategies of dispersion, an example of the strategies of dispersion were the whistling or chanting protests in Chile. Whistling or chanting well-known political protest songs throughout the main square, as police would near the whistling or chanting would subside, only to resume once the police moved away, ultimately making the police look foolish (Scarpaci and Frazier 1993: 17). In some of the concentration strategies, the mobilizations were unprecedented. In Brazil, between January 16 and April 16, 1984, close to six million people took to the squares of the nation in support for direct elections (Diretas Já). Never in the history of the country had there been such a unity on a single issue and never had there been demonstrations as large (Moreira Alves 1989: 293-294). Although not nearly as large, in Uruguay 100,000 demonstrators participated in the May Day rally of 1983, and 400,000 were in attendance at the rally at the obelisk of Montevideo the following November (Gillespie 1986: 187; Gillespie 1991: 131).

After being suppressed for almost ten years, mass mobilization in Chile broke out in 1983. Led by the Copper Workers’ Confederation, the first national protest in May 1983 witnessed strikes, high levels of absenteeism, work slowdowns, and demonstrations. In the city center and on the main thoroughfares drivers would repeatedly honk their horns (Garretón 1989: 266-267). In these and subsequent protests, people built burning barricades, marched, sprayed walls with anti-regime slogans, and pelted military tanks with rocks (Schneider 1995: 4). The middle-class who banged their pots and pans to protest Allende now used their kitchen utensils to demonstrate their opposition to the very regime they helped bring to power (Garretón 1989: 267). Despite severe repression,
the poblaciones that had fought against the military during 1973 coup, such as La Victoria, La Legua, and Herminda de la Victoria, staged demonstrations and protests (Schneider 1995: 71, 160-161, 180).

In Argentina, the first general strike under the military regime was organized on April 27, 1979 (Collier 1999: 122). In July 1981, the General Labor Confederation (CGT) mounted a general strike and another mass mobilization was called by the CGT, which expressed a depth of opposition that surprised both the organizers and the regime. Then, on March 30, 1982, human rights groups, political parties, and the CGT initiated the largest demonstrations since 1976, totally destabilizing an already fragmented regime amidst the disastrous military escapade in the Falklands (Ibid: 124-125). In Uruguay, a general strike paralyzed the capital on January 18, 1984. On June 27, Uruguay would be paralyzed by the second illegal strike in six months (Gillespie 1986: 176; Gillespie 1991: 131, 135). With more than three million workers participating in over a hundred strikes, one of the largest strike waves in Brazilian history came in 1979 (Collier 1999: 135). Likewise, in 1980, metalworkers in Brazil called a strike that, with the assistance of the urban popular movement, was sustained for forty-one days (Ibid: 138).

There were symbolic dimensions to certain strategies. For example, human rights movements would identify centers of detention and torture, then protest around them in order to focus national and international attention on state terror (Scarpaci and Frazier 1993: 10). Similarly, beyond guaranteeing an audience, as a symbol of state authority going back to the colonial period the central plaza had a symbolic significance that could be exploited (Ibid: 15-18). Eventually serving to publicize human rights abuses nationally and internationally, this is what the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo did when they
appeared in 1977 around the Plaza de Mayo demanding an answer to the question: “Where are our children?” (Navarro 1989: 241). The Plaza de Mayo had been an important site of Peronist rallies and mobilizations going back to 1945 (James 1988), and, as the most public space in Argentina (Torre 1996: 245), there was a symbolic weight attached to the Plaza.

Of the Mothers of the Plaza, Jean Franco (1992: 67) said, “The women turned the city into a theater into which the entire population was obliged to become spectators, making public both their children’s disappearance and the disappearance of the public sphere itself.” There were similar demonstrations in Chile, and of these Mary Louise Pratt (1996: 158) said, “These groups…intercepted and redeployed the dynamics of the secret and the seen and unseen. The international community became familiar with images of demonstrations of women parading photos of the ‘disappeared,’ who were thus made to reappear.” In Uruguay, life-size human outlines were spray-painted on public buildings and the names of the missing persons were written in by hand. This was followed by a march of over a thousand people in complete silence in the middle of 1984 to protest Uruguay’s disappeared (Gillespie 1991: 130).

Eventually, large segments of the respective societies turned against the military regimes, including the urban poor and popular sectors, students, the working class, and middle-class professionals. Initially, the upper-class had provided the social base for the new regimes. However, with the exception of Chile, the upper-classes in the other countries withdrew their support for the military regimes (Stepan 1985: 318, 326-329, 335). While the regime in Chile remained significant support, after Pinochet lost the 1988 plebiscite there was not much support for the military to overturn the result in order to
extend authoritarian rule. The business community and international opinion were largely opposed to such a move, and the military saw Pinochet’s defeat as a defeat of him, but not the military per se (Angell and Pollack 1990: 2).

Huntington (1991: 86, 91-100) noted the importance of the U.S. in actively promoting democratization throughout the world by the late 1980s. In the Southern Cone of Latin America, this is a bit muddled. The Reagan administration was highly critical of the Carter administration’s human rights policies, which were believed to have destabilized friendly regimes, particularly with regards to the Somoza regime in Nicaragua and the Shah in Iran. Seeking to reverse this trend, the Reagan administration made friendly overtures to the military regimes in the Southern Cone, renewing material and diplomatic support (Lowenthal 1991: 390, 392). As democracy spread in Latin America, the Reagan administration tried to take credit for the democratization. But, the transitions in the Southern Cone were the result of years of activism (Carothers 1991: 91, 110). If anything, the U.S. not taking an active stance against these campaigns assisted them. Given the predominantly non-violent and democratic nature of these campaigns, active and vocal opposition by the U.S. was politically untenable.

