Date on Senior Honors Thesis

3-2024

Document Type

Senior Honors Thesis

Degree Name

B.S.

Department

Political Science

Committee Chair

Grady, Kristopher

Committee Member

Ziegler, Charles E.

Committee Member

Gibson, John

Author's Keywords

offense-defense theory; offense-defense balance; militarized interstate disputes; international relations; security dilemma; armored fighting vehicles; anti-tank weapons

Abstract

Political scientists and government advisors have long sought to understand what influences conflicts and how to predict them. Despite constant war, a commonly used empirical theory that can answer this question has not emerged. The majority of theories created are either conflict-specific or not empirically testable. Considering these factors, I sought out a theory that would help me better understand Russia's choice to invade Ukraine in the spring of 2022. I selected the offense-defense theory due to its many attempts to explain territorial conquest, the likeliness of conflict, and overall losses. The main focus of the theory is to explain how technology favoring attackers or defenders can influence the likelihood of war. Considering the lack of application of the offense-defense balance theory to conflicts where both sides used equivalent levels of modern technology, like what we currently see in the Russo-Ukrainian war, I identified this as a gap in the research that warranted further explanation.

My research focuses on the relationship between technology and multiple variables in conflicts, like the loss ratio of initiators, the overall loss ratio of armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), territory gained, and the ratio of AFVs lost per square mile captured. To test this relationship, I collected 41 historical military battles and utilized an OLS regression analysis to measure the relationship of technology in four different models containing different variables. Testing revealed that defensively-sided technology caused the AFV loss ratio to increase, with no statistical significance regarding other variables, demonstrating a lack of empirical support for the abilities of the offense-defense theory to predict aspects beyond losses, like territorial conquest.

Lay Summary

Media reports often criticize military spending on tank technology, saying that they have been rendered useless by advances in autonomous systems. Why should the military spend money on tanks if they can be destroyed relatively easily by someone who lacks formal training? This debate has been exacerbated by the Russo-Ukrainian war, as videos of drones dropping grenades into trenches, houses, and tanks continue to be posted with no end in sight. What is the real reason the Ukranians have held on as long as they have? Do they possess a unique tenacity, or is it a technological advantage?

I want to investigate how advances in tank and anti-tank-specific technology have impacted the balance of warfare, either in favor of attackers or defenders. A theory was created after WW2 that sought to predict when countries were likely to engage in interstate warfare. The theory holds that if technology makes attacking easier, countries are more likely to initiate a war. The inverse is also true. Technology benefiting the defender makes countries less likely to start a war. However, can this even be measured?

I will run a statistical analysis using the number of tanks destroyed in different historical battles and see how much it correlates with variables meant to quantify technology. I will see if the recent technological advances make defending more favorable by examining how loss numbers have gone up or down over time, as well as how much territory these attackers gained per tank lost. The war in Ukraine is somewhat of an enigma to modern media, who have claimed a litany of factors that prove why they are still holding out. I hope the results of this research will give us a better look into why Ukraine is performing as it is.

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