Date on Senior Honors Thesis
5-2018
Document Type
Senior Honors Thesis
Degree Name
B.A.
Department
Political Science
Committee Chair
Ziegler, Charles
Committee Co-Chair (if applicable)
Bunck, Julie
Committee Member
Riedel, Thomas
Author's Keywords
foreign policy; decision-making; sports; Soviet-Afghan War, the Olympics
Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the efficacy of sporting boycotts as a foreign-policy tool. Government officials use sporting boycotts, a nontraditional form of a sanction, in contemporary politics. Using the Carter administration’s boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics as a case study, this thesis elucidates why President Carter chose to implement a sporting boycott, and whether the boycott was effective in achieving its intended goals. President Carter chose to boycott the Olympics because of the failure of past sanctions to force the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, the influence of his National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the potential to challenge the Soviet Union’s reputation in a very public setting. The boycott did not force Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan; however, it was an effective symbolic tool aimed to embarrass the Soviet Union.
Recommended Citation
Lane, Deserae, "Sports and foreign policy : President Jimmy Carter and the 1980 Moscow Olympics boycott." (2018). College of Arts & Sciences Senior Honors Theses. Paper 154.
Retrieved from https://ir.library.louisville.edu/honors/154
Lay Summary
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the efficacy of sporting boycotts as a foreign-policy tool. Government officials use sporting boycotts, a nontraditional form of a sanction, in contemporary politics. Using the Carter administration’s boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics as a case study, this thesis elucidates why President Carter chose to implement a sporting boycott, and whether the boycott was effective in achieving its intended goals. President Carter chose to boycott the Olympics because of the failure of past sanctions to force the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, the influence of his National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the potential to challenge the Soviet Union’s reputation in a very public setting. The boycott did not force Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan; however, it was an effective symbolic tool aimed to embarrass the Soviet Union.