**Coup, Counter-Coup, & Counter-Revolution**

Chilean politics leading up to the 1973 coup were increasingly defined in all-or-nothing terms. People came to see the regime of Allende as a threat to their existence, and, as a result, “the nation was engulfed in a rising tide of private and public violence” (Levine 1978: 106). Although the democratically elected Allende maintained significant support all the way to the very end, particularly amongst the urban poor of the *poblaciones* (Schneider 1995: 69, 74), Allende suffered widespread loss of legitimacy as
Chilean society was moving in opposing directions to the point of rupture. In one direction was Allende’s Popular Unity (UP) and its strategy of socialist transformation, on the other was the insurrectional strategy by the main organized groups of the Right. Because of the former, the centrist middle-class, which had been the cornerstone of democracy, underwent a “fascistization,” aligning with the extreme Right, then giving tacit or express consent for the coup (Garretón 1986: 97-100). That said, Allende came under attack from “groups from all walks of life” (Valenzuela 1978: 62).

In rural areas disruptions rose as land seizures went from 9 seizures in 1967 to 1,278 seizures in 1971 (Kay 1976: 84). In addition to the land seizures, peasants also seized government offices in rural areas (Ibid: 85). While the Chilean countryside was the scene of intense mobilization, it did not match the visibility of the urban strikes and protests (Bermeo 2003: 153-154). For example, in December 1971, comprising a broad spectrum of women’s associations linked to opposition parties, 100,000 women marched through the streets of Santiago banging pots and pans in protest of UP’s economic policies (Ibid: 154-155). Strike activity rose during Allende’s presidency, and in 1972 there were 3,287 strikes (Valenzuela 1978: 61). Increasingly, confrontation between pro-government and anti-government mobilizations became an almost daily occurrence (Bermeo2003: 156). Indeed, by 1972 “mobilization had gotten out of hand” (Valenzuela 1978: 62). Though they would come to oppose military dictatorship in the democratization campaign of the 1980s, like many societal actors in Chile during the early 1970s the Catholic Church came to oppose the Allende regime and welcomed the 1973 coup, which, according to some in the Church, freed Chile from “the worst clutches of lies and evil that have ever plagued poor humanity” (Smith 1982: 292).
The “hypermobilization” during the Allende was aided and fueled in no small part by the U.S. (Bermeo 2003: 156). Between 1970 and 1973, the U.S. spent some $8 million on covert intervention in Chilean politics, financing the political activities of anti-regime workers, students, women’s groups, professional organizations, and other civic associations. Among these and other opposition movements, the U.S. financed the terroristic Right. The U.S. also fed misinformation to Chilean military officer that served to cultivate fears of Cuban subversion in Chilean politics. Furthermore, employing various economic pressures, the U.S. cut off Chile’s access to important international loans and credits, stimulating capital flight (Lowenthal 1976: 199-200). Destabilizing Chilean politics through economic sabotage and financing opposition groups, the U.S. greatly facilitated the conditions conducive to Allende’s overthrow (Brands 2010: 117; Garretón 1989: 264).

The crisis in Chile continued in 1973 with worsening shortages and continuing strikes. Approaching September 11, 1973, the day of the coup, opposition parties gathered signatures calling for Allende’s resignation. Simultaneously, Santiago braced itself for pro-government demonstrations and opposition counterdemonstrations on September 4, 1973, the third anniversary of Allende’s electoral victory. Then, right-wing terrorist attacks on highways and railroads prevented wheat from being brought to Santiago from Chilean ports, and on September 6 Allende announced to the country that there was only enough flour for three or four more days (Sigmund 1977: 238-239). With increased mobilization for and against Allende, as well as large arms caches on both sides of this divide, it came to be believed that armed insurrection was inevitable (Bermeo 2003: 166). Generally speaking, the military had been hesitant to intervene, and even
crushed an attempted coup by right-wing junior officers on June 29, 1973. But, amidst concerns over the build-up of weaponry on the Right and Left in conjunction with the discovery of a plan by left-wing sailors in Talcahuano and Valparaíso to revolt, a plan to overthrow Allende was prepared (Ibid: 170).

The military began to move in the early morning of September 11. By 8:15 am Concepción, the third largest city in Chile and traditional leftist stronghold, had fallen, while Valparaíso had been occupied by the navy before 7 am. Amidst the efforts and movement in Santiago, the military broadcasted its justification for the coup. At 9:30 am Allende delivered a dramatic last message to the nation, and by mid-morning tanks lined up in front of the presidential palace in Santiago. At 11:55 am, the bombing of the palace began. While the military surely could have taken the palace by less dramatic means, the bombings were likely meant to convey military might. Later that afternoon Allende was found dead, though it is uncertain whether he was murdered or committed suicide (Sigmund 1977: 242-244). There was some further fighting and resistance. Many in the poblaciones—from La Legua to La Victoria to Herminda de la Victoria—fought the military using nothing more than their own crudely made weapons (Schneider 1995: 71). Nonetheless, by mid-afternoon the military controlled the country (Sigmund 1977: 247).

Chile had a long tradition of democratic regimes, a relatively strong party apparatus, and significant political participation accompanied by a broad and active civil society (Garretón 1986: 95). This tradition seems at odds with Chilean society’s embrace of a coup that ousted an elected president. Moreover, it seems at odds with the subsequent installation of a right-wing military dictatorship. Though not unproblematic, many Chileans seemed to support the coup as a means to preserve their democratic
tradition, and support for military intervention was not necessarily synonymous with support for outright military dictatorship (Bermeo 2003: 168). Indeed, many Chileans were probably taken aback when it was announced in March 1974 that the military would not merely be a parentheses between regimes, but would create a “democracy purged of vices” (Garretón 1986: 107). However, this obscures the deep-seated tradition of conservativism in Chile, what would certainly more aptly be called a culture of conservativism rather than a culture of resistance. Therefore, though perhaps hyperbolic, the so-called “fascistization” (Ibid: 98) of segments of Chilean society may not have been that much of a stretch.

