Date on Master's Thesis/Doctoral Dissertation
5-2024
Document Type
Doctoral Dissertation
Degree Name
Ph. D.
Department
Mathematics
Degree Program
Applied and Industrial Mathematics, PhD
Committee Chair
Powers, Robert
Committee Member
Riedel, Thomas
Committee Member
McMorris, Fred
Committee Member
Enders, Adam
Author's Keywords
Strategy-proof; neutral; anonymous; majority; single-peaked
Abstract
A social choice function is said to be strategy-proof if no voter has any motivation to lie about their true preference. Strategy-proofness is a desirable property of social choice functions so we consider here functions that always satisfy this property. We add to this property the additional desirable conditions of anonymity and neutrality and present domains on which we can get a characterization of majority rule as the only social choice function that satisfies these three properties. Furthermore, we consider what functions look like when we drop the condition of anonymity.
Recommended Citation
Wells, Flannery Marie Musk, "Strategy-proof social choice functions on Condorcet domains." (2024). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 4291.
Retrieved from https://ir.library.louisville.edu/etd/4291
