In eschewing the specialty-standards of neuro-babble and philosophical neologism, Paul S. Davies (2016) argues with courageous clarity. He connects issues in neuroscience and epistemology to problems surrounding agency. I agree with many of his claims, but I think they need more context and precision for application. This is because his argument as it stands now affects only a limited set of theories, and a hidden modality in thesis 3 tempers his argument further. And perhaps most urgently, if his theory fails to address “top-down”1 mental processes or social dimensions of knowledge, his argument fails to meet even his own goals set out in the paper.
Original Publication Information
Trujillo, Jr., G.M. "Reasons to Care about Reasons for Action: A Response to Paul S. Davies." 2016. Southwest Philosophy Review 32(2): 43-48.
Trujillo, Glenn "Boomer" Mac, "Reasons to Care about Reasons for Action: A Response to Paul S. Davies" (2016). Faculty Scholarship. 453.