Assuming dictatorial rule, claiming that it was his duty and obligation as an upstanding citizen in a time of crisis, Pinochet liked to draw parallels between himself and the Roman emperor Cincinnatus (Weeks 2000: 727). This sentiment surely resonated with segments of Chilean society and military in the 1970s, 1980s, and beyond, translating into support for Allende’s overthrow and support for the installation of a military dictatorship. Regarding the military, they had an authoritarian tradition of intervention going back to the 1924-1932 period, which gave rise to the dictatorship of Carlos Ibáñez (Remmer 1989: 152). Regarding society, Chile had a traditional and developed Right that was a discreet and electoral alternative. Taken together, the authoritarian tradition in the military and the long-standing strength of the Right made the 1973 coup possible (Ibid: 166). The military and the traditional Right, the latter being a sort of proxy for the upper-class, continued to provide the base of support for an authoritarian regime that came to revolve around the figure of Pinochet. As late as 1988 the military was united and the regime still had a core of supporters in society (Linz and
Stepan 1996: 205). Further, it is worth pointing out that Pinochet was not resoundingly
defeated in the 1988 plebiscite. Rather, he received 44 percent of the vote, just shy of the
50.1 percent he needed for eight more years of rule (Ibid: 206).

The situation leading to the attempted overthrow of Chávez was comparable to
that in Chile leading to Allende’s demise. Following Chávez’s election and ascendancy to
the presidency in 1998, polarization in Venezuela became the norm. By 2002 pro- and
anti-Chávez mobilizations placed in sharp relief the divides between classes. Becoming
weekly occurrences, marches and rallies demanding Chávez’s ouster took place in the
affluent eastern part of Caracas. In contrast, most of the pro-government marches were in
the poorer, western half of the city (Ellner 2003: 152). As protests were mounting over
concerns that the political reforms initiated by Chávez were really a means to consolidate
dictatorial rule, relations between the U.S. and Venezuela were souring. Indeed, the U.S.
took Chávez’s incendiary, anti-imperialist rhetoric and increasing solidarity with Cuba as
reasons to question his commitment to democracy, human rights, and hemispheric
security (Clement 2005: 67).

In April 2002, the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers and the business
federation Fedecámaras led a series of work stoppages and demonstrations with the intent
to oust the democratically elected Chávez. Supporting these actions were the media,
opposition parties, a number of civil associations and NGOs, as well as much of the
middle-class and working class (Cannon 2004: 285). On the morning of April 11,
protestors marched towards the presidential palace. Moving from the east of Caracas
towards the presidential palace the march expanded with estimates of participants ranging
from 300,000 to a million (Coronil 2011: 43). That afternoon, around the Llaguno Bridge
by the presidential palace, nineteen people were shot dead. Although it was later discovered that the dead were Chavistas killed by Metropolitan Police, who were under the command of opposition leader and mayor of Caracas Alfredo Peña, the opposition initially claimed that the government was responsible and that those killed were peaceful demonstrators. As a result, civil unrest turned into open military rebellion, and Chávez was taken into custody in the morning of April 12 (Ibid: 48, 54-55).

With Chávez gone, the hardline opposition seized power. On April 12, Pedro Carmona proclaimed himself provisional president, named the members of his cabinet, then proceeded to summarily dismiss the National Assembly, the state governors, and municipal leaders, all of whom were elected democratically (Ibid: 49). According to the national media, which was run by the anti-Chavista opposition, by the evening of April 12 Caracas had returned to normal and the streets were calm. However, it quickly became clear that this was anything but true (Beasley-Murray 2002: 17-19). Rather, Carmona’s self-inauguration was immediately rejected by a wide range of society and not just among Chavistas. While Chavistas were being violently persecuted in the streets, some in the opposition became concerned over Carmona’s undemocratic actions, and others were upset because the elitist, partisan regime that replaced Chávez excluded the vast majority of groups that worked to overthrow Chávez (Coronil 2011: 49-51).

On April 12, aided by text messages that alerted the population of events not covered in the media, people came flooding from the barrios, blocking the highway and streets, converging on downtown Caracas, surrounding Miraflores Palace, where the opposition protests had converged the day before. In addition to the thousands outside of Miraflores demanding Chávez’s return on April 12, a large crowd gathered near Fuerte
Tiuna, a military base in the south of Caracas that was the site of negotiations among coup participants, both civilian and military. By April 13, amid popular pressure, opposition forces were unravelling, and then the military moved to reinstate the briefly ousted Chávez. During the early morning of Sunday April 14, Chávez had returned to the presidential palace amidst an emotional crowd (Ciccariello-Maher 2013: 169-171, 173; Coronil 2011: 53).

The vital role of the popular sectors in defeating the April 2002 coup highlighted the fact that Chávez could rely on their active support and not just passive backing (Ellner 2003: 152). Moreover, since the popular sectors were acting independent and in the absence of any top-down commands or organizational structure, Jon Beasley-Murray (2002: 20) said, “For in the tumultuous 48 hours in which the president was detained, it became clear that ‘Chavismo without Chávez’ has a power all its own.” While it has been common for recent analyses to locate all agency in the figure of Chávez (Fernandes 2010: 4), it could be argued that Chavismo is but an articulation of a particularly strong culture of resistance. After all, the popular sectors had played crucial roles in the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez and the guerrilla movements in the 1960s. Furthermore, the popular sectors had a considerable role in the Caracazo of 1989, which was one of the most massive and severely repressed riots in the history of Latin America (Coronil and Skurski 1991: 291).

In some respects, the Contras’ strategy resembles more the guerrilla movements discussed earlier than the events surrounding Chile 1973 and Venezuela 2002. However, the Contras are similar to these two campaigns insofar as they were a reactionary campaign aimed at overthrowing a left-wing government. Following the overthrow of
Somoza in 1979, the Sandinistas replaced Somoza’s National Guard with ex-combatants from the revolutionary struggle (Levitsky and Way 2013: 8, 10). From the remnants of the defeated National Guard, the CIA constructed a paramilitary force, which was initially comprised of roughly 500 exiled Nicaraguans (Roberts 1985: 136). The U.S. would provide tens of millions of dollars in aid to the Contras in the early 1980s. In 1986, Congress approved $100 million aid package to the Contras (Carothers 1991: 102).

Wanting to make the Sandinistas “cry uncle” (Roberts 1990: 67), the Reagan administration imposed a trade embargo and blocked loans and credits to Nicaragua from multilateral development banks (Carothers 1991: 102).

