Date on Master's Thesis/Doctoral Dissertation


Document Type

Doctoral Dissertation

Degree Name

Ph. D.



Degree Program

Applied and Industrial Mathematics, PhD

Committee Chair

Powers, Robert

Committee Member

Riedel, Thomas

Committee Member

McMorris, Fred

Committee Member

Enders, Adam

Author's Keywords

Strategy-proof; neutral; anonymous; majority; single-peaked


A social choice function is said to be strategy-proof if no voter has any motivation to lie about their true preference. Strategy-proofness is a desirable property of social choice functions so we consider here functions that always satisfy this property. We add to this property the additional desirable conditions of anonymity and neutrality and present domains on which we can get a characterization of majority rule as the only social choice function that satisfies these three properties. Furthermore, we consider what functions look like when we drop the condition of anonymity.