In Quilalí, a rural interior zone in the mountains of northern Nicaragua and the site of the first anti-Sandinista uprising in 1980, the Contras were able to develop peasant support and as many as 800 Quilalí peasants fought with the Contras in the 1980s (Horton 1998: 2). As a core of peasant resistance during Sandino’s guerrilla war, this rural interior area had a strong culture of resistance. Going back further, throughout the 1500s indigenous groups in the region led a number of attacks on the Spanish, forcing the Spanish to abandon settlements like Ciudad Segovia (Ibid: 26). From 1521 through the period of independence in the nineteenth century, the indigenous highlanders resisted centralized government and Pacific lowlander domination (Brown 2001:9-10). Given the aforementioned, Timothy Brown (2001: 92, 5) described the Contras as “a spontaneous grassroots rebellion” comprised “of simple peasant farmers trying to protect their tiny farms and families from outsiders they saw as trying to ‘revolutionize’ them against their will.”
Although the Contras had popular support, they could not operate within Nicaragua without external assistance orchestrated by the U.S. (Roberts 1990: 89).

Specifically, the Contras fought from bases in Honduras and Costa Rica (Carothers 1991: 102). While the Contras’ capabilities had risen over time, they proved unable to seize and hold territory. Unable to establish multiple sovereignty, the Contras were also unable to stage attacks on urban areas (Spalding 1999: 34). Further, forged out of the ex-commanders and ex-combatants of the revolutionary struggle, the Sandinista army was highly partisan and committed to the regime (Levitsky and Way 2013: 10). Nevertheless, the Sandinistas could not defeat the Contras and it gradually became clear that the Contras were not merely a residue of somocismo and that some segments of the Contras represented a genuine domestic opposition (Spaulding 1999: 34-35). In this regard, it should be noted that after Somoza’s overthrow the Sandinistas, unlike their Cuban counterparts, did not systematically destroy non-revolutionary actors, such as the private sector and the Church. These actors would play a major role in mobilizing opposition to the regime (Levitsky and Way 2013: 8).

Realizing that continued conflict was not ideal (Spaulding 1999: 35), the Sandinistas convoked elections in 1990. With the election of Violeta Chamorro from the Nicaraguan Opposition Union the Sandinistas had been displaced from the commanding heights of Nicaraguan society. However, this is not to say that the Contras won since the Sandinistas considerable political, social, and military power was hardly eliminated (Roberts 1990: 67). The Contras had opposed an electoral strategy and were abandoned by the U.S., which, given the election of Chamorro, had little reason to continue aiding the Contras. As such, the Contras became largely insignificant (Peceny and Stanley 2001: 102).
162). In contrast, FSLN leader Daniel Ortega announced that the FSLN would continue to “govern from below.” After a series of general strikes led by the Sandinistas, Chamorro was forced to cooperate with the FSLN. She even allowed the Sandinistas to retain prominent control of the military and national police (Ibid 2001: 160-161).
CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS & ANALYSIS

The revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua were quite different from most of the other revolutions of the twentieth century insofar as peasant support would not be as crucial. Rather, as with the Iranian Revolution, the revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua relied considerably on urban resistance. The conditions that made the Cuban Revolution and the Nicaraguan Revolution possible included: sultanistic regimes; society-wide, cross-class alliances made up of urban elements; military shifts through defection, desertion, and open rebellion; U.S. withdrawal of support for the respective regimes; and cultures of resistance. With the exception of the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela, none of the other cases precisely matched this pattern. Nonetheless, in demonstrating that the resistance campaigns—comprised of phenomena long considered disparate—have remarkably similar processes and dynamics it became clear that roughly the same scheme could explain the other cases, though regime-type had to be more general than sultanistic regimes.

All of the guerrilla movements, including the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, considered themselves heirs to *foquismo* and drew inspiration from the revolution in Cuba. However, while some conditions needed for success were met, others were not. The majority of the guerrilla movements began in rural areas outside of administrative control. It is worth noting that Latin America is abound with such spaces and attempts at guerrilla warfare after the Cuban Revolution were a dime a dozen, though most of them failed to launch or come to really challenge authority (Gott 1970). For the guerrilla
movements analyzed here, the guerrilla movements that did launch and did come to be a serious threat, they succeeded in setting themselves up in the countryside as the authority and mobilized the peasantry in guerrilla warfare. But, given the urban-tilt of Latin America, success could not be achieved without building society-wide, cross-class alliances that had urban elements. The only case where victory could have perhaps been achieved primarily on the backs of peasants was Guatemala in the 1960s.

There were some guerrilla movements that had important urban links, such as the MIR and PCV in Venezuela. In Argentina and Uruguay guerrillas opted for an urban approach to guerrilla warfare rather than a rural approach. Urban guerrilla warfare was considered to have significant advantages over rural guerrilla warfare in these countries because their populations were overwhelmingly urban. More generally, guerrilla operations in urban areas were seen as having the advantage over their rural counterparts insofar as urban areas readily provided access to arms, funds, food, medical supplies, and intelligence information. Additionally, terror targets were readily available and urban students-turned-guerrillas could melt easily back into their natural environment (Russell et al. 1974: 38-39). Yet, the violence of non-state actors appears to be disadvantaged in urban areas. Indeed, as the urban guerrillas increased their use of violence it seems as though their support decreased as these guerrillas lost their romantic image, which is “a vital antidote to the essential ugliness of violence” (Gillespie 1982: 216).

Whether operating primarily in urban areas or rural areas, the guerrilla movements generally failed to build society-wide, cross-class alliances. For their part, the FMLN in El Salvador had an impressively heterogeneous coalition, but it was not able to attract the support of the upper-class since the Salvadoran upper-class was essentially the
regime. Turning to military shifts, some of the guerrilla movements benefitted from military desertions, defections, or revolts. The Guatemalan guerrillas of the 1960s were significantly made up of military men who had taken part in an abortive revolt. Venezuelan guerrillas also had military men join them in the mountains after failed revolts in the early 1960s. Stretching it somewhat, an argument could be made that in Argentina and Uruguay there had been military shifts insofar as there was an initial inaction and hesitancy to get involved in the conflict, thus helping the guerrillas. Regardless, in all of these countries the military came to be unified in crushing the guerrillas. In Guatemala, as the regime, the military became especially virulent in its repression. The militaries in Peru and Colombia had maintained complete unity and commitment to extirpating the guerrillas.

The U.S. did not withdraw its support for any of the regimes that faced guerrilla movements. That said, U.S. support was relative as some of the regimes received more assistance than others and the dependency upon such assistance varied. For example, the U.S. had been critically involved in Guatemala since the overthrow of Árbenz in 1954. The military campaign that defeated the Guatemalan guerrillas in the 1960s had been organized by and led by Green Berets. In El Salvador, there is little doubt that the FMLN would have defeated the Salvadoran regime outright had it not been for the very active assistance that the U.S. provided the regime. In contrast to these poorer Central American countries particularly susceptible to U.S. influence, it does not seem as though the Venezuelan regime was as dependent on the U.S. and likely could have defeated the guerrillas even without U.S. support. An oil-rich democracy where the ruling party had
strong links to the peasants and ties to a particular culture of resistance, the conditions for revolutionary success in Venezuela did not look good.

All of the countries with guerrilla movements had some sort of culture of resistance, though some were stronger than others. Strong cultures of resistance are compelling explanations for both Shining Path and the FARC. Though ultimately failing, Shining Path should not have even emerged, let alone continued as long as it did. In addition to facing a democratic regime that maintained U.S. support and a unified military, while also having minimal urban presence, Shining Path was exceptionally violent and sectarian. There is little reason to believe that Shining Path could have emerged and continued its bloody campaign without its strong peasant links and a long tradition of resistance in the Peruvian Andes. Likewise, as the longest guerrilla campaign in Latin America and possible the world, the FARC has effectively established multiple sovereignty and the Colombian state has been unable to defeat the guerrillas despite the long-standing presence of democracy and a staunchly anti-guerrilla military. Moreover, the FARC has continued to have minimal urban support and presence, while the U.S. has provided substantial assistance to the Colombian government in a conflict that has spanned the Cold War, the Drug War, and the War on Terror. The partial success of the FARC is very much related to its emergence out of the peasant republics of La Violencia.

Regarding the democratic transitions, though it was much more urban in orientation, the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela had very similar processes and dynamics as the overthrow of Batista and Somoza. Further, this Venezuela case had the same conditions as Cuba and Nicaragua, including: a sultanistic dictator; a society-wide, cross-class alliance with urban elements; military shifts through rebellion; U.S.
withdrawal of support for the regime; and a culture of resistance. Like the narrative presented on the revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua, the presentation of the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez served to highlight the society-wide shifts in power away from the regime and that the distinction between violence and non-violence can be blurred. In contrast to the Venezuela case, where victory was marked by the rupture of Pérez Jiménez’s departure, the cases of democratic transitions in the Southern Cone were more reform where victory was marked by a return to civilian rule as the military went back to the barracks. Indeed, a significant aspect of these campaigns were negotiations with the military (Stepan 1988). The exception to this may be Argentina, which, in contrast to Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay, had an unpacted and relatively “free” transition (Linz and Stepan 1996: 193).

The willingness of the militaries to negotiate with the oppositions and then transition to democracy represented a sort of defection of “soft-liners” from the more authoritarian stance of the “hard-liners” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 15-16). Although elite negotiations were part of the Southern Cone transitions, “collective protest…often pushed forward the transition and helped to prevent a retreat” (Collier 1999: 183). The goals and strategies of the opposition to military rule evinced a relatively high level of deliberative consciousness, and have a certain affinity with what Adam Michnik (1985: 142-143) described as “new evolutionism,” which is a dissident strategy and ethos “based on gradual piecemeal change, not violent upheaval and forceful destruction of the existing system.” Indeed, the Southern Cone cases of transitions were very much rooted in the experiences of polarization and violent insurrection that ushered in military rule. In this regard, the culture of resistance for these campaigns was rooted in
a process of “political learning” whereby old beliefs like the possibility of violent overthrow became discredited, while aims of resistance were also critically reassessed (Bermeo 1992: 274, 281).

Predominantly non-violent in their strategic use of urban space for on-stage and off-stage resistance, large segments of society came to oppose military rule in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. In Chile, however, Pinochet maintained a core of support among the upper-class. Yet, after Pinochet lost the 1988 plebiscite there was domestic and international consensus that the vote be respected and not overturned by the military. When the U.S. State Department heard that Pinochet was considering calling off the plebiscite, the State Department made clear the preference of the U.S. was to have the plebiscite held. The plebiscite was held as scheduled and Pinochet lost (Carothers 1991: 110). Nonetheless, it is important not to overstate the role of the U.S. in promoting democratization in the Southern Cone. Serious opposition to the military regimes had begun while the Reagan administration was supporting the military regimes. Although U.S. foreign policy cannot be said to have caused the democratic campaigns, the U.S. at least tacitly accepting them and eventually placing some pressure on the military regimes did not hurt the cause of democratization.

The narrative of the overthrow of Allende in Chile in 1973 resembles the ousters of Batista, Somoza, and Pérez Jiménez in terms of processes and dynamics. As with the presentation of these other campaigns, the presentation of the 1973 coup in Chile highlights the society-wide shifts in power away from the regime, as well as the blurred distinction between violence and non-violence. Of further interest in looking at the similarities of the 1973 coup with the other leading campaigns is that the long-term
outcomes were by no means assured. More precisely, not everyone who came to oppose and mobilize against Batista and Somoza wanted the establishment of a revolutionary government. Likewise, not everyone who opposed and mobilized against Pérez Jiménez wanted the establishment of an elitist democracy and not everyone who came to oppose and mobilize against Allende wanted the establishment of a military dictatorship.

In contrast to the other leading campaigns, the opposition to Allende benefitted from very substantial U.S. assistance and not merely from the U.S. withdrawing support from the regime. It is difficult to say whether Allende could have been overthrown without such positive aid and support given to the Chilean opposition from the U.S. However, such assistance certainly did not hurt the opposition. The situation leading to the overthrow of Allende was further characterized by a society-wide, cross-class alliance against the Allende regime. Although hesitant to get involved, the military eventually intervened and openly rebelled against the regime. It is worth noting that the 1973 coup in Chile is the only campaign of all eighteen that was successful against a democracy. Part of the explanation for support of the coup by society and the military is a strong tradition of conservativism in Chile. Such a right-wing tradition also helps explain the continued support for the military dictatorship within sectors of society and the military up until the end.

As with the opposition to Allende, the Contras benefitted from substantial U.S. financing. It can be said, however, with some degree of certainty that the Contras would not have lasted as long as they did without the support of the U.S. and that their partial success was directly related to such support. The Contras did have some peasant support and did benefit from strong a strong culture of resistance. Interestingly, some of the areas
with strong cultures of resistance where the Contras found some modicum of support were also areas where the Sandinistas found support in the fight against Somoza. The Contras were not able to establish an urban presence and found it difficult to build a society-wide coalition as being opposed to the Sandinistas was not synonymous with being pro-Contra. Finally, the Sandinista military was forged from the ex-commanders and ex-combatants of the revolutionary struggle, and were thus not likely to desert, defect, or rebel. That said, some have suggested that those drafted into the Sandinista military may have had questionable commitments to the Sandinista cause (Child 1992: 88-89).

As with the overthrow of Allende and the Contras, the campaign that attempted to overthrow Chávez in 2002 was reactionary in its opposition to a left-wing government. A “coup within a coup” (Coronil 2011: 51) whereby a segment of the opposition hijacked power, the events of the attempted overthrow of Chávez are particularly confusing as there are almost two campaigns in one. Nonetheless, the military acted to reinstate Chávez amidst popular pressure and large segments of society turning against the hard-line opposition. Chávez’s initial ouster was questionable in itself since he was democratically elected, but broader opposition came with the power grab by Carmona and the hard-line opposition. The core of resistance demanding an end to the usurper regime and the reinstatement of Chávez were the Chavistas, many of whom were the urban poor of the barrios and superblocks. The popular sectors’ support of Chavismo was very much rooted in a culture of resistance going back to the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez. Finally, the U.S did withdraw its support for the regime, finance opposition associations,
and welcome the coup, but these efforts, in terms of intensity and extensity, are not really comparable to the U.S. support for the opposition to Allende or the Contras.

Since considerations of why resistance campaigns emerged have generally been side-stepped, what gets obscured is that there is a significant ideational component to the emergence, continuation, and outcome of resistance campaigns. Simply, meanings matter, and, as Erica Simmons (2014: 514) said, “The ideas with which some claims are imbued might be more conducive than others to motivating political resistance.” In resistance campaigns, meaning is imbued to the anti-regime cause through the dynamic interactions of regime-type, cultures of resistance, and spaces of society. More precisely, the presence of a certain regime may dovetail with a culture of resistance, serving as a framing opportunity (McAdam et al. 1996: 7) for the creation of a “negative coalition” (Dix 1984). Thus, cultures of resistance and regime-type can be part and parcel of repertoires of collective action (Tilly 1978: 151-158, 224-225). This is perhaps most evident in the overthrow of Batista, Somoza, Pérez Jiménez, and Allende.
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION

The theoretical significance of this project is in demonstrating that phenomena long considered disparate have remarkably similar processes and that the varying outcomes (success, partial success, or failure) could be understood schematically by the same conditions, which include: facing an authoritarian regime; ability of campaign to build cross-class alliances that included urban elements; military shifts through defection, desertion, or rebellion; the U.S. withdrawing support of the target regime, providing at least tacit support for the campaign; and cultures of resistance that the struggle could be rooted in. achieved by side-stepping the causes of resistance campaigns and the long-term transformations far removed from the initial goal of regime change, these findings speak to the importance of not selecting on the dependent variable.

Successful resistance campaigns will have a perceptible shift in power away from the regime, highlighting the fact that regimes are propped up by actors whose loyalties can shift. Looking to bring about regime change, campaigns can exercise spatial agency in different ways. Rural areas outside of administrative control and home to significant numbers of peasants can be prime real estate for guerrilla warfare. But, since there is power in numbers and since Latin America has had an urban-tilted population distribution after WWII, resistance campaigns would need urban support that cut across class and would need to be able to operate within urban areas. Thus, the guerrilla movements analyzed here could emerge out of the off-stage spaces afforded by the countryside, but they could not win.
While not being able to win, it should be noted that some of the guerrilla movements were able to achieve partial success. Examples include the second guerrilla movement in Guatemala, the FMLN, and the FARC. However, the partial success of the Guatemalan guerrillas is really not the same as that of the FMLN or the FARC. In other words, the Guatemalan government was not really forced to deal with the URNG as much as it acquiesced. In contrast, given their power and the forcefulness of the campaign, the FMLN is a borderline success. Likewise, the FARC is in a league way beyond the URNG insofar as it has achieved multiple sovereignty and has survived for roughly half a century. Differently, the violent urban campaigns were largely disadvantaged, while non-violent urban campaigns could turn the disciplinary elements of urban areas to their advantage through both on-stage and off-stage resistance. That said, the resistance campaigns against Batista, Somoza, Pérez Jiménez, and Allende had significant, if not primarily, urban elements and had a very dynamic relationship between violent and non-violent strategies.

Although Table 1 and Table 2 have violence and non-violence treated dichotomously, violent strategies of resistance and non-violent strategies of resistance often operate together. The democratic transitions in the Southern Cone were predominantly non-violent, but there were instances of violence as in Chile. As should be clear, however, non-violent strategies as exercised in the Southern Cone can hardly be considered passive. Likewise, although there was not a level of violence as high as the Cuban Revolution where the death toll was as high as 5,000 (Walt 1992: 334n35), as many as 300 were killed and 1,500 wounded in the events leading to Pérez Jiménez’s overthrow (Doyle 1967: 527; Coronil 1997: 215n5; Taylor, Jr. 1968: 55). For their part,
the violent campaigns analyzed here were not exclusively violent and were comprised of many strategies of resistance that were non-violent. Venezuela 2002 was a peculiar case in this regard because there were the non-violent demonstrations in the morning of April 11, 2002, then violence with the initial ouster of Chávez and the events surrounding it, such as the Llaguno Massacre and attacks on Chavistas, followed by a counter-coup that was predominantly non-violent. Nevertheless, violence and non-violence would more accurately be seen as continuous rather than dichotomously.

It is particularly interesting that the ouster of Pérez Jiménez not only has the same conditions present as the ousters of Batista and Somoza, but also processes and dynamics similar to the events that led to revolutions. What makes this so interesting is that the literature has generally treated Venezuela as an ideal model for democratization, and thus it has been sharply contrasted with the revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua. In fact, while many of the theories about democratic success were thrown into question with the rise of Chávez (Levine 2002), Venezuela was once considered “the only trail to a democratic future…a textbook case of step-by-step progress” (Merkl 1981: 127). However, in looking at the long-term outcomes, this perspective largely obscures the fact that the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez was a rupture. Further, it is worth recalling that the Pact of Punto Fijo was not signed until the end of October 1958 after nearly a year of non-stop mobilization before Venezuela was engulfed in a guerrilla conflict. Simply, if you were trying to engineer a democratic transition, the regime change in Venezuela actually seems to be far from ideal.

A study that looked at the cases that were ruptures in Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Chile could be worthwhile. Specifically, looking at the respective
overthrows of Batista, Somoza, Pérez Jiménez, and Allende as “critical junctures” (Collier and Collier 1991: 27), what explains the divergence in long-term outcomes? Regardless, related to these points on Venezuela, it was interesting to see how strong of a culture of resistance there was in Venezuela though the Punto Fijo democratic system was the antithesis of praetorian politics (Levine 1978: 99-100). Exciting scholarship in recent years has begun to shed light on this culture of resistance, particularly with regards to the urban popular sectors of Venezuela (Fernandes 2010; Smilde 2011; Velasco 2015), which seems to have found articulation in Chavismo.

Interestingly, other democratic transitions forged cultures of resistance in the Southern Cone. Following military rule Argentines declared “Nunce Mas!” (Bermeo 1992: 281), and in 1987 a military rebellion was met with a massive demonstration in support of democracy as the military rebels were seen as a dangerous remnant of an authoritarian past (Norden 1996: 83). Similarly, grassroots organizations of the urban poor that grew out of the period of democratization in Brazil continue to mobilize for a variety of causes (Mainwaring 1989; Holston 2008).

While culture of resistance has been an important variable, particularly in Colombia and Peru, it should be noted that this variable runs into a problem. Like rational choice theory (Green and Shapiro 1994: 180), a critique that can be leveled against culture of resistance is that it is not falsifiable. Put differently, just as everything people do can be rationalized in some way (Nietzsche 1996: 55), it is difficult, given Latin America’s tumultuous history, not to find what could be considered a culture of resistance in any given country. If nothing else, culture of resistance may have too much variance on the independent variable (Wickham-Crowley 1994: 781).
Culture of resistance still has explanatory capacities that could be fruitfully explored for future research. The FARC remains active, but entered into talks with the Colombian government just over two years ago (McCoy 2015). Culture of resistance is related to this insofar as the FARC cannot be understood or dealt with if viewed ahistorically and separated from its emergence during La Violencia in the late 1940s and through the 1950s. It is in this respect that any negotiation between the Colombian government and the FARC must recognize the long-standing grievances that have given credence to the FARC (Chernick 2007a: 52). Assuming a deal were to be reached between the FARC and Colombian government, how would it compare with the 1990s peace treaties in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua? An examination of these four cases would be very interesting.

Among other issues to consider, although discussed briefly in some sections, this project has largely ignored economic factors as they relate to state capacities. In some ways, avoiding these factors was an effort to sidestep a tradition that has posited modernization and economic conditions as causal mechanisms for revolutions (Huntington 1968; Skocpol 1979) and the rise of authoritarian regimes (Schmitter 1974; O’Donnell 1973). Instead of such structural accounts, I took the causal mechanisms explaining why resistance campaigns emerged for granted as simply the choices of people, albeit choices that are only realized in certain social contexts. Nevertheless, while not posited as a causal mechanism of the resistance campaigns, there are hints of modernization in this analysis insofar as modernization led to a situation where peasants were drastically reduced in number amidst technological advances and shifts away from
agricultural production (Halpern and Brode 1967), thus removing peasants from being the *sine qua non* of success for the resistance campaigns analyzed here.

Differently, while the emphasis here has been on collective action, elites have still been able to creep in. With discussions about Pinochet, Allende, and Chávez, as well as the sultanistic dictators, it seems that discussing elite figures may be unavoidable in analyzing politics. Yet, while discussing elite figures, none of the elites portrayed here could be said to have anything close to an unfettered agency as their fates came to be tied to the actions of societal actors. After all, Pinochet did not want to lose the plebiscite in 1988, Allende surely did not want to be deposed and die, and Chávez did not want to be even temporarily ousted. Similarly, Batista, Somoza, and Pérez Jiménez wanted to stay in power. By no means is this to suggest that these figures were “forced to be actors, caught by the constraints of a script whose authors they cannot be” (Althusser 1970: 193).

However, the outcomes of the respective resistance campaigns eventually came to be largely out of their hands as their willingness to stay in power was either enabled or hindered by the ability to do so (Tilly 1978: 200; Bellin 2012) amidst shifting power bases in society.

As far as institutional actors, an actor that has been noticeably absent here is the Catholic Church. Although briefly mentioned during the narratives of the leading campaigns in order to really highlight the societal shifts, the Church has not been mentioned otherwise though it has been an important political actor in Latin America for roughly half a millennium (Gill 1998) and would play different roles in resistance campaigns in different countries. For example, the Argentine Church supported the military regime, while the Chilean Church, after supporting the 1973 coup, came to be a
primary opponent of the military dictatorship (Levine 1986). Additionally, in Brazil a
“quasi-revolutionary liberation theology” challenged the military regime and helped “to
regain the streets for public protest” (Skidmore 1988: 183). Although a more systematic
account of the Church’s role in resistance campaigns would be interesting, it does not
seem as though it would fundamentally alter the findings here. Regarding international
relations, an actor noticeably absent in the present analysis is the Soviet Union.

Importantly, all but one of the resistance campaigns analyzed here began before
the fall of the Berlin Wall. As with many parts of the world, the Russian Revolution
(1917) was a significant influence on aspiring revolutionaries in Latin America. Before
WWII there would even be attempts at revolutionary insurrection by the Brazilian
Communist Party and the Salvadoran Communist Party (Skidmore 1970). Yet, the
influence of the Soviets in Latin America should not be overstated and was not even
comparable to the influence of the U.S. The overthrow of Batista completely surprised
Moscow, and as late as October 1958 Khrushchev was comparing “the tragic fate of
Guatemala [in 1954]” with “the heroic but unequal struggle of the Cuban people” (Miller
1989: 10). Excluding Cuba, Latin America would receive less than 2.5 percent of Soviet
military deliveries to the countries in the developing world. Indeed, with the exception of
the importance Moscow attached to maintaining a socialist Cuba, Latin America was not
especially important for the Soviets (Ibid: 5).

It is difficult to say whether there has been an “end to revolution” (Snyder 1999).
Looking forward, if there are revolutions in this century, they will not look like the
majority of the revolutions in the last century. Rather, if they occur, future revolutions
will need to capture urban support and be able to operate in urban spaces. It does not
seem likely that there will be an end to resistance campaigns any time soon and the need to capture urban support and be able to operate within urban areas certainly applies to any resistance campaign that will emerge and be successful in the contemporary world. Accordingly, it seems probable that resistance campaigns in this century will rely less on insurrectionary strategies and more on non-violent strategies.

Given the time-frame used, cell phones, the Internet, and social media were non-existent or minimally important for the majority of the resistance campaigns examined here. Yet, the proliferation of telecommunications in recent years has already proven itself to be an important part of contemporary resistance and lends itself well to off-stage resistance (van Stekelenburg and Roggeband 2013; Howard and Hussain 2013). Another consideration for resistance campaigns in Latin America is how grievances could emerge in the milieu of regime-type, culture of resistance, and society since almost all of Latin America is now democratic. Regardless, in anticipating future resistance campaigns, it will be interesting to see how actions and intentions will be realized within the contexts of various social spaces.
REFERENCES


Geddes, Barbara. 1999b. What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years? Annual Review of Political Science, 2: 115-144.


Kalyvas, Stathis N. The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars. *Perspectives on Politics* 1, no. 3: 475-494.


McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. 1996. Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. New York: Cambridge University Press.


Slater, Dan, and Erica Simmons. 2010. Informative Regress: Critical Antecedents in Comparative Politics. Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 7: 886-917.


Weyland, Kurt. 2012. The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary Wave of 1848? Perspectives on Politics, 10, no. 4: 917-934.


CURRICULUM VITAE

Sean L. Welch
122 Spickert Knob Rd. New Albany, IN 47150
502-403-0681
Slwelc02@louisville.edu

Research Area
Comparative Politics

Research Interests
Contentious politics; extra-institutional mobilization; theories of revolution; Latin American politics

Education
University of Louisville- Master of Arts (2015)
Political Science
GPA- 3.96

Indiana University Southeast- Bachelor of Arts (2012)
Political Science (Honors)
Minors: International Studies (Latin America) & Philosophy
GPA- 3.69

Presentations & Lectures
“Ideology & Inheritance: Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss,” presented at Indiana University Undergraduate Research Conference at Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (Fall, 2012).
“A History of Violence,” presented at IU Southeast Philosophy Department’s Annual Colloquium (Spring, 2012).
“A History of Violence,” presented at IU Southeast’s Undergraduate Research Conference (Spring, 2012).

Field Experience
Cuba (Summer, 2012)

Publications

Research Assistance
Transcription (Fall, 2014-Spring, 2015)
Reviews of Literature and Theory Development (Fall, 2014-Spring, 2015)
Facilitation of Controlled Experiments (Spring, 2015)
Data Cleaning and Data Entry (Fall, 2014)

Teaching Experience
D-501 The Development of Cherokee Law in the Wake of Early U.S. Nationalism (Fall, 2012)
Y-103 Introduction to American Politics (Spring, 2012)
Y-105 Introduction to Political Theory (Fall, 2011)

Languages/Skills
English; Spanish
Statistical Programs: R

Memberships
Southern Political Science Association (2015)
Louisville Committee on Foreign Relations (2013-2015)
Pi Sigma Alpha Political Science Honor Society- Delta Beta (Inducted Spring, 2014)
**Awards, Honors, & Scholarships**
Graduate Dean’s Citation, School of Interdisciplinary Graduate Studies at University of Louisville (Spring, 2015)
Louisville Committee on Foreign Relations Scholarship (Fall, 2014)
University of Louisville Graduate Student Union Research/Travel Grant (Fall, 2014)
University of Louisville Graduate Student Council Research/Travel Grant (Fall, 2014)
University of Louisville Political Science Research/Travel Grant (Fall, 2014)
University of Louisville Graduate Student Council Research/Travel Grant (Spring, 2014)
Louisville Committee on Foreign Relations Scholarship (Fall, 2013)
Outstanding Senior Thesis (2012)
Center for Cultural Resources Travel Grant—Cuba (2012)
Ed Quinn Scholarship (2012)
David Starr Jordan Scholarship (2012)
Linda C. Gugin Scholarship in Political Science (2012)
Thomas P. and Ella N. Wolf Prize in Political Science (2011)

**Extra-curricular/Co-curricular Positions**
Graduate Assistant- Political Science Department, University of Louisville (Teaching & Research) (2014-2015)
Representative- Graduate Student Council, University of Louisville (2014-2015)
Representative- Graduate Student Union, University of Louisville (2014-2015)
Internship- World Affairs Council of Kentucky/Southern Indiana (March-August, 2013)
Delegate (Iran)- College Model United Nations at University of Indianapolis (Fall, 2012)
Internship in Philosophy- Philosophy Department, IU Southeast (Fall, 2012)
Supplemental Instructor- Political Science Department, IU Southeast (Fall, 2011)
Member & President- IU Southeast Civil Liberties Union (2010-2012)
Founder- ONE Campus Coalition at IU Southeast (2011)
Volunteer- Kentucky Refugee Ministries (Summer, 2011)